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# Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization

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## ABSTRACT

New powers, such as China, India and Brazil, are challenging the traditional dominance of the US in the governance of the global economy. It is generally taken for granted that the rise of new powers is simply a reflection of their growing economic might. In this article, however, I challenge this assumption by drawing on the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to show that the forces driving the rise of new powers are more heterogeneous and complex than suggested by a simple economic determinism. I argue that these countries have in fact taken different paths to power: while China's rise has been more closely tied to its growing economic might, the rise of Brazil and India has been driven primarily by their mobilization and leadership of developing country coalitions, which enabled them to exercise influence above their economic weight. One important result is that Brazil and India have assumed a more aggressive and activist position in WTO negotiations than China and played a greater role in shaping the agenda of the Doha Round. Thus, although the new powers are frequently grouped together (as the 'BRICs', for example), this masks considerable variation in their sources of power and behaviour in global economic governance.

## KEYWORDS

BRICs; emerging powers; leadership; alliances; World Trade Organization (WTO); global governance.

## INTRODUCTION

The existing international economic architecture was created during the era of American hegemony that followed World War II and heavily shaped by US power (Gilpin, 1987; Ruggie, 1996). For over half a century,

the institutions charged with governing the global economy – including the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank – were dominated by the US and other advanced-industrialized states (Babb, 2009; Chorev, 2008). Developing countries were largely excluded from global economic decision-making and their interests severely marginalized. However, the dynamics of global economic governance are currently being transformed, as developing countries such as China, India and Brazil become increasingly important actors and challenge the dominance of the Global North. The growing centrality of these actors is evident across a range of institutions. In the midst of the 2008 global financial crisis, for instance, the Group of 8 (G8) rich countries was replaced by the G20 Leaders Summit (G20), a mixed group of developed and developing countries, as the primary forum for coordinating the management of the global economy and the response to the crisis. The Financial Stability Board – responsible for overseeing coordination of global financial regulation – was subsequently expanded to include the developing country members of the G20. The voting structures of the IMF and World Bank are in the process of being reformed to increase the weight of major developing countries.<sup>1</sup> China, India and Brazil have played a prominent role in the international climate change negotiations. At the WTO, these three countries have entered the inner circle of power and emerged as important actors in the Doha Round of trade negotiations.

This shift in global power relations has been identified as one of the most important transformations in modern history and fuelled a large and growing literature (Beeson and Bell, 2009; Hurrell, 2006; Margulis and Porter, 2013; Mittelman, 2013; Stephen, 2012; Young, 2010). Much of this scholarship has focused on seeking to assess the agendas of the new powers and the implications of their rise, such as whether they are likely to be supporters or challengers of the existing international economic order. Yet, the forces driving the rise of these new powers have received comparatively little attention. Few studies have sought to analyze in detail why and how such countries have come to play a more central role within specific governance institutions. Instead, it is widely assumed that the rise of new powers in global economic governance is simply a reflection of their growing economic might (Arrighi, 2007; Cooper and Schwanen, 2009; Emmott, 2008; Hung, 2009; Jacques, 2009; Wade, 2011; Zakaria, 2008). Discussions of the emerging powers emphasize their economic capabilities, as the following example from John Ikenberry (2008: 25) illustrates:

China is well on its way to becoming a formidable global power. The size of its economy has quadrupled since the launch of market reforms in the late 1970s and, by some estimates, will double again over the next decade. It has become one of the world's major

manufacturing centers and consumes roughly a third of the global supply of iron, steel, and coal. It has accumulated massive foreign reserves, worth more than \$1 trillion at the end of 2006. . . . Indeed, whereas the Soviet Union rivaled the United States as a military competitor only, China is emerging as both a military and an economic rival – heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power.

He later continues (35):

The United States and Europe must find room at the table not only for China but also for countries such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. A Goldman Sachs report on the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) noted that by 2050 these countries' economies could together be larger than those of the original G-6 countries (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) combined.

This depiction is echoed in the popular media, with *The Economist* (2010) for example stating: 'The BRICs matter because of their economic weight'. The World Bank (2010) offers a similar assessment of the rise of new powers: 'Increased income and growth . . . means increasing influence'. The dominant interpretation is thus that power shifts in global economic governance are being driven by changes in the relative economic power of states.<sup>2</sup>

One result of the emphasis on economic might is that attention has overwhelmingly focused on China (Arrighi, 2007; Babones, 2011; Beeson, 2009; Breslin, 2010; Emmott, 2008; Hung, 2009; Jacques, 2009; Subramanian, 2011). As the previous quote from Ikenberry exemplifies, China is widely seen as the key rising new power and challenger to the US, based on its large economy, rapid growth rates, major role in world trade, and considerable financial power. Where India and Brazil are brought into discussions of contemporary power shifts, they are typically positioned as secondary, since they possess considerably fewer of the capabilities that are seen as making China powerful. China is now the world's second largest economy, after the US, and the world's largest exporter of goods. Yet Brazil and India's economies are only a fraction of the size of China's (with Brazil's GDP \$2.4 trillion and India's \$1.9 trillion compared to China's \$8.3 trillion); they play a much smaller role in world trade (while China's exports represent 10 per cent of world trade, Brazil and India's constitute only 1 and 2 per cent, respectively); and their economic growth has been far slower (particularly in the case of Brazil, whose growth rates over the past 15 years have averaged only 3 per cent compared to

10 per cent in China and 7 per cent in India).<sup>3</sup> In economic terms, Brazil and India are lightweights compared to China.

In contrast to the predominant emphasis on their economic capabilities, however, this article seeks to provide a richer and more nuanced account of the rise to power and behaviour of Brazil, India and China in global economic governance by examining the case of the WTO. The WTO is a core multilateral economic institution, responsible for setting and enforcing the rules of the international trading system. It has been a key site of struggle over global power relations and was one of the first sites where Brazil, India and China emerged as major players in global economic governance. The analysis presented here is based on 15 months of field research conducted from 2007–2010 at the WTO in Geneva, as well as in Beijing, New Delhi, Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Washington, including 157 interviews with negotiators and other senior officials, industry representatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ethnographic observation, and analysis of negotiating texts, proposals and other documents.<sup>4</sup> As the focus of the paper is on interactions among states within the WTO, an analysis of trade policymaking in the emerging powers is beyond its scope, but has been extensively documented elsewhere.<sup>5</sup>

Drawing on the case of the WTO, I show that although the new developing country powers are frequently grouped together (as part of the 'BRICs', for example), this masks important variation in their sources of power and behaviour in global economic governance.<sup>6</sup> I argue that the forces driving the rise of new powers are more diverse and complex than suggested by a simple economic determinism and that these countries have in fact taken different paths to power. While China's rise has been more closely tied to its growing economic might, the rise of Brazil and India has been driven primarily by their mobilization and leadership of developing country coalitions, which has enabled them to exercise influence far above their economic weight. My intent is not to deny the importance of economic factors, but to suggest that focusing solely on the economic provides an overly simplistic reading of contemporary power shifts.

Indeed, an account centred exclusively on the economic capabilities of states would be unable to explain much of what has occurred at the WTO in the last decade. In contrast to expectations of a dyadic shift in power from the US to China, I show that Brazil and India were the first developing countries to successfully challenge the US and they emerged as major players at the WTO several years before China. Moreover, it was in fact Brazil and India who overturned the traditional power structure at the WTO, rather than China. I demonstrate that not only do the rising powers have different sources of power but, as a result, they have also exercised different forms of influence. Despite their relatively small economies and

limited roles in world trade, Brazil and India assumed a more aggressive and activist position in WTO trade negotiations than China and, for much of the Doha Round, were far more influential in shaping the dynamics and agenda of the negotiations. Towards the endgame stage of negotiations, China ultimately came to have significant impact, but its impact was primarily as a reactive veto-power in contrast to the proactive agenda-setting role played by Brazil and India.<sup>7</sup>

### CONCEPTUALIZING CONTEMPORARY POWER SHIFTS IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Drawing on the case of the WTO, this article seeks to problematize and unpack the origins and nature of contemporary power shifts and the increased power of Brazil, India and China in global economic governance. As James Mittelman (2013) observes, accounts of contemporary power shifts have been heavily shaped by the traditional realist conception of international relations, which defines a state's power in terms of its economic and military capabilities (Kennedy, 1987; Waltz, 1979). These are viewed as the essential sources of 'raw' or 'hard' power that determine the position of states within an overarching global power hierarchy (Organski, 1968). Although more complex conceptualizations of power have emerged within international relations, including the growth of a rich constructivist literature (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Mattern 2008), the narrow realist conception of power as material resources has been highly influential in shaping how contemporary power shifts are understood.

The prevailing view is that current changes taking place in the global economic governance institutions are a reflection of structural changes in the distribution of economic power among states. According to realism, international organizations mirror the distribution of power in the international system and act as vehicles for the interests of the most economically and militarily powerful states. Yet, institutionalist scholars have long argued that international organizations not only reproduce but can also reconfigure power relations among states (Conti, 2011). Notably, institutions create spaces for alliance-building and leadership that can enhance the influence of economically or militarily weaker states (Drahos, 2003; Hampson, 1990; Higgott and Cooper, 1990; Narlikar, 2003). The ability of a state to attract followers and mobilize other states into effective coalitions can serve as an important form of power in global governance.

Although largely overlooked in discussions of contemporary power shifts, an extensive literature has documented a surge of developing country coalition-building at the WTO (Clapp, 2006; Eagleton-Pierce, 2012; Grant, 2007; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006; Narlikar and Tussie 2004;

Taylor 2007). It is no coincidence that the rise of new powers from the Global South took place amid a rising tide of developing country activism and unrest at the WTO. Coming out of the previous Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986–94), there was growing dissatisfaction among developing countries about their exclusion from decision-making and the profoundly unbalanced results of that round. The protests of developing countries, combined with those of civil society (such as the massive street protests at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial intended to launch the new round), created a legitimacy crisis for the WTO and pressure for greater inclusion of developing countries in the organization's decision-making. Developing countries channelled their frustrations into coalition-building in an attempt to redress power imbalances and assert their interests. These coalitions greatly heightened the power of developing countries in the Doha Round and created a new politics of North–South confrontation at the WTO (Hurrell and Narlikar, 2006; Taylor, 2007).

The scholarship on developing country coalitions offers an important contribution to our understanding of the transformation that occurred at the WTO. Yet within this literature, there has been little explicit comparison of the role that developing country coalitions played in the rise of Brazil and India in contrast to China. Most accounts tend to group the emerging powers together and treat their relationships to developing country coalitions as similar. The three new powers are often, for example, identified collectively as leaders of the Group of 20 (G20-T) coalition at the WTO (Clapp, 2006; Grant, 2007; Hurrell and Narlikar, 2006; Narlikar and Tussie, 2004).<sup>8</sup> In the analysis that follows, however, I show that while Brazil and India were activist and entrepreneurial leaders of developing country coalitions, China was decidedly not. On the contrary, China – despite (or more accurately *because of*) its economic might – was a follower rather than a leader in these coalitions. The relationships of the new powers to developing country coalitions differed fundamentally, and I will argue that this difference was not incidental but highly significant. It is connected to critical differences in their behaviour, their sources of power, and the types of influence they have exercised at the WTO. The analysis presented here builds on and extends the existing literature on WTO coalitions; however, it is distinct in its comparison of the role that coalitions played in the rise of the new powers and its emphasis on the different paths to power taken by Brazil and India, on the one hand, and China, on the other.

Despite a burgeoning literature on the emerging powers, comparison of their role in global economic governance has been limited. Research on emerging powers in world politics has been conducted mainly in the form of case studies on individual countries (Armijo and Burges, 2010; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; Hopewell, 2013; Lima and Hirst, 2006; Scott and Wilkinson, 2013). Only rarely have emerging powers been analyzed

in a comparative perspective (Ban and Blyth, 2013; Narlikar, 2013; Schirm, 2010). A comparative analysis of Brazil, India and China at the WTO highlights important distinctions among the emerging powers and in their behaviour in global economic governance.

Some critics have questioned whether apparent power shifts in global economic governance are more symbolic or superficial than real. Sceptics contend that the traditional powers retain their dominance in governance institutions and the emerging powers have yet to exercise significant voice and influence or become a source of initiative and agenda-setting (Beeson and Bell, 2009; Pinto, Macdonald and Marshall, 2011; Subacchi, 2008; Wade, 2011). In the analysis that follows, I show that there has indeed been a real shift in power at the WTO. Brazil, India and China have not only gained seats at the high table, but also come to play pivotal roles in the Doha Round, though the nature of their influence has differed.

### POWER SHIFTS AT THE WTO

The WTO, and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), work through successive rounds of negotiations to progressively liberalize trade. Formally, agreements are reached on the basis of consensus and each member is afforded an equal vote ('one-member, one-vote'). Initially, the consensus-based decision-making of the GATT/WTO appears remarkably democratic compared to the IMF and World Bank, with their weighted voting systems and veto power accorded to the US. The institutional design of the GATT/WTO would appear to afford more scope for developing countries to use coalition-building to influence decision-making outcomes. Despite this, however, for nearly its entire history, the GATT/WTO has been dominated by the US and other rich countries. In practice, the most significant negotiations take place in informal meetings of small groups of states (called 'Green Room' meetings). Once an agreement is reached within this core group, it is then extended out to the rest of the organization's membership. This group constitutes the elite inner circle of the WTO – those states that are recognized as key players and exercise the most influence over the negotiations. Until recently, agreements were negotiated among 'the Quad' – the US, EU, Canada and Japan – and imposed upon the rest of the organization's membership effectively as a *fait accompli* (Kapoor, 2006). The US and EU were the primary states to advance initiatives and they constructed a trading order that suited their own interests (Porter, 2005). Historically, developing countries were highly disadvantaged within the institution, largely excluded from decision-making and ignored; they rarely tabled proposals and were often blocked when they sought to advance initiatives (Raghavan, 2000; Steinberg, 2002).

However, over the course of the Doha Round, which began in 2001, a significant transformation has taken place at the WTO. After 2003, the old 'Quad' was replaced by a series of core negotiating groups centred on the US, EU, Brazil, and India. These four states have been at the heart of the negotiations since then. Beginning in 2008, they were joined by China. Brazil, India and China have become key players whose assent is considered essential to securing a Doha agreement: in the words of one negotiator, 'now, you can't conclude any deal at the WTO without them'.<sup>9</sup> As the following sections will show, far from merely symbolic, these power shifts have had a profound impact on the WTO and the Doha Round.

### **THE RISE OF BRAZIL AND INDIA**

The factors that propelled Brazil and India into the inner circle of power at the WTO differed from China. Unlike China, discussed in the next section, Brazil and India could not rely on their economic might and had to strategically manoeuvre to increase their status and influence. The emergence of Brazil and India as major players at the WTO was intertwined with a broader revolt on the part of developing countries. Brazil and India were key figures in fostering and channelling this uprising and it played a major role in fuelling their rise to power.

#### **Emergence and impact of the G20-T**

At the start of the Doha Round, the US and EU remained firmly in the driver's seat: they played the central role in formulating the negotiating mandate and the negotiations continued to centre on the old 'Quad'. However, the emergence of the G20-T – a coalition of developing countries led by Brazil and India – at the Cancun Ministerial in 2003 marked a critical turning point. The Ministerial was intended to be an important milestone in the progress of the Doha Round, with negotiations shifting to determining the more concrete and specific terms of the deal. In advance of Cancun, the US and EU reached an agreement among themselves and put forward a joint proposal on agriculture. This proposal prompted a strong reaction from developing countries, who saw it as an effort to force them to lower their trade barriers, while allowing the US and EU to maintain their trade distorting subsidies. For many, this presaged a repeat of the Uruguay Round when a private compromise between the US and EU (the Blair House Accord) served as the basis for the ultimate agreement and obliterated the hopes of developing countries for making gains in the round. Once again, it looked like developing countries were going to get a highly unbalanced agreement. Prompted by the US-EU proposal, Brazil approached India with a plan for forming

an alliance to oppose that initiative. The two countries joined forces and together succeeded in assembling a coalition of developing countries that represented over half the world's population and two-thirds of its farmers. The G20-T united not only to block the US-EU proposal but, driven primarily by Brazil, also arrived at Cancun with its own technically sophisticated counter-proposal that specifically targeted US and EU agriculture subsidies. Several other developing country coalitions emerged in the process leading up to Cancun (including the Core Group, the Cotton-4, and the G33), joining existing groupings (such as the African Group, the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, the LDC Group, and the Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs)), and there was significant consultation and cooperation among them (Narlikar and Tussie, 2004). Amid the proliferation of developing country coalitions in the Doha Round, the G20-T played a central and pivotal role because of its proactive agenda that turned the tables on the traditional powers by going after their agriculture and trade policies, backed by a technically substantive and astute proposal. As a result, the Cancun Ministerial took shape as a dramatic battle between developed and developing countries and ultimately ended in collapse, with the G20-T's block of the US-EU proposal a central factor in the breakdown.

Under the leadership of Brazil and India, the emergence of the G20-T produced a tectonic shift at the WTO, bringing an end to the US and EU 'cartel over agenda setting and compromise brokering' (Evenett, 2007). From that point, it became impossible for the US and EU to secure a Doha agreement without the assent of Brazil and India as representatives of the G20-T and the developing world more broadly. Their leadership of developing countries in opposing the US and EU launched Brazil and India into the inner circle of negotiations, as key players who were considered essential to breaking the stalemate and securing a deal. In the words of one WTO Secretariat official, the 'creation of the G20-T completely imploded the Quad'.<sup>10</sup> Despite the fact that several other states (including Japan and Canada, as well as China, Mexico and South Korea) had larger economies and more significant roles in world trade, Brazil and India displaced Japan and Canada from the inner circle.

In addition to upending the traditional power structure of the WTO, Brazil and India's leadership of the G20-T fundamentally altered the dynamic and agenda of the Doha Round. The agenda-setting process that takes place between the launch and conclusion of a round is critical to determining its final outcome and the time when powerful countries flex their muscles (Steinberg, 2002). Agriculture has been a central issue since the start of the round, as one of the least liberalized sectors of global trade. When the negotiations began, they centred on demands from the US and the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters that the EU and Japan eliminate their trade distorting policies; however, over the course of the

round, the negotiations were transformed into a struggle between developed and developing countries focused on US and EU subsidies (Clapp, 2006). As a negotiator stated, 'at the start of this round, the US saw itself in an offensive position. It had no idea it would be a target on agriculture. But now it has become the key focus of the negotiations'.<sup>11</sup> There has been a dramatic shift in roles: for the first time, the US – historically the key aggressor in the GATT/WTO – found itself isolated and on the defensive, while developing countries assumed the role of *demandeurs*.

The coalitions led by Brazil and India had a major impact on the negotiating agenda, successfully putting issues like rich country agricultural subsidies and market access, as well as special safeguards and flexibilities for developing countries (provisions advanced by another coalition, the G33, discussed below), at the heart of the negotiations. Furthermore, the negotiating texts since Cancun have substantively reflected many of their proposals. The G20-T, for example, secured: a tiered formula for reducing subsidies ('domestic support'), ensuring that countries that provide the most support are required to make the biggest reductions, and stiffer criteria for cutting domestic support, such as product-specific caps; substantial reductions in domestic support (compared to historical bound levels), with the EU cutting overall trade distorting support (OTDS) by 80 per cent and the US by 70 per cent; the elimination of export subsidies and parallel disciplines on export credit and food aid; non-extension of the Peace Clause (protecting developed countries from WTO challenges), countering the long-standing position of the US and EU; and a 'tiered' formula for reducing tariffs, rather than the 'blended' formula sought by the US and EU. Although, as discussed below, the future of the Doha Round is now in doubt, these coalitions significantly shaped the content of any prospective agreement. This represents a dramatic departure from the past, when developing countries had little or no influence over the shape of GATT/WTO agreements.

### **Brazil-India partnership**

The alliance between Brazil and India that forms the basis for the G20-T is surprising given their opposing negotiating positions. Brazil – which over the last two decades has emerged as one of the world's leading agricultural exporters – has defined its primary interest in the Doha Round as seeking to expand markets for its agricultural exports.<sup>12</sup> It is widely viewed as being among the biggest potential winners from the round and has been one of its strongest supporters (Polaski, 2006). Brazil has actively worked to construct an image of itself as a leader of developing countries, fighting to hold rich countries accountable to WTO rules and pushing them to liberalize their markets. Beyond the G20-T, Brazil

successfully waged two landmark disputes against US cotton subsidies and EU sugar export subsidies. Brazil's victories revealed major inconsistencies between US and EU agriculture policies and WTO rules and raised the prospect that those countries could be subject to a wave of future WTO challenges. Despite Brazil's major agro-industrial interests, it succeeded in portraying the G20-T and these disputes as a shared struggle of poor, developing country farmers against the rich countries, fostering an image of Brazil as a hero of the developing world taking on the traditional powers in a David-and-Goliath-like struggle (Hopewell, 2013).

In contrast to Brazil's export interests, India's negotiating position more closely resembles that of most developing countries at the WTO, with major defensive interests in agriculture: it has a weak agricultural sector consisting primarily of peasant farmers, who are highly vulnerable to trade liberalization. India has historically been a leading voice among developing countries at the GATT/WTO, fiercely resistant to efforts by the US and other developed countries to force developing countries to open their markets. In the Uruguay Round, for example, India was a strident (though ultimately unsuccessful) opponent of an aggressive push by the US and EU to expand trade rules into the new areas of services, investment and intellectual property, which it correctly forecast would impose significant costs on developing countries (Shadlen, 2005; Wade, 2003). India strongly opposed the launch of the Doha Round, arguing instead that implementation issues and other lingering problems for developing countries from the Uruguay Round needed to be dealt with first. Like Brazil, India is also widely seen as a leader of developing countries at the WTO, but in its case of their defensive concerns in seeking to resist trade liberalization. To quote one close NGO observer regarding the Doha Round: 'If India wasn't there, we'd have had this deal long ago and with no protections for developing countries'.<sup>13</sup>

Despite considerable differences in their interests, both Brazil and India recognized the strategic value of an alliance. Motivated by the expansion of its agribusiness sector, Brazil came to the Doha Round seeking to make significant gains in agriculture (Hopewell, 2013). Yet, it saw that it lacked sufficient power operating alone and needed allies. As one Brazilian negotiator stated, 'we needed a credible blocking coalition to start playing the game at the WTO'.<sup>14</sup> Prior to Cancun, Brazil had begun looking for ways to construct a coalition to advance its interests, but was awaiting the right opportunity, which the US-EU agriculture proposal provided. Given its major export interests, however, Brazil risked being perceived as a threat by most developing countries. An alliance with India – the leading champion of the defensive interests of developing countries – was therefore of considerable tactical importance to Brazil: in

the words of one of its negotiators, 'we realized that we needed to reach out to India in order for us to have any credibility with developing countries. For us it was a clear strategic move'.<sup>15</sup>

The alliance was equally vital for India. In the past, India had repeatedly been left isolated in its opposition to the US and other dominant powers, painted as the lone 'troublemaker' objecting to and blocking agreement. Such pressure previously forced India to cave in and consent to agreements it was profoundly dissatisfied with. Given its sensitivities in agriculture and other areas, combined with its experience of previous trade rounds, India knew that it needed a strong coalition of allies to effectively defend its interests in the Doha Round. Consequently, for India, to quote one of its former negotiators, 'the G20-T was a compulsion. They knew they had to do something but they knew they couldn't do it alone'.<sup>16</sup> Although the initial impetus behind the G20-T and its subsidy reduction agenda came from Brazil, India embraced and became equally aggressive in pursuing this agenda as a means of advancing its own strategic interests. The G20-T would not have been feasible without India, whose active participation and leadership was essential to securing the support of developing countries.

It was the underlying partnership between Brazil and India that made the G20-T possible, but the two countries are forthright in acknowledging the tensions in their relationship. As a Brazilian negotiator acknowledged:

It was sheer personal interests forcing Brazil and India to get into a coalition. We knew there were difficulties in trying to form a long-term coalition with the Indians given their difficulties in agriculture. Our relationship with India is like a kind of very delicate embrace where you cannot leave each other.<sup>17</sup>

An Indian negotiator concurred:

It's a coalition of the unwilling, let me admit. But at the same time, we know we can't have any kind of illusion of our status being equivalent to the G2 [the US and EU]. Even China has greater status than us. But we know between the two of us [India and Brazil] there's a formidable force that the G2 can't ignore.<sup>18</sup>

Given their lesser economic weight, compared to either the traditional powers or China, neither Brazil nor India could rely on economic might alone. Instead, they needed to ally together and secure the backing of the developing world more broadly to enhance their power and effectively counter the US and EU.

### Beyond the G20-T

At the same time, concerns about the durability of its alliance with Brazil led India to diversify its strategy beyond the G20-T. India is acutely aware of the differences in their interests and far from confident about the long-term loyalty or reliability of Brazil. During the Uruguay Round, India and Brazil created and led a coalition – the G10 – to oppose the inclusion of services, investment and intellectual property in the round. The coalition eventually collapsed, as its members were bought off with carrots and sticks from the US and other Northern powers; India was left the last one standing after Brazil conceded and was consequently forced to consent itself. Contemporary Indian negotiators have a strong sense that the country was abandoned by Brazil, leaving it isolated and powerless to defend its interests. To quote one Indian trade official, ‘Brazil can’t be trusted – they have a history of abandoning developing country positions’.<sup>19</sup> India’s fears that it would not be able to count on Brazil in the endgame stage of the Doha negotiations motivated it to invest in developing other alliances.<sup>20</sup>

India has been a leading force behind the G33, a second coalition that emerged at Cancun and has had a significant impact on the Doha negotiations. The G33 is a large coalition of developing countries – currently comprised of 46 states – with defensive concerns in agriculture, whose objective is to limit the degree of market opening required of developing countries. It has advocated the creation of a ‘special products’ (SPs) exemption that would allow developing countries to shield some products from tariff cuts as well as a ‘special safeguard mechanism’ (SSM) that would allow them to raise tariffs in response to an import surge. The stated intent of both instruments is to protect food security, rural livelihoods and rural development. These were new initiatives, with an innovative rationale, and of considerable consequence: combined with weaker tariff reduction formulas, the SPs exemption would significantly reduce the extent of liberalization required of developing countries in the round, while the SSM design advocated by India would allow developing countries to breach their pre-Doha commitments thus potentially rolling-back liberalization undertaken in the last round. Although these measures were defensively-oriented, this was a proactive agenda involving the creation of new negotiation issues that generated substantial opposition from the US, EU, and other developed countries. India and the G33 not only succeeded in putting special products and the SSM onto the negotiating agenda but secured the commitment that they will be part of any final Doha agreement (Eagleton-Pierce, 2012; Margulis, 2013). India led the charge for an expansive definition and operationalization of these measures and, as discussed below, conflict over the design of the SSM ultimately became a central issue in the breakdown of the 2008 Ministerial Meeting.

More recently, under the auspices of the G33, India led an initiative to reform WTO subsidy limits to ensure the ability of developing countries to engage in public food stockholding for food security purposes. India sought such changes to protect its landmark new food security programme from WTO challenges. This became the 'make or break' issue at the 2013 Bali Ministerial (*Bridges, 2013*). Despite American opposition, India secured an interim agreement providing the needed exemption from WTO subsidy rules until a permanent solution can be negotiated.

Brazil and India's leadership has extended beyond the G20-T and the G33. Through the Core Group, India mobilized developing country opposition to the Singapore Issues (investment, competition and government procurement) – which further contributed to the breakdown at the Cancun Ministerial – and succeeded in forcing those issues off the negotiating table, representing a major victory for developing countries. Brazil and India (along with South Africa) have also led developing countries to important victories in the area of intellectual property and access to medicines: despite strong opposition from the US and EU and their pharmaceutical corporations, they secured an agreement in 2001 exempting essential medicines (such as HIV/AIDS drugs) from WTO intellectual property rules (the 'TRIPs Agreement') and declaring that such rules could not be used to prevent governments from acting to protect public health, as well as a waiver in 2003 allowing the export of generic drugs to developing countries that lack domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. In pursuing these initiatives, India was motivated in part by their commercial significance for its generic pharmaceutical industry, which played an important role in this fight (Roemer-Mahler, 2012). The intense opposition to TRIPs also prevented efforts by the US and EU to seek expanded IP protections ('TRIPs-Plus') in the Doha Round. In addition, Brazil and India have been key figures in the NAMA-11 coalition of developing countries in the negotiations on manufactured goods (Non-Agricultural Market Access, or NAMA). Under their leadership, developing countries secured major 'special and differential treatment' (SDT) provisions, including weaker tariff-reduction formulas and substantial flexibilities in both agriculture and manufactured goods. Beyond specific coalitions, Brazil and India have engaged in extensive coordination and alliance-building across the developing world. At the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, for example, they led a mass coalition of developing countries (the G110) to oppose the agenda being pushed by the advanced-industrialized states. Through a combination of formal coalitions and more informal leadership, Brazil and India have organized a significant portion of the WTO's membership behind them, which they used to play a major agenda-setting role and significantly shape the direction of the Doha Round.

### **Building effective coalitions**

Developing country coalitions are not new to the WTO. With India and Brazil playing a central role, developing countries began experimenting more actively with forming coalitions to increase their bargaining power during the Uruguay Round – the first to fully bring developing countries into the GATT/WTO by requiring them to undertake commitments (Gallagher, 2008) – and leading up to the Doha Round (including the Informal Group, G10, and Like Minded Group). However, as Amrita Narlikar (2003) has documented, these early coalitions were largely ineffective, hampered by the absence of a strong issue-specific focus, a lack of technical capacity, and an inability to maintain unity and resist collapse in the face of pressures from the dominant powers. The collapse of their coalitions proved extremely costly for developing countries, who were left deeply dissatisfied with the results of the Uruguay Round (Wilkinson, 2007).

An important question is thus why Brazil and India's coalition-building efforts in the Doha Round were successful when previous such efforts had failed. As Narlikar and co-authors (Hurrell and Narlikar, 2006; Narlikar and Tussie, 2004) convincingly argue, these new coalitions were the product of almost two decades of experimentation, learning and adaptation by developing countries. Led by Brazil and India, they were able to learn from their previous mistakes in order to build stronger and more effective coalitions in this round. Perhaps most importantly, coming out of their experiences in the Uruguay Round and the lead up to Doha, developing countries were keenly aware of the danger of political isolation and the costs of failing to maintain unity (Lima and Hirst, 2006). Developing countries had a renewed and strengthened commitment to coalitions but needed effective leadership, which Brazil and India provided.

The G20-T alliance forged by Brazil and India was the real game changer at the WTO and marked a break with previous coalitions in several important ways. First, given the diverse (and potentially conflicting) interests of developing countries, building and maintaining coalitions at the WTO is no easy feat. By constructing the agenda of the G20-T around the issue of rich country agricultural subsidies, Brazil and India found a means to overcome differences and unite developing countries. Second, making the argument that subsidies artificially depress global prices and undermine the competitiveness and livelihoods of farmers in the Global South, the issue provided a compelling narrative that accorded with the liberalization mandate of the WTO and increased the legitimacy of the G20-T's claims (Eagleton-Pierce, 2012; Hopewell, 2013). Third, and perhaps most importantly, while developing countries have repeatedly been on the defensive in WTO negotiations, the subsidies issue provided an

opportunity to turn the tables and go on the offensive against the developed countries. The G20-T turned the rhetoric of free trade and liberalization back on the major powers and highlighted their hypocrisy (Bukovansky, 2010; Taylor, 2007). In the process, this significantly strengthened the position of developing countries vis-à-vis the US and EU across the negotiations, including their ability to defend protections in their own markets.

Diplomatic and technical capacity were critical to the ability of Brazil and India to create and manage the G20-T and other coalitions that could provide a credible challenge to the US and EU. In the lead-up to the Doha Round, Brazil and India both invested heavily in staff and resources dedicated to the WTO (Shaffer, Sanchez and Rosenberg, 2008; Sinha, 2007). They now have among the largest delegations in Geneva, supported by highly trained officials in their capitals, and their negotiating teams are among the most skilled, active and knowledgeable at the WTO. Brazil and India used their considerable diplomatic skill to coordinate the positions of developing countries; provide strategy, talking points and messaging; and produce compelling negotiating proposals backed by research and analysis. Most developing countries are extremely limited in their technical capacity, and to quote one negotiator, 'in this game, either you have the technical capacity or people will take your wallet'.<sup>21</sup> Brazil and India were able to provide the highly sophisticated expertise and technical capacity (i.e., the ability to run econometric analysis, assess the impacts of specific commitments, and generate negotiating proposals) that most developing countries lacked. This marked a major change from previous developing country coalitions and made it possible for them to respond to and counter the US and EU. Brazil and India's success in securing important gains for developing countries in the negotiations – including on the agriculture and industrial tariff reduction formulas and flexibilities, agriculture subsidies, SPs, the SSM, TRIPs and public health, and the Singapore Issues – consolidated support for their leadership and further enhanced their clout.

The vital importance of coalitions for Brazil and India is apparent in the considerable work they have invested in creating and maintaining them, including the costs they have been willingly to incur. Although developing countries represent significant markets for Brazil's agricultural exports, for example, it held back from seeking improved access to their markets, because that would jeopardize the unity of the G20-T and support for its leadership.<sup>22</sup> Instead, Brazil supported efforts by developing countries to secure flexibilities that would limit the extent of their market opening, despite the negative commercial implications for its own exporters. The importance of these coalitions is further evidenced by the concerted efforts of the traditional powers to break them. Following the Cancun Ministerial, for instance, the US went on the attack

against the G20-T, using strong-arm tactics – including threatening to withdraw from bilateral and regional free trade negotiations – to force five countries to leave the coalition. The G20-T, however, ultimately withstood these pressures and remained intact, even replacing its lost members and increasing its numbers.

Given the diverse interests of developing countries, Brazil and India's leadership has not been without friction (Burgess, 2013). Tensions within the G20-T and G33 reached a height at the 2008 Ministerial, when it appeared negotiations were nearing conclusion; criticism erupted from developing countries on multiple sides over the positions Brazil and India had taken in the Green Room. Tensions likewise flared within the G33 during the 2013 Bali Ministerial, when negotiations threatened to breakdown due to conflict between the US and India over the food stockholding issue (Bridges, 2013). Yet both the two leaders and their developing country followers are keenly aware that, as one G20-T member stated, 'our strength lies in the group' and were these coalitions to crumble, their positions would be substantially weakened.<sup>23</sup> Brazil and India actively worked to repair divisions and successfully maintained their coalitions intact. This does, however, suggest potential instability in the new-found power of Brazil and India, given its high degree of dependence on the backing of other states.

It was Brazil and India's leadership of developing country coalitions – particularly the G20-T and G33 – that catalyzed power shifts at the WTO and propelled them into the inner circle of power. As one negotiator stated, 'The US and EU aren't talking to India because India is India. They do it because India is seen as a leader of the G20-T and the G33, and if they don't get an agreement with India, it's not just India that will withdraw its support, it's all of those countries'.<sup>24</sup> A Brazilian negotiator concurred: 'there are various ways to be admitted [to the inner circle]. For us, the G20-T served as a stepping stone to consolidate our access to the most exclusive negotiating forum [at the WTO]'.<sup>25</sup> Lacking the economic heft of other major powers, their mobilization of developing country coalitions was critical in enabling Brazil and India to boost their status and influence at the WTO.

## THE RISE OF CHINA

China's rise to power and behaviour have differed greatly from Brazil and India. China only joined the WTO in 2001, after an arduous accession process that took over 15 years of negotiations and required China to undertake substantial concessions and domestic reforms. Its accession corresponded with the launch of the Doha Round and many predicted it would assume a central role in the negotiations, given its prominent role in world trade. Instead, however, for much of the Doha Round,

China has been a relatively marginal player on the sidelines of decision-making. While Brazil and India joined the elite inner circle at the WTO following Cancun in 2003, it was only much later – not until the Ministerial Meeting in July 2008 – that China was included in this core group and assumed a more significant role in the negotiations. Furthermore, whereas Brazil and India *fought* their way into the inner circle, China was *brought* in – and it was brought in largely because Brazil and India had been so successful in fundamentally changing the dynamics of the negotiations.

### A quiet presence

If Brazil and India sought the spotlight at the WTO, China sought to avoid it. Although a member of the G20-T and the G33, China made no effort to establish itself as a leader of developing countries like Brazil and India. As its negotiators indicate, ‘China is not a leader and China does not want to be a leader’ – ‘we would have to take the spotlight, and that is against China’s philosophy to be quiet, low profile, modest’.<sup>26</sup> Such a strategy is in keeping with Deng Xiaoping’s famous directive of ‘*taoguang yanghui*’ that the country should ‘observe developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capabilities and bide our time, remain free of ambition, and never claim leadership’. As a rival negotiator stated: ‘China doesn’t want a following . . . China’s not like an India or a Brazil. They stay behind and do not take on a prominent position at the forefront’.<sup>27</sup> Instead, China has been remarkably quiet and assumed a low-profile in the negotiations, with other negotiators describing it as ‘a little on the outside of things’.<sup>28</sup> Unlike Brazil and India, China has sought to avoid prominence or any obvious projection of its power.

China’s quietude is often attributed to the newness of its membership in the organization (Scott and Wilkinson 2013), and certainly China itself has sought to foster this interpretation. But after 15 years of intense accession negotiations and subsequently over a decade of membership in the WTO, China’s efforts to portray itself as new and inexperienced and still learning the ropes within the institution warrant scepticism. China has important strategic reasons for its comparatively quiet behaviour in the negotiations. Its position at the WTO is a complicated one. As the world’s largest exporter, China has a major interest in reducing trade barriers, further opening markets to its exports, and strengthening the rules of the multilateral trading system. In fact, many expect that China would be one of the biggest winners from the Doha Round (Polaski, 2006). However, the size and rapid growth of its economy make China a major target for other countries seeking access to its market. At the same time, many countries are concerned about China’s industrial export capacity and the competitive threat that it poses. As an export powerhouse in an

organization designed to open markets, China frightens many WTO members. These factors create vulnerabilities for China, as it potentially faces both demands that it open its market and efforts to constrain its exports. For China, being proactive or aggressive in seeking to expand its access to foreign markets through the Doha Round risks creating a backlash that could ultimately jeopardize its exports and economic growth. China has therefore exercised a form of pre-emptive restraint and avoided taking a leadership role or actively trying to shape the agenda of the negotiations.

China has determined that the primary threat it faces is from the advanced-industrialized states – particularly the US – and consequently has allied itself with the developing world and joined developing country coalitions to strengthen its defences and avoid being singled out and targeted. As a member of the G20-T and the G33, China has allowed itself to be led and represented by Brazil and India. Notes one observer, China is ‘happy to leave the leadership role to India and Brazil. I’m sure they think there is enough China-bashing already’.<sup>29</sup> Seeking the protection of developing country alliances and with Brazil and India advancing an agenda broadly in accord with its own interests, China was disposed to let those two countries wage the fight against the traditional powers. A Secretariat official offered this assessment: ‘they don’t waste capital if they have others that will do it for them’.<sup>30</sup> Thus, as another official stated, for many years, China ‘effectively let Brazil and India run their participation’ at the WTO.<sup>31</sup>

### **China’s entry to the inner circle**

It was not until the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial Meeting in Geneva that China was included in the inner circle and began to assume a more important role in the negotiations. As usual at the Ministerial, the centre of the action was the Green Room, where a small, elite group of trade ministers gathered for negotiations. For the first time, however, China was invited to join this core group. What changed to prompt the inclusion of China? The decision was driven by the US and the WTO’s Director-General. Their motives were twofold. First, four years of negotiations centred on the US, EU, Brazil, and India had produced a standstill – as the breakdown of the previous Ministerial meeting the year before in Potsdam had shown. Faced with an impasse – between the US and EU versus Brazil and India over the issues of agricultural subsidies and market access in the North and industrial tariffs in the South – there was a sense that it was necessary to re-jig the players in the group to try to break the standstill. The US in particular – as well as others seeking a conclusion to the round – thought that China would side with them and help to counter India, whom the US blamed for holding up the deal. As

one official commented: 'The US believed that China would be more of an ally than an adversary in these meetings. It made a calculation that because of China's relatively passive approach to being the biggest developing country here and letting others run with the agenda, it would be an ally'.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, another negotiator stated, 'China has a lot to gain, so people thought bringing it to the table will help get a deal. They thought it would put added pressure on India by having China in the room'.<sup>33</sup>

The US also had a second motivation for including China. While the US is interested in gaining improved access to the Chinese market through the Doha Round, China's absence from the Green Room for most of the round indicates that the US expected to be able to secure these gains without directly engaging China. The US believed that it needed only to strike a deal with Brazil and India, which would set the terms of its access to developing country markets, including China. However, by 2008, Brazil and India, leading the developing world, had been so successful in resisting the pressures of the US and its allies and securing their own demands that the negotiations had moved towards a prospective agreement that provoked protest from powerful actors in the US Congress and its business and farm lobby groups. Many in the US viewed the deal taking shape – with what they saw as weak tariff-reduction formulas and extensive flexibilities for developing countries – as unbalanced against the US. They argued that the US was not making sufficient gains in expanding access for its exports, particularly to the large and rapidly growing Chinese market as well as those of other emerging economies, to justify its concessions on agriculture subsidies and other areas. As one US negotiator put it, 'we'd be giving everything and getting nothing'.<sup>34</sup>

In response, US negotiators determined that the best way to improve the package and sell it to their domestic constituencies would be to secure special concessions from China beyond the formal terms of the agreement that was emerging. The US sought an informal commitment from China that it would agree to limit the use of its flexibilities in agriculture (keeping key items of interest to the US – cotton, wheat and corn – off their list of special products that would be shielded from full tariff cuts) and participate in 'sectorals' (aggressive liberalization to cut tariffs to zero or near zero across entire industrial sectors) in two areas of US competitiveness, chemicals and industrial machinery. Thus, by the 2008 Ministerial, as one negotiator stated, 'the main demands of the US and EU couldn't be addressed without getting a "yes" from China. The US needed China to be there'.<sup>35</sup>

There were therefore two key factors driving the decision to bring China into the Green Room: one was strategic – the US thought it could use China to put pressure on Brazil and India – the other was that because Brazil and India had been so successful in negotiating a

favourable deal for developing countries and had backed the US into a corner, it needed to be able to secure extra concessions from China in order to sell the deal back home. Unfortunately for the US, however, this strategy backfired. Negotiations in the Green Room came to centre on the design of the SSM championed by India. Rather than joining with the US, China – who also has significant defensive agricultural interests arising from its large peasant population – supported India on the SSM. Moreover, China refused to simply give away the additional commitments the US was demanding on agricultural special products and industrial sectorals, which it saw as unjustified relative to the concessions the US was willing to make and beyond the scope of the terms already agreed to. Ultimately, the Ministerial broke down with recriminations on all sides.

### **Doha breakdown**

On its face, the breakdown was due to conflict over the SSM, but the deeper issue was the US desire to ‘rebalance’ the deal by securing greater access for its agriculture and manufactured goods to the markets of the large emerging economies, particularly China. If China had conceded to the US and agreed to grant the additional concessions it was seeking, the Doha Round may well have been concluded in 2008. Certainly, the US has a long track record in multilateral trade negotiations of successfully overpowering developing countries and securing their assent for its initiatives. Instead, however, China stood firm, refused to cave to the US and rebuffed its demands for additional market opening. Thus, when pushed, China showed that it is willing and able to assert itself and defend its interests against the US. Given its economic heft and the importance of its market, by blocking the US initiative to ‘rebalance’ the round, China effectively exercised a veto that contributed directly to the current breakdown and stalemate in the Doha Round.

With the 2008 Ministerial, China was almost involuntarily pulled into the spotlight. Even since being admitted to the inner circle in 2008, negotiators report that China has still tried to slip back into its comparatively quiet and low profile role in the negotiations. Its attempts to do so have been less successful than in the past due to the US emphasis on gaining further opening in its market and those of other large emerging economies. Yet China did not suddenly assume an activist role like that of Brazil and India.

The Doha Round has remained deadlocked along the same fault line with no significant progress since 2008.<sup>36</sup> With the traditional and emerging powers unable to reach agreement, the Doha Round negotiations were officially declared at an impasse in 2011. In December 2013, efforts to salvage a small number of issues from the round produced a

micro-agreement – the ‘Bali Package’ – centred on trade facilitation. Yet even this very limited agreement proved fractious and difficult to achieve, and the future of the Doha Round remains highly uncertain.

Some take the fact that the new powers have ultimately been unable to secure their objectives through conclusion of the Doha Round as an indication that they lack power (Narlikar 2010; Schirm 2010). I would argue, however, that this is an excessively high standard by which to evaluate the power of Brazil, India and China. By this criterion, even the US could not be considered powerful, since it has not been able to conclude the round and achieve its preferred objectives either. A more realistic standard of power at the WTO is to evaluate the impact that countries have had on the round. By this measure, though the nature of their behaviour and impact differ, Brazil, India and China have undoubtedly arrived as major powers.

## CONCLUSION

An analysis of developments over the last decade at the WTO challenges the conventional wisdom that the rise of new powers in global economic governance is merely a function of their growing economic might. Instead, I have argued that the forces driving their rise are more diverse and complex than suggested by a simple economic determinism and that these countries have taken different paths to power. Although China’s rise has been more closely tied to its economic weight, for Brazil and India alliance-building and leadership have been critical to enhancing their power at the WTO. My purpose has not been to deny the role of economic change in contemporary power shifts, but to suggest that an exclusive focus on economic capabilities risks missing important aspects of the rise of new powers in global economic governance.

This analysis points to the need to pay greater attention to differences in the sources of power of these countries, particularly as these differences have important implications for their strategies and behaviour in international institutions like the WTO. Brazil and India worked to position themselves as leaders of the developing world and assumed a confrontational stance in relation to the US and EU, as a means to elevate their status and influence. Highly vocal and assertive, Brazil and India have been a major source of initiative and played a central role in shaping the agenda of the Doha negotiations. In contrast, China has been reluctant to throw its weight around. China has been assertive only in a defensive and reactive manner and has not sought to be an initiator or agenda-setter; yet, China nonetheless came to have a significant impact in the later stages of the round, when it refused to concede to US demands.

In looking at the rise of new powers, the experience of the WTO suggests the need to look beyond material capabilities to understand

emerging challenges to the dominance of the US and other states of the Global North in global economic governance. The realist expectation is that those states with the greatest economic and military capabilities will dominate global governance and exercise the greatest influence. But this case suggests just the opposite: that the possession of material power capabilities can actually work to constrain a state and hinder its influence. In this case, those with lesser economic and military might had more room to manoeuvre. With fewer material power resources, Brazil and India were perceived as less of a threat and could therefore be more aggressive and proactive. They were able to use leadership and alliances to enhance their influence, which ultimately enabled them to have a considerable impact on the negotiating agenda in the Doha Round. Counter-intuitively, the emerging power with the greatest material power capabilities – China – has been the least proactive or agenda-setting in its effects. The paradox is that the very things that we would expect to make China powerful at the WTO – its large market and role in world trade – limited its ability to exercise agenda-setting influence. Instead, its influence has come in the form of veto power. The structure of influence at the WTO is therefore far more complex than a mechanical reflection of the distribution of raw economic power.

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### NOTES

1. While quota reforms of the IMF agreed in 2008 became effective in March 2011, further reforms agreed in 2010 have yet to be ratified by the US.
2. In the literature on rising powers, the line between the analytical and the normative at times appears blurred, such that the distinction between assessing the rise of new powers and making a case for their greater inclusion in global economic governance is not always clear. Thus, in some instances, attempts to measure and catalogue the material resources of the rising powers may be more a question of arguing for their inclusion, rather than accepting military or economic capabilities as the sole measure of their power or influence. The point remains, however, that discussions of the emerging powers have overwhelmingly focused on their material power capabilities.
3. IMF and WTO 2012.
4. The interviews not directly quoted in the paper were used for background information, to triangulate among different sources in order to accurately reconstruct events at the WTO, and to substantiate the selected quotes presented in the paper. To protect the confidentiality of interview respondents

- in the diplomatic community surrounding the WTO, names and other identifying information have been removed.
5. For Brazil, see: Armijo and Kearney, 2008; Hopewell, 2013; Veiga, 2007; India: Dhar and Kallummal, 2007; Sinha, 2007; China: Feng, 2006; Jiang, 2010; Zeng, 2007.
  6. Since Russia – the fourth ‘BRIC’ – did not become a member of the WTO until 2012 and was therefore not part of the power shift within the institution, it is not included in the analysis presented here.
  7. I use the term veto in the informal, practical sense of having the power to block an initiative or agreement; no state has formal, legal veto power at the WTO.
  8. I refer to the coalition of developing countries at the WTO as the G20-Trade (G20-T) to avoid confusion with the G20 Leaders Summit.
  9. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  10. Interview, Geneva, March 2009.
  11. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  12. In Brazil, the primacy accorded to expanding its agribusiness exports has been strongly opposed by a variety of other actors (including social movements, NGOs, trade unions, small farmers and peasants, and many manufacturing sectors). Yet, in shaping Brazilian trade policy, agribusiness has largely won out over opposing social forces (see Hopewell, 2013).
  13. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  14. Ibid..
  15. Ibid..
  16. Ibid..
  17. Ibid..
  18. Ibid..
  19. Interview, New Delhi, March 2010.
  20. Interviews with Indian negotiators, Geneva, September 2008–June 2009.
  21. Interview, Geneva, March 2009.
  22. Interviews with trade officials, Brasilia, May 2010.
  23. Interview with negotiator, Geneva, March 2009.
  24. Interview, Geneva, April 2009.
  25. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  26. Interviews, Geneva, March and May 2009.
  27. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  28. Multiple interviews, Geneva, September 2008–June 2009.
  29. Interview with NGO representative, Geneva, May 2009.
  30. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  31. Interview with Secretariat official, Geneva, March 2009.
  32. Interview with Secretariat official, Geneva, March 2009.
  33. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  34. Interview, Geneva, April 2009.
  35. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
  36. For discussion of the difficulties in concluding the Doha Round see Gallagher, 2008; Margulis, 2013; Wilkinson, 2009.

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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