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Globalisation, Globalism and Cosmopolitanism as an Educational Ideal

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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss globalisation as an empirical reality that is in a complex relation to its corresponding discourse and in a critical distance from the cosmopolitan ideal. I argue that failure to grasp the distinctions between globalisation, globalism, and cosmopolitanism derives from mistaken identifications of the Is with the Ought and leads to naïve and ethnocentric glorifications of the potentialities of globalisation. Conversely, drawing the appropriate distinctions helps us articulate a more critical approach to contemporary cultural phenomena, and reconsider the current place and potential role of education within the context of global affairs. From this perspective, the antagonistic impulses cultivated by globalisation and some globalist discourse are singled out and targeted via a radicalization of educational orientations. The final suggestion of the article concerns the vision of a more cosmopolitically sensitive education.

Introduction

As early as 1916, John Dewey wrote:

> Every expansive era in the history of mankind has coincided with the operation of factors which have tended to eliminate distance between peoples and classes previously hemmed off from one another. Even the alleged benefits of war, so far as more than alleged, spring from the fact that conflict of peoples at least enforces intercourse between them and thus accidentally enables them to learn from one another, and thereby to expand their horizons. Travels, economic and commercial tendencies, have at present gone far to break down external barriers; to bring peoples and classes into closer and more perceptible connection with one another. It remains for the most part to secure the intellectual and emotional significance of this physical annihilation of space. (Dewey, 1993, p. 110)

Today, although the relevant empirical phenomena have advanced in incredible ways and paces, the intellectual and emotional significance has not been debated

exhaustively, let alone secured. The economic and commercial tendencies that Dewey noticed have now taken the form of a shift of the population to the tertiary sector of economy, i.e. services, commerce, transport, etc. (Habermas, 1998, p. 308), what is often seen as knowledge economy, and an unprecedented flow of information across the globe. These facts—and many more—constitute the phenomenon of globalisation, which has become the object of globalist studies.

In this paper, after exploring the connection of globalisation and globalism meta-theoretically, I discuss some tendencies in the globalist examination of the factual, intellectual and emotional significance of globalisation and show how they affect educational theory. A critical assessment of these tendencies leads me to suggestions regarding the direction globalism and the theorization of the cosmopolitan pedagogical ideal must take.

Globalisation

Globalisation is an empirical phenomenon that has been primarily felt as a structural transformation of the world economic system operating in a complex dialectics with time and space compression effected by advances in technology and communication. Politically, globalisation is playing a major role in issues of state sovereignty, world-order, extra-state policies and administration practices. Culturally, it is intervening dramatically in the (re)shaping of identities and self-conceptions, the premises of human encounter and exchange of world-interpretations and the frame of diverse sensitivities, creativities and responses to aesthetic experience. As a result of its multi-dimensionality and the chaotic force of its effects, globalisation denotes the 'indeterminate, unruly and self-propelled character of world affairs: the absence of a centre, of a controlling desk, of a board of directors' (Bauman, 1998, p. 38).

Theoretical responses to the facts of globalisation vary and often conflate empirical reality and rhetorical myth. The line distinguishing the two is fuzzy since our access to empirical reality is always linguistically and culturally mediated but this should not lead us to blurring the distinction itself. To see Globalisation as a 'discursively constructed master discourse of uncontrollable global market forces' (Janice Dudley, cf. Porter & Vidovich, 2000, p. 451) ignores the material effects of globalisation and their extra-linguistic factual character. That this character is thematized and known to us through our linguistically mediated interactions (a chiefly epistemological matter) should not obscure the fact that globalisation occurs as a set of actualities that radicalize and accentuate older phenomena of cross-cultural human contact. Such a set may be entangled in a complex dialectics with its discursiveness, as its narrativity, its representation and the imaginary investments they create play an important ideological role in that very consolidation and promotion of globalizing effects and the construction of the particular symbolic sphere that nurtures globalisation. Globalisation often becomes an ideological device that states and governments employ as an excuse for imposing certain policies that would otherwise fail to gain public acceptance or support. But it would be erroneous to conclude that the admission of the ideological role globalisation plays should lead us somehow to deny its reality. It could even be politically dangerous since the political

significance of a discursive construction differs from that of a detectable reality and focusing on the former would engender one-sided interpretations overlooking the need to deal with the latter. In any case, as Giddens writes,

> … a few years ago, there was some doubt, particularly on the left, about whether globalization was a reality. The unpersuaded would write 'globalization' in inverted commas, to demonstrate their essential scepticism about the idea. This controversy has moved on. Discussion continues about how best to conceptualize globalization, but few would any longer deny its influence—as signalled by the role of global financial markets, new developments in electronic communication and geopolitical transitions […]. Discussion of globalization is no longer concentrated on whether or not it exists, but on what its consequences are (Giddens, 2001, p. 3).

In this respect, I argue, the idea that 'globalization is best understood as a kind of *imaginary*' (Smith, 1999, p. 2) should rather correspond to globalism than the latter's object of inquiry. For, the facticity of globalisation is one thing but the *thematization* of this facticity is quite another.

For many thinkers, especially Third Way advocates, the impact of globalisation 'has been compared to that of the weather; a "self-regulating, implacable Force of nature" about which we can do nothing except look out of the window and hope for the best' (Andrews, 1999, p. 1). But also critics of the Third way such as Bauman diagnose the same quality. 'Globalization is not about what we all or at least the most resourceful and enterprising among us wish or hope *to do*. It is about what is *happening to us all*. It explicitly refers to the foggy and slushy "no man's land" stretching beyond the reach of the design and action capacity of anybody in particular' (Bauman, 1998, p. 39). These meteorological metaphors that have been employed by many theorists to illustrate the unanticipated and unintended character of globalisation prove indirectly the facticity of this phenomenon and the need for a nuanced conceptual treatment of globalisation and its discursive thematization.

Given such a chaotic multiplicity and lack of determinate responsibility or liability, it is no wonder that the causes and consequences of globalisation, 'let alone the new political arrangements and kinds of democracy—cosmopolitan, realist, liberal, radical—that should respond to globalization are debated and contested' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 92). To render the distinction between empirical reality and its theorization more operative, I suggest that we reserve the term 'globalization' for the description of the intensification of global interconnectedness and use the term 'globalism' for the discursive treatment and analysis of the empirical phenomenon. Globalisation as an empirical phenomenon involves various practices—some of which are discursive—and states of affairs. But the discourse about globalisation, i.e. its thematization, should be examined separately, at least for methodological purposes, and under a different heading: the term I suggest is 'globalism'. To use an example, it is part of globalisation that a multinational company operating in a Western state may cause an ecological disaster that will affect primarily the climatological conditions of some remote countries or perhaps even the whole planet.

The debate on this phenomenon, however, belongs to a particular discourse that we may call globalist.

Globalism

Following Isin & Wood, we may regard globalism as a discourse that constitutes globalisation as an object (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 92). Therefore, globalism is not a process or a set of realities independent from researchers.[1] It is a 'discourse in which the very idea of globalization is articulated, disseminated, justified, debated, in short, constituted as an object of reflection and analysis' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 94).

Globalist discourse operates at many levels deploying a large variety of descriptive, evaluative and normative judgements—most frequently in a syncretic and eclectic fashion. But one may synthesize some of the approaches so as to group them in three main categories of responses to globalisation.

1. The *first* category includes the positions that express deep concern about globalisation as a new form of domination propelled by a 'homogenization' principle.
2. The *second* comprises those that have a more positive and optimistic outlook resting on what I would call a 'global diversity thesis'.
3. The *third* involves positions that share the pessimism of the first category but explain it via a description that acknowledges more subtle differentiations and accepts the dual nature of globalisation.

The first and third focus on the concentration of power whereas the second on its dispersal. One may associate the first with Eric Hobsbawm, the second with Featherstone, Giddens and Appadurai and the last with Bauman. (It should be noted here that there is nothing 'essential' about the association of the above thinkers with the corresponding positions on globalisation. Categorizations of the above kind serve methodological purposes and can become easily relativized by the polemical shifts that often guide theoretical discussions. For instance, Giddens's approach can be largely associated with the 'global diversity thesis' but when he confronts the glorifications of globalisation that derive from the conservative internationalist camp he adopts a far more sceptical and critical outlook. Therefore, like all generalizations, the above segregation of positions is subject to the vagaries of deliberation.)

1. Hobsbawm deplores the fact that globalisation puts heterogeneity and particularity under threat by imposing a single dominant culture as the model of all operations. Globalisation is 'a state of affairs in which the globe is the essential unit of operation of some human activity, and where this activity is ideally conducted in terms of single, universal, systems of thought, techniques and modes of communication. Other particularities of those who engage in such activities, or of the territories in which they are conducted, are troublesome or, at best, irrelevant' (Hobsbawm, 1998, p. 1).

2. The opposite holds for Featherstone who 'calls into question the homogenization thesis, arguing that globalization often results in indigenization and syncretization of global symbols and hybridization of various local symbols' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 105). To him, complexity is the most important feature of globalisation. He argues that a paradoxical consequence of that phenomenon and the awareness of 'finitude and boundedness of the planet and humanity, is not to produce homogeneity but to familiarize us with greater diversity, the extensive range of the local cultures' (cf. Porter & Vidovich, 2000, p. 451). Giddens singles out and focuses on another positive effect of globalisation, namely, the freedom that stems from the enlargement of the economic, political and cultural horizons of people. Thus, he considers globalisation a 'transformation of space and time in which the development of global systems and networks reduces the hold of local circumstances over people's lives' (Porter & Vidovich, 2000, p. 449).

3. Giddens' approach appears one-sided when compared to Bauman's position. Bauman associates the above kind of freedom with the potentialities of a small percentage of the population worldwide. 'The global network of communication, acclaimed as the gateway to a new and unheard of freedom, is clearly very selectively used; it is a narrow cleft in the thick wall, rather than a gate' (Bauman, 1998, p. 44). The sway of a localizing trend triggers a new social division and hierarchy. The knowledge economy that cancels old modes and relations of production, as well as the movement of the footloose élites and their sense of time are such that secure for the rich an unprecedented independence from the poor. Those are now even removed from the sight of the privileged classes and become so tied to their local circumstances that social mobility seems no longer to be a feasible life option for them. Habermas's analysis converges with Bauman's on this point. As Habermas writes, 'pauperized groups are no longer able to change their social situation by their own efforts' (1998, p. 315). Overall, the third large category of positions we notice in globalist discourse provides a comprehensive and nuanced reading of globalisation but concentrates on a diagnosis of negative global effects. I will return to the positions that have consolidated in globalist discourse thematically after I examine how educational theory has responded to them by generating what I would call 'educational globalism'.

The main positions of general globalism are traceable and informative in educational globalism too. Additionally, within it, one may discern perspectives from which the relation of education and globalisation can be examined. One perspective is concerned with research in ways by which practices, institutions, discourses and structures of education have been affected by globalisation. Another places more emphasis on ways by which educational policies express and respond to the pressures of globalisation (Rizvi & Lingard, 2000, p. 421), i.e. on how education actively engages with the facts of globalisation and often with the promotion of globalizing effects. A third perspective, which appears as yet underdeveloped, explores ways by which education should try to counterbalance the negative effects of globalisation and extend the potentialities of it for all in a democratic fashion. Most authors have dealt with the first two points in a diagnostic mode. [With

respect to this last point, cosmopolitanism can contribute a lot having first being defined in an appropriate way.]

What underlies most approaches, however, is the same feeling of unease, power-lessness and bewilderment that characterizes general globalism. As Gregory Heath remarks, 'education sits in an unfamiliar and interesting position in the face of globalisation. This is new territory for education, its institutions and practitioners' (2002, p. 37). Patrick Fitzsimons comments that, regarding globalisation, 'exactly how education is involved or what it can or should do, is not quite as clear' (2000, p. 505). Overall, education seems to be unsure of its direction regarding globalisation and this is often attributed precisely to the tensions between the global and the local and unity and difference that mark globalist discourse (Fitzsimons, 2000, p. 520).

A Critique of Globalist Positions

The position I defend in relation to the theorization of globalisation, which under-lies the suggestions in the educational frame that will follow, is deontological. By this I mean that my approach is primarily concerned with the imperatives and the impact of globalisation regarding the ethical dimension of intersubjectivity rather than with the economic growth or techno-informational progress it may facilitate. Issues such as productivity, efficiency and profit enter the picture of a deontological approach only when and if they answer the question: for whom? Who or which group of people benefit from globalisation? How are justice and equality affected? What seems to be happening to diversity and cultural plurality in a globalized world? How does the Is of globalisation relates to the Ought of the vision of better conditions for all biota?

Therefore, I shall concentrate on how globalisation is viewed as affecting unity and plurality, social and international justice, and emancipatory enrichment of humanity and protection of natural life. I shall expound my critique thematically by focusing on the issues of (i) the nation-state and territoriality, (ii) diversity and homogeneity, (iii) identity and rootlessness and (iv) equality and life options.

The Nation-state and Territoriality

The nation-state and its prospects constitute a crucial point of contention within globalism. Advocates of globalisation celebrate its challenging impact on the modernist construction of the nation-state because they associate with this configuration the terror of totality and homogeneity and treat it as a barrier to 'cosmopolitanism'. Detractors of globalisation (and of the corresponding appreciative globalist theory) defend the nation-state invoking a very wide spectrum of arguments. For polemical reasons, or due to lack of true engagement in the debate, many thinkers who regard globalisation positively draw a caricature of their opponents and reduce the latter's defense of the nation-state to a conservative and reactionary commitment to obso-lete notions such as consanguinity, community ethos, and cultural purism. 'For some, the de-realisation and de-territorialisation of place associated with the growth of globalisation and symbolic exchange results in a loss of social meaning

and disruption of established senses of community and identity' (Usher, 2002, p. 48). This picture is accurate only for a small group of globalist theorists and within it there is room for a variety of positions, not all of which could be considered as motivated by conservative nationalist concerns. By contrast, there are those who defend the nation-state precisely because they see it as the last bulwark of particularity against the homogenizing flows of globalisation. Additionally, there are thinkers who offer the theoretical means for dissociating the nation-state from the unity *versus* plurality binarism by unmasking operations of domination that use diversity *and* totality equally effectively for their purposes but detrimentally for people and nature.

Let us examine the issue of the nation-state more closely. It may be true that 'the establishment of any sovereign state required as a rule the suppression of state-formative ambitions of many lesser collectivities' (Bauman, 1998, p. 40). But accounts presenting the nation-state as a product of homogenization at the expense of the lives of millions of people by suppressing uprisings, oppositional movements, and so on (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 93) are one-sided and eurocentric. They are so in the sense that they generalize the data that concern major Occidental states to cover all cases of territorial sovereignty on the planet without taking into consideration independence wars and anti-colonial movements. The reason why I pinpoint this has nothing to do with a defense of the nation-state or a belief in its preservation. It aims solely to draw attention to its double nature which problematizes any effort to render the nation-state a scapegoat on which we could project the trials of modernity and establish its overcoming as the new legitimating metaphor of globalisation.

Another reason motivating some globalist theorists to allocate globalisation's challenges of the nation-state immediately into the sphere of progressivism is the assumption that national territoriality is intimately bound up with tribal instincts that impede the just and equal treatment of alterity imposing homogeneity. Globalisation then is presented as the process that disarms territoriality and allows more diasporic and differentiated political configurations to flourish. A concomitant—and equally faulty assumption—is that cosmopolitanism is a simple matter of rootlessness. In turn, this idea leads to a mistaken identification of globalized managerialism and footloose entrepreneurs as 'emerging cosmopolitan classes' (Isin & Wood, 1999, 7). Both assumptions are reflected in the following connection of globalisation and postmodernism. 'If globalization is contesting the sovereignty of the nation-state and making its boundaries permeable, giving rise to various forms of cosmopolitan citizenship, postmodernization is creating new forms of social differentiation, establishing new relationships between class and citizenship' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 23). I will deal with the issue of rootlessness and cosmopolitanism later on but now I will turn to territoriality.

Contrary to the fashionable idea that the territorial principle of political organization emanates from a dormant tribalism, Bauman writes that it 'does not stem from the natural or contrived tribal instincts alone (not even primarily)' (1998, pp. 41–2) and proves that its relation to globalisation is far more complicated. Beneath the surface gloss, and despite its threat to the nation-state, globalisation encourages forms of tribal territoriality for reasons of money and power. The territorial principle is being revived now because 'global finance, trade and information industry

depend for their liberty of movement and their unconstrained freedom to pursue their ends on the political fragmentation, the *morcellement* of the world scene' (Bauman, 1998, p. 42). Thus, homogenizing and imperialist forces use plurality in a strategic way while destroying those aspects of that plurality that would slow down the 'free movement of capital and limit market liberty' (p. 42). 'Far from acting at cross-purposes and being at war with each other, the political "tribalization" and economic "globalization" are close allies and fellow conspirators' (p. 42).

In those circumstances, the task of a profound postmodernist outlook would be, I argue, to unveil the fact that in the complexities of globalisation doubleness borders with duplicity. This becomes more evident if we recall that the debilitating effects of globalizing processes on territorial sovereignty do not affect all nation-states equally. On the contrary, some powerful nations stand up against extra-national publics and stop the globalizing measures the latter impose so long as they do not serve the interests of the former. An obvious and relatively recent example is 'the refusal of the United States to accept one of the few international agreements genuinely accepted by everyone else, namely, the commitment to cut the emission of greenhouse gases down to the required level. It has thus single-handed sabotaged a global measure' (Hobsbawm, 1998, p. 3).

I would like to conclude this section by stressing that if competitiveness damages the significance intersubjectivity may acquire for our lives, then, the nation-state, by not being the only possible carrier of competitiveness, cannot be the only cause of oppression of alterity, culturally or socially. Recalling the cold war, we realize the fact that at that time the nodal points of coexistence and competition were the blocks of states rather than the states themselves (Bauman, 1998, p. 40). And in the Fordist and post-Fordist landscapes, economy has gradually shifted some of the political initiative and control from the nation-state to extra-national formations while preserving and even exacerbating self-interested antagonism[2] among nations[3] and individuals. The persistence of competitiveness and its negative effects (that we cannot take up here)[4] transcending the nation-state ought to put us on guard vis-à-vis postmodern political optimism. Like other things, imperialism takes a new form too. It no longer conquers territories but preserves and intensifies the aggression and competitiveness that used to characterize the nationalist claims of superiority.

Diversity and Homogeneity

However, affirmative responses to globalisation do not herald only the limitations confronting the nation-state. They also discard the idea that the New World order promotes a Western-led homogenization as too simplistic and argue that, though Occidental influence is significant, 'there is a degree of cultural interpenetration, hybridity and fluidity across different localities around the globe' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 94). Equated with either modernization or Westernization, globalisation becomes bereft of the multiplicity of its rationalities. Moreover, within the frame of globalisation-as-modernization the mobilization of encounter and influence of non-western cultures would be underestimated. For many globalist theorists, 'the

"global" and the "local" are not opposing but mutually constituting elements of globalization' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 94).

For Bauman, on the other hand, this complexity and interrelation of the global and the local—what he calls 'glo*ca*lization'—is precisely the vehicle of new modes of domination and oppression of diverse others. Glo*ca*lization as the process of the 'world-wide redistribution of sovereignty, power, and freedom to act' (Bauman, 1998, p. 42) divides the world into the tourists of the planet and the vagabonds of regions, i.e. those that 'inhabit the globe' and the others that 'are chained to place' (p. 45). Moreover, I believe, counterarguments to the positive globalist outlook do not emanate solely from different interpretations and appraisals of the interconnection of the global and local. Doing justice to the qualitative asymmetries of influence among cultures is an additional motivation for turning a critical eye on favourable treatments of globalisation. 'If globalization has to adjust to local particularities, of which "nations" are an important subvariety, particularities are much more powerfully affected by globalization and have to adjust to it or be eliminated by it' (Hobsbawm, 1998, p. 2). Hence, what is sidestepped by the positive category of globalist discourse is the fact that, in certain cases, the difference in degree makes all the difference in the world and the deflationist theorization of modernization and Westernization misdirects globalism.

Consider for instance the fact that to the critical and often dismissive treatments of globalisation through the employment of notions such as 'Americanization', Westernization', and 'McDonaldization' is counterpoised a set of terms such as 'diaspora', 'hybridity', '*metissage* identities' and so on. However, if one thinks over the generality of the latter set of terms one cannot but notice that they do not really articulate processes that run truly counter the occidental domination of cultural influence. Contrasted to the concrete character of the terms signifying one-sided expansion and concentration of power, the generality and vagueness of 'diaspora' and 'hybridity' speaks for a lack of analogous influence of non-western cultures on the western ones rather than a possibility for a more even-handed reshuffling and dispersal of power. None of the defenders of the complexity of cultural interpenetration seems to have terms to offer that account for how the Western world is influenced by non-Western cultures—and that is no accident. The lack of terms theorizing e.g. 'Easternization' is very telling regarding the asymmetries of cultural interplay.

Also, the implicit assumption of some positive treatments of globalisation that cultural influence is a matter of free play in which people select merrily what they find attractive is politically insensitive and sociologically blind to issues of power and control. Capitalism with its subsystems of economy and administration penetrates lifeworlds anchoring in them and often eroding them in ways that go far beyond the scope of cultural merry-go-rounds. Finally, we should take into account the qualitative differences that mark the reception of or, adaptation to, otherness by diverse cultures. Even when western cultures are influenced by others this does not occur with respect to what they really desire but with respect to what they lack. For instance, the 'fastfoodization' of foreign food we notice in the western world has added variety to western eating habits without contributing significantly to changes of western perceptions of time, labor, and lifestyle. Eating Chinese or

Indian or Mexican food relates to cultural sufficiency, desire, social position and overall influence in ways that are strikingly different from those surrounding the introduction of fast food in the non-Western world. Fast food in the latter world goes hand in hand with a change in the conception of time, the sense of worthy activity and the assumptions about what is nutritious or healthy.

Identity and Rootlessness

Many globalists hope that the recognition of the fact that subjectivities are constructions rather than essences will lead to eliminating or complicating the neat categorization of people that usually sparks off wars, violence, exclusion and racism. It is true that phenomena of globalisation could be credited with a reassertion of fluid, diasporic, hybrid and contingent identities but this is only one side of the story. Only by way of a logical leap one could justify the identification of fluidity as such with its potential fruitful political interpretation. That is to say, the diasporic and the hybrid identity on their own do not determine the conditions of their political treatment or their cultural reception and ethical significance. To give an example, the relativized identity of footloose élites does not appear very helpful when they negotiate in the good old capitalist fashion about their interests. Worse, it does not seem to enter the picture when they display the disarming innocence of the unsuspecting with regard to their own, subtle or manifest, complicities.

   In this respect, rootlessness may be a disguise of a deep and unreflective rootedness in the Occidental culture of performativity, modernization and profit. A closer look shows that the hope that rootlessness is the royal route to transcending a tyrannical conception of identity is grounded in problematic and ethnocentric premises. Let us first examine an example of the attention rootlessness has received. In certain locations, the space-time compression results in globalized senses of place. This 'can lead to what Benko refers to as non-places, spaces "devoid of the symbolic expressions of identity, relations and history: examples include airports, motoways, anonymous hotel rooms, public transport"—and possibly even cyberspace' (cf. Usher, 2002, p. 47). This phenomenon invites a careful interpretation. In my opinion, the anonymity of a hotel room, instead of rendering it a non-place, is precisely one of the features that root it in a particular culture in relational distinction to non-anonymous space. The sense of normalcy it enjoys because it is ours empties it in our eyes of any content as we forget that its lack of name is exactly what makes it northwestern, i.e. ours and nobody else's.

   As to airports being non-places, once again, this idea mirrors our ethnocentric forgetfulness that efficiency, passports, security, regional or racial origin and so on, are still loaded with various cultural meanings. For instance, as Habermas argues, international flights, global stock market transactions, the millennium, conferences etc, are scheduled by the Christian calendar (1998, p. 307). I believe that this example proves that the identity of the supposed non-places, which is not discernible to us when we assume that history and culture are cancelled out when conventionally standardized, is surely felt by those who follow our conventions temporarily and then return to their own. 'World air travel is possible because of a number of

arrangements which link all airports and airlines of the globe, and which are handled in a standardized manner everywhere and, in fact, with the use of a single language of communication for all essential technicians anywhere in the world' (Hobsbawm, 1998, p. 1). Thus, the so-called rootlessness and its supposed mani-festations speak more for the homogenizing effects of globalisation and the euro-centrism they encourage rather than the redemption of pluralism. If there is freedom from the constraints of identity, that freedom is for those others who make the effort to adjust to our normalized and eurocentrically anonymized modes of existence.

Equality and Life Options

The approaches I have placed in the large category of affirmative theorizations of globalisation also converge in their appreciation of the new opportunities for improvement of people's lives. 'The movement of people, money, and information across national and cultural boundaries means that we now have access to markets, cultural practices, and products as never before. This access clearly has the poten-tial for enriching our lives by providing lifestyle and employment options that were once beyond our reach. […] Even the remotest cultural traditions are now readily accessible to us' (Rizvi & Lingard, 2000, p. 419). It is true that politically pessimist globalist discourses often downplay these opportunities or unduly demystify them as being a smoke screen. But the undue emphasis on prospects for equality and enlarged existential choice founders upon serious problems too. These involve issues such as for whom the employment options are truly available, what happens to cultures that are not very adaptable to the globalizing rationale and to what extent (and filtered through what) remote cultures are really accessible.

Besides, any account of globalisation, precisely those which purport to grasp the complexities and paradoxes of the phenomenon, must pay attention to the fundamental inequalities that solidify or emerge from the course of restratification (Bauman, 1998, p. 43) effected through globalisation. As Habermas diagnoses, 'the gap between the living conditions of the employed, the underemployed, and the unemployed is widen-ing' (1998, p. 315). Globalisation as, primarily, 'a redistribution of privileges and deprivations, of wealth and poverty, of resources and impotence' (Bauman, 1998, p. 43) widens the scope of choice for some and drastically narrows it for some others.

Given that our times are marked 'by the structural menace to the welfarist domestication of capitalism and by the revival of a neoliberalism unhampered by considerations of social justice' (Habermas, 1998, p. 314),[5] equality is sacrificed on the altar of performativity. A consequence of economic globalisation and the competitiveness it has imposed is the transformation and reduction of the welfare state mirrored in the fact that benefits drop, access to social security is toughened and pressure on the unemployed is increased (Habermas, 1998, p. 315).

Educational Globalist Discourse

The dilemmas and tensions of globalism are noticeable in educational theory too. Some commentators concentrate on the complexities of the global knowledge

economy and their impact on education directing their endeavours in a theorization of the new possibilities. Novel conceptions of spatiality, the cyberspace, and diaspora (Usher, 2002) as well as the features of knowledge economy (Peters, 2002)[6] attract the attention of theorists in a way that often refrains from painting a gloomy picture—or sometimes creates a picture that is even overtly optimist.

Some others refer to the fact that globalisation threatens traditional forms and structures of pedagogy to render them obsolete (Heath, 2002). Haynes (2002, p. 103) contrasts the conception of the university 'as a community of academics engaged in a range of traditions or practices' with its conception as a 'quasi-governmental administrative entity'—a conception shaped by globalizing procedures and the tolerance or welcome they encounter in educational systems and policies. The latter conception should be combated because it reduces the university to an organization 'employing workers to value-add to customers intending to maximise personal economic rewards from future engagement in a more competitive national economy' (p. 103).

Others focus not so much on the threats confronting tradition and community but rather on what they view as an overwhelming tendency of the globalized world to treat education solely as a means to an end (Coxon, 2002, pp. 69–70). Education, then, turned to a commodity (Bagnall, 2002, p. 81), becomes 'instrumental to goods which lie outside the realm of knowledge and rational or critical understanding' (Heath, 2002, p. 38).[7] In this way, it is complicitous in the cultivation of consumptive subjectivities (Fitzsimons, 2000, p. 519) and the promotion of policies that aim to 'ensure the competitiveness of the national economy in the face of globalization' disregarding the democratic deficits they involve (Rizvi & Lingard, 2000, p. 421). Such deficits affect detrimentally, among other things, gender sensitive state policies and educational practices (Blackmore, 2000).[8]

True, there is a positive side in the relation of globalisation and education which seems to relate chiefly to new modes of encouraging multiculturalism, group differentiated citizenship, diversity and cross-cultural encounters. However, this admission should not be overgeneralized and exaggerated lest the negative side will be obscured and covered up. Some educationalists have already acknowledged that the educational systems of the newer states emerging as a result of recent developments in world affairs 'may be shaped by some degree by colonialism' (Dale, 2000, p. 446). Bagnall argues that the internationalisation of higher education may be seen as 'counter-ethical to the extent that it is irremediably cultural hegemonic regardless of the efforts that are made to be sensitive and responsive to the cultures into which it is marketed' (2002, p. 85). Others diagnose a homogenizing linguistic imperialism operating in educational systems worldwide endangering linguistic diversity and plurality (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2001; Phillipson, 2001). And, in spite of the fact that the extent of global educational curricular homogeneity is contestable, it is evident that it imposes, at least to some degree, a kind of world culture. This favors unity rather than plurality since isomorphism of curricular categories across the world applies 'irrespectively of national, economic, political and cultural differences' (Dale, 2000, p. 430). To summarize, globalisation regarding education is guilty of a promotion of unity over plurality through cultural imperialism (Porter & Vidovich,

2000, p. 451) and the cultivation of antagonism.[9] Via market imperialism, it is guilty of vocationalization of higher education, privatisation of educational responsibility and benefit, dependence of accountability on educational outcomes and 'competitive marketization of educational institutions and their services' (Bagnall, 2002, p. 78).

Overall, this kind of educational globalist critique of the unethical consequences of globalisation shares nothing—in most cases—with reactionary or conservative notions attached to narrow conceptions of value, identity and cultural homogeneity. It also reflects the concerns of the equivalent tendencies within general globalism. What is more important is that this educational critique displays a very 'healthy' reaction to the connection of globalisation and competitiveness. It seems to be well aware of the fact that the system encourages self-regarding rather than ethical conduct through an assumption of 'enlightened self-interest through individual choice' (Bagnall, 2002, pp. 81-2) and condemns it relentlessly. 'Education has been seen as the key factor in honing states' competitive edge with respect to each other' (Dale, 2000, p. 441), which means that local diversity is promoted only to the extent that it is conducive to the goals of the market. Thus, situational sensitivity serves a largely Western, privatized, and ego-centred set of cultural values (Bagnall, 2002, p. 86). Due to a conflation of conflict and antagonism, postmodernism often becomes a secret accomplice of the market by associating dissent, pluralism and competition. The awareness 'that highly competitive, unregulated, marketised systems do not, in fact, encourage educational (or any other "product") diversity, at least beyond a particular minimal level' (p. 82), should lead us to questioning this hasty identification of antagonism as the inexhaustible source of the new and the unknown.

Suggestions

As I mentioned in my introductory comments, educational philosophical globalism performs diagnostic interventions rather than concrete and deontological suggestions for change. Or, it draws from the suggestions offered within general globalism. The latter has produced a wide spectrum of speculations about the future of the globalizing world, some of which have a clearly normative character and mirror the position one takes regarding the significance of globalisation. I shall examine some of these ideas (regardless of whether they have been used in education or not) in order to move to my own suggestions.

First of all, I believe, identity politics sometimes approximates conservatism and purism wishing cultures to remain as they are, supposedly uncontaminated by obtrusive otherness. It tries to arrest time and sees change as violation and distortion. The solutions it offers do not touch upon issues of power but rather on issues of communal bonds and preservation of the 'spirit' of collectivities. More than anything, the emphasis on the idea of community is no antidote to globalisation 'but one of its indispensable global corollaries simultaneously products (*sic*) and conditions' (Bauman, 1998, p. 43).

Part of the postmodernist discourse that seems to be less troubled by globalisation imagines a future in which diversity and hybridity will effect new forms of

solidarity. Kristeva's position seems to me to be exemplary of this trend. Admitting that one is strange to oneself creates a sense of solidarity among us because 'we all belong to a future type of humanity which will be made entirely of foreigners/strangers who try to understand each other' (1998, p. 323). To my mind, this position betrays overgeneralizations, is completely negligent of the complex politics of difference and normalizes the experiences of one as being those of all.[10] Worse, it not only misses all the tensions and negative effects that material and symbolic competitiveness produces but it even justifies them through a very misguided and conservative pragmatism. This is evident by the following. Kristeva mentions cultural difference as something we have to pay attention to but, as she adds, 'still, we are fully aware of the risks that may come with such an attitude: ignorance of contemporary economic reality, excessive union demands, inability to take part in international competition, idleness, backwardness. This is why we need to be alert and always remember the new constraints of our technological world, of "causes and effects"' (1998, p. 329). Kristeva's main suggestion, however, reflects a psychoanalytic rather than a sociopolitical problematic—and a very dubious one—as the next citation shows. 'In order to fight the state of national depression that we have in France (and in other countries as well) as a result of globalization and the influx of immigrants, and also in order to oppose maniacal reactions to this depression (such as that of the National Front), it is important to restore national confidence' (p. 326). Here, the association of national depression with globalisation and the influx of immigrants is negligent of other important factors. As for the idea of restoring national confidence, in its vagueness, it accommodates the worldwide pressures for more competitive nation-states instead of fighting them.

Other approaches along similar lines derive a 'critical' aspect of globalisation from the very lack of coherence and unity characterizing this phenomenon. As I have mentioned previously, this move takes a leap of thought that is arbitrary and, arguably, in underestimating the negative signs of globalisation, it makes unwittingly common cause with the market. A more sophisticated variation of this theme connects the unpredictability of globalizing realities with the possibility for the emergence of a critical localism (Fitzsimons, 2000). But as Habermas argues, local governmental measures 'would bring about local advantages, but would not change the pattern of international competition between countries. Economic globalisation, no matter how we look at it, destroys a historical constellation in which, for a certain period, the welfare state compromise was possible. This compromise, to be sure, is by no means the ideal solution of a problem inherent to capitalism, but it has after all succeeded in keeping the social costs within accepted limits' (1998, p. 316).

Now, Habermas seems to opt for the opposite solution, i.e. instead of critical localism he defends the idea of differentiated international publics. To him, welfare functions may be rescued if transferred from the nation-state to larger political units that can catch up with transnationalized economy (1998, p. 317). A supranational politics catching up with markets would promote the transformation of the world into a community of solidarity placing the emphasis on generalizable interests.

However, this solution is also problematic for nothing guarantees that these publics will truly serve the interests of all people. Habermas admits a similar weakness when he writes that 'the creation of larger political units leads to defensive alliances opposed to the rest of the world, but does not change the mode of competition between countries as such' (p. 317). Hence he sets the following precondition that he hopes it will have a reforming effect on human relations. 'Only under the pressure of the changing consciousness of citizens, and of its impact on the field of domestic affairs, may those collective actors capable of acting globally come to perceive themselves differently, that is, increasingly as members of a community that leaves them no choice but cooperation and compromise' (pp. 318–9). Now, if we consider the role education plays in the shaping and change of the consciousness of future citizens, we realize that the need for new pedagogical ideals is compelling. These will undo the effects of dominant ideals such as the individualist and the technicist that have elevated antagonism to a major given of human coexistence. I suggest, then, that we search for or construct those ideals the educational cultivation of which will encourage a different way of relating to otherness. And here is where cosmopolitanism enters the picture.

There has been a revived interest in cosmopolitanism recently that has created, in my opinion, two major tendencies: one is to understand cosmopolitanism in a pragmatist way as mobility, rootlessness, openness to different lifestyles and detachment from the nation-state;[11] the other adds to it strong legal and ethical dimensions. The former derives from a confused and under-theorized equation of the everyday use of the term with the philosophical one whereas the latter attempts to reformulate the notion drawing from the philosophical tradition but couching it in a more adequate philosophical idiom. The former, light-hearted, sense of cosmopolitanism can be encountered in the work of many contemporary and influential political philosophers like Jeremy Waldron (2000) and to a lesser degree even in Bruce Ackerman (1994). The latter, deeper, sense of cosmopolitanism can be found in Nussbaum's renegotiation of Stoicism and in neo-Kantian and post-Kantian political philosophies. The notion of cosmopolitanism I see as compatible with the above mentioned educational suggestion is this latter one, but as I argue elsewhere, it has first to address some serious criticisms, which here I shall only briefly summarize. First, it must distance itself from a 'tourist' conception of cosmopolitanism. It must also show that it does not rest on obsolete philosophical accounts of the self i.e. accounts that give antagonism ontological citizenship and establish it as an inescapable human reality (Papastephanou, 2002). Then it must prove that it is not a secret accomplice of ethnocentrism and finally that it does not express the concerns of a paternalistic and elitist small group of intellectuals (Lu, 2000).

What is important here is that only a reformulated conception of cosmopolitanism and its transference to educational goal-setting can address the need for a change of consciousness and frame it legally and ethically. The relevance of the legal dimension is demonstrated by the fact that all efforts to counterbalancing the negative side of globalisation founder upon a fundamental lack. As Habermas writes, 'what is lacking is the emergence of a cosmopolitan solidarity, less binding, of course, than the civic solidarity that has emerged within nation-states' (1998,

p. 319). The ethical dimension concerns the fact that true cosmopolitanism is not just about openness to alternative ways of life but involves also the duty to material aid and transnational redistribution (Nussbaum, 2000).

In this context, it becomes apparent that, whereas globalisation regarding education concerns new global policies and the structural changes of schooling they are causing, the cosmopolitan pedagogical ideal should concern the cultivation of resistant, critical and reflective subjectivities. It should concern the effort to minimize the risks for individuals and cultures and maximize the positive potentialities of globalisation in a fairer way by encouraging non-competitive feelings to others and acknowledging that there are more than just negative duties towards them.

Conclusion

A very powerful objection to what I have suggested above would involve the assumption that the cultivation of non-competitive attitudes is unrealistic because antagonism is—supposedly—intrinsic in human nature. Because people are self-centred beings, the excessive competitiveness we notice nowadays among individuals and nations is not a pathology but rather a side-effect of an otherwise much desired freedom of thought and action. However, one of the very few points on which postmodernist trends—and globalism that concerns us here—converge is that postmodern discourse is de-essentializing, although the implications of this appear not to be fully recognized yet. Had they been recognized, the objection would have lost its meaning. For, if there are no essential characteristics of humanity, then no possibility of becoming could be blocked from the start. A rejection of assumptions such as the antagonistic nature of people should become part of anti-essentialism as much as the questioning of identity, transcendentalism, rationalism and absolute truth. Consequently, a discourse or practice that relies tacitly on the idea that people are self-serving and interest-driven cannot be de-essentialist or at least not all the way. Some postmodernists are led astray by their conflation of agonistics with antagonism and their hasty glorification of conflict. By omitting to draw the necessary distinctions within conflict, they weaken its explanatory power and transcendentalize it by making it an almost mystical source of innovation and progress. They do so as they hope that in this way they protect heterogeneity and lose sight of the fact that antagonism is the worst enemy precisely of that kind of cosmopolitanism that recognizes and defends plurality. If the major issue is to change the consciousness of people, then education has a heavy burden, because people often become what they are taught that they are. Thus, in the endeavour to problematize external borders, many postmodernists forget that borders are sometimes internal and their overcoming presupposes a dismantling of the binarisms (e.g. internal vs external, nature vs culture etc.) that have grounded them. By emphasizing so much the overcoming of external borders we overlook the complex interplay of internal and external. Such an 'internal' border—philosophical, psychological, and moral—is the one created by the assumption of closed and competitive subjectivities.

Habermas states that 'the Hobbesian problem of how to create and to stabilize social order is too big a challenge, on the global scale as well, for the capacity of

rational egotists to cooperate' (1998, p. 319). Postmodernist philosophers have taken great pains to demonstrate that the rational egotists are not exactly rational. It remains now to demonstrate that they are not necessarily egotists either. It is perhaps then that the intellectual and emotional significance of the physical annihilation of space that Dewey mentioned will be secured.

Notes

1. It should be noted here that not only philosophers and academics but many others participate in the constitution of globalization as discourse, e.g. government officials, journalists, social movements, artists, managers, politicians, etc.
2. 'There can be little doubt that there has been an intensification of economic competition among nations, regions, and industries with dramatic changes in state policies, markets, and work' (Porter & Vidovich, 2000, p. 453).
3. On how the international competitiveness places the nation-states in a self-contradictory position, see Habermas (1998, p. 316).
4. On the dangerous impact of competitiveness and the pursuit of self-interest on gender issues, see Blackmore (2000, pp. 480–1) and on personal relations generally, see Haynes (2002, p. 108).
5. Many educationalists also see neoliberalism as the underpinning logic of the most recent wave of globalization (Fitzsimons, 2000, p. 505; Blackmore, 2000).
6. Knowledge economy 'allegedly differs from the traditional economy with an emphasis on what I shall call the "economics of abundance", the "annihilation of distance", "deterritoralisation of the state", the importance of "local knowledge", and "investment in human capital" (and its embedding in processes)' (Peters, 2002, p. 94).
7. 'Not least of the ironies is that in the knowledge economy, knowledge and its legitimation is controlled by the consumers rather than the producers of knowledge' (ibid.).
8. As for the optimist view that schooling can now better contribute to a meritocratic stratification structure, it is debatable first and foremost due to the philosophical challenges the notion of meritocracy faces today.
9. Grubb uses the book *A Nation at Risk* (US Government Printing, 1983) as a source of a major strand of new vocationalism in American education and he writes that this book epitomizes the insistent economic rhetoric of this strand of new vocationalism 'the great threat to our country's future was "a rising tide of mediocrity" in the schools, causing a decline in competitiveness with the Japanese, the South Koreans, and the Germans' (Grubb, 1996, p. 2).
10. This becomes more apparent when she writes (1998, p. 323), 'whatever its ostracisms and difficulties with foreigners, on American soil I feel foreigner just like all the other foreigners'. The problem here is the equation of all foreigners and their feelings and experiences.
11. Consider, for instance, the following comment: 'the new professional-managerial groups have become less concerned about national interests and turned their back on the nation-state: they display cosmopolitan tendencies' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 101).

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