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Xlibris Corporation 1-888-795-4274 www.Xlibris.com [email protected] 27509 CONTENTS Contributors .............................................................................. 1 1 Forward ...................................................................................... 1 3 Introduction.............................................................................. 1 9 PART I 1:An Interpretation Of Disaster In Terms Of Changes In Culture, Society And International Relations David Alexander........................................................... 2 5 2:Are We Asking The Right Question?

Susan L. Cutter ............................................................. 3 9 3:Disaster: A “Reality” Or Construct”?

Perspective From The “East” Rohit Jigyasu................................................................ 4 9 4:What’s A Word? Opening Up The Debate Neil R. Britton............................................................. 6 0 5:Not Every Move Is A Step Forward:

A Critique Of David Alexander, Susan L. Cutter, Rohit Jigyasu And Neil Britton Wolf R. Dombrowsky ................................................... 7 9 6:The Meaning Of Disaster:

A Reply To Wolf Dombrowsky David Alexander........................................................... 9 7 7:Pragmatism And Relevance:

A Response To Wolf R. Dombrowsky Susan L. Cutter .......................................................... 1 0 4 8:Defining The Definition For Addressing The “Reality” Rohit Jigyasu............................................................. 1 0 7 9:Dog Or Demon?

Neil R. Britton.......................................................... 1 1 3 PART II 10:Disaster And Collective Stress Allen H. Barton ......................................................... 1 2 5 11:From Crisis To Disaster:

Towards An Integrative Perspective Arjen Boin .................................................................. 1 5 3 12:Disaster: Mandated Definitions, Local Knowledge And Complexity Philip Buckle............................................................. 1 7 3 13: In The Eyes Of The Beholder? Making Sense Of The System(s) Of Disaster(s) Denis Smith............................................................... 2 0 1 14:Disaster, Crisis, Collective Stress, And Mass Deprivation Robert Stallings ......................................................... 2 3 7 15:A Response To Robert Stallings: Ideal Type Concepts And Generalized Analytic Theory Allen H. Barton ......................................................... 2 7 5 16:Back To Nature? A Reply To Stallings Arjen Boin .................................................................. 2 8 0 17:Response To Robert Stallings Philip Buckle............................................................. 2 8 6 18:Through A Glass Darkly: A Response To Stallings Denis Smith............................................................... 2 9 2 PART III 19:Disasters, Definitions And Theory Construction Ronald W. Perry ......................................................... 3 1 1 20: A Social Science Research Agenda For The Disasters Of The 21st Century: Theoretical, Methodological And Empirical Issues And Their Professional Implementation E. L. (Henry) Quarantelli ........................................ 3 2 5 Bibliography........................................................................... 3 9 7 LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Globalization, modernity and their implications for disaster.......................................... 2 0 7 Table 2. Elements of the crisis timeline ................................. 2 1 9 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Disaster: towards an initial construction ................ 2 0 9 Figure 2. Elements of disaster research.................................. 2 1 4 Figure 3. Towards a root definition of disaster ...................... 2 2 3 Figure 4. Shifting definitions of the disaster process in three stages ............................................ 2 2 5 Figure 5. Space-place-time and the development of disaster potential................................................ 2 2 8 Figure 6. Learning and the incubation process within disasters.......................................... 2 2 9 Figure 7. Issues for disaster research ...................................... 2 3 5 In memory of Fred Bates and Ritsuo Akimoto, Disaster Research Pioneers 11 CONTRIBUTORS David Alexander is Scientific Director of the Region of Lombardy School of Civil Protection, based in Milan, Italy.

[[email protected]] Allen H. Barton was for many years a Professor of Sociology and Director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, and has retired to North Carolina at 118 Wolf ’s Trail, Chapel Hill, NC 27516 USA. [[email protected]] Arjen Boin is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Administration, Leiden University, The Netherlands.

[[email protected]] Neil R. Britton is Team Leader (International Disaster Reduction Strategies Research) and EqTAP Project Chief Coordinator, at the Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Research Centre, National Research Institute of Earth Sciences and Disaster Prevention, Kobe, Japan. [[email protected]].

Philip Buckle is a Senior Lecturer in the Coventry Centre for Disaster Management, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry CV1 5FB United Kingdom. [[email protected]] Susan L. Cutter is a Carolina Distinguished Professor and Director of the Hazards Research in the Department of Geography at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 USA.

[[email protected]] Wolf R. Dombrowsky is Director of the Katastrophenfor- schungsstelle (KFS) [Disaster Research Unit], Christian- Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Olshausenstraße 40, Kiel D- 24098, Germany. [[email protected]] 12 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI Rohit Jigyasu is a conservation architect and planner and visiting faculty in the Department of Architectural Conservation, School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi, India.

[rohitjig [email protected]] Ronald W. Perry is Professor of Public Affairs in the School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287 USA [[email protected]] E. L. Quarantelli is Emeritus Professor at the Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716, USA. [[email protected]] Denis Smith is Professor of Management and Director of the Management School at the University of Liverpool, United Kingdom. [[email protected]] Robert A. Stallings is Professor of Public Policy and Sociology, Program in Public Policy, School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-0626, USA. [[email protected]] 13 FORWARD T. Joseph Scanlon Professor Emeritus and Director, Emergency Communications Research Unit, Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario, Canada On the morning of September 11, 2001, I received a phone call from Canada’s public radio system, the CBC, asking me to comment on the terrorist attack on the United States. I said among other things that New York City had enormous resources and that these resources would give it the resilience needed to cope with and recover from the events of that day. My host was to say the least skeptical. Mesmerized by the visuals of the planes hitting the towers and the towers collapsing, she was—at least at that moment—incapable of grasping the concept of resilience or of what Susan Cutter might call an “affordable disaster”.

This volume—What is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question— is the fourth volume in our series of books on disaster, the second to tackle the definition of disaster. Reading it, I was struck by how much of the debate was—or so it seemed to me—influenced by awareness of various events and how much of that awareness was media related. That was of course especially true of 9/11, an event which most, but not all of the contributors to this volume, felt compelled to mention, and an event that was not even in the back of our minds when the first volume was published, yet an event that has changed the way many think about disaster. As Neil Britton writes: “ . . . the fundamentals of conventional organized emergency 14 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI management are now about fifty years old. During that period, the practice of emergency management has changed from an essentially reactive and response-focused command-and-control civil defence approach, which grew out of the 1940s World War II and 1950s Korean War eras, phased into a comprehensive and integrated approach during the late 1970s, and from the 1990s started to re-emerge around the twin concepts of risk management and sustainable hazard mitigation.” However, recent events connected with highly organized terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, most notably in the USA whereby a strong reaction has resulted in its lead disaster agency being subsumed into a federal homeland security mega-department, might see this latest transformation being short-lived in favour of a replay of earlier cycles.

Ron Perry makes the importance of 9/11 similarly clear: “As we move into the new century, the experience with terrorism has challenged both governments and disaster researchers. In the United States, all levels of government have invested substantial resources in emergency management, with much of that devoted to terrorism consequence management. With the investment of resources, governments expect more from the community of disaster researchers. To answer such questions regarding the need for and implementation of warning systems, appropriate mitigation measures, tactics for response and recovery, researchers need to have a firm grasp on what a disaster is and what it is not.” There is no question 9/11 has become important in our struggle to find an acceptable definition of disaster. Yet reading this book made me reflect not so much on 9/ll and its significance but on the agenda setting role of the mass media in determining what we think about and write about. Everett Rogers and Rahul Sood raised this issue when they discussed the way American media—in fact most of the world’s media—ignored the Sahel drought. Phil Buckle touches on it when he mentions the attention given to the heat wave that led to 10,000 deaths in France in 2003. “There is now [Buckle writes] broad acceptance at political and community levels that heat waves are disasters. But heat waves have been with us 15 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? since time immemorial. So why the change now to move heat wave from a weather condition to a disaster?” The role of media possibly—but this begs the question—why were the media interested? Why is heat wave now a disaster when a year ago it was not? Eric Klinenberg’s book Heat Wa v e underlines the importance of this question. Though the heat wave in Chicago costs more lives than the Northridge earthquake, Hurricane Andrew or the bombing at Oklahoma City, there were many debates in Chicago newsrooms about its news value and whether it was truly a disaster. Certainly, Barton makes clear that the absence of media attention explains why some events have not become significant in our attempts to explain how we perceive disaster:

Media coverage of human suffering in countries with authoritarian regimes is subject to government censorship and control of both domestic and outside news media. The outstanding example is the largest famine in modern history in which somewhere around 30,000,000 Chinese died in 1958-61 as a result of Maoist mismanagement. The famine was kept secret within the country and from the outside world, and indeed the highest levels of government refused to accept information on it and continued to demand extraction of food from the starving areas. Other examples of “secret famines” come from the Stalinist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. In the 1930s the government created the Ukraine famine to wipe out peasant resistance to collectivization, and a similar famine right after World War II, in both of which millions died under conditions of secrecy and state terror. The British colonial government imposed wartime censorship on the Bengal famine of 1943 in which over 2,000,000 died, to avoid pressure to divert resources from the war effort. Around 3 million are estimated to have died in the North Korean famines in the 1990s under conditions of secrecy and suppression of information.

Strangely, I also thought of the media when I read Wolf Dombrovsky’s story of the old Chinese tale about an Emperor.

“One day [the Emperor] asked his court artist, ‘What is easy to paint and what is difficult to paint?’ The courtier thought hard on this for as long as he knew his master’s tolerance would permit and 16 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI replied, ‘Dogs are difficult, but demons are easy.’ The courtier explained further to his Emperor that obvious things are hard to get right because everyone knows all about them and hence everyone thinks they know what the essence of a dog is. However, since no one has actually seen a demon then drawing one is easy, because who can say it is not correct.” I once did an examination of reporting textbooks and one thing that became evident was that there is no accepted definition of the term, “news.” In fact there was not only massive disagreement among the authors about what the term meant a number simply gave up on the task of definition. At the best they concluded, “News is what an editor says it is,” a useful but not very illuminating definition. We are, in short, not alone in struggling to define a seemingly commonplace term. Yet the media seem sometimes to force us into definitions that are adjusted to those events we know or think we know.

All those who read this book will probably notice some references more than others partly because of their own awareness of the world. Just as this book stimulated me to think about the mass media and the problems Journalism scholars have had with definitions, others will think about other concerns. In that way, this book will have achieved its goal—to make us think about disaster. Ron Perry explains why that is important: “The variation observed among researchers permits one to assess the extent and the conceptual dimensions along which the field of study is growing and changing. Second, the discussion of disaster definitions encourages refinement of the concept of disaster. It enables the reader and the authors to reflect on their definitions and trace through the consequences of those definitions for different aspects of the field of disaster study, whether academic or applied. As we sharpen our conception of disaster, we identify the disciplinary niches and their value in a field that is almost inherently interdisciplinary. The extent to which we are able to identify and manage disasters of the future is contingent upon our collective understanding of the meaning and dimensions of the concept.” In a way this book reflects the work of the first and third 17 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? generation of scholars in the field of disaster study. I am aware of course that many consider the pioneer to be Samuel Henry Prince with his study of the 1917 Halifax explosion. I am also aware of the recent work Russ Dynes has done on Voltaire and Alexander Pope and others and their appraisals of the significance of the 1775 Lisbon earthquake.

But I think all of us would agree that our field took off roughly 40 years ago with Russell Dynes and Henry Quarantelli and the creation of the Disaster Research Center. One of their students was Bill Anderson and one of his students at Arizona State University was none other than Ron Perry. In fact—and I am relying on the memory of others here—when Ron first became Bill’s student he was the only undergraduate allowed into the graduate section of a course on Collective Behavior. [He was also the best in the class.] Historically, that means Ron became the first scholar in our field to have been the student of a student of Russell Dynes and Henry Quarantelli, in short our first third generation scholar. Now he and Quarantelli have teamed up.

I noted the important contribution Henry Quarantelli has made to our field in the foreword to the first version of What is a Disaster? and was delighted to do so again at the celebration we had for him and Russell Dynes at the DRC last spring. I have not had the chance until now to say anything in writing about Ron Perry. I first worked with Ron when he was in Seattle shortly after Mount St. Helens but only got to know him well when I was President of the International Research Committee on Disasters and he was editor of the International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. It was a wonderful relationship, one that makes me not the least surprised to note how many scholars he has worked with. Ron maintained his editorial independence and integrity but at the same time was supportive. And when the time came for him to move on we together were fortunate enough to be able to choose a wonderful successor in Bob Stallings. But what most of you will not know if that our relationship was defined not just by mutual respect and goodwill but by a document—a written definition of the role of the editor and the editor’s relationship to 18 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI the President of the IRCD. And that document—this should come as no surprise—was written by none other than Henry Quarantelli.

I want to thank both Bob Stallings and Benigno Aguirre for allowing me to stay on as general editor of this series of books because of the opportunity it has given me to say thanks to both Henry and Ron for their contributions to our field of which this book is only the latest example. 19 INTRODUCTION This volume represents the second book devoted to the issue of definitions of disasters, and the first to deal with this topic in the International Research Committee on Disasters book series.

The first book—What is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question— appeared in 1998 and brought together thirteen contributors and discussants from six countries and nine academic disciplines. The goal for the second book is the same as that for the first: select an interdisciplinary, international collection of disaster researchers and ask them to present their definition of disasters. In both volumes the selection of authors followed a philosophy of gaining wide variation, rather than attempting any sort of random or representative sampling. The principal product of both books is an examination of meaning, as well as the exchange of ideas, with respect to disaster as a phenomenon of study. Ultimately, the purpose of course is to emphasize the exchange, not to promote any particular definition. The exercise of defining and then discussing definitions addresses several important issues in both research and application. First, it enables one to gage the consensus about what disasters are both among researchers and between researchers and practitioners. The authors in this volume go far to differentiating the use of disaster definitions as a basis for government action versus as a basis for identifying a field of study.

The variation observed among researchers permits one to assess the extent and the conceptual dimensions along which the field of study is growing and changing. Second, the discussion of disaster definitions encourages refinement of the concept of disaster. It enables the reader and the authors to reflect on their definitions 20 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI and trace through the consequences of those definitions for different aspects of the field of disaster study, whether academic or applied.

As we sharpen our conception of disaster, we identify the disciplinary niches and their value in a field that is almost inherently interdisciplinary. The extent to which we are able to identify and manage disasters of the future is contingent upon our collective understanding of the meaning and dimensions of the concept.

Finally, there is a strong policy side to this work. As we move into the new century, the experience with terrorism has challenged both governments and disaster researchers. In the United States, all levels of government have invested substantial resources in emergency management, with much of that devoted to terrorism consequence management. With the investment of resources, governments expect more from the community of disaster researchers. To answer such questions regarding the need for and implementation of warning systems, appropriate mitigation measures, tactics for response and recovery, researchers need to have a firm grasp on what a disaster is and what it is not. This is especially relevant to the issue of comprehensive emergency management and integrated emergency management systems as promoted in the United States. To say that an “in place” system (for mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery) that works for one “disaster” will also work for another requires that one know about the comparability and “types” of disasters.

This volume is structured to follow the first book. Authors were asked to present their definition of disaster and explain it, and in addition to react to the definitions offered by authors in the first volume. The eight contributors were paired with one of two discussants. Wolf Dombrowsky, a German Sociologist by training, was asked to react to the papers created by David Alexander, Susan L. Cutter, Rohit Jigyasu and Neil Britton. David Alexander teaches in England and was trained as a geographer and geologist. Dr.

Cutter is an American Geographer, Dr. Jigyasu is an architect and planner, and Dr. Britton is a social scientist with broad applied experience at the national level in disaster management. In Part I, each contributor presents their discussion, followed by Dr. 21 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? Dombrosky’s critique; the discussion closes with reaction papers to the critique by each author.

Part II of the book presents the definitional statements by four additional authors. Allen Barton is a sociologist and pioneer in the field of disaster studies. Arjen Boin is a professor of public administration, Philip Buckle is professor of disaster management and Denis Smith a professor of management. Robert Stallings, professor of sociology and public policy serves as discussant for this group. This part also closes with reactions from each author to Dr. Stallings’ critique.

The book closes with Part III, which contains two papers. Perry reviews the efforts of the contributors and discussants in this book and examines conceptual definitional differences among them and implications for theory construction. Quarantelli’s paper is more broad ranging and focuses upon the current state of the field and scenarios for the future. The purpose of this closing paper is to explore the field of disaster research and define an agenda for study in the twenty-first century. He identifies and examines critical questions in the areas of theory, methodology and professional implementation.

Ronald W. Perry Tempe, Arizona E. L. (Henry) Quarantelli Newark, Delaware PART I 25 1 AN INTERPRETATION OF DISASTER IN TERMS OF CHANGES IN CULTURE, SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS David Alexander On average about 220 natural catastrophes, 70 technological disasters and three new armed conflicts occur each year (IFRCRCS 2002). Calamity is thus a recurrent feature of human life. Bearing in mind that the temporal distribution of extreme events of all kinds tends to be irregular, at the world scale, an “average” day would see two or three disasters in their emergency phases, 15-20 in their recovery periods, and about a dozen conflict-based emergencies in progress. Catastrophe is exceptional for the people involved, but at a grander scale it is almost run-of-the-mill, even more so given the recurrent spatial patterns that characterise it.

Even at the local scale, extreme events can be routine (see Jeffrey 1981).

Not only is disaster common—and increasingly so—it is an extraordinarily revealing sort of affliction. It can be interpreted in various ways as a window upon the inner workings of society. To begin with, any failure to mitigate hazards is shown up in their impacts. Second, corruption is exposed by bringing its consequences to light, for example in the collapse of a badly-built structure during 26 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI an earthquake. Third, human relations are made more explicit and conspicuous by the increased levels of socialization that commonly occur in the immediate aftermath of disaster. In this respect, people’s attitudes and preferences are revealed (Rogers and Nehnevajsa 1984). Fourth, the spotlight is turned on ways of life that have been threatened or disrupted. As a result, cultural traits may be accentuated and subjected to scrutiny by outsiders (Gherardi 1998).

Models and interpretations of disaster abound, but the phenomenon is so multi-faceted that a general theory of universal explanatory power is unlikely ever to be formulated. Moreover, changes in society and economy (dare one call them evolution?) continually alter the tenets and controlling parameters of disaster.

For this reason, it is important periodically to revisit the question “what is disaster?” in the light of current concerns. This chapter will therefore examine various thematic interpretations of calamity—perceptual, symbolic, socio-economic and strategic— in relation to world events and current developments in society. It will seek out the connections between them. First, however, I will begin with a word about definitions. A DEFINITIONAL MINEFIELD Some years ago I identified six distinct schools of thought and expertise on disasters (Alexander 1993: 13-14). They can be classed broadly as geography, anthropology, sociology, development studies, health sciences and the geophysical sciences with engineering.

Possibly social psychology can be added as a seventh. Not all of these fields have made a serious attempt to define disaster before studying it. Indeed, many researchers have either taken the definitions for granted or have side-stepped the issue.

The explanations and definitions given by Quarantelli and his colleagues in the first symposium and book entitled What is a Disaster? (Quarantelli 1998b) are so varied and detailed that they are practically impossible to summarise in brief. All that can be said is that these authors have chosen to define disaster as something 27 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? that is mostly social in character. Quarantelli himself argued (1998c: 236) that we define disaster intuitively. Gilbert (1998:

11) regarded it, among other things, as the passage to a state of uncertainty. Following Fritz (1961), who interpreted disaster as a state in which the social fabric is disrupted and becomes dysfunctional to a greater or lesser extent, Fischer (2003: 94) suggested that “What disaster sociologists actually study is social (structure) change under specialised circumstances” (his italics).

Several of the authors in Quarantelli’s book seem to bear this out (e.g. Porfiriev 1998: 72), but the definitions are very tentative and mostly rather specific to the sociological perspective on disasters.

Would geophysical scientists and engineers accept them?

Perhaps they ought to, as the following comparison suggests.

The Sherman landslide in Alaska, a direct consequence of the 1964 earthquake in that state, involved 29 million cubic meters of rock that slid at 180 km/hr into an uninhabited valley (Shreve 1966).

Except from the point of view of local flora and fauna, the event was a mere geological curiosity, discovered by accident during a routine aerial photography over flight. In contrast, the Aberfan landslide of 1966 in South Wales was 193 times smaller and moved 25-30 times more slowly, but it killed 144 people, 116 of them small children. It was a major disaster and led to decades of hardship for bereaved survivors (Austin 1967). This implies that physical magnitude is not necessarily very useful to our attempts to develop a general definition of disaster.

Three important questions related to the definition problem are as follows. (1) At what point do routine emergencies pass a quantitative threshold or go through a qualitative change and become disasters? (2) Is a catastrophe a large disaster, and if so, how large? (3) What functional attributes turn an emergency into a disaster? I t would be interesting to see whether physical and social scientists have the same answers to these questions. It is pretty clear that the sociologists would look for the solutions in the form, function and mutation of the social system. Most engineers would have at least a rough, intuitive idea of the physical forces (relative to earthquakes, explosions, crashes, etc.) that would be 28 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI required to cause major disruption to the social system. Their advice is often more central to policy formulation than are those of social scientists who are more able to predict the actual human consequences. But despite the current vogue for examining the societal implications of engineering (Zebrowski 1997), there is little evidence that social and physical scientists are on the same wavelength and would arrive at a common perspective.

Rather than seeking to resolve the definitional problem, in this chapter I will take up a theme discussed by Hewitt (1998) in Quarantelli’s book: that of equity in disaster. My aim here is to explore the ways in which our view of the phenomenon should be adapted to accommodate the perspectives of the most severely affected victims, as more than ever before disaster is becoming a question of social equity and manipulation of society (Bankoff 2001). FIXITY OF PERCEPTION:

DISASTER AS MINDSET Whereas much has been written about the perception of hazard, risk and disaster (Saarinen et al. 1984), little attention has been devoted to disaster as mindset, fixity of opinions or states of mind created by events. Regularities in perception are usually considered to be dependent upon consensus (i.e., the mean of individual experiences), which implies a certain freedom of interpretation (Rubonis and Bickman 1991), but what happens when the consensus is manufactured?

The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 ushered in a new era of emergency preparedness in the world’s richer countries. It seems logical to assume that the outrages did not change the essence of disaster itself, but perhaps the matter is not quite so simple (Alexander 2002a). The attacks were a watershed in both official and public perception of disaster and they changed the focus of preparedness (Calhoun et al. 2002). The picture that has emerged is that of a large and powerful nation under threat, and a significant number of people, organizations and governments 29 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? engaged in a gigantic conspiracy to threaten it. Some would even regard it as a clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996). As a strategic reality this generalization may not survive critical analysis, especially as it relies upon maintaining a widespread ignorance of history, both ancient and modern. But for many world leaders it is a convenient fiction, for it endows international relations with a new form of polarity to replace that lost when the Soviet bloc crumbled and the Chinese started to liberalize their economy.

Whether or not it has adopted the right approach towards international relations, the United States of America has shown a genius for organization. The U.S. federal agencies responsible for emergency management have provided a model for the rest of the world (Sylves and Waugh 1996). It is a remarkably progressive model in which the foundations have been laid to tackle one of the great challenges of the 21st century: how to involve ordinary people democratically in preparation for and management of emergency situations, and thus devolve more of the responsibility for public safety to the actual stakeholders (Platt 1999). Thus, civil protection has evolved out of civil defense. Flexible, collaborative forms of the local management of incidents has supplanted monolithic command and control procedures.

However, disaster is not defined by fixed events, or immutable relationships, but by social constructs, and these are liable to change.

The new U.S. model that other countries may begin to emulate is, of course, the homeland security one (CSIS 2000). Natural disaster management is once again subsumed into a command-and-control structure in which secrecy and authoritarianism are ever-present risks. At the time of writing, the full implications of homeland security have not yet become clear, but they could easily mean greater rigidity in the approach to extreme events, both conceptually and operationally (Alexander 2002b). At the very least, around the world national priorities seem to have shifted from “neutral” threats, such as earthquakes and floods, to teleological ones, in which deliberate harm is done. This can be judged as mindset if it does not reflect an objective assessment of what is likely to happen. 30 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI DISASTER AS SYMBOLISM Any other collective view of disaster, whether it be a rigid one such as a mindset or a more pluralistic one, is achieved by converting complex events into symbolic ones (Kroll-Smith and Couch 1991). Thus one arrives at models in which phenomena are endowed with meaning. In order to interpret the symbolism of disaster, it is useful to distinguish between individual and collective viewpoints (Dynes and Quarantelli 1976). For the survivor, a catastrophic event is a milestone in his or her life and something that for better or worse will help define the rest of it. Individually, disaster brings people back to the basics of survival, deprivation, injury or bereavement (Erickson 1994). Except perhaps for the chronically imprudent, or for hopelessly disadvantaged people, it graphically demonstrates the apparent arbitrariness of fate. On a more positive note, it may mark a high point of social participation through involvement in the so-called “therapeutic” or “altruistic” community (Barton 1969). Of course, Cuthbertson and Nigg (1987) and Olson and Drury (1997) have questioned the universal applicability of Barton’s original concept of the therapeutic community in disaster. For some people, perhaps too few, such social participation represents a direct lesson in the value of hazard and risk mitigation.

With these differences in mind, we may divide the symbolism of disaster into three categories: functional (i.e., symbolic of physical or social process), linguistic (i.e., a convenient form of notation), and as an allegory or parable (i.e., with a tale to tell, possibly of a moral kind). In reality, symbolic views of disaster can be endowed with more than one of these attributes. For example, disaster may be regarded as a punishment, a wake-up call or a betrayal of trust in safety systems (Horlick-Jones 1995), all of which are both functional and allegorical representations. In western societies, there is an increasing tendency to equate disaster with notions of recrimination, scapegoats, negligence and culpability, ideas that have strong moral overtones (Olson 2000). In this process, societies attempt to neutralise fear of disaster through anger and blame. It 31 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? contrasts with the older, more conventional symbolism in which disaster is seen as a sudden reminder of one’s own mortality and the impermanence and precariousness of life: And Hell the Shadow of a Soul on fire, Cast on the Darkness into which Ourselves, So late emerg’d from, shall so soon expire.

[Rubayyat of Omar Khayyam, LIV, trans. Edward FitzGerald, 1859] Nothing could be more symbolic than the disaster memorial book, a publication, usually dominated by eye-catching photographs, put together hastily after a particular event and sold mainly in the region affected by the disaster it portrays. Such books are quite common, at least in western societies, and are a perishable record of the events that form their subject matter. A typical example would seek to portray the following aspects of the disaster:\ the enormity of the event; the paradoxical beauty—or at least the visual novelty— of destruction; the courage of rescuers; humanity reasserted amid terrible physical destruction; the pathos of charity and solidarity; the triumph of moral purpose over arbitrariness or malevolence; the value of determination and staying power; the wonder of an indomitable spirit. As there is seldom much intellectual or analytical depth in such books, they rely heavily on symbolism, which according to the above list uses the functional aspects of disaster to make points that are heavily moral. In the visual images there is often a heavy dose of iconography. Thus in the Florence floods of 1966 the tattered remains of Cimabue’s crucifix (circa AD 1284) symbolised the event, especially as that particular work of art was already 32 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI symbolic of age-old suffering. In New York on September 11, 2001, the jagged screens of lattice-work girders which were all that remained standing of the World Trade Centre towers powerfully symbolised destruction, precariousness and impermanence.

But symbolism changes over time, even with respect to a single event. Symbols thus form markers in the long process of rationalizing a disaster progressively over time, in which the details become hazy and the event gradually loses its grip on people’s imagination. The explosions against blue skies that characterised both the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St Helens and the attack on the World Trade Centre assume a different significance as they lose their immediacy. They become rather flatter and less suggestive icons, overlain with meanings that accrete during the recovery phase and thereafter (cf. Cross 1990).

Two aspects of symbolism deserve special mention. First, until the 20th century there was very little Darwinism in catastrophe (Alexander 2000: 67). There was little sign of the survival of the fittest building, community, administration, emergency service or infrastructure. To a certain extent, with the endless resurgence of vulnerability, this is still true in the 21st century, as socio-economic inequality continues to grow throughout the world. This implies that good examples of mitigation have had little symbolic value in history (for example, it took 500 years for a short-stubby, earthquake-proof minaret to appear in Turkey, one of the world’s most seismic countries). Given the pervasive need to mitigate the recurrent effects of disaster, this is a singular omission, especially as items destroyed have often been heavily endowed with meaning and symbolism.

Rather different is the symbolic value of the victim in modern society (Lifton 1980). Due partly to mass media constructs and partly to the growing culture of blame, victims who survive disaster assume the status of beneficiaries and acquire a degree of moral authority. If they are articulate and well-organized they can become significant players, perhaps even points of reference, in the debates that follow extreme events (Mulwanda 1992). Certainly, in the mass media victims are now often seen as being as authoritative as 33 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? are technical experts. It is hard to determine whether this shows the democratization of disaster or some kind of inversion of values. DISASTER AS SPECTACLE In the modern world the meaning of disaster cannot easily be dissociated from how it is portrayed and interpreted by the mass media (Couch 2000). In the popular culture shaped by and reflected in the media, news is essentially whatever people are interested in. Newsworthiness is defined by people’s interest level.

Disaster assumes a symbolic value as spectacle, as a story or saga, or as competition, imbued with notions of the breakdown of society, the spread of anarchy, heroic leadership and villainous malevolence.

At worst, such crude notions can descend to the level of voyeurism, analogous to watching a spectacular crash at a motor race. Above all, when there is a lack of personal experience to relate it to, an event may become associated with the distillates or stereotypes of popular culture.

Such shallowness is very much in the interests of the main providers of information who are increasingly the same commercial oligarchies that, through intensive lobbying, have done much to shape the political process (Smith 1992). At its most negative, modern journalism reports facts selectively to suit partisan or commercial objectives, seldom explains causes adequately, simplifies events until they are deprived of real meaning, and conflates entertainment values with real-life ones until they become indistinguishable. To obtain an accurate and objective picture of situations requires much reading and comparison between reports.

The symbolic aspects of disaster can easily lead one away from real understanding.

Newsworthiness also depends on the systems of values held in common between the purveyors and consumers of news (Goltz 1984). In the western world we see an increasing primacy of the entertainment industry in public communication. News and entertainment are often conflated, or at least given equal weight.

Though people are interested in history, current affairs and 34 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI environment, they seem increasingly willing to accept versions of events that lack depth. In the disasters field, there is no sign of an end to the antagonism of popular culture and academic research.

For decades the latter has striven to debunk the model of the breakdown of society in disaster. In this, mass panic and flight occur, chaos and anarchy prevail, antisocial and competitive behaviour proliferate, populations are stunned and made helpless by sudden shock, and authoritarianism is the only means of restoring calm and reason (Mitchell et al. 2000).

The primacy of image in the mass media does little to encourage subtlety of interpretation. The breakdown of society remains extraordinarily persistent in the western public’s mind, as this model is continually reinforced by the products of mass entertainment.

Conspiracy theorists may argue that this very convenient for the forces that command society, as it prepares the ground for Draconian measures, should homeland security require them to be used.

Whether nor not that is so, globalization drives both the diffusion of media stereotypes of disaster and the real patterns of change in the impacts of extreme phenomena. DISASTER AS A CONSEQUENCE OF GLOBALIZATION More than ever before, natural, technological and social disasters are becoming internationalised. They are intertwined with the course of human affairs in ways that were unimaginable decades ago. The rapid global movement of capital and standardization of information, the importance of disaster to geo-strategic policies, and the multinational growth of poverty and marginalization all have a bearing on our interpretation of calamity in the modern world (Dembo et al. 1990). Disaster occurs against the background of three separate worldwide tendencies: the onset of global change, which for the present purposes means the possibility of more frequent or higher magnitude natural hazard events; 35 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? the rise of globalization, which could signify more frequent or higher magnitude exploitation, given its tendency to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of international corporations and oligarchies; the emergence of global consciousness in the form of a collective, international attempt to fight injustice. Although the alignments that prevailed during the Cold War (1948-89) have changed, it appears that it may take 15 years or more to shape the new pattern of global strategic alliances.

Currently it is not clear what the final balance of power and interests will be. Capital has scored many victories over labor (hence the second point, above), but there are signs of a resurgence in popular consciousness in response to the excesses of capitalistic exploitation (hence the third).

I suggested above that the contemporary challenge is to democratize society’s responses to risk and disaster. However, there are two kinds of democracy, not one. In the present day we have become used to the idea that democracy should take its representative form by allowing people to choose and vote periodically for candidates at elections. This idea has been vigorously fostered in western society by the mass media and has proved convenient to the ruling oligarchies in that many people tend to demonstrate innate conservatism in their choice of candidates and political ideologies. It is wrongly supposed that representative democracy is part of a tradition invented in the city- states of Greece more than 2500 years ago. In fact, democracy was born in its participatory form, which is now regarded by the rich and powerful as “subversive,” because it involves direct collective action.

If, for the purposes of argument, we consider representative democracy to be “top-down” in its organization and participatory democracy to be “bottom-up” or grass-roots based, then there is clearly a need for more of the latter in disaster mitigation and management throughout the world, for risks and emergencies cannot be tackled effectively without robust local organization. 36 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI In fact, the Western mass media have put about the idea that participatory democracy is inimical to representative democracy, which it undermines. In reality, the two are complementary:

democracy cannot be healthy unless it is both participatory and representative. Three aspects of modern western presidential and parliamentary democracies suggest that they have become insalubrious: first, people have become disaffected and, in many cases, disinclined to vote; secondly, corruption in high places has become very hard to stem, which points to a lack of accountability; and thirdly, industrial and commercial lobbies seem to have gained as much power as the voters have. Therefore it is hardly surprising that resilience to disaster has only increased, where it has increased at all, painfully slowly: in many places it lacks the essential democratic base.

It is axiomatic that socio-economic stability is a pre-condition for resilience against disaster. Instead, increased militarization has had the effect of fragmenting and factionalizing peoples, as in Colombia, Liberia, Somalia and Angola. A divide and rule strategy has preserved the West’s global hegemony. But this is beginning to look fragile. It is possible that people of entirely different persuasions who are disaffected with the course of globalization will eventually find common cause.

Clausewitz wrote that war is politics carried on by other means.

Others have since suggested that economics, more than politics, are at the root (Atmore 2001). If this is true, then global polarization is a response to economic forces which create and maintain the forms of deprivation that foster ideological struggle. Globalization has resulted in increasingly vast expenditures on defending particular interests, especially the main sources of crude oil exported to North America and Europe. The Persian Gulf War of 1991, for example, is reputed to have cost $692 billion (1992 dollars) in short term expenditures on military action (Hillel 1994).

Policies leading to containment or regime change in Iraq have, at the time of writing, met with only limited success but have been extremely expensive. 37 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? There seems to be no better example of lack of resilience to disaster than that of Afghanistan. The rural and provincial areas of the country, perhaps Kabul too, appear to be stuck at the lowest level of mitigation and highest level of vulnerability. With regard to one of the country’s most frequent kinds of natural disaster, the earthquake, for the overwhelming majority of the population all the achievements in seismic engineering and civil protection of the last hundred years might as well never have happened. There is no sign that progress has been made in protecting the population since the magnitude 8.1 earthquake of 1907 that killed 12,000 Afghanis. Over most of the twentieth century lethal earthquakes have occurred in the Hindu Kush at the rate of one every nine years, but in the period 1993-2002 there were nearly 10,000 deaths in five events—once every two years. The trend is towards larger, more lethal seismic disasters: the average magnitude is 6.3, but twice as many people are killed as are significantly injured, a clear sign of the severity of disasters or the heightened nature of vulnerability in Afghanistan. The country is populated by an inter- ethnic society. It slides towards the contemporary model of “war lordism” by a process of vicious circles within vicious circles:

internal factions thrive because of the existence of external divisions between the forces that have intervened in Afghanistan (Atmore 2001). This, of course, is a disaster in its own right, and it adds up to the complete stagnation of measures to reduce the impact of other prevalent forms of disaster, such as earthquake and landslide.

Many traditional societies still face up to the scourge of disaster with religiously-inspired fatalism (Sims and Baumann 1972).

Catastrophe is once again an “Act of God”, a punishment for sins committed, part of an inscrutable higher plan. Are we to call this retrograde, a sign of cultural underdevelopment? Such means of rationalizing disaster are coping mechanisms and we might judge whether or not they are effective ones. Certainly the symbolism involved is no worse than that constructed by the western media (Vitaliano 1973, frontispiece). 38 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI CONCLUSION Disasters are rationalized or interpreted according to the canons and preoccupations of the contemporary period. Modern interpretations are increasingly dominated by the new forms of symbolism constructed by the mass communication industry (Lombardi 1997). These encourage a shallow view of history and strategic relationships, and thus a superficial approach to causality.

Instead, one needs to search for the explanations of disaster in the global changes that are currently altering the scope and tenor of international relations (Anderson 1997). On aggregate, vulnerability to disaster is set to rise with the increasing polarization of a world in which two billion people have practically no access to modern technology and 800 million live in conditions of misery. As yet they have little collective voice, but that cannot be true forever, as present trends are unsustainable.

The foregoing discussion implies very strongly that disasters in the modern world are an artifact of two forces: commercialism and strategic hegemonies inherent in globalization. At the broadest scale that may be true, though it does not preclude more traditional interpretations based on primary vulnerability (Blaikie et al. 1994), or more optimistic ones based on globalism (Kelman and Koukis 2000). Perhaps one reason why “disaster” will probably never be completely, immutably defined is because the definition depends on shifting portrayals and perceptions of what is significant about the phenomenon. I would argue that it must be interpreted, and continually reinterpreted in the context of contemporary issues. NOTES 1 “Der Krieg ist nichts als eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs mit Einmischung anderer Mittel.” War is nothing but a continuation of politics with the admixture of other means. Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) Vom Kriege (1832-4) book. 8, chapter 6, section B. 39 2 ARE WE ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION? Susan L. Cutter In his landmark volume, What is a Disaster?, Quarantelli (1998b) lamented the state of theory building and conceptual development the disasters field. In his imperturbable manner, Quarantelli challenged the community to come to some conceptual closure regarding the nature of a disaster—was it fundamentally a social construction, some physical event, or a combination of the two? As he stated, “ . . . unless we clarify and obtain minimum consensus on the defining features per se, we will continue to talk past one another on the characteristics, conditions and consequences of disasters (Quarantelli 1998b:4).” I submit that disasters studies (as recognized in the 1998 volume) are spending too much time and intellectual capital in defining the phenomena under study, rather than in researching more important and fundamental concerns of the field. The question is not what is a disaster, but what is our vulnerability (and resiliency) to environmental threats and extreme events? In other words, what makes human and environmental systems vulnerable and more or less resilient to threats and extreme events? As conceptual frameworks, vulnerability and resiliency imply an examination of human systems, natural (or environmental) and technological systems, and the interconnectedness between them. It is, in fact, the linkages and interdependencies between these three systems and the built 40 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI environment that amplify or attenuate vulnerability. While each component can be studied independently, it is the interaction that becomes most important in understanding vulnerability, resiliency, and their correlates. To use the old adage, the whole (vulnerability) is greater than the sum of its parts (human systems, the built environment, technological systems, natural systems). TALKING PAST EACH OTHER It has always been a source of professional frustration that as the risk, hazards, and disasters communities evolved along parallel paths, there was little intersection and integration of knowledge between them (Cutter 2001a). White (1988) noted this communication and intellectual divide more than a decade ago, when he opined that the risk analysis field failed to include the social context within which risks occurred, a fundamentally important element for social scientists. With a few rare exceptions, there is very little crossover in literature, concepts, and methodologies among these three communities who study disasters (Kunreuther and Slovic 1996). Simply put, we rarely read each other’s work unless it is in our own academic discipline (e.g. geography, sociology, planning) or in our own hazard specialty domain (e.g. earthquakes, floods, hazardous technologies). Why is this?

The segregation of the research community is due to a number of factors, among them differences in the type of event examined (natural hazards, technological risks, industrial failures); methods employed (qualitative versus quantitative analyses, computer modeling and simulations versus survey interviews); and outlets for research findings (Risk Analysis, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Natural Hazards Review, Environmental Hazards, Disasters). In many ways, the risk, hazards, and disasters communities could not (and still do not) fully understand each other’s “science”. How are we ever going to advance social science perspectives on risk, hazards, and disasters if we are unaware of the totality of social science perspectives that can be brought to bear?

There are many critical challenges that confront the disaster research 41 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? and practitioner communities. How we approach them will dictate the relevance of disaster studies in the future. Will the field be mired in the depths of ontological debates on the meaning of disaster, risk, hazards, and vulnerability? Or, will the field forge ahead with new understandings of how these phenomenon affect the human condition, how human agency increases or decreases their temporal and spatial distribution, and how individuals, social groups, and society at large perceives of and responds to external threats, regardless of their origin?

REFLEXIVE SOCIETIES AND ADAPTIVE THREATS The centrality of risk in modern society pervades everyday life— from the food that we eat, to the water we drink, to the air we breathe, to where we live and work. We live in a global risk society (Beck 1992; Adam, Beck and Van Loon 2000), one that is influenced by a myriad of global processes, many of which interact to produce unforeseen dangers and an endless array of risks. The range and diversity of threats that face modern society are too numerous to catalog and they constantly change. Some arise from the intersection of human use and natural systems, which in turn are exacerbated by social practices such as construction in known floodplains or along coastal margins (Heinz Center 2002). Others are seemingly random events, by-products of locational choices, decisions often constrained by class (Davis 1998), privilege (Pulido 2000), and gender (Fothergill 1996, Enarson and Morrow 1998).

Some threats are perpetuated over time and across space creating a disaster culture replete with unsustainable practices. Others like human-induced threats, such as terrorism, are equally complex, yet they entail even greater challenges in detection, warning, and response because of their adaptive nature. There is little constancy to the threat, which is highly responsive to changing conditions and opportunities in both targets and methods. If detected, the terrorist simply changes the preferred target, location, method of delivery, or scale of the attack. Under these conditions, it is very difficult to assess all the known points of vulnerability within 42 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI modern systems, systems that in turn give rise to and ultimately produce the global risk society.

The global extent of risks (and disasters and hazards) does not imply that they are equally distributed among all places or among all social groups. Often, they are also influenced by societal needs and wants, which are quite variable as well. The reflexive nature of the risk society (influences risk production and is influenced by risks) suggests a need to move away from analyses (and control strategies) based on singular events with proximate causes (somewhat akin to a simple cause and effect model) toward a more dynamical understanding of the global interdependence of human, natural, and technological systems. The interaction of these systems in untold ways produces risks, hazards, and disasters, or what some term, complex emergencies. Some are controllable, others are unintended; some have spatial-temporal limits, while others are simply accepted by those affected. The scare of the week or hazard de jour approach to the disasters field is rapidly becoming passé. In its place, we see a more complicated and nuanced set of explanations that help us to understand how, where and why human intervention 1) changes the way in which individuals and societies cognize and detect threats, 2) reduces the initiating sources and root causes of threats, 3) mediates vulnerability to threats, and 4) improves resiliency and responses to threats. POST-SEPTEMBER 11 th The world was significantly altered by the events of September 11, 2001 in both incalculable and measurable ways. The trio of events on that day—airline crash in Pennsylvania, airline projectile into the Pentagon, and the collapse of the World Trade Center in New York City—were clearly disasters. There is no debate about that. Disaster researchers were mobilized and dispatched into the field to examine a wide range of post disaster event responses (Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center 2003). These field studies included an examination of student responses in New York City (Peek 2002); the development of 43 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? emergent organizations in the crisis response (Tierney 2002), mental health impacts (Sattler 2002), institutional warnings and response (Grant et al. 2002; Rubin and Renda-Tenali 2001); and the role of geographic information technologies and digital disaster assistance in the rescue and relief efforts (Thomas et al. 2002; Michaels 2001). This is what the community does extremely well—applications of our social science in understanding the immediate disaster situation and assisting in recovery operations. What we don’t do as well or as consistently is examining the historical antecedents (Alexander 2002), or underlying conditions (or root causes) that produced such an unexpected event in the first place (Blaikie et al. 1994).

Why didn’t we foresee the events of 9/11 occurring? How did we become so vulnerable in the first place? How can we reduce our vulnerability and make society, the built environment, and the natural world more resilient in the face of unanticipated, unexpected, and unknown threats? How do we move beyond the singular disaster or disaster situation to a more robust understanding of local conditions and the geography of the everyday that gives rise to crises in the first place? What conceptual frameworks and organizational structures are required to anticipate and respond to human-induced deliberate threats? Can we build a more secure homeland with increasing security without reductions in privacy, civil liberties, and trust in democratic institutions?

I have intentionally conflated the terms to make the point.

Disasters research, thus far, has failed in responding to many of these questions, but this is precisely how a shift in our orientation towards vulnerability science can assist and advance our thinking.

So where do we begin? How do we identify non-structural vulnerabilities in society? How do we understand our vulnerability to the unknown? What theoretical constructs are required to address vulnerability from a social science perspective? A PARADIGM SHIFT A number of researchers have commented on the need for a redirection of risk, hazards, and disasters research into understanding 44 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI vulnerability and reorienting disaster policy (Comfort et al. 1999; Cutter 2001b, 2003). Science, as a 20th century construct has lost some of its explanatory power in anticipating and understanding unexpected events. Questions surrounding applied versus basic science (Stokes 1997), science as a driver for technological change, and science in support of public policy have increased science’s own vulnerability as the dominant explanatory paradigm. This has lead some to question whether we’ve reached the limits of scientific explanation (Horgan 1996). For example, one of the most powerful weapons in the terrorist arsenal is fear. How do we understand the social consequences of fear in modern society and what does this tell us about individual and collective willingness to respond to and recover from disasters? One of the conclusions of the National Research Council’s (2002) post- September 11 th study, Making the Nation Safer, was a need for better understanding of human systems—how people respond to crises and threats; how they reduce their vulnerability to them; what social conditions give rise to terrorist threats in the first place. Yet, the contributions from the disasters research community are conspicuous by their absence or unknowing misinterpretation.

In responding to the events of 9/11, the geographical community developed a research agenda on the geographical dimensions of terrorism (Cutter et al. 2003) and highlighted a number of research themes focusing on variability in the root causes, geo-spatial technologies, and hazards research including vulnerability. Many of the research questions that were identified transcend disciplinary boundaries and thus form a core set of topics that warrant further investigation by the research community interested in risk, hazards, and disasters as well as vulnerability science (Cutter 2001b, 2003).

These broad domains are listed below: Root causes/driving forces—Identification of the root causes, underlying conditions, and driving forces that amplify or attenuate vulnerability across social groups, over time, and through space.

Risk transference—Role of current policies and practices in transferring threat burdens from one social group to 45 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? another or from one institution to another, transference of threat burdens from one generation to another (generational inequity), and risk relocation (spatial transference from one region or place to another).

Dynamic models—Advancements in risk, hazards exposure, and consequences modeling that link events to impacts (biophysical and social) and to causal factors in dynamic ways.

Vulnerability/resiliency indicators—Development of relative indicators of vulnerability to enable comparisons among social groups and/or places.

Decision making under uncertainty—Enhanced understanding of individual and collective decision making processes, especially those decisions made under high levels of uncertainty.

Perception-behavioral linkages—Role of fear, emotions, trust, personal responsibility, and altruism in risk perception, risk sharing, and disaster response.

Capturing surprise—Incorporate surprise, uncertainty, and adaptability into models of understanding human responses to disasters and unexpected events.

Emergence and convergence—Role of emergent technologies, organizations, social groups in anticipatory planning for and response to disasters, role of convergence in response, and conditions that support adaptive behaviors during crises.

Universality and replication—Movement beyond localized case studies and after-event analyses to broader generalizations of human responses to environmental threats and unexpected events utilizing both qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques. AFFORDABLE DISASTERS? Disaster research was conceived as an applied subject—an effort to engage the sociological community in responding to an external 46 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI threat, initially viewed as warfare and then later expanded into disaster studies (Gilbert 1998; Quarantelli 1988b). This public policy orientation is one of the great strengths of the field and is as important today as it was fifty years ago, perhaps more so.

The United States has a set of policy constructs that enable the federal government to assist state and local communities in the aftermath of a natural hazard or unexpected event. Largely codified and implemented under the auspices of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (commonly known as the Stafford Act) disaster policy in the U.S. essentially begs the question of what is a disaster? As defined in the legislation, a major disaster . . . means any natural catastrophe (including hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby (FEMA 2003). As many have suggested (Platt 1999; Downton and Pielke 2001), the mechanism for declaring Presidential disasters (and thus determining what is a major disaster) is essentially a political process, not a determination based on a consistent definition or clear-cut criteria. Are disasters the same for all places? How do we know whether they are or are not?

Some communities are more resilient to environmental hazards and unexpected events than others. This resiliency is derived, in part, from individual wealth and financial health; human resources and social networks; infrastructure age and density; adequate planning, mitigation, and preparedness; local governance; and the 47 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? site and situation (absolute and relative location) of communities.

A million dollar loss in Miami-Dade County, Florida, for example, might be expensive and devastating to the individuals who incurred the loss, but in fact might be quite “absorbable” within the existing financial setting of the county. It might even spur a rise in economic growth given the need to rebuild and recover. If this same million- dollar loss was to occur in eastern North Carolina, say in Edgecombe County (where Princeville, a historic African American community hard hit by Hurricane Floyd is located), it could prove devastating to the community. Edgecombe County had a local economy based on slave labor and plantation agriculture (cotton and tobacco).

The declining agricultural base, the county’s rural nature devoid of any industrial development, the above average levels of poverty, and the below average levels of educational attainment all contribute to Edgecombe’s vulnerability and weaken its ability to respond in the aftermath of a disaster such as Hurricane Floyd. At what point does an event overwhelm local capacity to respond and recover? Is this point the same for all communities and all states? Should there be a minimum threshold of disruption, lives lost, property damage to even qualify as a disaster, regardless of where you are? Similarly, are some disasters affordable while others are not, and if so, according to whom?

How might the concept of an “affordable disaster” be manifested socially, economically, politically, temporally, and spatially?

These questions require sound social scientific responses to help us understand the socioeconomic and demographic differences among communities and how this influences their vulnerability and resiliency to environmental threats. Perhaps a differential system of qualification (with minimum thresholds, and triaged based on local capacities) for Presidential disaster declarations might be warranted rather than a one-size-fits-all model, which is subject to political whim and favoritism, and the continued irresponsibility of state and local governments. Disaster studies and broader-based social science perspectives will be important in helping to reformulate disaster policy in the U.S. This type of research is what the community should be pursuing, not examining semantic differences in our terminology. 48 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI CONCLUSIONS While it is important to advance conceptual and theoretical understanding of the field, we also must be vigilant to apply this knowledge in the solution of real-world concerns and every day issues. The prescriptive agenda suggested here will position the field to undertake the requisite research on the “big unanswered” questions in disaster studies, while at the same time enhancing our capabilities to inform policy makers and local responders on the human dimensions of disasters and emergency response. It is difficult to do one without the other.

We are facing a future full of pessimism. The events of September 11, 2001, as tragic as they were, provided a newly found respect for the social sciences, especially those engaged in risk, hazards, and disasters research. We must capitalize on this and turn our knowledge base and practical experience into addressing some of the most vexing issues in the next decade. The motivating question for this new paradigm is not what is a disaster, but rather what makes people and places vulnerable (and resilient) to environmental threats and unexpected events? 49 3 DISASTER: A “REALITY” OR CONSTRUCT”?

PERSPECTIVE FROM THE “EAST” Rohit Jig yasu Disaster is a term, which has been defined, understood and packaged by the so-called “experts” to an extent that disaster reduction has become merely a problem solving exercise. The definers declare what they perceive as a problem and how they intend to solve it (Dombrowsky 1998: 19). Gilbert (1998: 11) has classified numerous theoretical approaches to disasters into three main paradigms:

The first is disaster as a duplication of war (catastrophe can be imputed to an external agent; human communities are entities that react globally against aggression). The second is disaster as an expression of social vulnerabilities (disaster is the result of underlying community logic, of an inward and social process). The third is disaster as an entrance into a state of uncertainty (disaster is tightly tied into the impossibility of defining real or supposed, especially after the upsetting of the mental frameworks we use to know and understand reality).

Disaster has been viewed in its extended scope and definition by taking into account all these perspectives and together these form the basis on which disaster vulnerability is understood and defined. The bottom line of all these paradigms is that disaster is 50 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI supposed to represent total or near total breakdown of local systems.

Ironically, the dilemma with all these paradigms is that while on one hand they define disaster as an objective reality, on the other hand measures to reduce disaster seem to be so far from reality, that in most cases one finds that disaster vulnerability is increasing at very fast pace. Dombrowsky (1998:19) rightly states that emancipation of the field from everyday knowledge and from the practical needs of disaster management has been neglected during the phase of its establishment.

This leads us to ask several questions. Has disaster lost touch with the reality? If yes, why this is so? What is this reality, after all?

Is there anything that we can say is universally “real” or reality itself is a construct, specific to shared values, thinking processes and visions of the groups of people—which we call communities.

Many or rather most of the times, these values, thinking processes and visions are consciously or sub-consciously shaped by religious philosophies, which have broadly or rather vaguely been categorized as “western” and “eastern”. The latter is primarily based on Hinduism and Buddhism, two great religions that originated in South Asian subcontinent. In this chapter, I will make an attempt at understanding the “reality” of disaster from “eastern” perspective.

Let us begin by discussing the main aspects, which help us define the scope and extent of the “reality” of disaster.

Dombrowsky (1998) sees disaster as the outcome of a scientific tradition that is “concentrated in time and space”, implying that disaster has mainly two types of “reality;” the spatial and the temporal. In the following sections, I will discuss each of these in detail with respect to spatial and temporal connotations in “eastern” way of thought DISASTER: A “SPATIAL” REALITY Disaster has clear geographical connotations with defined extent and boundaries. In fact space characterizes key local factors that trigger disasters. These include natural hazards such as earthquakes that a particular space is exposed to. Also it is characterised by 51 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? local vulnerability processes at a particular point of time. Needless to say, space is also defined by the natural resources available and not to forget the people who inhabit that particular space and intervene over time to create a distinct cultural landscape. Disaster adversely affects the natural and human resources characterising the space and creates sudden disruption in the local processes defining human environment relationships in that particular space.

All these aspects help us to spatially delimit disasters.

Now let us understand how space is understood and defined in an “eastern” way of thought. The physical manifestation remains the same, as this is the reality which human senses can perceive, irrespective of social, cultural or religious background. However, in eastern thought, such a physical manifestation gets directly linked to the understanding at sub-conscious level, which give shape and deeper meaning to the landscape. Such a landscape is constructed through symbolic representations, sometimes even representing the whole cosmos at the micro level (Galtung 1979; Vatsayan 1994). This has clear philosophical connotations, which I would not pursue in detail. However, the main point is that space—its elements and processes—is no longer “real”, but in fact a “construction” at one or more levels of consciousness, which we will discuss later in detail.

This forces us to go beyond our traditional understanding of disaster as a spatial reality and view it as a phenomenon, which has impact deeper than visual. Its comprehension goes deeper for its effect on human perceptions. Disaster is no longer bounded by the physical boundaries; rather it extends deeper into human consciousness, extending much beyond physically perceived boundaries. The psychological impact of this is very deep. It is much deeper than one can expect, not only shaping the way people perceive the cause of disasters but also the way they respond to it.

Interestingly, similar kinds of symbolical associations shape the perceptions and response actions as the ones, which give meaning to the space in the first place. However, there is always a limit to what our senses and the tools available can measure and these in fact pose a limit to individual ability of comprehension. 52 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI DISASTER: A “TEMPORAL” REALITY Our understanding of disasters is also linked to temporal dimensions. In fact the changing theoretical paradigms of disaster mentioned before are very much linked to the notion of time. The perception of disaster as an “event” implies that disaster has a point of beginning and an end. Therefore we categorize disaster situations with reference to the event in focus; before, during and after disasters. This also determines disaster management actions as prevention or mitigation (before), emergency response (during) and long term rehabilitation and development (after), which together form part of disaster management cycle. When viewed this way, disaster has periods of onset, development and finally an end One wonders, if it begins at a moment in time and stops at another moment; the moment being the smallest possible unit in time scale, which our senses or available tools can visualise. While considering disaster this way, we view time in a linear scale. (Jigyasu 2002) However the “eastern” notion of time is cyclic; an endless cycle of birth and death, creation and destruction, implying that there is no beginning or an end (Galtung, 1979; Vatsayan, 1994). When seen from this perspective, disasters repeat themselves as part of this endless cycle of creation and destruction. Although, this seems to be compatible with widely accepted disaster management cycle, the division of cycle into clearly demarcated phases, is very much part of the “reality” that we construct for the sake of comprehension.

However, when we dissolve these thresholds which distinguish one phase from another, disaster is a continuum; a part of the continuous complex process, which cannot be clearly distinguished.

Another interesting aspect of this continuum is that the cyclic process is not really a cycle, as we do not return to the point from where we begin. This is because nothing is permanent. All things change. One has to work hard to reach salvation (Buddha, 543BC).

Our actions and thinking processes can change the point of return in a way that we return but not exactly at the same point. It is part of our evolution process in a cyclic loop (and not a cycle). So we 53 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? discover that even the “reality” of time is what we “construct” for the sake of comprehension. THE “EXPERIENTIAL” DIMENSION Now that we are breaking boundaries between “reality” and “construct”, I would like to bring in the third dimension, which is crucial in our understanding of disaster but has often been overlooked. This is “experiential” dimension, which is inherently linked to our cognition levels determined by three modes of comprehension, namely conscious (visible), sub-conscious (hidden) and unconscious (invisible) modes. In fact, the “spatial” and “temporal” constructs that we discussed before get their enlarged meanings when we adopt a holistic view combining these three modes, each of which I will discuss briefly. The visible pratakshya refers to the tangible aspect, which is mostly physical. The world itself is an illusion and its material content is completely destructible. The illusion is created to confuse oneself from the right path of God.

The Maya or illusion seduces one into the “worldly materialist aspects away from God and the real experience and thus all tangible aspects are of no or very little importance (Gupta 2003). This mode of comprehension is most easily and clearly measured by our senses.

The hidden, covered, adrishya is the second level where one starts recognizing the illusion and making the effort of “discovering” (trying finding the truth and the meanings).

This aspect is represented in nature, as it is believed that whatever God “created” (even illusionary) is greater than man-made, so sacred gets associated with nature. The divine aspect of trees, mountains, rivers, water bodies, forests, stones etc. may not be apparent but needs discovery and creativity in this mode of comprehension (Gupta 2003). The “visible” manifestation of this hidden aspect is in the form of rituals and practices. 54 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI The invisible, intangible, apratakshya can never be seen by “human eye” and can only be accessed through a pure heart. However, it can be experienced. This is considered as the “true” landscape where all tangible and intangible, visible and hidden aspects become meaningless. The quality is only experiential without any physical attributes. It is something, which is a perfection of divinity and even difficult to define (ibid.) One of the important aspects which come forth in the last mode of comprehension is that human being is inseparable part of these “constructs”. After all, these are “constructed” within his “self ”, which is defined metaphorically but experienced spiritually.

Importantly, “experience” is different from “perception”. The latter determines opinion and not comprehension.

Now I return to our discussion on disasters. “Experiencing” a disaster may be part of survival strategy; a source of continuity of existence, by accepting disaster as part of the endless cycle of birth and death. Within experiential mode, disaster is not an event to fight with; it is part of existence to live with. In a way, this seems to point to a tendency to turn people passive and not take actions they are supposed to take. Clearly this might be the case, but on the other hand, this also turns out to be an effective psychological coping mechanism that helps communities to live with disasters. THE UNDERLYING REASON: INTERNAL CHAOS ? I shall like to extend the discussion from the core question “What is a disaster? to finding out the underlying causes of disaster in the first place and also probing the reasons for its increasing frequency and intensity. This will again require an understanding much beyond the tangible level of comprehension. In the present age, we are changing at a fast pace, faster than ever before. We have reached a point where science and technology has completely over-dominated our lives. From a tool, it has become a weapon, which is turning back on us; from masters of technology; we have become its slaves. 55 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? This has a direct implication on our conception of space and time. At spatial level, world has become much smaller due to increasing mobility and powerful media images, which was unthinkable proposition before. However, contrary to these achievements, it is getting larger in our subconscious mind. We tend to see it physically so small, but perceive many more distinctions within it. Similar changes are happening at temporal level. We have been able to beat time through sophisticated technology but now we have reached a stage, where time is beating us. We are no longer able to get hold of it, rather always running after it. Undoubtedly, our ability to grasp time and space are being severely delimited, if not at the physical level, at the experiential and metaphysical level.

We, the humans (I would say, humans will be more appropriate term than human beings as many times, we cease to exist as beings; forget what is “to be”) are finding ourselves in the midst of deep metaphorically divisions. We have become “educated” and supposedly “expert” with tonnes of information loads and not necessarily knowledge (to know one needs to develop cognitive thinking abilities). We make notions of “development”, which are primarily visible in nature and overlook other dimensions. On the other hand, the local “illiterate” people (I will call them illiterate and not ignorant as they may have their cognitive abilities but may not be formally able to read and write) may have the hidden and invisible dimensions intact but fail to link these to the visible reality. To substantiate this, I will cite an example from my own “eastern” context.

River Ganga and Yamuna are the holiest rivers for Hindus.

The spiritual association with these rivers has been so strong that it has led to the evolution of one of the greatest civilizations in the world. In fact religious landscapes like Braj, in which the story of Lord Krishna”s childhood is interwoven with the natural landscape, have evolved around these rivers. Undoubtedly, the visible qualities of these human interventions were (and remain) of extraordinary architectural and ecological merit. For generations these have been maintained without much or rather any help from the so called 56 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI “experts;” the distinct elitist category of engineers, architects, disaster managers, sociologists, that we, the users of this book, identify ourselves with.

To get to the issue lets look at the present status. Most of the rituals and beliefs remain as strong as ever (in fact, many of them have become more intense for better or for worse). So the hidden and invisible dimensions are intact to a great extent. But what about their “visible” condition?

The rivers are polluted to dangerous proportions. In fact these have become dumping grounds for throwing all kinds of waste.

There is a clear indifference towards cultural heritage, which in more tangible aspects continuous to be replaced by poor and ugly “modern” construction. So most of the times, even new creation is not visibly pleasing. True, these are directly linked to increasing poverty, urbanisation and population growth. But on close inspection, one can easily see that much of the threats to visible aspects of cultural heritage are due to indifference and neglect. It seems that heritage is slowly but consistently being disowned by its own bearers. It is like separating body from the soul.

Now let us look at the way, we “the experts” handle the problems. To get rid of pollution in these “holy” rivers, an action plan was drafted in early 90s spending millions of dollars from international aid. Most of this money was used to install sewage treatment plants to clean the water. Nearly every town along these rivers established these plants, including the holy cities of Mathura and Vrindavan, which were part of sacred landscape that I mentioned before. So the entire urban sewage in these towns was collected through electrically driven motors. These were installed in a direction opposite to the natural slope to prevent the sewage to flow towards the river. The entire system was heavily dependent on technology. Also it required regular maintenance. Contrary to this, the traditional system worked obeying the natural landform.

Not to mention, there also existed some local ecological ways and means to dispose the sewage. People had a certain sense of responsibility towards the river, which deliberately prevented them from doing those things, which polluted the river. Now, this I 57 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? would not say was a perfect system, but nevertheless it worked to an extent that we read such beautiful accounts of pleasant experiences of the pilgrims and travellers.

But what is the status of these plants now? Most of them are not working at all or working half of their original capacity. This is because there is not enough electricity to keep them running all the time and once power fails, the entire sewage system gets clogged and pollutes the river (remember it is in a direction opposite to natural topography). And the “visible” results are devastating. Most people do not take the initiative as they think, technology is meant to do the job. So here is what we end up with solely techno-centric way of thinking.

Here one can see clear dilemma and conflict at two levels.

First, increasing gap between visible, hidden and invisible dimensions. Second, between the perceptions of “experts” and local people. No longer are we able to make the link between the three levels of cognition. We need to ask ourselves, why this is so? Are these a result of some deeper struggle that we are entangled within ourselves, at this stage of our super technological advancement?

(Malik, 1990, 1995). I believe that this internal chaos is the underlying cause of the slow onset of disaster situation; the central subject of our discussion. CONCLUSION We are now at the “crossroads” where we suffer from this internal chaos and all this is getting reflected in what we call “a disaster”.

Although it is triggered by an extreme natural hazard, it is a slow onset process, which is making us, the humans, not just physically but mentally more vulnerable than ever before. We are living in an age of “lost” generations, which are neither able to reap benefits of what we call as “modern”, nor able to make use of traditional systems developed over time through trial and error, which seem to have become outdated.

According to me, the main reason for all these contradictions is that we no longer live on our own terms; by this I mean those 58 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI conditions which are collectively defined by particular group of people with shared values and visions. Although our perception of world has drastically changed, thanks to technological advancement, our humanness (that we can not deny even if we want) enables us to relate best to other humans through these shared values and visions. No matter how much these values and visions change, they still exist in various forms.

There is a deep division between our perceptions of what is “modern” and what is “traditional”. The former carries with itself the notions of development of “backward” traditional communities; while latter either implies outdated knowledge or nostalgic images to be romanticised. Our perceptions have taken over our ability of comprehension at various levels. We no longer look deep inwards but tend to look outwards, denying “internal” contradictions as well as capacities. All this clearly influences the actions that we take to reduce the impact of disaster.

I shall like to exemplify this on a more tangible level by citing the case of post earthquake reconstruction process following 1993 earthquake in Marathwada region in India. The reconstructed villages had “city-like” plan with wide streets forming grid-.iron pattern and row housing. The designers in the local town planning office perceived that such a “modern” planning would ensure “development” of “backward” local communities. Ironically many local people also shared this perception. Interestingly however, several years after the quake, the villagers themselves have initiated drastic changes in these tailor-made designs to suit their way of life. Moreover, “earthquake resistant” technology, which was imported as rigid design packages has failed to take roots with local communities, owing to the fact that these were found to be unsuited to local climate, affordability and identity. Besides in the absence of proper workmanship, these in fact have resulted in poor constructions, which ironically are even poorer than traditional technology that they have replaced (Jigyasu 2001). Such examples are not uncommon. In fact, we continue to see the same phenomenon and repeat the same mistakes, over and over again, irrespective of geographical context. Again, I would emphasis that 59 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? this should force us to look for deeper reasons behind all this, which I have mentioned before.

I would like to conclude this discussion by stressing on the fact that “disaster” is not just about spatial and temporal reality that has to be resisted. Disaster is as much rooted in consciousness of “the self ”, which makes and breaks these spatial and temporal boundaries. This rediscovering of “the self ” places ethics and responsibility on each human being. In this experiential realm, we start from “the self ”, move on to the community (with whom we share values and visions by choice and not compulsion) and to other levels, even extending to the cosmos (the most perceivable entity). But at the end, we must return and get connected to “the self ”.

This implies that our understanding of disaster needs to be turned inside out and not the other way around, as it tends to become, thanks to the “expert” notions of what is a disaster. There needs to be a strong interface between “reality” of disaster constructed by us “the experts” and the one created by the victims, based on their worldviews. After all, “reality” is nothing but a “construct;” it is about rediscovering “the self.” Only “the self ” is real in the sense that it is insurmountable truth of our existence; omnipresent in visible, hidden and invisible realms of consciousness.

Rather than wasting all our time and efforts in finding out ways to fight the disaster as an external objective reality, we need to live with disaster, not as passive recipients but as proactive participants. This essentially requires moving from “perceptual” mode of thinking (that unfortunately we have got entangled at present) to an “experiential” mode of comprehension. To this end, I would even deny the very understanding and divisions of so called “east” and “west” that we construct as part of perceptual reality.

The perspective on disaster that I have brought forward through this discussion is not “eastern”; it is rather “human”. 60 4 WHAT’S A WORD? OPENING UP THE DEBATE Neil R. Britton Definitions are meant to be clarifying statements that assist to distinguish a specific phenomenon from others in a way that highlights any unique attribute or set of differentiating features so that all potential social actors, operating in similar social time and social space, can extract the same, or similar, meaning and/or application from the term. However, to achieve this there needs at the very least, to be consensus about what the distinguishing features are. This might be achieved by comparing phenomena that have some level of commonality but when put side by side, the uniqueness of each is made clearer: this is what I tried to do, primarily for my own benefit, in an early attempt to understand what a disaster was (Britton 1986). Since many terms are dependent on others, for example the concept of masculine is dependent in explanation as well as in social action on the reciprocal concept of feminine this approach has some sense. However, defining phenomenon by comparison only will not by itself provide a full explanation. A concept should stand in its own right; its uniqueness should be expressed. If this is not possible then perhaps it is not a unique phenomenon and is dependent on reciprocal relationships.

Hence a relative distinction may be all that is required for social 61 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? actors in social time and social space to develop a mutual acknowledgement of what “it” is. This last point is significant because, at the end of the day, if different groups of social actors cannot agree on what “it” is in terms of distinguishing features or, more importantly, about how to explain the phenomenon then successful social action based on mutual understanding will be difficult to achieve. For a notion like “disaster” with its connotation that specific social action is an associative factor, this is an important consideration.

Is it important that disaster has a “pure” definition or is a relational explanation acceptable? I don’t know the answer, although in many ways this seems to be where we are in the current debate.

We appear to be having problems reaching agreement on what we are dealing with in a pure sense even though we all seem to agree on, and are comfortable with, the parameters that distinguish disaster from other relative terms. Is there anything really wrong then, working with a concept that portrays “family resemblance”, as Tony Oliver-Smith (1999: 21) aptly puts it? I acknowledge that for some, such as most of those who contributed to the 1998 text (which includes Oliver-Smith), and its precursor, the 1995 special volume of the International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, that developing a precise definition for “disaster” is an intellectual challenge worth the effort; even if this is undertaken by a comparatively homogeneous group of social actors (that is, scholars), albeit from a range of disciplines that have very different start and end points. There is no doubt that scholars have been a major contributing force in helping wider society recognize that disaster, as a specific phenomenon, has distinct characteristics and that these need to be taken into account in terms of social organization.

Moreover, many of these same scholars have turned their attention to implementation strategies that has enabled a generation of practitioners to more readily utilize the results of research. This contribution has been outstanding and it is a legacy that these researchers should be especially proud.

My suggestion, however, and hence the point of this essay, is to bring into the debate the perspective of emergency management 62 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI practitioners. The fact that researchers and practitioners have distinct cultures, institutional constraints and rewards, linkages and interaction needs (Fothergill 2000:93) would add strength to any definition produced. To be fair, scholars who study disasters have never claimed sovereignty over this field, and I am not asserting otherwise. In fact, most of the contributors to What is a Disaster?

mention in some way or another that other actors have and need working definitions. Equally, the current group of disaster scholars exploring issues of definition are themselves an eclectic lot covering several disciplines, mostly from the social sciences. I suspect that this is also one of the reasons why the debate is still open-ended currently, since different disciplines naturally have different construct parameters and focus on different attributes. This is the strength of inter-disciplinary and cross-cultural research and is one of the many reasons why disaster research is such an exciting field to be part of. To be fairer still, there are ample opportunities for scholars and practitioners to come together to discuss, debate, refine and reflect on issues of definitions and their implications, and many of these opportunities are regularly taken up. In recent years this has been made easier because of increasing professionalism within emergency management and in particular the development of university-level degree courses now being offered in disasters. This latter point is important because degree courses provide researcher and practitioner with common platforms. Nevertheless, it is the emergency manager who has to interpret definitions, circumstances and information from which to develop disaster pertinent strategies, policies, procedures and practices. It is also the emergency manager who has to negotiate, mobilize and maintain resources from which to create appropriate public safety programs. How emergency managers view the world and how they define disaster is therefore highly relevant. So, why not bring disaster researcher and emergency practitioner together to work on the matter of “what is a disaster?” I acknowledge this would not be an easy task. For one thing, such an activity necessitates a definition of emergency management:

and here I agree with Waugh’s (2000) observation that a major problem in defining emergency management today is finding the 63 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? boundaries of the field; and the field is as broad as the risks that society faces. Similarly, many practitioners would dismiss such an exercise as too esoteric, and no doubt some academics would dismiss the idea as being mundane, although I suspect that these views are not as prevalent now as they were even a few years ago. There are nonetheless some helpful signs. For example, the evolution of emergency management practice closely follows advances in disaster research, especially within the social sciences (Drabek 1991; Lindell and Perry 1992; Lindell and Perry 2004). Likewise, as Anderson and Mattingly (1991) observed over a decade ago, a symbiotic relationship exists between the disaster researcher and the emergency manager. Indeed, since an explicit public policy component to hazard and disaster research exists in several countries, many scholars have an interest in, and concern about knowledge transfer (Fothergill 2000). More significantly, researchers and practitioners are together developing a sustainable hazard mitigation approach to disaster reduction (Mileti 2002). There is also the fact that universities in many countries are increasingly recognizing the benefits of providing outreach or service work programs to the community, and fields such as disaster research serve this purpose well.

I want to build on my conviction that the professional emergency manager can assist to deepen levels of understanding about disaster, which may lead to the creation of a definition that will reduce the current level of discontent. Not every emergency manager will be helpful in this exercise, certainly, as is the case with disaster researchers: there is wide variation in terms of competence and credibility in both groups. My purpose is not to offer a definition of disaster (although I will express a view about what I believe some essential attributes are in the latter part of this discussion) but rather to request an opening up of the debate in a collaborative manner beyond the current cadre of interested spectators.

To initiate this process, I set out below some brief comments that illustrate the major shifts within emergency management practice as well as developments in the professionalization of 64 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI emergency managers that give reason for their ability to participate in developing definitions of what a disaster might be. I then justify my conviction for a pluralist approach to definition setting by employing four triggers, three of which are offered up by contributors to What is a Disaster? The first is predicated on one of sociology’s basic concepts, the definition of the situation. The second originates from two comments by Ron Perry in What is a Disaster? In the first he states that “many people and groups both define and need definitions of disaster” and in the second he reminds us that “each group or individual creates a definition with different ends in mind” (1998: 214). The third trigger is Ken Hewitt’s observation, in the same text, that “the question behind the question seems to be: How do we characterize disaster as a social problem for centralized organizations and professional management?” (1998: 88). The final entry is a proclamation by Henry Quarantelli, also in What is a Disaster?, wherein he seems worried that “our continuing dependence on the jargon inherent in everyday or popular speech continues to blind us to other more useful ways of looking at “disasters” (1998c: 246). To set the context to the discussion, however, an overview of emergency management as a research area and a practice field is useful. DISASTER RESEARCH AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Modern disaster research in the western world has its origins in Samuel Prince’s 1917 doctoral study of the Halifax, Canada, munitions ship explosion and its impact on the local community (Prince 1920). In the ensuing 85 years the field has evolved into a well-established and eclectic area of research conducted primarily by university-based academics who, in the past decade especially, have increasingly learned to work and communicate with policymakers and practitioners. Disaster academics have also learnt to cohabit with researchers outside their own discipline to the point where inter-disciplinary and applied approaches to research have given birth to a “hazards community;” people from many 65 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? fields and agencies who address the myriad of aspects of natural disasters” (Mileti 1999a: 1-2). The most recent manifestation of this endeavor is the sustainable hazard mitigation approach (Mileti 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Beavers et al. 2000) which, since losses from hazards have now been shown to be predictable, has given rise to the call for a reconsideration of the relationship between the natural environment and human use. This approach recommends the need to think about the long-term effectiveness of various types of mitigation efforts and the adoption of a framework for sustainable development practices and. The approach, however, is not without concern being expressed (see for instance, Aguirre 2002; Sachs 1999).

With specific interest on group and organizational aspects, many disaster researchers also directed their attention to emergency management aspects. During the late 1970s and early 1980s in particular, US social scientists raised some serious questions about the practice of emergency management. Picking up on the research output of groups such as the Disaster Research Center, the USA’s National Governors’ Association (1979), for instance, expressed concern about a lack of comprehensive management at both policy and operational levels; about the lack of understanding of the relationship between preparedness and response on the one hand and recovery and mitigation on the other; about the limited talent pool available to manage all four phases; and about the narrow focus on quick-onset natural hazards and the concomitant lack of planning for technological hazards, energy and material shortages, and long-onset natural disasters. Perry (1982) raised issues about the appropriateness of the “dual use” policy connecting civil defense and emergency management. Dynes (1983) queried the relevance of the dominant “command and control” practice model. Other issues ranged from the narrow frame of reference within which hazards and disasters were viewed (Hewitt, 1983); to emergency management’s tenuous links with hazard management (Burton et al. 1978; White 1974), planning practices (Kartez 1984); and the relative lack of understanding within the emergency management community of mental health issues in the disaster context (Parad 66 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI et al. 1976; Raphael 1986). With the expansion of academic interest beyond these areas in the past two decades there has been a corresponding increase in attention about their theoretical implications for emergency management. This has resulted in the study of disaster research, sustainable hazard mitigation and emergency management starting to blend as well as to burgeon.

Emergency management has followed a similar pattern and the fundamentals of conventional organized emergency management are now about fifty years old. During that period, the practice of emergency management has changed from an essentially reactive and response-focused command-and-control civil defense approach, which grew out of the 1940s World War II and 1950s Korean War eras, phased into a comprehensive and integrated approach during the late 1970s, and from the 1990s started to re-emerge around the twin concepts of risk management and sustainable hazard mitigation. However, recent events connected with highly organized terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, most notably in the USA whereby a strong reaction has resulted in its lead disaster agency being subsumed into a federal homeland security mega-department, might see this latest transformation being short-lived in favor of a replay of earlier cycles.

Attempts to bring practice into line produced the Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) approach. CEM referred to the responsibility and capability of a political unit (nation, state, local area) to manage all types of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of all players involved. The “comprehensive” aspect was based on the idea that there are generic processes for addressing most kinds of hazards and disasters. The model included four phases of an emergency activity: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. While this may have been somewhat simplistic in terms of disaster authenticity, it greatly assisted bureaucratic agencies to develop more realistic administrative and human resource capacities. One of these initiatives was the bringing forth of the “emergency manager” as a specific administrator/practitioner. Also stemming from this approach was the Integrated Emergency Management System 67 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? (IEMS), which would help form partnerships between different levels of resource owners, both vertically (between levels of government) and horizontally (between different agencies and the public-private sector). Basically a process model, Integrated Emergency Management Systems, focused attention on hazard analysis, capability assessment, disaster planning, capacity maintenance, and disaster response/recovery requirements. In this way CEM/IEMS dominated emergency management thinking for the subsequent two decades.

The 1990s and the early twenty-first century witnessed a different set of imperatives on the role and direction of emergency management. Two unambiguous influences are sustainable development and the heightened public demand for increased safety. In this respect, disasters, now more broadly considered than ever before, have started to become a policy problem of global proportion because of the growing realization that what humans do in the normal course of their lives can magnify the vulnerability of their community. With this understanding starting to take root emergency management is incorporating its activities into a wider risk management framework. This approach places emergency management in the overall context of a community’s economic and social activities. Steps taken to manage risks of extreme events can be justified to the extent that they deliver a net benefit to society. Attempts to manage risks, however, will invariably impose costs as well as benefits. Hence, the social function of emergency management is shifting from one that only minimizes losses (for example, reducing loss of life or property damage), but also maximizes gains (such as supporting sound investment decision- making, and general community well being). A key factor in this new thinking is the concentration on the “management” component rather than the “emergency”. This has widened the focus of emergency management from being highly task-specific (that is planning and responding to particular categories of events by engaging dedicated skilled personnel and resources) to a more generic social function looking at socially disruptive episodes from a holistic perspective. This, in turn, directs attention to integration 68 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI as a central concept. Possible implications have been outlined elsewhere for emergency management (Britton 2002) and emergency managers (Britton 1999a). However, the inference that emergency management trends have on research does not appear to have been reciprocally and systematically explored. WHOSE DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED?

I want to return to the assertion I made at the outset of this essay, that the supply side for current definitions of disaster is too narrow, and turn attention to the four triggers I mentioned earlier that, in my view help justify why an expansion of intellectual input is required. One of the basic postulates of sociology is that each person acts on the basis of his or her definition of the situation (Thomas 1918). Human beings do not passively respond to environmental stimuli, but rather we constantly interpret what we perceive. It is difficult to account for the social action of others except in terms of how those actors define the situation they find themselves in. The way people define a situation is the reality for them and they fashion attitudes, behavior and action accordingly.

Even if others regard them as misguided, if scientists or any other social group might prove them wrong through social facts, or the initial idea turns out to be inappropriate or false they nevertheless during the time that they are salient have consequences for action.

Perhaps a more contemporary and non-sociological way of articulating this might be, “where you stand on an issue depends on where you sit”; or to put it another way, “how a person/group interprets something depends on what they are required to do about it”. These expressions resonate with Dombrowsky’s comment that definitions provide a justification of positions (1998: 20).

One important implication of this principle is that people, especially if they are drawn from dissimilar backgrounds, may define an identical situation quite differently and for valid reasons.

Placing this into the context at hand, Aguirre sums it up superbly when he states, “disasters are what communities define as 69 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? disasters, and are thus the outcome of social constructions” (2002:

114). If this is the case, then bringing practitioner perspectives into definition deliberations will be useful. Governments are not theoretical in orientation, but empirical. They form positions and policies on the basis of reflection—and reaction—to occasions that impact on the lives of citizens they (the government) are obliged, both legally and morally, to protect. Disasters, as social disruptions, are one such category of occasion that requires governmental attention, although it must be said that low probability events tend not to carry much weight in policymaking unless, of course, the consequences are so great they cannot be ignored. Be this as it may, how government defines disaster is important because this starts the process of policy development that leads to the domain, tasks, resources and activities mix described by Kreps (1998), the combination of which frames social action in disaster. Moreover, practitioners tend to operate within action frameworks that are handed down by governments through legislation, and which they have helped shape. Hence, practitioner explanations tend to include statements outlining general directions and commitment of resources. These elements give focus to specific dimensions that may be important for clarifying what a disaster is. Two non-USA examples will suffice.

Probably the most recent emergency management legislation comes from New Zealand, when in December 2002 the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act came into force, replacing earlier legislation originally enacted in 1967. The Act redefines the duties of central and local governments, and also directly brings the private sector, specifically utilities, into both emergency management strategic decision-making and operational contexts.

In particular, the Act promotes sustainable management of hazards and risks in a way that contributes to the well-being and safety of the public and property. This Act states “emergency” to mean a situation that:

1 . is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, 70 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure or disruption to an emergency service or lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and 2 . causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; and 3 . cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a significant co-ordinated response under this Act.

(New Zealand Government, 2002: Section 4) The link between disaster, sustainable hazard mitigation and sustainable development proposed by Mileti and his contemporaries are evidenced in the new legislation. This orientation helps to distance the approach from the traditional “preoccupation” (to use Rosenthal’s word, 1998: 148) of a prompt return to normalcy. Instead of this, the New Zealand approach is very much an attempt toward moving to a higher state of resilience.

Moreover, the concerns Kroll-Smith and Gunter (1998) raise in What is a Disaster? about overly restrictive legislated definitions hamstringing local needs and efforts are overcome in the New Zealand context through the legislation being explicitly directed to encouraging innovation and providing empowerment at local levels so long as these actions are not inconsistent with national requirements. To ensure overall consistency, the Act requires the national administering agency to develop a national emergency management strategy that sets out goals, objectives and measurable targets, and which has to be publicly notified. The framework for the national strategy is based on a risk management approach developed by Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand. This non- mandatory Standard defines risk management as “the culture, practices, processes and structures that come together to optimise the management of potential opportunities and adverse effects” (Standards Australia 1999: 4). Together with a risk management approach for 71 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? local governments (Standards New Zealand 2000), the Standard is being promoted as the basis for developing a risk management approach to emergency management and for communicating the concepts of risk management to all groups and individuals with emergency management responsibilities.

The New Zealand Act also provides an explanation about what is expected from emergency management when it explains the concept as being:

1 . the application of knowledge, measures and practices that are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property; and are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with an emergency; and 2 . includes, without limitation, the planning, organisation, co- ordination, and implementation of measures, knowledge, and practices (New Zealand Government, 2002: Section 4).

Similarly, Emergency Management Australia suggests “disaster” is, A serious disruption to community life which threatens or causes death or injury in that community and/or damage to property which is beyond the day-to- day capacity of the prescribed statutory authorities and which requires special mobilization and organisation of resources other than those normally available to those authorities. See also accident, emergency and incident (Emergency Management Australia, 1998: 33). By inviting the reader to also look at the explanations offered for other disruptive situations, Emergency Management Australia infers that “disaster” is a relative state and its meaning made clearer through contrast.

As sensitizing concepts (Kreps 1998: 34), these working characterizations bring forth all the components discussed by the 72 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI contributors in What is a Disaster? They are socially defined requiring social action by social actors in social space; they identify triggers; they imply a collapse of cultural protection and convey the notion of harm to the physical and social environment entailing a state or condition that is destabilizing; they require exception routines and extraordinary countermeasures. While the expression and approach between the researcher and practitioner is different, the result is similar. Few practitioners (or researchers, I suspect) would disagree with Stallings when he states that disasters are fundamentally disruptions of routines (1998: 129). Since researchers and practitioners emphasize different attributes that have been extracted from the understood agreed common pool of components, the perspectives of each can be explored and hopefully enhanced. SHOULD RESEARCHER PERCEPTIONS BE PARAMOUNT? Ron Perry’s comments that “many people and groups both define and need definitions of disaster” (1998:214) and that “each group or individual creates a definition with different ends in mind” raises an issue about why the researchers’ notion of a definition should be the one to prevail, particularly when such definitions tend to be restricted to academic publications that even researchers themselves agree are not good vehicles for dissemination (Fothergill 2000). Once they have been extricated from these constraining devices, however, which takes a lot of time and effort, academic definitions can be very influential in directing, and re-directing, the focus of official orientations (a trawl through relevant archives gives a fascinating insight into how word changes in official documents has followed changes in academic thinking, although the lag time is often considerable and the two never quite seem to catch up). In particular, academic input has helped practitioners to at least get some thinking straight and develop a pattern of the type urged by Quarantelli when he stated that we should stop confusing antecedent conditions and subsequent consequences with the characteristics of disaster (1987a: 7). 73 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? Examples of how close collaboration can have positive effects are becoming more frequent and the results promising: New Zealand’s emergency management legislation that is explicitly built upon risk management principles rather than the more typical disaster preparedness and response duo is a case in point. Another observation about New Zealand’s legislation is that its purposeful updating and refinement of the duties of officials and citizens took place without a major disaster portraying the gaps and omissions in existing systems and hence changes being demanded. It is a nice example of a proactive output resulting from systematic consultation with all social groups, which also involved national and international academics. This is not an isolated example, but it is a case in point of how things can be done, and in particular it is a case in point that shows how significant progress can be achieved when different sectors work together on a single issue. To quote Alice Fothergill again, “working in separate cultures does not mean that there cannot be communication and respect” (2000: 97).

Hence, Perry’s observation is useful, in that while different groups inevitably have different ends in mind, it does not follow that those ends are incompatible or unable to be linked. In the context of definition creation, differing ends may well be a key to establishing a better explanation of the whole. QUESTIONS WITHIN QUESTIONS Ken Hewitt’s point that the question What is a Disaster? has more to do with how disaster is characterized for centralized organizations and professional management (Hewitt 1998: 88) is, to me, important. For decades government and non-government agencies accepted notions implicit in the definitions at the time that the real tasks about organizing for disaster was to concentrate on preparedness and response. This approach seriously hampered addressing underlying causal issues, and it weakened hazard mitigation efforts. Even now, practitioners tend to focus on the consequences of disasters, but many do so in a way that has shifted their thinking from a response-focused to a consequence-based 74 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI analysis. In this respect, their thinking reflected a definitional shift that incorporates political, economic and cultural ecological perspectives. Emergency managers are now more likely to ask themselves “what will the overall societal effects of impact be?” The sustainable hazard mitigation approach will consolidate this thinking: emergency managers in some countries have spent a great deal of effort thinking about disaster resilience and what it means for social stability. This thinking and the practical applications derived from it give another dimension to the issue of how disaster can be defined. Over time, the sustainable hazard mitigation approach will also move thinking on, but whatever direction it takes it is unlikely to only involve academics. Emergency managers and many of their political masters are, now, too interested in these fundamental issues. ARE WE BLINDED BY EVERYDAY LANGUAGE?

Four years ago I attended a workshop sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s teaching arm, the Emergency Management Institute, in Emmitsburg, Maryland. The workshop comprised full-time academics from throughout the US who were currently providing emergency management courses or who were interested in teaching emergency management courses. Some were old hands, others new. They came from a variety of disciplines and facilitation was provided by an equally diverse group of academic hazard and disaster specialists. The workshop highlighted several positive aspects; such as how far and how fast practitioners are moving to incorporate theory and empirically based knowledge into their practice ideology, the close relationships between academic and practitioner, and how quickly the academic community was responding to the needs of practitioners. Perhaps too quickly, because the workshop illustrated another, more worrying, quality.

Many of the academics at the workshop were struggling to comprehend the basics of what they were being told. The questions they asked about hazards, disasters and emergency management appeared naïve and the responses given by the facilitators seemed 75 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? not to resonate. Much of the difficulty centered on the precise academic language and definitions used to describe the characteristics and components of disaster-relevant findings, and a lot of time was spent having to “translate” definitions so they could be better understood.

Quarantelli (1993a) has argued that scientific jargon actually makes for precise and clear communication within a discipline, and that to lose the jargon would signify a loss of precision and clarity of that discipline. In What is a Disaster? he extends this line of argument by stating, “our continuing dependence on the jargon inherent in everyday or popular speech continues to blind us to other more useful ways of looking at disaster (1998c: 246). That may be the case, but if it is then it is not without penalty. I have emphasized the word “within” in the first reference to Quarantelli above because we are not actually dealing with a single disciplinary issue when it comes to disaster research. Progress in the field of disaster research, especially over recent decades, has been the result of inter-disciplinary activity. What this suggests to me is that a single disciplinary perspective in terms of a definition of the field is now incongruous. Disciplinary specific explanations couched in jargon are not going to win the day, even for academics with an interest in the field, as the example of the FEMA workshop illustrates.

What is the implication of this for emergency management practice, especially at a time when other sectors of the community, such as lawmakers and parliamentary legislation writers are turning more and more to “everyday language” in an attempt to make important documents accessible to as many as possible? My own experience tells me that if the intention is to inform and elucidate then there is an inherent problem with academic definitions.

Lawmakers, decision-makers, teachers, practitioners and publics don’t want to spend time being tripped up by unfamiliar words that are strung together in an odd manner. They want to know what the words actually mean. Surely definitions can be written to convey unambiguous meaning while at the same time using familiar language. This act alone would go a long way to bridge the “town- 76 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI gown” gap that currently exists. Since so much time has to be given to “translating” definitions so they can be understood (and not only for non-academics!), and since so much antagonism and apprehension is created by having to do this, why don’t disaster researchers adopt a user-friendly approach to their explanations?

This makes a lot of sense since much current disaster literature tends to be a combination of scientific and engineering technical reports and social science analyses, much of which is synthesized and translated into plain English so that emergency managers, policymakers and other researchers can understand their policy implications (Waugh, 2000: 16). Such an approach would not demean the scientific input. Although research sometimes seems theoretical, jargon-laden and impractical (Quarantelli 1993b), this research nevertheless has an important practical value even if it does not give specific answers to specific questions. However, by working alongside emergency managers, issues relating to translation and the link with practicality could be ameliorated. A CONCLUDING COMMENT So, what is a disaster? It seems to me that it is something to do about a set of circumstances wherein risk is realized and collective expectations about societal safety is acknowledged to be inadequate.

Risk is realized in the form of either/or manifest and latent threats and opportunities, and can be due to a social system’s geographical proximity to biological, environmental, socio-political or technological attributes that have not been sufficiently incorporated into planning regimes of one kind or another (land-use planning, technical systems management, public security measures, and so forth). Collective expectations about safety are inadequate because institutionalized beliefs, experiences and perspectives are somehow not matched with the risk reality. These “sets of circumstances” necessitates social redefinition and requires changes in social action, particularly about understanding the implications of both context and consequence with respect to mitigation as well as remediation. 77 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? I should point out that this is not a definition of disaster: I stand by my original assertion that developing an acceptable definition is more likely to be achieved if it is derived from a broad base. I don’t think single discipline specialist definitions are advantageous. This is where the four starting points outlined above come in. They each provide justification for broadening the inputs with respect to different social actors who can make a valuable contribution to defining disaster.

Academic researchers have provided, and will continue to provide, invaluable insights into the phenomenon of disaster. There is no question about this. The systematic and objective approach that typifies much (unfortunately not all) of disaster research provides an essential framework for the wealth of rich descriptions about how nature, technology or fellow humans have disrupted social systems, much of which comes from practitioner and other official sources. The analytic approach that most researchers display has provided us with a detailed understanding about what the key components of disaster might be, and this in turn has produced a of definitions that is getting closer and closer to what disaster might actually be in both “pure” and relative terms. Whether disaster researchers alone can—or should—take this burden on their shoulders exclusively is the question that I have posed. My answer is “no”, I don’t think it is possible or desirable. When it comes to the context and consequences of the set of circumstances I outlined above, disaster managers are more likely to be attuned to many of the relevant nuances. Current practitioner definitions, reflected in recent legislation as well as in practice ideology, now reflect academic thinking; the result of collaboration between the two groups. Since practitioner definitions reflect the current status, there is every reason to believe that this new breed of practitioners can also project their reality into the definition debate and help work through this important activity.

Outlining the role anthropology can play in disaster research and in developing disaster theory, Tony Oliver-Smith (2002) concluded by encouraging more of his fellow anthropologists to become engaged. He said that “in grappling with the problematics 78 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI of disasters, anthropologists . . . can clarify the important distinction between symptoms, the disaster events and processes themselves, and their underlying and largely systemic causes, (2002:

46). While he did not explicitly state it, I have a suspicion that he was also reminding the current doyens of disaster research, who are mainly sociologists, of this matter and to let them in. Far less eloquently than he, but with the same conviction, I am also asking disaster researchers to open up and let others in. I am certain that the new breed of emergency managers, as practitioners who are becoming more capable and more willing to conceptualize the issues they confront in their profession of choice, can make a valuable contribution. And once the notion that other sectors can—and should—contribute to this exercise, there is another group that needs to be seriously considered: those involved in development research and practice. As Quarantelli reminds us, “we can all learn from one another if we but listen” (1993: 37). 79 5 NOT EVERY MOVE IS A STEP FORWARD:

A CRITIQUE OF DAVID ALEXANDER, SUSAN L. CUTTER, ROHIT JIGYASU AND NEIL BRITTON Wolf R. Dombrowsky One of the founders and doyens of disaster sociology initiated the debate on the question “what is a disaster?” but in doing so E.L. Quarantelli (1998b) probably did not intend to reflect on disasters in epic breadth. After decades of contributions in research, teaching and—most important, contributing inspiration and incentive to others all over the world—he may have desired to share the results of his assessment of his sociological specialization.

Normally, the idea of a specialization needs clarification: What is the specialty like? In sociology, this question has historically been, and remains, difficult to answer. Students will find dozens of books on the question “What is sociology?” (Elias 1981). The struggle for sociology to be recognized as legitimate science took generations.

In dispute was the subject matter of sociology, its “field” (Reiss 1972: 10f.). For the “sub-science” of “disaster-sociology”, which emerged far later and which carries the field of sociology in its name, one should expect an understanding of what “disaster” means; 80 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI in sociological terms above all. However, decades after establishing sociological disaster research as a uniquely sociological conceptualization of the core matter is still lacking. This appears to be one of histories ironies—particularly for Quarantelli—that the definition of the science to which he devoted his work has to be argued out well after the original founding.

In fact, there is only a little sociology in “disaster,” but there are a lot of other concepts derived from other sciences and from the practitioners (see Britton’s arguments). The practitioners, of course, strive for applicability. They prefer theoretical models that are highly congruent with their operational needs and experiences.

However, the proximity of phase or stage models of disaster to the demands on scene (i.e. to sequence the chaos into manageable portions) makes them excessively attractive but not very revealing.

In the end, the sequence of phases models describe an ideal succession, but never the social configurations of the disaster events themselves. To some degree the description of disaster as a sequence of phases (or stages) is in itself ideological. It is the modelled order of succession that persuades into thinking that relief work and reality proceed not only in the same sequence but more than that in an orderly manner, which suggests coping will be successful and action controlled.

Much more difficult to reconcile with the disaster proper are so-called disaster theories that adopt fragments of models and theories from other disciplines. Barry A. Turner (1978) adopted a central category from physics when he defined disaster as wrong amount of energy in the wrong place at the wrong time. To argue consistently, the theoretical loan from physics would need to apply the matching categorical apparatus and its appropriate transformation into sociology, otherwise it will be nothing more than a nice analogy without significant sociological explanatory power. The same is true for other adoptions from other disciplines.

To define disaster as an event concentrated in time and space combines quantity with spatial dimensions and has its roots in geographical concepts; Jigyasu reflects on that issue. Resource related definitions (i.e. a “lack” of something) basically stem from 81 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? economics and primarily transform the concept of disaster into a miscalculated supply and demand ratio. In the end every shortage could be disastrous and, consequently, turns “disaster” into an empty term that includes many diverse, unrelated events.

It is important not to be misunderstood on the issue of borrowing concepts and vision from other sciences and social sciences. There is no reason to avoid the use of concepts from other disciplines or different paradigmatic orientations. In this point I agree with Cutter’s remark on the “segregation” of the research communities and their mutual ignorance. However, ignorance is something different than a special, disciplinary quality. Sociological disaster research should have the ability and scientific power to mark its disciplinary originality, not in special self-references (or even worse as jargon), but as evidence that sociology provides concepts and frameworks to solve societal problems (and here again I agree with Cutter). This notion captures the core point of my argument and the foundation of my critique of the contributions of David Alexander, Susan L. Cutter, Rohit Jigyasuand Neil Britton.

I simply do not believe that conceptualizations like those cited in the two paragraphs above will achieve explanation, particularly not in a sociological way, of the target social phenomena. I shall use this yardstick to measure their contributions. The adoption of paradigmatic or conceptual bits and pieces will, from my point of view, quickly lead to a theoretically fragmented perspective that will not serve as an effective foundation for sociological explanation.

David Alexander’s contribution confronts the reader with a mix of theoretical imagery from multiple paradigms. I do not contend that Alexander is inappropriately borrowing. Instead, he is doing what his title says: providing an interpretation. I recall Marx´ eleven theses on Feuerbach. The philosophers only have interpreted the world differently, however, the important thing is to change it. This is very close to what I find here. Alexander delivers another interpretation of disaster; the important thing, however, is to understand it.

Alexander himself has done much research and published well- known books; the most prominent in Germany is “Natural 82 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI Disasters” (1993). These are good reasons to find substance in his contribution to the question “what is a disaster”. However, Alexander did not proceed beyond interpretation. His approach combines many things together: disaster, catastrophe, calamity, corruption, terrorism, and war, at least generalized into “affliction”.

In affliction—these so-called “phenomena”—are included the ways to analyse them, methods, paradigms, and epistemology in the widest sense. Alexander does not advance a notion of what “disaster” could be in reality nor in scientific terms, because to him “the definition depends on shifting portrayals and perceptions of what is significant about the phenomenon.” And the phenomenon, he argues, is “so multi-faceted that a general theory of universal explanatory power is unlikely ever to be formulated”, which is “the reason why ‘disaster’ will probably never be completely, immutably defined.” Leaving aside that general theories (as well as their operational distinctive marks) are always subject to falsification, the quest never was for a “general theory” or for “complete, immutable” definitions, but simply for a scientifically solid concept, a precise definition at least. That, of course, has nothing to do with ones disciplinary affiliation. Alexander, as a geographer, is not expected to clarify the specifically sociological aspects of the question. But of what fabric is his answer? I have neither found an answer nor could I identify the “fabric” of his multi-facetted presentation. At first I had the impression that Alexander does not differentiate between definiens and definiendum. Sentences like “disasters in the modern world are an artifact of two forces: commercialism and strategic hegemonies inherent in globalization”, disaster is “an extraordinarily revealing sort of affliction”, and “disaster is not defined by fixed events, or immutable relationships, but by social constructs, and these are liable to change” are indeed asking for “the tenets and controlling parameters of disaster.” Thus, one is eager to learn how the geographer operationalizes “artifact”, “affliction”, “social constructs” or “change,” and all of the other “parameters” he is mentioning.

My examination of Alexander’s work also revealed what I see as inconsistency. Alexander surprises the reader with the introduction 83 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? of the concept of “mindset”, to which, in the author’s words, “little attention has been devoted”. However, neither an elaboration of “mindset” nor a thorough application to disaster is presented. Very briefly Alexander defines mindset as “fixity of opinions or states of mind created by events” which stems from cognitive psychology and learning theory and is contradictory to his expression that “disaster is not defined by fixed events” (and, conclusively, will not create a corresponding mindset). In fact, Alexander does not aim at real phenomena (in the sense of hermeneutics; see Dilthey 1972 and Habermas 1973) or of phenomenology (see Schütz 1974).

Instead, he focuses upon perception and further on “new forms of symbolism constructed by the mass communication industry”, which originate from various possible approaches (see, for example, Cassirer 1958; Schütz 1967; Marcuse 1964) that Alexander again does not cite. There is some evidence, however, that Alexander favors some sort of symbolic constructivism with an emphasis on psychological approaches combined with some sort of contemporary ideology critique.

Perhaps this view allows too much influence of ideology upon science as evidenced when we consider his judgements on poverty and globalization, or more clearly, his comparison between modern and traditional societies and their matching symbolic constructs. Alexander describes these as historically— more or less—appropriate “coping mechanisms”, and “means of rationalizing disaster”. From such a perspective of a vernacular “Anything-Goes Constructivism” (see Feyerabend 1979), even going back to declare a disaster as an “Act of God” appears (politically or ideologically) as equal rights. This perspective leaves Alexander asking rhetorically: “Are we to call this retrograde, a sign of cultural underdevelopment?” Coincidentally, Eric Arthur Blair, born in 1903, created under the name George Orwell the term “New Speak” in his famous novel “1984”. One hundred years later, David Alexander uses the new speak principle to interpret disaster as continuous interpretation, which has to be interpreted and reinterpreted as often as interpretation appears contemporarily appropriate. 84 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI This disintegration of social science into interpretive discretion appears to capture the consequences of Alexander’s admonition to abstain from “general theory”. In his case it is more (and worse) than a subtle subversion of the ideologically loaded controversy on “grand theory” (see Mills 1963). It challenges the traditional principles and practice of scientific craft. Within an approach of continuous interpretation, precise definitions and consistent theorizing appear to hinder the bulwarks of scrutiny and understanding. Alexander’s characterization of science as “universal explanatory power” and of defining toward completion and immutability appears entirely dismissive scientific craft and reasoning (see Chalmers 1982).

Susan L. Cutter advances another strategy. She simply redefines the question: “The question is not what is a disaster, but what is our vulnerability (and resiliency) to environmental threats and extreme events?” That reminds me of the innocent question: “what is a car?”. The reply is: “the question is not what is a car, but what is your danger of an accident and of the vehicles pollution potential and extreme speed?” In science, it is important to avoid answering questions by deflecting them and redirect our attention to the original question.

Redefined that way, Cutter becomes systematic: “What makes human and environmental systems vulnerable and more or less resilient to threats and extreme events?” In elaborating conceptual frameworks, she posits that “vulnerability and resiliency imply an examination of human systems, natural (or environmental) and technological systems, and the interconnectedness between them . . . it is, in fact, the linkages and interdependencies between these three systems and the built environment that amplify or attenuate vulnerability.” Cutter elaborates this “four systems” approach, but does not elaborate on the question of which “systems theory” paradigm she really has in mind. Parenthetically, to reveal ones paradigmatic background is, in my point of view, the conditio sine qua non of mutual understanding.

I embrace Cutter’s cautions regarding the segregation of research communities, their mutually unperceived publications, their 85 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? different methods, and the “differences in the type of event examined,” exemplified by “natural hazards, technological risks, industrial failures”. This enumeration is revealing, because “hazard” is not “risk” and “risk” is not “failure” and “failure” is not “disaster”.

Above all, “disaster” is not “vulnerability”. In fact, and in that I completely agree with Cutter, “the risk, hazards, and disasters communities could not (and still do not) fully understand each other’s ‘science’.” Cutter’s conclusion, however, I do not understand.

For her, the mutual ignorance of the different communities makes each “unaware of the totality of social science perspectives” and thus of their progressive capacities for future advance. (May be that the reason for quotation marks around science?) But instead of forging ahead with new understandings reflected in distinctions among these phenomena (such as disaster, risk, hazards and vulnerability), Cutter argues, the field “will mire in the depths of ontological debates” about their meaning. Cutter’s vision of ontological debate as problematic reveals her apparent suspicious view of philosophy of science. In its neo-positivist interpretation (which predominates in Anglo-American science in contrast to Husserl’s idealistic restoration together with Heidegger in Old Europe) “ontology” focuses on the relation between “word” and “phenomenon”, or more precisely, on “term” or “idea” and “thing” or “object”. In the German language, the play on words with “Begriff ” (term) and “Begreifen” (understand, but also touch, grasp) was invoked by Dieter Claessens (1980) to clarify that hand and brain have to work together to understand the world and that this understanding is impossible without appropriate terms (“abstract thinking”). The terms (concepts) in mind represent (conceptualize) the world’s reality. Thus, without correct words there will be no correct practice. In this sense, Popper’s dictum: “Words don’t matter, let’s look for the problems” was a joke, because without words we would be unable to solve any problem, much less to recognize it. This appears to be what Cutter has in mind: To proceed to better practice while leaving the fruitless hair-splitting aside.

In the light of the interdependence of concept and conceptualising, Cutter’s central question, her “telos” perhaps, 86 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI appears at once well-meaning but without appreciation of philosophy of science. She asks “ . . . will the field forge ahead with new understandings of how these phenomenon affect the human condition, how human agency increases or decreases their temporal and spatial distribution, and how individuals, social groups, and society at large perceives of and responds to external threats, regardless of their origin?” (emphasis added).

Regardless of their origin? Obviously, the 11 th September attack has focused the theorizing of both Cutter and Alexander upon catastrophic terrorism and motivated them to do something about the shocking brutality of international terrorism. As their first step, they combine the incompatible together: vulnerability, disaster, danger, failure, hazards, threat, risk, emergency, terrorism, and war. Because they do not appreciate the origins and advances in science, “new understandings”, can not take place.

Taking up the findings of the different communities, four rough categories can be built, leading toward a four pattern scheme: The 1) potential and 2) manifest phenomenon, the 3) intended and planned and the 4) unintended and unplanned. In contrast to failures, disasters, terrorism and war, hazards, threats, dangers and risks have not occurred yet, “vulnerability” has to be counted for potentiality, as a result of preventive (risk and/or danger) reduction measures. In contrast to war and terrorism, which are both intended and planned action, normally nobody intends and plans to produce failure, accident or disaster. Of course, there are always, exceptions. On 1 October 1944 General Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the decision to flood Walcheren Island, the Netherlands, by bombing the dikes. This attempt to isolate German forces on the island has often, incorrectly, been attributed to the defensive efforts of the German army. On 3 October 1944 dykes around Walcheren Island were bombed and breached by the RAF. There are also many deliberate violations of laws, standards and regulations—in work, health and environmental safety, in constructional engineering and building codes—but nowhere are illness, pollution or collapses, or disasters intended. Instead, what is sought often are profits or other immediate advantages. The same is true for intended accidents as insurance fraud. 87 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? The heuristic four-pattern scheme may be shown as a table. P O T EN T IAL M AN IF ES T Risk War Danger Terrorism Threat Vulnerability Failure Accident Disaster IN T EN DED & PLANNED UNINTENDED & UNPLANNEDStupidity:

failure to recognize and prepare When we try to fill the “unintended/unplanned-potential” cell, we may realize that Cutter’s borrowed terminology from systems theory remains very cursory. Each of her “human systems”, sometimes “individuals” and “social action”, in untold ways produces risks, hazards, and disasters, or what some refer to as complex emergencies. Some are controllable, others are unintended; some have spatial-temporal limits, while others are simply accepted by those affected. I agree with this contention in general, but I have not found the “more complicated and nuanced set of explanations” that may help us “to understand how, where and why human intervention 1) changes the way in which individuals and societies conceptualize and detect threats, 2) reduces the initiating sources and root causes of threats, 3) mediates vulnerability to threats, and 4) improves resiliency and responses to threats.” What we find, as an empirical outcome of existing research, is in contrast to Cutter’s observation some sort of social disintegration, a loss of coherence and mutual commitment. We find an increase in carelessness, inattentiveness, thoughtlessness, inconsiderateness, indifference, irresponsibility, or “to-hell-with- it” attitude. But how do we conceptualize that? Has it to do with “will” and “decision”, or is it a (self-referential) systemic outcome?

I would choose, for heuristic purposes, “stupidity” for the “unintended/unplanned-potential” cell; in such events there was a 88 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI failure to recognize coupled with an unplanned outcome. All the other attributes, particularly the “to-the-hell-with-it” attitude, should go into the “intended/planned-potential” cell, because alternative behaviors are possible but shunned. Sennet (1998), for example, has described this development as loss of interpersonal narratives, which tends toward the loss of ones own history and, consequently, toward the loss of identity and sociability. Cutter’s contingency “regardless of their origin . . .” makes a system (but no systems theory) of this loss, and, unknowingly or not, undermines the precepts of science.

When we regard the origins, then the differences between hazard, threat, danger and risk reveal significant cultural differentiation and conclusively, insight into the cultural evolution of the fabric of the perception of our world. This is close to Alexander’s notion of the historical “coping mechanisms” every culture has invented as “means of rationalizing” disasters. But in contrast to his context of political correctness, the historical reassurance of the development of concepts should enable a reflexivity of our own conceptualization. Thus the disaster-researcher should appreciate that des astro, the evil star, derives from astrology and astronomy and inherits completely different traditions of viewing the world. This is distinct from catastrophe, with its strong and influential connotations stemming from Jewish-Christian apocalyptic traditions (see Cohn 1993). The geographer might recognize that hazard stems from Indian-Arabic roots of fortune- telling (throwing bones, engraved stones, coins or dice). Then, and most important to me, other sciences will recognize that sociologists are not simply espousing an argot by do not mixing concepts into an indefinable whole with little explanatory power.

Only a few scholars in the field have paid attention to the historical influences on our present (scientific) concepts. Barkun (1979) did, also Dynes (2000), some others too. I (1989) have spent some years on studying these others, finding that our modes of perceiving, coping with and learning from failures are completely determined by these historio-cultural but hidden, “underground insinuating” heritages. 89 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? Looking closer, we will find how these heritages work to shape our scientific thinking. The transformation of a religious mode of “prediction” into a secular dice game called az-zahr, where money was put into molds, expresses a far-reaching social change over centuries. Its most momentous aspect was the capability to dissect and analyse the seemingly uniform and consistent. The game az- zahr dissected decision and result. As long as the dice turn, the effect of a past decision remains its future. Time enough to think about and to analyse how fortuna could be charmed. In the end, gambling and its accompanying desire to influence ones luck and to find regularities, has led to our theories of the distribution of numbers, of randomness, and statistics, but also to social strategies of assurance and economical insurance (Bernstein 1996). Risk- taking in the sense of riscare, (Latin-Italian for circumnavigate) and risco (cliff, rock) originate from ancient shipping and have nothing in common with our present concept of risk, which is a mere statistical calculus which depends on a certain amount of comparable cases and a certain time period of observation.

Historically the more appropriate term would be venture, which literally dared the devil if it was not considered together with those who were potentially affected. The so called “Philosophical Probabilism” of Bartholomé de Medina (1577; see Gigerenzer et al. 1989), a catholic moralist, formulated an ethical procedure with which ventures had jointly to weigh up the pros and cons until so called “probable reasons” could be defined. Before God, only the well-considered, probably best solution was pleasant, whereas the ill-considered, “daredevil” venture was an adventure and a sin.

In contemporary terms, this process of consideration could be defined as “risk-communication”. Alexander is discussing the problem when he considers “how to involve ordinary people democratically in preparation for and management of emergency situations”. Our ancestors have had an appropriate answer, although it does not originate from the field of politics. From there stemmed the principle of majority rule that was never accepted within the private and economic sphere. There the principle of (unanimous) 90 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI consensus rule predominated, because the “whole house” (dominium), life, life-stock and property was “at risk” when a venture failed. Therefore, regarding the origins, one would never mix political decision-making and the modes of democratic participation with risk-taking and the modes of sharing losses and profits or disadvantages and advantages.

A similar etiology holds for the concepts of “danger” and “threat”. By exploring the origins, one realizes that incompatible social relations and interaction patterns are lying underneath.

“Danger” stems from the Latin words dominium/dominus and damnum. The first meant a very specific relationship, the ownership of a thing (slave) or a person (woman, children); the second meant a very delicate juridical and economical relation, a flaw that could be directly executed and, historically later, sued before a judge.

On slave markets or before marriages transfers to reserve have been common to change the contracted prizes (or the contract itself ) or to refund in case of hidden flaws (complaint, ailment, etc.). In addition to the right to claim for the damnum in case of a flaw, initially the proprietor also owed the right to “damage” his possession when he discovered a flaw, or other cases of diminished value. Unsurprisingly, “danger” was closely connected with modesty and haughtiness on the side of the possessed (be with or without flaw) and with “pity” at the side of those who were imperfect and with “mercy” at the side of the proprietor who could graciously overlook imperfection. Our whole Christian behavior codex roots back to this until today: “nobody is perfect”.

Therefore a nonchalant (regardless of origin) translation of “danger” into the German word “Gefahr” would radically miss the subject. Etymologically, “Gefahr” stems from drive, travel, lead, cart, ford and companion (fahren, führen, Fuhre, Furt, Gefährte) and connotes to the venture to go on unknown or rough terrain, virtually impassible routes or fords. On the way, only two sorts of adversities posed peril: insurmountable natural conditions and encroachments, mostly assaults, ambush, hold-ups. “Threat” derives from the latter context. The Indo-European word treud as well as the old-german thrustjan meant squeeze, press, oppression, use force. 91 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? Both are related with the Latin word trudere, which is found in obtrude, protrude, abstruse (originally: push from the hidden!).

Threat also meant troop, crowd and trouble, which altogether points at the relation with weaponry and military force (knights or warriors). Our present meaning of threat as an intention to inflict pain, injury, evil, or punishment, as an indication of impending or possible harm or menace, eludes the violent, destructive aspects, the intentional, deliberate brutality of its origin. Therefore, the use of the word threat in the context with nature is a mere misconception or, to cite Alexander, “a retrograde” toward a state of belief where an animated, intentionally acting nature “strikes back” and “takes revenge”. This is even more true for the term “hazard” because gambling, not the game, is hazardous. The notion “natural hazard” distorts subject and object in the same way. Nature is nature is nature, regardless of its form: air movement, for example.

As a mild summer wind, we love “mother nature”, as an unruly, “destructive” tornado we blame her destructiveness.

Rohit Jigyasu’s contribution was not easy to critique: both because of his closeness to my own ways of thinking and because his subject matter is not familiar to me. I have never before studied “eastern” philosophy, apart from general education (based on Boorstin 1992). Jigyasu’s work was a pleasing expansion of my knowledge, but simultaneously disturbing because of his central issue: “Has disaster lost touch with the reality? If yes, why this is so? What is this reality, after all?” As typical “Westerner” I immediately thought of Paul Watzlawick’s question: “How real is reality?” (1976) and the constructivist debate (see v. Foerster 1985; Putnam 1975, 1985). Then I realized that Jigyasu referred to the religious sources of worldview and the contemplative aspects of “being in the world”, as Heidegger would say. The disturbing aspect was that Jigyasu did not answer his own question. This contrasts with the work by Alexander and Cutter that implies that the human perceptive faculty lost touch with disaster than that disaster loses touch with reality.

From the long pathway from Plato’s parable of the cave (Politeia), Kant and Hegel, the Marxist theory of reflection (see Bloch 1977) 92 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI through radical constructivism, the core question always was the relation between idea and the world beyond perception. Insofar as these philosophical issues are concerned, Jigyasu’s expression that disaster “is no longer bounded by the physical boundaries” fell short. Disaster is not and never was a reality, it is a word that describes something (damage, destruction, harm, and so on) we perceive within the space and time we observe. More important, disaster takes its “boundaries” from long lasting heritages.

Sometimes, the heritages are more meaningful (and thus binding) than the present phenomena we want to describe. When we talk in tongues, the mindsets are light years apart from present reality.

(Which is reason enough to flee such contaminated words or to define them as precisely as possible!) Jigyasu forces us to leave the security of our western abstract thinking. The problem of abstract thinking, however, is the same everywhere and that is why Jigyasu concluded that it is rather ‘human’. “Yeah! Thank God!”, I thought, reinforced in my believe that science in the first place has to sharpen the instruments, which, for sociologists, always are words.

Neil R. Britton has chosen that as a title: “what’s in a word”.

He is asking and reopening E.L. Quarantelli’s and his own conceptual debate (Britton 1986). Britton is the only one of the four contributors to explore “ontology” and makes a serious attempt to come to terms with the term “disaster”. A concept, Britton argues, should be more than “a set of differentiating features”, it “should stand in its own right; its uniqueness should be expressed.” But what if that fails? Britton offers two answers: “If this is not possible then perhaps it is not a unique phenomenon and is dependent on reciprocal relationships.” Both answers are touching the core of our debate, although it is not clear whether Britton really distinguishes between “phenomenon” and “concept”, between definiens and definiendum.

Be that as it may, I will not allege that “unique phenomenon” was meant as real. To do so would place Britton in the same category as Alexander who looks at infinite changing facets of something one always calls disaster (as the “real” phenomenon) no matter which facets anew and anew will become selected. Taking Britton’s 93 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? argument epistemologically, the uniqueness of a concept will only emerge when it is expressed “uniquely,” which is means “scientifically” which is tantamount to the “uniqueness” of sociology (or another science) as discipline, not as collection of paradigmatic “facets”. Seen that way, Britton is pointing at our proper problem.

The notion “in its own right” is only meaningful in the sense of “expressed in sociological (or any disciplinary word) originality”.

Conclusively, Britton’s answer should read: If this is not possible then perhaps it is not a unique science and is dependent on more settled or accepted sciences. (Which explains why sociology still applies definitions from other disciplines, from geography for example, or from biology that defines disaster as infection or disease.) The second part of Britton’s answer, his emphasis on “consensus”, corresponds with the peculiar self-image of sociologists.

No physicist would accept a definition of “light” other than an electromagnetic phenomenon within the current “corpuscle-wave” paradigm. Sociologists, however, seem to accept every “interpretation” of disaster, the main criterion being that it is consensual. But is “truth” a variable of consensus and scientific precision a variable of majority? Britton’s line of argument is a little bit different, of course. I have carried my own argument too far. Hence, Britton’s distinction between “a ‘pure’ definition” and “a relational explanation” is again not far from Alexander’s argument.

Britton prefers “relational” explanations as a temporary accepted “mutual acknowledgement” of the needs of “social actors in social time and social space”. Thus, “disaster” is what we think it is the moment we deal with it. That is very close to the idea of truth as the handy; and finally to Mao’s interpretative misshapen figure that the truth comes out of barrels. Such a conclusion is rude and surely never intended by Britton, although internally logical.

The problem with Britton’s contribution is that his description of practitioners and their fruitful exchange with science makes any critique twice difficult. First, because practitioners are “the good ones” (the global volunteer helpers) which may bias our scientific view a little bit, and second because they are our most important 94 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI first hand engagers of disasters (the hand we should not bite because it feeds us). Britton knows this, because he calls it a “symbiotic relationship” and gives many convincing examples of successful symbioses. Sir Karl Popper however taught us that successes are no real proof. And to carry my argument once more too far, the successful symbioses are at the least an indication for successful scientific scholarship. In the worst case, particularly the symbioses could be an indication for being an accomplice with a reality far from optimum; if not studied appropriately.

The International Decade for the Reduction of Natural Disasters (IDNDR), for example, literally needed a decade to overcome the ideology of “natural” disasters. The conceptual changes from the initial UN Declaration toward the final “Yokohama- Protocol” testify impressively to the negative effects of too successful symbioses (Plate/Merz 2001). Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) has shown that in most cases scientific progress was thwarted by so called “consensus”, which very often is nothing else than the stubborn sticking to ingrained concepts. What might the IDNDR outcome have been like if the decade started with its final conceptual approach to disaster? This is exactly my question for Britton: Where might the practitioners stay if disaster sociology would provide them with “pure”, “unique” concepts (instead of reflecting their every-day-concepts)?

This is, of course, a heuristic question. In reverse, we know that wrong concepts result in wrong practice. Even today, disaster sociology has not yet developed indicators that measure the success of disaster management. We still have no standardized benchmark, no exact criterion to identify any valid relation between “severity” of a disaster and the “efficacy” of disaster management. That is the reason why each person defines disaster idiosyncratically and why the fashionable trends rotate faster and faster. That is also the reason why “modern” approaches focus more on management than on emergency, as Britton reports, because “emergency” since long has disappeared in the indefinable mush of all-is-all-terminology. Even the legislation Britton cites as exemplary is far distant from understandable, measurable criteria. It is more a “programmatic 95 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? declaration” of those who are in charge for emergency management but not a scientifically appropriate definition.

I completely agree with Britton that definitions about which only researchers themselves agree are of marginal value. On the other hand, definitions are not only the tools of our thinking, which also includes mental and emotional orientations, models for meaning, and worldview. Britton is absolutely right when he points at the influence of definitions for Government Organizations (GOs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), governmental politics and policies and international aid concepts.

Supposing that the practitioners all over the world base their practice on inappropriate concepts, and disaster sociology reproduces these concepts because they are consensual in practice. What then is our science worth?

That has nothing to do with jargon and Britton’s attack against unintelligibility. To communicate scientific findings in a manner laypersons can grasp is no argument against (internal) scientific draft (including conceptual precision). More elucidating is Britton’s reference to the FEMA workshop and the scientists who hadn’t the faintest idea of the empirical reality of their field. Empirically oriented researchers can tell you a thing or two about the incongruence of the factual dealing with disaster, the after-action reports and the different “narratives” along the levels of action, how “emergency management” was taught and trained and the so called “programmatic declarations” forming legislation. Scientific precision cannot be achieved if scientists simply parrot one or another of these “every-day-concepts”. They should decipher the underlying “truth” and develop a concept of “disaster” as a measurable test criterion beyond the appeasing, easing, and whitewashing telling that dominates in practice.

That, again, has nothing to do with disciplinary narrow- mindedness or with intellectual imperialism. Each science has to have a unique intellectual discipline, which is in the first place, conceptual precision. Otherwise mutual understanding across disciplines at least, will remain impossible. To me, Britton is wrong in setting the broadness and intellectual richness of all sciences 96 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI into an irreconcilable contradiction with the “iron discipline”, as Max Weber has put it, of the internal disciplinary reasoning.

Without such an iron discipline sciences in general and disaster sociology in particular will not survive as specialized fields. Britton’s statement that “disaster managers are more likely to be attuned to many of the relevant nuances” sounds alarming. What might happen to all contributing sciences, when their field can create only disciplinary instruments that miss real nuances? In that case we have to ask ourselves what our discipline is useful for; certainly not explanation.

What can I conclude? I read four interesting, stimulating, thoughtful articles that seemed to be entirely individual in the positive sense of “headstrong” but which turned out to be very similar, almost corresponding in their disregard of terminological accuracy and scientific efficiency and efficacy. I was alarmed that none of the authors seemed to embrace science, at least “western” science, and that a strange “liberalism” comes to the fore which makes everything equal, or at least indifferent. No wonder that the emergency managers become the real sentinels among the intermissions between the endless “run-of-the-mill” of their failures. 97 6 THE MEANING OF DISASTER:

A REPLY TO WOLF DOMBROWSKY David Alexander “Tell me, my man, which is the quickest way to Dublin?” “Well, Sir, to begin with, I wouldn’t start from here.” In this essay, I shall reflect on both Dombrowsky’s critique of my chapter in this book and the wider issue he raises: namely, the role of science and academic disciplines in conditioning the theoretical study and practical management of disaster. With particular reference to disaster, I shall consider how the agendas of scientific and academic organization may have influenced the ways in which we define the phenomena we study. The paradox of modern intellectual activity is that we strive for objectivity but, in the Kantian manner, construct knowledge out of our own rather fragile sensory impressions guided by universal concepts and received wisdom. If this makes for incomplete theories and fluid interpretations, then perhaps that is all to the good, as they are the raw material of healthy debate. Science is a record of incomplete progress, rather than a path to ultimate enlightenment (Davies 1989) and hence none of us should presume to have all the answers.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s geographers conducted a long and introspective debate on the meaning of their subject. 98 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI They were concerned that its breadth and division into human and physical branches allowed very little common ground. The only lasting consensus to be achieved was that, in the words of Peter Haggett’s famous phrase, “geography is what geographers do.” Fortunately, the diversity of the subject is its principal strength and so geography has survived, the science of the spatial view of everything and anything (Holt-Jensen 1988). Geographers have grown accustomed to the diffuseness of their collective aims, and I would hope that sociologists and other students of disaster have as well, for diversity is strength in this field too.

Although I have great sympathy for sociologists in their struggle to gain as much acceptance as physical scientists and engineers, I am not concerned about how much sociology there is in disaster.

Let there be no doctrine or dogma in studies of catastrophe: I believe such works should be adisciplinary, based on the demands of the problem, not the strictures of academic disciplines (Alexander 1991), though the expertise of sociologists is obviously fundamental to such endeavours.

I do, however, believe that we should look at disaster from different perspectives and then try to integrate them. The whole is very definitely the sum of the parts, but, in certain cases, lack of adequate knowledge and understanding may make integration impossible: that is one reason why more research is needed in order to bring subtle connections to light. In this respect, it is not clear to me why Dombrowsky thinks that the economic interpretation of disaster “turns [it] into an empty term that includes many diverse, unrelated events.” Disaster does involve imbalance between supply and demand, but no one is suggesting that this is our key to the deepest level of understanding. It is nevertheless a factor that influences attitudes and in some cases the ability to survive. Hence the relationships do exist. For a detailed demonstration of this, I recommend Eric Jones’s chapter on disaster in his brilliant treatise on European and Asian economic history (Jones 1987).

Whether in economics, sociology, geography or another discipline, concentrating on a sectoral interpretation of disaster fails to gain us a holistic perspective—that was supposed to be the 99 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? message of my chapter. Trying to gauge how closely or not my contribution sticks to disciplinary norms therefore misses the point.

I believe instead that we should seek holistic perspectives even if progress in creating them is slow and arduous—ad astra per aspera.

Contrary to Dombrowsky’s interpretation of my chapter, I do not “admonish” the reader to “abstain from general theory”. On the contrary, I have been struggling for years to construct one (see Alexander 2000: 238-247). If my perspective tends to shift as I write, besides any failings on my part, this is because of the need to view the phenomenon of disaster from different angles in order to get at the truth. This, pace may involve taking an epic approach in order to search for the overall picture and at more modest levels it may involve seeking connections between, as Dombrowsky puts it, “diverse, unrelated events”. I fear that the links may take many more years to establish fully.

Like Dombrowsky, I have studied the antecedents of modern science (e.g. Alexander 1982, 1989) and found modern practitioners to be strongly influenced by them. Science has developed a long and honourable tradition of objective research, but it has also developed under the shadow of various questionable ideologies (see critiques by Meyer-Abich 1997 and Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1996). Anderson (1997) argued that this is equally true for sociology, whose emergence as a discipline in the nineteenth century reflected the need for systematic control of the industrial proletariat. I am not qualified to comment on the rightness of wrongness of that interpretation, but I do think that, even if Dombrowsky complains about it, we should “challenge the principles and practices of scientific craft”: after all, they were brought to you by the folks who gave you, not only cures for major diseases, but also weapons of mass destruction. Hence, I have tried to lend support to the process of breaking out from scientific orthodoxy and academic territoriality. At the very least we should ask ourselves whose interests science is meant to serve.

Dombrowsky seems preoccupied with the terminology of definitions (and also with the process of defining things—circulus in definiendo), but let us not follow his example. Whether what I 100 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI say is symbolic constructivism 1 as he argues, or not matters very little: it is all part of the struggle to understand disaster, and preferably without loading it with too much cumbersome intellectual baggage. I agree with Dombrowsky that the “sequence of phases” model of disaster (the “disaster cycle”) has its faults, but I am not sure that students of disaster regard the phases as necessarily consecutive (Drabek 1985). Like all models, it is a convenient simplification and we fully appreciate that the fit with reality is somewhat awkward (Neal 1997).

Rather than being a politically correct acolyte of liberalism, I believe the current era is similar to the Baroque period, in that interpretations of reality are increasingly dominated by the tension of opposites (Maravall 1979). Far from “mixing the incompatible together”, it is my intention to differentiate them by looking at the relationships between them (see Alexander 2000, 244-247).

To give due weight to the role of different types of coping mechanism in reducing the impact of disasters is not “political correctness”. Instead, it shows due respect for different ways of viewing disasters and surviving their impacts. In this, it is well known that modern institutional science does not have all the answers. For instance, the original, mid-1980s version of the Bangladesh Flood Action Plan (FAP) would have canalised the Brahmaputra River in order to reduce its contingent flood propensity (Dempster and Brammer 1992). Some riparian rice- farmers in Bangladesh have developed as many as 75 ways of coping with seasonal and contingent flooding. Most of these would have been no use after the restricted drainage and inadequate flood protection that massive levee building would have imposed (Westcoat et al. 1992). Fortunately, significant pressure from knowledgeable academics and others forced the transformation of the FAP into a series of smaller projects that are more hospitable to local expertise, though unfortunately, the mindset of provincial administrators in Bangladesh quelled most of the nascent democratisation of flood prevention (Warner 2003).

Dombrowsky argues that I contradict myself in saying that disasters are not defined by fixed events but mindset is. This is not 101 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? so. I regard the definition of disaster to be fluid, but I see fixed attitudes to it developing in some quarters. Regarding the situation in which perceptions and opinions are manufactured by the controllers of mass communication, mindset is perhaps more of a convenience term than a descriptive one. Nevertheless, Thomas Love Peacock satirised the process very elegantly in his novel Crochet Castle (1831): He [Crochet of Crochet] found it essential to his dignity to furnish himself with a coat of arms, which, after the proper ceremonies (payment being the principal), he obtained, vide-licet: Crest, a crochet rampant, in A sharp:

Arms, three empty bladders, turgescent, to show how opinions are formed; three bags of gold, pendant, so show how they are maintained; three naked swords, tranchant, to show how they are administered; and three barbers’ blocks, gaspant, to show how they are swallowed. How very appropriate this seems in the modern world of mass- media empires!

While on the subject of public opinion-mongering, Dombrowsky appears to have misinterpreted Newspeak, from Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (first published in 1949), which was an attempt to reduce concepts to a simple, black-and-white juxtaposition of opposites (in the form of single words), and then to satirise them, reductio ad absurdum, in order to stop people thinking deeply. That was not my intention and I hope very much that it was not the outcome of my chapter. I do not see why the interpretation of disaster in contemporary terms is a form of Newspeak. Instead, it is something that has always taken place.

Mere tradition may not be a good argument for its continuation, but as people perceive disaster and deal with it in the context of the realities of their times, so it deserves to be interpreted in that light. Hence, we will probably never achieve a telos, or masterful completion to our studies of disaster, so let us return to Omar Khayyam and reconcile ourselves to transiency: 102 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI With them the Seed of Wisdom did I sow, And with my own hand labour’d it to grow:

And this was all the Harvest that I reap’d— “I came like Water and like Wind I go.” (Rubayyat, XXX, trans. Edward Fitzgerald, 1859) I do agree with Orwell that we are creating a dystopia (a society which is considered undesirable), but that is as far as it goes. With respect to Orwell’s times, the world has changed, the context is different, and the root causes of dystopia are now based on different patterns of inequality and power imbalances.

In his essay Dombrowsky has mounted a spirited defence of science against “liberalism”. I agree with that stance, in so far as neo-liberalism has done so much to subvert the aims and choices inherent in modern scientific activity. However, that should not be a reason for ignoring the role of science, hand-in-hand with neo-liberalism, in the creation of both vulnerability and disaster, as well as a set of public attitudes and perceptions connected with technocentrism and fuelled by lucrocentrism (yes, I did coin that term—see Alexander 2000: 244). Indigenous coping mechanisms are thus increasingly a defence against both disasters and the depredations wrought by the modern world’s power structures.

It is not political correctness to discuss coping mechanisms as a means of rationalising disaster (though in reality they are a means of coping with it). The message from fieldwork is that indigenous coping mechanisms are not to be swept aside and replaced with imported ones without very good justification (for a good example of this, see Schware 1982). However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the way to involve people in managing their own security is to resort to participatory rather than representative democracy.

The latter has proved inadequate on numerous occasions, as Wisner (2003) has chronicled (Dombrowsky should see this excellent article for the details he is seeking of how geographers operationally define the concepts “artifact”, “affliction”, “social construct” and “change”).

Finally, if emergency managers are the real custodians of truth about disasters, as Dombrowsky seems to be saying, this is because 103 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? of the failure of academics to communicate in simple language to a wider audience than people of their own kind. Disaster studies are very distinctive in that they rely on a mixture of theoretical constructions by scholars and reports from the field by practitioners.

It is a major task to get the two groups to communicate with one another, but a vitally important one.

I trust I have not been too idiosyncratic in my definition of disaster, and have not preferred convenient fictions to awkward truths. Scientific (or more precisely social scientific) orthodoxy is not necessarily efficient or efficacious in getting at the latter. Instead, it is time to strike out and look for radical new interpretations of disaster, and that will also help keep the debate fresh and vigorous. NOTES 1“ Symbolic constructivism” seems to be a neologism and hence its meaning is unclear. The more common term in the social sciences is “symbolic interactionism”, in which the individual’s concept of self is regarded as an internalisation of social processes (Charron 2000). “Constructivism” was originally the movement through which art was “constructed” to be functional in some manner. The term has since been applied to the way that images are created by publicity (Ploughman 1995). I am not aware that this notion has yet been merged with symbolic interactionism, though presumably it could be. 104 7 PRAGMATISM AND RELEVANCE:

A RESPONSE TO WOLF R. DOMBROWSKY Susan L. Cutter I read Dombrowsky’s critique of the set of papers with great interest. His critique was often difficult to follow especially the logic of his argument, but the paper did present some interesting points worth considering.

First, I do not hold a “suspicious view of philosophy of science”.

Rather, I acknowledge that there are competing views of science and scientific explanation (Snow 1993). From my perspective, science (and scientific practice) is socially constructed, a position that is viewed as membership in relativist school of thought within the “science wars” (Gould 2000). Science is but one set of beliefs that help us to understanding the intrinsic order of nature. Scientific “truth” or the universality of the findings are not absolute, but are in fact socially conditioned. The production of knowledge itself is partially determined by human agency and influenced by gender, race, social, and cultural differences (Harding 1991). Thus, the choice of scientific problems and hypotheses are not based on some objective truth in as much as they can be defined and structured differently depending on one’s personal agenda and perspective.

Second, I am skeptical of the continuing definitional debates and arguments regarding the terminology that is used in our 105 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? discourse involving hazards, risks, disasters, and vulnerability.

Instead of being mired in these definitional concerns about what is a disaster, we should simply state our usage of the term and move forward to solve some of the pressing research and applications questions. In that spirit, I use the following definitions: risk is the likelihood or the probability of occurrence of an event; hazards are the potential threats to people and the things they value as well as the impact of an event on society and the environment; vulnerability is the potential for loss or the capacity to suffer harm from a hazard; and disasters are singular (or interactive) events that have a profound impact on local people or places in terms of injuries, deaths, property damages or environmental impacts. I contended in the paper, and re-iterate here, that this line of scholarly inquiry into semantics (or ontological debates) is counter-productive at this point in the intellectual development of the field. We need to move on to more important questions. Dombrowsky suggests one himself: “We still have no standardized benchmark, no exact criterion to identify any valid relation between ‘severity’ of a disaster and the ‘efficacy’ of disaster management”. This is an important consideration that the social sciences can and should address. The academic practice of navel staring is fine for some scholars and disciplines, but disaster research is a relevant and pragmatic endeavor; one that uncovers new knowledge and then applies it to reduce the impacts of disasters on society. We must not forget that.

Third, I would like the research community to read more widely than we do at present and develop more intellectual synergism in our range of perspectives and methodologies that impinge on disaster research. Ignorance of the contributions of allied disciplines is inexcusable especially when they can inform and advance multidisciplinary understanding of disasters and their consequences on society. On this point, Dombrowsky and I concur.

Fourth, I think Dombrowsky misunderstood the meaning of my phrasing “regardless of origin”. Until very recently, research and practice in the disasters field was segmented into specific hazard domains; earthquake response, hurricane preparedness and so on. 106 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI Now the dominant approach by state and local governments in the U.S. is increasingly oriented towards an “all hazards” perspective.

There is a set of generic understandings about hazards assessment and response, which are then customized based on the source of the threat (e.g. flooding, terrorist act). In contrast to this more integrative perspective, the research community still generally practices its science based on specific hazard etiologies and is not examining the commonalities in how society responds to, learns from, and mitigates environmental threats. This is not to suggest that all hazards are equal in their characteristics, impact, or importance, however. Dombrowsky does make a good point about the intent heuristic (or what many call adaptive threats or social hazards) as a distinguishing attribute of hazards. I would also include the voluntary/involuntary nature of the hazard exposure and the geographic scale as other key heuristics in differentiating among different hazards. However, we don’t need to reinvent a typology of hazards or taxonomies of causal agents for disasters—work that was done decades ago (Hohenemser, Kates and Slovic 1985; Burton, Kates, and White, 1993).

Finally, I remain steadfast in my opinion that social science perspectives on disasters will assume increasing importance and relevance in the next decade. There are serious concerns about the role of human agency in threat perception, hazard production, vulnerability mediation, and response. Are disasters the same everywhere and do they have similar effects? How are risks transferred over space and through time? What conditions cause adaptive or maladaptive responses to crises? In what ways do disasters threaten the environmental security of nations? How have the processes of urbanization and globalization increased societal vulnerability to hazards? How do individuals and communities respond to unexpected events? Are our organizational structures and institutions adequately prepared to respond to unanticipated and unexpected events? We need to shift our focus away from semantic debates on what is a disaster to a more focused research endeavor that is theoretically robust, methodologically challenging, and above all, responsive to the informational needs of the hazard and disaster practitioner communities. 107 8 DEFINING THE DEFINITION FOR ADDRESSING THE “REALITY” Rohit Jig yasu Dombrowsky’s response to the four approach papers is very articulate and he manages to raise some very basic issues concerning the theme of our discussion of “What is a disaster?”. I think one of his main achievements has been to pull together various papers (even those which manage to drift away) and bring them back to the central point of our discussion.

My response to Dombrowsky and also to other approach papers will be an elaboration of some central points raised by the authors.

I will be touching on two aspects; firstly regarding the scope, limits and purpose behind the definition of “disaster” and secondly, I shall attempt to answer the apt question put forward by Dombrowsky: “How real is the reality of disaster?” DEFINING THE DEFINITION I shall begin by bringing forth Perry’s (1998) view that many people and groups both define and need definitions of disaster and that each group or individual creates a definition with different ends in mind. In the words of Britton, definitions are not only the tools of our thinking, but also mental and emotional orientations, 108 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI models for meaning and world-views. In my opinion, the question of definitions with respect to important terms such as disaster in our case is paramount but the strive towards defining commonly acceptable definitions should be open and flexible. There may be multiple definitions of a single term, based on what we put in the center, whether viewed purely from a sociological view or taking into consideration multiple disciplinary views. Even one discipline may take an ideological view based on the undercurrents of political standpoint and this is all the more evident in the case of sociology, which forms diverse views on how the researcher views the society and its interrelationships.

While the definitions are crucial for deciding the limits of any particular discipline they should also form a blueprint where flexible relationships with other disciplines can be developed leading to gradual advance and extending the scope of the discipline. The ultimate point of a field is not to become isolated shell, something that is complete within itself, rather any advancement in the field should ultimately contribute towards larger goals for the betterment of humanity. Therefore it is good to have multiple definitions of a concept. What is also needed is a debate on inherent similarities and differences between these multiple definitions so as to be able to create a symbiosis on the concept, thereby giving it totality of meaning. “RESEARCHER” VERSUS “PRACTITIONER” Britton, in his approach paper also stresses on the need as well as existing opportunities to bring together scholars and practitioners to discuss, debate, refine and reflect on the issues of definitions of disasters and their implications. He emphasizes the need of providing researcher and practitioner with common platforms. As a practitioner, the emergency manager plays an important role in developing procedures in disaster situations. Britton agrees with Waugh’s observation that a major problem in defining emergency management today is finding the boundaries of the field; and the field is as broad as the risks that society faces. He raises the issue of both researchers and practitioners dismissing each other. 109 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? While common platforms for researcher and practitioner will indeed be useful in order that both can draw from the experience of each other. The question is whether the boundaries between emergency manager (basically a practitioner) and a disaster researcher should be merged. I am very skeptical to this idea as both have different, although closely related roles to perform. While a “research” (literally meaning “to search again”) by its very definition is a backward looking activity, a practice is based on a vision, which is drawn on past knowledge or experience. A researcher can put on the hat of a practitioner and vice versa but a researcher cannot be in the same mode of thinking as a practitioner at the same time.

Actually a researcher and a practitioner can work hand in hand, learning from each other. While a practitioner can try testing some theoretical construct in practice, the researcher can generate significant knowledge on the basis of the experience gathered by the practitioner and in many cases can even decide on the question of his or her research based on the hole in the knowledge that he will be able to figure out only by gathering flaws in existing practice.

How emergency managers view the world and how they define disaster is therefore highly relevant. But I feel that the task of defining a disaster should be left mainly on to disaster researcher, who may generate significant knowledge from the results in practice and use that very knowledge to improve the definition of disaster. We may define disasters for the sake of research or practice but our crucial search here is about the meanings and characteristics of the term itself.

To conclude however, the fundamental question is whether we are addressing, “disaster research” or “disaster (emergency) management”. Both these terms are quite different but may ultimately contribute towards the definition of the disaster. As part of disaster research, one may research on existing emergency management systems as part of exploring the successes and failures in dealing with disasters. Disaster Research may ultimately mean research on disaster, research in disaster or research on disaster management. To put it in other words, disaster researcher may call 110 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI for reflecting in the action, on the action or on the phenomena itself that leads to or calls for action. Each of this type of distinct research activity will contribute towards definition of disasters. THEORY AS “PRODUCT” AND “GENERATOR” OF DEFINITION In order to take this discussion further, I wish to bring in the importance of theory in the definition of disaster. Needless to say, in the pursuit towards defining disaster, one needs a strong theoretical basis. While I do not wish to deny the importance of developing the theory itself, I am quite critical to the process in which theory is constructed and packaged in many cases. Disaster research can significantly aid towards construction of theory, which will aid in refining the definition of disaster. However at the same time, we need to find out why theory is not influencing results and based on our results modify the theory. A theory might well be the starting point of research (theory as generator) or it might be the result of practical experience in the field (theory as product).

I agree with Dombrowsky’s criticism of Cutter that while the relationship between disaster and vulnerability are paramount, these cannot be lumped together. One needs to separate normative aspects from the phenomenon itself. Underlying or root causes of vulnerability are important in order to be able to reduce vulnerability.

FROM PERCEPTION TO COMPREHENSION FOR THE SAKE OF “REALITY” Britton refers to Thomas (1918) while talking about the basic postulates of sociology that each person acts on the basis of his or definition of the situation. According to him, human beings do not passively respond to environmental stimuli, but rather we constantly interpret what we perceive. It is difficult to account for the social action of others except in terms of how those actors define the situation they find themselves in. This issue of perception is 111 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? again raised by Dombrowsky when he raises a critique on my question on the “reality” of the disaster. I agree with his view that disaster is not and never was a reality and that it is a word that describes something we perceive within the space and time we observe. However, the critical question is whose perception are we talking about. The moment we bring in perception, the “object” which could be “described” turns into a “subject” which is colored by the images, which in most societies are result of religious or other belief systems.

In my paper, I have taken this debate further by stressing that we need to move beyond perception. Very much the way Dombrowsky states, the core question always was and still is the relation between idea and the world beyond perception. In my opinion, the world beyond perceptions is not about constructivism but about comprehension in physical and mental space and time.

Although as geographers we describe disaster in space and time, it is the mental description (collective as well as individual), that constructs disaster in human conscience. Therefore disaster no matter how we describe it in constructivist tradition (image formation) is ultimately a reality, which is constructed in cognitive mind of those who experience and also those who address disasters.

Another important point, which Dombrowsky touches upon while giving a critique on my paper is about the problem of “abstract thinking”. However I believe that thinking or rather thought process is not abstract, it is always based on some underlying assumptions and belief systems. Rather, it is only human behavior, which is abstract in more than one ways. I am in fact glad to learn that my paper reinforced his belief in sharpening instruments of science, so that they are able to recognize the recognizable human behavior and brings them into a mode of indicators, which gives us the ability to “construct” the reality of the disaster in a scientific manner.

It is important to move beyond western world views on which our notions of “reality” have been well-founded and take into consideration multiple world views from various cultures, not only to emphasize what is different, but rather more importantly to recognize the basic similarities which form the crux of human 112 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI behavior in the times of “disasters” as is understand by us and them. On the other hand, I very much agree with Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) viewpoint mentioned by Dombrwosky that in most cases, scientific progress was thwarted by so called “consensus”. For advance of the field , it is equally important to make the differences explicit and base our definitions on the premises of recognizing these subtle or sharp differences in “comprehensions” and not mere “perceptions” of a phenomena described as “disaster”. 113 9 DOG OR DEMON? Neil R. Britton Wolf Dombrowsky’s comments remind me of an old Chinese tale about an Emperor who one day asked his court artist, “What is easy to paint and what is difficult to paint?” The courtier thought hard on this for as long as he knew his master’s tolerance would permit and replied, “Dogs are difficult, but demons are easy.” The courtier explained further to his Emperor that obvious things are hard to get right because everyone knows all about them and hence everyone thinks they know what the essence of a dog is. However, since no one has actually seen a demon then drawing one is easy, because who can say it is not correct.

To me, this ancient tale strikes at the heart of the debate about ‘What is a Disaster?” Is disaster a dog because when one occurs it is “obvious”, or is it a demon because, up to now at least, no-one really knows what it is? Even though both scientist and citizen have trouble reaching agreement about what the precise factors are, it seems that most are certain when one has occurred. While there are major policy and practice, let alone theoretical, implications in having disaster as dog, it must surely be better than having disaster as demon. In fact, we have already been down the latter track and thankfully got off it, although it took a concerted effort to overcome the comfort that disaster as an “act of god” provided. It was no doubt comforting for policy—and decision- 114 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI makers to regard disaster as an event beyond their control. Old- time disaster practitioners certainly benefited; all they needed to be seen to do was to play games and everyone was happy. The reason why we overcame that particular superstition and silliness was because academics—sociologists in particular—were able to set the stage by identifying, qualifying and documenting disaster’s key parameters and over time to associate many of the causal factors to human activity rather than other-world demons. Although some influential segments of society have not lost the need to conjure up demons or insist on demon definitions, and here I am thinking particularly of the current US Administration and its bizarre rhetoric in its so-called war against terrorism, it is pleasing to know that such a fundamentalist attitude does not appear to be in the ascendance. The real dilemma about this specific situation is that after all the events that the modern world has gone through, why can such a view be tolerated at all as we move on through the twenty-first century?

The question that I posed in my initial contribution centers on these issues. Namely, if disaster is a social action that everyone as a social actor has the potential to experience, but at the same there is a gap between groups of actors about what the said activity is, then one way to bridge this disparity is to release the definitional debate from its customary keepers (the academics) and allow other groups at least to contribute as of right. This should not be regarded as an heretical recommendation, especially given today’s reality that there are many social groups now who have the credentials as well as the inclination to worry about definitions and generate theories apart from the professional academic-as-scientist-or- researcher, who at one stage were society’s paid elite thinkers, but now are experiencing competition from many sources outside the university or research agency. Today there are tens of thousands of highly trained practitioners many of whom hold doctoral degrees, who have received higher education that permits them to be systematic in their thinking and to have excellent analytical capabilities. Moreover, this non-academic group is able to offer different perspectives from which to view disaster. Disaster after 115 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? all, as Quarantelli and Dynes reminded us many years ago, is a social occasion. To take this one step further, defining disaster should also be a social occasion in the sense that those groups who have a declared interest in it should be able to contribute to its definition.

If this was done as an open process, then it might be possible to overcome the perennial issue of not being able to agree on what “it” is. Of course, social scientists will be amongst those who will put up their hands to indicate they have a vested interest; and so they should. Social science and sociology in particular has contributed immensely to the de-mystification of disaster. One of the many contributions sociology makes is that it helps to explain the obvious, the everyday as well as the unintended and unanticipated implications of social action. In this respect, the courtier’s “dog or demon” distinction is just as relevant for sociology as it is for disaster:

1 . Sociology as dog provides explanation of the ‘obvious’ factors pertaining to social interaction, social systems, social processes, social structure, interpretation of social life and so on; 2 . Disaster as dog; sociology provides explanation of the obvious pertaining to social sequelae of threat and/or impact; 3. Sociology as demon; provides explanation of the latent, unintended, hidden, and masked; 4 . Disaster as demon; sociology provides explanation of latent, unintended, hidden, and masked effects surrounding non- routine events.

In my view, sociology will contribute more in the future, particularly after sociologists specializing in disaster willingly and systematically assess their own contribution within a wider definitional field, which would include other disciplines as well as practitioners from backgrounds as diverse as emergency management, development, environment, health, welfare and justice, and also the public administration and policy-oriented sector. If this were to occur, it is likely to spark some interesting 116 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI synthesis. I don’t believe it will be to the detriment of any specific discipline, certainly not sociology, in fact it might be the light that flames a truly multi-disciplinary fusion. It will definitely be to the betterment of understanding what disaster is. In this respect, everyone will win.

Moving on to Dombrowsky’s central comment about my initial paper, my sense is that he over-read my statements or else I failed to make the point clear that contemporary practitioners who have academic training, and who contribute significantly in academic settings (for example as adjunct professors, special advisers, contributors to journals, journal editors, academic text writers, specialist presenters to academic conferences) are now very capable of making a contribution to theory, which is an area that academics have traditionally considered to be their turf. One aspect I failed to mention in my initial paper is that my view on the significance of practitioners to academic activities was formed in large part after I had spent a few years pursuing a second career away from universities, to realize what relatively little impact academics had on framing and explaining some vexed issues confronting government policy—and decision-makers. As a manager specializing in disaster management in both local and central government settings, and later in the international arena, one of my frustrations was dealing with the reluctance of academics to come to grips with the reality of actual situations that disaster managers were dealing with. More recently, this frustration has been compounded by the realization that academic researchers in some non-western societies, including social scientists, are reluctant to acknowledge practitioners as legitimate stakeholders worth engaging. In a way, academics need to “unlearn” in order to learn what the issues are, how the issues are perceived and dealt with by other sectors, and how they could contribute to a process of issue solution. Of course, this is a generalization. There are some extremely competent academics who intuitively know how to convert their specialized knowledge into meaningful and practical outputs. However, they seem to be in the minority. Whether overall this is a good thing or not, I am not in a position to answer, but I do believe this situation 117 W HAT IS A D ISASTER ? is socially unbeneficial. What my experience has taught me is that these days I am more ready to call upon a practitioner with academic training to help me out rather than a professional academic. The specialized disciplinary approach that comes with most academics seems to somehow get in the way.

I presented this line of argument to Dombrowsky during the course of one of our email exchanges following his review of the first set of contributions, and he agrees that he may have over- emphasized the impression I placed on practitioners. However, he did it for a reason (Wolf never does anything without having a reason!), and that was to express a concern about what he detects as an increasing undertone against sociology and a growing over- estimation of what practitioners are capable of doing. In this respect, Dombrowsky is concerned that some new myths are being created.

I do not dispute Dombrowsky’s concern. In fact I sense he is correct in his suggestion that academics are currently afflicted by a relative decline in favor, and that perhaps the pendulum is currently swinging away from them. This, however, is a separate issue from that to which the current focus is directed. On this point, however, let me simply state that I am not happy with the apparent anti- intellectual sentiment that often surfaces, although it does not really surprise me. What does surprise me is how well academia has been able to avoid, in relative terms, close scrutiny of much of its activities, especially at a time when other sectors of society are witnessing often nasty attacks from above and below.

Nevertheless, I would not like the comments I made in the initial paper, or in this reply, to be regarded as an attack on academics even though I do think there are issues pertaining to academic competence, performance and in some cases relevance that need to be dealt with as a matter of some urgency. Bringing this back to the matter at hand, my reply to Dombrowsky is that it should not be regarded as one group against another; it should be groups complementing other groups. The matter at hand is how to combine the efforts of all groups so that the insights and potential of all can be brought together. This seems like an appropriate sociological exercise to me. 118 (E DITED BY) R ONALD W. P ERRY & E.L. Q UARANTELLI Dombrowsky further states the problem with my contribution is that my eulogy (sic) on practitioners and their fruitful exchange with science makes any critique twice difficult: because the practitioners are “the good ones”. In response, I don’t think in terms of good or bad ones. I certainly do not believe for a moment that practitioners are capable of providing the conc