STUDYDADDY

Get Homework Help From Expert Tutor

Get Help

Copyright © 1995 National Endowment for Democracy and the Johns Hopkins University Press. All rights reserved.

Journal of Democracy 6.1 (1995) 146-158

Redemocratization in Chile

Manuel Antonio Garretón

Political democratization is the process of establishing, strengthening, or extending the principles, mechanisms, and institutions that define a democratic regime. [1] This may be done through *democratic founding*, meaning the generation of a democratic regime for the first time in a given society. It may also be done through *political redemocratization* where a democratic regime had existed previously and was replaced by an authoritarian one. Or it may be done through the *extension* or *deepening* of existing democratic institutions where the point of departure is a semidemocratic or protodemocratic regime. Transitions to democracy belong to the second type of political democratization. In Latin America over the last few decades, we have witnessed very few foundings (Central America), some extensions (Mexico and Colombia), and numerous transitions from authoritarian, usually military, regimes (Southern Cone).

Political redemocratization consists of several phases. The first is *transition*, meaning the initial passage from an authoritarian or military regime to a basic set of democratic institutions. Transition ends with the *inauguration* of the new democratic government. Both transition and inauguration must be distinguished from *consolidation*, that is, the strengthening of the new regime over a period of time.

While a transition generally has a fairly distinct starting and ending point, consolidation is difficult to define. One fruitful approach is to identify factors that contribute to the maintenance of democracy over time and that vary from one society to another. It may also prove **[End Page 146]** helpful to distinguish consolidation from what it is *not*, such as *meaningfulness*--that is, democracy's capacity to fulfill the tasks that are proper to a regime. In other words, a democracy can become consolidated, yet remain unable to cope with the problems that it is supposed to solve (governance, citizenship, and institutional frameworks for resolving demands and conflicts).

The most salient feature of redemocratization in contemporary Latin America is its limited, strictly political, character. With so many Latin transitions beginning from the starting point of military rule, their dominant motif is negotiation and institutional mediation between power-holders and opposition. Such transitions typically occur within the institutional framework of the authoritarian regime, with one of the opposition's main problems being how to work from within this framework in order to change it and achieve democratic institutions. The outcome, not surprisingly, is often *incomplete* democracy, a regime basically democratic but riddled with

inherited authoritarian enclaves: nondemocratic institutions, unresolved human rights problems, and social actors not fully willing to play by democratic rules.

New democratic governments must therefore seek to eliminate (or at least contain) authoritarian enclaves with one hand, while initiating the process of consolidation with the other. In Latin America today, democratization is related to a new phase of socioeconomic development and modernization as well as to profound political change. Democratic consolidation is thus associated with two tasks. The first is the definition of a new model for economic development and insertion into the world economy that can point the way to the elimination of structural poverty. The second is the transformation of relations among the state, political parties, and social actors in a manner aimed at strengthening their autonomy and mutual complementarity.

From Crisis to Plebiscite

Any attempt to understand the transition in Chile must begin with a look at the period from the military regime's first crisis in 1981-82 to the plebiscite of 5 October 1988, in which voters rejected another eight-year presidential term for dictator Augusto Pinochet. [2] The main issue of this period for the regime was whether it could maintain itself according to the terms of its own institutionalization. For the opposition, the question was whether it could unite and find a way to turn the partial crisis of the regime into a final one.

The democracy reinaugurated on 11 March 1990 succeeded a military regime that had partially resolved its own socioeconomic crisis. The period 1982-89 was not just a time of crisis management; it also saw economic recovery and recomposition. Unlike many of its counterparts elsewhere in Latin America, the democratic government that took office **[End Page 147]** in Chile in 1990 did not inherit an economic crisis. True, the economic-policy problems it faced were very serious and needed fundamental correction, but they were *not* such as to require emergency measures, which might polarize society or leave the former opposition divided against itself in the face of still-powerful authoritarian foes.

The 1980s also witnessed the ongoing political institutionalization of the military regime, a process that was guided by the Constitution of 1980. This Constitution would furnish the framework for the future transition to democracy, not least because it would appear to the military as its only guide for the future as its larger socioeconomic program began to collapse. The opposition, likewise, found in the 1980 Constitution a clue to solving the classic problem of how to get rid of a dictatorship that cannot be directly overthrown and replaced, even though it can be destabilized by popular mobilization.

In the end, the 1988 plebiscite frustrated the expectations of Pinochet and his lieutenants: designed to cap a process of authoritarian institutionalization, the vote instead unleashed a transition and a change of regime. Yet this transition had to go forward while Pinochet, although relinquishing the presidency, nonetheless retained a powerful institutional presence in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Moreover, the transition had to leave untouched numerous bastions of institutionalized authoritarianism.

Still another process that characterized the years 1982 to 1989, and which continues to have consequences for the future of democracy in Chile, concerns the opposition to the military regime. During those years, the social and cultural opposition that predominated during the first decade of military rule began to be overshadowed by social mobilizations and protests, and afterwards by more politically oriented goals. Chilean opposition leaders learned much from such international examples of democratization as the elections in the Philippines and Argentina, the transition in Spain, and the plebiscite in Uruguay, among other cases. The key

lesson, perhaps, concerned the need to stay unified and work within existing institutional channels.

From the opposition triumph in the plebiscite of 5 October 1988 to the presidential and parliamentary elections of December 1989, three main processes unfolded. First, the opposition coalition that had formed to encourage votes against continuing General Pinochet in the presidency--the Concertación de Partidos por el No--transformed itself into a potential governing group: the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. It selected Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin as its presidential candidate, fielded a unified slate of parliamentary candidates, and adopted a platform. Second, an agreement on proposed constitutional amendments was signed between the opposition and one of the right-wing parties (the Partido de Renovación Nacional, or PRN) that had been providing the regime with much of its "soft-line" support. Third, **[End Page 148]** Pinochet arranged the passage of a series of laws designed to reinforce certain authoritarian mechanisms and institutions.

Chile's redemocratization bears the imprint of all these processes, both the more recent ones and the ones that can be traced back to the early 1980s.

First, the Aylwin government did not inherit a full-blown economic crisis. Although serious socioeconomic challenges remained-- unemployment, social equity, income redistribution, productive transformation, lack of regulations, state modernization, tax reform, health, and education--these did not amount to an urgent crisis that could distract the new regime from its main goal of completing the political transition.

Second, three authoritarian enclaves remained: 1) the institutional enclave represented by the Constitution of 1980 and its many restrictions on popular sovereignty, including Pinochet-controlled senatorial appointments, antimajoritarian features in the electoral system, the autonomy of the armed forces from civilian control, and so on; 2) the ethical-symbolic enclave represented by all the unresolved cases of human rights violations left behind by the military regime; and 3) the continuing presence of a "Pinochetist" hard core centering around Pinochet himself, who remained as commander-in-chief of the Chilean armed forces, with a term extending to 1998.

Third, unique among contemporary instances of redemocratization, the end result in Chile was a democratic government formed by almost the entire spectrum of opposition to the old dictatorship. Democracy was reinaugurated by a social, political, and electoral majority, a coalition of the center and center-left (the main parties being Christian Democracy in the center and the Socialist Party and Party for Democracy on the left) that cast the political sectors linked to the military regime in a minority role. At the same time, however, the democratic majority could not make its presence fully felt in institutional terms, which hindered its ability to address demands for social change.

Aylwin's Strategy of Consolidation

In order to securely consolidate democracy, this new majority had to overcome remaining redoubts of authoritarianism while initiating a process of modernization and social democratization that could diminish poverty and increase the autonomy of social actors, especially those in the popular sectors of Chilean society. In the prosecution of these tasks, the new government's democratic legitimacy and the absence of economic crisis were great advantages.

To call the coalition government that was sworn in under President Patricio Aylwin on 11 March 1990 a "transitional government" would be a grave misnomer. The real transitional government, ironically, was **[End Page 149]** Pinochet's own regime, which found itself pressed

into this role against its will when its leader lost the October 1988 plebiscite. Overnight, the regime went from being an institutionalized dictatorship to being a dictatorial transition government. Hence the incomplete and distorted character of the transition that ensued.

President Aylwin, whose term was reduced to four years under the constitutional changes agreed on in 1989, was the head of a fully democratic *government* in a less than fully democratic *regime*. But he and his main advisors made the mistake of seeing themselves as transitional authorities, thus limiting their own goals. The question of what makes a government "transitional" is not merely an academic or semantic affair, for the answer points to certain political options. The Aylwin administration's own self-definition, for instance, led it to concentrate on two tasks: preventing any authoritarian regression and maintaining macroeconomic stability. The administration succeeded at both, even if the scope of its mission was restricted.

The Aylwin administration's strategy was to deal separately with each type of authoritarian enclave, and always with a watchful eye on the overarching goals of democratic stability and sound economic management. On the institutional front, the presence of a cohesive bloc of Pinochet-appointed senators led the government to set aside any plans for sweeping constitutional change and to focus instead on municipal-level democratization. When at last constitutional reform did wind up in Congress (in 1993), it failed. On human rights, the most important moves were the creation of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and the provision of compensation to victims and their families. Critical problems remain, however, regarding the composition and role of the judiciary and the amnesty law that bars trials of military personnel. [3] The government's attempts to address these have been halfhearted and inconsequential, drawing little social or political support.

As for Pinochet, while he has been isolated politically, he nonetheless retains a very strong institutional power base in the nearly autonomous Armed Forces High Command. In May 1993, he showed that he was not above ordering ominous troop mobilizations as a means of publicly pressuring the civilian government.

Perhaps following the decisive plebiscite of 1988 and the elections of 1989, the new government could have used its great legitimacy to overcome right-wing opposition and undertake profound political and socioeconomic reform. This could have been done, moreover, without risking the country's economic equilibrium or achievements. But the government felt that it could not afford to risk an authoritarian regression, and so chose to seek merely incremental changes on particular points. Although this strategy went by the name of "consensual democracy," it actually ran contrary to the tradition that defines consensual democracy as "agreement on fundamentals," for no **[End Page 150]** truly momentous issues (for example, human rights, the constitution, electoral-system reform, civilian authority over the military, or the choice of a socioeconomic model) were really confronted or settled.

Thus the first post-Pinochet government presents a picture of success on immediate objectives accompanied by inaction on deeper problems. Under Aylwin there was respect for freedom, the rule of law, and human rights; a policy of truth-telling and reparations (though not of justice and punishment) regarding the old regime's human rights violations; the political isolation of Pinochet; and the foreclosure of authoritarian regression as a live possibility. All these represented real achievements that opened a new epoch in Chilean history. Yet none of these advances was backed up by solid institutional reforms or the eradication of authoritarian enclaves. Vital tasks of transition remained unfinished, awaiting completion in the next democratic period.

A rather paradoxical aspect of the first phase was that the incomplete transition and the persisting authoritarian enclaves held no threat of an authoritarian or military regression. Thus the postauthoritarian regime was consolidated. [4] Yet what was consolidated was, to borrow

from Juan Linz, a "democratic situation" rather than a democratic regime. Hence the paradox of advanced consolidation on many fronts (macroeconomic stability, sustained growth, and a strong and reliably democratic governing coalition) coexisting with an uncompleted transition. Both sides of the current regime, the democratic and the nondemocratic, are being consolidated simultaneously, with authoritarian regression and further democratic reform alike receding as possibilities.

The Second Democratic Government

December 1993 witnessed the first parliamentary and presidential elections to replace the democratic authorities elected after the end of military rule. Two main political and electoral coalitions competed for seats in the two-chamber parliament. One (the Unión por el Progreso) was formed by the two main opposition parties on the right: the Unión Demócrata Independiente, more identified with the military government, and the PRN, which was more oriented toward the new democracy. [5] The other political pact, the ruling Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, was formed mainly by the Christian Democrats, the party with the greatest support, plus the Partido por la Democracia and Partido Socialista (along with minor parties such as the Partido Radical and Partido Democrático Independiente). The Concertación won in both chambers, but the presence of the nine Pinochet-appointed senators was enough to deny it a majority in the upper house, which also contains seats for 38 elected senators and all living ex-presidents (excluding Aylwin, who did not complete a regular eight-year term). Moreover, the majoritarian-binomial electoral system left behind by Pinochet (each **[End Page 151]** district elects two persons, favoring the first minority) prevented the Concertacíon from obtaining the legislative majorities it needed to pass its preferred package of new laws and constitutional changes.

In the presidential race, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, the son and namesake of a former Chilean president, obtained 58 percent of the vote and took office in March 1994. Frei had previously defeated Socialist leader Ricardo Lagos in an intra-Concertacíon race for the role of coalition presidential candidate.

Whatever one might criticize in the Aylwin administration's agenda and strategy, no one could deny that they were clear. When Frei and his lieutenants took office four years later, however, they seemed at a loss to gauge the political situation they faced or to formulate a coherent plan for dealing with it. Two factors account for these difficulties. The first is the way in which the higher authorities under the president were constituted. Unlike his predecessor, Frei formed his first cabinet with the chiefs of the various party factions, thus jeopardizing prospects for coherent leadership. The parties, in turn, have become more concerned with who is getting which cabinet post than with their traditional functions--interest representation and policy elaboration. This was partially corrected six months later, but in a way that created tensions inside the coalition: political leadership in the cabinet was assigned to a single minister, a Christian Democrat.

The second, more ideological reason for the new administration's travails was the hazy debate about priorities that it blundered into. [6] During its first six months, the government was very effective at maintaining the president's high standing with the public, but never clearly spelled out what was at stake politically. It was unable to define political goals and strategy concerning the remaining tasks of political democratization. As a consequence, the right-wing opposition in Congress, though a minority, has been able to set the political agenda. Only in August 1994 did the government present a proposal for constitutional reform. However, of five reforms under consideration it selected only two--the elimination of appointive Senate seats and the streamlining of the lawmaking process--to send to Congress. As of this writing, the fate of these two reforms remains uncertain.

It would not be accurate to say that Chile has solved the problem of political democratization and now faces only problems of economic development and modernization--that is, problems of a nonpolitical nature. Instead, there looms on one side the challenge posed by a minority that is not entirely democratic but *is* well organized and capable of vetoing any change in the institutional framework from which it currently benefits despite its weak electoral support. On the other side is a deeper problem that touches on the nature of our epoch and the meaning of politics everywhere: How can a society comprehensively address the economic, political, social, and cultural tasks that face it, **[End Page 152]** recognizing that all of them are equally important and cannot be postponed or reduced one to another?

A Preliminary Balance

As long as the transition remains incomplete, the *quality* of democracy will remain poor. This is reflected in the absence of national debate about crucial aspects of Chile's future. Clearly, macroeconomic equilibrium has been maintained and improved, and extreme poverty has been reduced. But there has been no serious discussion about the model that Chile should follow in order to modernize itself and find its place in the world economy; nor has the problem of inequality been much ameliorated. [7] The general public opinion is that democracy is very weak and the military threat still a live one, that human rights problems have not been solved, and that the end of dictatorship and the return to democracy have not changed the personal situation of the average Chilean.

True, there is freedom today, and social indicators are improving, but social actors are extremely weak, whether older ones like unions and peasant movements, or newer ones like local, environmental, or youth movements. The only actors with an important presence are business and some professional organizations. Because the center-left Concertación has been so successful in administering the government, some emerging conflicts and actors in society have found it hard to find political channels of expression. For example, old social actors like national unions no longer feel fully represented by the political parties to which their leaders belong, and newer issues regarding the environment, local and regional interests, poverty, and modernization seem unable to find organized social or political actors to express and represent them. Also, the Concertacíon itself lacks institutional mechanisms for ensuring a balance between competition and unity among its components. [8] Finally, while there is no longer a full-blown authoritarian challenge, the political right and the military have not entirely shed their attachment to the Pinochet years.

It is difficult to assess to what extent the processes of transition and consolidation have generated a new set of relations between the state, the party system, and various social actors. [9] In fact, each of these three possesses greater autonomy than in the past, but this does not mean that they are stronger. The state's high legitimacy is accompanied by a weak capacity to effect social and political reform, while society's greater autonomy is accompanied by the weakness of actors and representation. As for the party system, its strength is counterbalanced by a dramatic shift in the nature of politics, where ideas and programs have to a large extent been replaced by interest-group maneuvers and strategic jockeying among political elites. This shift threatens to separate politics from the **[End Page 153]** needs and interests of the people. Finally, linking these three components is the democratic regime, where the absence of an authoritarian threat is counterbalanced by the persistence of authoritarian enclaves that can hobble further efforts at the institutional consolidation of democracy.

The State of Public Opinion

A look at public opinion tends to confirm what we have said so far. [10] In a 1993 survey, for instance, the largest share of respondents (23 percent) said that the most important goal of

democracy is "equal opportunity for all." A roughly equal proportion (22 percent) endorsed the "elimination of poverty" as democracy's primary objective, with "creating a climate of peace" and "improving the life conditions of people" following at 16 and 14 percent, respectively. "Human rights," "freedom of expression," "participation," and "protection and personal security" were each chosen by fewer than 10 percent of all respondents. This is evidence that Chileans conceive the main goals of democracy in terms of what remains to be achieved: widespread socioeconomic development and equal opportunity for all. In the same survey, respondents rated Chilean democracy as very good at guaranteeing freedom of expression, participation in national life, and respect for human rights, but not very good at the elimination of poverty and the provision of equal opportunity. The high appraisal of current Chilean democracy, in other words, stems from an appreciation of its superiority to dictatorship and not from any belief that it perfectly actualizes every democratic ideal.

While just over a third of the respondents in the 1993 survey considered democracy strong in Chile, 55 percent found it weak (9 percent did not answer). Moreover, only 12 percent considered that democracy in Chile was doing well; 74 percent considered it still confronted with many problems, 6 percent considered it to be doing worse, and 8 percent thought that the country was not yet a democracy. When asked to compare the general situation of the country under democracy with its condition under military rule, 47 percent affirmed that democracy had improved things, 13 percent said that democracy had made things worse, and 40 percent could see no change either way. Looking at the impact of the regime change on their own lives, 31 percent of respondents said that democracy had improved their personal situation, 13 percent said that their personal situation had worsened with democracy, and 56 percent said that nothing had changed. Finally, summarizing satisfaction with democracy, 60 percent called themselves satisfied or very satisfied with democracy's functioning in Chile, while 37 percent declared themselves dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.

Regarding the problems of democratic transition and authoritarian enclaves, public opinion varies according to the issue. Thus while only **[End Page 154]** 10 percent thought that civil-military problems had been resolved, 51 percent found the situation to be improved, 24 percent found it to be unchanged, 4 percent found it worse, 2 percent said that the problem did not exist, and 9 percent did not answer. In similar fashion, while only 8 percent thought that the problem of what to do about human rights violations under the military regime had been resolved, 52 percent saw improvement in that area, with 24 percent seeing no change and only 5 percent claiming a worsening of the situation; 2 percent said that the problem did not exist and 9 percent did not answer. When asked about problems remaining in Chilean democracy, 26 percent cited the lack of legal proceedings against human rights violators as the worst defect. Another 22 percent chose the president's inability to name a new commander-in-chief for the armed forces. The lack of representation in the electoral system struck 19 percent as the worst problem. Only 20 percent saw no serious weakness in Chile's democracy. With regard to the risk of regression to military rule, 40 percent saw it as a live possibility, 50 percent saw it as impossible or very unlikely, and 10 percent did not answer.

Around 90 percent consider that to vote is to participate, and in the last four years never more than a third (on average 25 percent) of respondents have refused to classify themselves along lines of left, right, or center and to state sympathy for any political party. Voter registration has hovered at about 90 percent of those eligible in recent years, and actual turnout has been nearly as high. Direct participation rates in various political activities are much lower: about 8 percent in rallies, 6 percent in regular party activism, 6 percent in political meetings, 3 percent in political work of one sort or another, and 1 percent in leadership posts. Nineteen percent of respondents declared themselves frequent followers of political news on television or in the press, half of those polled said that they are informed only some of the time, and 31 percent stated that they never bother to become informed about political matters. In 1991, an indicator of political interest constructed from answers regarding degrees of information and frequency

of political discussion showed that 23 percent of Chileans have "high" levels of interest in politics, with 37 percent measuring "low" and 40 percent in the middle.

Satisfaction with the way in which one is taken into account changes according to the different spheres of society. The highest satisfaction levels are expressed with regard to family life (87 percent feel satisfied) and work (68 percent). We find middling rates of satisfaction at the national and neighborhood levels (50 and 51 percent, respectively), and lower rates at the level of one's county (45 percent) and place of study (46 percent).

Taking a rough measure of confidence in representative institutions, our 1993 random-sample survey found that 25 percent of Chileans **[End Page 155]** believe elected municipal authorities to be better defenders of citizens' interests than appointed authorities; 13 percent think the contrary, and fully half said it does not matter whether officials are elected or appointed. More than a third (37 percent) think deputies and senators represent the people's interests, while 43 percent believe they do not. Four percent said these representatives have damaged the people's interests. Public confidence in the presidency is higher: its corresponding figures are 63 percent, 24 percent, and 2 percent, respectively.

The data that we have just surveyed are in keeping with the tradition of Chilean exceptionalism vis-à-vis the rest of Latin America when it comes to levels of legitimacy and support for political activity. So they do not record a crisis, but rather a state of affairs where politics has lost its centrality as the almost exclusive source of solutions to all problems, and where people are dissatisfied with both the way in which and the extent to which they are taken into account. It is also a situation in which parties remain prime articulators of political opinions, but no longer serve as the unique expressions of social aspirations and programs. The main conflicts of society are defined primarily in socioeconomic terms ("rich versus poor," "business versus labor"), secondarily in political terms, and lastly in terms of modernization. This partially accounts for the stability of a party system rooted in those classic cleavages, leaving the new issues and problems mentioned above without actors or channels to represent them. On the other side, new conflicts and aspirations highlight alternative models of modernity that are not included in the traditional ideological and political programs and leaderships, thus challenging their appeal or representativeness. Our look at public opinion reveals that while democracy is the only legitimate type of regime in Chile, it is considered the weak product of an uncompleted transition. Finally, while there is no crisis of social participation, there may be one of representation.

Unfinished Business

Considering all the elements of the analysis presented here, it should be clear that some tasks of transition have not been achieved, and that some characteristics of the transition so far have had an impact on the postauthoritarian regime and the quality of its democracy. This is no trivial matter, for gaps and weakness in the regime's democracy affect the totality of social life and make it difficult for social and political actors to emerge and express their alternative proposals.

What is at stake is the continuity of political democratization, the overcoming of poverty and inequalities, and the reformulation of a model of economic development and reinsertion into the global economy--all of which must be achieved in a way that combines modernization with the preservation of social diversity and national **[End Page 156]** identity. None of these goals--all of which are of equal importance--has been achieved.

The debate around democratization and modernization is an old one in Chilean society, and has traditionally been the province of the center and left. In order to avoid a modernization process that excludes people or imposes itself in authoritarian ways, it is absolutely essential to

enlarge permanently the democratic "space" in society, and to make democracy meaningful. This means, at a minimum, passing decisively from a democratic *situation* to a fully institutionalized democratic *regime*, which presupposes a completed transition and substantial institutional reform.

The experience of the last decades teaches us that there are close links binding together cultural, social, economic, and political development, all of which are indispensable. Politics is crucial because of the articulation that it can establish among itself and the three other axes of development. Political-institutional reform therefore must not be forgotten. In Chile's case, such reform is needed to complete the postauthoritarian transition and extend democratic principles to the cultural and socioeconomic spheres. Appropriate goals include judicial reform, the redefinition of civilian-military relations, decentralization and development of local democracy, the enhancement of political representation, the expansion of citizenship, and the improvement of relations among the state, the parties, and social actors.

If these areas are neglected, the nation will find itself reduced to a simple aggregate of individuals subject to the vagaries of transnational markets. It is true that freeing the economy from excessive political control was a necessity and constituted progress in a certain sense. Yet this process has also weakened society's capacity to correct environmental, cultural, and social distortions, and threatens to spread the notion that politics is meaningless and leadership unnecessary.

To claim that the transition is over and that development and modernization can now replace democratization as the main item on the national agenda would be a mistake and would contribute to the devaluation of politics. Yet neither would it be accurate to assert that Chile is still in transition. The problems that Chile faces cannot be *reduced to* problems of transition. At the same time, we cannot hold out hope of solving them until such problems of transition as do exist are confronted and tamed.

Manuel Antonio Garretón is the director of the department of sociology at the University of Chile, and professor and senior researcher at FLACSO-Chile. Preliminary versions of some parts of this essay were presented at meetings of the American Sociological Association (1993) and the American Political Science Association (1994), and have been published in Spanish.

Notes

1. See M.A. Garretón, "Political Democratisation in Latin America and the Crisis of Paradigms," in J. Manor, ed., *Rethinking Third World Politics* (London: Longmans, 1991), 100-17.

2. On this period, see P. Drake and I. Jaksic, eds., *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991). My own vision is presented in "Democratic Inauguration in Chile: Pinochet to Aylwin," *Third World Quarterly* 12 (1990-91): 64-81 and "La redemocratización política en Chile: Transición, inauguración y evolución," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América latina y el Caribe* 4 (January-June 1993): 5-25.

3. See my essay entitled "Human Rights in Processes of Democratization," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26 (February 1994): 221-34.

4. Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz also refer to this paradox in their essay "Contextos politico-institucionales de las consolidaciones democráticas y legados de los regímenes jerárquico-

militares," in M.A. Garretón, ed., *La democratización chilena en perspectiva comparada* (Santiago de Chile: FLACSO, forthcoming).

5. This rightist coalition also drew the support of the Uníon de Centro, a small party linked to an independent conservative presidential contender from 1990, Francisco Javier Errázuriz.

6. Landmarks in this 1994 debate are the Presidential Message to Congress (May 21); the speech by Minister of the Presidency Genaro Arriagada to the Chilean Political Science Congress (July 6); and the televised address of Finance Minister Eduardo Aninat (August 29).

7. On the question of economic modernization, see Alejandro Foxley, "Las políticas y modelos económicos: El caso chileno," in Garretón, ed., *La democratización chilena*. On the relations between economic and social policy, see P. Vergara, "Market Economy, Social Welfare and Democratic Consolidation in Chile," in W. Smith, Carlos Acuña, and E. Gamarra, eds., *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994), 237-61. It is generally agreed that poverty has been reduced in recent years, but that inequality and distribution have not improved and not reached the standards of 1970. For a general vision of the different approaches to this problem, see the debate in "Chile: ¿Crecimiento económico sin equidad?" *Mensaje* (Santiago de Chile), September 1994, 417-24.

8. The absence of this kind of mechanism proved significant when it came time to nominate a presidential candidate. The absence of an institutional mechanism for coalition government was clear in the crisis of the first cabinet of President Frei. The need for a less presidentialist system has been stressed by various authors. See O. Godoy, ed., *Cambio de régimen político* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1992).

9. M.A. Garretón, "New State-Society Relations in Latin America," in C. Bradford, ed., *Redefining the State in Latin America* (Paris: OECD, 1994), 239-51.

10. The data used here are from M.A. Garretón, M. Lagos, and R. Méndez, *Los chilenos y la democracia: La opinión pública 1991-1994* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Participa, 1994).

Muse | Search | Journals | This Journal | Contents | Top

.

STUDYDADDY

Get Homework Help From Expert Tutor

Get Help