1. Do you agree with President Jackson's conclusions of the necessity for an Indian Removal Policy? Why or why not?2. Do you agree with President Jackson's assessment of the faults of the Bank of the
A series of prim ary documents pertaining to Andrew
Jackson and his v ision for America
1. Andrew Jackson’s Annual Message to Congress on Indian Removal
(December 6, 1830)
Prior to the modern practice of giving a “State of the Union Address,” U.S. Presidents from Thomas Jefferson
until Woodrow Wilson submitted a written report to Congress to be read before both houses outlining the
administration’s policies and outlook for the nation. In this message, Pre sident Andrew Jackson articulated
his support of the Indian Removal Act passed by Congress earlier that same year as a necessary requirement
for the growth and prosperity of the “southwestern frontier” as well as a humanitarian gesture towards the
native p eoples of the region.
2. President Jackson's Veto Message Regardin g the Bank of the United
States ’ Renewed Charter (July 10, 1832 )
This formal message to Congress explaining President Jackson ’s decision to veto a bill renewing the charter
for the Bank of the United States offers a glimpse at Jackson ’s views on the evolution of the American
economy and his concerns about the path upon which it was progressing.
3. President Jackson's Procl amation Regarding Nullification (December 10,
1832 )
President Jackson believed South Carolina ’s a ttempts to nullify federal law could se t a terrib le precedent. In
expressing his oppo sition to the concept of Nullifi cation, Jackson foreshadowe d the specter of secession and
crisis that could rip the very fabric of the Union.
1. Andrew Jackson’s December 6, 1830 Annual Message to Congress
. . . . It gives me pleasure to announce to Congress that the benevolent policy of the Government, steadily pursued for
nearly thirty years, in relation to the removal of the Indians beyond the white settlements is approaching to a happy
consummation. Two important tribes have accepted the provision made for their removal at the last session of
Congress, and it is believed that their example will induce the remaining tribes also to seek the s ame obvious
advantages.
The consequences of a speedy removal will be important to the United States, to individual States, and to the
Indians themselves. The pecuniary advantages which it promises to the Government are the least of its
recommendations. It puts an end to all possible danger of collision between the authorities of the General and State
Governments on account of the Indians. It will place a dense and civilized population in large tracts of country now
occupied by a few savage hunters. By open ing the whole territory between Tennessee on the north and Louisiana on
the south to the settlement of the whites it will incalculably strengthen the southwestern frontier and render the adjacent
States strong enough to repel future invasions without remot e aid. It will relieve the whole State of Mississippi and
the western part of Alabama of Indian occupancy, and enable those States to advance rapidly in population, wealth,
and power. It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them from the power
of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude institutions; will retard the
progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protect ion of the
Government and through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting,
civilized, and Christian community.
What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our
extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms embellished with all the improvements which
art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings
of liberty, civili zation and religion?
The present policy of the Government is but a continuation of the same progressive change by a milder
process. The tribes which occupied the countries now constituting the Eastern States were annihilated or have melted
away to make roo m for the whites. The waves of population and civilization are rolling to the westward, and we now propose to acquire the countries occupied by the red men of the South and West by a fair exchange, and, at the expense
of the United States, to send them to land where their existence may be prolonged and perhaps made perpetual.
Doubtless it will be painful to leave the graves of their fathers; but what do they more than our ancestors did or than
our children are now doing? To better their condition in an unkn own land our forefathers left all that was dear in
earthly objects. Our children by thousands yearly leave the land of their birth to seek new homes in distant regions.
Does Humanity weep at these painful separations from everything, animate and inanimate, with which the young heart
has become entwined? Far from it. It is rather a source of joy that our country affords scope where our young
population may range unconstrained in body or in mind, developing the power and facilities of man in their highest
per fection. These remove hundreds and almost thousands of miles at their own expense, purchase the lands they
occupy, and support themselves at their new homes from the moment of their arrival. Can it be cruel in this
Government when, by events which it can n ot control, the Indian is made discontented in his ancient home to purchase
his lands, to give him a new and extensive territory, to pay the expense of his removal, and support him a year in his
new abode? How many thousands of our own people would gladly embrace the opportunity of removing to the West
on such conditions! If the offers made to the Indians were extended to them, they would be hailed with gratitude and
joy.
And is it supposed that the wandering savage has a stronger attachment to his home tha n the settled, civilized
Christian? Is it more afflicting to him to leave the graves of his fathers than it is to our brothers and children? Rightly
considered, the policy of the General Government toward the red man is not only liberal, but generous. He i s unwilling
to submit to the laws of the States and mingle with their population. To save him from this alternative, or perhaps utter
annihilation, the General Government kindly offers him a new home, and proposes to pay the whole expense of his
removal an d settlement.
2. President Jackson's Veto Message Regardin g the Bank of the United States (July 10,
1832 )
WASHINGTON, July 10, 1832.
To the Senate.
The bill "to modify and continue " the act entitled "An act to incorp orate the subscribers to the Bank of the
United States " was presented to me on the 4th July instant. Having considered it with that solemn regard to the
principles of the Constitution which the day was calculated to inspire, and come to the conclusion tha t it ought not to
become a law, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which it originated, with my objections.
A bank of the United States is in many respects convenient for the Government and useful to the people.
Entertaining this opinion, and deeply i mpressed with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by
the existing bank are unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the
liberties of the people, I felt it my duty at an early period of my Administration to call the attention of Congress to the
practicability of organizing an institution combining all its advantages and obviating these objections. I sincerely
regret that in the act before me I can perceive none of those modifications o f the bank charter which are necessary, in
my opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound policy, or with the Constitution of our country.
The present corporate body, denominated the president, directors, and company of the Bank of the United States, will
have existed at the time this act is intended to take effect twenty years. It enjoys an exclusive privilege of banking
under the authority of the General Government, a monopoly of its favor and support, and, as a necessary consequence,
almost a monopoly of the foreign and domestic exchange. The powers, privileges, and favors bestowed upon it in the
original charter, by increasing the value of the stock far above its par value, operated as a gratuity of many millions to
the stockholders.
An apo logy may be found for the failure to guard against this result in the consideration that the effect of the
original act of incorporation could not be certainly foreseen at the time of its passage. The act before me proposes
another gratuity to the holders of the same stock, and in many cases to the same men, of at least seven millions more.
This donation finds no apology in any uncertainty as to the effect of the act. On all hands it is conceded that its passage
will increase at least so or 30 per cent more the market price of the stock, subject to the payment of the annuity of
$200,000 per year secured by the act, thus adding in a moment one -fourth to its par value. It is not our own citizens only who are to receive the bounty of our Government. More than e ight millions of the stock of this bank are held by
foreigners. By this act the American Republic proposes virtually to make them a present of some millions of dollars.
For these gratuities to foreigners and to some of our own opulent citizens the act secu res no equivalent whatever. They
are the certain gains of the present stockholders under the operation of this act, after making full allowance for the
payment of the bonus.
Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the pub lic, which ought to receive a fair
equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to bestow on the stockholders of the existing bank must come
directly or indirectly out of the earnings of the American people. It is due to them, therefore, if their Government sell
monopolies and exclusive privileges, that they should at least exact for them as much as they are worth in open market.
The value of the monopoly in this case may be correctly ascertained. The twenty -eight millions of stock would
probably b e at an advance of 50 per cent, and command in market at least $42,000,000, subject to the payment of the
present bonus. The present value of the monopoly, therefore, is $17,000,000, and this the act proposes to sell for three
millions, payable in fifteen annual installments of $200,000 each.
It is not conceivable how the present stockholders can have any claim to the special favor of the Government.
The present corporation has enjoyed its monopoly during the period stipulated in the original contract. If we must
have such a corporation, why should not the Government sell out the whole stock and thus secure to the people the
full market value of the privileges granted? Why should not Congress create and sell twenty -eight millions of stock,
incorporating the purchasers with all the powers and privileges secured in this act and putting the premium upon the
sales into the Treasury?
But this act does not permit competition in the purchase of this monopoly. It seems to be predicated on the
erroneous idea that the present stockholders have a prescriptive right not only to the favor but to the bounty of
Government. It appears that more t han a fourth part of the stock is held by foreigners and the residue is held by a few
hundred of our own citizens, chiefly of the richest class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole American
people from competition in the purchase of this mono poly and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth.
This seems the less excusable because some of our citizens not now stockholders petitioned that the door of
competition might be opened, and offered to take a charter on terms much more favora ble to the Government and
country. But this proposition, although made by men whose aggregate wealth is believed to be equal to all the private stock in
the existing bank, has been set aside, and the bounty of our Government is proposed to be again bestow ed on the few
who have been fortunate enough to secure the stock and at this moment wield the power of the existing institution. I
can not perceive the justice or policy of this course. If our Government must sell monopolies, it would seem to be its
duty t o take nothing less than their full value, and if gratuities must be made once in fifteen or twenty years let them
not be bestowed on the subjects of a foreign government nor upon a designated and favored class of men in our own
country. It is but justice and good policy, as far as the nature of the case will admit, to confine our favors to our own
fellow -citizens, and let each in his turn enjoy an opportunity to profit by our bounty. In the bearings of the act before
me upon these points I find ample reaso ns why it should not become a law.
It has been urged as an argument in favor of rechartering the present bank that the calling in its loans will
produce great embarrassment and distress. The time allowed to close its concerns is ample, and if it has been well
managed its pressure will be light, and heavy only in case its management has been bad. If, therefore, it shall produce
distress, the fault will be its own, and it would furnish a reason against renewing a power which has been so obviously
abused. But will there ever be a time when this reason will be less powerful? To acknowledge its force is to admit that
the bank ought to be perpetual, and as a consequence the present stockholders and those inheriting their rights as
successors be established a priv ileged order, clothed both with great political power and enjoying immense pecuniary
advantages from their connection with the Government.
The modifications of the existing charter proposed by this act are not such, in my view, as make it consistent
with the rights of the States or the liberties of the people. The qualification of the right of the bank to hold real estate,
the limitation of its power to establish branches, and the power reserved to Congress to forbid the circulation of small
notes are rest rictions comparatively of little value or importance. All the objectionable principles of the existing
corporation, and most of its odious features, are retained without alleviation.
The fourth section provides " that the notes or bills of the said corpor ation, although the same be, on the faces thereof,
respectively made payable at one place only, shall nevertheless be received by the said corporation at the bank or at
any of the offices of discount and deposit thereof if tendered in liquidation or paymen t of any balance or balances due
to said corporation or to such office of discount and deposit from any other incorporated bank." This provision secures
to the State banks a legal privilege in the Bank of the United States which is withheld from all privat e citizens. If a
State bank in Philadelphia owe the Bank of the United States and have notes issued by the St. Louis branch, it can pay the debt with those notes, but if a merchant, mechanic, or other private citizen be in like circumstances he can not by
law pay his debt with those notes, but must sell them at a discount or send them to St. Louis to be cashed. This boon
conceded to the State banks, though not unjust in itself, is most odious because it does not measure out equal justice
to the high and the low, the rich and the poor. To the extent of its practical effect it is a bond of union among the
banking establishments of the nation, erecting them into an interest separate from that of the people, and its necessary
tendency is to unite the Bank of the United States and the State banks in any measure which may be thought conducive
to their common interest.
The ninth section of the act recognizes principles of worse tendency than any provision of the present charter.
It enacts that " the cashier of the bank shall annually report to the Secretary of the Treasury the names of all
stockholders who are not resident citizens of the United States, and on the application of the treasurer of any State
shall make out and transmit to such treasurer a list of stoc kholders residing in or citizens of such State, with the amount
of stock owned by each." Although this provision, taken in connection with a decision of the Supreme Court,
surrenders, by its silence, the right of the States to tax the banking institutions created by this corporation under the
name of branches throughout the Union, it is evidently intended to be construed as a concession of their right to tax
that portion of the stock which may be held by their own citizens and residents. In this light, if t he act becomes a law,
it will be understood by the States, who will probably proceed to levy a tax equal to that paid upon the stock of banks
incorporated by themselves. In some States that tax is now I per cent, either on the capital or on the shares, and that
may be assumed as the amount which all citizen or resident stockholders would be taxed under the operation of this
act. As it is only the stock held in the States and not that employed within them which would be subject to taxation,
and as the names of foreign stockholders are not to be reported to the treasurers of the States, it is obvious that the
stock held by them will be exempt from this burden. Their annual profits will therefore be I per cent more than the
citizen stockholders, and as the annu al dividends of the bank may be safely estimated at 7 per cent, the stock will be
worth 10 or 15 per cent more to foreigners than to citizens of the United States. To appreciate the effects which this
state of things will produce, we must take a brief revi ew of the operations and present condition of the Bank of the
United States.
By documents submitted to Congress at the present session it appears that on the 1st of January, 1832, of the
twenty -eight millions of private stock in the corporation, $8,405,50 0 were held by foreigners, mostly of Great Britain.
The amount of stock held in the nine Western and Southwestern States is $140,200, and in the four Southern States is $5,623,100, and in the Middle and Eastern States is about $13,522,000. The profits of t he bank in 1831, as shown in
a statement to Congress, were about $3,455,598; of this there accrued in the nine western States about $1,640,048; in
the four Southern States about $352,507, and in the Middle and Eastern States about $1,463,041. As little sto ck is held
in the West, it is obvious that the debt of the people in that section to the bank is principally a debt to the Eastern and
foreign stockholders; that the interest they pay upon it is carried into the Eastern States and into Europe, and that it is
a burden upon their industry and a drain of their currency, which no country can bear without inconvenience and
occasional distress. To meet this burden and equalize the exchange operations of the bank, the amount of specie drawn
from those States throu gh its branches within the last two years, as shown by its official reports, was about $6,000,000.
More than half a million of this amount does not stop in the Eastern States, but passes on to Europe to pay the dividends
of the foreign stockholders. In the principle of taxation recognized by this act the Western States find no adequate
compensation for this perpetual burden on their industry and drain of their currency. The branch bank at Mobile made
last year $95,140, yet under the provisions of this act t he State of Alabama can raise no revenue from these profitable
operations, because not a share of the stock is held by any of her citizens. Mississippi and Missouri are in the same
condition in relation to the branches at Natchez and St. Louis, and such, i n a greater or less degree, is the condition of
every Western State. The tendency of the plan of taxation which this act proposes will be to place the whole United
States in the same relation to foreign countries which the Western States now bear to the Ea stern. When by a tax on
resident stockholders the stock of this bank is made worth 10 or 15 per cent more to foreigners than to residents, most
of it will inevitably leave the country.
Thus will this provision in its practical effect deprive the Eastern a s well as the Southern and Western States
of the means of raising a revenue from the extension of business and great profits of this institution. It will make the
American people debtors to aliens in nearly the whole amount due to this bank, and send acros s the Atlantic from two
to five millions of specie every year to pay the bank dividends.
In another of its bearings this provision is fraught with danger. Of the twenty -five directors of this bank five
are chosen by the Government and twenty by the citize n stockholders. From all voice in these elections the foreign
stockholders are excluded by the charter. In proportion, therefore, as the stock is transferred to foreign holders the
extent of suffrage in the choice of directors is curtailed. Already is almo st a third of the stock in foreign hands and not
represented in elections. It is constantly passing out of the country, and this act will accelerate its departure. The entire
control of the institution would necessarily fall into the hands of a few citizen stockholders, and the ease with which the object would be accomplished would be a temptation to designing men to secure that control in their own hands
by monopolizing the remaining stock. There is danger that a president and directors would then be able to elect
themselves from year to year, and without responsibility or control manage the whole concerns of the bank during the
existence of its charter. It is easy to conceive that great evils to our country and its institutions millet flow from such
a conc entration of power in the hands of a few men irresponsible to the people.
Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that in its nature has so little to bind it to our
country? The president of the bank has told us that most of the State banks exist by its forbearance. Should its influence
become concentered, as it may under the operation of such an act as this, in the hands of a self -elected directory whose
interests are identified with those of the foreign stockholders, will there not b e cause to tremble for the purity of our
elections in peace and for the independence of our country in war? Their power would be great whenever they might
choose to exert it; but if this monopoly were regularly renewed every fifteen or twenty years on term s proposed by
themselves, they might seldom in peace put forth their strength to influence elections or control the affairs of the
nation. But if any private citizen or public functionary should interpose to curtail its powers or prevent a renewal of
its p rivileges, it can not be doubted that he would be made to feel its influence.
Should the stock of the bank principally pass into the hands of the subjects of a foreign country, and we
should unfortunately become involved in a war with that country, what w ould be our condition? Of the course which
would be pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the subjects of a foreign power, and managed by those whose
interests, if not affections, would run in the same direction there can be no doubt. All its operations within would be
in aid of the hostile fleets and armies without. Controlling our currency, receiving our public moneys, and holding
thousands of our citizens in dependence, it would be more formidable and dangerous than the naval and military power
of the enemy.
If we must have a bank with private stockholders, every consideration of sound policy and every impulse of
American feeling admonishes that it should be purely American . Its stockholders should be composed exclusively of
our own citizens, who at l east ought to be friendly to our Government and willing to support it in times of difficulty
and danger. So abundant is domestic capital that competition in subscribing for the stock of local banks has recently
led almost to riots. To a bank exclusively of American stockholders, possessing the powers and privileges granted by
this act, subscriptions for $200,000,000 could be readily obtained. Instead of sending abroad the stock of the bank in which the Government must deposit its funds and on which it must rely to sustain its credit in times of emergency, it
would rather seem to be expedient to prohibit its sale to aliens under penalty of absolute forfeiture.
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered
as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent
is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except
where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled. So far from this being the case
on this subject, an argument against the bank might be based on precedent. One Congress, in 1791, decided in favor
of a bank; another, in 1811 , decided against it. One Congress, in 1815, decided against a bank; another, in 1816,
decided in its favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore, the precedents drawn from that source were equal. If we
resort to the States, the expressions of legislat ive, judicial, and executive opinions against the bank have been probably
to those in its favor as 4 to 1. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its authority were admitted, ought to
weigh in favor of the act before me.
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate
authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own
opinion of the Constitution. Each public office r who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of
Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the const itutionality of any bill or resolution which
may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them
for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the op inion of Congress has
over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not,
therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have
only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.
But in the case relied upon the Supreme Court have not decided that all the features of this corporation are
compatible with the Constitution. It is true that the court have said that the law incorporating the bank is a constitutional
exercise of power by Congress; but taking into view the whole opinion of the court and the reasoning by which they
have come to that conclusion, I understand them to have decided that inasmuch as a bank is an appropriate means for
carrying into effect the enumerated powers of the General Government, therefore the law incorporating it is in
accordance with that provision of the Constitution which declares t hat Congress shall have power " to make all laws whi ch shall be necessary and proper for carryi ng those powers into execution. " Having satisfied themselves that the
word "necessary" in the Constitution means needful," "requisite," "essential," "conducive to," and that "a bank" is a
convenient, a useful, an d essential instrument in the prosecution of the Government's "fiscal operations," they conclude
that to "use one must be within the discretion of Congress " and that " the act to incorporate the Bank of the United
States is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution;" "but, " say they, "where the law is not prohibited and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the Government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its
necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread on legislative ground."
The principle here affirmed is that the "degree of its necessity," involving all the details of a banking
institution, is a question exclusively for legislative consideration. A bank is constit utional, but it is the province of the
Legislature to determine whether this or that particular power, privilege, or exemption is "necessary and proper" to
enable the bank to discharge its duties to the Government, and from their decision there is no appea l to the courts of
justice. Under the decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, it is the exclusive province of Congress and the President
to decide whether the particular features of this act are necessary and proper in order to enable the bank to perform
conveniently and efficiently the public duties assigned to it as a fiscal agent, and therefore constitutional, or
unnecessary and improper , and therefore unconstitutional.
Without commenting on the general principle affirmed by the Supreme Court, let us examine the details of
this act in accordance with the rule of legislative action which they have laid down. It will be found that many of the
powers and privileges conferred on it can not be supposed necessary for the purpose for which it is proposed to b e
created, and are not, therefore, means necessary to attain the end in view, and consequently not justified by the
Constitution.
The original act of incorporation, section 2I, enacts "that no other bank shall be established by any future law
of the Unite d States during the continuance of the corporation hereby created, for which the faith of the United States
is hereby pledged: Provided , Congress may renew existing charters for banks within the District of Columbia not
increasing the capital thereof, and may also establish any other bank or banks in said District with capitals not
exceeding in the whole $6,000,000 if they shall deem it expedient." This provision is continued in force by the act
before me fifteen years from the ad of March, 1836.
If Congre ss possessed the power to establish one bank, they had power to establish more than one if in their
opinion two or more banks had been " necessary " to facilitate the execution of the powers delegated to them in the Constitution. If they possessed the powe r to establish a second bank, it was a power derived from the Constitution to
be exercised from time to time, and at any time when the interests of the country or the emergencies of the Government
might make it expedient. It was possessed by one Congress a s well as another, and by all Congresses alike, and alike
at every session. But the Congress of 1816 have taken it away from their successors for twenty years, and the Congress
of 1832 proposes to abolish it for fifteen years more. It can not be "necessary " or "proper " for Congress to barter away
or divest themselves of any of the powers -vested in them by the Constitution to be exercised for the public good. It is
not " necessary " to the efficiency of the bank, nor is it "proper'' in relation to themselves and their successors. They
may properly use the discretion vested in them, but they may not limit the discretion of their successors. This
restriction on themselves and grant of a monopoly to the bank is therefore unconstitutional.
In another point of vi ew this provision is a palpable attempt to amend the Constitution by an act of legislation.
The Constitution declares that "the Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever"
over the District of Columbia. Its constitu tional power, therefore, to establish banks in the District of Columbia and
increase their capital at will is unlimited and uncontrollable by any other power than that which gave authority to the
Constitution. Yet this act declares that Congress shall not increase the capital of existing banks, nor create other banks
with capitals exceeding in the whole $6,000,000. The Constitution declares that Congress shall have power to exercise
exclusive legislation over this District "in all cases whatsoever," and thi s act declares they shall not. Which is the
supreme law of the land? This provision can not be "necessary" or "proper" or constitutional unless the absurdity be
admitted that whenever it be "necessary and proper " in the opinion of Congress they have a rig ht to barter away one
portion of the powers vested in them by the Constitution as a means of executing the rest.
On two subjects only does the Constitution recognize in Congress the power to grant exclusive privileges or
monopolies. It declares that "Cong ress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Out of this
express delegation of power have grown our laws o f patents and copyrights. As the Constitution expressly delegates
to Congress the power to grant exclusive privileges in these cases as the means of executing the substantive power "
to promote the progress of science and useful arts," it is consistent wit h the fair rules of construction to conclude that
such a power was not intended to be granted as a means of accomplishing any other end. On every other subject which
comes within the scope of Congressional power there is an ever -living discretion in the us e of proper means, which
can not be restricted or abolished without an amendment of the Constitution. Every act of Congress, therefore, which attempts by grants of monopolies or sale of exclusive privileges for a limited time, or a time without limit, to r estrict
or extinguish its own discretion in the choice of means to execute its delegated powers is equivalent to a legislative
amendment of the Constitution, and palpably unconstitutional.
This act authorizes and encourages transfers of its stock to forei gners and grants them an exemption from all
State and national taxation. So far from being "necessary and proper" that the bank should possess this power to make
it a safe and efficient agent of the Government in its fiscal operations, it is calculated to convert the Bank of the United
States into a foreign bank, to impoverish our people in time of peace, to disseminate a foreign influence through every
section of the Republic, and in war to endanger our independence.
The several States reserved the power at the formation of the Constitution to regulate and control titles and transfers
of real property, and most, if not all, of them have laws disqualifying aliens from acquiring or holding lands within
their limits. But this act, in disregard of the undoubte d right of the States to prescribe such disqualifications, gives to
aliens stockholders in this bank an interest and title, as members of the corporation, to all the real property it may
acquire within any of the States of this Union. This privilege grante d to aliens is not "necessary" to enable the bank
to perform its public duties, nor in any sense "proper," because it is vitally subversive of the rights of the States.
The Government of the United States have no constitutional power to purchase lands within the States except
"for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings," and even for these objects
only "by the consent of the leg islature of the State in which the same shall be." By making themselves stockholders
in the bank and granting to the corporation the power to purchase lands for other purposes they assume a power not
granted in the Constitution and grant to others what the y do not themselves possess. It is not necessary to the receiving,
safe -keeping, or transmission of the funds of the Government that the bank should possess this power, and it is not
proper that Congress should thus enlarge the powers delegated to them in the Constitution.
The old Bank of the United States possessed a capital of only $11,000,000, which was found fully sufficient
to enable it with dispatch and safety to perform all the functions required of it by the Government. The capital of the
present b ank is $35,000,000 -at least twenty -four more than experience has proved to be necessary to enable a bank to
perform its public functions. The public debt which existed during the period of the old bank and on the establishment
of the new has been nearly pa id off, and our revenue will soon be reduced. This increase of capital is therefore not for
public but for private purposes. The Government is the only "proper" judge where its agents should reside and keep their offices, because it
best knows where their presence will be "necessary." It can not, therefore, be "necessary" or "proper" to authorize the
bank to locate branches where it pleases to perform the public service, without consulting the Government, and
contrary to its will. The principle laid down b y the Supreme Court concedes that Congress can not establish a bank
for purposes of private speculation and gain, but only as a means of executing the delegated powers of the General
Government. By the same principle a branch bank can not constitutionally be established for other than public
purposes. The power which this act gives to establish two branches in any State, without the injunction or request of
the Government and for other than public purposes, is not "necessary" to the due execution of the pow ers delegated
to Congress.
The bonus which is exacted from the bank is a confession upon the face of the act that the powers granted by it are
greater than are "necessary" to its character of a fiscal agent. The Government does not tax its officers and ag ents for
the privilege of serving it. The bonus of a million and a half required by the original charter and that of three millions
proposed by this act are not exacted for the privilege of giving "the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds
from place to place within the United States or the Territories thereof, and for distributing the same in payment of the
public creditors without charging commission or claiming allowance on account of the difference of exchange," as
required by the act o f incorporation, but for something more beneficial to the stockholders. The original act declares
that it (the bonus) is granted " in consideration of the exclusive privileges and benefits conferred by this act upon the
said bank, " and the act before me d eclares it to be "in consideration of the exclusive benefits and privileges continued
by this act to the said corporation for fifteen years, as aforesaid." It is therefore for "exclusive privileges and benefits"
conferred for their own use and emolument, a nd not for the advantage of the Government, that a bonus is exacted.
These surplus powers for which the bank is required to pay can not surely be "necessary" to make it the fiscal agent
of the Treasury. If they were, the exaction of a bonus for them would not be " proper."
It is maintained by some that the bank is a means of executing the constitutional power "to coin money and
regulate the value thereof." Congress have established a mint to coin money and passed laws to regulate the value
thereof. The mon ey so coined, with its value so regulated, and such foreign coins as Congress may adopt are the only
currency known to the Constitution. But if they have other power to regulate the currency, it was conferred to be
exercised by themselves, and not to be tr ansferred to a corporation. If the bank be established for that purpose, with a
charter unalterable without its consent, Congress have parted with their power for a term of years, during which the Constitution is a dead letter. It is neither necessary nor proper to transfer its legislative power to such a bank, and
therefore unconstitutional.
By its silence, considered in connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of McCulloch
against the State of Maryland, this act takes from the States the power to tax a portion of the banking business carried
on within their limits, in sub version of one of the strongest barriers which secured them against Federal encroachments.
Banking, like farming, manufacturing, or any other occupation or profession, is a business, the right to follow which
is not originally derived from the laws. Every citizen and every company of citizens in all of our States possessed the
right until the State legislatures deemed it good policy to prohibit private banking by law. If the prohibitory State laws
were now repealed, every citizen would again possess the rig ht. The State banks are a qualified restoration of the right
which has been taken away by the laws against banking, guarded by such provisions and limitations as in the opinion
of the State legislatures the public interest requires. These corporations, unl ess there be an exemption in their charter,
are, like private bankers and banking companies, subject to State taxation. The manner in which these taxes shall be
laid depends wholly on legislative discretion. It may be upon the bank, upon the stock, upon th e profits, or in any other
mode which the sovereign power shall will.
Upon the formation of the Constitution the States guarded their taxing power with peculiar jealousy. They
surrendered it only as it regards imports and exports. In relation to every oth er object within their jurisdiction, whether
persons, property, business, or professions, it was secured in as ample a manner as it was before possessed. All persons,
though United States officers, are liable to a poll tax by the States within which they r eside. The lands of the United
States are liable to the usual land tax, except in the new States, from whom agreements that they will not tax unsold
lands are exacted when they are admitted into the Union. Horses, wagons, any beasts or vehicles, tools, or property
belonging to private citizens, though employed in the service of the United States, are subject to State taxation. Every
private business, whether carried on by an officer of the General Government or not, whether it be mixed with public
concerns or not, even if it be carried on by the Government of the United States itself, separately or in partnership,
falls within the scope of the taxing power of the State. Nothing comes more fully within it than banks and the business
of banking, by whomsoever instituted and carried on. Over this whole subject -matter it is just as absolute, unlimited,
and uncontrollable as if the Constitution had never been adopted, because in the formation of that instrument it was
reserved without qualification. The principle is conceded that the States can not rightfully tax the operations of the General Government.
They can not tax the money of the Government deposited in the State banks, nor the agency of those banks in remitting
it; but will any man maintain that their mer e selection to perform this public service for the General Government
would exempt the State banks and their ordinary business from State taxation? Had the United States, instead of
establishing a bank at Philadelphia, employed a private banker to keep and transmit their funds, would it have deprived
Pennsylvania of the right to tax his bank and his usual banking operations? It will not be pretended. Upon what
principal, then, are the banking establishments of the Bank of the United States and their usual b anking operations to
be exempted from taxation ? It is not their public agency or the deposits of the Government which the States claim a
right to tax, but their banks and their banking powers, instituted and exercised within State jurisdiction for their p rivate
emolument -those powers and privileges for which they pay a bonus, and which the States tax in their own banks. The
exercise of these powers within a State, no matter by whom or under what authority, whether by private citizens in
their original righ t, by corporate bodies created by the States, by foreigners or the agents of foreign governments
located within their limits, forms a legitimate object of State taxation. From this and like sources, from the persons,
property, and business that are found r esiding, located, or carried on under their jurisdiction, must the States, since the
surrender of their right to raise a revenue from imports and exports, draw all the money necessary for the support of
their governments and the maintenance of their indepe ndence. There is no more appropriate subject of taxation than
banks, banking, and bank stocks, and none to which the States ought more pertinaciously to cling.
It can not be necessary to the character of the bank as a fiscal agent of the Government that i ts private business
should be exempted from that taxation to which all the State banks are liable, nor can I conceive it "proper" that the
substantive and most essential powers reserved by the States shall be thus attacked and annihilated as a means of
exe cuting the powers delegated to the General Government. It may be safely assumed that none of those sages who
had an agency in forming or adopting our Constitution ever imagined that any portion of the taxing power of the States
not prohibited to them nor d elegated to Congress was to be swept away and annihilated as a means of executing certain
powers delegated to Congress.
If our power over means is so absolute that the Supreme Court will not call in question the constitutionality
of an act of Congress the subject of which "is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects
intrusted to the Government," although, as in the case before me, it takes away powers expressly granted to Congress
and rights scrupulously reserved to the States, it becomes us to proceed in our legislation with the utmost caution. Though not directly, our own powers and the rights of the States may be indirectly legislated away in the use of means
to execute substantive powers. We may not enact that Congress shall not have the power of exclusive legislation over
the District of Columbia, but we may pledge the faith of the United States that as a means of executing other powers
it shall not be exercised for twenty years or forever. We may not pass an act prohibiting the States to tax the banking
business carried on within their limits, but we may, as a means of executing our powers over other objects, place that
business in the hands of our agents and then declare it exempt from State taxation in their hands. Thus ma y our own
powers and the rights of the States, which we can not directly curtail or invade, be frittered away and extinguished in
the use of means employed by us to execute other powers. That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties
which m ay be required by the Government, might be so organized as not to infringe on our own delegated powers or
the reserved rights of the States I do not entertain a doubt. Had the Executive been called upon to furnish the project
of such an institution, the du ty would have been cheerfully performed. In the absence of such a call it was obviously
proper that he should confine himself to pointing out those prominent features in the act presented which in his opinion
make it incompatible with the Constitution and sound policy. A general discussion will now take place, eliciting new
light and settling important principles; and a new Congress, elected in the midst of such discussion, and furnishing an
equal representation of the people according to the last census, w ill bear to the Capitol the verdict of public opinion,
and, I doubt not, bring this important question to a satisfactory result.
Under such circumstances the bank comes forward and asks a renewal of its charter for a term of fifteen years upon
conditions which not only operate as a gratuity to the stockholders of many millions of dollars, but will sanction any
abuses and legalize any encroachments.
Suspicions are entertained and charges are made of gross abuse and violation of its charter. An investigatio n
unwillingly conceded and so restricted in time as necessarily to make it incomplete and unsatisfactory discloses
enough to excite suspicion and alarm. In the practices of the principal bank partially unveiled, in the absence of
important witnesses, and i n numerous charges confidently made and as yet wholly uninvestigated there was enough
to induce a majority of the committee of investigation -a committee which was selected from the most able and
honorable members of the House of Representatives -to recommen d a suspension of further action upon the bill and a
prosecution of the inquiry. As the charter had yet four years to run, and as a renewal now was not necessary to the
successful prosecution of its business, it was to have been expected that the bank itse lf, conscious of its purity and
proud of its character, would have withdrawn its application for the present, and demanded the severest scrutiny into all its transactions. In their declining to do so there seems to be an additional reason why the functiona ries of the
Government should proceed with less haste and more caution in the rene \val of their monopoly.
The bank is professedly established as an agent of the executive branch of the Government, and its
constitutionality is maintained on that ground. Ne ither upon the propriety of present action nor upon the provisions of
this act was the Executive consulted. It has had no opportunity to say that it neither needs nor wants an agent clothed
with such powers and favored by such exemptions. There is nothing in its legitimate functions which makes it
necessary or proper. Whatever interest or influence, whether public or private, has given birth to this act, it can not be
found either in the wishes or necessities of the executive department, by which present ac tion is deemed premature,
and the powers conferred upon its agent not only unnecessary, but dangerous to the Government and country.
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes.
Distinct ions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth
can not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior
industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add
to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make
the rich richer and the potent more powerfu l, the humble members of society -the farmers, mechanics, and laborers -
who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice
of their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine
itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and
the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and unnecessary departure
from these just principles.
Nor is our Government to be maintained or our Union preserved by invasions of the rights and powers of the
several States. In thus attempting to make our General Government strong we make it weak. Its true strength consists
in leaving individuals and States as much as possible to themselves -in making itself felt, not in its power, but in its
beneficence; not in its control, but in its protection; not in binding the States more closely to t he center, but leaving
each to move unobstructed in its proper orbit.
Experience should teach us wisdom. Most of the difficulties our Government now encounters and most of
the dangers which impend over our Union have sprung from an abandonment of the legi timate objects of Government
by our national legislation, and the adoption of such principles as are embodied in this act. Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and equal benefits, but have besought us to make them richer by act of Congress.
By attempting to gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation arrayed section against section, interest
against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the foundations of our Union.
It is time to pause in our career to review our principles, and if possible revive that devoted patriotism and spirit of
compromise which distinguished the sages of the Revolution and the fathers of our Union. If we can not at once, in
justice to interests ve sted under improvident legislation, make our Government what it ought to be, we can at least
take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our Government
to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many, and in favor of compromise and gradual reform in our code
of laws and system of political economy.
I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my fellow citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if
not, I shall find in the motives which impel me ample grounds for contentment and peace. In the difficulties which
surround us and the dangers which threaten our institutions there is cause for neither dismay nor alarm. For relief and
deliverance let us firmly rely on that kind Providence which I am sure watches with peculiar care over the destinies
of our Republic, and on the intelligence and wisdom of our countrymen. Through His abundant goodness and heir
patriotic devotion our liberty and Union will be preserved.
ANDREW JACKSON.
3. President Jackson's Procl amation Regarding Nullification (December 10, 1832 )
Whereas a convention, assembled in the State of South Carolina, have passed an ordinance , by which they declare
that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of
duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having act ual operation and effect within the
United States, and more especially "two acts for the same purposes, passed on the 29th of May, 1828, and on the 14th
of July, 1832, are unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent
thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on the citizens of that State or its officers, and by the said
ordin ance it is further declared to b e unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the State, or of the United States,
to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the
legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinances:
And whereas, by the said ordinance it is fur ther ordained, that, in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts
of said State, wherein shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that
may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and that any
person attempting to take such appeal, shall be punished as for a contempt of cour t:
And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at
every hazard, and that they will consider the passage of any act by Congress abolishing or closing the ports of the said
State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the
Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts
otherwise than through the civil t ribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina
in the Union; and that the people of the said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation
to maintain or preserve their political connect ion with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to
organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right
do.
And whereas the said ordinance prescribes to the people of Sout h Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation
of their duty as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its Constitution, and having for its object the instruction of the Union -that Union, which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers,
without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and common cause, through the sanguinary struggle to a
glorious independence -that sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy Consti tution, has brought
us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equaled in
the history of nations; to preserve this bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate th is state
of national honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow -citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew
Jackson, President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of
the Constitution and l aws applicable to the measures adopted by the Convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons
they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the
understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably result from an
observance of the dictates of the Convention.
Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may
hereafter be, invested, for preserv ing the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which
opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of
the United States must all feel in preventing a resort t o stronger measures, while there is a hope that anything will be
yielded to reasoning and remonstrances, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina
and the nation of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which
my sense of duty will require me to pursue.
The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional, and
too oppressive to be endured, but on the stran ge position that any one State may not only declare an act of Congress
void, but prohibit its execution - that they may do this consistently with the Constitution -that the true construction of
that instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union , and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it
may choose to consider as constitutional. It is true they add, that to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably
contrary to the Constitution, but it is evident, that to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with
the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by
the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that
public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by Congress. There is, however, a restraint in t his last case, which
makes the assumed power of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals
from an unconstitutional act passed by Congress -one to the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is
no appeal from the State decision in theory; and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an
application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is
superfluous, when o ur social compact in express terms declares, that the laws of the United States, its Constitution,
and treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land; and for greater caution adds, "that the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything i n the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." And it may
be asserted, without fear of refutation, that no federative government could exist without a similar provision. Look,
for a moment, to the consequence. If South Carolina c onsiders the revenue laws unconstitutional, and has a right to
prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection in
every other port, and no revenue could be collected anywhere; for all i mposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat
that an unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decided by the State itself, for
every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and c ertainly represented, as
unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal.
If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The
excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non -interco urse law in the Eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia,
were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the laws now complained of;
but, fortunately, none of those States discovered that they had the right now c laimed by South Carolina. The war into
which we were forced, to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat
and disgrace instead of victory and honor, if the States, who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitut ional measure, had
thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution.
Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did thi s
efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our Constitution
was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of
that State wi ll, unfortunately, fall the evils of reducing it to practice. If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable
absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abundant proof that it w ould have been repudiated with
indignation had it been proposed to form a feature in our Government.
In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by
common interest with each other. Leagues we re formed for common defense, and before the Declaration of
Independence , we were known in our aggregate character as the United Colonies of America. That decisive and
important step was t aken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts; and when the terms
of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several Sta tes, by which they agreed
that they would, collectively, form one nation, for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns, and all
foreign relations. In the instrument forming that Union , is found an article which declares that "every State shall abide
by the determinations of Congress on all questions which by that Confederation should be submi tted to them."
Under the Confederation , then, no State could legally annul a decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its
execution, but no provision was made to enforce these dec isions. Congress made requisitions, but they were not
complied with. The Government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting
revenue.
But the defects of the Confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation we could scarcely be called a nation.
We had neither prosperity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be endured, and our present
happy Constitution was formed, but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for important objects
that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United S tates, whose
delegates framed, and whose conventions approved it.
The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest, is " to form
a more perfect Union. " Now, is it possible that, even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the
Constitution and laws of the United States over those of the States, it can be conceived that an Instrument made for
the purpose of " forming; a more perfect Union " than that of the confederation, could be so constr ucted by the
assembled wisdom of our country as to substitute for that confederation a form of government, dependent for its
existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man, of plain,
unsophist icated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy
it.
I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the
existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent
with every principle on which It was founded, and destr uctive of the great object for which it was formed.
After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the particular application of it which is made
in the ordinance.
The preamble rests its justification on these grounds: It assumes as a fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they
purport to be laws for raising revenue, were in reality intended for the protection of manufactures, which purpose it
asserts to be unconstitutional; that the operation of these laws is unequal, that the amount raised by them is greater
than is required by the wants of the Government; and, finally, that the proceeds are to be applied to objects
unauthorized by the Constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open opposition to the laws of the
cou ntry, and a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first virtually
acknowledges that the law in question was passed under a power expressly given by the Constitution, to lay and collect
imposts, but its consti tutionality is drawn in question from the motives of those who passed it. However apparent this
purpose may be in the present case, nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an unconstitutional
purpose, entertained by the members who as sent to a law enacted under a constitutional power, shall make that law
void; for how is that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How often may bad purposes be falsely
imputed ? In how many cases are they concealed by false professions? In how many is no declaration of motive made?
Admit this doctrine and you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide, and every law may be annulled under
this pretext. If, therefore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a Sta te may annul an
unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply to the present case.
The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This objection may be made with truth to every
law that has been or can be passed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that would operate
with perfect equality. If the unequal operation of a law makes it unconstitutional and if all laws of that description
may be abrogated by any State for that cause, then, indeed, is the federal Constitution unworthy of the slightest effort
for its preservation. We have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union. We have received it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation We have trusted to it as to the shee t-anchor of our safety, in the stormy times
of conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred awe as the palladium of our liberties, and
with all the solemnities of religion have pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here, and our hopes of happiness
hereafter, in its defense and support. Were we mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching this importance to the
Constitution of our country? Was our devotion paid to the wretched, inefficient, clumsy contrivance, which this new
doct rine would make it? Did we pledge ourselves to the support of an airy nothing -a bubble that must be blown away
by the first breath of disaffection? Was this self -destroying, visionary theory the work of the profound statesmen, the
exalted patriots, to whom the task of constitutional reform was intrusted [entrusted] ? Did the name of Washington
sanction, did the States deliberately ratify, such an anomaly in the history of fundamental legislation? No. We were
not mistaken. The letter of this great instrument is free from this radical fault; its language directly contradicts the
imputation, its spirit, its evident intent, contradicts it. No, we did not err. Our Constitution does not contain the
absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist them. The s ages, whose memory will always be
reverenced, have given us a practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional compact. The Father of his
Country did not affix his revered name to so palpable an absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally r atified it,
do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the United States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise
it by application. Search the debates in all their conventions -examine the speeches of the most zealous opposers of
federa l authority -look at the amendments that were proposed. They are all silent --not a syllable uttered, not a vote
given, not a motion made, to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the Union over those of the States, or
to show that implication, as is now contended, could defeat it. No, we have not erred! The Constitution is still the
object of our reverence, the bond of our Union, our defense in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It shall
descend, as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical construction to our posterity; and the sacrifices of local
interest, of State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it into existence, will again be
patriotically offered for its support.
The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws are, that the sums intended to be raised by
them are greater than are required, and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed. The Constitution has
given expressly to Congress the right of raising revenue, an d of determining the sum the public exigencies will require.
The States have no control over the exercise of this right other than that which results from the power of changing the
representatives who abuse it, and thus procure redress. Congress may undoub tedly abuse this discretionary power, but the same may be said of others with which they are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution
has given it to the representatives of all the people, checked by the representatives of the Stat es, and by the executive
power. The South Carolina construction gives it to the legislature, or the convention of a single State, where neither
the people of the different States, nor the States in their separate capacity, nor the chief magistrate elected by the
people, have any representation. Which is the most discreet disposition of the power? I do not ask you, fellow -citizens,
which is the constitutional disposition -that instrument speaks a language not to be misunderstood. But if you were
assembled in general convention, which would you think the safest depository of this discretionary power in the last
resort? Would you add a clause giving it to each of the States, or would you sanction the wise provisions already made
by your Constitution? If this sho uld be the result of your deliberations when providing for the future, are you -can you -
be ready to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, for a temporary and a local purpose, that which you must
acknowledge to be destructive, and even absurd, as a gener al provision? Carry out the consequences of this right
vested in the different States, and you must perceive that the crisis your conduct presents at this day would recur
whenever any law of the United States displeased any of the States, and that we shoul d soon cease to be a nation.
The ordinance with the same knowledge of the future that characterizes a former objection, tells you that the
proceeds of the tax will be unconstitutionally applied. If this could be ascertained with certainty, the objection w ould,
with more propriety, be reserved for the law so applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged against the laws
levying the duty.
These are the allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine them seriously, my fellow -citizens -judge for
yourselve s. I appeal to you to determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt of their
correctness, and even if you should come to this conclusion, how far they justify the reckless, destructive course which
you are directed to pursue. Rev iew these objections and the conclusions drawn from them once more. What are they!
Every law, then, for raising revenue, according to the South Carolina ordinance, may be rightfully annulled, unless it
be so framed as no law ever will or can be framed. Con gress have a right to pass laws for raising revenue, and each
State has a right to oppose their execution -two rights directly opposed to each other; and yet is this absurdity supposed
to be contained in an instrument drawn for the express purpose of avoidi ng collisions between the States and the
general government, by an assembly of the most enlightened statesmen and purest patriots ever embodied for a similar
purpose. In vain have these sages declared that Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxe s, duties, imposts, and
excises -in vain have they provided that they shall have power to pass laws which shall be necessary and proper to
carry those powers into execution, that those laws and that Constitution shall be the "supreme law of the land; that t he
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding." In vain have the people of the several States solemnly sanctioned these provisions, made them their
paramount law, and indi vidually sworn to support them whenever they were c alled on to execute any office.
Vain provisions! Ineffectual restrictions! Vile profanation of oaths! M iserable mockery of legislation ! If a bare
majority of the voters in any one State may, on a real o r supposed knowledge of the intent with which a law has been
passed, declare themselves free from its operation -say here it gives too little, there too much, and operates unequally -
here it suffers articles to be free that ought to be taxed, there it taxes those that ought to be free -in this case the proceeds
are intended to be applied to purposes which we do not approve, in that the amount raised is more than is wanted.
Congress, it is true, are invested by the Constitution with the right of deciding these questions according to their sound
discretion. Congress is composed of the representatives of all the States, and of all the people of all the states; but WE,
part of the people of one State, to whom the Constitution has given no power on the subject from whom it has expressly
taken it away -we, who have solemnly agreed that this Constitution shall be our law -we, most of whom have sworn to
support it -we now abrogate this law, and swear, and force others to swear, that it shall not be obeyed -and we do this,
not because Congress have no right to pass such laws; this we do not allege; but because they have passed them with
improper views. They are unconstitutional from the motives of those who passed them, which we can never with
certainty know, from their unequ al operation; although it is impossible from the nature of things that they should be
equal -and from the disposition which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although that disposition has not
been declared. This is the plain meaning of the ordinance in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged
unconstitutionality. But it does not stop here. It repeals, in express terms, an important part of the Constitution itself,
and of laws passed to give it effect, which have never been alleged to be uncons titutional. The Constitution declares
that the judicial powers of the United States extend to cases arising under the laws of the United States, and that such
laws, the Constitution and treaties, shall be paramount to the State constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes
the mode by which the case may be brought before a court of the United States, by appeal, when a State tribunal shall
decide against this provision of the Constitution. The ordinance declares there shall be no appeal; makes the Sta te law
paramount to the Constitution and laws of the United States; forces judges and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions; and even makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares that it shall not be
lawfu l for the authorities of the United States, or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the revenue
laws within its limits.
Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended to be unconstitutional, repealed by the authority of a sma ll
majority of the voters of a single State. Here is a provision of the Constitution which is solemnly abrogated by the
same authority.
On such expositions and reasonings, the ordinance grounds not only an assertion of the right to annul the laws of
which it complains, but to enforce it by a threat of seceding from the Union if any attempt is made to execute them.
This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the Constitution, which they say is a compact between sovereign
States who have preserved their whole sovereignty, and therefore are subject to no superior; that because they made
the compact, they can break it when in their opin ion it has been departed from by the other States. Fallacious as this
course of reasoning is, it enlists State pride, and finds advocates in the honest prejudices of those who have not studied
the nature of our government sufficiently to see the radical er ror on which it rests.
The people of the United States formed the Constitution, acting through the State legislatures, in making the
compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate conventions when they ratified those provisions;
but t he terms used in its construction show it to be a government in which the people of all the States collectively are
represented. We are ONE PEOPLE in the choice of the President and Vice President. Here the States have no other
agency than to direct the mo de in which the vote shall be given. The candidates having the majority of all the votes
are chosen. The electors of a majority of States may have given their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be
chosen. The people, then, and not the States, are represented in the executive branch.
In the House of Representa tives there is this difference, that the people of one State do not, as in the case of
President and Vice President, all vote for all the members, each State electing only its own representat ives. But this
creates no material distinction. When chosen, they are all representatives of the United States, not representatives of
the particular State from which they come. They are paid by the United States, not by the State; nor are they
accountable to it for any act done in performance of their legislative functions; and however they may in practice, as
it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of their particular constituents when they come in conflict with any other partial or local interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as representatives of the United States, to promote
the general good.
The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, not a league, and whether it be formed by
compact between the States, or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in which ale the
people are represented, which operates directly on the people individually, not upon the States; they retained all the
power they did not grant. But each State having e xpressly parted with so many powers as to constitute jointly with the
other States a single nation, cannot from that period possess any right to secede, because such secession does not break
a league, but destroys the unity of a nation, and any injury to t hat unity is not only a breach which would result from
the contravention of a compact, but it is an offense against the whole Union. To say that any State may at pleasure
secede from the Union, is to say that the United States are not a nation
Because it would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other
parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing any offense. Secession, like any other revolutionary act, may be
morally justified by the extremity of oppression; but to call it a constitutional right, is confounding the meaning of
terms, and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause
before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties c onsequent upon a failure.
Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties to that compact may, when they feel themselves
aggrieved, depart from it; but it is precisely because it is a compact that they cannot. A compact is an agreement or
binding obligation. It may by its terms have a sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no sanction,
it may be broken with no other consequence than moral guilt; if it have a sanction, then the breach incurs the designated
or impli ed penalty. A league between independent nations, generally, has no sanction other than a moral one; or if it
should contain a penalty, as there is no common superior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always
has a sanction, express or implied; and, in our case, it is both necessarily implied and expressly given. An attempt by
force of arms to destroy a government is an offense, by whatever means the constitutional compact may have been
formed; and such government has the right, by the l aw of self -defense, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless
that right is modified, restrained, or resumed by the constitutional act. In our system, although it is modified in the
case of treason, yet authority is expressly given to pass all laws n ecessary to carry its powers into effect, and under
this grant provision has been made for punishing acts which obstruct the due administration of the laws. It would seem superfluous to add anything to show the nature of that union which connects us; but as erroneous
opinions on this subject are the foundation of doctrines the most destructive to our peace, I must give some further
development to my views on this subject. No one, fellow -citizens, has a higher reverence for the reserved rights of the
States than the magistrate who now addresses you. No one would make greater personal sacrifices, or official
exertions, to defend them from violation; but equal care must be taken to prevent, on their part, an improper
interference with, or resumption of, the ri ghts they have vested in the nation.
The line has not been so distinctly drawn as to avoid doubts in some cases of the exercise of power. Men of the
best intentions and soundest views may differ in their construction of some parts of the Constitution, but there are
others on which dispassionate reflection can leave no doubt. Of this nature appears to be the assumed right of
secession. It rests, as we have seen, on the alleged undivided sovereignty of the States, and on their having formed in
this sovereign capacity a compact which is called the Constitution, from which, because they made it, they have the
right to secede. Both of these positions are erroneous, and some of the arguments to prove them so have been
anticipated.
The States severally have not r etained their entire sovereignty. It has been shown that in becoming parts of a
nation, not members of a league, they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty. The right to make
treaties, declare war, levy taxes, exercise exclusive judicial and legislative powers, were all functions of sovereign
power. The States, then, for all these important purposes, were no longer sovereign. The allegiance of their citizens
was transferred in the first instance to the government of the United States; the y became American citizens, and owed
obedience to the Constitution of the United States, and to laws made in conformity with the powers vested in Congress.
This last position has not been, and cannot be, denied. How then, can that State be said to be sover eign and independent
whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws, when
they come in conflict with those passed by another? What shows conclusively that the States cannot be said to have
reser ved an undivided sovereignty, is that they expressly ceded the right to punish treason -not treason against their
separate power, but treason against the United States. Treason is an offense against sovereignty, and sovereignty must
reside with the power to punish it. But the reserved rights of the States are not less sacred because they have for their
common interest made the general government the depository of these powers. The unity of our political character (as
has been shown for another purpose) comme nced with its very existence. Under the royal government we had no separate character; our opposition to its oppression began as UNITED COLONIES. We were the UNITED STATES
under the Confederation, and the name was perpetuated and the Union rendered more pe rfect by the federal
Constitution. In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties
and alliances were made in the name of all. Troops were raised for the joint defense. How, then, with all these pro ofs,
that under all changes of our position we had, for designated purposes and with defined powers, created national
governments -how is it that the most perfect of these several modes of union should now be considered as a mere
league that may be dissolve d at pleasure ? It is from an abuse of terms. Compact is used as synonymous with league,
although the true term is not employed, because it would at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do to
say that our Constitution was only a league, but it is labored to prove it a compact (which, in one sense, it is), and then
to argue that as a league is a compact, every compact between nations must, of course, be a league, and that from such
an engagement every sovereign power has a right to recede. Bu t it has been shown that in this sense the States are not
sovereign, and that even if they were, and the national Constitution had been formed by compact, there would be no
right in any one State to exonerate itself from the obligation.
So obvious are the reasons which forbid this secession, that it is necessary only to allude to them. The Union was
formed for the benefit of all. It was produced by mutual sacrifice of interest and opinions. Can those sacrifices be
recalled? Can the States, who magnanimousl y surrendered their title to the territories of the West, recall the grant?
Will the inhabitants of the inland States agree to pay the duties that may be imposed without their assent by those on
the Atlantic or the Gulf, for their own benefit? Shall there be a free port in one State, and enormous duties in another?
No one believes that any right exists in a single State to involve all the others in these and countless other evils,
contrary to engagements solemnly made. Everyone must see that the other State s, in self -defense, must oppose it at
all hazards.
These are the alternatives that are presented by the convention: A repeal of all the acts for raising revenue, leaving
the government without the means of support; or an acquiescence in the dissolution of our Union by the secession of
one of its members. When the first was proposed, it was known that it could not be listened to for a moment. It was
known if force was applied to oppose the execution of the laws, that it must be repelled by force -that Congre ss could
not, without involving itself in disgrace and the country in ruin, accede to the proposition; and yet if this is not done
in a given day, or if any attempt is made to execute the laws, the State is, by the ordinance, declared to be out of the Unio n. The majority of a convention assembled for the purpose have dictated these terms, or rather this rejection of
all terms, in the name of the people of South Carolina. It is true that the governor of the State speaks of the submission
of their grievances to a convention of all the States; which, he says, they ''sincerely and anxiously seek and desire."
Yet this obvious and constitutional mode of obtaining the sense of the other States on the construction of the federal
compact, and amending it, if necessar y, has never been attempted by those who have urged the State on to this
destructive measure. The State might have proposed a call for a general convention to the other States, and Congress,
if a sufficient number of them concurred, must have called it. Bu t the first magistrate of South Carolina, when he
expressed a hope that "on a review by Congress and the functionaries of the general government of the merits of the
controversy,' such a convention will be accorded to them, must have known that neither Con gress, nor any functionary
in the general government, has authority to call such a convention, unless it be demanded by two -thirds of the States.
This suggestion, then, is another instance of the reckless inattention to the provisions of the Constitution w ith which
this crisis has been madly hurried on; or of the attempt to persuade the people that a constitutional remedy has been
sought and refused. If the legislature of South Carolina "anxiously desire" a general convention to consider their
complaints, w hy have they not made application for it in the way the Constitution points out? The assertion that they
"earnestly seek" is completely negatived by the omission.
This, then, is the position in which we stand. A small majority of the citizens of one State in the Union have
elected delegates to a State convention; that convention has ordained that all the revenue laws of the United States
must be repealed, or that they are no longer a member of the Union. The governor of that State has recommended to
the le gislature the raising of an army to carry the secession into effect, and that he may be empowered to give
clearances to vessels in the name of the State. No act of violent opposition to the laws has yet been committed, but
such a state of things is hourly apprehended, and it is the intent of this instrument to PROCLAIM, not only that the
duty imposed on me by the Constitution, '` to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," shall be performed to the
extent of the powers already vested in me by law or of such others as the wisdom of Congress shall devise and Entrust
to me for that purpose; but to warn the citizens of South Carolina, who have been deluded into an opposition to the
laws, of the danger they will incur by obedience to the illegal and disor ganizing ordinance of the convention -to exhort
those who have refused to support it to persevere in their determination to uphold the Constitution and laws of their
country, and to point out to all the perilous situation into which the good people of that State have been led, and that
the course they are urged to pursue is one of ruin and disgrace to the very State whose rights they affect to support. Fel low -citizens of my native State ! let me not only admonish you, as the first magistrate of our common c ountry,
not to incur the penalty of its laws, but use the influence that a father would over his children whom he saw rushing
to a certain ruin. In that paternal language, with that paternal feeling, let me tell you, my countrymen, that you are
deluded by men who are either deceived themselves or wish to deceive you. Mark under what pretenses you have
been led on to the brink of insurrection and treason on which you stand! First a diminution of the value of our staple
commodity, lowered by over -production i n other quarters and the consequent diminution in the value of your lands,
were the sole effect of the tariff laws. The effect of those laws was confessedly injurious, but the evil was greatly
exaggerated by the unfounded theory you were taught to believe, that its burdens were in proportion to your exports,
not to your consumption of imported articles. Your pride was aroused by the assertions that a submission to these laws
was a state of vassalage, and that resistance to them was equal, in patriotic merit , to the opposition our fathers offered
to the oppressive laws of Great Britain. You were told that this opposition might be peaceably -might be
constitutionally made -that you might enjoy all the advantages of the Union and bear none of its burdens. Eloquen t
appeals to your passions, to your State pride, to your native courage, to your sense of real injury, were used to prepare
you for the period when the mask which concealed the hideous features of DISUNION should be taken off. It fell, and
you were made to look with complacency on objects which not long since you would have regarded with horror. Look
back to the arts which have brought you to this state -look forward to the consequences to which it must inevitably
lead! Look back to what was first told you a s an inducement to enter into this dangerous course. The great political
truth was repeated to you that you had the revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably unconstitutional
and intolerably oppressive -it was added that the right to null ify a law rested on the same principle, but that it was a
peaceable remedy! This character which was given to it, made you receive with too much confidence the assertions
that were made of the unconstitutionality of the law and its oppressive effects. Mark , my fellow -citizens, that by the
admission of your leaders the unconstitutionality must be palpable , or it will not justify either resistance or
nullification ! What is the meaning of the word palpable in the sense in which it is here used? that which is apparent
to everyone, that which no man of ordinary intellect will fail to perceive. Is the unconstitutionality of these laws of
that description? Let those among your leaders who once approved and advocated the principles of protective duties,
answer the question; and let them choose whether they will be considered as incapable, then, of perceiving that which
must have been apparent to every man of common understanding, or as imposing upon your confidence and
endeavoring to mislead you now. In either case, they are unsafe guides in the perilous path they urge you to tread. Ponder well on this circumstance, and you will know how to appreciate the exaggerated language they address to you.
They are not champions of liberty emulating the fame of our Revolutiona ry fathers, nor are you an oppressed people,
contending, as they repeat to you, against worse than colonial vassalage. You are free members of a flourishing and
happy Union. There is no settled design to oppress you. You have, indeed, felt the unequal oper ation of laws which
may have been unwisely, not unconstitutionally passed; but that inequality must necessarily be removed. At the very
moment when you were madly urged on to the unfortunate course you have begun, a change in public opinion has
commenced. The nearly approaching payment of the public debt, and the consequent necessity of a diminution of
duties, had already caused a considerable reduction, and that, too, on some articles of general consumption in your
State. The importance of this change was underrated, and you were authoritatively told that no further alleviation of
your burdens was to be expected, at the very time when the condition of the country imperiously demanded such a
modification of the duties as should reduce them to a just and equi table scale. But as apprehensive of the effect of this
change in allaying your discontents, you were precipitated into the fearful state in which you now find yourselves.
I have urged you to look back to the means that were used to burly you on to the pos ition you have now assumed,
and forward to the consequences they will produce. Something more is necessary. Contemplate the condition of that
country of which you still form an important part; consider its government uniting in one bond of common interest
and general protection so many different States -giving to all their inhabitants the proud title of AMERICAN CITIZEN -
protecting their commerce -securing their literature and arts -facilitating their intercommunication --defending their
frontiers -and making the ir name respected in the remotest parts of the earth! Consider the extent of its territory its
increasing and happy population, its advance in arts, which render life agreeable, and the sciences which elevate the
mind! See education spreading the lights of religion, morality, and general information into every cottage in this wide
extent of our Territories and States! Behold it as the asylum where the wretched and the oppressed find a refuge and
support! Look on this picture of happiness and honor, and say, WE TOO, ARE CITIZENS OF AMERICA --Carolina
is one of these proud States her arms have defended -her best blood has cemented this happy Union! And then add, if
you can, without horror and remorse this happy Union we will dissolve -this picture of peace and pr osperity we will
deface -this free intercourse we will interrupt - these fertile fields we will deluge with blood -the protection of that
glorious flag we renounce -the very name of Americans we discard. And for what, mistaken men! For what do you
throw away t hese inestimable blessings -for what would you exchange your share in the advantages and honor of the
Union? For the dream of a separate independence -a dream interrupted by bloody conflicts with your neighbors, and a vile dependence on a foreign power. If y our leaders could succeed in establishing a separation, what would be your
situation? Are you united at home -are you free from the apprehension of civil discord, with all its fearful
consequences? Do our neighboring republics, every day suffering some new revolution or contending with some new
insurrection - do they excite your envy? But the dictates of a high duty oblige me solemnly to announce that you cannot
succeed. The laws of the United States must be executed. I have no discretionary power on the subj ect -my duty is
emphatically pronounced in the Constitution. Those who told you that you might peaceably prevent their execution,
deceived you -they could not have been deceived themselves. They know that a forcible opposition could alone prevent
the executi on of the laws, and they know that such opposition must be repelled. Their object is disunion, hut be not
deceived by names; disunion, by armed force, is TREASON. Are you really ready to incur its guilt? If you are, on the
head of the instigators of the ac t be the dreadful consequences -on their heads be the dishonor, but on yours may fall
the punishment -on your unhappy State will inevitably fall all the evils of the conflict you force upon the government
of your country. It cannot accede to the mad project of disunion, of which you would be the first victims -its first
magistrate cannot, if he would, avoid the performance of his duty -the consequence must be fearful for you, distressing
to your fellow -citizens here, and to the friends of good government throug hout the world. Its enemies have beheld our
prosperity with a vexation they could not conceal --it was a standing refutation of their slavish doctrines, and they will
point to our discord with the triumph of malignant joy. It is yet in your power to disappo int them. There is yet time to
show that the descendants of the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Rutledges, and of the thousand other names which
adorn the pages of your Revolutionary history, will not abandon that Union to support which so many of them fought
and bled and died. I adjure you, as you honor their memory --as you love the cause of freedom, to which they dedicated
their lives --as you prize the peace of your country, the lives of its best citizens, and your own fair fame, to retrace your
steps. Snatc h from the archives of your State the disorganizing edict of its convention -hid its members to re -assemble
and promulgate the decided expressions of your will to remain in the path which alone can conduct you to safety,
prosperity, and honor -tell them that compared to disunion, all other evils are light, because that brings with it an
accumulation of all -declare that you will never take the field unless the star -spangled banner of your country shall
float over you --that you will not be stigmatized when dead , and dishonored and scorned while you live, as the authors
of the first attack on the Constitution of your country! -its destroyers you cannot be. You may disturb its peace -you
may interrupt the course of its prosperity -you may cloud its reputation for sta bility - but its tranquillity will be restored, its prosperity will return, and the stain upon its national character will be transferred and remain an eternal blot on the
memory of those who caused the disorder.
Fellow -citizens of the United States! the t hreat of unhallowed disunion -the names of those, once respected, by
whom it is uttered --the array of military force to support it -denote the approach of a crisis in our affairs on which the
continuance of our unexampled prosperity, our political existence, and perhaps that of all free governments, may
depend. The conjuncture demanded a free, a full, and explicit enunciation, not only of my intentions, but of my
principles of action, and as the claim was asserted of a right by a State to annul the laws of th e Union, and even to
secede from it at pleasure, a frank exposition of my opinions in relation to the origin and form of our government, and
the construction I give to the instrument by which it was created, seemed to be proper. Having the fullest confiden ce
in the justness of the legal and constitutional opinion of my duties which has been expressed, I rely with equal
confidence on your undivided support in my determination to execute the laws -to preserve the Union by all
constitutional means -to arrest, if possible, by moderate but firm measures, the necessity of a recourse to force; and, if
it be the will of Heaven that the recurrence of its primeval curse on man for the shedding of a brother's blood should
fall upon our land, that it be not called down by any offensive act on the part of the United States.
Fellow -citizens! the momentous case is before you. On your undivided support of your government depends the
decision of the great question it involves, whether your sacred Union will be preserved, and t he blessing it secures to
us as one people shall be perpetuated. No one can doubt that the unanimity with which that decision will be expressed,
will he such as to inspire new confidence in republican institutions, and that the prudence, the wisdom, and th e courage
which it will bring to their defense, will transmit them unimpaired and invigorated to our children.
May the Great Ruler of nations grant that the signal blessings with which he has favored ours may not, by the
madness of party or personal ambit ion, be disregarded and lost, and may His wise providence bring those who have
produced this crisis to see the folly, before they feel the misery, of civil strife, and inspire a returning veneration for
that Union which, if we may dare to penetrate his des igns, he has chosen, as the only means of attaining the high
destinies to which we may reasonably aspire.
In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, having signed the same
with my hand. Done at the City of W ashington, this 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and thirty -two, and of the independence of the United States the fifty -seventh.
ANDREW JACKSON.
By the President
EDW. LIVINGSTON, Secretary of State.
