Issues related prejudice, discrimination, and aggression are present in many different aspects of offender behavior and interactions. Sometimes it could be an offender's prejudicial attitude that prod

Chapter 6 Causes and Cures of Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination

Chapter Overview

How Members of Different Groups Perceive Inequality
What Research Tells Us About…Biases in Our Beliefs About Inequality
The Nature and Origins of Stereotyping
1. Stereotyping: Beliefs About Social Groups
2. Is Stereotyping Absent If Members of Different Groups Are Rated the Same?
3. Can We Be Victims of Stereotyping and Not Even Recognize It: The Case of Single People
4. Why Do People Form and Use Stereotypes?
Prejudice: Feelings Toward Social Groups
1. The Origins of Prejudice: Contrasting Perspectives
What Research Tells Us About…The Role of Existential Threat in Prejudice
Discrimination: Prejudice in Action
1. Modern Racism: More Subtle, but Just as Harmful
Why Prejudice Is Not Inevitable: Techniques for Countering Its Effects
1. On Learning Not to Hate
2. The Potential Benefits of Contact
3. Recategorization: Changing the Boundaries
4. The Benefits of Guilt for Prejudice Reduction
5. Can We Learn to Just Say “No” to Stereotyping and Biased Attributions?
6. Social Influence as a Means of Reducing Prejudice

Learning Objectives

6.1Examine how inequality is perceived by different groups
6.2Evaluate how people form and use stereotypes
6.3Recall the factors leading to prejudice against specific groups
6.4Explain how subtle forms of discrimination are the manifestations of prejudice
6.5Outline ways of reducing prejudice

On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown and a friend were stopped by Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson while walking down the street. Although eyewitness testimony differs on what happened next, the altercation between the unarmed 18-year-old Brown, a black man, and the 28-year-old Wilson, a white police officer, resulted in Brown being fatally shot six times. Following his death, residents gathered outside the Ferguson police department to protest this police shooting, holding signs such as those shown in Figure 6.1 that read “Black Lives Matter” and “Hands Up: Don’t Shoot.” The protests in Ferguson, and subsequently in other cities across the United States, garnered considerable media attention, placing race relations and police tactics at the forefront of news and public discussion.

Figure 6.1 Do Black and White Americans Perceive Tragic Events Involving Police Actions Differently?

As these images suggest, Black Americans perceive the Ferguson, Missouri, events as reflecting racism, especially in terms of police treatment. National opinion polls after the incident revealed that the majority (80 percent) of African Americans perceive the shooting as raising important issues about race relations, while many (47 percent) white Americans believe such racial issues are receiving more attention than they deserve.

Why were these residents of Ferguson and other cities so upset over Michael Brown’s death? Why did so many people feel a strong connection to the protesters, supporting them and their cause through social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter? While any loss of life may be viewed as tragic, what made this case so important that hundreds of people would come together and collectively voice their anger and sadness for such a long period of time? Before trying to answer these questions, let’s first look at the protests themselves.

During the Ferguson protests, the actions of both protesters and police became hot button issues. Some felt that the protesters were using the death of Michael Brown as an excuse to loot and vandalize local businesses. Others argued that this was a peaceful movement akin to the civil rights rallies of the 1960s and aimed only at generating change in how the police deal with black citizens. In fact, many prominent citizens including local Alderman Antonio French and U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill joined the protest to show their support.

In contrast to this perception of peaceful protest, the police response indicated they viewed the situation differently. Using military tactics and equipment, the police of Ferguson, as shown in Figure 6.2, reacted as if the protesters represented a violent threat to the safety and security of local businesses and townspeople. To suppress the protests, the Ferguson police department utilized tear gas, rubber bullets, smoke grenades, and the presence of heavy weapons to try to control and dissolve the protests. Senator McCaskill herself reported being subjected to tear gas from officers while she sat quietly with a group of young Ferguson protesters. Alderman Antonio French related how he was pulled from his car, handcuffed, and detained overnight for being present at the protest. Both politicians related how they were just two of the many citizens treated as if they were violent insurgents by police. Police officers were also documented arresting journalists and confiscating their filming equipment during the protests, citing their participation in an unlawful assembly as cause.

The police actions in Ferguson came under close scrutiny by national and international groups alike, with many citizens, politicians, police officers, and human rights advocates admonishing the Ferguson police for what they viewed as an inappropriate escalation of conflict and the violation of the protesters human rights that resulted in greater acts of violence. There is a considerable divide in views surrounding this incident and its implications for race relations. According to a Pew Research Center poll, 70 percent of black Americans say the police are doing a “poor job” treating racial groups fairly, while only 25 percent of white Americans agree with this assessment. Why do black and white Americans differ so much in their interpretation of the shooting of Michael Brown and the police response to the protests that followed? How can two groups have such differing perceptions of the same situation? In this chapter we will examine social psychological research that can help us answer these and other questions by considering how the groups we belong to can shape our interpretation and reaction to situations involving race, gender, nationality, and other social categories.

Figure 6.2 Facing Police Attempts to Disolve the Ferguson, Missouri, Protests

In response to reports of vandalizing and looting, military-style policing directed at the protestors produced a wide public opinion racial divide. Black Americans on the whole felt the police went too far in their response, while only a minority of white Americans felt the same.

At some time or other, everyone comes face to face with prejudice—negative emotional responses or dislike based on group membership. Such experience with prejudice can come about either because we are the target of it, we observe others’ prejudicial treatment of members of another group such as African Americans as we discussed in the opening example, or when we recognize prejudice in ourselves and realize our actions toward some groups are less positive compared to how we respond to members of our own group. As you will see in this chapter, the roots of prejudice can be found in the cognitive and emotional processes that social psychologists have measured with reference to a variety of different social groups.

Prejudice may be perceived by its perpetrators (and, sometimes, even its victims) as legitimate and justified (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Effron & Knowles, 2015; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, Garza, & Mewse, 2011) or it can be seen as entirely illegitimate and something that individuals should actively strive to eliminate (Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 2005; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002). Furthermore, prejudice and discriminatory treatment can be blatant or it can be relatively subtle (Barreto & Ellemers, 2015). Indeed, all forms of discrimination—differential treatment based on group membership—are not perceived by its perpetrators, and responded to by its targets, in the same way.

In this chapter, we begin by considering how our own group membership affects perceptions of social outcomes. As you saw in the opening, white and black Americans often respond differently to issues concerning racial treatment on the part of the police, particularly the shooting of young black men. Social psychological research has confirmed that there is a good reason for this. Using meta-analysis as a means of summarizing the results of 42 experiments, the evidence indicates that white participants are substantially faster to shoot unarmed black targets than white targets in a speeded laboratory “shooting” task (Mekawi & Bresin, 2015).

Likewise, when we examine the nature of stereotyping—beliefs about what members of a social group are like—and consider how it is related to discrimination, we will need to address the role of the perceiver’s group membership. In the section on stereotyping, we will particularly emphasize gender stereotyping, in part because its role in our own lives is easy to recognize—we all have a stake in gender relations. Although there is a high degree of interpersonal contact between men and women, which tends to be absent in many other cases including racial and religious groups (Jackman, 1994), gender-based discrimination continues to affect a substantial proportion of the population, particularly in the workplace. We will next turn to perspectives on the origins and nature of prejudice, and address why it so persistent across time and social groups. Lastly, we will explore various strategies that have been used to successfully change stereotypes and reduce prejudice.

6.1: How Members of Different Groups Perceive Inequality

Objective

Examine how inequality is perceived by different groups

Whether discrimination is perceived to be legitimate or not and the extent to which progress toward its reduction has been made depends on whether one is a member of the group experiencing or perpetrating the discrimination. For example, white and black Americans show substantial differences in how much discrimination and racial inequality they perceive to be present in employment wages (Miron, Warner, & Branscombe, 2011). Furthermore, whites perceive less racism in many everyday events than do blacks (Johnson, Simmons, Trawalter, Ferguson, & Reed, 2003). This pattern is found in many groups that differ in status—with high-status groups perceiving the status differential that favors them as less than members of low-status groups (Exline & Lobel, 1999). In terms of perceptions of how much progress has been made in moving toward equality, national surveys consistently find that white respondents perceive there to have been “a lot of progress,” whereas black respondents are more likely to perceive that there has been “not much progress.” Is one group correct in their perceptions and the other group incorrect? How are we to account for such different subjective perceptions of the same events and outcomes?

An important step in accounting for these differing perceptions involves consideration of the different meanings and implications derived from any potential change in the status relations between the groups. According to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1984) prospect theory (for which the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics was awarded), people are risk averse—they tend to weigh possible losses more heavily than equivalent potential gains. To take a monetary example, the possibility of losing a dollar is subjectively more negative than the possibility of gaining a dollar is positive.

How might this idea apply to perceptions of social changes that could result in greater racial equality? Let’s assume that whites will perceive greater equality from the standpoint of a potential “loss” for their group—compared to their historically privileged position. Whites will therefore respond to additional movement toward equality more negatively, and suppose that more change has already occurred, than will blacks. In contrast, if we assume that blacks are likely to see greater equality as a potential “gain” for them—compared to their historically disadvantaged position—then change toward increased equality will be experienced as a positive. But, if a “possible loss” evokes more intense emotion than a “possible gain,” then increased equality should be more negative for whites than the same increased equality is positive for blacks. Research has revealed that white Americans who are highly identified with their racial group do respond negatively—with increased racism—when their race-based privileges are questioned (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007).

Even a cursory look at racist websites and other sources such as those shown in Figure 6.3 reveals that they often frame existing race relations as “white people are losing ground.” This is, of course, not unlike how the Nazis and other anti-Semitic groups (again, all too easily found on the Internet) framed German losses (and Jewish gains). Indeed, considerable evidence indicates that hate crimes increase as minorities are perceived as gaining political power (Dancygier & Green, 2010).

Although hate group members are not typical white Americans, perhaps this tendency to see social change as a zero-sum outcome in which “we are losing” plays a role in explaining the discrepancies that are observed between minority and majority perceptions of inequality. To test this explanation, Eibach and Keegan (2006) had white and nonwhite participants create a graph—in one of three forms—depicting change in the racial composition of students in U.S. universities from 1960 to the present. In the “Minority gains and white losses” case, the percentages they were asked to insert showed the percent of whites going down, and the exact same percentage increase in favor of minorities. In a “white losses only” case, the graphs that students were asked to draw simply showed a reduction in the percentage of whites, and in the “Minorities gain only” case they simply showed an increase in the percentage of minorities at American universities.

Figure 6.3 Hate Groups on the Internet

Hate groups incite concerns about their own group by claiming theirs is “losing ground” and that the targeted group is illegitimately gaining. Hate is then seen as justified in order to protect their group.

In both conditions where “white losses” were included, white participants saw race relations in a more “zero-sum” fashion than when “Minority gains” alone were considered. What impact did this have on judged progress toward equality? When participants focused on “white losses,” there were racial group differences in judged progress—mirroring the consistently obtained national survey findings. White participants perceived greater progress toward equality for minorities than did nonwhite participants. However, when only “Minority gains” were considered, whites perceived less progress toward equality; in fact, in that case, their perceptions were not different than the nonwhite participants. So, the “racial divide” in public perceptions of events would appear to stem in part from whites’ framing social change as involving losses for their own group.

It is worth considering whether a similar tendency to frame affirmative action as a loss of white privilege or as a gain for minorities can account for racial differences in support for that social change policy too (Crosby, 2004). Research reveals that when whites expect that affirmative action procedures will negatively affect white Americans’ chances to obtain jobs and promotions—by focusing on possible losses their own racial group could experience—whites oppose affirmative action policies, regardless of what impact it might have on minority groups (Lowery, Unzueta, Goff, & Knowles, 2006). Similarly, among white South Africans, support for affirmative action for black Africans depends on the extent to which they are perceived as a threat to white South Africans’ high-status jobs and access to good housing (Durrheim et al., 2009).

Has the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. Presidency changed these racial dynamics in perceptions of progress and support for policies that are aimed at addressing racial inequality such as affirmative action? Clearly, the election of Barack Obama was one dramatic example of how much race relations in the United States have changed since the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, which made racial segregation in public institutions such as schools illegal. However, as shown in Figure 6.4, research has revealed that pre- to postelection white Americans came to believe that there is less need for further racial progress and less support for social policies aimed at increasing equality (Kaiser, Drury, Spalding, Cheryan, & O’Brien, 2009). As we will discuss later in this chapter, the presence of “token” (numerically infrequent) minorities or women in highly visible positions can lead majority group members to believe that not only has substantial change occurred, but that there is less need for further social change. For other surprising findings concerning why people might misperceive the amount of inequality that exists, see the special section “What Research Tells Us About…Biases in Our Beliefs About Inequality.”

Figure 6.4 Perceptions of Racial Progress and Need for Future Progress Was Affected by the Election of Barack Obama

Ironically, the election of Barack Obama, the first African American as U.S. President, reduced the perceived need among white Americans for further progress toward racial equality and support for policies to achieve that goal.

Description

What Research Tells Us About… Biases in Our Beliefs about Inequality

How would you answer the question: “How much wealth inequality exists in the United States?” And is it too little, too much, or just the right amount? Given the “Occupy Wall Street” and other similar movements around the world (see Figure 6.5), it might seem that many believe the existing (and growing) inequality in the United States is too great. Such concern about rising inequality may stem from the multiple social ills, including reduced psychological well-being, that such inequality is linked with (see Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Indeed, increasing inequality is associated with decreased tolerance for ethnic diversity (Corneo & Neher, 2014) and increased prejudice toward minorities (Andersen & Fetner, 2008).

When social psychologists asked a representative sample of Americans these two questions about wealth inequality (Norton & Ariely, 2011), they found that how much inequality exists was dramatically underestimated and that the majority of their respondents felt it should be even less than they erroneously believed it was! That is, when asked how much wealth the richest 20 percent of Americans possess, respondents estimated that it was 59 percent of the nation’s total wealth. In actuality, the top 20 percent in the United States owns 84 percent of the wealth. When asked about how much the top 20 percent should ideally own, respondents believed it should be just 32 percent (which is closer to Sweden, a well-known low-inequality nation, than the United States). Similar underestimates of existing wealth inequality have been obtained in Australia, a nation with somewhat less inequality than the United States (Norton, Neal, Govan, Ariely, & Holland, 2014). In both of these nations, though, people’s actual desire to live in a more equal society did not differ much as a function of their political orientation (e.g., Democrat vs. Republican), despite the fact that beliefs about the causes of poverty do differ according to political ideology (Guimond & de la Sablonniere, 2015).

So what accounts for these widespread misperceptions concerning how much inequality exists? And, if people really knew how much inequality actually does exist, would we see more people seeking change—and supporting policies that would bring about such change—than we currently do?

First, with respect to the question of the misperception of how much wealth inequality exists, in rich countries there are a number of widely shared beliefs that help maintain the idea such differential outcomes are actually just. As Dorling (2015) has documented, people subscribe to a few critical beliefs, including the idea that “prejudice is normal,” with those who are not “us” being seen as not deserving. This helps us collectively remain remarkably unaware of how inequality based on group membership is transmitted across generations—through inherited wealth. A second widely shared set of beliefs—that pursuing personal self-interest at the expense of others (i.e., that “greed is good”) because it is efficient (creates growth)—helps to “normalize” inequality, especially when coupled with the idea that it has always been this way (even though it is historically relatively recent) and therefore such “natural” social arrangements cannot be changed.

Unfortunately, other mechanisms help to mask how much inequality (and prejudice) exists and how it is maintained. Because we live out our lives in relatively segregated contexts (e.g., neighborhoods, schools, and employment), and we judge the nature of the world based on the experiences of our family, friends, coworkers and neighbors who are placed similarly to ourselves, we may fail to see the amount of inequality that actually exists. That is, by comparing ourselves with other similarly wealthy or similarly poor people, we may fail to see the substantial differences that truly exist. If vast differences in wealth are not perceived, there will be little support for redistribution of it.

Consider recent research involving both American and New Zealand citizens conducted by Dawtry, Sutton, and Sibley (2015) that illustrates this process. Respondents were first asked to estimate the annual household income for their personal social contacts that they have face-to-face interaction with. They then did the same household income estimation task for their entire nation, and indicated how fair and satisfied they were with that income distribution. Lastly, respondents indicated whether they supported redistribution of wealth through taxes on the rich and welfare benefits for the poor (i.e., means of reducing inequality). Regardless of respondents’ political orientation, the perceived national income distribution closely reflected respondents’ own household income and members of their personal social circle. People who are wealthier and whose contacts are also, estimated that the rest of their nation was too (i.e., they failed to see inequality). As a result of perceiving the population as a whole as wealthy, like one’s own group, the economic status quo was seen as fair and wealth redistribution policies were opposed. So, misperception concerning the extent of wealth inequality that exists is based on our own social placement and assuming that the experience of others is similar to those in our own social circle.

Figure 6.5 How Much Inequality Exists?

As the Occupy Wall Street movement claimed, inequality is substantial and growing in the United States and other countries. Yet, surveys reveal that existing inequality is dramatically underestimated by large numbers of people.

Key Points

Prejudice—negative emotional responses toward members of a group, stereotyping—beliefs about what members of a group are like, and discrimination—differential treatment—can be based on many different category memberships including age, race, marital status, gender, religion, and sexual orientation.
All forms of differential treatment based on group membership are not perceived and responded to in the same way. There is a substantial “racial divide” in the perception of the legitimacy of police treatment. Black Americans report that the police do not treat racial groups fairly, while few white Americans agree with this view.
Prospect theory argues that people are risk averse—and they therefore weigh possible losses more heavily than equivalent potential gains.
When change is seen as a potential loss, those who are privileged respond more negatively to further change and suppose greater change toward equality has already occurred compared to those who do not see it as a loss for them.
Social groups differ in the value they accord “equality.” When equality is framed as a loss for whites, they perceive that more progress has already occurred and they are less supportive of affirmative action. Perceived threat to the dominant group’s economic well-being lowers support for affirmative action.
The election of Barack Obama, which was indeed unimaginable only a few decades earlier, had the effect of increasing white Americans’ perceptions that substantial racial progress has been made, and also decreased the perceived need for policies aimed at creating greater racial equality.
People substantially underestimate the extent to which inequality exists, while they report desiring greater equality. Widely shared beliefs (e.g., prejudice is normal; greed is good) help to support existing inequality, as does basing our perceptions of the nation on our own personal social circle.

6.2.3: Can We Be Victims of Stereotyping and Not Even Recognize It: The Case of Single People

Do people always recognize when they stereotype themselves and others? Or, are there circumstances in which we might largely concur with widely held stereotypes—even ones that reflect poorly on ourselves? DePaulo (2006) points out one intriguing instance of this in her research on singlism—the negative stereotyping and discrimination that is directed toward people who are single. In a study of over 1,000 undergraduates, DePaulo and Morris (2006) measured how single and married people are characterized. As shown in Table 6.3, the attributes these primarily single participants used to describe “singles” are fairly negative, particularly in contrast to how they described “married” people. And, the differences in the descriptions spontaneously used to describe these groups was often quite substantial: 50 percent of the time, married people were described as kind, giving, and caring, but those attributes were applied to single people only 2 percent of the time. Furthermore, this difference in how married and single people are stereotyped is even greater when the targets are described as over 40 years old compared to when they were said to be 25 years of age. In fact, people who choose to be single are perceived as lonelier, less sociable, and more miserable than those who are not single by choice (Slonim, Gur-Yaish, & Katz, 2015).

Although single people currently represent more than 40 percent of American adults (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007), there is no shortage of evidence of discrimination against them (DePaulo & Morris, 2006). When asked to indicate who they would prefer to rent property to, people overwhelmingly chose a married couple (70 percent) over a single man (12 percent) or single woman (18 percent). There are also a variety of legal privileges that come with married status: employer-subsidized health benefits for spouses, discounts on auto insurance, club memberships, and travel, as well as tax and Social Security benefits. So, why is this inequality not salient (and protested) by its victims? One reason is that single people fail to realize it. When singles are asked if they are members of any groups that might be targets of discrimination, DePaulo and Morris (2006) found that only 4 percent spontaneously mention “single” as such a category. When asked directly if singles might be stigmatized, only 30 percent of

Table 6.3 Traits Stereotypically Associated with Single and Married People

As this list of stereotypic traits illustrates, single people are stereotyped in largely negative terms, whereas those who are married are characterized in terms of more positive attributes.

SOURCE: Compiled based on DePaulo and Morris (2006).

Traits of Single People	Traits of Married People
Immature	Mature
Insecure	Stable
Self-centered	Kind
Unhappy	Happy
ugly	Honest
Lonely	Loving
Independent	Giving

singles say that could be the case! In contrast, almost all members of other stigmatized groups, including those based on race, weight, and sexual orientation, agree they could be discriminated against.

So, a lack of awareness of the negative stereotyping and discrimination they face does appear to be part of the explanation for why singles themselves fail to acknowledge singlism. But might it also be a case in which people (even its victims) feel that such discrimination is legitimate? When Morris, Sinclair, and DePaulo (2007) asked whether a landlord who refused to rent a property to various categories of people—African Americans, women, homosexuals, or obese people—had stereotyped and engaged in discrimination, participants agreed that was the case, but not when the person who was refused the rental was single. These results support the idea that discrimination against single people is seen—by both single and married people—as more legitimate than any of these other forms of discrimination. As we will discuss in the next section on prejudice, there are groups who we seem to feel it is justified to feel prejudice toward. (Although it may not be typical for members of those groups to agree!)

DePaulo and Morris (2006) suggest that negative stereotyping and discrimination against singles serve to protect and glorify an important social institution—marriage—and this is a central reason that it is so widespread and heavily legitimized. Singles, by definition, challenge the existing belief system that finding and marrying one’s soulmate is crucial to having a meaningful life. By derogating those who challenge that idea, we can all believe in vital cultural “myths.” Consider how just knowing that the people shown in Figure 6.10 have chosen to be single or are part of a couple can change what inferences we might make about what they are likely to be like.

6.2.4: Why Do People Form and Use Stereotypes?

Stereotypes often function as schemas, which as we saw in Chapter 2 are cognitive frameworks for organizing, interpreting, and recalling information. So, categorizing people according to their group membership can be efficient for human beings who may invest little cognitive effort in many situations. Thus, one important reason people hold stereotypes is that doing so can conserve the cognitive effort that may be used for other tasks (Bodenhausen, 1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). According to this view, we rely on our stereotypes when responding to others because it is easy.

But which stereotype are we most likely to use—if people can be categorized in terms of several different group memberships? Consider the person shown in Figure 6.11. Are we most likely to stereotype her as a woman, Asian American, or waitress? Both ethnicity and gender are categories that people frequently employ, but given the restaurant context and our interaction with her as a customer, research suggests that people would be most likely to stereotype her in terms of her occupation (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). Indeed, as you will see later in this chapter, stereotypes can serve important motivational

Figure 6.10 How Does Being Single or Part of a Couple Influence Perceptions of People?

Do the single people in Panels A and B seem more self-centered and less well-adjusted compared to when we see them as part of a couple as shown in Panel C? Research suggests this is the case.

Figure 6.11 What Stereotype Is Most Likely to Be Applied to Predict This Person’s Behavior?

Even though ethnicity and gender are basic categories that are readily employed, given the context, we may be particularly likely to perceive this person in terms of her occupational role.

purposes; in addition to providing us with a sense that we can predict others’ behavior, they can help us feel positive about our own group identity in comparison to other social groups. For now though, let’s consider what the cognitive miser perspective suggests in terms of how stereotypes are used.

Stereotypes: How They Operate

Consider the following groups: gun owners, Mexican Americans, professors, U.S. soldiers, homeless people, Russians, and dog lovers. Suppose you were asked to list the traits most characteristic of each. You would probably not find this a difficult task. Most people can easily construct a list for each group and they could probably do so even for groups with whom they have had limited contact. Stereotypes provide us with information about the typical traits possessed by people belonging to these groups and, once activated, these traits seem to come automatically to mind (Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, 2009). It is this fact that explains the ease with which you can construct such lists, even though you may not have had much direct experience with those groups.

Stereotypes act as theories, guiding what we attend to, and exerting strong effects on how we process social information (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schradron, 1997). Information relevant to an activated stereotype is often processed more quickly, and remembered better, than information unrelated to it (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997). Similarly, stereotypes lead us to pay attention to specific types of information—usually, information consistent with our stereotypes.

When we encounter someone who belongs to a group about whom we have a stereotype, and this person does not seem to fit the stereotype (e.g., a highly intelligent and cultivated person who is also a member of a low-status occupational group), we do not necessarily alter our stereotype about what is typical of members of that group. Rather, we place such people into a special category or subtype consisting of people who do not confirm the schema or stereotype (Queller & Smith, 2002; Richards & Hewstone, 2001). Subtyping acts to protect the stereotype of the group as a whole (Park, Wolsko, & Judd, 2001). When the disconfirming target is seen as not typical of the group as a whole, stereotypes are not revised.

Do Stereotypes Ever Change?

If stereotypes are automatically activated and we interpret information in ways that allow us to maintain our stereotypes, this raises the question: Do stereotypes ever change? Many theorists have suggested that stereotyping will be stable as long as the nature of the relationship that exists between those groups is stable (e.g., Eagly, 1987; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Pettigrew, 1981; Tajfel, 1981). That is, because we construct stereotypes that reflect how we see members of different groups actually behaving, stereotype change should occur when the relations between the groups change (so the behaviors we observe change accordingly).

In an interesting demonstration of this process, Dasgupta and Asgari (2004) assessed women students’ gender stereotypes in their first year and again in their second year in college. The students in this study were attending either a women’s college where by their second year they had repeated exposure to women faculty behaving in nontraditional ways or they were attending a coeducational college where they had considerably less exposure to women faculty. As expected, agreement with gender stereotypes was significantly reduced among the students attending a women’s college compared to those attending a coeducational college, and the extent of the stereotype change that occurred was predicted by the number of women faculty the students had exposure to in a classroom setting.

Key Points

Stereotypes are beliefs about what members of a particular group are like. Prejudice is the feelings component of our reactions toward particular groups, and discrimination is differential behavior that is directed toward members of specific groups.
Gender stereotypes—beliefs about the different attributes that males and females possess—act as schemas for interpreting their actions and outcomes. Women are stereotyped as high on warmth, but low on competence, while men are stereotyped as low on warmth, but high on competence.
A glass ceiling exists such that women encounter more barriers than men in their careers, and as a result find it difficult to move into top positions. Women are especially likely to be affected in the workplace by the “think manager–think male” bias.
Women who violate stereotypic expectancies, especially on the warmth dimension, are likely to face hostility. Defying gender stereotypes can be difficult for both women and men.
Women are most likely to be appointed to leadership positions when a crisis has occurred, the position is more precarious, and there is a greater risk of failure, which has been referred to as the glass cliff effect. When men’s stereotypic attributes appear to have led the organization downhill, then women’s presumed stereotypic communal attributes are seen as suitable in a new leader.
Tokenism—the hiring or acceptance of only a few members of a particular group has two effects: It maintains perceptions that the system is not discriminatory and it harms how tokens are perceived by others and can undermine performance when they believe their appointment to leadership positions was without regard to their merit. Exposure to token conditions can maintain people’s perceptions of fairness and their belief in meritocracy.
Publicly claiming discrimination as a cause of one’s outcomes can produce negative responses by both outgroup and ingroup members, albeit for different reasons. Managers who have considered their diversity efforts are the least supportive of those who complain about racial discrimination.
Stereotypes can influence behavior even in the absence of different subjective scale ratings. When objective scale measures are employed, where shifting standards cannot occur and the meaning of the response is constant, the effect of stereotypes can be observed.
In the case of singlism—negative stereotyping and discrimination directed toward people who are single—both single and married people show the effect. Singlism may stem from the targets being unaware of the discrimination they face, or because they too see it as legitimate to be biased against their group.
Stereotypes lead us to attend to information that is consistent with them and to construe inconsistent information in ways that allow us to maintain our stereotypes. When a person’s actions are strongly stereotype discrepant, we subtype that person as a special case that proves the rule and do not change our stereotypes.
Stereotypes change as the relations between the groups are altered. Those who are exposed to women in nontraditional roles show reductions in gender stereotyping.

6.2.4: Why Do People Form and Use Stereotypes?

Figure 6.10 How Does Being Single or Part of a Couple Influence Perceptions of People?

Do the single people in Panels A and B seem more self-centered and less well-adjusted compared to when we see them as part of a couple as shown in Panel C? Research suggests this is the case.

Figure 6.11 What Stereotype Is Most Likely to Be Applied to Predict This Person’s Behavior?

Even though ethnicity and gender are basic categories that are readily employed, given the context, we may be particularly likely to perceive this person in terms of her occupational role.

Stereotypes: How They Operate

Do Stereotypes Ever Change?

Key Points

Stereotypes are beliefs about what members of a particular group are like. Prejudice is the feelings component of our reactions toward particular groups, and discrimination is differential behavior that is directed toward members of specific groups.
Gender stereotypes—beliefs about the different attributes that males and females possess—act as schemas for interpreting their actions and outcomes. Women are stereotyped as high on warmth, but low on competence, while men are stereotyped as low on warmth, but high on competence.
A glass ceiling exists such that women encounter more barriers than men in their careers, and as a result find it difficult to move into top positions. Women are especially likely to be affected in the workplace by the “think manager–think male” bias.
Women who violate stereotypic expectancies, especially on the warmth dimension, are likely to face hostility. Defying gender stereotypes can be difficult for both women and men.
Women are most likely to be appointed to leadership positions when a crisis has occurred, the position is more precarious, and there is a greater risk of failure, which has been referred to as the glass cliff effect. When men’s stereotypic attributes appear to have led the organization downhill, then women’s presumed stereotypic communal attributes are seen as suitable in a new leader.
Tokenism—the hiring or acceptance of only a few members of a particular group has two effects: It maintains perceptions that the system is not discriminatory and it harms how tokens are perceived by others and can undermine performance when they believe their appointment to leadership positions was without regard to their merit. Exposure to token conditions can maintain people’s perceptions of fairness and their belief in meritocracy.
Publicly claiming discrimination as a cause of one’s outcomes can produce negative responses by both outgroup and ingroup members, albeit for different reasons. Managers who have considered their diversity efforts are the least supportive of those who complain about racial discrimination.
Stereotypes can influence behavior even in the absence of different subjective scale ratings. When objective scale measures are employed, where shifting standards cannot occur and the meaning of the response is constant, the effect of stereotypes can be observed.
In the case of singlism—negative stereotyping and discrimination directed toward people who are single—both single and married people show the effect. Singlism may stem from the targets being unaware of the discrimination they face, or because they too see it as legitimate to be biased against their group.
Stereotypes lead us to attend to information that is consistent with them and to construe inconsistent information in ways that allow us to maintain our stereotypes. When a person’s actions are strongly stereotype discrepant, we subtype that person as a special case that proves the rule and do not change our stereotypes.
Stereotypes change as the relations between the groups are altered. Those who are exposed to women in nontraditional roles show reductions in gender stereotyping.

6.3.1: The Origins of Prejudice: Contrasting Perspectives

Several important perspectives have been developed to answer the question: “Where does prejudice come from, and why does it persist?” The most general response to this question has focused on perceived threat—be it either material or symbolic—to a valued ingroup (Esses, Jackson, & Bennett-AbuAyyash, 2010). We will first consider how perceptions of threat to self-esteem and group interests are critical for prejudice. Then we will contemplate how competition for scarce resources can increase prejudice. At the end of this section, we will examine whether categorizing the self as a member of a group, and others as members of a different group, is a sufficient condition for prejudice to occur. Based on a cross-cultural study of 186 different societies, it is clear that the more important loyalty to one’s own ingroup is, the greater the support there is for prejudice toward outgroups (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006). So feelings about one’s own group are related to prejudice toward outgroups.

Threats to Self-Esteem

It is certainly true that prejudice cannot be understood unless threat—and how it affects people—is taken into account. People want to see their own group positively (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which in practice means more positively than some other group. When an event threatens people’s perceptions of their group’s value, they may retaliate by derogating the source of the threat. It is also the case that perceiving a threat to our group can lead us to identify more with our ingroup. Several studies, using reminders of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as the threatening event, have found increases in identification with the nation (Landau et al., 2004).

Does the event that threatens one’s group identity need to involve possible death, or is it sufficient that it simply implies your group is not as positive as you would like to see it, for prejudice responses to occur? To test this idea, American college students, who differed in the extent to which they placed value on their identity as Americans, were shown one of two 6-minute videos based on the movie Rocky IV (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). In one clip, Rocky (an American boxer played by Sylvester Stallone) won the match against Ivan (a Russian contender). This version was not threatening, for it supports Americans’ positive views of their group as winners. In the other clip, Rocky loses the fight to Ivan, the Russian. This version was threatening, particularly to those who highly value their identity as Americans, and it lowered feelings of self-esteem based on group membership. The question is, Can exposure to such a minor threat to identity in the laboratory result in prejudice? The answer obtained was yes—those who were highly identified as Americans and who saw the threatening Rocky “as loser” film clip showed increased prejudice toward Russians and advocated they be kept out of the United States in the future. In fact, the more these participants negatively evaluated Russians, the more their self-esteem based on their group membership subsequently increased.

This research suggests that holding prejudiced views of an outgroup allows group members to bolster their own group’s image, particularly when it has been threatened. By “putting down” members of another group, we can affirm our own group’s comparative value—and such prejudice is most strongly expressed when threat is experienced. The important role of such perceived threat to one’s group has been demonstrated in a wide variety of group contexts: whites’ prejudice toward black Americans (Stephan et al., 2002), prejudice toward various immigrant groups (Esses, Jackson, Nolan, & Armstrong, 1999; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005), Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2007), and men’s prejudice and sabotaging actions toward women they perceive as “moving in” on males’ traditional territory (Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Evidence for this process, illustrated in Figure 6.14, has been obtained in numerous studies.

Overall, then, advantaged groups exhibit prejudice toward outgroups most strongly when they are experiencing a threat to their group’s image and interests. Because of the critical role that perceived threat can play in maintaining and escalating prejudice, research has addressed how such threat may be reduced. Simply reminding people who value their ingroup identity—as Democrats or Republicans—that they share a more inclusive identity (American) with the other group can lower perceived threat and prejudice (Riek, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010). We will return to this technique, known as recategorization, in our discussion of procedures for reducing prejudice.

Competition for Resources as a Source of Prejudice

It is sad but true that the things people want most—good jobs, nice homes—are in short supply. Quite frequently, these are zero-sum outcomes—if one group gets them, the other group cannot. Consider the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, which has been ongoing since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Both want to control Jerusalem. This sort of conflict over desirable territory has been considered within realistic conflict theory to be a major cause of prejudice (Bobo, 1983). The theory further suggests that as competition escalates, the members of the groups involved will come to view each other in increasingly negative terms. They may label each other as “enemies,” view their own group as morally superior, draw the boundaries between themselves and their opponents more firmly, and, under extreme conditions, come to see the opposing group as not even human (Bar-Tal, 2003).

While competition can intensify conflict, as you will see, it may not be the most basic cause of conflict between groups. A classic study by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961)

Figure 6.14 Prejudice Persists When It Serves Our Group’s Interests

When self-esteem is threatened, people are most likely to derogate the groups representing the threat. Indeed, doing so helps to boost or restore threatened self-esteem. Via this mechanism, groups can maintain their dominant position.

with middle-class well-adjusted boys illustrates the process. The boys were brought to a summer camp called Robber’s Cave, where they were randomly assigned to two different groups, but because their cabins were well separated they were unaware of the existence of the other group. Initially, the boys in each cabin enjoyed hiking, swimming, and other sports, and they rapidly developed strong attachments to their group—choosing names for themselves (Rattlers and Eagles) and making up flags with their groups’ symbols on them. In the second phase of the study, the groups were brought together and they began a series of competitions. They were told that the winning team would receive a trophy and various desirable prizes; since both groups of boys wanted the prizes badly, the stage was set for intense competition.

As the boys competed, the tension between the groups rose. At first it was limited to verbal taunts, but soon escalated into direct acts—such as when the Rattlers broke into the Eagles’ cabin, overturning beds and generally wreaking havoc. The two groups voiced increasingly negative views of each other, while heaping praise on their own group. In short, strong prejudice developed.

In the final phase, competition was eliminated, but that alone did not reduce the negative reactions toward the other group. Only when conditions were altered so that the groups found it necessary to work together to reach superordinate goals—ones they both desired but neither group could achieve alone—did dramatic change occur. The boys worked cooperatively together to restore their water supply (secretly sabotaged by the researchers), combined funds to rent a movie, and jointly repaired a broken-down truck so they could all go into town to get ice cream. The tensions between the groups gradually decreased, and many cross-group friendships developed.

Despite what Sherif’s research showed about factors that can intensify and reduce intergroup conflict, what he did not show is whether competition is necessary for prejudice to develop. In fact, prior to the introduction of the competition, the mere knowledge of the other group was sufficient to generate name-calling between the two groups of boys. Perhaps simply being a member of a group and identifying with it is sufficient for prejudice to emerge. This is the idea that Tajfel and Turner (1986) developed further in their social identity theory, which we turn to next.

Cognitive Effects of Social Categorization: The US-Vs.-Them Effect

“How is genocide possible?” This was a question that preoccupied Henri Tajfel throughout his life, in part because he was a Jew who had lived through the Nazi Holocaust. Unlike some who believed that the source of such intergroup violence lay in irrationality, Tajfel (1982) believed that there were important cognitive processes involved. He argued that a history of conflict, personal animosity, individual self-interest or competition were not necessary to create group behavior. Perhaps, as with boys in Sherif’s study, if people were merely categorized into different groups, then you would see the beginnings of ingroup loyalty and outgroup discrimination. Indeed, he was searching for a “baseline” condition where prejudice would be lacking, when he stumbled onto the most basic condition needed to create prejudice.

Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) originated a paradigm for studying intergroup behavior in which participants were categorized into groups on some trivial basis. He had participants view a set of pictures—as shown in Figure 6.15—by the artists Klee and Kandinsky. In all instances, participants were assigned to one group or the other randomly, but were told that it was based on whether they had shared a preference for Klee or Kandinsky paintings. Each group that was created on this minimal basis had no history, no contact among its members, no leader—that is, nothing whatsoever that would cause it to be a real “group.”

The task of the participants was simply to allocate points or money, between two other participants—one of whom was presented as an ingroup member and one of whom was an outgroup member. Participants on average awarded members of their own group more than members of the other group. Furthermore, when participants

Figure 6.15 Social Categorization: Ingroups and Outgroups

In Panel A, the artist Paul Klee’s work is shown, and a Kandinsky painting is shown in Panel B. A “minimal” categorization can be created by telling participants that they share a preference for one artist over the other.

could choose to allocate more money in absolute terms to members of their own group, they chose to allocate smaller absolute amounts if that would also mean allocating relatively less to members of the other group, suggesting that the participants were attempting to maximize the difference between the rewards given to the two groups. The results of these experiments were shocking at the time, because they illustrated how people could be divided into distinct categories on almost any basis, and doing so could result in different perceptions of, and actions toward, us (members of their own group) versus them (members of the other group).

Once the social world is divided into “us” and “them,” it takes on emotional significance. Some differences are granted social importance and have meaning for our identities (Oakes et al., 1994). People in the “us” category are viewed in more favorable terms, while those in the “them” category are perceived more negatively. Indeed, it may be widely expected that some groups should be disliked, while prejudice toward other groups is seen as not justified (Crandall et al., 2002). For example, college students who were asked to rate the extent to which it was appropriate or legitimate to express prejudice toward 105 different social groups did so easily. The top-10 groups it is acceptable to display prejudice toward, and the 10 for whom it is least legitimate to express prejudice against, are shown in Table 6.4.

How, precisely, does social categorization result in prejudice? Social identity theory suggests that individuals seek to feel positively about the groups to which they belong, and part of our self-esteem is derived from our social group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Since people who are identified with their group are most likely to express favoritism toward their own group and a corresponding bias against outgroups, valuing our own group will have predictable consequences for prejudice. Can extreme valuing of our own group, what has been called feeling “fused with our group,” affect willingness to engage in extreme actions to benefit and protect it?

Recent research has addressed this precise question (Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012). These researchers first assess identity fusion—the extent to which a person sees the self and their group as overlapping. The idea is that people who see themselves as fused with their nation yoke their personal agency to their group and see its outcomes as like their own. Therefore, when given an opportunity to protect their group they will be more willing to do so than those who do not

Table 6.4 Who Do We Believe It Is OK or Not OK to Express Prejudice Toward?

The “top 10” list on the left indicates what groups college students perceive it to be acceptable and legitimate to feel prejudice toward. The “top 10” list on the right indicates what groups they perceive it to be unacceptable and illegitimate to feel prejudice toward. How do you think these lists would differ for people living in other regions of the United States besides the Midwest? How might they differ for people who are members of different ethnic groups?

Source: Based on data provided by Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien (2002).

Prejudice Legitimized	Prejudice Seen as Illegitimate
Rapists	Blind people
Child abusers	Women homemakers
Child molesters	People who are deaf
Wife beaters	People who are mentally impaired
Terrorists	Family men
Racists	Farmers
Ku Klux Klan members	Male nurses
Drunk drivers	Librarians
Nazi party members	Bowling league members
Pregnant women who drink alcohol	Dog owners

yoke themselves to their group. In a series of studies, fused and nonfused students were asked how they would respond to a moral dilemma. The dilemma they were confronted with has been referred to as the “trolley problem.” People are asked to imagine a runaway trolley that is about to kill five of their ingroup members, unless the participant jumps from a bridge onto the trolley’s path, thereby re-directing the trolley away from the others. Participants have to choose between letting the trolley crush five of their fellow ingroup members, or sacrificing themselves to save the five ingroup members (who were strangers to them). As you can see in Figure 6.16,

Figure 6.16 Identity Fusion: Willingness to Die for One’s Group

People who are “fused” see themselves as completely overlapping with their group. A greater percentage of those who were fused with their national group, Spain, were willing to sacrifice themselves to save ingroup members than were people who were not fused.

Description

75 percent of those who were fused with Spain chose to sacrifice themselves to save five other Spaniards, whereas only 24 percent of those who were not fused chose to do so.

When a person’s identity is fused with a group, it appears to create a willingness to undertake extreme forms of self-sacrifice to protect the group. This research provides us with insight into how emotional responses to others and extreme behavior can be influenced by people’s relationship to their group (fused or not fused) and how we categorize those who are at risk (“us” or “them”). For another perspective on how prejudice toward outgroups can stem from our own concerns—in this case existential threat—which stems from anxiety based on awareness of our own mortality, see the special section “What Research Tells Us About…The Role of Existential Threat in Prejudice.”

What Research Tells Us About… The Role of Existential Threat in Prejudice

Prejudice toward atheists is widespread in the United States and elsewhere; in fact, it is explicitly and more strongly endorsed than prejudice toward almost any other group including Muslims, ethnic minorities, and gay people (Franks & Scherr, 2014). American Christians are most likely to say they would not vote for an atheist for public office, perceive atheists as untrustworthy, and report feeling fear and disgust in response to this category. Why does the lack of belief in God elicit such intense prejudice? Atheists are likely to represent a threat to widely shared ingroup values and for this reason can be seen as threatening the existing social order that provides meaning.

How might people’s own existential anxiety—arising from awareness of our own mortality—affect prejudice toward atheists? Might such prejudice be especially high when our own mortality is salient, which brings questions of existential meaning to mind? Guided by terror management theory, which argues that awareness of death can evoke existential terror that can be reduced by adhering to prevailing cultural worldviews, recent research has addressed this question (Cook, Cohen, & Solomon, 2015). Given that the existence of atheists implies the cultural worldview of those who do believe in God is questionable, atheists are likely to be experienced as a strong existential threat. To test this straightforward idea, these researchers randomly assigned college students to think about “their own death” (the mortality salient condition) or a control condition in which they were to think about “a painful event.” After a delay, participants were asked about their feelings toward “Atheists” (people who do not believe in God) or “Quakers” (people who adhere to a small Christian organization), how much distance they would like to maintain between themselves and that group, and how much they would trust members of that group.

As you can see in Figure 6.17, Atheists were, overall, responded to more negatively than Quakers. However, the most extreme negative responses toward atheists were evoked when participants’ own mortality had been made salient. This same pattern of results was obtained for social distancing and distrust: When death was salient, participants wanted greater distance from atheists and distrusted them more than in the pain control condition. A subsequent study illustrated too that thinking about atheism made thoughts of death more accessible (like the morality salient condition) than in the control condition.

This research suggests that our own existential concerns can elicit prejudice toward a group that is seen as a fundamental threat to our cultural worldview that is adhered to as a means of protecting us from the terror of our own mortality. Indeed, the mere existence of atheists seems to arouse concerns about mortality.

Figure 6.17 Awareness of Our Own Mortality Affects Feelings Toward Atheists

Atheists are generally responded to negatively. However, feeling thermometer ratings are especially low so when our own mortality concerns have been activated.

Description

Key Points

Discrimination refers to the unfavorable treatment or negative actions directed toward members of disliked groups, which are believed to have essences that make them inferior to other groups. Whether discrimination will be expressed or not depends on the perceived norms or acceptability of doing so.
Research indicates that prejudice may reflect more specific underlying emotional responses toward different outgroups including fear, anger, guilt, pity, and disgust. Different behaviors are likely, depending on the emotional basis of the prejudice. Even incidental feelings caused by factors other than the outgroup can result in prejudice.
Implicit associations—links between group membership and evaluations—can be triggered automatically from categorizing others as ingroup or outgroup members.
Prejudice persists because derogating outgroups can protect our self-esteem. Threat to our group’s interests can motivate prejudice, and perceived competition between groups for resources can escalate conflict.
The Robber’s Cave study of two groups of boys at a summer camp who had been in conflict showed that superordinate goalstransformed zero-sum outcomes where only one group could get the desired outcome into shared outcomes that could only be obtained if the groups worked together. This reduced the conflict between the groups.
According to social identity theory, prejudice is derived from our tendency to divide the world into “us” and “them” and to view our own group more favorably than various outgroups. This is true even when the groups are formed on a minimal or trivial basis.
People may feel it is legitimate to display prejudice toward some groups, but it is seen as highly illegitimate to express prejudice toward other groups.
People who are fused with their group are particularly likely to say they would sacrifice their own life to save other ingroup members. Emotional responses to others and extreme behavior can be influenced by people’s relationship to their group (identity fusion) and how others are categorized (“us” or “them”).
Terror management theory argues that awareness of our own mortality can evoke existential threat that can be reduced by adhering to our cultural worldview. Because atheists represent an existential threat, they are especially likely to be responded to negatively when our mortality is salient.

What Research Tells Us About… The Role of Existential Threat in Prejudice

Figure 6.17 Awareness of Our Own Mortality Affects Feelings Toward Atheists

Atheists are generally responded to negatively. However, feeling thermometer ratings are especially low so when our own mortality concerns have been activated.

Description

Key Points

Discrimination refers to the unfavorable treatment or negative actions directed toward members of disliked groups, which are believed to have essences that make them inferior to other groups. Whether discrimination will be expressed or not depends on the perceived norms or acceptability of doing so.
Research indicates that prejudice may reflect more specific underlying emotional responses toward different outgroups including fear, anger, guilt, pity, and disgust. Different behaviors are likely, depending on the emotional basis of the prejudice. Even incidental feelings caused by factors other than the outgroup can result in prejudice.
Implicit associations—links between group membership and evaluations—can be triggered automatically from categorizing others as ingroup or outgroup members.
Prejudice persists because derogating outgroups can protect our self-esteem. Threat to our group’s interests can motivate prejudice, and perceived competition between groups for resources can escalate conflict.
The Robber’s Cave study of two groups of boys at a summer camp who had been in conflict showed that superordinate goalstransformed zero-sum outcomes where only one group could get the desired outcome into shared outcomes that could only be obtained if the groups worked together. This reduced the conflict between the groups.
According to social identity theory, prejudice is derived from our tendency to divide the world into “us” and “them” and to view our own group more favorably than various outgroups. This is true even when the groups are formed on a minimal or trivial basis.
People may feel it is legitimate to display prejudice toward some groups, but it is seen as highly illegitimate to express prejudice toward other groups.
People who are fused with their group are particularly likely to say they would sacrifice their own life to save other ingroup members. Emotional responses to others and extreme behavior can be influenced by people’s relationship to their group (identity fusion) and how others are categorized (“us” or “them”).
Terror management theory argues that awareness of our own mortality can evoke existential threat that can be reduced by adhering to our cultural worldview. Because atheists represent an existential threat, they are especially likely to be responded to negatively when our mortality is salient.

6.2: The Nature and Origins of Stereotyping

Objective

Evaluate how people form and use stereotypes

In everyday conversation, the terms stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are often used interchangeably. However, social psychologists have traditionally drawn a distinction between them by building on the more general attitude concept (see Chapter 5). That is, stereotypes are considered the cognitive component of attitudes toward a social group—specifically, beliefs about what a particular group is like. Prejudice is considered the affective component, or the feelings we have about a particular group. Discrimination concerns the behavioral component, or differential actions taken toward members of specific social groups.

According to this attitude approach, some groups are characterized by negative stereotypes and this leads to a general feeling of hostility (although, as we will see, there might actually be other types of emotions underlying prejudice toward different groups), which then results in a conscious intention to discriminate against members of the targeted group. As we describe recent research in this chapter, ask yourself the following question, which researchers are increasingly raising: “How well does the prevailing attitude approach to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination capture the phenomena of interest?” (Adams, Biernat, Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008). Are there questions and findings the attitude approach cannot address or account for? Are stereotypes about social groups always negative beliefs—for example, do we typically stereotype groups of which we are members in negative terms? Is prejudice always reflected in exclusion and hostility? Could there be such a thing as “benevolent prejudice”? Can discrimination occur without any conscious intention to do so? These are all issues that we will consider in this chapter.

6.2.1: Stereotyping: Beliefs about Social Groups

Stereotypes about groups are the beliefs and expectations that we have concerning what members of those groups are like. Stereotypes can include more than just traits; physical appearance, abilities, and behaviors are all common components of stereotypic expectancies (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Zhang, Schmader, & Forbes, 2009). The traits thought to distinguish between one group and another can be either positive or negative; they can be accurate or inaccurate, and may be either agreed with or rejected by members of the stereotyped group.

Gender stereotypes—beliefs concerning the characteristics of women and men—consist of both positive and negative traits (see Table6.1). Stereotypes of each gender are typically the converse of one another. For instance, on the positive side of the gender stereotype for women, they are viewed as being kind, nurturant, and considerate. On the negative side, they are viewed as being dependent, weak, and overly emotional. Thus, our collective portrait of women is that they are high on warmth but low on competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Indeed, perceptions of women are similar on these two dimensions to other groups (e.g., the elderly) who are seen as relatively low in status and nonthreatening (Eagly, 1987; Stewart, Vassar, Sanchez, & David, 2000).

Men too are assumed to have both positive and negative stereotypic traits (e.g., they are viewed as decisive, assertive, and accomplished, but also as aggressive, insensitive, and arrogant). Such a portrait—being perceived as high on competence but low on communal attributes—reflects men’s relatively high status (e.g., the category “rich people” is perceived similarly on these two dimensions; Cikara & Fiske, 2009). Interestingly, because of the strong emphasis on warmth in the stereotype for women, people tend to feel somewhat more positively about women on the whole compared to men—a finding described by Eagly and Mladinic (1994) as the “women are wonderful” effect.

Despite this greater perceived likeability, women face a key problem: The traits they supposedly possess tend to be viewed as less appropriate for high-status positions than the traits presumed to be possessed by men. Women’s traits make them seem appropriate for “support roles” rather than “leadership roles” (Eagly & Sczesny, 2009). Although dramatic change has occurred in the extent to which women participate in the labor force—from 20 percent in 1900 to 59 percent in 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007)—the vast majority of working women in the United States and other nations are in occupations that bring less status and monetary compensation than comparably skilled male-dominated occupations (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2006).

Stereotypes and the “Glass Ceiling”

Although there are clear organizational benefits of gender diversity in upper management in terms of developing new markets

Table 6.1 Traits Stereotypically Associated with Women and Men

As this list of stereotypic traits implies, women are seen as “nicer and warm,” whereas men are seen as more “competent and independent.”

SOURCE: Based on: Deaux & Kite, 1993; Eagly & Mladinic, 1994.

Female Traits	Male Traits
Warm	Competent
Emotional	Stable
Kind/polite	Tough/coarse
Sensitive	Self-confident
Follower	Leader
Weak	Strong
Friendly	Accomplished
Fashionable	Nonconformist
Gentle	Aggressive

and other forms of innovation (Ellemers, 2014), women continue to be underrepresented in the corporate world. Only 16 percent of corporate officers in the United States are women, and only about 1 percent of CEO positions in Fortune 500 companies are occupied by women (Catalyst, 2009; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). In other occupations, more progress can be seen. Although the political power structure remains heavily male dominated, women have been seeking elected office in record numbers (Center for American Women and Politics, 2010). In terms of high-level judicial appointments, in addition to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, with the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor in 2009 and Elena Kagan in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court now has its highest representation of women—33 percent. In science and health care, the percentage of women has grown too, although the gender wage gap continues to be substantial (Shen, 2013).

Despite the gains for women in these important institutions, in corporate settings, while women are making it into middle management they are infrequently found in the higher echelons. This situation, where women find it difficult to advance, may be indicative of a glass ceiling—a final barrier that prevents women, as a group, from reaching top positions in the workplace. Several studies have confirmed that a “think manager—think male” bias exists and can help explain how the glass ceiling is maintained (Bruckmüller & Branscombe, 2010; Schein, 2001). Because the stereotypic attributes of a “typical manager” overlap considerably with the “typical man” and share fewer attributes with the “typical woman,” this leads to a perceived “lack of fit” of women for positions of organizational leadership (Eagly & Sczesny, 2009; Heilman, 2001). The cartoon in Figure 6.6 provides an amusing illustration of how the perceived lack of fit of those newly entering the field and the group membership of typical leaders of the past may be perceived.

So is it just a matter of being perceived as “leadership material”? Not necessarily. Even when women do break through the glass ceiling, they experience less favorable outcomes in their careers because of their gender than do men (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Stroh, Langlands, & Simpson, 2004). For example, when women serve as leaders, they tend to receive lower evaluations from subordinates than males, even when

Figure 6.6 Progress Toward Gender Equality Is an Ongoing Process

As this cartoon illustrates, women’s (or the dragon’s) presence in male-dominated professions (the knights’ domain) represents a “good start,” but there might seem to be some fit issues between the old membership and the new leadership.

Description

they act similarly (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Lyness & Heilman, 2006). Indeed, those women who have been successful in competitive, male-dominated work environments are most likely to report experiencing gender discrimination compared to those in gender stereotypic occupations (Ellemers, 2014; Redersdorff, Martinot, & Branscombe, 2004), and they are especially likely to be evaluated negatively when their leadership style is task-focused or authoritarian (Eagly & Karau, 2002).

In other words, when women violate stereotypic expectancies concerning warmth and nurturance, and instead act according to the prototype of a leader, particularly in masculine domains, they are likely to face hostility and rejection (Bowles, 2013; Glick & Rudman, 2010). Violations of stereotype-based expectancies by women in the workplace appear to evoke threat in some men, particularly among those inclined to sexually harass (Maass, Cadinu, & Galdi, 2013). Indeed, both women and men seem to be aware of the consequences of appearing to violate gender stereotypic expectancies. Because of fear of the social punishments that are likely following such violations, when told that they were highly successful on a knowledge test typical of the other gender group, participants were more likely to lie about which test they performed well on and to hide their success from others (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). These results suggest that it takes a lot of courage to attempt to defy gender stereotypes!

Gender Stereotypes and the “Glass Cliff”

When, then, are women most likely to gain access to high-status positions—or break through the glass ceiling? Michelle Ryan and Alex Haslam offered the intriguing hypothesis that times of crisis may be “prime time” for women’s advancement. There are a host of individual examples that might seem to confirm the idea that women achieve leadership positions when “things are going downhill.” Here are a few examples: Shortly after Sunoco Oil’s shares fell by 52 percent in 2008, Lynn Laverty Elsenhans was appointed CEO. Kate Swann was appointed CEO of the bookseller, W.H. Smith following a substantial share price drop that required massive job cuts. And, not to leave out the political leadership realm, Johanna Siguroardottir was appointed the first female Prime Minister of Iceland shortly after that country’s economy collapsed. To investigate whether these examples are merely coincidental or represent a real phenomenon, in an intriguing series of studies, Ryan and Haslam (2005, 2007) provided evidence that women are indeed more likely to gain admittance to valued leadership positions when a crisis has occurred, the leadership position is more precarious, and there is greater risk of failure—what they refer to as the glass cliff effect.

In their first archival studies, they analyzed large companies on the London Stock Exchange, assessing their performance before new members were appointed to the board of directors. Ryan and Haslam (2005) found that companies that had experienced consistently poor stock performance in the months preceding the appointment were more likely to appoint a woman to their boards, whereas those that were performing well in the period before the appointment were unlikely to do so.

To ensure that “bad corporate performance history” was the cause of women being selected for these positions, in a series of experiments using different respondent populations (e.g., students, managers), these researchers found that when people were presented with an equally qualified male and female candidate, the female was selected significantly more often when the position was risky and the male candidate was selected more often when the situation was not risky (Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, Kulich, & Wilson-Kovacs, 2009). Table 6.2 provides a summary of the contexts studied and findings obtained. What these findings imply is that when men’s stereotypic leadership attributes appear not to be working because the organization that has been historically led by men is on a downhill trend, then women with their presumed stereotypic communal attributes are seen as suitable for leadership (Bruckmüller & Branscombe, 2010; Bruckmüller, Ryan, Rink, & Haslam, 2014).

Consequences of Token Women in High Places

Does the success of those individual women who do break through the glass ceiling in politics (e.g., see Figure 6.7)

Table 6.2 Are Women Most Likely to Be Appointed to Leadership Positions Under Risky Conditions?

Research reveals that women are more likely to be selected for precarious leadership positions, whereas men are more likely to be selected when there are “good prospects” of success.

SOURCE: Based on research summarized in Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, Kulich, and Wilson-Kovacs (2009).

As shown in this table, research reveals that women are consistently more likely to be selected compared to men for precarious leadership positions, whereas men are more likely to be selected when there are “good prospects” of success.

Conditions under which women have been found to be placed on “the glass cliff”: respondents were provided with information about two equally qualified candidates and they favor selecting the woman over the man when:

The organizational unit to be managed is in crisis, rather than when it is running smoothly
Financial director for large company is to be hired when the company is on a downward trajectory versus an upward trajectory
An attorney is appointed to a legal case that is doomed to fail, rather than when it has a good chance of success
A director for a music festival is selected when it is declining in popularity, rather than when it is increasing in popularity
A political candidate is selected to run when the election is unwinnable versus certain to win
CEO hired for a supermarket chain that is losing money and closing stores versus making money and opening new stores

make discrimination seem less plausible as an explanation for other women’s relative lack of success? To the extent that such numerically infrequent high-status women is taken as evidence that gender no longer matters, people may infer that the relative infrequency of women in high places is due to their lacking the necessary qualities or motivation to succeed. For this reason, the success of a few women may obscure the structural nature of the disadvantages that women on the whole still face. Thus, the presence of a few successful women can lead those who do not achieve similar success to believe that they “lack the merit” needed to succeed (Castilla & Benard, 2010; Schmitt, Ellemers, & Branscombe, 2003).

A number of laboratory experiments have confirmed that tokenism—where only a few members of a previously excluded group are admitted—can be a highly effective strategy for deterring collective protest in disadvantaged groups. For instance,

Figure 6.7 Do Visible High-Status Women Lead Us to Believe That Discrimination Is a Thing of the Past?

Hillary Clinton, contender for the U.S. Presidency in 2016, and other female leaders including Janet Yellen, Chair of the Federal Reserve, may suggest to ordinary women and men that group membership is no longer an important impediment for getting ahead.

allowing even a small percentage (e.g., 2 percent) of low-status group members to advance into a higher-status group deters collective resistance and leads disadvantaged group members to favor individual attempts to overcome barriers (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

What effect does exposure to visible tokens have on women and men who are observers? Might it make ordinary women and men complacent with regard to the ongoing barriers that women as a group face, and result in beliefs that help to maintain the status quo? Research has explored the consequences of exposure to token practices within an organization (Danaher & Branscombe, 2010). In one experiment, university women were first told that Boards of Regents govern universities in the United States. They were then told that the composition of the board at their university had been stable over the past 10 years and they were given a list of 10 fictitious names of people on the board. In the “open” condition, five of the names were female; in the “token” condition, only one name was female; in the “closed” condition, no female names were present, so all 10 board member names were male. The women were then asked to imagine that a seat on their Board of Regents had been vacated and that they were offered the newly opened seat. From this perspective, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they would identify with the organization, and they completed a measure assessing their beliefs about meritocracy (e.g., “All people have equal opportunity to succeed”).

In both the open and token conditions, women reported believing in meritocracy more than in the closed condition. Likewise, in both the open and token conditions, the participants reported greater identification with the organization than in the closed condition. This means that token conditions—to the same degree as when there is equal gender representation—encourages women to maintain their faith that they can move up and engenders allegiance to organizations where they are substantially underrepresented. In a subsequent experiment, both men and women were asked to imagine serving as an employee in an organization whose hiring policies resulted in 50 percent of employees being women (open), 10 percent were women (token), or only 2 percent were women (virtually closed). The open condition was seen as more fair to women and the closed condition was seen as more fair to men, but the token condition was perceived by both genders as equally fair for women and men. Token practices, therefore, appear to serve to maintain the status quo by making women’s token representation in organizational settings appear fair.

There are other negative consequences of tokenism, especially when the subsequent performance and well-being of the people occupying those positions are considered. First, people who are hired as token representatives of their groups are perceived quite negatively by other members of the organization (Fuegen & Biernat, 2002; Yoder & Berendsen, 2001). In a sense then, such tokens are “set up” to be marginalized by their coworkers. Job applicants who are identified as “affirmative action hirees” are perceived as less competent by people reviewing their files than applicants who are not identified in this manner (Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992). Second, as shown in Figure 6.8, when Brown, Charnsangavej, Keough, Newman, and Rentfrow (2000) told some women that they were selected to lead a group because “there was a quota for their gender,” the women’s performance in that role was undermined compared to when the women were led to believe that their qualifications as well as their gender played a role in their selection.

Figure 6.8 Believing You Are Selected Strictly Based on Gender Leads to Underperformance

When women were told that they were selected because of a quota, their leadership performance was reduced compared to when they believed their qualifications also played a role in their selection, or when no information was given about why they were made leader.

Description

In whatever form it occurs, research indicates that tokenism can have at least two negative effects. First, it lets prejudiced people off the hook; they can point to the token as public proof that they are not really bigoted, and the presence of a token helps to maintain perceptions that the existing system is fair—even among members of the disadvantaged group. Second, it can be damaging to the self-esteem and confidence of the targets of prejudice, including those few people who are selected as tokens.

Responses to Those Who Speak Out about Discrimination

What happens when tokens or other targets of discrimination complain about their treatment? Complaining about unjust circumstances can serve a useful function (Kowalski, 1996). It draws people’s attention to unfairness, which can ultimately bring about improvement. But, complaining can be also construed as attempting to escape personal responsibility and that is one reason that observers might be suspicious of it.

To test this idea, Kaiser and Miller (2001) told participants about an African American student who attributed his negative grade on an essay to racial discrimination (the “complaint” condition), or that he accepted responsibility for his bad outcome (the “I’m responsible” condition). Regardless of whether the white perceivers in the study thought the bad grade was due to discrimination or not, they evaluated the student more negatively in the “complaint” condition than in the “I’m responsible” condition. Thus, even when we as observers think that another person’s negative outcome is not that person’s fault, we have a negative impression when that individual does not accept responsibility for the outcome and instead attributes it (accurately) to discrimination!

Moreover, members of the complainer’s own ingroup may disapprove of discrimination claimers, when they believe it could suggest to outgroup members that the ingroup is given to unjustified griping (Garcia, Horstman Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005). Only when the complainer’s ingroup believes that the complaint is appropriate because the discrimination is serious and that complaining is likely to improve the situation of the group as a whole are they likely to support a fellow ingroup member who complains about discriminatory treatment (Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Ellemers, 2010).

Perhaps actual business managers would be concerned about fairness in their own organizations and therefore be responsive to people who claim to have experienced racial discrimination. To assess this possibility, Kaiser et al. (2013) randomly assigned white business managers to first consider what their company does to increase diversity or to a control condition where they considered what their company does to increase environmental sustainability. These managers were then presented with a detailed case file documenting racial discrimination, which they were to consider as though it occurred in their own company. The managers who had first thought about their diversity efforts, perceived the discrimination claim as less legitimate, less of a cause for concern, and importantly, reported being less willing to support the employee filing the discrimination claim compared to managers who had not thought about their diversity efforts. These researchers point out that organizations with diversity structures in place could create the “illusion of fairness” and, ironically, undermine majority group members sensitivity to actual discrimination against minorities and ultimately produce more negative responses to minorities who do claim discrimination.

6.2.2: Is Stereotyping Absent If Members of Different Groups Are Rated the Same?

Most of us would be quick to answer this question with a definite “Yes,” but we would be wrong! Biernat’s (2012) work on shifting standardsindicates that although the same evaluation ratings can be given to members of different groups, stereotypes may have influenced those ratings. Furthermore, those identical evaluation ratings given to members of different groups will not necessarily translate into the same behavioral expectations for the people rated—suggesting that stereotyping has occurred.

How does this work? People can use different standards—but the same words—to describe different objects. For example, I may say that I have a large cat and a small car, but I don’t mean that my large cat is anywhere near the size of my small car! When I use the word large to describe both a car and a cat, I am using different comparisons (“large as cats go” and “small compared to other cars”).

Likewise, for judgments of people, I may use the same sort of language to describe two basketball players whom I believe will actually perform quite differently. Consider the two basketball players shown in Figure 6.9. I might refer to the 10-year-old basketball player as “great,” but that does not mean the same thing as when I say my favorite NBA player is “great.” The 10-year-old is excellent in comparison to other child players, whereas the NBA player is excellent in comparison to other professional players. Terms such as good–bad and small–large can mask our use of different standards or comparisons—in this case, age. But other standards are available—standards that will always mean the same thing no matter what is being referred to. That is, when rating a basketball player, I might use a standard such as “percentage of free throws made”; such a standard is the same no matter who (the 10-year-old or the NBA player) is attempting to sink those shots from the free-throw line. These standards are referred to as objective scales, because the meaning is the same no matter who they are applied to, whereas standards that can take on different meanings, depending on who they are applied to, are called subjective scales. Because people shift the meaning with subjective standards and language, it allows for real stereotyping effects to be present, even when the same rating is given to two quite different targets.

How might this play out when a person has to evaluate a male and a female to decide which should be promoted to management? If the evaluator believes that males have more competence in management than females, although both the female and male candidates are rated “good” on business success likelihood, that “good” rating will translate into different things on measures whose meaning is the same no matter who is rated. So when asked to rate the male and female applicants on their potential

Figure 6.9 Does It Mean the Same Thing When Different People Are Rated the Same?

We might give both the young player on the left and the NBA player on the right a “6” on a 1 to 6 (“very poor to very good”) subjective rating scale. But the “6” rating for the boy might translate into low expectations for his ability to consistently sink baskets, whereas the “6” for the professional player would translate into high expectations for sinking baskets (percentage of shots sunk being an objective scale with a constant meaning no matter who it is applied to).

sales capabilities in dollars they will sell per year, the male may be rated higher on this objective measure than the female applicant. Thus, the use of subjective rating scales can conceal the presence of stereotypical judgments, whereas use of objective scales tends to expose them. Numerous studies have supported the process where “same” ratings on subjective scales do not mean “equal” on objective scales, or the absence of stereotyping. In fact, the more people show evidence of using shifting race-based standards, the more they behaviorally discriminate against black job candidates (Biernat, Collins, Katzarska-Miller, & Thompson, 2009).

6.2.3: Can We Be Victims of Stereotyping and Not Even Recognize It: The Case of Single People

Do people always recognize when they stereotype themselves and others? Or, are there circumstances in which we might largely concur with widely held stereotypes—even ones that reflect poorly on ourselves? DePaulo (2006) points out one intriguing instance of this in her research on singlism—the negative stereotyping and discrimination that is directed toward people who are single. In a study of over 1,000 undergraduates, DePaulo and Morris (2006) measured how single and married people are characterized. As shown in Table 6.3, the attributes these primarily single participants used to describe “singles” are fairly negative, particularly in contrast to how they described “married” people. And, the differences in the descriptions spontaneously used to describe these groups was often quite substantial: 50 percent of the time, married people were described as kind, giving, and caring, but those attributes were applied to single people only 2 percent of the time. Furthermore, this difference in how married and single people are stereotyped is even greater when the targets are described as over 40 years old compared to when they were said to be 25 years of age. In fact, people who choose to be single are perceived as lonelier, less sociable, and more miserable than those who are not single by choice (Slonim, Gur-Yaish, & Katz, 2015).

Table 6.3 Traits Stereotypically Associated with Single and Married People

As this list of stereotypic traits illustrates, single people are stereotyped in largely negative terms, whereas those who are married are characterized in terms of more positive attributes.

SOURCE: Compiled based on DePaulo and Morris (2006).

Traits of Single People	Traits of Married People
Immature	Mature
Insecure	Stable
Self-centered	Kind
Unhappy	Happy
ugly	Honest
Lonely	Loving
Independent	Giving

DePaulo and Morris (2006) suggest that negative stereotyping and discrimination against singles serve to protect and glorify an important social institution—marriage—and this is a central reason that it is so widespread and heavily legitimized. Singles, by definition, challenge the existing belief system that finding and marrying one’s soulmate is crucial to having a meaningful life. By derogating those who challenge that idea, we can all believe in vital cultural “myths.” Consider how just knowing that the people shown in Figure 6.10 have chosen to be single or are part of a couple can change what inferences we might make about what they are likely to be like.

6.2.4: Why Do People Form and Use Stereotypes?

Stereotypes often function as schemas, which as we saw in Chapter 2 are cognitive frameworks for organizing, interpreting, and recalling information. So, categorizing people according to their group membership can be efficient for human beings who may invest little cognitive effort in many situations. Thus, one important reason people hold stereotypes is that doing so can conserve the cognitive effort that may be used for other tasks (Bodenhausen, 1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). According to this view, we rely on our stereotypes when responding to others because it is easy.

But which stereotype are we most likely to use—if people can be categorized in terms of several different group memberships? Consider the person shown in Figure 6.11. Are we most likely to stereotype her as a woman, Asian American, or waitress? Both ethnicity and gender are categories that people frequently employ, but given the restaurant context and our interaction with her as a customer, research suggests that people would be most likely to stereotype her in terms of her occupation (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). Indeed, as you will see later in this chapter, stereotypes can serve important motivational

Figure 6.10 How Does Being Single or Part of a Couple Influence Perceptions of People?

Do the single people in Panels A and B seem more self-centered and less well-adjusted compared to when we see them as part of a couple as shown in Panel C? Research suggests this is the case.

Figure 6.11 What Stereotype Is Most Likely to Be Applied to Predict This Person’s Behavior?

Even though ethnicity and gender are basic categories that are readily employed, given the context, we may be particularly likely to perceive this person in terms of her occupational role.

Stereotypes: How They Operate

Do Stereotypes Ever Change?

Key Points

Stereotypes are beliefs about what members of a particular group are like. Prejudice is the feelings component of our reactions toward particular groups, and discrimination is differential behavior that is directed toward members of specific groups.
Gender stereotypes—beliefs about the different attributes that males and females possess—act as schemas for interpreting their actions and outcomes. Women are stereotyped as high on warmth, but low on competence, while men are stereotyped as low on warmth, but high on competence.
A glass ceiling exists such that women encounter more barriers than men in their careers, and as a result find it difficult to move into top positions. Women are especially likely to be affected in the workplace by the “think manager–think male” bias.
Women who violate stereotypic expectancies, especially on the warmth dimension, are likely to face hostility. Defying gender stereotypes can be difficult for both women and men.
Women are most likely to be appointed to leadership positions when a crisis has occurred, the position is more precarious, and there is a greater risk of failure, which has been referred to as the glass cliff effect. When men’s stereotypic attributes appear to have led the organization downhill, then women’s presumed stereotypic communal attributes are seen as suitable in a new leader.
Tokenism—the hiring or acceptance of only a few members of a particular group has two effects: It maintains perceptions that the system is not discriminatory and it harms how tokens are perceived by others and can undermine performance when they believe their appointment to leadership positions was without regard to their merit. Exposure to token conditions can maintain people’s perceptions of fairness and their belief in meritocracy.
Publicly claiming discrimination as a cause of one’s outcomes can produce negative responses by both outgroup and ingroup members, albeit for different reasons. Managers who have considered their diversity efforts are the least supportive of those who complain about racial discrimination.
Stereotypes can influence behavior even in the absence of different subjective scale ratings. When objective scale measures are employed, where shifting standards cannot occur and the meaning of the response is constant, the effect of stereotypes can be observed.
In the case of singlism—negative stereotyping and discrimination directed toward people who are single—both single and married people show the effect. Singlism may stem from the targets being unaware of the discrimination they face, or because they too see it as legitimate to be biased against their group.
Stereotypes lead us to attend to information that is consistent with them and to construe inconsistent information in ways that allow us to maintain our stereotypes. When a person’s actions are strongly stereotype discrepant, we subtype that person as a special case that proves the rule and do not change our stereotypes.
Stereotypes change as the relations between the groups are altered. Those who are exposed to women in nontraditional roles show reductions in gender stereotyping.