Read case 3 titled "Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison" on pages 568 - 570 in your textbook.Answer the case questions below as they are DIFFERENT from the textbook questions:1. Do you feel the alt

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 432 U.S. 63

(1977)

Employer was unable to accommodate employee’s religious conflict of working on the Sabbath, without

undue hardship. The Court set forth the guidelines for determining what constitutes undue hardship.

White, J.

***

Case3

The employee, Hardison, was employed by Trans World

Airlines (TWA), in a department that operated 24 hours a

day throughout the year in connection with an airplane

maintenance and overhaul base. Hardison was subject to

a seniority system in a collective bargaining agreement

between TWA and the International Association of Machinists

& Aerospace Workers (union), whereby the most

senior employees have first choice for job and shift assignments

as they become available, and the most junior

employees are required to work when enough employees

to work at a particular time or in a particular job to fill

TWA’s needs cannot be found.

Because Hardison’s religious beliefs prohibit him

from working on Saturdays, attempts were made to accommodate

him, and these were temporarily successful

mainly because on his job at the time he had sufficient

seniority regularly to observe Saturday as his Sabbath.

But when he sought, and was transferred to, another job

where he was asked to work Saturdays and where he had

low seniority, problems began to arise. TWA agreed to

permit the union to seek a change of work assignments,

but the union was not willing to violate the seniority system,

and Hardison had insufficient seniority to bid for a

shift having Saturdays off. After TWA rejected a proposal

that Hardison work only four days a week on the

ground that this would impair critical functions in the

airline operations, no accommodation could be reached,

and Hardison was discharged for refusing to work on

Saturdays.

We hold that TWA, which made reasonable efforts to

accommodate Hardison’s religious needs, did not violate

Title VII, and each of the Court of Appeals’ suggested

alternatives would have been an undue hardship within

the meaning of the statute as construed by the EEOC

guidelines. The employer’s statutory obligation to make

reasonable accommodation for the religious observances

of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship, is

clear, but the reach of that obligation has never been

spelled out by Congress or by EEOC guidelines. With

this in mind, we turn to a consideration of whether TWA

has met its obligation under Title VII to accommodate

the religious observances of its employees.

The Court of Appeals held that TWA had not made

reasonable efforts to accommodate Hardison’s religious

needs. In its view, TWA had rejected three reasonable

alternatives, any one of which would have satisfied its

obligation without undue hardship. First, within the

framework of the seniority system, TWA could have

permitted Hardison to work a four-day week, utilizing

in his place a supervisor or another worker on duty

elsewhere. That this would have caused other shop

functions to suffer was insufficient to amount to undue

hardship in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Second,

also within the bounds of the collective-bargaining

contract the company could have filled Hardison’s

Saturday shift from other available personnel competent

to do the job, of which the court said there were at least

200. That this would have involved premium overtime

pay was not deemed an undue hardship. Third, TWA

could have arranged a “swap between Hardison and

another employee either for another shift or for the Sabbath

days.” In response to the assertion that this would

have involved a breach of the seniority provisions of the

contract, the court noted that it had not been settled in

the courts whether the required statutory accommodation

to religious needs stopped short of transgressing

seniority rules, but found it unnecessary to decide the

issue because, as the Court of Appeals saw the record,

TWA had not sought, and the union had therefore not

declined to entertain, a possible variance from the

seniority provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement.

The company had simply left the entire matter to

the union steward who the Court of Appeals said “likewise

did nothing.”

We disagree with the Court of Appeals in all relevant

respects. It is our view that TWA made reasonable efforts

Chapter Eleven Religious Discrimination 529

to accommodate and that each of the suggested alternatives

would have been an undue hardship within the

meaning of the statute as construed by the EEOC

guidelines.

It might be inferred from the Court of Appeals’ opinion

and from the brief of the EEOC in this Court that

TWA’s efforts to accommodate were no more than negligible.

The findings of the District Court, supported by

the record, are to the contrary. In summarizing its more

detailed findings, the District Court observed:

“TWA established as a matter of fact that it did take

appropriate action to accommodate as required by

Title VII. It held several meetings with plaintiff at

which it attempted to find a solution to plaintiff’s

problems. It did accommodate plaintiff’s observance

of his special religious holidays. It authorized

the union steward to search for someone who

would swap shifts, which apparently was normal

procedure.”

It is also true that TWA itself attempted without success

to find Hardison another job. The District Court’s

view was that TWA had done all that could reasonably be

expected within the bounds of the seniority system.

We are also convinced, contrary to the Court of Appeals,

that TWA itself cannot be faulted for having failed

to work out a shift or job swap for Hardison. Both the

union and TWA had agreed to the seniority system; the

union was unwilling to entertain a variance over the objections

of men senior to Hardison; and for TWA to have

arranged unilaterally for a swap would have amounted to

a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement.

Hardison and the EEOC insist that the statutory

obligation to accommodate religious needs takes precedence

over both the collective-bargaining contract and

the seniority rights of TWA’s other employees. We agree

that neither a collective-bargaining contract nor a

seniority system may be employed to violate the statute,

but we do not believe that the duty to accommodate

requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise

valid agreement. Collective bargaining, aimed at

effecting workable and enforceable agreements between

management and labor, lies at the core of our national

labor policy, and seniority provisions are universally

included in these contracts. Without a clear and express

indication from Congress, we cannot agree with

Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-upon seniority

system must give way when necessary to accommodate

religious observances.

The Court of Appeals also suggested that TWA

could have permitted Hardison to work a four-day week

if necessary in order to avoid working on his Sabbath.

Recognizing that this might have left TWA shorthanded

on the one shift each week that Hardison did

not work, the court still concluded that TWA would

suffer no undue hardship if it were required to replace

Hardison either with supervisory personnel or with

qualified personnel from other departments. Alternatively,

the Court of Appeals suggested that TWA could

have replaced Hardison on his Saturday shift with other

available employees through the payment of premium

wages. Both of these alternatives would involve costs to

TWA, either in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs

or higher wages.

To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost

in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue

hardship. Like abandonment of the seniority system, to

require TWA to bear additional costs when no such costs

are incurred to give other employees the days off that

they want would involve unequal treatment of employees

on the basis of their religion. By suggesting that TWA

should incur certain costs in order to give Hardison

Saturdays off the Court of Appeals would in effect require

TWA to finance an additional Saturday off and then

to choose the employee who will enjoy it on the basis of

his religious beliefs. While incurring extra costs to secure

a replacement for Hardison might remove the necessity

of compelling another employee to work involuntarily in

Hardison’s place, it would not change the fact that the

privilege of having Saturdays off would be allocated

according to religious beliefs. While the cost may seem

small for one employee compared to TWA’s resources,

TWA may have many employees who need such

accommodation.