Read Chapter 3, Understanding Ethical Problems, from your text by Fleddermann.  Compare and contrast two Ethical Theories you believe are distinctly different from each other.   Which two you pick

Engineering Ethics Fourth Edition C HARLES B. F LEDDERMANN University of New Mexico Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River • Boston • Columbus • San Francisco • New York • Indianapolis London • Toronto • Sydney • Singapore • Tokyo • Montreal • Dubai • Madrid Hong Kong • Mexico City • Munich • Paris • Amsterdam • Cape Town Vice President and Editorial Director, ECS: Marcia J. Horton Executive Editor: Holly Stark Editorial Assistant: William Opaluch Marketing Manager: Tim Galligan Production Manager: Pat Brown Art Director: Jayne Conte Cover Designer: Black Horse Designs and Bruce Kenselaar Full-Service Project Management/Composition: Vijayakumar Sekar, TexTech International Pvt Ltd Printer/Binder: Edwards Brothers Cover Printer: Lehigh-Phoenix Credits and acknowledgments borrowed from other sources and reproduced, with permission, in this textbook appear on appropriate page within text.

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Librar y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fleddermann, Charles B. (Charles Byrns), 1956– Engineering ethics / Charles B. Fleddermann. — 4th ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-13-214521-3 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-13-214521-9 (alk. paper) 1. Engineering ethics. I. Title.

TA157.F525 2012 174'.962—dc23 2011023371 ISBN 10: 0-13-214521-9 ISBN 13: 978-0-13-214521-3 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 iii Contents ABOUT THIS BOOK vii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background Ideas 2 1.2 Why Study Engineering Ethics? 2 1.3 Engineering Is Managing the Unknown 3 1.4 Personal vs. Professional Ethics 4 1.5 The Origins of Ethical Thought 4 1.6 Ethics and the Law 4 1.7 Ethics Problems Are Like Design Problems 5 1.8 Case Studies 6 Summary 15 References 15 Problems 16 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 18 2.1 Introduction 19 2.2 Is Engineering a Profession? 19 2.3 Codes of Ethics 24 Key Terms 33 References 34 Problems 34 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 37 3.1 Introduction 38 3.2 A Brief History of Ethical Thought 38 3.3 Ethical Theories 39 3.4 Non-Western Ethical Thinking 46 Key Terms 53 References 53 Problems 53 iv Contents 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 56 4.1 Introduction 57 4.2 Analysis of Issues in Ethical Problems 57 4.3 Line Drawing 59 4.4 Flow Charting 62 4.5 Confl ict Problems 63 4.6 An Application of Problem-Solving Methods: Bribery/Acceptance of Gifts 65 Key Terms 71 References 71 Problems 72 5 Risk, Safety, and Accidents 74 5.1 Introduction 75 5.2 Safety and Risk 75 5.3 Accidents 79 Key Terms 98 References 98 Problems 99 6 The Rights and Responsibilities of Engineers 103 6.1 Introduction 104 6.2 Professional Responsibilities 104 6.3 Professional Rights 106 6.4 Whistle-Blowing 108 Key Terms 120 References 120 Problems 121 7 Ethical Issues in Engineering Practice 124 7.1 Introduction 125 7.2 Environmental Ethics 125 7.3 Computer Ethics 127 7.4 Ethics and Research 135 Key Terms 143 References 143 Problems 144 8 Doing the Right Thing 150 References 155 Problems 155 Contents v APPENDIX A Codes of Ethics of Professional Engineering Societies 157 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 157 National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) 158 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 163 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 164 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AICHE) 168 Japan Society of Civil Engineers 169 APPENDIX B Bibliography 172 General Books on Engineering Ethics 172 Journals with Articles on Engineering Ethics and Cases 173 Websites 173 Index 174 This page intentionally left blank About This Book Engineering Ethics is an introductory textbook that explores many of the ethical issues that a practicing engineer might encounter in the course of his or her profes- sional engineering practice. The book contains a discussion of ethical theories, develops several ethical problem-solving methods, and contains case studies based on real events that illustrate the problems faced by engineers. The case studies also show the effects that engineering decisions have on society.

WHAT’S NEW IN THIS EDITION • A new section showing how ethical issues are viewed in non-Western societies including China, India, and the Middle East. • Codes of Ethics from a professional engineering society outside the United States has been added. • The issues brought up by competitive bidding by engineers are discussed. • Case studies have been updated. • Several new case studies including ones on the I-35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis, issues related to the recall of Toyota passenger cars, and the earth- quake damage in Haiti have been added. • Many new and updated problems have been added. vii This page intentionally left blank 1 O n August 10, 1978, a Ford Pinto was hit from behind on a highway in Indiana. The impact of the collision caused the Pinto’s fuel tank to rupture and burst into fl ames, leading to the deaths of three teenage girls riding in the car. This was not the fi rst time that a Pinto had caught on fi re as a result of a rear-end collision. In the seven years following the introduction of the Pinto, there had been some 50 lawsuits related to rear-end collisions. However, this time Ford was charged in a criminal court for the deaths of the passengers. This case was a signifi cant departure from the norm and had important implica- tions for the Ford engineers and managers. A civil lawsuit could only result in Ford being required to pay damages to the victim’s estates. A criminal proceeding, on the other hand, would indicate that Ford was grossly negligent in the deaths of the passengers and could result in jail terms for the Ford engineers or managers who worked on the Pinto. The case against Ford hinged on charges that it was known that the gas-tank design was fl awed and was not in line with accepted engineering standards, even though it did meet applicable federal safety standards at the time. During the trial, it was determined that Ford engineers were aware of the dangers of this design, but management, concerned with getting the Pinto to market rapidly at a price competi- tive with subcompact cars already introduced or planned by other manufacturers, had constrained the engineers to use this design. After reading this chapter, you will be able to • Know why it is important to study engineering ethics • Understand the distinction between professional and personal ethics • See how ethical problem solving and engineering design are similar. Objectives Introduction CHAPTER 2 1.2 Why Study Engineering Ethics The dilemma faced by the design engineers who worked on the Pinto was to balance the safety of the people who would be riding in the car against the need to produce the Pinto at a price that would be competitive in the market. They had to attempt to balance their duty to the public against their duty to their employer.

Ultimately, the attempt by Ford to save a few dollars in manufacturing costs led to the expenditure of millions of dollars in defending lawsuits and payments to vic- tims. Of course, there were also uncountable costs in lost sales due to bad public- ity and a public perception that Ford did not engineer its products to be safe. 1.1 BACKGROUND IDEAS The Pinto case is just one example of the ethical problems faced by engineers in the course of their professional practice. Ethical cases can go far beyond issues of pub- lic safety and may involve bribery, fraud, environmental protection, fairness, hon- esty in research and testing, and confl icts of interest. During their undergraduate education, engineers receive training in basic and engineering sciences, problem- solving methodology, and engineering design, but generally receive little training in business practices, safety, and ethics.

This problem has been partially corrected, as many engineering education programs now have courses in what is called engineering ethics. Indeed, the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), the body responsi- ble for accrediting undergraduate engineering programs in the United States, has mandated that ethics topics be incorporated into undergraduate engineering cur- ricula. The purpose of this book is to provide a text and a resource for the study of engineering ethics and to help future engineers be prepared for confronting and resolving ethical dilemmas, such as the design of an unsafe product like the Pinto, that they might encounter during their professional careers.

A good place to start a discussion of ethics in engineering is with defi nitions of ethics and engineering ethics. Ethics is the study of the characteristics of morals.

Ethics also deals with the moral choices that are made by each person in his or her relationship with other persons. As engineers, we are concerned with ethics because these defi nitions apply to all of the choices an individual makes in life, including those made while practicing engineering.

For our purposes, the defi nition of ethics can be narrowed a little. Engineering ethics is the rules and standards governing the conduct of engineers in their role as professionals. Engineering ethics encompasses the more general defi nition of eth- ics, but applies it more specifi cally to situations involving engineers in their profes- sional lives. Thus, engineering ethics is a body of philosophy indicating the ways that engineers should conduct themselves in their professional capacity. 1.2 WHY STUDY ENGINEERING ETHICS?

Why is it important for engineering students to study engineering ethics? Several notorious cases that have received a great deal of media attention in the past few years have led engineers to gain an increased sense of their professional responsibili- ties. These cases have led to an awareness of the importance of ethics within the engi- neering profession as engineers realize how their technical work has far-reaching impacts on society. The work of engineers can affect public health and safety and can infl uence business practices and even politics.

One result of this increase in awareness is that nearly every major corporation now has an ethics offi ce that has the responsibility to ensure that employees have Chapter 1 Introduction 3 the ability to express their concerns about issues such as safety and corporate busi- ness practices in a way that will yield results and won’t result in retaliation against the employees. Ethics offi ces also try to foster an ethical culture that will help to head off ethical problems in a corporation before they start.

The goal of this book and courses in engineering ethics is to sensitize you to important ethical issues before you have to confront them. You will study important cases from the past so that you will know what situations other engineers have faced and will know what to do when similar situations arise in your professional career.

Finally, you will learn techniques for analyzing and resolving ethical problems when they arise.

Our goal is frequently summed up using the term “moral autonomy.” Moral autonomy is the ability to think critically and independently about moral issues and to apply this moral thinking to situations that arise in the course of professional engineering practice. The goal of this book, then, is to foster the moral autonomy of future engineers.

The question asked at the beginning of this section can also be asked in a slightly different way. Why should a future engineer bother studying ethics at all?

After all, at this point in your life, you’re already either a good person or a bad per- son. Good people already know the right thing to do, and bad people aren’t going to do the right thing no matter how much ethical training they receive. The answer to this question lies in the nature of the ethical problems that are often encoun- tered by an engineer. In most situations, the correct response to an ethical problem is very obvious. For example, it is clear that to knowingly equip the Pinto with wheel lugs made from substandard, weak steel that is susceptible to breaking is unethical and wrong. This action could lead to the loss of a wheel while driving and could cause numerous accidents and put many lives at risk. Of course, such a design deci- sion would also be a commercial disaster for Ford.

However, many times, the ethical problems encountered in engineering prac- tice are very complex and involve confl icting ethical principles. For example, the engineers working on the Pinto were presented with a very clear dilemma. Trade- offs were made so that the Pinto could be successfully marketed at a reasonable price. One of these trade-offs involved the placement of the gas tank, which led to the accident in Indiana. So, for the Ford engineers and managers, the question became the following: Where does an engineering team strike the balance between safety and affordability and, simultaneously, between the ability of the company to sell the car and make a profi t?

These are the types of situations that we will discuss in this book. The goal, then, is not to train you to do the right thing when the ethical choice is obvious and you already know the right thing to do. Rather, the goal is to train you to ana- lyze complex problems and learn to resolve these problems in the most ethical manner. 1.3 ENGINEERING IS MANAGING THE UNKNOWN One source of the ethical issues encountered in the course of engineering practice is a lack of knowledge. This is by no means an unusual situation in engineering.

Engineers often encounter situations in which they don’t have all of the information that is needed. By its nature, engineering design is about creating new devices and products. When something is new, many questions need to be answered. How well does it work? How will it affect people? What changes will this lead to in society?

How well will this work under all of the conditions that it will be exposed to? Is it 4 1.6 Ethics and the Law safe? If there are some safety concerns, how bad are they? What are the effects of doing nothing? The answers to these questions are often only partly known.

So, to a large extent, an engineer’s job is to manage the unknown. How does an engineer accomplish this? Really, as an engineer you can never be absolutely cer- tain that your design will never harm anyone or cause detrimental changes to soci- ety. But you must test your design as thoroughly as time and resources permit to ensure that it operates safely and as planned. Also, you must use your creativity to attempt to foresee the possible consequences of your work. 1.4 PERSONAL VS. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS In discussing engineering ethics, it is important to make a distinction between per- sonal ethics and professional, or business, ethics, although there isn’t always a clear boundary between the two. Personal ethics deals with how we treat others in our day-to-day lives. Many of these principles are applicable to ethical situations that occur in business and engineering. However, professional ethics often involves choices on an organizational level rather than a personal level. Many of the prob- lems will seem different because they involve relationships between two corpora- tions, between a corporation and the government, or between corporations and groups of individuals. Frequently, these types of relationships pose problems that are not encountered in personal ethics. 1.5 THE ORIGINS OF ETHICAL THOUGHT Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge in a general way the origins of the ethical philosophies that we will be discussing in this book. The Western ethical thought that is discussed here originated in the philosophy of the ancient Greeks and their predecessors. It has been developed through subsequent centuries by many thinkers in the Judeo–Christian tradition. Interestingly, non-Western cultures have independently developed similar ethical principles.

Although for many individuals, personal ethics are rooted in religious beliefs, this is not true for everyone. Certainly, there are many ethical people who are not religious, and there are numerous examples of people who appear to be religious but who are not ethical. So while the ethical principles that we will discuss come to us fi ltered through a religious tradition, these principles are now cultural norms in the West, and as such, they are widely accepted regardless of their origin. We won’t need to refer explicitly to religion in order to discuss ethics in the engineering profession. 1.6 ETHICS AND THE LAW We should also mention the role of law in engineering ethics. The practice of engi- neering is governed by many laws on the international, federal, state, and local lev- els. Many of these laws are based on ethical principles, although many are purely of a practical, rather than a philosophical, nature.

There is also a distinction between what is legal and what is ethical. Many things that are legal could be considered unethical. For example, designing a process that releases a known toxic, but unregulated, substance into the environment is proba- bly unethical, although it is legal. Chapter 1 Introduction 5 Conversely, just because something is illegal doesn’t mean that it is unethical.

For example, there might be substances that were once thought to be harmful, but have now been shown to be safe, that you wish to incorporate into a product. If the law has not caught up with the latest scientifi c fi ndings, it might be illegal to release these substances into the environment, even though there is no ethical problem in doing so.

As an engineer, you are always minimally safe if you follow the requirements of the applicable laws. But in engineering ethics, we seek to go beyond the dictates of the law. Our interest is in areas where ethical principles confl ict and there is no legal guidance for how to resolve the confl ict. 1.7 ETHICS PROBLEMS ARE LIKE DESIGN PROBLEMS At fi rst, many engineering students fi nd the types of problems and discussions that take place in an engineering ethics class a little alien. The problems are more open ended and are not as susceptible to formulaic answers as are problems typically assigned in other engineering classes. Ethics problems rarely have a correct answer that will be arrived at by everyone in the class. Surprisingly, however, the types of problem-solving techniques that we will use in this book and the nature of the answers that result bear a striking resemblance to the most fundamental engineer- ing activity: engineering design.

The essence of engineering practice is the design of products, structures, and processes. The design problem is stated in terms of specifi cations: A device must be designed that meets criteria for performance, aesthetics, and price. Within the limits of these specifi cations, there are many correct solutions. There will, of course, be some solutions that are better than others in terms of higher perfor- mance or lower cost. Frequently, there will be two (or more) designs that are very different, yet perform identically. For example, competing automobile manufac- turers may design a car to meet the same market niche, yet each manufacturer’s solution to the problem will be somewhat different. In fact, we will see later that although the Pinto was susceptible to explosion after rear-end impact, other simi- lar subcompact automobiles were not. In engineering design, there is no unique correct answer!

Ethical problem solving shares these attributes with engineering design.

Although there will be no unique correct solution to most of the problems we will examine, there will be a range of solutions that are clearly right, some of which are better than others. There will also be a range of solutions that are clearly wrong.

There are other similarities between engineering ethics and engineering design.

Both apply a large body of knowledge to the solution of a problem, and both involve the use of analytical skills. So, although the nature of the solutions to the problems in ethics will be different from those in most engineering classes, approaches to the problems and the ultimate solution will be very similar to those in engineering practice. 1.8 CASE STUDIES Before starting to learn the theoretical ideas regarding engineering ethics and before looking at some interesting real-life cases that will illustrate these ideas, let’s begin by looking at a very well-known engineering ethics case: the space 6 1.8 Case Studies shuttle Challenger accident. This case is presented in depth at the end of this chap- ter, but at this point we will look at a brief synopsis of the case to further illustrate the  types of ethical issues and questions that arise in the course of engineering practice.

Many readers are already familiar with some aspects of this case. The space shuttle Challenger was launched in extremely cold weather. During the launch, an O-ring on one of the solid-propellant boosters, made more brittle by the cold, failed. This failure led to an explosion soon after liftoff. Engineers who had designed this booster had concerns about launching under these cold conditions and recom- mended that the launch be delayed, but they were overruled by their management (some of whom were trained as engineers), who didn’t feel that there were enough data to support a delay in the launch. The shuttle was launched, resulting in the well-documented accident.

On the surface, there appear to be no engineering ethical issues here to dis- cuss. Rather, it seems to simply be an accident. The engineers properly recom- mended that there be no launch, but they were overruled by management. In the strictest sense, this can be considered an accident—no one wanted the Challenger to explode—but there are still many interesting questions that should be asked. When there are safety concerns, what is the engineer’s responsibility before the launch decision is made? After the launch decision is made, but before the actual launch, what duty does the engineer have? If the decision doesn’t go the engineer’s way, should she complain to upper management? Or should she bring the problem to the attention of the press? After the accident has occurred, what are the duties and responsibilities of the engineers? If the launch were successful, but the postmortem showed that the O-ring had failed and an accident had very nearly occurred, what would be the engineer’s responsibility? Even if an engineer moves into manage- ment, should he separate engineering from management decisions?

These types of questions will be the subject of this book. As an engineer, you will need to be familiar with ideas about the nature of the engineering profession, ethi- cal theories, and the application of these theories to situations that are likely to occur in professional practice. Looking at other real-life cases taken from newspaper accounts and books will help you examine what engineers should do when con- fronted with ethically troubling situations. Many cases will be postmortem examina- tions of disasters, while others may involve an analysis of situations in which disaster was averted when many of the individuals involved made ethically sound choices and cooperated to solve a problem.

A word of warning is necessary: The cliché “Hind-sight is 20/20” will seem very true in engineering ethics case studies. When studying a case several years after the fact and knowing the ultimate outcome, it is easy to see what the right decision should have been. Obviously, had the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) owned a crystal ball and been able to predict the future, the Challenger would never have been launched. Had Ford known the number of people who would be killed as a result of gas-tank failures in the Pinto and the sub- sequent fi nancial losses in lawsuits and criminal cases, it would have found a better solution to the problem of gas-tank placement. However, we rarely have such clear predictive abilities and must base decisions on our best guess of what the outcome will be. It will be important in studying the cases presented here to try to look at them from the point of view of the individuals who were involved at the time, using their best judgment about how to proceed, and not to judge the cases solely based on the outcome. Chapter 1 Introduction 7 THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER AND COLUMBIA ACCIDENTS The NASA Space Shuttle Disasters The space shuttle is one of the most complex engineered systems ever built. The challenge of lifting a space vehicle from earth into orbit and have it safely return to earth presents many engineering problems. Not surprisingly, there have been sev- eral accidents in the U.S. space program since its inception, including two failures of the space shuttle. The disasters involving the space shuttles Challenger and Columbia illustrate many of the issues related to engineering ethics as shown in the following discussion. The space shuttle originally went into service in the early 1980s and is set to be retired sometime in 2011 or 2012. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster The explosion of the space shuttle Challenger is perhaps the most widely written about case in engineering ethics because of the extensive media coverage at the time of the accident and also because of the many available government reports and transcripts of congressional hearings regarding the explosion. The case illustrates many important ethical issues that engineers face: What is the proper role of the engineer when safety issues are a concern? Who should have the ultimate decision- making authority to order a launch? Should the ordering of a launch be an engi- neering or a managerial decision? This case has already been presented briefl y, and we will now take a more in-depth look. Background The space shuttle was designed to be a reusable launch vehicle. The vehicle consists of an orbiter, which looks much like a medium-sized airliner (minus the engines!), two solid-propellant boosters, and a single liquid-propellant booster. At takeoff, all of the boosters are ignited and lift the orbiter out of the earth’s atmosphere. The solid rocket boosters are only used early in the fl ight and are jettisoned soon after takeoff, parachute back to earth, and are recovered from the ocean. They are sub- sequently repacked with fuel and are reused. The liquid-propellant booster is used to fi nish lifting the shuttle into orbit, at which point the booster is jettisoned and burns up during reentry. The liquid booster is the only part of the shuttle vehicle that is not reusable. After completion of the mission, the orbiter uses its limited thrust capabilities to reenter the atmosphere and glides to a landing.

The accident on January 28, 1986, was blamed on a failure of one of the solid rocket boosters. Solid rocket boosters have the advantage that they deliver far more thrust per pound of fuel than do their liquid-fueled counterparts, but have the dis- advantage that once the fuel is lit, there is no way to turn the booster off or even to control the amount of thrust produced. In contrast, a liquid-fuel rocket can be con- trolled by throttling the supply of fuel to the combustion chamber or can be shut off by stopping the fl ow of fuel entirely.

In 1974, NASA awarded the contract to design and build the solid rocket boost- ers for the shuttle to Morton Thiokol. The design that was submitted by Thiokol was a scaled-up version of the Titan missile, which had been used successfully for many years to launch satellites. This design was accepted by NASA in 1976. The solid rocket consists of several cylindrical pieces that are fi lled with solid propellant and stacked one on top of the other to form the completed booster. The assembly of the propellant-fi lled cylinders was performed at Thiokol’s plant in Utah. The APPLICATION 8 1.8 Case Studies cylinders were then shipped to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida for assembly into a completed booster.

A key aspect of the booster design are the joints where the individual cylinders come together, known as the fi eld joints, illustrated schematically in Figure 1.1a .

These are tang and clevis joints, fastened with 177 clevis pins. The joints are sealed by two O-rings, a primary and a secondary. The O-rings are designed to prevent hot gases from the combustion of the solid propellant from escaping. The O-rings are made from a type of synthetic rubber and so are not particularly heat resistant. To prevent the hot gases from damaging the O-rings, a heat-resistant putty is placed in the joint. The Titan booster had only one O-ring in the fi eld joint. The second O-ring was added to the booster for the shuttle to provide an extra margin of safety since, unlike the Titan, this booster would be used for a manned space craft. Early Problems with the Solid Rocket Boosters Problems with the fi eld-joint design had been recognized long before the launch of the Challenger.

When the rocket is ignited, the internal pressure causes the booster wall to expand outward, putting pressure on the fi eld joint. This pressure causes the joint to open slightly, a process called “joint rotation,” illustrated in Figure 1.1b .

The joint was designed so that the internal pressure pushes on the putty, displacing the primary O-ring into this gap, helping to seal it. During testing of the boosters in 1977, Thiokol became aware that this joint-rotation problem was more severe than on the Titan and discussed it with NASA. Design changes were made, including an increase in the thickness of the O-ring, to try to control this problem.

Further testing revealed problems with the secondary seal, and more changes were initiated to correct that problem. In November of 1981, after the second shut- tle fl ight, a postlaunch examination of the booster fi eld joints indicated that the Figure 1.1 (a) A schematic drawing of a tang and clevis joint like the one on the Challenger solid rocket boosters.

(b) The same joint as in Figure 1.1a , but with the effects of joint rotation exaggerated.

Note that the O-rings no longer seal the joint. Pin Clevis Inside of boosterO-rings Putty Pin ClevisO-rings Putty Tang Chapter 1 Introduction 9 O-rings were being eroded by hot gases during the launch. Although there was no failure of the joint, there was some concern about this situation, and Thiokol looked into the use of different types of putty and alternative methods for applying it to solve the problem. Despite these efforts, approximately half of the shuttle fl ights before the Challenger accident had experienced some degree of O-ring erosion. Of course, this type of testing and redesign is not unusual in engineering. Seldom do things work correctly the fi rst time, and modifi cations to the original design are often required.

It should be pointed out that erosion of the O-rings is not necessarily a bad thing. Since the solid rocket boosters are only used for the fi rst few minutes of the fl ight, it might be perfectly acceptable to design a joint in which O-rings erode in a controlled manner. As long as the O-rings don’t completely burn through before the solid boosters run out of fuel and are jettisoned, this design should be fi ne.

However, this was not the way the space shuttle was designed, and O-ring erosion was one of the problems that the Thiokol engineers were addressing.

The fi rst documented joint failure came after the launch on January 24, 1985, which occurred during very cold weather. The postfl ight examination of the boost- ers revealed black soot and grease on the outside of the booster, which indicated that hot gases from the booster had blown by the O-ring seals. This observation gave rise to concern about the resiliency of the O-ring materials at reduced tem- peratures. Thiokol performed tests of the ability of the O-rings to compress to fi ll the joints and found that they were inadequate. In July of 1985, Thiokol engineers redesigned the fi eld joints without O-rings. Instead, they used steel billets, which should have been better able to withstand the hot gases. Unfortunately, the new design was not ready in time for the Challenger fl ight in early 1986 [ Elliot et al., 1990 ]. The Political Climate To fully understand and analyze the decision making that took place leading to the fatal launch, it is important also to discuss the political environment under which NASA was operating at that time. NASA’s budget was determined by Congress, which was becoming increasingly unhappy with delays in the shuttle project and shuttle performance. NASA had billed the shuttle as a reliable, inexpensive launch vehicle for a variety of scientifi c and commercial purposes, including the launching of commercial and military satellites. It had been promised that the shuttle would be capable of frequent fl ights (several per year) and quick turnarounds and would be competitively priced with more traditional nonreusable launch vehicles. NASA was feeling some urgency in the program because the European Space Agency was developing what seemed to be a cheaper alternative to the shuttle, which could potentially put the shuttle out of business.

These pressures led NASA to schedule a record number of missions for 1986 to prove to Congress that the program was on track. Launching a mission was espe- cially important in January 1986, since the previous mission had been delayed numerous times by both weather and mechanical failures. NASA also felt pressure to get the Challenger launched on time so that the next shuttle launch, which was to carry a probe to examine Halley’s comet, would be launched before a Russian probe designed to do the same thing. There was additional political pressure to launch the Challenger before the upcoming state-of-the-union address, in which President Reagan hoped to mention the shuttle and a special astronaut—the fi rst teacher in space, Christa McAuliffe—in the context of his comments on education. 10 1.8 Case Studies The Days Before the Launch Even before the accident, the Challenger launch didn’t go off without a hitch, as NASA had hoped. The fi rst launch date had to be abandoned due to a cold front expected to move through the area. The front stalled, and the launch could have taken place on schedule. But the launch had already been postponed in deference to Vice President George Bush, who was to attend. NASA didn’t want to antagonize Bush, a strong NASA supporter, by postponing the launch due to inclement weather after he had arrived. The launch of the shuttle was further delayed by a defective microswitch in the hatch-locking mechanism. When this problem was resolved, the front had changed course and was now moving through the area. The front was expected to bring extremely cold weather to the launch site, with temperatures predicted to be in the low 20’s (°F) by the new launch time.

Given the expected cold temperatures, NASA checked with all of the shuttle contractors to determine if they foresaw any problems with launching the shuttle in cold temperatures. Alan McDonald, the director of Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Motor Project, was concerned about the cold weather problems that had been experi- enced with the solid rocket boosters. The evening before the rescheduled launch, a teleconference was arranged between engineers and management from the Kennedy Space Center, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and Thiokol in Utah to discuss the possible effects of cold temperatures on the performance of the solid rocket boosters. During this teleconference, Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Thompson, two Thiokol engineers who had worked on the solid- propellant booster design, gave an hour-long presentation on how the cold weather would increase the problems of joint rotation and sealing of the joint by the O-rings. The engineers’ point was that the lowest temperature at which the shuttle had previously been launched was 53°F, on January 24, 1985, when there was blow-by of the O-rings. The O-ring temperature at Challenger’s expected launch time the fol- lowing morning was predicted to be 29°F, far below the temperature at which NASA had previous experience. After the engineers’ presentation, Bob Lund, the vice president for engineering at Morton Thiokol, presented his recommendations. He reasoned that since there had previously been severe O-ring erosion at 53°F and the launch would take place at signifi cantly below this temperature where no data and no experience were available, NASA should delay the launch until the O-ring tem- perature could be at least 53°F. Interestingly, in the original design, it was specifi ed that the booster should operate properly down to an outside temperature of 31°F.

Larry Mulloy, the Solid Rocket Booster Project manager at Marshall and a NASA employee, correctly pointed out that the data were inconclusive and disagreed with the Thiokol engineers. After some discussion, Mulloy asked Joe Kilminster, an engi- neering manager working on the project, for his opinion. Kilminster backed up the recommendation of his fellow engineers. Others from Marshall expressed their disagreement with the Thiokol engineers’ recommendation, which prompted Kilminster to ask to take the discussion off line for a few minutes. Boisjoly and other engineers reiterated to their management that the original decision not to launch was the correct one.

A key fact that ultimately swayed the decision was that in the available data, there seemed to be no correlation between temperature and the degree to which blow-by gasses had eroded the O-rings in previous launches. Thus, it could be con- cluded that there was really no trend in the data indicating that a launch at the expected temperature would necessarily be unsafe. After much discussion, Jerald Mason, a senior manager with Thiokol, turned to Lund and said, “Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat,” a phrase that has become Chapter 1 Introduction 11 famous in engineering ethics discussions. Lund reversed his previous decision and recommended that the launch proceed. The new recommendation included an indication that there was a safety concern due to the cold weather, but that the data were inconclusive and the launch was recommended. McDonald, who was in Florida, was surprised by this recommendation and attempted to convince NASA to delay the launch, but to no avail. The Launch Contrary to the weather predictions, the overnight temperature was 8°F, colder than the shuttle had ever experienced before. In fact, there was a signifi cant accu- mulation of ice on the launchpad from safety showers and fi re hoses that had been left on to prevent the pipes from freezing. It has been estimated that the aft fi eld joint of the right-hand booster was at 28°F.

NASA routinely documents as many aspects of launches as possible. One part of this monitoring is the extensive use of cameras focused on critical areas of the launch vehicle. One of these cameras, looking at the right booster, recorded puffs of smoke coming from the aft fi eld joint immediately after the boosters were ignited.

This smoke is thought to have been caused by the steel cylinder of this segment of the booster expanding outward and causing the fi eld joint to rotate. But, due to the extremely cold temperature, the O-ring didn’t seat properly. The heat-resistant putty was also so cold that it didn’t protect the O-rings, and hot gases burned past both O-rings. It was later determined that this blow-by occurred over 70º of arc around the O-rings.

Very quickly, the fi eld joint was sealed again by byproducts of the solid rocket- propellant combustion, which formed a glassy oxide on the joint. This oxide Table 1.1 Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: Who’s Who   Organizations NASA The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, responsible for space exploration. The space shuttle is one of NASA’s programs   Marshall Space Flight Center A NASA facility that was in charge of the solid rocket booster development for the shuttle     Morton Thiokol A private company that won the contract from NASA for building the solid rocket boosters for the shuttle     People NASA Larry Mulloy Solid Rocket Booster Project manager at Marshall Morton Thiokol Roger Boisjoly Arnie Johnson Engineers who worked on the Solid Rocket Booster Development Program Joe Kilminster Engineering manager on the Solid Rocket Booster Development Program Alan McDonald Director of the Solid Rocket Booster Project Bob Lund Vice president for engineering Jerald Mason General manager 12 1.8 Case Studies formation might have averted the disaster had it not been for a very strong wind shear that the shuttle encountered almost one minute into the fl ight. The oxides that were temporarily sealing the fi eld joint were shattered by the stresses caused by the wind shear. The joint was now opened again, and hot gases escaped from the solid booster. Since the booster was attached to the large liquid-fuel booster, the fl ames from the solid-fuel booster blow-by quickly burned through the external tank. The liquid propellant was ignited and the shuttle exploded. The Aftermath As a result of the explosion, the shuttle program was grounded as a thorough review of shuttle safety was conducted. Thiokol formed a failure-investigation team on January 31, 1986, which included Roger Boisjoly. There were also many investiga- tions into the cause of the accident, both by the contractors involved (including Thiokol) and by various government bodies. As part of the governmental investiga- tion, President Reagan appointed a blue-ribbon commission, known as the Rogers Commission, after its chair. The commission consisted of distinguished scientists and engineers who were asked to look into the cause of the accident and to recom- mend changes in the shuttle program.

One of the commission members was Richard Feynman, a Nobel Prize winner in physics, who ably demonstrated to the country what had gone wrong. In a dem- onstration that was repeatedly shown on national news programs, he demonstrated the problem with the O-rings by taking a sample of the O-ring material and bend- ing it. The fl exibility of the material at room temperature was evident. He then immersed it in ice water. When Feynman again bent the O-ring, it was obvious that the resiliency of the material was severely reduced, a very clear demonstration of what happened to the O-rings on the cold launch date in Florida. As part of the commission hearings, Boisjoly and other Thiokol engineers were asked to testify. Boisjoly handed over to the commission copies of internal Thiokol memos and reports detailing the design process and the problems that had already been encountered. Naturally, Thiokol was trying to put the best possible spin on the situation, and Boisjoly’s actions hurt this effort. According to Boisjoly, after this action he was isolated within the company, his responsibilities for the redesign of the joint were taken away, and he was subtly harassed by Thiokol management [ Boisjoly, 1991 , and Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellicam, 1989 ].

Eventually, the atmosphere became intolerable for Boisjoly, and he took extended sick leave from his position at Thiokol. The joint was redesigned, and the shuttle has since fl own numerous successful missions. However, the ambitious launch schedule originally intended by NASA was never met. It was reported in 2001 that NASA has spent $5 million to study the possibility of installing some type of escape system to protect the shuttle crew in the event of an accident. Possibilities include ejection seats or an escape capsule that would work during the fi rst three minutes of fl ight. These features were incorporated into earlier manned space vehicles and in fact were in place on the shuttle until 1982. Whether such a system would have saved the astronauts aboard the Challenger is unknown, and ultimately an escape system was never incorporated into the space shuttle. The Space Shuttle Columbia Failure During the early morning hours of February 1, 2003, many people across the Southwestern United States awoke to a loud noise, sounding like the boom associ- ated with supersonic aircraft. This was the space shuttle Columbia breaking up during Chapter 1 Introduction 13 reentry to the earth’s atmosphere. This accident was the second loss of a space shut- tle in 113 fl ights—all seven astronauts aboard the Columbia were killed—and pieces of the shuttle were scattered over a wide area of eastern Texas and western Louisiana.

Over 84,000 individual pieces were eventually recovered, comprising only about 38% of the shuttle. This was the 28th mission fl own by the Columbia, a 16-day mission involving many tasks. The fi rst indication of trouble during reentry came when temperature sensors near the left wheel well indicated a rise in temperature. Soon, hydraulic lines on the left side of the craft began to fail, making it diffi cult to keep control of the vehicle. Finally, it was impossible for the pilots to maintain the proper position- ing of the shuttle during reentry—the Columbia went out of control and broke up. The bottom of the space shuttle is covered with ceramic tiles designed to dissi- pate the intense heat generated during reentry from space. The destruction of the Columbia was attributed to damage to tiles on the leading edge of the left wing. During liftoff, a piece of insulating foam on the external fuel tank dislodged and Explosion of the space shuttle Challenger soon after liftoff in January 1986. NASA/ Johnson Space Center 14 1.8 Case Studies struck the shuttle. It was estimated that this foam struck the shuttle wing at over 500 miles per hour, causing signifi cant damage to the tiles on the wing over an area of approximately 650 cm 2. With the integrity of these tiles compromised, the wing structure was susceptible to extreme heating during reentry and ultimately failed.

Shuttle launches are closely observed by numerous video cameras. During this launch, the foam separation and strike had been observed. Much thought was given during Columbia ’s mission to attempting to determine whether signifi cant damage had occurred. For example, there was some discussion of trying to use ground- based telescopes to look at the bottom of the shuttle while in orbit. Unfortunately, even if it had been possible to observe the damage, there would have been no way to repair the damage in space. The only alternatives would have been to attempt to launch another shuttle on a dangerous rescue mission, or attempt to get the astro- nauts to the space station in the hopes of launching a later rescue mission to bring them back to earth. In the end, NASA decided that the damage from the foam strike had probably not been signifi cant and decided to continue with the mission and reentry as planned.

This was not the fi rst time that foam had detached from the fuel tank during launch, and it was not the fi rst time that foam had struck the shuttle. Apparently numerous small pieces of foam hit the shuttle during every launch, and on at least seven occasions previous to the Columbia launch, large pieces of foam had detached and hit the shuttle. Solutions to the problem had been proposed over the years, but none had been implemented. Although NASA engineers initially identifi ed foam strikes as a major safety concern for the shuttle, after many launches with no safety problems due to the foam, NASA management became complacent and overlooked the potential for foam to cause major problems. In essence, the prevailing attitude suggested that if there had been numerous launches with foam strikes before, with none leading to major accidents, then it must be safe to continue launches without fi xing the problem.

In the aftermath of this mishap, an investigative panel was formed to deter- mine the cause of the accident and to make recommendations for the future of the shuttle program. The report of this panel contained information on their fi nd- ings regarding the physical causes of the accident: the detachment of the foam, the damage to the tiles, and the subsequent failure of critical components of the shuttle. More signifi cantly, the report also went into great depth on the cultural issues within NASA that led to the accident. The report cited a “broken safety cul- ture” within NASA. Perhaps most damning was the assessment that many of the problems that existed within NASA that led to the Challenger accident sixteen years earlier had not been fi xed. Especially worrisome was the fi nding that schedule pressures had been allowed to supercede good engineering judgment. An acci- dent such as the Challenger explosion should have led to a major change in the safety and ethics culture within NASA. But sadly for the crew of the Columbia, it had not.

After the Columbia accident, the space shuttle was once again grounded until safety concerns related to foam strikes could be addressed. By 2005, NASA was con- fi dent that steps had been taken to make the launch of the shuttle safe and once again restarted the launch program. In July of 2005, Discovery was launched. During this launch, another foam strike occurred. This time, NASA was prepared and had planned for means to photographically assess the potential damage to the heat shield, and also planned to allow astronauts to make a space walk to assess the dam- age to the tiles and to make repairs as necessary. The damage from this strike was Chapter 1 Introduction 15 repaired in space and the shuttle returned to earth safely. Despite the success of the in-orbit repairs, NASA again grounded the shuttle fl eet until a redesign of the foam could be implemented. The redesign called for removal of foam from areas where foam detachment could have the greatest impact on tiles. The shuttle resumed fl ight with a successful launch in September of 2006 and no further major accidents through early 2011. SUMMARY Engineering ethics is the study of moral decisions that must be made by engineers in the course of engineering practice. It is important for engineering students to study ethics so that they will be prepared to respond appropriately to ethical chal- lenges during their careers. Often, the correct answer to an ethical problem will not be obvious and will require some analysis using ethical theories. The types of prob- lems that we will encounter in studying engineering ethics are very similar to the design problems that engineers work on every day. As in design, there will not be a single correct answer. Rather, engineering ethics problems will have multiple cor- rect solutions, with some solutions being better than others. REFERENCES Roger Boisjoly , “The Challenger Disaster: Moral Responsibility and the Working Engineer,” in Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1991 , pp. 6–14.

Norbert Elliot , Eric Katz , and Robert Lynch , “The Challenger Tragedy:

A Case Study in Organizational Communication and Professional Ethics,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, vol. 12, 1990 , pp. 91–108.

Joseph R. Herkert , “Management’s Hat Trick: Misuse of ‘Engineering Judgment’ in the Challenger Incident,” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 10, 1991 , pp. 617–620.

Patricia H. Werhane , “Engineers and Management: The Challenge of the Challenger Incident,” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 10, 1991 , pp. 605–616.

Russell Boisjoly , Ellen Foster Curtis , and Eugene Mellican , “Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions,” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 8, 1989 , pp. 217–230.

David E. Sanger , “Loss of the Shuttle: The Overview; Shuttle Breaks Up, Seven Dead,” February 2, 2003 , Section 1, p. 1. Numerous other articles can be found in The New York Times on February 2, 2003 and subsequent days or in any local U.S. newspaper.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board , Information on the investigation including links to the fi nal report can be found at the board’s website, caib.

nasa.gov, or on the NASA website, www.nasa.gov . 16 Problems PROBLEMS 1.1 How different are personal ethics and professional ethics? Have you found this difference to be signifi cant in your experience? 1.2 What are the roots of your personal ethics? Discuss this question with a friend and compare your answers. 1.3 Engineering design generally involves fi ve steps: developing a statement of the problem and/or a set of specifi cations, gathering information pertinent to the problem, designing several alternatives that meet the specifi cations, analyzing the alternatives and selecting the best one, and testing and imple- menting the best design. How is ethical problem solving like this? SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER 1.4 The astronauts on the Challenger mission were aware of the dangerous nature of riding a complex machine such as the space shuttle into space, so they can be thought of as having given informed consent to participating in a danger- ous enterprise. What role did informed consent play in this case? Do you think that the astronauts had enough information to give informed consent to launch the shuttle that day? 1.5 Can an engineer who has become a manager truly ever take off her engineer’s hat? Should she? 1.6 Some say that the shuttle was really designed by Congress rather than NASA.

What does this statement mean? What are the ramifi cations for engineers if this is true? 1.7 Aboard the shuttle for this fl ight was the fi rst teacher in space. Should civilians be allowed on what is basically an experimental launch vehicle? At the time, many felt that the placement of a teacher on the shuttle was for purely political purposes. President Reagan was thought by many to be doing nothing while the American educational system decayed. Cynics felt that the teacher-in-space idea was cooked up as a method of diverting attention from this problem and was to be seen as Reagan doing something for education while he really wasn’t doing anything. What are the ethical implications if this scenario is true? 1.8 Should a launch have been allowed when there were no test data for the expected conditions? Keep in mind that it is probably impossible to test for all possible operating conditions. More generally, should a product be released for use even when it hasn’t been tested over all expected operational condi- tions? When the data are inconclusive, which way should the decision go? 1.9 During the aftermath of the accident, Thiokol and NASA investigated possi- ble causes of the explosion. Boisjoly accused Thiokol and NASA of intention- ally downplaying the problems with the O-rings while looking for other causes of the accident. If true, what are the ethical implications of this type of investigation? 1.10 It might be assumed that the management decision to launch was prompted in part by concerns for the health of the company and the space program as a whole. Given the political climate at the time of the launch, if problems and delays continued, ultimately Thiokol might have lost NASA contracts, or NASA budgets might have been severely reduced. Clearly, this scenario could have led to the loss of many jobs at Thiokol and NASA. How might these considera- tions ethically be factored into the decision? Chapter 1 Introduction 17 1.11 Engineering codes of ethics require engineers to protect the safety and health of the public in the course of their duties. Do the astronauts count as “the public” in this context? How about test pilots of new airplane designs? 1.12 What should NASA management have done differently? What should Thiokol management have done differently? 1.13 What else could Boisjoly and the other engineers at Thiokol have done to prevent the launch from occurring? SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA 1.14 The Columbia tragedy was attributed to a foam strike on the shuttle wing. This sort of strike had occurred often in previous fl ights. What role do you think complacency of NASA engineers and managers played in this story? 1.15 Some people believe that the shuttle should have been better engineered for crew safety, including provisions for repair of the shuttle during the mission, escape of the crew when problems occur during launch, or having a backup shuttle ready to launch for rescue missions. What are some reasons why NASA would not have planned this when the shuttle was designed? 1.16 The space shuttle is an extremely complex engineered system. The more com- plex a system, the harder it is to make safe especially in a harsh environment such as outer space. Do you think that two accidents in 113 fl ights is an accept- able level of risk for an experimental system such as the shuttle? CHAPTER Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 2 After reading this chapter, you will be able to • Determine whether engineering is a profession • Understand what codes of ethics are, and • Examine some codes of ethics of professional engineering societies. Objectives L ate in 1994, reports began to appear in the news media that the latest generation of Pentium ® microprocessors, the heart and soul of personal computers, was fl awed. These reports appeared not only in trade journals and magazines aimed at computer specialists, but also in The New York Times and other daily newspapers. The stories reported that computers equipped with these chips were unable to correctly perform some relatively simple multiplication and division operations. At fi rst, Intel, the manufacturer of the Pentium microprocessor, denied that there was a problem. Later, it argued that although there was a problem, the error would be signifi cant only in sophisticated applications, and most people wouldn’t even notice that an error had occurred. It was also reported that Intel had been aware of the problem and already was working to fi x it. As a result of this publicity, many people who had purchased Pentium-based computers asked to have the defec- tive chip replaced. Until the public outcry had reached huge proportions, Intel refused to replace the chips. Finally, when it was clear that this situation was a public- relations disaster for them, Intel agreed to replace the defective chips when custom- ers requested it. Did Intel do anything unethical? To answer this question, we will need to develop a framework for understanding ethical problems. One part of this frame- work will be the codes of ethics that have been established by professional engi- neering organizations. These codes help guide engineers in the course of their Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 19 professional duties and give them insight into ethical problems such as the one just described. The engineering codes of ethics hold that engineers should not make false claims or represent a product to be something that it is not. In some ways, the Pentium case might seem to simply be a public-relations problem. But, looking at the problem with a code of ethics will indicate that there is more to this situation than simple PR, especially since the chip did not operate in the way that Intel claimed it did.

In this chapter, the nature of professions will be examined with the goal of determining whether engineering is a profession. Two representative engineering codes of ethics will be looked at in detail. At the end of this chapter, the Pentium case is presented in more detail along with two other cases, and codes of ethics are applied to analyze what the engineers in these cases should have done. 2.1 INTRODUCTION When confronted by an ethical problem, what resources are available to an engi- neer to help fi nd a solution? One of the hallmarks of modern professions are codes of ethics promulgated by various professional societies. These codes serve to guide practitioners of the profession in making decisions about how to conduct them- selves and how to resolve ethical issues that might confront them. Are codes of eth- ics applicable to engineering? To answer this question, we must fi rst consider what professions are and how they function, and decide if this defi nition applies to engi- neering. Then we will examine codes of ethics in general and look specifi cally at some of the codes of engineering professional societies. 2.2 IS ENGINEERING A PROFESSION?

In order to determine whether engineering is a profession, the nature of profes- sions must fi rst be examined. As a starting point, it will be valuable to distinguish the word “profession” from other words that are sometimes used synonymously with “profession”: “job” and “occupation.” Any work for hire can be considered a job, regardless of the skill level involved and the responsibility granted. Engineering is certainly a job—engineers are paid for their services—but the skills and responsi- bilities involved in engineering make it more than just a job.

Similarly, the word “occupation” implies employment through which someone makes a living. Engineering, then, is also an occupation. How do the words “job” and “occupation” differ from “profession?” The words “profession” and “professional” have many uses in modern society that go beyond the defi nition of a job or occupation. One often hears about “professional athletes” or someone referring to himself as a “professional carpen- ter,” for example. In the fi rst case, the word “professional” is being used to distin- guish the practitioner from an unpaid amateur. In the second case, it is used to indicate some degree of skill acquired through many years of experience, with an implication that this practitioner will provide quality services.

Neither of these senses of the word “professional” is applicable to engineers.

There are no amateur engineers who perform engineering work without being paid while they train to become professional, paid engineers. Likewise, the length of time one works at an engineering-related job, such as an engineering aide or engineering technician, does not confer professional status no matter how skilled a technician one might become. To see what is meant by the term “professional engineer,” we will fi rst examine the nature of professions. 20 2.2 Is Engineering a Profession? 2.2.1 What Is a Profession?

What are the attributes of a profession? There have been many studies of this ques- tion, and some consensus as to the nature of professions has been achieved. Attributes of a profession include:

1. Work that requires sophisticated skills, the use of judgment, and the exercise of  discretion. Also, the work is not routine and is not capable of being mechanized. 2. Membership in the profession requires extensive formal education, not simply practical training or apprenticeship. 3. The public allows special societies or organizations that are controlled by mem- bers of the profession to set standards for admission to the profession, to set standards of conduct for members, and to enforce these standards. 4. Signifi cant public good results from the practice of the profession [ Schinzinger and Martin, 2000 ]. The terms “judgment” and “discretion” used in the fi rst part of this defi nition require a little amplifi cation. Many occupations require judgment every day. A sec- retary must decide what work to tackle fi rst. An auto mechanic must decide if a part is suffi ciently worn to require complete replacement, or if rebuilding will do.

This is not the type of judgment implied in this defi nition. In a profession, “judg- ment” refers to making signifi cant decisions based on formal training and experi- ence. In general, the decisions will have serious impacts on people’s lives and will often have important implications regarding the spending of large amounts of money.

“Discretion” can have two different meanings. The fi rst defi nition involves being discrete in the performance of one’s duties by keeping information about customers, clients, and patients confi dential. This confi dentiality is essential for engendering a trusting relationship and is a hallmark of professions. While many jobs might involve some discretion, this defi nition implies a high level of signifi - cance to the information that must be kept private by a professional. The other defi nition of discretion involves the ability to make decisions autonomously. When making a decision, one is often told, “Use your discretion.” This defi nition is similar in many ways to that of the term “judgment” described previously. Many people are allowed to use their discretion in making choices while performing their jobs.

However, the signifi cance and potential impact of the decision marks the difference between a job and a profession.

One thing not mentioned in the defi nition of a profession is the compensa- tion received by a professional for his services. Although most professionals tend to be relatively well compensated, high pay is not a suffi cient condition for professional status. Entertainers and athletes are among the most highly paid members of our society, and yet few would describe them as professionals in the sense described previously. Although professional status often helps one to get better pay and better working conditions, these are more often determined by economic forces.

Earlier, reference was made to “professional” athletes and carpenters. Let’s examine these occupations in light of the foregoing defi nition of professions and see if athletics and carpentry qualify as professions. An athlete who is paid for her appearances is referred to as a professional athlete. Clearly, being a paid athlete does involve sophisticated skills that most people do not possess, and these skills are Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 21 not capable of mechanization. However, substantial judgment and discretion are not called for on the part of athletes in their “professional” lives, so athletics fails the fi rst part of the defi nition of “professional.” Interestingly, though, professional athletes are frequently viewed as role models and are often disciplined for a lack of discre- tion in their personal lives.

Athletics requires extensive training, not of a formal nature, but more of a prac- tical nature acquired through practice and coaching. No special societies (as opposed to unions, which will be discussed in more detail later) are required by athletes, and athletics does not meet an important public need; although entertain- ment is a public need, it certainly doesn’t rank high compared to the needs met by professions such as medicine. So, although they are highly trained and very well compensated, athletes are not professionals.

Similarly, carpenters require special skills to perform their jobs, but many aspects of their work can be mechanized, and little judgment or discretion is required. Training in carpentry is not formal, but rather is practical by way of apprenticeships. No organizations or societies are required. However, carpentry certainly does meet an aspect of the public good—providing shelter is fundamental to society—although perhaps not to the same extent as do professions such as med- icine. So, carpentry also doesn’t meet the basic requirements to be a profession. We can see, then, that many jobs or occupations whose practitioners might be referred to as professionals don’t really meet the basic defi nition of a profession. Although they may be highly paid or important jobs, they are not professions.

Before continuing with an examination of whether engineering is a profession, let’s look at two occupations that are defi nitely regarded by society as professions:

medicine and law. Medicine certainly fi ts the defi nition of a profession given previ- ously. It requires very sophisticated skills that can’t be mechanized, it requires judg- ment as to appropriate treatment plans for individual patients, and it requires discretion. (Physicians have even been granted physician–patient privilege, the duty not to divulge information given in confi dence by the patient to the physician.) Although medicine requires extensive practical training learned through an appren- ticeship called a residency, it also requires much formal training (four years of undergraduate school, three to four years of medical school, and extensive hands- on practice in patient care). Medicine has a special society, the American Medical Association (AMA), to which a large fraction of practicing physicians belong and that participates in the regulation of medical schools, sets standards for practice of the profession, and promulgates a code of ethical behavior for its members. Finally, healing the sick and helping to prevent disease clearly involve the public good. By the defi nition presented previously, medicine clearly qualifi es as a profession.

Similarly, law is a profession. It involves sophisticated skills acquired through extensive formal training; has a professional society, the American Bar Association (ABA); and serves an important aspect of the public good. (Although this last point is increasingly becoming a point of debate within American society!) The differ- ence between athletics and carpentry on one hand and law and medicine on the other is clear. The fi rst two really cannot be considered professions, and the latter two most certainly are. 2.2.2 Engineering as a Profession Using medicine and law as our examples of professions, it is now time to consider whether engineering is a profession. Certainly, engineering requires extensive and sophisticated skills. Otherwise, why spend four years in college just to get a 22 2.2 Is Engineering a Profession? start in engineering? The essence of engineering design is judgment: how to use the available materials, components, and devices to reach a specifi ed objective.

Discretion is required in engineering: Engineers are required to keep their employers’ or clients’ intellectual property and business information confi den- tial. Also, a primary concern of any engineer is the safety of the public that will use the products and devices he designs. There is always a trade-off between safety and other engineering issues in a design, requiring discretion on the part of the engineer to ensure that the design serves its purpose and fi lls its market niche safely.

The point about mechanization needs to be addressed a little more carefully with respect to engineering. Certainly, once a design has been performed, it can easily be replicated without the intervention of an engineer. However, each new situation that requires a new design or a modifi cation of an existing design requires an engineer. Industry commonly uses many computer-based tools for generating designs, such as computer-aided design (CAD) software. This shouldn’t be mistaken for mechanization of engineering. CAD is simply a tool used by engineers, not a replacement for the skills of an actual engineer. A wrench can’t fi x an automobile without a mechanic. Likewise, a computer with CAD software can’t design an antilock braking system for an automobile without an engineer.

Engineering requires extensive formal training. Four years of undergraduate training leading to a bachelor’s degree in an engineering program is essential, fol- lowed by work under the supervision of an experienced engineer. Many engineer- ing jobs even require advanced degrees beyond the bachelor’s degree. The work of engineers serves the public good by providing communication systems, transporta- tion, energy resources, and medical diagnostic and treatment equipment, to name only a few.

Before passing fi nal judgment on the professional status of engineering, the nature of engineering societies requires a little consideration. Each discipline within engineering has a professional society, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) for electrical engineers and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) for mechanical engineers. These societies serve to set professional standards and frequently work with schools of engineering to set standards for admission, curricula, and accreditation. However, these societies dif- fer signifi cantly from the AMA and the ABA. Unlike law and medicine, each spe- cialty of engineering has its own society. There is no overall engineering society that most engineers identify with, although the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) tries to function in this way. In addition, relatively few practicing engineers belong to their professional societies. Thus, the engineering societies are weak compared to the AMA and the ABA.

It is clear that engineering meets all of the defi nitions of a profession. In addi- tion, it is clear that engineering practice has much in common with medicine and law. Interestingly, although they are professionals, engineers do not yet hold the same status within society that physicians and lawyers do. 2.2.3 Differences between Engineering and Other Professions Although we have determined that engineering is a profession, it should be noted that there are signifi cant differences between how engineering is practiced and how law and medicine are practiced. Lawyers are typically self-employed in private practice, essentially an independent business, or in larger group practices with Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 23 other lawyers. Relatively few are employed by large organizations such as corpora- tions. Until recently, this was also the case for most physicians, although with the accelerating trend toward managed care and HMOs in the past decade, many more physicians work for large corporations rather than in private practice.

However, even physicians who are employed by large HMOs are members of organizations in which they retain much of the decision-making power—often, the head of an HMO is a physician—and make up a substantial fraction of the total number of employees.

In contrast, engineers generally practice their profession very differently from physicians and lawyers. Most engineers are not self-employed, but more often are a small part of larger companies involving many different occupations, including accountants, marketing specialists, and extensive numbers of less skilled manufac- turing employees. The exception to this rule is civil engineers, who generally prac- tice as independent consultants either on their own or in engineering fi rms similar in many ways to law fi rms. When employed by large corporations, engineers are rarely in signifi cant managerial positions, except with regard to managing other engineers. Although engineers are paid well compared to the rest of society, they are generally less well compensated than physicians and lawyers.

Training for engineers is different than for physicians and lawyers. One can be employed as an engineer after four years of undergraduate education, unlike law and medicine, for which training in the profession doesn’t begin until after the undergraduate program has been completed. As mentioned previously, the engi- neering societies are not as powerful as the AMA and the ABA, perhaps because of the number of different professional engineering societies. Also, both law and med- icine require licenses granted by the state in order to practice. Many engineers, especially those employed by large industrial companies, do not have engineering licenses. It can be debated whether someone who is unlicensed is truly an engineer or whether he is practicing engineering illegally, but the reality is that many of those who are trained as engineers and are employed as engineers are not licensed.

Finally, engineering doesn’t have the social stature that law and medicine have (a fact that is partly refl ected in the lower pay that engineers receive as compared to that of lawyers and doctors). Despite these differences, on balance, engineering is still clearly a profession, albeit one that is not as mature as medicine and law.

However, the engineering profession should be striving to emulate some of the aspects of these other professions. 2.2.4 Other Aspects of Professional Societies We should briefl y note that professional societies also serve other, perhaps less noble, purposes than those mentioned previously. Sociologists who study the nature of professional societies describe two different models of professions, sometimes referred to as the social-contract and the business models. The social-contract model views professional societies as being set up primarily to further the public good, as described in the defi nition of a profession given previously. There is an implicit social contract involved with professions, according to this model. Society grants to the professions perks such as high pay, a high status in society, and the ability to self-regulate. In return for these perks, society gets the services provided by the profession.

A perhaps more cynical view of professions is provided by the business model.

According to this model, professions function as a means for furthering the economic advantage of the members. Put another way, professional organizations 24 2.3 Codes of Ethics are labor unions for the elite, strictly limiting the number of practitioners of the profession, controlling the working conditions for professionals, and artifi cially infl ating the salaries of its members. An analysis of both models in terms of law and medicine would show that there are ways in which these professions exhibit aspects of both of these models.

Where does engineering fi t into this picture? Engineering is certainly a service- oriented profession and thus fits into the social-contract model quite nicely.

Although some engineers might wish to see engineering professional societies func- tion more according to the business model, they currently don’t function that way.

The engineering societies have virtually no clout with major engineering employers to set wages and working conditions or to help engineers resolve ethical disputes with their employers. Moreover, there is very little prospect that the engineering societies will function this way in the near future. 2.2.5 If Engineering Were Practiced More Like Medicine It is perhaps instructive to speculate a little on how engineering might change in the future if our model of the engineering profession were closer to that of law or medicine. One major change would be in the way engineers are educated. Rather than the current system, in which students study engineering as undergraduates and then pursue advanced degrees as appropriate, prospective engineers would probably get a four-year “preengineering” degree in mathematics, physics, chemis- try, computer science, or some combination of these fi elds. After the four-year undergraduate program, students would enter a three- or four-year engineering professional program culminating in a “doctor of engineering” degree (or other appropriately named degree). This program would include extensive study of engi- neering fundamentals, specialization in a fi eld of study, and perhaps “clinical” train- ing under a practicing engineer.

How would such engineers be employed? The pattern of employment would certainly be different for engineers trained this way. Engineers in all fi elds might work for engineering fi rms similar to the way in which civil engineers work now, consulting on projects for government agencies or large corporations. The corpo- rate employers who now have numerous engineers on their staff would probably have far fewer engineers on the payroll, opting instead for a few professional engi- neers who would supervise the work of several less highly trained “engineering tech- nicians.” Adoption of this model would probably reduce the number of engineers in the work force, leading to higher earnings for those who remain. Those rele- gated to the ranks of engineering technicians would probably earn less than those currently employed as engineers. 2.3 CODES OF ETHICS An aspect of professional societies that has not been mentioned yet is the codes of ethics that engineering societies have adopted. These codes express the rights, duties, and obligations of the members of the profession. In this section, we will examine the codes of ethics of professional engineering societies.

It should be noted that although most of the discussion thus far has focused on professionalism and professional societies, codes of ethics are not limited to profes- sional organizations. They can also be found, for example, in corporations and uni- versities as well. We start with some general ideas about what codes of ethics are and what purpose they serve and then examine two professional engineering codes in more detail. Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 25 2.3.1 What Is a Code of Ethics?

Primarily, a code of ethics provides a framework for ethical judgment for a profes- sional. The key word here is “framework.” No code can be totally comprehensive and cover all possible ethical situations that a professional engineer is likely to encounter. Rather, codes serve as a starting point for ethical decision making.

A code can also express the commitment to ethical conduct shared by members of a profession. It is important to note that ethical codes do not establish new ethical principles. They simply reiterate principles and standards that are already accepted as responsible engineering practice. A code expresses these principles in a coher- ent, comprehensive, and accessible manner. Finally, a code defi nes the roles and responsibilities of professionals [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ].

It is important also to look at what a code of ethics is not. It is not a recipe for ethical behavior; as previously stated, it is only a framework for arriving at good ethical choices. A code of ethics is never a substitute for sound judgment. A code of ethics is not a legal document. One can’t be arrested for violating its provisions, although expulsion from the professional society might result from code violations.

As mentioned in the previous section, with the current state of engineering socie- ties, expulsion from an engineering society generally will not result in an inability to practice engineering, so there are not necessarily any direct consequences of violat- ing engineering ethical codes. Finally, a code of ethics doesn’t create new moral or ethical principles. As described in the previous chapter, these principles are well established in society, and foundations of our ethical and moral principles go back many centuries. Rather, a code of ethics spells out the ways in which moral and ethical principles apply to professional practice. Put another way, a code helps the engineer to apply moral principles to the unique situations encountered in profes- sional practice.

How does a code of ethics achieve these goals? First, a code of ethics helps create an environment within a profession where ethical behavior is the norm. It also serves as a guide or reminder of how to act in specifi c situations. A code of ethics can also be used to bolster an individual’s position with regard to a certain activity: The code provides a little backup for an individual who is being pressured by a superior to behave unethically. A code of ethics can also bolster the individual’s position by indi- cating that there is a collective sense of correct behavior; there is strength in num- bers. Finally, a code of ethics can indicate to others that the profession is seriously concerned about responsible, professional conduct [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ]. A code of ethics, however, should not be used as “window dressing,” an attempt by an organization to appear to be committed to ethical behavior when it really is not. 2.3.2 Objections to Codes Although codes of ethics are widely used by many organizations, including engi- neering societies, there are many objections to codes of ethics, specifi cally as they apply to engineering practice. First, as mentioned previously, relatively few practic- ing engineers are members of professional societies and so don’t necessarily feel compelled to abide by their codes. Many engineers who are members of profes- sional societies are not aware of the existence of the society’s code, or if they are aware of it, they have never read it. Even among engineers who know about their society’s code, consultation of the code is rare. There are also objections that the engineering codes often have internal confl icts, but don’t give a method for resolv- ing the confl ict. Finally, codes can be coercive: They foster ethical behavior with a 26 2.3 Codes of Ethics stick rather than with a carrot [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ]. Despite these objections, codes are in widespread use today and are generally thought to serve a useful function. 2.3.3 Codes of the Engineering Societies Before examining professional codes in more detail, it might be instructive to look  briefly at the history of the engineering codes of ethics. Professional engineering societies in the United States began to be organized in the late 19th century. As these societies matured, many of them created codes of ethics to guide practicing engineers.

Early in the 20th century, these codes were mostly concerned with issues of how to conduct business. For example, many early codes had clauses forbidding advertising of services or prohibiting competitive bidding by engineers for design projects. Codes also spelled out the duties that engineers had toward their employers. Relatively less emphasis than today was given to issues of ser- vice to the public and safety. This imbalance has changed greatly in recent dec- ades as public perceptions and concerns about the safety of engineered products and devices have changed. Now, most codes emphasize commitments to safety, public health, and even environmental protection as the most important duties of the engineer. 2.3.4 A Closer Look at Two Codes of Ethics Having looked at some ideas about what codes of ethics are and how they function, let’s look more closely at two codes of ethics: the codes of the IEEE and the NSPE.

Although these codes have some common content, the structures of the codes are very different.

The IEEE code is short and deals in generalities, whereas the NSPE code is much longer and more detailed. An explanation of these differences is rooted in the philosophy of the authors of these codes. A short code that is lacking in detail is more likely to be read by members of the society than is a longer code. A short code is also more understandable. It articulates general principles and truly functions as a framework for ethical decision making, as described previously.

A longer code, such as the NSPE code, has the advantage of being more explicit and is thus able to cover more ground. It leaves less to the imagination of the indi- vidual and therefore is more useful for application to specifi c cases. The length of the code, however, makes it less likely to be read and thoroughly understood by most engineers.

There are some specifi cs of these two codes that are worth noting here. The IEEE code doesn’t mention a duty to one’s employer. However, the IEEE code does explicitly mention a duty to protect the environment. The NSPE code has a preamble that succinctly presents the duties of the engineer before going on to the more explicit discussions of the rest of the code. Like most codes of ethics, the NSPE code does mention the engineer’s duty to his or her employer in Section I.4, where it states that engineers shall “[a]ct . . . for each employer . . . as faithful agents or trustees.” 2.3.5 Resolving Internal Confl icts in Codes One objection to codes of ethics is the internal confl icts that can exist within them, with no instructions on how to resolve these confl icts. An example of this problem would be a situation in which an employer asks or even orders an engineer to Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 27 implement a design that the engineer feels will be unsafe. It is made clear that the engineer’s job is at stake if he doesn’t do as instructed. What does the NSPE code tell us about this situation?

In clause I.4, the NSPE code indicates that engineers have a duty to their employers, which implies that the engineer should go ahead with the unsafe design favored by his employer. However, clause I.1 and the preamble make it clear that the safety of the public is also an important concern of an engineer. In fact, it says that the safety of the public is paramount. How can this confl ict be resolved?

There is no implication in this or any other code that all clauses are equally important. Rather, there is a hierarchy within the code. Some clauses take prece- dence over others, although there is generally no explicit indication in the code of what the hierarchy is. The preceding dilemma is easily resolved within the context of this hierarchy. The duty to protect the safety of the public is paramount and takes precedence over the duty to the employer. In this case, the code provides very clear support to the engineer, who must convince his supervisor that the product can’t be designed as requested. Unfortunately, not all internal confl icts in codes of ethics are so easily resolved. 2.3.6 Can Codes and Professional Societies Protect Employees?

One important area where professional societies can and should function is as pro- tectors of the rights of employees who are being pressured by their employer to do something unethical or who are accusing their employers or the government of unethical conduct. The codes of the professional societies are of some use in this since they can be used by employees as ammunition against an employer who is sanctioning them for pointing out unethical behavior or who are being asked to engage in unethical acts.

An example of this situation is the action of the IEEE on behalf of three elec- trical engineers who were fi red from their jobs at the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) organization when they pointed out defi ciencies in the way the control systems for the BART trains were being designed and tested. After being fi red, the engineers sued BART, citing the IEEE code of ethics which impelled them to hold as their primary concern the safety of the public who would be using the BART system. The IEEE intervened on their behalf in court, although ultimately the engineers lost the case.

If the codes of ethics of professional societies are to have any meaning, this type of intervention is essential when ethical violations are pointed out. However, since not all engineers are members of professional societies and the engineering societies are relatively weak, the pressure that can be exerted by these organizations is limited. 2.3.7 Other Types of Codes of Ethics Professional societies aren’t the only organizations that have codifi ed their ethical standards. Many other organizations have also developed codes of ethics for various purposes similar to those of the professional engineering organizations. For exam- ple, codes for the ethical use of computers have been developed, and student organizations in universities have framed student codes of ethics. In this section, we will examine how codes of ethics function in corporations.

Many of the important ethical questions faced by engineers come up in the context of their work for corporations. Since most practicing engineers are not members of professional organizations, it seems that for many engineers, there is 28 2.3 Codes of Ethics little ethical guidance in the course of their daily work. This problem has led to the adoption of codes of ethics by many corporations.

Even if the professional codes were widely adopted and recognized by practic- ing engineers, there would still be some value to the corporate codes, since a corpo- ration can tailor its code to the individual circumstances and unique mission of the company. As such, these codes tend to be relatively long and very detailed, incorpo- rating many rules specifi c to the practices of the company. For example, corporate codes frequently spell out in detail the company policies on business practices, rela- tionships with suppliers, relationships with government agencies, compliance with government regulations, health and safety issues, issues related to environmental protection, equal employment opportunity and affi rmative action, sexual harass- ment, and diversity and racial/ethnic tolerance. Since corporate codes are coercive in nature—your continued employment by the company depends on your compli- ance with the company code—these codes tend to be longer and more detailed in order to provide very clear and specifi c guidelines to the employees.

Codes of professional societies, by their nature, can’t be this explicit, since there is no means for a professional society to reasonably enforce its code. Due to the typically long lengths of these codes, no example of a corporate code of ethics can be included here. However, codes for companies can sometimes be found via the Internet at corporate websites.

Some of the heightened awareness of ethics in corporations stems from the increasing public scrutiny that has accompanied well-publicized disasters, such as the cases presented in this book, as well as from cases of fraud and cost overruns, particularly in the defense industry, that have been exposed in the media. Many large corporations have developed corporate codes of ethics in response to these problems to help heighten employee’s awareness of ethical issues and to help estab- lish a strong corporate ethics culture. These codes give employees ready access to guidelines and policies of the corporations. But, as with professional codes, it is important to remember that these codes cannot cover all possible situations that an employee might encounter; there is no substitute for good judgment. A code also doesn’t substitute for good lines of communications between employees and upper management and for workable methods for fi xing ethical problems when they occur. APPLICATION CASES Codes of ethics can be used as a tool for analyzing cases and for gaining some insight into the proper course of action. Before reading these cases, it would be helpful to read a couple of the codes in Appendix A, especially the code most closely related to your fi eld of study, to become familiar with the types of issues that codes deal with. Then, put yourself in the position of an engineer working for these companies—Intel, Paradyne Computers, and 3Bs Construction—to see what you would have done in each case. The Intel Pentium ® Chip In late 1994, the media began to report that there was a fl aw in the new Pentium microprocessor produced by Intel. The microprocessor is the heart of a personal computer and controls all of the operations and calculations that take place. A fl aw in the Pentium was especially signifi cant, since it was the microprocessor used in 80% of the personal computers produced in the world at that time. Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 29 Apparently, fl aws in a complicated integrated circuit such as the Pentium, which at the time contained over one million transistors, are common. However, most of the fl aws are undetectable by the user and don’t affect the operation of the computer. Many of these fl aws are easily compensated for through software. The fl aw that came to light in 1994 was different: It was detectable by the user. This par- ticular fl aw was in the fl oating-point unit (FPU) and caused a wrong answer when double-precision arithmetic, a very common operation, was performed.

A standard test was widely published to determine whether a user’s micropro- cessor was fl awed. Using spreadsheet software, the user was to take the number 4,195,835, multiply it by 3,145,727, and then divide that result by 3,145,727. As we all know from elementary math, when a number is multiplied and then divided by the same number, the result should be the original number. In this example, the result should be 4,195,835. However, with the fl awed FPU, the result of this calcula- tion was 4,195,579 [ Infoworld , 1994]. Depending on the application, this six- thousandths-of-a-percent error might be very signifi cant.

At fi rst, Intel’s response to these reports was to deny that there was any problem with the chip. When it became clear that this assertion was not accurate, Intel switched its policy and stated that although there was indeed a defect in the chip, it was insignifi cant and the vast majority of users would never even notice it. The chip would be replaced for free only for users who could demonstrate that they needed an unfl awed version of the chip [ Infoworld , 1994]. There is some logic to this policy from Intel’s point of view, since over two million computers had already been sold with the defective chip.

Of course, this approach didn’t satisfy most Pentium owners. After all, how can you predict whether you will have a future application where this fl aw might be signifi cant? IBM, a major Pentium user, canceled the sales of all IBM computers containing the fl awed chip. Finally, after much negative publicity in the popular personal computer literature and an outcry from Pentium users, Intel agreed to replace the fl awed chip with an unfl awed version for any customer who asked to have it replaced.

It should be noted that long before news of the fl aw surfaced in the popular press, Intel was aware of the problem and had already corrected it on subsequent versions. It did, however, continue to sell the fl awed version and, based on its early insistence that the fl aw did not present a signifi cant problem to users, seemingly planned to do so until the new version was available and the stocks of the fl awed one were exhausted. Eventually, the damage caused by this case was fi xed as the media reports of the problem died down and as customers were able to get unf- lawed chips into their computers. Ultimately, Intel had a write-off of 475 million dollars to solve this problem.

What did Intel learn from this experience? The early designs for new chips con- tinue to have fl aws, and sometimes these fl aws are not detected until the product is already in use by consumers. However, Intel’s approach to these problems has changed. It now seems to feel that problems need to be fi xed immediately. In addi- tion, the decision is now based on the consumer’s perception of the signifi cance of the fl aw, rather than on Intel’s opinion of its signifi cance.

Indeed, similar fl aws were found in 1997 in the early versions of the Pentium II and Pentium Pro processors. This time, Intel immediately confi rmed that the fl aw existed and offered customers software that would correct it. Other companies also seem to have benefi ted from Intel’s experience. For example, Intuit, a leading man- ufacturer of tax preparation and fi nancial software, called a news conference in 30 2.3 Codes of Ethics March of 1995 to apologize for fl aws in its TurboTax software that had become apparent earlier in that year. In addition to the apology, they offered consumers replacements for the defective software. Runway Concrete at the Denver International Airport In the early 1990s, the city of Denver, Colorado, embarked on one of the largest public works projects in history: the construction of a new airport to replace the aging Stapleton International Airport. The new Denver International Airport (DIA) would be the fi rst new airport constructed in the United States since the Dallas–Fort Worth Airport was completed in the early 1970s. Of course, the size and complexity of this type of project lends itself to many problems, including cost overruns, worker safety and health issues, and controversies over the need for the project. The con- struction of DIA was no exception.

Perhaps the most widely known problem with the airport was the malfunction- ing of a new computer-controlled high-tech baggage handling system, which in pre- liminary tests consistently mangled and misrouted baggage and frequently jammed, leading to the shutdown of the entire system. Problems with the baggage handling system delayed the opening of the airport for over a year and cost the city millions of dollars in expenses for replacement of the system and lost revenues while the airport was unable to open. In addition, the baggage system made the airport the butt of many jokes, especially on late-night television.

More interesting from the perspective of engineering ethics are problems dur- ing the construction of DIA involving the concrete used for the runways, taxiways, and aprons at the airport. The story of concrete problems at DIA was fi rst reported by the Denver Post in early August of 1993 as the airport neared completion. Two subcontractors fi led lawsuits against the runway paving contractor, California-based construction company Ball, Ball, & Brosamer (known as 3Bs), claiming that 3Bs owed them money. Parts of these suits were allegations that 3Bs had altered the recipe for the concrete used in the runway and apron construction, deliberately diluting the concrete with more gravel, water, and sand (and thus less cement), thereby weakening it. 3Bs motivation for doing so would be to save money and thus to increase their profi ts. One of the subcontractors, CSI Trucking, whose job was to haul the sand and gravel used in the concrete, claimed that 3Bs hadn’t paid them for materials that had been delivered. They claimed that these materials had been used to dilute the mixture, but hadn’t been paid for, since the payment would leave a record of the improper recipe.

At fi rst, Denver offi cials downplayed the reports of defective concrete, relying on the results of independent tests of the concrete. In addition, the city of Denver ordered core samples to be taken from the runways. Tests on these cores showed that the runway concrete had the correct strength. The subcontractors claimed that the improperly mixed concrete could have the proper test strength, but would lead to a severely shortened runway lifetime. The FBI also became involved in investigat- ing this case, since federal transportation grants were used by Denver to help fi nance the construction of the runways.

The controversy seemed to settle down for a while, but a year later, in August of 1994, the Denver district attorney’s offi ce announced that it was investigating alle- gations that inspection reports on the runways were falsifi ed during the construc- tion. This announcement was followed on November 13, 1994, by a lengthy story in the Denver Post detailing a large number of allegations of illegal activities and uneth- ical practices with regard to the runway construction. Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 31 The November 13 story revolved around an admission by a Fort Collins, Colorado, company, Empire Laboratories, that test reports on the concrete had been falsifi ed to hide results which showed that some of the concrete did not meet the specifi cations. Attorneys for Empire said that this falsifi cation had hap- pened fi ve or six times in the course of this work, but four employees of Empire claimed that the altering of test data was standard operating procedure at Empire.

The nature of the test modifi cations and the rationale behind them illustrate many of the important problems in engineering ethics, including the need for objectivity and honesty in reporting results of tests and experiments. One Empire employee said that if a test result was inconsistent with other tests, then the results would be changed to mask the difference. This practice was justifi ed by Empire as being “based upon engineering judgment” [ Denver Post, Nov. 13, 1994]. The con- crete was tested by pouring test samples when the actual runways were poured.

These samples were subjected to fl exural tests, which consist of subjecting the con- crete to an increasing force until it fails. The tests were performed at 7 days after pouring and also at 28 days. Many of the test results showed that the concrete was weaker at 28 days than at 7 days. However, the results should have been the oppo- site, since concrete normally increases in strength as it cures. Empire employees indicated that this apparent anomaly was because many of the 7-day tests had been altered to make the concrete seem stronger than it was.

Other problems with the concrete also surfaced. Some of the concrete used in the runways contained clay balls up to 10 inches in diameter. While not uncommon in concrete batching, the presence of this clay can lead to runways that are signifi - cantly weaker than planned.

Questions about the short cement content in 3Bs concrete mixture also resur- faced in the November Denver Post article. The main question was “given that the concrete batching operation was routinely monitored, how did 3Bs get away with shorting the cement content of the concrete?” One of the batch plant operators for 3Bs explained that they were tipped off about upcoming inspections. When an inspector was due, they used the correct recipe so that concrete would appear to be correctly formulated. The shorting of the concrete mixture could also be detected by looking at the records of materials delivered to the batch plants. However, DIA administrators found that this documentation was missing, and it was unclear whether it had ever existed.

A batch plant operator also gave a sworn statement that he had been directed to fool the computer that operated the batch plant. The computer was fooled by tampering with the scale used to weigh materials and by inputting false numbers for the moisture content of the sand. In some cases, the water content of the sand that was input into the computer was a negative number! This tampering forced the computer to alter the mixture to use less cement, but the records printed by the computer would show that the mix was properly constituted. In his statement, the batch plant operator also swore that this practice was known to some of the highest offi cials in 3Bs.

Despite the problems with the batching of the concrete used in the runways, DIA offi cials insisted that the runways built by 3Bs met the specifi cations. This asser- tion was based on the test results, which showed that although some parts of the runway were below standard, all of the runways met FAA specifi cations. 3Bs was paid for those areas that were below standard at a lower rate than for the stronger parts of the runway. Further investigations about misdeeds in the construction of DIA Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 33 had proposed selling SSA their P8400 model with the PIOS operating system. The bid was written as if this system currently existed. However, at the time that the bid was prepared, the 8400 system did not exist and had not been developed, proto- typed, or manufactured [ Head, 1986 ].

There were other problems associated with Paradyne’s performance during the bidding. The RFP stated that there was to be a preaward demonstration of the prod- uct, not a demonstration of a prototype. Paradyne demonstrated to SSA a different computer, a modifi ed PDP 11/23 computer manufactured by Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) placed in a cabinet that was labeled P8400. Apparently, many of the DEC labels on the equipment that was demonstrated to SSA had Paradyne labels pasted over them. Paradyne disingenuously claimed that since the DEC equipment was based on a 16-bit processor, as was the P8400 they proposed, it was irrelevant whether the machine demonstrated was the DEC or the actual P8400. Of course, com- puter users recognize that this statement is nonsense. Even modern “PC-compatible” computers with the same microprocessor chip and operating system can have widely different operating characteristics in terms of speed and the software that can be run.

There were also questions about the operating system. Apparently, at the time of Paradyne’s bid, the PIOS system was under development as well and hadn’t been tested on a prototype of the proposed system. Even a functioning hardware system will not operate correctly without the correct operating system. No software has ever worked correctly the fi rst time, but rather requires extensive debugging to make it operate properly with a new system. Signifi cantly, the DEC system with the P8400 label that was actually tested by SSA was not running with the proposed PIOS system.

Some of the blame for this fi asco can also be laid at the feet of the SSA. There were six bidders for this contract. Each of the bidders was to have an on-site visit from SSA inspectors to determine whether it was capable of doing the work that it included in its bid. Paradyne’s capabilities were not assessed using an on-site visit.

Moreover, Paradyne was judged based on its ability to manufacture modems, which was then its main business. Apparently, its ability to produce complete computer systems wasn’t assessed. As part of its attempt to gain this contract, Paradyne hired a former SSA offi cial who, while still working for SSA, had participated in preparing the RFP and had helped with setting up the team that would evaluate the bids.

Paradyne had notifi ed SSA of the hiring of this person, and SSA decided that there  were no ethical problems with this. However, when the Paradyne machine failed the initial acceptance test, this Paradyne offi cial was directly involved in nego- tiating the relaxed standards with his former boss at SSA.

This situation was resolved when the Paradyne computers were fi nally brought to the point of functioning as required. However, as a result of these problems, there were many investigations by government agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the General Accounting Office, the House of Representatives’ Government Operations Committee, the Health and Human Services Department (of which SSA is part), and the Justice Department. Code of ethics Professions Professional societies KEY TERMS 34 Problems REFERENCES Charles E. Harris , Jr., Michael S. Pritchard , and Michael J. Rabins , Engineering Ethics, Concepts and Cases, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont CA, 2000 .

Roland Schinzinger and Mike W. Martin , Introduction to Engineering Ethics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2000 .

Intel Pentium Chip Case “When the Chips Are Down,” Time, December 26–January 2, 1995, p. 126.

“The Fallout from Intel’s Pentium Bug,” Fortune, January 16, 1995, p. 15.

“Pentium Woes Continue,” Infoworld, November 18, 1994, vol. 16, no. 48, p. 1.

“Flawed Chips Still Shipping,” Infoworld, December 5, 1994, vol. 16, no. 49, p. 1.

Numerous other accounts from late 1994 and early 1995 in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, etc. DIA Runaway Concrete Lou Kilzer, Robert Kowalski, and Steven Wilmsen, “Concrete Tests Faked at Airport,” Denver Post, November 13, 1994, Section A, p. 1. Paradyne Computers J. Steve Davis , “Ethical Problems in Competitive Bidding: The Paradyne Case,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, vol. 7, 1988 , p. 3.

Robert V. Head , “Paradyne Dispute: A Matter of Using a Proper Tense,” Government Computer News, February 14, 1986 , p. 23. 2.1 What changes would have to be made for engineering to be a profession more like medicine or law? 2.2 In which ways do law, medicine, and engineering fi t the social-contract and the business models of a profession? 2.3 The fi rst part of the defi nition of a profession says that professions involve the use of sophisticated skills. Do you think that these skills are primarily physical or intellectual skills? Give examples from professions such as law, medicine, and engineering, as well as from non-professions. 2.4 Read about the space shuttle Challenger accident in 1986. (You can fi nd infor- mation on this in magazines, newspapers, or on the internet.) Apply an engi- neering code of ethics to this case. What guidance might one of the engineering society codes of ethics have given the Thiokol engineers when faced with a decision to launch? Which specifi c parts of the code are applicable to this situ- ation? Does a manager who is trained as an engineer still have to adhere to an engineering code of ethics? 2.5 Write a code of ethics for students in your college or department. Start by deciding what type of code you want: short, long, detailed, general, etc. Then, list the important ethical issues you think students face. Finally, organize these ideas into a coherent structure. 2.6 Imagine that you are the president of a small high-technology fi rm. Your company has grown over the last few years to the point where you feel that it PROBLEMS Chapter 2 Professionalism and Codes of Ethics 35 is important that your employees have some guidelines regarding ethics.

Defi ne the type of company you are running, then develop an appropriate code of ethics. As in Question 2.5, start by deciding what type of code is appropriate for your company. Then, list specifi c points that are impor- tant—for example, relationships with vendors, treatment of fellow employ- ees, etc. Finally, write a code that incorporates these features. In developing your code of ethics, you should think about the difference between business policies and ethical concerns. For example, business policies might be spe- cifi c about what time workers should arrive each day and how many hours they should work; a code of ethics would focus more on integrity in follow- ing the business rules of a company. INTEL PENTIUM CHIP 2.7 Was this case simply a customer-relations and PR problem, or are there ethical issues to be considered as well? 2.8 Use one of the engineering codes of ethics to analyze this case. Pay special attention to issues of accurate representation of engineered products and to safety issues. 2.9 When a product is sold, is there an implication that it will work as advertised? 2.10 Should you reveal defects in a product to a consumer? Is the answer to this question different if the defect is a safety issue rather than simply a fl aw? (It might be useful to note in this discussion that although there is no appar- ent safety concern for someone using a computer with this fl aw, PCs are often used to control a variety of instruments, such as medical equipment.

For such equipment, a fl aw might have a very real safety implication.) Is the answer to this question different if the customer is a bank that uses the computer to calculate interest paid, loan payments, etc. for customers? 2.11 Should you replace defective products even if customers won’t recognize the defect? 2.12 How thorough should testing be? Is it ever possible to say that no defect exists in a product or structure? 2.13 Do fl aws that Intel found previously in the 386 and 486 chips have any bearing on these questions? In other words, if Intel got away with selling fl awed chips before without informing consumers, does that fact have any bearing on this case? 2.14 G. Richard Thoman, an IBM senior vice president, was quoted as saying, “Nobody should have to worry about the integrity of data calculated on an IBM machine.” How does this statement by a major Intel customer change the answers to the previous questions? 2.15 Just prior to when this problem surfaced, Intel had begun a major advertising campaign to make Intel a household name. They had gotten computer manu- facturers to place “Intel Inside” labels on their computers and had spent money on television advertising seeking to increase the public demand for computers with Intel processors, with the unstated message that Intel chips were of signifi cantly higher quality than other manufacturers’ chips. How might this campaign have affected what happened in this case? 2.16 What responsibilities did the engineers who were aware of the fl aw have before the chip was sold? After the chips began to be sold? After the fl aw became apparent? DIA RUNAWAY CONCRETE 2.17 Using one of the engineering codes of ethics, analyze the actions of the batch plant operators and Empire Laboratories. 2.18 Is altering data a proper use of “engineering judgment”? What alternative might have existed to altering the test data on the concrete? 2.19 Who is responsible for ensuring that the materials used in a project meet the specifi cations? The supplier or the purchaser? PARADYNE COMPUTERS 2.20 Choose an engineering code of ethics and use it to analyze this case. Were the engineers and managers of Paradyne operating ethically? 2.21 In preparing their bid, Paradyne wrote in the present tense, as if the com- puter they proposed currently existed, rather than in the future tense, which would have indicated that the product was still under development. Paradyne claimed that the use of the present tense in its bid (which led SSA to believe that the P8400 actually existed) was acceptable, since it is common business practice to advertise products under development this way. Was this a new product announcement with a specifi ed availability date? Is there a distinction between a response to a bid and company advertising? Is it acceptable to respond to a bid with a planned system if there is no indication when that system is expected to be available? 2.22 Paradyne also claimed that it was acting as a system integrator (which was allowed by the RFP), using components from other manufacturers to form the Paradyne system. These other components were mostly off the shelf, but they had never been integrated into a system before. Does this meet the SSA requirement for an existing system? 2.23 Once the Paradyne machine failed the initial test, should the requirements have been relaxed to help the machine qualify? If the requirements were going to be modifi ed, should the bidding process have been reopened to the other bidders and others who might now be able to bid? Should bidding be reopened even if it causes a delay in delivery, increased work for the SSA, etc.? 2.24 Was it acceptable to represent a proposed system as existing, if indeed that is what Paradyne did? 2.25 Is it ethical for a former SSA employee to take a job negotiating contracts with the SSA for a private company? Did this relationship give Paradyne an unfair advantage over its competition? 36 Problems I n late 1984, a pressure-relief valve on a tank used to store methyl isocyanate (MIC) at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, accidentally opened. MIC is a poisonous compound used in the manufacture of pesticides. When the valve opened, MIC was released from the tank, and a cloud of toxic gas formed over the area surrounding the plant. Unfortunately, this neighborhood was very densely populated. Some two thou- sand people were killed, and thousands more were injured as a result of the accident.

Many of the injured have remained permanently disabled. The causes of the accident are not completely clear, but there appear to have been many contributing factors. Pipes in the plant were misconnected, and essential safety systems were either broken or had been taken off-line for maintenance. The effects of the leak were intensifi ed by the presence of so many people living in close proximity to the plant. Among the many important issues this case brings up are questions of balancing risk to the local community with the economic benefi ts to the larger community of the state or nation. Undoubtedly, the presence of this chemical plant brought signifi - cant local economic benefi t. However, the accident at the plant also brought disaster to the local community at an enormous cost in human lives and suffering. How can we decide if on balance the economic benefi t brought by this plant outweighed the potential safety hazards? After reading this chapter, you will be able to • Discuss several ethical theories • See how these theories can be applied to engineering situations. Objectives Understanding Ethical Problems 3 CHAPTER 38 3.2 A Brief History of Ethical Thought In order to answer this question and analyze other engineering ethics cases, we need a framework for analyzing ethical problems. Codes of ethics can be used as an aid in analyzing ethical issues. In this chapter, we will examine moral theories and see how they can also be used as a means for analyzing ethical cases such as the Bhopal disaster. 3.1 INTRODUCTION In this chapter, we will develop moral theories that can be applied to the ethical problems confronted by engineers. Unfortunately, a thorough and in-depth discus- sion of all possible ethical theories is beyond the scope of this text. Rather, some important theories will be developed in suffi cient detail for use in analyzing cases.

Our approach to ethical problem solving will be similar to problem-solving strat- egies in other engineering classes. To learn how to build a bridge, you must fi rst learn the basics of physics and then apply this knowledge to engineering statics and dynamics. Only when the basic understanding of these topics has been acquired can problems in structures be solved and bridges built. Similarly, in ethical problem solv- ing, we will need some knowledge of ethical theory to provide a framework for understanding and reaching solutions in ethical problems. In this chapter, we will develop this theoretical framework and apply it to an engineering case. We will begin by looking at the origins of Western ethical thinking. 3.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF ETHICAL THOUGHT It is impossible in this text to give a complete history of ethical thinking. Numerous books, some of them quite lengthy, have already been written on this subject.

However, it is instructive to give a brief outline of the origins and development of the ethical principles that will be applied to engineering practice.

The moral and ethical theories that we will be applying in engineering ethics are derived from a Western cultural tradition. In other words, these ideas origi- nated in the Middle East and Europe. Western moral thought has not come down to us from just a single source. Rather, it is derived both from the thinking of the ancient Greeks and from ancient religious thinking and writing, starting with Judaism and its foundations.

Although it is easy to think of these two sources as separate, there was a great deal of infl uence on ancient religious thought by the Greek philosophers. The written sources of the Jewish moral traditions are the Torah and the Old Testament of the Bible and their enumeration of moral laws, including the Ten Commandments.

Greek ethical thought originated with the famous Greek philosophers that are com- monly studied in freshman philosophy classes, principally Socrates and Aristotle, who discussed ethics at great length in his Nichomachean Ethics.

Greek philosophic ideas were melded together with early Christian and Jewish thought and were spread throughout Europe and the Middle East during the height of the Roman Empire.

Ethical ideas were continually refi ned during the course of history. Many great thinkers have turned their attention to ethics and morals and have tried to provide insight into these issues through their writings. For example, philosophers such as Locke, Kant, and Mill wrote about moral and ethical issues. The thinking of these philosophers is especially important for our study of engineering ethics, since they did not rely on religion to underpin their moral thinking. Rather, they acknowledged that moral principles are universal, regardless of their origin, and are applicable even in secular settings. Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 39 Many of the moral principles that we will discuss have also been codifi ed and handed down through the law. So, in discussing engineering ethics, there is a large body of thinking—philosophical, legal, and religious—to draw from. However, even though there are religious and legal origins of many of the moral principles that we will encounter in our study of engineering ethics, it is important to acknowledge that ethical conduct is fundamentally grounded in a concern for other people. It is not just about law or religion. 3.3 ETHICAL THEORIES In order to develop workable ethical problem-solving techniques, we must fi rst look at several theories of ethics in order to have a framework for decision making.

Ethical problem solving is not as cut and dried as problem solving in engineering classes. In most engineering classes, there is generally just one theory to consider when tackling a problem. In studying engineering ethics, there are several theories that will be considered. The relatively large number of theories doesn’t indicate a weakness in theoretical understanding of ethics or a “fuzziness” of ethical thinking.

Rather, it refl ects the complexity of ethical problems and the diversity of approaches to ethical problem solving that have been developed over the centuries.

Having multiple theories to apply actually enriches the problem-solving pro- cess, allowing problems to be looked at from different angles, since each theory stresses different aspects of a problem. Even though we will use multiple theories to examine ethical problems, each theory applied to a problem will not necessarily lead to a different solution. Frequently, different theories yield the same solution.

Our basic ethical problem-solving technique will utilize different theories and approaches to analyze the problem and then try to determine the best solution.

3.3.1 What Is a Moral Theor y?

Before looking more closely at individual moral theories, we should start with a defi nition of what a moral theory is and how it functions. A moral theory defi nes terms in uniform ways and links ideas and problems together in consistent ways [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ]. This is exactly how the scientifi c theories used in other engineering classes function. Scientifi c theories also organize ideas, defi ne terms, and facilitate problem solving. So, we will use moral theories in exactly the same way that engineering theories are used in other classes.

There are four ethical theories that will be considered here, each differing according to what is held to be the most important moral concept. Utilitarianism seeks to produce the most utility, defi ned as a balance between good and bad consequences of an action, taking into account the consequences for everyone affected. A different approach is provided by duty ethics.

Duty ethics contends that there are duties that should be performed (for example, the duty to treat others fairly or the duty not to injure others) regardless of whether these acts lead to the most good. Rights ethics emphasizes that we all have moral rights, and any action that violates these rights is ethically unacceptable. Like duty ethics, the ultimate overall good of the actions is not taken into account. Finally, virtue ethics regards actions as right that manifest good character traits (virtues) and regards actions as bad that display bad character traits (vices); this ethical theory focuses on the type of person we should strive to be. 3.3.2 Utilitarianism The fi rst of the moral theories that will be considered is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that those actions are good that serve to maximize human well-being. The 40 3.3 Ethical Theories emphasis in utilitarianism is not on maximizing the well-being of the individual, but rather on maximizing the well-being of society as a whole, and as such it is some- what of a collectivist approach. An example of this theory that has been played out in this country many times over the past century is the building of dams. Dams often lead to great benefi t to society by providing stable supplies of drinking water, fl ood control, and recreational opportunities. However, these benefi ts often come at the expense of people who live in areas that will be fl ooded by the dam and are required to fi nd new homes, or lose the use of their land. Utilitarianism tries to bal- ance the needs of society with the needs of the individual, with an emphasis on what will provide the most benefi t to the most people.

Utilitarianism is fundamental to many types of engineering analysis, including risk–benefi t analysis and cost–benefi t analysis, which we will discuss later. However, as good as the utilitarian principle sounds, there are some problems with it. First, as seen in the example of the building of a dam, sometimes what is best for everyone may be bad for a particular individual or a group of individuals. An example of this problem is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico.

WIPP is designed to be a permanent repository for nuclear waste generated in the United States. It consists of a system of tunnels bored into underground salt forma- tions. These salt beds are considered by geologists to be extremely stable, especially to incursion of water which could lead to seepage of the nuclear wastes into ground- water. However, there are many who oppose this facility, principally on the grounds that transportation of the wastes across highways has the potential for accidents that might cause health problems for people living near these routes.

An analysis of WIPP using utilitarianism might indicate that the disposal of nuclear wastes is a major problem hindering the implementation of many useful technologies, including medicinal uses of radioisotopes and nuclear generation of electricity. Solution of this waste disposal problem will benefi t society by providing improved health care and more plentiful electricity. The slight potential for adverse health effects for individuals living near the transportation routes is far outweighed by the overall benefi ts to society. So, WIPP should be allowed to open. As this exam- ple demonstrates, the utilitarian approach can seem to ignore the needs of indi- viduals, especially if these needs seem relatively insignifi cant.

Another objection to utilitarianism is that its implementation depends greatly on knowing what will lead to the most good. Frequently, it is impossible to know exactly what the consequences of an action are. It is often impossible to do a com- plete set of experiments to determine all of the potential outcomes, especially when humans are involved as subjects of the experiments. So, maximizing the benefi t to society involves guesswork and the risk that the best guess might be wrong. Despite these objections, utilitarianism is a valuable tool for ethical problem solving, provid- ing one way of looking at engineering ethics cases.

Before ending our discussion of utilitarianism, it should be noted that there are many fl avors of the basic tenets of utilitarianism. Two of these are act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism focuses on individual actions rather than on rules. The best known proponent of act utilitarianism was John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), who felt that most of the common rules of morality (e.g., don’t steal, be honest, don’t harm others) are good guidelines derived from centuries of human experience. However, Mill felt that individual actions should be judged based on whether the most good was produced in a given situation, and rules should be bro- ken if doing so will lead to the most good.

Rule utilitarianism differs from act utilitarianism in holding that moral rules are most important. As mentioned previously, these rules include “do not harm others” and Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 41 “do not steal.” Rule utilitarians hold that although adhering to these rules might not always maximize good in a particular situation, overall, adhering to moral rules will ultimately lead to the most good. Although these two different types of utilitarianism can lead to slightly different results when applied in specifi c situations, in this text, we will consider these ideas together and not worry about the distinctions between the two. 3.3.3 Cost–Benefi t Analysis One tool often used in engineering analysis, especially when trying to determine whether a project makes sense, is cost–benefi t analysis. Fundamentally, this type of analysis is just an application of utilitarianism. In cost–benefi t analysis, the costs of a John Stuart Mill, a leading philosopher of utilitarianism. Courtesy of the Library of Congress. 42 3.3 Ethical Theories project are assessed, as are the benefi ts. Only those projects with the highest ratio of benefi ts to costs will be implemented. This principle is similar to the utilitarian goal of maximizing the overall good.

As with utilitarianism, there are pitfalls in the use of cost–benefi t analysis. While it is often easy to predict the costs for most projects, the benefi ts that are derived from them are often harder to predict and to assign a dollar value to. Once dollar amounts for the costs and benefi ts are determined, calculating a mathematical ratio may seem very objective and therefore may appear to be the best way to make a decision. However, this ratio can’t take into account many of the more subjective aspects of a decision. For example, from a pure cost–benefi t discussion, it might seem that the building of a dam is an excellent idea. But this analysis won’t include other issues such as whether the benefi ts outweigh the loss of a scenic wilderness area or the loss of an endangered species with no current economic value. Finally, it is also important to determine whether those who stand to reap the benefi ts are also those who will pay the costs. It is unfair to place all of the costs on one group while another reaps the benefi ts.

It should be noted that although cost–benefi t analysis shares many similarities with utilitarianism, cost–benefi t analysis isn’t really an ethical analysis tool. The goal of an ethical analysis is to determine what the ethical path is. The goal of a cost– benefi t analysis is to determine the feasibility of a project based on costs. When looking at an ethical problem, the fi rst step should be to determine what the right course of action is and then factor in the fi nancial costs in choosing between ethical alternatives. 3.3.4 Duty Ethics and Rights Ethics Two other ethical theories—duty ethics and rights ethics—are similar to each other and will be considered together. These theories hold that those actions are good that respect the rights of the individual. Here, good consequences for society as a whole are not the only moral consideration.

A major proponent of duty ethics was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who held that moral duties are fundamental. Ethical actions are those actions that could be written down on a list of duties: be honest, don’t cause suffering to other people, be fair to others, etc. These actions are our duties because they express respect for persons, express an unqualifi ed regard for autonomous moral agents, and are uni- versal principles [ Schinzinger and Martin, 2000 ]. Once one’s duties are recognized, the ethically correct moral actions are obvious. In this formulation, ethical acts are a result of proper performance of one’s duties.

Rights ethics was largely formulated by John Locke (1632–1704), whose state- ment that humans have the right to life, liberty, and property was paraphrased in the Declaration of Independence of the soon-to-be United States of America in 1776. Rights ethics holds that people have fundamental rights that other people have a duty to respect.

Duty ethics and rights ethics are really just two different sides of the same coin.

Both of these theories achieve the same end: Individual persons must be respected, and actions are ethical that maintain this respect for the individual. In duty ethics, people have duties, an important one of which is to protect the rights of others.

And in rights ethics, people have fundamental rights that others have duties to protect.

As with utilitarianism, there are problems with the duty and rights ethics theo- ries that must be considered. First the basic rights of one person (or group) may confl ict with the basic rights of another group. How do we decide whose rights have Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 43 priority? Using our previous example of the building of a dam, people have the right to use their property. If their land happens to be in the way of a proposed dam, then rights ethics would hold that this property right is paramount and is suf- fi cient to stop the dam project. A single property holder’s objection would require that the project be terminated. However, there is a need for others living in nearby communities to have a reliable water supply and to be safe from continual fl ooding. Whose rights are paramount here? Rights and duty ethics don’t resolve this confl ict very well; hence, the utilitarian approach of trying to determine the most good is more useful in this case. The second problem with duty and rights ethics is that these theories don’t always account for the overall good of society very well. Since the emphasis is on the individual, the good of a single individual can be paramount compared to what is Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher whose work included early formulations of duty ethics. Courtesy of the Library of Congress. 44 3.3 Ethical Theories good for society as a whole. The WIPP case discussed before illustrates this problem.

Certainly, people who live along the route where the radioactive wastes will be trans- ported have the right to live without fear of harm due to accidental spills of hazardous waste. But the nation as a whole will benefi t from the safe disposal of these wastes.

Rights ethics would come down clearly on the side of the individuals living along the route despite the overall advantage to society.

Already it is clear why we will be considering more than one ethical theory in our discussion of engineering cases. The theories already presented clearly repre- sent different ways of looking at ethical problems and can frequently arrive at differ- ent solutions. Thus, any complete analysis of an ethical problem must incorporate multiple theories if valid conclusions are to be drawn. 3.3.5 Virtue Ethics Another important ethical theory that we will consider is virtue ethics. Fundamentally, virtue ethics is interested in determining what kind of people we should be. Virtue is often defi ned as moral distinction and goodness. A virtuous person exhibits good and benefi cial qualities. In virtue ethics, actions are considered right if they support good character traits (virtues) and wrong if they support bad character traits (vices) [ Schinzinger and Martin, 2000 ]. Virtue ethics focuses on words such as responsibil- ity, honesty, competence, and loyalty, which are virtues. Other virtues might include trustworthiness, fairness, caring, citizenship, and respect. Vices could include dis- honesty, disloyalty, irresponsibility, or incompetence. As you can see, virtue ethics is closely tied to personal character. We do good things because we are virtuous people and seek to enhance these character traits in ourselves and in others.

In many ways, this theory may seem to be mostly personal ethics and not par- ticularly applicable to engineering or professional ethics. However, personal moral- ity cannot, or at any rate should not, be separated from professional morality. If a behavior is virtuous in the individual’s personal life, the behavior is virtuous in his or her professional life as well.

How can virtue ethics be applied to business and engineering situations? This type of ethical theory is somewhat trickier to apply to the types of problems that we will consider, perhaps because virtue ethics seems less concrete and less susceptible to rigorous analysis and because it is harder to describe nonhuman entities such as a corporation or government in terms of virtue. However, we can use virtue ethics in our engineering career by answering questions such as: Is this action honest? Will this action demonstrate loyalty to my community and/or my employer? Have I acted in a responsible fashion? Often, the answer to these questions makes the proper course of action obvious. To use virtue ethics in an analysis of an ethical problem, you should fi rst identify the virtues or vices that are applicable to the situation.

Then, determine what course of action each of these suggests.

As with any ethical theory, it is important to be careful in applying virtue ethics.

Problems can arise with words that on the face seem to be virtues, but can actually lead to vices. For example, the concept of “honor” has been around for centuries and is often viewed positively. One sense of the word “honor” is a code of dignity, integrity, and pride. Honor may seem like a very positive thing, especially the aspects related to integrity. But the aspects related to pride can often have negative conse- quences. There are numerous examples in history of wars that have been fought and atrocities committed in order to preserve the honor of an individual or a nation. Individuals have often committed crimes as a way of preserving their honor.

In using virtue ethics, it is important to ensure that the traits you identify as virtues are indeed virtuous and will not lead to negative consequences. Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 45 3.3.6 Personal vs. Corporate Morality This is an appropriate place to discuss a tricky issue in engineering ethics: Is there a distinction between the ethics practiced by an individual and the ethics practiced by a corporation? Put another way, can a corporation be a moral agent as an individual can? This is a question that is central to many discussions of business and engineer- ing ethics. If a corporation has no moral agency, then it cannot be held accountable for its actions, although sometimes individuals within a company can be held accountable. The law is not always clear on the answer to this question and can’t be relied upon to resolve the issue.

This dilemma comes most sharply into focus in a discussion of virtue ethics.

Can a company truly be expected to display honesty or loyalty? These are strictly human traits and cannot be ascribed to a corporation. In the strictest defi nition of moral agency, a company cannot be a moral agent, and yet companies have many dealings with individuals or groups of people.

How, then, do we resolve this problem? In their capacity to deal with individuals, corporations should be considered pseudo-moral agents and should be held account- able in the same way that individuals are, even if the ability to do this within the legal system is limited. In other words, with regard to an ethical problem, responsibility for corporate wrongdoing shouldn’t be hidden behind a corporate mask. Just because it isn’t really a moral agent like a person doesn’t mean that a corporation can do what- ever it pleases. Instead, in its interactions with individuals or communities, a corpora- tion must respect the rights of individuals and should exhibit the same virtues that we expect of individuals.

Some insight into how the legal system views the moral status of corporations came in the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , handed down in 2010. This case was in response to a federal law that limited the ability of corporations to contribute money to the campaigns of political candi- dates. The Supreme Court held that corporations have a free-speech right to con- tribute to political campaigns just like individual citizens do, and that this right was being infringed upon by the federal law. Basically, the court said that corporations are like individuals and have some of the same rights. 3.3.7 Which Theor y to Use?

Now that we have discussed four different ethical theories, the question arises: How do we decide which theory is applicable to a given problem? The good news is that in solving ethical problems, we don’t have to choose from among these theories.

Rather, we can use all of them to analyze a problem from different angles and see what result each of the theories gives us. This allows us to examine a problem from different perspectives to see what conclusion each one reaches. Frequently, the result will be the same even though the theories are very different.

Take, for example, a chemical plant near a small city that discharges a hazardous waste into the groundwater. If the city takes its water from wells, the water supply for the city will be compromised and signifi cant health problems for the community may result. Rights ethics indicates that this pollution is unethical, since it causes harm to many of the residents. A utilitarian analysis would probably also come to the same conclusion, since the economic benefi ts of the plant would almost certainly be outweighed by the negative effects of the pollution and the costs required to ensure a safe municipal water supply. Virtue ethics would say that discharging wastes into groundwater is irresponsible and harmful to individuals and so shouldn’t be done.

In this case, all of the ethical theories lead to the same conclusion. 46 3.4 Non-Western Ethical Thinking What happens when the different theories seem to give different answers? This scenario can be illustrated by the discussion of WIPP presented previously. Rights ethics indicated that transporting wastes through communities is not a good idea, whereas utilitarianism concluded that WIPP would be benefi cial to society as a whole. This is a trickier situation, and the answers given by each of the theories must be examined in detail, compared with each other, and carefully weighed.

Generally, rights and duty ethics should take precedence over utilitarian considera- tions. This is because the rights of individuals should receive relatively stronger weight than the needs of society as a whole. For example, an action that led to the death of even one person is generally viewed very negatively, regardless of the over- all benefi t to society. After thorough analysis using all of the theories, a balanced judgment can be formed. 3.4 NON-WESTERN ETHICAL THINKING It is tempting to think that the ethical theories that have been described here are applicable only in business relations within cultures that share our Western ethical traditions: Europe and the Americas. Since the rest of the world has different foun- dations for its ethical systems, it might seem that what we learn here won’t be appli- cable in our business dealings in, for example, Japan, India, Africa, or Saudi Arabia.

However, this thinking is incorrect. Ethics is not geographic or cultural. Indeed, ethical thinking and standards have developed similarly around the world and is not dependent on a Western cultural or religious tradition. Since the engineering workforce in the United States is international, and since engineering itself is a global profession with engineers from differing cultural backgrounds working together all over the world, it is important that we understand the origins of ethical thinking from places outside the Western world.

A detailed understanding of ethical thinking from cultures around the world is well beyond the scope (or page limit!) of a book such as this. So we will look at the ethical thinking in a few representative cultural/religious traditions—Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and Buddhist—and will attempt to see how these ethical principles infl uence the ethics of engineering practice in these cultures. In trying to do this in a few para- graphs, we will of necessity oversimplify ethical traditions that have developed over centuries, and which are not monolithic, but rather have evolved rich and varied inter- pretations and meanings over the centuries as they have matured, and expanded into new cultural groups. Despite the diversity of origins of ethical philosophy, we will see that the ethical concepts governing engineering practice are similar regardless of where engineers practice.

For example, ethical principles in Arab countries are grounded in the tradi- tions of their religion, Islam. Islam is one of the three major monotheistic religions, along with Christianity and Judaism. It is surprising to many Westerners that Islam, which developed in the Middle East just as Judaism and Christianity did, shares many prophets and religious concepts with the other two monotheistic religions.

The foundations of ethical principles relating to engineering and business in Islamic countries are thus very similar to those in Western countries. Although cul- tural practices may vary when dealing with the many Islamic nations that stretch from Africa and the Middle East to Southeast Asia, the same ethical principles that apply in Western countries are applicable.

Similarly, ethical principles of Hindus, Buddhists, and practitioners of all the world’s major religions are similar. Although the ethical principles in other cultures may be derived in different ways, the results are generally the same regardless of culture. Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 47 Personal ethics are not determined by geography. Personal and business behav- ior should be the same regardless of where you happen to be on a given day. For example, few would fi nd the expression “When in Rome, do as the Romans do” applicable to personal morality. If you believe that being deceptive is wrong, cer- tainly it is no less wrong when you are dealing with a (hypothetical) culture where this behavior is not considered to be bad. Thus, the ethics that we discuss in this book will be applicable regardless of where you are doing business. 3.4.1 Chinese Ethical Traditions Chinese ethical philosophy originates with the writings of Kongzi, more commonly known in the West by his Latinized name, Confucius, who lived from 551 to 479 BCE in what is now the southern portion of Shandong province in China. Confucius’ writ- ten works refl ect a practical rather than a theoretical approach to moral problems, unlike Western philosophy after Plato that emphasizes more theoretical thinking.

This way of thinking is often called “pre-theoretical.” Confucian ethics emphasizes the role of ideal character traits. As such, it has much in common with the Western concept of virtue ethics.

Confucian ethics emphasizes the importance of balancing individual rights with the needs of the larger community, often expressed through a sense of mutual respect. In trying to balance individual and group rights, Confucianism emphasizes the fact that this is not an either/or proposition: either individual rights are para- mount or the rights of society as a whole are paramount. Rather Confucianism emphasizes the interdependence of the group and the individual. In other words, the individual depends on the group and so must take group concerns into account, but also the group must recognize its dependence on individuals and must respect individual rights. In acknowledging this interdependence, Confucianism mirrors the tension inherent in trying to balance the Western concepts of utilitarianism and rights or duty ethics [ Wong, 2008 ].

How might Confucian ethics inform our decision making as engineers? First, its emphasis on virtues and the importance of leading a virtuous life speaks very directly to the engineering profession especially in terms of integrity, honesty, and other core values of engineers. It also speaks toward ensuring that we do not harm others by our actions. In its sense of the interdependence of individual and group rights, Confucianism speaks to the need for engineers to balance respect for individuals with the needs of society in making design decisions. 3.4.2 Indian Ethics The philosophical traditions of the Indian subcontinent are the oldest surviving written philosophical systems in human civilization. Discussing Indian philosophy and Indian ethics are made very diffi cult by the diversity and richness of the various cultures that make up the modern nation of India, each with its own literature and philosophical background. Indian philosophical and ethical thinking have their origins in the ancient texts known as the Vedas, further developed through the Upanishads, Jainism, Buddhism, and also expressed in the Bhagavad-Gita. These ancient traditions continue to inform current philosophical thinking in India, though more contemporary thinkers such as Tagore, Gandhi, and Nehru have adapted these traditions to the modern world [ Sharma and Daugert, 1965 ].

Indian philosophy and ethics, like many other non-Western philosophies, focuses less on the theoretical and intellectual aspects of philosophy, and more on the practical and the spiritual. “Indian ethics, instead of analyzing the nature of good, lays down practical means of attaining a life of perfection . . .” [ Sharma and 48 3.4 Non-Western Ethical Thinking Daugert, 1965 ]. This practical orientation speaks directly to our interest in ethics; nothing could be more practical than the ethical concerns about human social behavior. In a very general way, like Chinese ethics, Indian ethical philosophy has much in common with virtue ethics discussed in Western ethical traditions. For example, “the Bhagavad-Gita mentions the virtues of non-violence, truth, freedom from anger, renunciation, tranquility, aversion to fault-fi nding, compassion to living beings, freedom from greed, gentleness, modesty, steadfastness, forgiveness, purity, freedom from malice; and excessive pride, anger, harshness, and ignorance” [ Sharma and Daugert, 1965 ]. These virtues are similar to those discussed by Western philosophers, and in the same way can be thought of as leading to good or bad character traits.

How do Indian philosophical and ethical traditions speak to modern engineer- ing practice? The emphasis on the practical everyday nature of philosophy directly speaks to modern engineers and engineering practice. In addition, the emphasis on reinforcing virtues and avoiding vices directly mirrors the language used in modern engineering codes of ethics. Indeed, codes of ethics of engineering professional societies in India are basically the same as those in Western countries. Of course, this is partly due to the international nature of the engineering profession, but certainly also refl ects ancient Indian ethical thinking applied to the modern world. An exam- ple of a code of ethics from an Indian engineering society is shown in Appendix I. 3.4.3 Muslim Ethics The early Muslim philosophers who formulated the foundations of Muslim ethical thinking were infl uenced by the early Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, whose works had been translated into Arabic and were available throughout what is now known as the Middle East. So Muslim ethics can be considered a cousin to many Western ethical traditions.

Broadly speaking, Muslim ethics have much in common with what Western phi- losophers refer to as virtue ethics. For Muslim philosophers, ethics is derived from principles set forth in the Qur’an. Specifi c virtues mentioned in the Qur’an are humility, honesty, giving to the poor, kindness, and trustworthiness. Very clearly honesty and trustworthiness are important virtues for those practicing a profession such as engineering, and indeed are articulated in the codes of ethics of the engi- neering societies in the United States. It’s also not much of a stretch to see how humility and kindness can be applied to professional practice. The Qur’an also mentions vices such as boasting, blasphemy, and slander [ Donaldson, 1963 ]. While blasphemy is only applicable in a religious context, the other two vices do speak to engineering professional practice. For example, the engineering codes of ethics discuss making accurate and realistic claims based on available data and prohibit engineers from making false claims about other engineers.

Thus, it seems that although some of the roots of ethical thinking common in the Islamic world are different from those in the Western world, the way Islamic eth- ics impacts engineering professional practice is the same as that of Western ethics.

Indeed, the codes of ethics of professional engineering societies in the Middle East are similar and frequently overlap those from the United States, as can be seen in Appendix A. 3.4.4 Buddhist Ethics Buddhism had its origins between the 6th and 4th centuries BCE in India and is based on the teachings of Siddhartha Guatama also known as Buddha. Buddhist Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 49 teachings come down to us through various ancient religious and philosophical writings in Sanskrit, and through subsequent interpretations and thought regard- ing these ancient works. Buddhism was very infl uential outside of India and is the dominant religious tradition in nations of the Far East such as Japan, China, Tibet, Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. In India, Buddhism is less widely practiced today than are other religious traditions such as Hinduism.

Like other formulations of ethical thinking in non-Western societies, Buddhist ethics can appear to be similar to the Western concept of virtue ethics. Buddhist’s speak of fi ve major vices: destruction of life, taking what is not given, licentiousness, lying, and taking intoxicants. Buddhism also speaks of virtues such as friendship, spir- itual development, learning, mastery of skills, fi lial piety, generosity, diligence, patience, and a sense of proportion or limits [ref to Dharmasiri book]. Buddhist teachings also emphasize the basic equality of mankind, and the interdependence of people on each other as well as our dependence on nature. Clearly, these virtues and vices have much in common with the virtue ethics systems developed by Western thinkers [ Dharmasiri, 1989 ].

Equally clear is how many of these virtues and vices speak to our roles in the engineering profession. For example, the desire to avoid destruction of life tells us that the safety of those who will use products and structures based on our engineer- ing work is important and closely parallels the statements in codes of ethics that tell us to keep paramount the health and safety of the public. Likewise, the Buddhist teachings against the vices of theft and lying have parallels in the codes of ethics relating to honesty and integrity. We should also examine the role that the Buddhist virtues of learning, mastery of skills, and diligence have in relation to engineering practice. The engineering codes of ethics often discuss the importance of continu- ous development of an engineer’s skills, and supporting others in developing their skills. It is interesting to note that many of those involved in the origins of the envi- ronmental movement beginning in the 1970s based their ideas on the Buddhist principals of the sense of limits and human’s basic interdependence with nature.

Thus, the ideas regarding protecting the environment and sustainable develop- ment that appear in the most recent versions of the codes of ethics of professional engineering societies are similar to ideas found in Buddhist teachings. As with other non-Western professional engineering societies, those based in predominantly Buddhist countries are very similar to those of Western countries as can be seen in the codes of ethics reproduced in Appendix A. 3.4.5 Engineering Codes of Ethics in non-Western Countries Although ethical thinking throughout the world has originated in various ways and has diverse language and terminology, the results are similar across cultures.

How then are the ethical principles of differing cultures expressed when applied to professional ethics in general, and codes of ethics specifi cally? It seems that the concept of a formal code of ethics is a Western creation designed to serve the needs of professional communities. However, engineers around the world have recognized the value of codes of ethics in expressing shared values and ideas on engineering practice. Indeed, many of the codes of ethics for engineering pro- fessional practice borrow heavily and sometimes even use the exact wording of the codes of ethics of the U.S. engineering societies. In addition, some of the engineering societies, such as the IEEE, already have an international reach and their code of ethics is widely recognized and adhered to by electrical engineers worldwide. 50 3.4 Non-Western Ethical Thinking APPLICATION CASES The Disaster at Bhopal On the night of December 2, 1984, a leak developed in a storage tank at a Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India. The tank contained 10,000 gallons of MIC, a highly toxic chemical used in the manufacture of pesticides, such as Sevin.

The leak sent a toxic cloud of gas over the surrounding slums of Bhopal, resulting in the death of over 2,000 people, and injuries to over 200,000 more.

The leak was attributed to the accidental pouring of water into the tank. Water reacts very vigorously with MIC, causing heating of the liquid. In Bhopal, the mix- ing of water with MIC increased the temperature of the liquid in the tank to an estimated 400°F. The high temperature caused the MIC to vaporize, leading to a build-up of high pressure within the tank. When the internal pressure became high enough, a pressure-relief valve popped open, leaking MIC vapors into the air.

The water had probably been introduced into the tank accidentally. A utility station on the site contained two pipes side by side. One pipe carried nitrogen, which was used to pressurize the tank to allow the liquid MIC to be removed. The other pipe contained water. It appears that instead of connecting the nitrogen pipe, someone accidentally connected the water pipe to the MIC tank. The accident was precipitated when an estimated 240 gallons of water were injected into the MIC storage tank.

As with many of the disasters and accidents that we study in this book, there was not just one event that led to the disaster, but rather there were several factors that contributed to this accident. Any one of these factors alone probably wouldn’t have led to the accident, but the combination of these factors made the accident almost inevitable and the consequences worse. A major factor in this accident was the cur- tailment of plant maintenance as part of a cost-cutting effort. The MIC storage tank had a refrigeration unit on it, which should have helped to keep the tank tempera- tures closer to normal, even with the water added, and might have prevented the vaporization of the liquid. However, this refrigeration unit had stopped working fi ve months before the accident and hadn’t yet been repaired.

The tank also was equipped with an alarm that should have alerted plant work- ers to the dangerous temperatures; this alarm was improperly set, so no warning was given. The plant was equipped with a fl are tower. This is a device designed to burn vapors before they enter the atmosphere, and it would have been able to at least reduce, if not eliminate, the amount of MIC reaching the surrounding neighbor- hood. The fl are tower was not functioning at the time of the accident. Finally, a scrubber that was used to neutralize toxic vapors was not activated until the vapor release was already in progress. Some investigators pointed out that the scrubber and fl are systems were probably inadequate, even had they been functioning.

However, had any of these systems been functioning at the time of the accident, the disaster could have at least been mitigated, if not completely averted. The fact that none of them were operating at the time ensured that once the water had been mistakenly added to the MIC tank, the ensuing reaction would proceed undetected until it was too late to prevent the accident.

It is unclear on whom the ultimate blame for this accident should be laid. The plant designers clearly did their job by anticipating problems that would occur and installing safety systems to prevent or mitigate potential accidents. The manage- ment of the plant seems obviously negligent. It is sometimes necessary for some safety features to be taken off-line for repair or maintenance. But to have all of the safety systems inoperative simultaneously is inexcusable. Union Carbide also seems Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 51 negligent in not preparing a plan for notifying and evacuating the surrounding population in the event of an accident. Such plans are standard in the United States and are often required by local ordinance.

Union Carbide was unable to say that such an accident was unforeseeable.

Leaky valves in the MIC system had been a problem at the Bhopal plant on at least six occasions before the accident. One of these gas leaks involved a fatality.

Moreover, Union Carbide had a plant in Institute, West Virginia, that also produced MIC. The experience in West Virginia was similar to that in Bhopal before the acci- dent. There had been a total of 28 leaks of MIC over the previous fi ve years, none leading to any serious problems. An internal Union Carbide memo from three months before the Bhopal accident warned of the potential for a runaway reaction in MIC storage tanks in West Virginia and called into question the adequacy of emergency plans at the plants. The memo concluded that “a real potential for a serious incident exists” [ US News and World Report , Feb. 4, 1985, p. 12]. Apparently, these warnings had not been transmitted to the plant in India.

Ultimately, some share of the blame must be borne by the Indian government.

Unlike in most Western nations, there was very little in the way of safety standards under which U.S. corporations must operate. In fact, third-world countries have often viewed pollution control and safety regulation as too expensive, and attempts by the industrialized nations to enforce Western-style safety and environmental regulations worldwide are regarded as attempts to keep the economies of develop- ing countries backward [ Atlantic Monthly , March 1987, p. 30]. In addition, the local government had no policy or zoning forbidding squatters and others from living so close to a plant where hazardous compounds are stored and used. The bulk of the blame goes to Union Carbide for failure to adequately train and supervise its Indian employees in the maintenance and safety procedures that are taken for granted in similar plants in the United States.

In the aftermath of the accident, lawsuits totaling over $250 billion were fi led on behalf of the victims of the accident. Union Carbide committed itself to ensur- ing that the victims of the accident were compensated in a timely fashion. Union Carbide also helped set up job training and relocation programs for the victims of the accident. Ultimately, it has been estimated that approximately 10,000 of those injured in the accident will suffer some form of permanent damage [ Atlantic Monthly , March 1987, p. 30]. The Aberdeen Three The Aberdeen Three is one of the classic cases often used in engineering ethics classes and texts to illustrate the importance of environmental protection and the safety of workers exposed to hazardous and toxic chemicals. The Aberdeen Proving Ground is a U.S. Army weapons development and test center located on a military base in Maryland with no access by civilian nonemployees. Since World War II, Aberdeen has been used to develop and test chemical weapons. Aberdeen has also been used for the storage and disposal of some of these chemicals.

This case involves three civilian managers at the Pilot Plant at the Proving Grounds: Carl Gepp, manager of the Pilot Plant; William Dee, who headed the chemical weapons development team; and Robert Lentz, who was in charge of developing manufacturing processes for the chemical weapons [ Weisskopf, 1989 ].

Between 1983 and 1986, inspections at the Pilot Plant indicated that there were seri- ous safety hazards. These hazards included carcinogenic and fl ammable substances left in open containers, chemicals that can become lethal when mixed together being stored in the same room, barrels of toxic chemicals that were leaking, and 52 3.4 Non-Western Ethical Thinking unlabeled containers of chemicals. There was also an external tank used to store sulfuric acid that had leaked 200 gallons of acid into a local river. This incident trig- gered state and federal safety investigations that revealed inadequate chemical retaining dikes and a system for containing and treating chemical hazards that was corroded and leaking.

In June of 1988, the three engineer/managers were indicted for violation of RCRA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. RCRA had been passed by Congress in 1976 and was intended to provide incentives for the recovery of impor- tant resources from wastes, the conservation of resources, and the control of the disposal of hazardous wastes. RCRA banned the dumping of solid hazardous wastes and included criminal penalties for violations of hazardous-waste disposal guide- lines. The three managers claimed that they were not aware that the plant’s storage practices were illegal and that they did things according to accepted practices at the Pilot Plant. Interestingly, since this was a criminal prosecution, the Army could not help defray the costs of the manager’s defense, and each of them incurred great costs defending themselves.

In 1989, the three engineer/managers were tried and convicted of illegally stor- ing, treating, and disposing of hazardous wastes. There was no indication that these three were the ones who actually handled chemicals in an unsafe manner, but as managers of the plant, the three were ultimately responsible for how the chemicals were stored and for the maintenance of the safety equipment. The potential pen- alty for these crimes was up to 15 years in prison and a fi ne of up to $750,000. Gepp, Dee, and Lentz were each found guilty and sentenced to three years’ probation and 1,000 hours of community service. The relative leniency of the sentences was based partly on the large court costs each had already incurred. PROFESSIONAL SUCCESS TEAMWORK Ethical issues can arise when working on projects in groups or teams. Many of your engineering classes are designed so that labs or projects are performed in groups. Successful performance in a group setting is a skill that is best learned early in your academic career since most projects in industry involve working as part of a team.

In order for a project to be completed successfully, cooperation among team members is essential. Problems can arise when a team member doesn’t do a good job on his part of the project, doesn’t make a contribution at all, or doesn’t complete his assignments on time. There can also be a problem when one team member tries to do everything. This shuts out teammates who want to contribute and learn. An analogy can be made here to team sports: clearly one individual on the team who is not performing his role can lead to a loss for the entire team. Equally true, individuals who try to do it all—“ballhogs”— can harm the team. Ethical teamwork includes performing the part of the work that you are assigned, keeping to schedules, sharing information with other team members, and helping to foster a cooperative and supportive team atmosphere so everyone can contribute. Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 53 Cost–benefi t analysis Duty ethics Rights ethics Utilitarianism Virtue ethics KEY TERMS REFERENCES Charles E. Harris , Jr., Michael S. Pritchard , and Michael J. Rabins , Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases , Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, CA, 2000.

Roland Schinzinger and Mike W. Martin, Introduction to Engineering Ethics , McGraw-Hill, New York, 2000.

Non-Western Ethical Traditions Wong, David, “Chinese Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition) , Edward N. Zalta (ed.); available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-chinese/ .

Gunapala Dharmasiri, Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics, Golden Leaves, Antioch, CA, 1989.

Dwight Donaldson, Studies in Muslim Ethics, S.P.C.K., London, 1963.

I.C. Sharma and Stanley Daugert, Ethical Philosophies of India, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1965. Bhopal Philip Elmer-DeWitt, “What Happened at Bhopal?” Time, April 1, 1985, p. 71.

“Bhopal Disaster—New Clues Emerge,” US News and World Report, February 4, 1985, p. 12.

Peter Stoler, “Frightening Findings at Bhopal,” Time, February 18, 1985, p. 78.

Fergus M. Bordewich, “The Lessons of Bhopal,” Atlantic Monthly, March 1987, p. 30. Aberdeen Three Steven Weisskopf, “The Aberdeen Mess,” The Washington Post, January 15, 1989, p. 55. 3.1 Find information on the space shuttle Challenger accident in 1986 and analyze it, using the ethical theories developed in this chapter. What does utilitarian- ism tell us about this case? In your analysis, be sure to include issues regarding benefi ts to the United States and mankind that might result from the space shuttle program. You might also include benefi ts to Morton Thiokol and the communities where it operates if the program is successful. 3.2 What do duty and rights ethics tell us about the Challenger case? How do your answers to this question and to the previous question infl uence your ideas on whether the Challenger should have been launched? 3.3 Use contemporary newspaper accounts to fi nd information on problems with Intel’s Pentium computer chip (1995) and with runway concrete at the Denver PROBLEMS 54 Problems International Airport (1994). Analyze these cases, using virtue ethics. Start by deciding what virtues are important for people in these businesses (e.g., honesty, fairness, etc.). Then see if these virtues were exhibited by the engineers work- ing for these companies. NON-WESTERN ETHICAL TRADITIONS 3.4 Develop a list of values that you think are important to being a successful engi- neer. This list will probably include things such as engineering knowledge and technical skills that are not ethical in nature. For the values that are ethical, think about where these values come from and how you came to hold them. 3.5 Discuss with a fellow student or faculty member who grew up in a different culture what their ethical values are and how those values are transmitted and discussed in their country. Develop a list of values that are common between your culture and their culture. BHOPAL 3.6 Use the ethical theories discussed in this chapter to analyze the Bhopal case.

Topics to be considered should include the placing of a hazardous plant in a populated area, decisions to defer maintenance on essential safety systems, etc. Important theories to consider when doing your analysis are rights and duty ethics and utilitarianism. 3.7 Find a copy of the code of ethics of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers and use it to analyze what a process engineer working at this plant should have done. What does the code say about the responsibilities of the engineers who designed the plant and the engineers responsible for making maintenance decisions? 3.8 What responsibility does Union Carbide have for the actions of its subsidiaries?

Union Carbide India was 50.9% owned by the parent company. 3.9 What duty did Union Carbide have to inform local offi cials in India of the potential dangers of manufacturing and storing MIC in India? 3.10 Some of Union Carbide’s reports hinted strongly that part of the fault lay with the inadequate workforce available in a third-world country such as India.

How valid is this statement? What are the ethical implications for Union Carbide if this statement is true? 3.11 What responsibility should the national and local government in Bhopal have for ensuring that the plant is operated safely? 3.12 What relative importance should be placed on keeping safety systems operat- ing as compared to maintaining other operations? (Note: From the reports on this accident, there is no indication that Union Carbide skimped on safety to keep production going. Rather, this is a hypothetical question.) 3.13 In the absence of environmental or safety laws in the locality where it oper- ates, what responsibility does a U.S. corporation have when operating over- seas? Does the answer change if the locality does have laws, but they are less strict than ours? What about the ethics of a U.S. corporation selling products overseas that are banned in the United States, such as DDT? THE ABERDEEN THREE 3.14 What does utilitarianism tell us about the behavior of the Aberdeen Three?

What do duty and rights ethics tell us? In analyzing this, start by determining Chapter 3 Understanding Ethical Problems 55 who is harmed or potentially harmed by these activities and who benefi ts or potentially benefi ts from them. 3.15 Can the actions of these engineer/managers be classifi ed as engineering deci- sions, management decisions, or both? Ethically, does it matter whether these decisions were engineering or management decisions? 3.16 Do you think that the Aberdeen Three knew about RCRA? If not, should they have? Does it really matter if they knew about RCRA or not? 3.17 Do you think that the Aberdeen Three were knowledgeable about the effects of these chemicals and proper storage methods? Should they have been? 3.18 Were the actions of the Aberdeen Three malicious? 3.19 In the course of this case, it came out that cleaning up the chemical storage at Aberdeen would have been paid for out of separate Army funds and would not have come from the budgets of the three managers. What bearing does this information have on the case? 3.20 What should the Aberdeen Three have done differently? Should the lower level workers at the plant have done anything to solve this problem? 3.21 The bosses of the Aberdeen Three claimed to have no idea about the condi- tions at the  Pilot Plant. Should they have done anything differently? Should they have been prosecuted as well? 3.22 Apply the code of ethics of one of the professional societies to this situation.

Were the managers guilty of ethical violations according to the code? CHAPTER Ethical Problem- Solving Techniques 4 After reading this chapter, you will be able to • Apply ethical problem- solving methods to hypo- thetical and real cases • See how fl ow charting can be used to solve ethical problems • Learn what bribery is and how to avoid it. Objectives I n the early 1990s, newspapers began to report on studies indicating that living near electrical-power distribution systems leads to an increased risk of cancer, especially in children. The risk was attributed to the effects of the weak, low-frequency magnetic fi elds present near such systems. Further reports indicated that there might also be some risk associated with the use of common household items such as electric blankets and clock radios. Predictably, there was much concern among the public about this problem, and many studies were performed to verify these results. Power companies began to look into methods for reducing the fi elds, and many engineers sought ways to design products that emitted reduced amounts of this radiation. In designing products and processes, engineers frequently encounter scenarios like the one just described. Nearly everything an engineer designs has some health or safety risk associated with it. Often, as with the case of the weak magnetic fi elds, the exact nature of the hazard is only poorly understood. How then does an engi- neer decide whether it is ethical to work on a particular product or process? What tools are there for an engineer who needs to decide which is the ethically correct path to take? In this chapter, we will develop analysis and problem-solving strategies to help answer these questions. These techniques will allow us to put ethical problems in the proper perspective and will point us in the direction of the correct solution. Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 57 4.1 INTRODUCTION Now that we have discussed codes of ethics and moral theories, we are ready to tackle the problem of how to analyze and resolve ethical dilemmas when they occur. In solving engineering problems, it is always tempting to look for an appropriate for- mula, plug in the numbers, and calculate an answer. This type of problem-solving approach, while sometimes useful for engineering analysis problems, is less useful for ethical problem solving. There are theories that help us to frame our under- standing of the problem, but there are no formulas and no easy “plug-and-chug” methods for reaching a solution.

In this chapter, we will examine methods for analyzing ethical problems and see how to apply them. Obviously, some problems are easily solved. If you are tempted to embezzle money from your employer, it is clear that this action is steal- ing and is not morally acceptable. However, as mentioned previously, many of the situations encountered by practicing engineers are ambiguous or unclear, involving confl icting moral principles. This is the type of problem for which we will most need analysis and problem-solving methods. 4.2 ANALYSIS OF ISSUES IN ETHICAL PROBLEMS A fi rst step in solving any ethical problem is to completely understand all of the issues involved. Once these issues are determined, frequently a solution to the prob- lem becomes apparent. The issues involved in understanding ethical problems can be split into three categories: factual, conceptual, and moral [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ]. Understanding these issues helps to put an ethical problem in the proper framework and often helps point the way to a solution.

4.2.1 Types of Issues in Ethical Problem Solving Let’s begin by examining in depth each of the types of issues involved in ethical problems. Factual issues involve what is actually known about a case—i.e., what the facts are. Although this concept seems straightforward, the facts of a particular case are not always clear and may be controversial. An example of facts that are not nec- essarily clear can be found in the controversy in contemporary society regarding abortion rights. There is great disagreement over the point at which life begins and at which point a fetus can be legally protected. Roe v. Wade, the original Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion in the United States, was decided by the Supreme Court in a split decision. Even the justices of the Supreme Court were unable to agree on this “fact.” In engineering, there are controversies over facts as well. For example, global warming is of great concern to society as we continue to emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, trap heat in the atmos- phere. This is thought by climate scientists to lead to a generalized warming of the atmosphere as emissions from automobiles and industrial plants increase the car- bon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. This issue is of great importance to engineers since they might be required to design new products or redesign old ones to comply with stricter environmental standards if this warming effect indeed proves to be a problem. However, the global warming process is not fully under- stood, and the need to curtail emission of these gases is a controversial topic. If it were known exactly what the effects of emitting greenhouse gases into the atmos- phere would be, the engineer’s role and responsibility in reducing this problem would be clearer. 58 4.2 Analysis of Issues in Ethical Problems Conceptual issues have to do with the meaning or applicability of an idea. In engineering ethics, this might mean defi ning what constitutes a bribe as opposed to an acceptable gift, or determining whether certain business information is propri- etary. In the case of the bribe, the value of the gift is probably a well-known fact.

What isn’t known is whether accepting it will lead to unfair infl uence on a business decision. For example, conceptually it must be determined if the gift of tickets to a sporting event by a potential supplier of parts for your project is meant to infl uence your decision or is just a nice gesture between friends. Of course, like factual issues, conceptual issues are not always clear-cut and will often result in controversy as well.

Once the factual and conceptual issues have been resolved, at least to the extent possible, all that remains is to determine which moral principle is applicable to the situation. Resolution of moral issues is often more obvious. Once the problem is defi ned, it is usually clear which moral concept applies, and the correct decision becomes obvious. In our example of a “gift” offered by a sales representative, once it is determined whether it is simply a gift or is really a bribe, then the appropriate action is obvious. If we determine that it is indeed a bribe, then it cannot ethically be accepted.

Given that the issues surrounding an ethical problem can be controversial, how can these controversies be resolved? Factual issues can often be resolved through research to establish the truth. It is not always possible to achieve a fi nal determina- tion of the “truth” that everyone can agree on, but generally, further research helps clarify the situation, can increase the areas of agreement, and can sometimes achieve consensus on the facts. Conceptual issues are resolved by agreeing on the  meaning and applicability of terms and concepts. Sometimes agreement isn’t possible, but as with factual issues, further analysis of the concepts at least clarifi es some of the issues and helps to facilitate agreement. Finally, moral issues are resolved by agreement as to which moral principles are pertinent and how they should be applied.

Often, all that is required to solve a particular ethical problem is a deeper anal- ysis of the issues involved according to the appropriate principles. Once the issues are analyzed and agreement is reached on the applicable moral principles, it is clear what the resolution should be. 4.2.2 Application to a Case Study: Paradyne Computers To illustrate the use of this problem-solving method, let’s analyze a case study. In 1980, Paradyne, a computer company, bid to supply the Social Security Administration (SSA) with new computer systems. We’ll look at the factual issues fi rst. The request for proposals clearly specifi ed that only existing systems would be considered. Paradyne did not have any such system running and had never tested the operating system on the product they actually proposed to sell to the SSA. The employment of a former SSA worker by Paradyne to help lobby SSA for the contract is also clear. In this case, the factual issues do not appear particularly controversial.

The conceptual issues involve whether bidding to provide an off-the-shelf prod- uct when the actual product is only in the planning stages is lying or is an accepta- ble business practice. Is placing a Paradyne label over the real manufacturer’s label deceptive? Does lobbying your former employer on behalf of your current employer constitute a confl ict of interest? These questions will certainly generate discussion.

Indeed, Paradyne asserted that it had done nothing wrong and was simply engaging in common business practices. The issue of the confl ict of interest is so hard to decide that laws have been enacted making it illegal for workers who have left gov- ernment employ to lobby their former employers for specifi ed periods of time. Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 59 The moral issues then include the following: Is lying an acceptable business prac- tice? Is it alright to be deceptive if doing so allows your company to get a contract?

The answers to these questions are obvious: Lying and deceit are no more acceptable in your business life than in your personal life. So, if conceptually we decide that Paradyne’s practices were deceptive, then our analysis indicates that their actions were unethical. 4.3 LINE DRAWING The line-drawing technique that will be described in this section is especially useful for situations in which the applicable moral principles are clear, but there seems to be a great deal of “gray area” about which ethical principle applies. Line drawing is performed by drawing a line along which various examples and hypothetical situa- tions are placed. At one end is placed the “positive paradigm,” an example of some- thing that is unambiguously morally acceptable. At the other end, the “negative paradigm,” an example of something that is unambiguously not morally acceptable, is placed. In between is placed the problem under consideration, along with other similar examples. Those examples that more closely conform to the positive para- digm are placed near it, and examples closer to the negative paradigm are placed near that paradigm. By carefully examining this continuum and placing the moral problem under consideration in the appropriate place along the line, it is possible to determine whether the problem is more like the positive or negative paradigm and therefore whether it is acceptable or unacceptable.

Let’s illustrate this technique using a hypothetical situation. Our company would like to dispose of a slightly toxic waste by dumping it into a local lake from which a nearby town gets its drinking water. How can we determine if this practice is accept- able? Let’s start by defi ning the problem and the positive and negative paradigms.

Problem: It is proposed that our company dispose of a slightly hazardous waste by dumping it into a lake. A nearby town takes its drinking water supply from this lake. Our research shows that with the amount of waste we plan to put into the lake, the average concentration of the waste in the lake will be 5 parts per million (ppm). The EPA limit for this material has been set at 10 ppm. At the 5-ppm level, we expect no health problems, and consumers would not be able to detect the compound in their drinking water. Positive paradigm: The water supply for the town should be clean and safe. Negative paradigm: Toxic levels of waste are put into the lake. Let’s start by drawing a line and placing the positive and negative paradigms on it: Negative paradigm (NP)Positive paradigm (PP) Dump toxic levels of waste in lakeWater should be clean and safe Figure 4.1 Example of line drawing showing the placement of the negative and positive paradigms. Now let’s establish some other hypothetical examples for consideration:

1. The company dumps the chemical into the lake. At 5 ppm, the chemical will be harmless, but the town’s water will have an unusual taste. 2. The chemical can be effectively removed by the town’s existing water-treatment system. 60 4.3 Line Drawing PP P N 6 5 4 1 7 2,3 Figure 4.2 Same as Figure 4.1 , with the addition of the examples to the line. 3. The chemical can be removed by the town with new equipment that will be purchased by the company. 4. The chemical can be removed by the town with new equipment for which the taxpayer will pay. 5. Occasionally, exposure to the chemical can make people feel ill, but this only lasts for an hour and is rare. 6. At 5 ppm, some people can get fairly sick, but the sickness only lasts a week, and there is no long-term harm. 7. Equipment can be installed at the plant to further reduce the waste level to 1 ppm. Obviously, we could go on for a long time creating more and more test exam- ples. Generally, where your problem fi ts along the line is obvious with only a few examples, but the exercise should be continued with more examples until it is clear what the proper resolution is. Now let’s redraw our line with the examples inserted appropriately: PP P N 65 417 P 2,3 Figure 4.3 Final version of the line-drawing example, with the problem under consideration added. After setting up the examples, it may be clear that there is a gap in the knowl- edge. For example, in our case, we might need more information on seasonal vari- ations in waste concentration and water usage of the town. We also could use information on potential interactions of the chemical with other pollutants, such as the runoff of pesticides from local farms. Note that there is some subjectivity in determining exactly where along the line each of the examples fi ts.

Now let’s complete the exercise by denoting our problem by a “P” and inserting it at the appropriate place along the line. As with the previous examples, placement of the problem along the line is somewhat subjective. As drawn here, it is clear that dumping the toxic waste is probably a morally acceptable choice, since no humans will be harmed and the waste levels will be well below those that could cause any harm. However, since it is somewhat far from the positive paradigm, there are probably better choices that can be made, and the company should investigate these alternatives.

It should be noted that although this action seems ethically acceptable, there are many other considerations that might be factored into the fi nal decision. For example, there are political aspects that should also be considered. Many people in the community are likely to regard the dumping of a toxin at any level as unaccep- table. Good community relations might dictate that another solution should be pursued instead. The company also might want to avoid the lengthy amount of time required to obtain a permit for the dumping and the oversight by various govern- ment agencies. This example illustrates that line drawing can help solve the ethical aspects of a problem, but a choice that appears morally acceptable still might not be Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 61 the best choice when politics and community relations are considered as well. Of course, the immoral choice is never the correct choice.

Although this problem-solving method seems to help with problem analysis and can lead to solutions, there are many pitfalls in its use. If not used properly, line drawing can lead to incorrect results. For example, line drawing can easily be used to prove that something is right when it is actually wrong. Line drawing is only effec- tive if it is used objectively and honestly. The choice of where to put the examples and how to defi ne the paradigms is up to you. You can reach false conclusions by using incorrect paradigms, by dishonest placement of the examples along the line, and by dishonest placement of the problem within the examples. In our example, we might have decided that the problem is somewhat like example 2 and thus placed our problem closer to the positive paradigm, making this solution seem more acceptable. Line drawing can be a very powerful analytic tool in ethical prob- lems, but only if used conscientiously.

There is a long history of the improper use of this technique. In its early days, a precursor to this method was known as “casuistry,” a term that eventually came to be pejorative. In the Middle Ages, casuistry was often used in religious debates to reach false conclusions. Indeed, one of the defi nitions of casuistry from the American Heritage Dictionary implies the use of false and subtle reasoning to achieve incor- rect solutions. Because of this negative connotation, the term “casuistry” is rarely used any more. This emphasizes the hazards of using line drawing: It is useful only if properly applied.

4.3.1 Application of Line Drawing to the Pentium Chip Case In 1994–95, it was discovered and widely reported that the latest version of the Intel Pentium chip had fl aws. At fi rst, Intel sought to hide this information, but later came around to a policy of offering consumers chips in which the fl aw had been corrected. We can use line drawing to get some insight into this problem.

For our positive paradigm, we will use the statement that “products should per- form as advertised.” The negative paradigm will be “Knowingly sell products that are defective and that will negatively affect customers’ applications.” A few examples that we can add to the line are as follows:

1. There is a fl aw in the chip, but it truly is undetectable and won’t affect any cus- tomer’s applications. 2. There are fl aws in the chip, the customer is informed of them, but no help is offered. 3. A warning label says that the chip should not be used for certain applications. 4. Recall notices are sent out, and all fl awed chips are replaced. 5. Replacement chips are offered only if the customer notices the problem. Of course, there are many other possible examples. One view of the line, then, is as follows: Negative paradigm (NP)Positive paradigm (PP) Sell defective productsProducts should be as advertised Figure 4.4 Application of line drawing to the Pentium case.

Negative and positive paradigms are provided along with the examples. 62 4.4 Flow Charting Where does our situation—there is a fl aw, customers aren’t informed, and the magnitude of the problem is minimized—fi t on this line? One possible analysis is the following: According to this line-drawing analysis, the approach taken by Intel in this case wasn’t the best ethical choice. 4.4 FLOW CHARTING Flow charts are very familiar to engineering students. They are most often used in developing computer programs, also fi nd application in other engineering disci- plines and are often used to describe business processes and procedures. In engi- neering ethics, fl ow charting will be helpful for analyzing a variety of cases, especially those in which there is a sequence of events to be considered or a series of conse- quences that fl ows from each decision. An advantage of using a fl ow chart to ana- lyze ethical problems is that it gives a visual picture of a situation and allows you to readily see the consequences that fl ow from each decision.

As with the line-drawing technique described in the previous section, there is no unique fl ow chart that is applicable to a given problem. In fact, different fl ow charts can be used to emphasize different aspects of the same problem. As with line drawing, it will be essential to be as objective as possible and to approach fl ow chart- ing honestly. Otherwise, it will be possible to draw any conclusion you want, even one that is clearly wrong.

We can illustrate this technique by applying a simple fl ow chart to a disaster that happened at Union Carbide’s plant in Bhopal, India, where MIC, a toxic sub- stance, was mixed with water, creating toxic fumes. One possible fl ow chart, illus- trated in Figure 4.6 , deals with the decision-making process that might have gone on at Union Carbide as they decided whether or not to build a plant at Bhopal. This chart emphasizes safety issues for the surrounding community. As indicated on the chart, there were several paths that might have been taken and multiple decisions that had to be made. The fl ow chart helps to visualize the consequences of each decision and indicates both the ethical and unethical choices. Of course, the fl ow chart used for a real ethical problem will be much larger and more complex than this example in order to thoroughly cover the entire problem. Another possible fl ow chart is shown in Figure 4.7 . This chart deals with the decisions required during the maintenance of the fl are tower at the Bhopal plant, an essential safety system. It considers issues of whether the MIC tank was fi lled at the time that the fl are tower was taken off-line for maintenance, whether other safety systems were operating when the fl are tower was taken out of operation, and whether the remaining safety systems were suffi cient to eliminate potential prob- lems. Using such a fl ow chart, it is possible to decide whether the fl are tower can be taken off-line for maintenance or whether it should remain operating. The key to effective use of fl ow charts for solving ethical problems is to be crea- tive in determining possible outcomes and scenarios and also to not be shy about getting a negative answer and deciding to stop the project. P P P N 5 P 2 3 1,4 Sell defective productsProducts should be as advertised Figure 4.5 Final version of the Pentium chip line-drawing example, with the problem added to the line. Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 63 4.5 CONFLICT PROBLEMS An area of ethical problem solving that we will frequently encounter in this book relates to problems that present us with a choice between two confl icting moral values, each of which seems to be correct. How do we make the correct choice in this situation? Union Carbide would like to build plant in Bhopal Are safety laws in India as strict as in U.S.? Are local laws adequate for safe operation? Yes Design plant as in U.S.

Yes YesDesign according to local standards No No No Decide on minimal standards that will ensure local safetyBuild plant anyway and assume risk Is this cost- effective?

Invest elsewhere Build plant Figure 4.6 Application of a simple fl ow chart to the Bhopal case, emphasizing potential decisions made during consideration of locating a plant in India. Maintenance needed on flare tower Is MIC tank filled? Go ahead NoAre other safety systems operating? Ye s Ye s Ye s Will these other systems adequately prevent accidents?Perform maintenance Defer maintenance No No Defer maintenance until other systems are available Figure 4.7 An alternative fl ow chart for the Bhopal case, emphasizing decisions made when considering deactivating the fl are tower for maintenance. 64 4.5 Confl ict Problems Confl ict problems can be solved in three ways [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ]. Often, there are confl icting moral choices, but one is obviously more signifi - cant than the other. For example, protecting the health and safety of the public is more important than your duty to your employer. In this type of case, the resolution of the confl ict involves an easy choice.

A second solution is sometimes called the “creative middle way” [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ]. This solution is an attempt at some kind of a compro- mise that will work for everyone. The emphasis here should be on the word “crea- tive,” because it takes a great deal of creativity to fi nd a middle ground that is acceptable to everyone and a great deal of diplomacy to sell it to everyone. The sales job is especially diffi cult because of the nature of compromise, which is often jokingly defi ned as “the solution where nobody gets what they want.” An example of a creative middle ground would be that rather than dumping a toxic waste into a local lake, one fi nds ways to redesign the production process to minimize the amount of waste products produced, fi nds ways to pretreat the waste to minimize the toxicity, or offers to pay for and install the equipment at the municipal water system necessary to treat the water to remove this chemical before it is sent to homes. Obviously, no one will be completely satisfi ed with these alternatives, since redesigns and pretreatment cost money and take time. Some people will not be satisfi ed with even a minimized dumping of toxics.

Finally, when there is no easy choice and attempts to fi nd a middle ground are not successful, all that is left is to make the hard choice. Sometimes, you have to bite the bullet and make the best choice possible with the information available at the time. Frequently, you must rely on “gut feelings” for which path is the cor- rect one.

Let’s illustrate the resolution-of-confl ict problems by examining the Challenger explosion, focusing on the dilemma faced by the engineering manager, Bob Lund.

The confl ict was clear: There was an unknown probability that the shuttle would explode, perhaps killing all aboard. On the other hand, Lund had a responsibility to his company and the people who worked for him. There were consequences of postponing the launch, potentially leading to the loss of future contracts from NASA, the loss of jobs to many Thiokol workers, and perhaps even bankruptcy of the company. For many, the easy choice here is simply to not launch. The risk to the lives of the astronauts is too great and far outweighs any other considerations. It is impossible to balance jobs against lives. After all, most people who lose their jobs will be able to fi nd other employment. However, not everyone will fi nd this to be such an easy choice; clearly, Lund didn’t fi nd it to be so.

The creative middle ground might involve delaying the launch until later in the day, when the temperature will have warmed up. Of course, this option might not be possible for many reasons associated with the timing of rocket launches and the successful completion of the planned missions. Instead, perhaps, the astro- nauts could be informed of the engineer’s concerns and be allowed to make the choice whether to launch or not. If a risk is informed and a choice is made by those taking the risk, it somewhat relieves the company of the responsibility if an accident occurs.

The hard choice is what Lund made. He chose to risk the launch, perhaps because the data were ambiguous. He might also have wanted to help ensure the future health of the shuttle program and to save the jobs of the Thiokol workers. As we know, his gamble didn’t pay off. The shuttle did explode, causing the deaths of the astronauts and leading to lengthy delays in the shuttle program, political prob- lems for NASA, and business diffi culties for Thiokol. Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 65 4.6 AN APPLICATION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODS:

BRIBERY/ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS One of the many gray areas of engineering ethics is the acceptance of gifts from ven- dors or the offering of gifts to customers to secure business. The diffi culty here comes because of the potential for gifts to become bribes or to be perceived of as bribes.

Frequently, engineers fi nd themselves in the position of either dealing with vendors who wish to sell them products for incorporation into the engineer’s work or acting as vendors themselves and working on sales to other engineers or com panies. In this section, we will look at what bribery is and see how some of the problem-solving tech- niques developed in this chapter can be used to decide when a gift is really a bribe.

Bribery is illegal in the United States and, contrary to popular opinion, is also illegal everywhere in the world. There are some places where bribery may be over- looked, or even expected, but it always takes place “under the table” and is never a legitimate business practice. Moreover, United States federal law forbids American businesses from engaging in bribery overseas, regardless of the local customs or expectations. In many cases, there is a fi ne line between bribery and a simple gift.

Sometimes, the distinction has to do with the value of the gift. Always, it has to do with the intent of the gift. It is important to ensure that no matter how innocent the gift may be, the appearance of impropriety is avoided.

By defi nition, a bribe is something, such as money or a favor, offered or given to someone in a position of trust in order to induce him to act dishonestly. It is some- thing offered or serving to infl uence or persuade. What are the ethical reasons for not tolerating bribery? First, bribery corrupts our free-market economic system and is anticompetitive. Unlike the practice of buying the best product at the best price, brib- ery does not reward the most effi cient producer. One can argue the virtues or vices of the free-market economy, but it is the system under which our economy operates, and anything that subverts this system is unfair and unethical. Second, bribery is a sellout to the rich. Bribery corrupts justice and public policy by allowing rich people to make all the rules. In business, it guarantees that only large, powerful corporations will sur- vive, since they are more capable of providing bribes. A small start-up company doesn’t have the resources to compete in an environment where expensive favors are required to secure business. Finally, bribery treats people as commodities that can be bought and sold. This practice is degrading to us as human beings and corrupts both the buyer and the seller [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ].

4.6.1 When Is a Gift a Bribe?

Frequently, the boundary between a legitimate gift and a bribe is very subtle. Gifts of nominal value, such as coffee mugs or calendars with a vendor’s logo and phone number on it, are really just an advertising tool. Generally, there is no problem with accepting these types of items. Dining with a customer or a supplier is also an acceptable practice, especially if everyone pays his or her own way. It is important from the point of view of both suppliers and customers that good relations be main- tained so that good service can be provided. Social interaction, such as eating together, often facilitates the type of close and successful interactions required by both sides. However, when meals or gifts are no longer of low cost and the expense of these items is not shared equally, the possibility for abuse becomes large. 4.6.2 Examples of Gifts vs. Bribes To help illustrate the difference between bribes and legitimate gifts, let’s look at a few potential scenarios to see how fuzzy this boundary can be. No answer will be 66 4.6 An Application of Problem-Solving Methods: Bribery/Acceptance of Gifts given to the questions posed, but rather the solution of these questions will be left to the reader.

• During a sales visit, a sales representative offers you a coffee mug with his com- pany’s name and logo on it. The value of the mug is fi ve dollars. Can you accept this item? Does the answer to this question change if this item is a $350 crystal bowl with the name of the company engraved on it? How about if there is no engraving on it? • Your meeting with a sales representative is running into the lunch hour. She invites you to go out for lunch. You go to a fast-food restaurant and pay for your own lunch. Is this practice acceptable? Does the answer to this question change if you go to an expensive French restaurant? If she pays for lunch? • A sales representative from whom you often purchase asks if you would like to play tennis with him this weekend at one of the local municipal courts. Should you go? Is the answer to this question different if the match is at an exclusive local club to which he belongs? What if he pays the club’s guest fee for you? • A company sales representative would like you to attend a one-day sales seminar in Cleveland. Your company will pay for your trip. Should you go? How about if the meeting is in Maui? What if the sales representative’s company is going to pay for you to go? What if your family is invited as well? Do the answers to any of these questions change if the gift is offered before you purchase anything from the company, as opposed to after you are already a steady customer? (A more detailed version of these types of scenarios can be found in [ Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 2000 ].) Keep in mind that gifts accepted even after the purchase of something from a company might be a bribe directed at securing future sales from you or might be aimed at engineers at other companies. Although nothing was said about a gift up front, now that you have received one, the expectation of gifts might affect your future purchase decisions. Similarly, an employee of a company like yours might become aware of the gift that you received. He now realizes that if he orders parts from the same supplier that you did, he will receive a gift similar to yours. He will be tempted to order from this supplier even if there is a better supplier of that product on the market. These types of gifts tend to shut out smaller companies that can’t necessarily afford gifts and might also cause an increase in everyone’s costs, since if everyone now expects to receive gifts, the product cost must go up. Clearly, bribery is pernicious, and even the appearance of bribery should be avoided. 4.6.3 Problem Solving How can the analysis methods described in this chapter be applied to these examples concerning bribery and the acceptance of gifts? We won’t go into the answer to this question in depth here, but will rather save it for the questions at the end of the chap- ter. However, some general ideas can be presented now. Bribery can easily be ana- lyzed by looking at the factual, conceptual, and moral issues described previously.

Frequently, the facts will be obvious: who offered a gift, what its value was, and what its purpose was. Conceptual issues will be somewhat more diffi cult, since it must be determined whether the gift is of suffi cient value to infl uence a decision or whether that infl uence is the intent of the gift. Once the conceptual issues have been worked out and it is clear whether or not the gift is a bribe, the moral issue is often very clear.

Line drawing can be very effectively applied to the examples given previously.

The subtle differences between the value of the gift, the timing of the gift, etc. are easily visualized using line drawing, and often it will be very clear what the ethical Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 67 choice will be based on a well-drawn line. Likewise, fl ow charting can be used to examine the consequences that will result from the acceptance or offer of a gift. 4.6.4 Avoiding Briber y Problems How does one ensure that accepting a gift doesn’t cross the line into bribery? The fi rst and most important method for determining this is to look at company policy.

All large corporations and many smaller companies have very clear rules about what is acceptable. Some companies have very strict policies. For example, some companies say that employees are not allowed to accept anything from a vendor and that any social interaction with vendors or customers must be paid for by your company. Any deviation from this rule requires approval from appropriate supervi- sors. This philosophy is rooted in a sense of trying to avoid any confl ict of interest and any appearance of impropriety.

Other companies realize the importance of social interactions in business trans- actions and allow their employees more discretion in determining what is proper.

In the absence of strict corporate guidelines, a preapproval from one’s manage- ment is the best guide to what is acceptable.

In the absence of any corporate guidelines, another method for determining the acceptability of an action is sometimes referred to as the “New York Times Test”:

Could your actions withstand the scrutiny of a newspaper reporter? Could you stand to see your name in the newspaper in an article about the gift you received? If you couldn’t easily defend your action without resorting to self-serving rationalizations, then you probably shouldn’t do it. APPLICATION CASES Cellular Phones and Cancer This case will seem different from many of the other cases we will study, since there is no disaster or wrongdoing that has to be analyzed after the fact. Rather, this is a case about the experimental nature of engineering and deals with issues of what engineers should do early in the design cycle for a new product or system in order to avoid possible harm to customers or the public in general. It also deals with what engineers should do after a product has been released when possible dangers are brought up.

Concerns about potential adverse health effects of cell phones began in 1992 with a lawsuit fi led in Florida. In this suit, David Reynard claimed that his wife’s fatal brain cancer had been caused by her use of a cell phone. Although the suit was dis- missed in 1995 due to a lack of scientifi c evidence to support Reynard’s claim, this and other similar suits received a great deal of media attention and caused some concern among frequent cell phone users.

The possible problems with cell phones are clear. In using a cell phone, you are placing a source of electromagnetic radiation in close proximity to your brain.

It doesn’t take much imagination to see the potential for problems: Microwave ovens use electromagnetic radiation to cook food. Of course, cell phones operate at a different frequency and at much lower power levels than do microwave ovens, but the analogy is clear. The human body evolved in an environment that did not contain signifi cant levels of radiofrequency (rf) radiation, so it is plausible that the ubiquity of rf fi elds in our modern industrial world might cause some adverse health effects. 68 4.6 An Application of Problem-Solving Methods: Bribery/Acceptance of Gifts The biological effects of rf energy have been studied for many years. Some of the early studies go back to the 1940s. What types of studies related to exposure to rf radiation have been performed? Typically, these were epidemiological stud- ies and were retrospective looks at people who have used cell phones. The goal of these studies was to try to determine the levels of exposure to rf radiation from cell phones of every person in the study and to try to correlate the levels with subsequent health effects, especially cancers. While the studies all generally indicated that there is no harm in cell phone use, problems remain. Many of the problems are due to the fact that the studies relied on self-reporting of cell phone use. They asked people to report how much time they spent talking on their phones. Many people reported their phone use accurately, but many others either didn’t really know how much they used their phones or misestimated their use. Epidemiological studies are also diffi cult to analyze, since it is hard to know the power levels each individual has been exposed to. The power emitted by the phone depends on what model of phone you use and how far you are from the base station while talking. Also, brain cancers generally take a long time to develop. There may not have been enough time since the widespread use of cell phones for a signifi cant number of cancers to have developed. Solid links between cell phone use and brain cancers might not show up for another 10 to 20 years.

Studies have also been performed on laboratory animals. Typically, these are done by placing the animals in an environment containing rf fi elds designed to mimic those of cell phones. Like the epidemiological studies, the research studies on laboratory animals have not indicated any signifi cant increase in health prob- lems for the animals. Of course, since laboratory animals are not humans, the results may not be directly applicable to humans.

There have been some studies of the effects of rf radiation on laboratory tissue and cell cultures. The results of these studies and their applicability to human health are controversial. Some theoretical studies have examined how rf energy might be deposited into a human brain during cell phone use. These studies are very diffi cult to benchmark because it is diffi cult to make measurements of energy deposition directly into a human brain.

Studies of the biological effects of cell phones continue. In February of 2011, the New York Times reported [ Parker-Pope, 2011 ] the results of a study performed by researchers at the National Institutes of Health. This study found that cell phone use leads to a 7% increase in brain activity in areas of the brain closest to the phone’s antenna. These results are signifi cant because although the levels of radiation emit- ted by cell phones is low, nevertheless this radiation causes measurable effects on the human brain. How important this increase in brain activity is and how it might affect human health remains to be determined.

What is an engineer working for a cell phone company or some other company making products that emit rf radiation to do when confronted with the ongoing concerns about the health effects of rf fi elds? Cell phones can certainly be rede- signed to reduce or eliminate this problem, but, of course, any design that will lead to reduced emission will probably cost more. We won’t know for many years what the fi nal answer is regarding cell phone health effects. For now, it seems that cell phones are probably safe to use. What is the prudent and ethical thing to do in designing such products in an atmosphere where some doubt about safety exists?

This case illustrates the problems that engineers have in dealing with and managing the unknown. Many of the designs that engineers produce are experimental in nature or deal with effects that aren’t fully understood. It is incumbent on the Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 69 designer to be informed about the potential risks to users of her designs and to seek to minimize these risks to the extent possible. Vice President Spiro Agnew and Construction Kickbacks in Mar yland In January of 1973, architects and consulting engineers all over Baltimore, Maryland, were seeking out any available defense attorneys with experience in criminal law.

This activity was brought on by subpoenas issued by the U.S. Attorney for Maryland, George Beall, who was looking into charges of bribes and kickbacks given to elected offi cials by engineers working in the construction industry. The subpoenas required these engineers to submit the records of their fi rms to the U.S. attorney. One of these engineers was Lester Matz, a partner in Matz, Childs and Associates, a Baltimore engineering fi rm. The subsequent events described by Richard Cohen and Jules Witcover in their book A Heartbeat Away eventually led to the disgrace and resigna- tion of Spiro Agnew, then the Vice President of the United States.

Matz was an engineer trained at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.

Although his fi rm was doing well, it always seemed to lose out to other fi rms on big public-works contracts. In Maryland, engineering and architectural services for gov- ernment projects were not put out for bid, but rather were awarded to individual fi rms using various criteria, including the fi rm’s ability to do the work, its perfor- mance on past contracts, etc. Interestingly, unlike the situation for engineering ser- vices, the contractor for government projects was chosen through a competitive bidding process. It became clear to Matz that in acquiring government contracts, his talents and those of his fi rm were unimportant. What was required to get the contracts for public works was contacts in government and the requisite bribes and kickbacks.

In 1961, Matz began courting Spiro T. Agnew, an ambitious and rising politi- cian. In 1962, Matz donated $500 to Agnew’s campaign for Baltimore county execu- tive, a post that is roughly equivalent to mayor for the areas of the county outside the city limits of Baltimore. The county executive wielded great power in determin- ing who received contracts for the engineering services required for the numerous public-works projects undertaken by the county. The campaign contribution was given by Matz and his partner in the hopes of receiving some of the county engi- neering contracts that they had been locked out of. After Agnew won the election, the contribution made by Matz’s engineering fi rm was rewarded with contracts for county engineering work. In return, the fi rm paid Agnew 5% of their fees from the county work, which apparently was the kickback paid by other engineering fi rms at the time.

With this arrangement, Matz, Childs and Associates prospered and Matz became relatively wealthy. At its peak, the fi rm employed nearly 350 people. Matz was able to rent an apartment in Aspen for his winter ski vacations and also had a beach condo at St. Croix in the Virgin Islands. Matz’s St. Croix condo was near a condo owned by his friend, Spiro Agnew. The “business” arrangement between Agnew and Matz continued when Agnew was elected governor of Maryland, only now Matz, Childs and Associates received contracts for state work. The fi nancial arrangement remained the same: Agnew received a payment for every contract awarded.

These payments continued even after Agnew was elected vice president on the Republican ticket with Richard Nixon in 1968. Matz testifi ed that he met with Agnew in his offi ce in the White House and had given him an envelope containing $10,000 in cash. Indeed, Matz also indicated that he had given $2,500 dollars to Agnew for a federal contract that a subsidiary of Matz, Childs and Associates had 70 4.6 An Application of Problem-Solving Methods: Bribery/Acceptance of Gifts received. All told, Matz described payments that he had given Agnew over the years totaling over $100,000.

As a brief aside, it is interesting to describe how the money paid to Agnew was generated. Clearly, these payments had to be made in cash in order to avoid leaving records of the transactions. However, engineering fi rms are not paid in cash for their services and thus don’t typically have large amounts of cash on hand. One method of generating cash was to give cash “bonuses” to key employees. After retaining a suffi cient amount to pay the income taxes on the bonus, the employee returned the cash to the fi rm, where it was placed in a safe until needed. Of course, this practice is a violation of the tax code: The company books record the transac- tion as a bonus, yet much of the money is retained by the fi rm. This practice sub- jected Matz, Childs and Associates to prosecution under the federal tax code. This method didn’t always generate the required amount of cash, so other means were also used. For example, large “loans” were made to colleagues, who cashed the money and returned it to the fi rm. These loans were then “repaid” slowly over a long period of time to make the books appear right.

With federal prosecutors threatening to indict Matz and Childs for income-tax evasion and other charges, they decided to provide evidence to the government of the wrongdoing of Agnew and his successor as county executive. Agnew’s lawyers and the prosecutors reached an agreement whereby Agnew would resign as vice president and plead nolo contendere (no contest) to a single count of income-tax eva- sion, a felony, for payments received in 1967. This plea is the legal equivalent of a plea of guilty; the defendant doesn’t admit to the crime, but does acknowledge that there is enough evidence to convict him. On October 10, 1973, Agnew resigned as vice president, the fi rst vice president to have resigned in disgrace. Later that day, in a dramatic appearance in a Maryland courtroom, he entered his plea. The judge fi ned him $10,000 and honored the plea agreement whereby Agnew received no jail term, but only three years of unsupervised probation. For agreeing to cooperate with the prosecution, Matz and Childs were not prosecuted.

These events took place against the backdrop of one of the most intense gov- ernment crises in U.S. history. Although Nixon and Agnew had been reelected in a landslide in the 1972 election, the Watergate scandal hung over the administration.

Shortly after the events of this case, the Watergate scandal intensifi ed, culminating in the resignation of Richard Nixon from the presidency. PROFESSIONAL SUCCESS LOOKING FOR A JOB Many ethical issues arise in the course of looking for a job. Even though as you approach graduation you are still an “amateur,” ethical and professional behavior is expected during your job search. There are many ways to be uneth- ical in searching for a job, such as exaggerating or falsifying your resume, or overstating expenses when getting reimbursed for an interview trip.

Other, less obvious, ethical concerns can occur during interview trips. For example, suppose you have had an on-campus interview with a large corpora- tion. After the interview you have decided that you aren’t really interested in this company. The company calls you later and asks you to come to the com- pany headquarters in Cleveland for a plant visit. You have a friend in Cleveland Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 71 who you would like to visit. Is it acceptable to go on the plant trip? Why? Does the situation change if the plant trip is to Hawaii? Does it change if your interest level in the company is low, but you honestly feel that you could be persuaded?

How do you decide what is acceptable during your job search? The easiest thing to do is to honestly discuss your plans with the recruiter. If she feels that what you want to do isn’t acceptable, then you shouldn’t do it. If, however, your plans are acceptable to the company then you can proceed. In addition, the ethical analysis and problem-solving methods that we developed in this chapter and have applied to cases thus far are equally applicable to job searches. PROFESSIONAL SUCCESS CHEATING ON ASSIGNMENTS The intense pressure to get good grades in college often leads to temptations to cheat on exams or assignments. Cheating is an issue that is likely to have arisen in educational settings even before you began your study of engineer- ing. Of course the stakes become higher in a college or university setting, so the temptation to cheat might seem larger now than in high school. Cheating can take many forms, including copying someone else’s work or using “cheat sheets” during an exam.

Although it can be analyzed using utilitarianism or rights and duty ethics, it is perhaps easiest to examine cheating using virtue ethics. Honesty is a virtue.

Honesty facilitates trust between individuals whereas dishonesty causes friction.

People rarely want to associate with others who they feel don’t behave fairly and can’t be trusted. Cheating or falsifying work is a form of dishonesty. We should seek to enhance virtues such as honesty within ourselves and others, so virtue ethics clearly tells us that cheating is unethical. Bribery Flow charting Line drawing KEY TERMS REFERENCES Charles E. Harris, Jr., Michael S. Pritchard, and Michael J. Rabins, Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, CA, 2000.

Roland Schinzinger and Mike W. Martin, Introduction to Engineering Ethics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2000.

Cellular Phones and Cancer Kenneth R. Foster and John E. Moulder, “Are Mobile Phones Safe?” IEEE Spectrum, August 2000, pp.23–28. 72 Problems Tara Parker-Pope, “Cell Phone Use Tied to Changes in Brain Activity,” New York Times , February 22, 2011. Spiro Agnew Richard M. Cohen and Jules Witcover, A Heartbeat Away: The Investigation and Resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, Viking, New York, 1974.

New York Times, October 11, 1973. Numerous articles, starting with the front-page article about Agnew’s resignation and his appearance in court. Articles leading up to this event can also be found in copies of the New York Times up to several weeks before this date. 4.1 Use line drawing to assess whether the scenarios of bribery/gift giving under Examples in Section 4.6 are acceptable. What other examples can you think of to add to these scenarios? 4.2 Use fl ow charting to analyze whether the examples given in Section 4.6 are legitimate gifts or bribes. Be sure to indicate what consequences will fl ow from each decision. CELLULAR PHONES AND CANCER 4.3 What does utilitarianism tell us about this case? What do rights and duty ethics tell us? Consider these questions from the point of view of a design engineer who must work on a product that might emit hazardous radiation. Which eth- ical theory applies best in this case? What does the code of ethics of the IEEE tell us about this case? 4.4 Analyze this case by determining the factual issues, determining the concep- tual issues, and deciding which moral issues apply. Hint: This case is a perfect instance of what we discussed previously in this chapter when we said that the factual issues can be controversial. 4.5 If there are potential, but not well-understood, hazards in building a product, what are the future consequences of doing nothing, i.e., of making no changes in the design? Will warnings to the consumer suffi ce to get the designer off the hook? Must the product be engineered to be totally safe at all costs? 4.6 How can one best balance safety with economics in this case? 4.7 In their book Ethics in Engineering, Martin and Schinzinger (2000) state that “[e] ngineering, more than any other profession, involves social experimenta- tion.” How applicable is this statement to this case? Do you think that this statement is true in general? 4.8 In light of the results of various panels that indicate that there is no hazard associated with cell phone use, what should an engineer do today when designing products that will emit this rf radiation? 4.9 Many of the studies researching cell phone safety have been funded by the cell phone industry. What are the ethical implications of this? 4.10 Similar concerns about the safety of powerlines and low-frequency magnetic fi elds were voiced in the early 1990s. Research this case and compare it to the case study on cell phones and cancer. A good starting point is the article “Today’s View of Magnetic Fields” in the December 1994 issue of IEEE Spectrum. PROBLEMS Chapter 4 Ethical Problem-Solving Techniques 73 SPIRO AGNEW 4.11 Does the fact that paying government offi cials for receiving contracts seemed to be a common-place business practice in Maryland at the time make this practice ethically acceptable? 4.12 What should an engineer do in the face of competition from others who are willing to resort to bribery? 4.13 What issues does this case raise regarding competitive bidding for engineering services? Would competitive bidding for the engineering contracts in Baltimore County have solved this problem? 4.14 What is the ethical status of a campaign contribution given to a politician to secure future business? Is this a bribe? Is it the same as a kickback? Perhaps line drawing would help answer this question. CHAPTER Risk, Safety, and Accidents 5 After reading this chapter, you will be able to • Know the defi nitions of risk and safety • Discover different factors that affect the perception of risk • Study the nature of accidents • Know how to ensure that your designs will be as safe as possible. Objectives O n a sunny afternoon in May of 1996, Valujet Flight 592 took off from Miami International Airport, heading for Atlanta. Within minutes of leaving the run- way, the DC-9’s electrical systems started to fail and the cockpit and passenger cabin began fi lling with smoke. The pilots immediately called the Miami tower for permis- sion to return and began to descend and turn back toward the airport. However, the situation worsened as fi re started melting control cables and the pilots became over- come with smoke. The plane suddenly banked sharply and descended rapidly. The descent was so fast that the air-traffi c control radar in Miami was no longer able to register an altitude for the airplane. Miraculously, the plane came out of its steep dive and leveled off, either through the efforts of the pilots or because the autopilot came back on. The airplane was now at only 1,000 feet above the ground. The air-traffi c con- trollers in Miami radioed the pilots and attempted to send the aircraft to the closer airport at Opa Locka, Florida. Instead, Flight 592 rolled sharply to the right and, fac- ing nose down, crashed into the Everglades. The two pilots, three fl ight attendants, and 105 passengers on board were killed. The subsequent investigation into this accident indicated that the fi re was caused by the accidental fi ring of at least one of many chemical oxygen generators that had been removed from another Valujet airplane and were being carried back to Valujet headquarters in Atlanta. The heat generated by this canister caused a fi re in the cargo Chapter 5 Risk, Safety, and Accidents 75 hold beneath the cockpit that ultimately brought Flight 592 down. The investigation showed that these canisters were improperly secured and shouldn’t have been on the airplane at all.

One of the most important duties of an engineer is to ensure the safety of the people who will be affected by the products that he designs. All of the codes of eth- ics of the professional engineering societies stress the importance of protecting the health and safety of the public in the engineer’s duties. As we will see later in this chapter, the cause of the Valujet accident wasn’t a fl aw in the airplane’s design, but rather was attributed to a series of mistakes in handling and securing of the oxygen canisters. What responsibility does the engineer have for ensuring that these types of mistakes are not made? How can products be designed to minimize the risk to the user? We will explore these questions in this chapter. 5.1 INTRODUCTION No duty of the engineer is more important than her duty to protect the safety and well-being of the public. Indeed, the codes of ethics of the professional engineering societies make it clear that safety is of paramount importance to the engineer. In this chapter, we will look into safety and risk. We will also examine the nature of accidents and try to determine what the engineer’s role is in preventing accidents and ensuring the safety of the public. 5.2 SAFETY AND RISK At the core of many of the cases that we will study are issues of safety and risk. The engineering codes of ethics show that engineers have a responsibility to society to  produce products, structures, and processes that are safe. There is an implied warranty with regard to all products that they will perform as advertised—a bridge should allow automobiles to cross from one side of a river to the other, and a com- puter should correctly perform calculations. Similarly, there is an implied warranty that products are safe to use. Clearly, nothing can be 100% safe, but engineers are required to make their designs as safe as reasonably possible. Thus, safety should be an integral part of any engineering design.

5.2.1 Defi nitions Safety is at the same time a very precise and a very vague term. It is vague because, to some extent, safety is a value judgment, but precise because in many cases, we can readily distinguish a safe design from an unsafe one. It is impossible to discuss safety without also including a discussion of risk. Risk is a key element in any engi- neering design; it is impossible to design anything to be completely risk free. How much risk is appropriate? How safe is safe enough? To answer these questions, we must fi rst study the nature of safety and risk.

The American Heritage Dictionary defi nes risk as the possibility of suffering harm or loss. Risk is sometimes used synonymously with danger. The same dictionary defi nes safety as freedom from damage, injury, or risk. There is some circularity to these defi nitions: We engage in risky behavior when we do something that is unsafe, and something is unsafe if it involves substantial risk.

Although these defi nitions are precise, safety and risk are essentially subjective and depend on many factors:

1. Voluntary vs. involuntary risk. Many consider something safer if they knowingly take on the risk, but would fi nd it unsafe if forced to do so. If the property values 76 5.2 Safety and Risk are low enough, some people will be tempted to buy a house near a plant that emits low levels of a toxic waste into the air. They are willing to assume the risk for the benefi t of cheap housing. However, if a person already living near a plant fi nds that toxic fumes are emitted by the plant and he wasn’t informed, the risk will appear to be larger, since it was not voluntarily assumed. This principle is true even if the level of emission is identical to that in the example of a person choosing to move near the plant. 2. Short-term vs. long-term consequences. Something that might cause a short-lived illness or disability seems safer than something that will result in permanent disability. An activity for which there is a risk of getting a fractured leg will appear much less risky than an activity with a risk of a spinal fracture, since a broken leg will be painful and disabling for a few months, but generally full  recovery is the norm. Spinal fractures, however, can lead to permanent disability. 3. Expected probability. Many might fi nd a one-in-a-million chance of a severe injury to be an acceptable risk, whereas a 50:50 chance of a fairly minor injury might be unacceptable. Swimming at a beach where there is known to be a large concentration of jellyfi sh would be unacceptable to many, since there would be a high probability of a painful, though rarely fatal, sting. Yet, at the same beach, the risk of a shark attack is low enough that it doesn’t deter anyone from swimming, even though such an attack would very likely lead to death or dismemberment. It is important to remember here that the expected probabil- ity is only an educated guess. 4. Reversible effects. Something will seem less risky if the bad effects are ultimately reversible. This concept is similar to the short-term vs. long-term risk question discussed previously. 5. Threshold levels for risk. Something that is risky only at fairly high exposures will seem safer than something with a uniform exposure to risk. For example, the probability of being in an automobile accident is the same regardless of how often you drive. (Of course, you can reduce the likelihood of being in an accident by driving less often.) In contrast, studies have shown that low levels of nuclear radiation actually have benefi cial effects on human health, while only at higher levels of exposure are there severe health problems or death. If there is a threshold for the effects, generally there will be a greater tolerance for risk. 6. Delayed vs. immediate risk. An activity whose harm is delayed for many years will seem much less risky than something with an immediate effect. For example, for several years now, Americans have been warned about the adverse long- term health effects of a high-fat diet. This type of diet can lead to chronic heart problems or stroke later in life. Yet, many ignore these warnings and are uncon- cerned about a risk that is so far in the future. These same people might fi nd an activity such as skydiving unacceptably risky, since an accident will cause imme- diate injury or death. Thus, whether something is unsafe or risky often depends on who is asked.

Something that one person feels is safe may seem very unsafe to someone else. This creates some confusion for the engineer who has to decide whether a project is safe enough to be pursued. In making a decision, some analysis methods, especially line drawing and fl ow charting, can be used. Ultimately, it is up to the engineer and company management to use their professional judgment to determine whether a project can be safely implemented. Chapter 5 Risk, Safety, and Accidents 77 5.2.2 Engineers and Safety Since safety is an essential aspect of our duties as engineers, how can we be sure that  our designs are safe? There are four criteria that must be met to help ensure a safe design.

First, the minimum requirement is that a design must comply with the applicable laws. This requirement should be easy to meet, since legal standards for product safety are generally well known, are published, and are easily accessible.

Second, a design must meet the standard of “accepted engineering practice.” You can’t create a design that is less safe than what everyone else in the profession understands to be acceptable. For example, federal safety laws might not require that the power supply in a home computer be made inaccessible to the consumer who opens up her computer. However, if most manufacturers have designed their supplies so that no potentially lethal voltages are accessible, then that standard should be followed by all designers, even if doing so increases the cost of the prod- uct. A real-life example of this will be shown later when we consider the DC-10 case, in which an airframe was adapted from another design, but was not in accordance with the practice of other aircraft manufacturers at the time. This requirement is harder to comply with than the legal standard, since “accepted engineering practice” is a somewhat vague term. To address this issue, an engineer must continually upgrade her skills by attending conferences and short courses, discussing issues with other engineers, and constantly surveying the literature and trade magazines for informa- tion on the current state of the art in the fi eld.

Third, alternative designs that are potentially safer must be explored. This requirement is also diffi cult to meet, since it requires a fair amount of creativity in seeking alternative solutions. This creativity can involve discussing design strategies with others in your fi eld and brainstorming new alternatives with them. The best way to know if your design is the safest available is to compare it to other potential designs.

Fourth, the engineer must attempt to foresee potential misuses of the product by the consumer and must design to avoid these problems. Again, this requires a fair amount of creativity and research. It is always tempting to think that if someone is stupid enough to misuse your product and is injured, then it’s his own fault and the misuse and its consequences shouldn’t bother you too much. However, an engi- neer should execute designs in such a way as to protect even someone who misuses the product. Juries aren’t always concerned with the stupidity of the user and might return a substantial judgment against you if they feel that a product was not prop- erly designed. Placing a warning label on a product is not suffi cient and is not a substitute for doing the extra engineering work required to produce a safe design.

Finally, once the product is designed, both prototypes and fi nished devices must be rigorously tested. This testing is not just to determine whether the product meets the specifi cations. It should also involve testing to see if the product is safe.

The importance of adequate testing can be illustrated by the Kursk submarine disas- ter. The Kursk was a Russian navy submarine that sank in August of 2000, killing everyone on board. The sinking has been attributed to an explosion in the torpedo room that ripped open a large hole in the hull. Many crew members of the Kursk survived the initial explosion, but died because they were unable to escape from the submarine, and no attempts at rescue by other ships were successful. The June 3, 2002, edition of Time reported that Russian naval engineers say that the Kursk was equipped with a rescue capsule designed to allow crew members to fl oat safely to the surface in an emergency. However, in the rush to get the submarine into ser- vice, this safety system was never tested. After the accident, some of the survivors 78 5.2 Safety and Risk attempted to rescue themselves by using this system, but it did not function properly.

It is essential that in any engineering design, all safety systems be tested to ensure that they work as intended. 5.2.3 Designing for Safety How should safety be incorporated into the engineering design process? Texts on engineering design often include some variation on a basic multistep procedure for effectively executing engineering designs. One version of this process is found in Wilcox [1990] and is summarized as follows:

1. Defi ne the problem. This step includes determining the needs and requirements and often involves determining the constraints. 2. Generate several solutions. Multiple alternative designs are created. 3. Analyze each solution to determine the pros and cons of each. This step involves determining the consequences of each design solution and determining whether it solves the problem. 4. Test the solutions. 5. Select the best solution. 6. Implement the chosen solution. In step 1, it is appropriate to include issues of safety in the product defi nition and specifi cation. During steps 2 through 5, engineers typically consider issues of how well the solution meets the specifi cations, how easy it will be to build, and how costly it will be. Safety and risk should also be criteria considered during each of these steps. Safety is especially important in step 5, where the engineer attempts to assess all of the trade-offs required to obtain a successful fi nal design. In assessing these trade-offs, it is important to remember that safety considerations should be paramount and should have relatively higher weight than other issues.

Minimizing risk is often easier said than done. There are many things that make this a diffi cult task for the engineer. For example, the design engineer often must deal in uncertainties. Many of the risks can only be expressed as probabilities and often are no more than educated guesses. Sometimes, there are synergistic effects between probabilities, especially in a new and innovative design for which the inter- action of risks will be unknown. Risk is also increased by the rapid pace at which engineering designs must be carried out. The prudent approach to minimizing risk in a design is a “go slow” approach, in which care is taken to ensure that all possi- bilities have been adequately explored and that testing has been suffi ciently thor- ough. However, this approach isn’t always possible in the real world.

Are minimizing risks and designing for safety always the more expensive alterna- tives? Spending a long time engineering a safer product may seem like a very expen- sive alternative, especially early in the design cycle before the product has been built or is on the market. This, however, is a very short-term view. A more long-term view looks at the possible consequences of not minimizing the risk. There is a great deal of guesswork involved here, but it is clear that any unsafe product on the market ultimately leads to lawsuits that are expensive to defend even if you don’t lose and are very costly if you do lose. The prudent and ethical thing to do is to spend as much time and expense as possible up front to engineer the design correctly so as to minimize future risk of injury and subsequent criminal or civil actions against you. 5.2.4 Risk–Benefi t Analysis One method that engineers sometimes use to help analyze risk and to determine whether a project should proceed is called risk–benefi t analysis. This technique is Chapter 5 Risk, Safety, and Accidents 79 similar to cost–benefi t analysis. In risk–benefi t analysis, the risks and benefi ts of a project are assigned dollar amounts, and the most favorable ratio between risks and benefi ts is sought. Cost–benefi t analysis is tricky because it is frequently diffi cult to assign realistic dollar amounts to alternatives. This task is especially diffi cult in risk– benefi t analysis because risks are much harder to quantify and more diffi cult to put a realistic price tag on. Still, this can be a useful technique if used as part of a broader analysis, but only if used objectively.

In doing a risk–benefi t analysis, one must consider who takes the risks and who reaps the benefi ts. It is important to be sure that those who are taking the risks are also those who are benefi ting. This consideration is fundamental to issues of eco- nomic justice in our society and can be illustrated by the concept of “environmental racism,” which is the placing of hazardous-waste sites, factories with unpleasant or noxious emissions, etc. near the least economically advantaged neighborhoods.

This practice is sometimes thought of as racism because in the United States, these types of neighborhoods are generally disproportionately occupied by minority groups. The only ethical way to implement risk–benefi t analysis is for the engineer to ensure to the greatest extent possible that the risks as well as the benefi ts of her design are shared equally in society. 5.3 ACCIDENTS Now that we have discussed some basic ideas related to safety and risk, it will also be useful to look at ideas on the nature of accidents and see how these ideas bear on our discussion of safety and the engineer’s duty to society. There have been numer- ous studies of accidents and their causes, with attempts to categorize different types of accidents. The goal of this type of work is to understand the nature of accidents and therefore fi nd ways to try to prevent them. Since the engineer’s most important job is to protect the safety of the public, the results of this type of research have an impact on the engineering professional.

There are many ways in which accidents can be categorized and studied. One method is to group accidents into three types: procedural, engineered, and systemic [ Langewiesche, 1998 ]. Procedural accidents are perhaps the most common and are the result of someone making a bad choice or not following established procedures.

For example, in the airline industry, procedural accidents are frequently labeled as “pilot error.” These are accidents caused by the misreading of an important gauge, fl ying when the weather should have dictated otherwise, or failure to follow regula- tions and procedures. In the airline industry, this type of error is not restricted to the pilot; it can also be committed by air-traffi c controllers and maintenance personnel.

Engineers must also guard against procedural problems that can lead to accidents.

These problems can include failure to adequately examine drawings before signing off on them, failure to follow design rules, or failure to design according to accepted engineering practice. Procedural accidents are fairly well understood and are ame- nable to solution through increased training, more supervision, new laws or regula- tions, or closer scrutiny by regulators.

Engineered accidents are caused by fl aws in the design. These are failures of materials, devices that don’t perform as expected, or devices that don’t perform well under all circumstances encountered. For example, microcracks sometimes develop in turbine blades in aircraft engines. When these cracks become severe enough, the blade can fail and break apart. Sometimes, this has resulted in the penetration of the cabin by metal fragments, causing injury to passengers. Engineered failures should be anticipated in the design stage and should be caught and corrected during testing. 80 5.3 Accidents However, it isn’t always possible to anticipate every condition that will be encoun- tered, and sometimes testing doesn’t occur over the entire range of possible operat- ing conditions. These types of accidents can be understood and alleviated as more knowledge is gained through testing and actual experience in the fi eld.

Systemic accidents are harder to understand and harder to control. They are characteristic of very complex technologies and the complex organizations that are required to operate them. A perfect example of this phenomenon is the airline industry. Modern aircraft are very complicated systems. Running them properly requires the work of many individuals, including baggage handlers, mechanics, fl ight attendants, pilots, government regulators and inspectors, and air-traffi c con- trollers. At many stages in the operation of an airline, there are chances for mis- takes to occur, some with serious consequences. Often, a single, minor mistake isn’t signifi cant, but a series of minor mistakes can add up to a disaster. We will see this type of situation later in this chapter when we study the Valujet crash, in which sev- eral individuals committed a series of small errors, none of which was signifi cant alone. These small errors came together to cause a major accident.

The airline industry is not the only complex engineered system in our society that is susceptible to systemic accidents. Both modern military systems, especially nuclear weapons, for which complicated detection and communication systems are relied on for control, and nuclear power plants with complicated control and safety systems, have documented failures in the past that can be attributed to this type of systemic problem.

What are the implications of this type of accident for the design engineer?

Because it is diffi cult to take systemic accidents into account during design, espe- cially since there are so many small and seemingly insignifi cant factors that come into play, it may seem that the engineer bears no responsibility for this type of acci- dent. However, it is important for the engineer to understand the complexity of the systems that he is working on and to attempt to be creative in determining how things can be designed to avert as many mistakes by people using the technology as possible. As designers, engineers are also partially responsible for generating owner’s manuals and procedures for the use of the devices they design. Although an engineer has no way of ensuring that the procedures will be followed, it is important that he be thorough and careful in establishing these procedures. In examining the Valujet accident, we will try to see how engineers could have designed some things differ- ently so that the accident might have been averted. APPLICATION CASES Hurricane Katrina Residents of coastal regions along the east and gulf coasts of the United States have long been familiar with the devastating effects of hurricanes. Rarely does a season go by without a hurricane striking the mainland United States, causing damage, disruption, and loss of lives near the coast as well as far inland where tornadoes spawned by the hurricane can destroy property while torrential rains fl ood entire communities. Although communities in the United States have plans for handling hurricanes and other natural disasters, Hurricane Katrina presented unique prob- lems that made the normal issues associated with hurricanes even worse.

Like many hurricanes that hit the United States, Katrina started as a tropical depression, forming in the Caribbean on August 23, 2005. Its fi rst landfall was in Chapter 5 Risk, Safety, and Accidents 81 south Florida where it was a relatively harmless Category 1 storm. (The intensity of hurricanes is described by a system of “categories” ranging from Category 1, the least intense, to Category 5, which denotes very signifi cant and dangerous storms.) After crossing southern Florida, Katrina intensifi ed into a Category 5 storm as it moved through the Gulf of Mexico. Katrina weakened to Category 3 status before making landfall along the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts on August 29, but the storm surge was still enormous. Damage was reported as far away as Alabama and Texas, but the bulk of the damage from wind and fl ooding occurred in New Orleans and the Mississippi communities of Biloxi, Gulfport, and Pass Christian [ Story and Farzad, 2005 ]. Initially, it appeared that New Orleans had survived the hurricane with only limited damage. But by August 30, it became clear that the system of levees and canals that protect New Orleans had failed, leading to fl ooding of the city. Ultimately, over 75% of the city was fl ooded, in some areas to depths as high as 25 feet [ Treaster and Kleinfeld, 2005 ].

To understand the problems that New Orleans faced, it is necessary to know a little about the infrastructure of the city. New Orleans is one of the oldest cities in the United States, having been founded on some relatively high and dry land along the Mississippi in 1718. Over the years, the city grew by draining swampland and protecting it from fl ooding using levees to hold back the river and other bodies of water. Much of the modern city of New Orleans lies below sea level, so a series of pumps is used to remove rainwater and prevent fl ooding in the city. As the city has grown, more levees were constructed and a system of canals was built in part to help protect the city from fl oods on the Mississippi and storm surges from the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, New Orleans is a major seaport: oceangoing ships arrive at the port of New Orleans through a series of dredged channels and canals.

A complete picture of what happened in New Orleans also requires looking beyond the city itself to the very complex Mississippi river system and the attempts over the years to control the river. Historically, the Mississippi, like all rivers, has fl ooded annually. From an ecological point of view, this fl ooding is a good thing, enriching the soil in the fl ooded areas and providing nutrients to plant and animal wildlife. This fl ooding also contributes to counteracting land subsidence as the fl oods leave behind a new layer of soil to rebuild land levels. However, fl ooding is generally incompatible with human activity—it interferes with agriculture and human habitation. To prevent this fl ooding, humans have been attempting to con- trol the Mississippi ever since the banks of the river have been occupied. For years, levees have been built along the river to prevent fl ooding, often by local entities with no coordination of efforts. This is illustrated by a passage from the book pub- lished in 1874, Life on the Mississippi by Mark Twain, where he describes the efforts of the precursor to the modern Army Corps of Engineers in taming the river: “The military engineers of the Commission have taken upon their shoulders the job of making the Mississippi over again—a job transcended in size by only the original job of creating it.” Not until relatively recently was there a centralized coordination of fl ood con- trol projects along the Mississippi, which was basically provided by the Army Corps of Engineers. The result of the years of building along the river is an extensive and complex system of levees, dams, and canals along the length of the river from Minnesota to Louisiana. Although fl ooding has largely been controlled by this, there have been numerous unintended consequences [ Hallowell, 2006 ]. For exam- ple, the Mississippi delta, the land created as soil carried downstream by the river is deposited into the Gulf of Mexico by the river, has stopped being nourished by the 82 5.3 Accidents river and has shrunk. The wetlands of the delta are an important component of the protection of New Orleans from storm surges such as those generated on the gulf coast by Katrina. Humans have also altered the protection system for New Orleans by cutting straight canals through the delta and adjacent areas. It is thought that these canals served to funnel storm surge from the gulf to the levees and canals protecting New Orleans.

On one level, the disaster in New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina can be viewed as simply an unfortunate natural disaster, similar to an earthquake in California. Viewed this way, there are certainly no ethical issues related to the engi- neering of the protection system for New Orleans. However, even though there is no obvious person or group who can be blamed for the disaster, in the weeks and months since the disaster, much new information has come to light regarding deci- sions that were made that contributed to the problems in New Orleans. Perhaps the most concise statement to date regarding the issues surrounding this disaster comes from a review done by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). This report addressed many important issues:

• The report states that “decisions made during the original design phase appear to refl ect an overall pattern of engineering judgment inconsistent with that required for critical structures.” • “The design calculations for the 17th Street Canal fl oodwall did not account for the possibility of a gap developing on the canal side of the fl oodwall as the hydraulic loading on it increased.” • “The potential for fl oodwalls to undergo large deformation was evident from a mid-1980s fi eld test performed by the Corps.” • “Because it appears that this information never triggered an assessment of the impact that such a gap would have on the stability of the existing levee and fl oodwall system . . . the ability of any I-wall design in New Orleans to withstand design fl ood level loading is unknown.” • “The design calculations did not account for the signifi cantly lower shear strength of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee relative to the strength beneath the levee crest. The profession has known for decades that strengths of soft soils are signifi cantly infl uenced by overburden pressure.” • “The stability of levees founded on soft soils remains in question . . .” • “The 17th Street Canal fl oodwall was designed too close to the margins for a critical life-safety structure.” • “[M]any miles of levee and floodwall were overwhelmed by overtopping because Katrina exceeded the standard project hurricane. It appears that the standard project hurricane refl ected the largest hurricane of record to hit the Gulf Coast, occasionally updated when an even larger hurricane struck. This approach is inconsistent with the logic used in design of structures to resist earthquake loadings or fl oods.” The Crash of Valujet Flight 592 Valujet was one of the generation of new discount airlines that sprang up as the result of airline deregulation in the 1980s. Based in Atlanta, it offered cheap fares to Florida and other popular destinations. Its cost savings were achieved in part by hiring other companies to perform many of the routine operations that keep an airline fl ying. For example, many major airlines perform aircraft maintenance themselves, work that Valujet hired a company named SabreTech to do. One of the jobs that SabreTech had been hired to perform for Valujet was the routine task of Chapter 5 Risk, Safety, and Accidents 83 replacing oxygen-generator canisters in some of its DC-9s. This work was performed at SabreTech’s facility at Miami International Airport.

The oxygen canisters in the DC-9 are located above the passenger seats and are used to provide oxygen to the passengers through masks should the cabin pressure somehow be lost. The canisters contain a core of sodium chlorate, which is activated by a small explosive charge. This small explosion is initiated when the passenger pulls the oxygen mask toward herself. A chemical reaction within the canister liber- ates oxygen, which the passenger breathes through the mask. During use, the sur- face temperature of the canister can be as high as 500°F, which is normally not a problem, since the canister is mounted so that it is well ventilated. To ensure that they will operate properly when needed, the oxygen-generator canisters must be replaced periodically.

The Valujet maintenance rules made it clear that when the canisters are removed, a bright yellow safety cap must be installed on them to ensure that the explosive charge is not inadvertently set off. Unfortunately, SabreTech didn’t have any of these safety caps on hand while they were performing this work. Instead, tape was applied where the caps should have gone, and the canisters were placed in fi ve cardboard boxes and left on a shelf in the hangar. However, two of the SabreTech mechanics marked on the paperwork that the caps had been installed and signed off on the job.

The fi ve boxes of canisters sat on the shelf for several weeks, until a manager instructed a shipping clerk to clean up the area and get the boxes out of the hangar.

Since the canisters were Valujet property, the shipping clerk prepared the boxes to be shipped back to Valujet headquarters in Atlanta. He rearranged the canisters, placing some of them end to end in the box, added some bubble pack on top, and sealed up the boxes. To this load, he also added tires, some of them mounted on wheels and probably fi lled with air. A shipping ticket was prepared describing the load as empty oxygen canisters (even though most of them were full) and tires. The load was delivered to Flight 592.

The Valujet ramp agent accepted the load despite the fact that Valujet was not certifi ed to carry hazardous wastes such as empty oxygen generators, which contain a toxic residue from the chemical reaction. The fl ight’s copilot, Richard Hazen, also looked at the load and the shipping ticket, but apparently didn’t think that there was a problem with carrying this cargo. Together, the ramp agent and the copilot decided to put the load in the forward hold, which is underneath and behind the cockpit. The Valujet ground crew placed the tires fl at on the bottom of the compartment and stacked the fi ve boxes on top of the tires.

What happened to the plane after the cargo hold was loaded was reconstructed from the fl ight data recorder and the voice recorder, the “black boxes” that all planes are required to carry. Takeoff of Flight 592 was normal. But six minutes into the fl ight, there was a beep on the public-address system. At the same time, there was a sound like a chirp on the voice recorder. The fl ight data recorder indicated a pulse of pressure occurring simultaneously with these sounds. Accident investigators think that during either taxi or takeoff, one of the canisters was jostled and the explosive charge ignited. As the chemical reaction proceeded, the canister got extremely hot, especially since the canisters were in a box and were not ventilated as they are when mounted in the airplane. The chirping sound and the accompanying pressure surge were probably caused by one of the tires in the hold bursting due to the heat. At this point, the cardboard boxes and the tires were probably on fi re. Suddenly, the plane’s instruments started to indicate an electrical failure, presumably caused by the short- ing or melting of some of the wiring that ran underneath the cabin fl oor. 84 5.3 Accidents As smoke fi lled the cabin, the pilot, Candalyn Kubek, struggled to regain con- trol of her aircraft. Desperate radio messages were sent to air-traffi c control in Miami, where controllers tried to route the plane back to Miami and, fi nally, to a closer airport. The pilots were unable to control the plane. It banked sharply to the right and dove nose fi rst into the Everglades. All 110 persons aboard were killed.

This case seems to be a perfect example of a systemic accident. There were many small mistakes made by several people:

• The proper safety caps should have been installed. • Although the safety caps were not installed on the oxygen canisters, had they been packed properly, this situation might not have been a problem. • The ramp agent, who was trained to identify improper and hazardous cargo, should not have let these boxes on the airplane. • The copilot, similarly trained, should also have refused to carry this cargo. • Something that generates such intense heat should not have been put in such close proximity to a tire, which burns with very acrid and thick smoke. • The cargo compartment should have had heat and smoke detectors to give the pilots advanced warning of trouble in the hold. By themselves, none of these lapses should have led to the crash. However, the convergence of all these mistakes made the accident inevitable.

In the aftermath of this accident, the State of Florida fi led criminal charges against SabreTech, charging the company with 110 counts of murder, 110 counts of manslaughter, and various charges related to the improper handling of hazardous materials. Initially, the jury in the trial found SabreTech guilty of some of the crimi- nal charges. This was the fi rst time a criminal guilty verdict had been returned against a corporation in the United States. After much legal wrangling, many of these guilty verdicts were thrown out by an appeals judge. Ultimately, SabreTech agreed to plead no contest to a single count of mishandling hazardous materials and to make a $500,000 donation to a fund supporting airline safety causes. This outcome dismayed many of the accident victims’ families. SabreTech is no longer in business.

Three SabreTech employees also faced criminal charges of making false state- ments, conspiracy, and willfully violating hazardous-materials regulations. At least one of them claimed that he was ordered by supervisors to sign forms allowing the mislabeled canisters to be placed on the airplane. Charges were dropped against one of the three, and ultimately the other two were found not guilty.

Immediately after the accident, Valujet’s entire fl eet was grounded for several months as the FAA investigated the company’s safety record. Valujet began fl ying again in 1996, but eventually changed its name to AirTran to try to help lure business back. As a result of the crash, the FAA began to require airlines to install heat and smoke detectors in the cargo holds of all airplanes. Firestone Tires In late 1999 and early 2000, Ford Motor Company began to receive reports from foreign countries of failure of tires on the Ford Explorer. The Explorer is a popular sport utility vehicle (SUV) equipped with standard equipment tires supplied by var- ious manufacturers. The reports of tire failures were mostly from countries like Brazil or Saudi Arabia, where the temperatures that the tires are subjected to can be expected to be relatively high. During early 2000, Ford began a program to replace tires on Explorers overseas. Chapter 5 Risk, Safety, and Accidents 85 At fi rst, it might not seem that tire problems have anything to do with engineer- ing ethics. Nothing could be further from the truth. Modern automobile tires use very complicated designs. Automobile tires are designed by engineers using modern engineering tools such as computer-aided design (CAD) software. In addition, engi- neers working for an automobile manufacturer such as Ford must be very concerned about what tires are specifi ed for the vehicles they design, how the tires are manufac- tured, and how they will interact with the vehicle.

During the spring of 2000, the National Highway Traffi c Safety Administration (NHTSA) opened an investigation into the tire failures after receiving numerous complaints of failures leading to rollovers on SUVs. The tires implicated in this problem were manufactured by Firestone, a major international supplier of tires.

The problem appeared to be that the tread would separate from the body of the tire. Firestone was originally a company headquartered in the United States, but had been purchased by the Japanese tire manufacturer, Bridgestone. Although the number of incidents was small, the tire separation often led to a rollover of the vehi- cle, which caused severe injury or death of the occupants. Although tire separation and subsequent rollovers were a problem on several SUV models, the rollover prob- lem appeared to be the most severe for Firestone tires mounted on the Ford Explorer.

As a result of the NHTSA investigation, Firestone voluntarily recalled 6.5 million tires. This was only a fraction of the total number of these tires that were already in service. Ford Motor Company was especially concerned about the problem, since so many of the Explorers were equipped with Firestone tires. After much wrangling between the two companies, both behind the scenes and in the newspapers, Ford decided to sever its relationship with Firestone, announcing that the company would no longer equip new Ford vehicles with Firestone tires. This was an especially sur- prising development, because Ford and Firestone had a business relationship going back almost 75 years.

The problems with the tires were ultimately traced to a Firestone manufacturing plant in Decatur, Illinois. In the course of the NHTSA investigation, many quality control issues were uncovered in this plant. One issue was the use of adhesives that had exceeded the manufacturer’s specifi ed shelf life. In addition, workers at the plant reported that, sometimes during tire manufacture, bubbles would occur in the body of the tire. This is apparently not unusual. Normally, if a bubble appeared during the manufacturing process, the tire would be scrapped. But in the case of the Firestone tires used on the Explorer, the bubbles were punctured and the manufacturing pro- cess continued. The workers suggested that these practices were the result of strong pressure from management to keep production high.

Severing its relationship with Firestone did not solve the problem for Ford, which still had huge numbers of their vehicles on the road with potentially fl awed tires that Firestone would not recall. After much public debate, Ford decided in May of 2001 to do its own recall of Firestone tires on Ford vehicles. Millions of Firestone tires were replaced at Ford’s own expense.

One of the interesting aspects of this case was that the data uncovered by the NHTSA indicated that there was a higher-than-normal rate of failure for these tires on all vehicles, but an especially large problem on Ford Explorers. In other words, the combination of those particular tires and the Ford Explorer seemed to make the problem with the tires worse. Indeed, Firestone tried to claim that the problem was really with the Explorer rather than with the tires: They claimed that the Explorer was poorly designed and was already susceptible to rollover accidents. 86 5.3 Accidents This is an illustration of the synergistic effects that occur often in engineering:

Sometimes two parts of a design that work well alone cause great problems when they are put together. It is important for engineers to keep synergistic effects in mind in performing new designs, in modifying existing designs and in specifying the test procedures for their designs.

Ford’s tire recall took many months to complete, but appeared to be successful, since the incidence of tire failures and rollovers on Ford Explorers seemed to have diminished. Ford also redesigned the Explorer to help eliminate the problem with rollovers. Ford spent millions of dollars on its tire recall program, severely affecting the company’s profi ts. Firestone has suffered from the negative publicity resulting from this case and came close to fi ling for bankruptcy. The Collapse of the Hyatt Regency Kansas City Walkways In the 1970s, it became popular to design upscale hotels with large atriums, some extending the entire height of the hotel, a design element still in use today. This feature helps create very dramatic architectural spaces in hotel lobbies. Many of these designs also include walkways suspended over the atrium. One hotel using this design was the Hyatt Regency Kansas City. Development of this hotel began in 1976, and construction was completed in the summer of 1980. One year later, in July 1981, during a dance party in the atrium lobby, some of the walkways on which people were dancing collapsed onto the crowded atrium fl oor, leaving 114 people dead and 185 people injured.

The development of the Hyatt Regency Kansas City was initiate