CAN ONLY USE THE SOURCES GIVEN BELOW IN THE FILES! NO OTHER SOURCES CAN BE USED! OR I WILLL HAVE TO DISPUTE THE CHARGE.Let’s assume that by virtue of your taking this class, you have become an exper

The Road to African Nationalism (Part II)The Rise and Curse of the “Nation-State” Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196)•Activists of the 1950s chose their own brand of nationalism, which they saw as their only available guarantee of an open road to progress: building nation-states on the British/French/European model; they had been conditioned into thinking this was the only viable model and path to progress for Africa (p. 162)•Some like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (or Sekou Touré of Guinea) argued for immediate independence in whatever form it came: they thought it was best to get it first and then endeavor to chart their own path for a new Africa (p. 162)•But many did also see the trap of independence for what it was:in accepting colonial partition of Africa, the new African leaders would also inherit the moral and political practices of colonial rule in terms of its institutional mentality. This had the potential of becoming a liability (p. 162) Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196)•The British made the offer to Kwame Nkrumah to become the new leader of the new Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1951, ahead of a possible independence: •But Nkrumah felt that the constitution being offered at the time was still a colonial onethat still would made Ghanaians half slaves-half free.•He called upon his people to be vigilant because, according to him, colonialism had already corrupted the fabric of African society by ushering in practices such as bribery and corruption, which in his opinion had eaten into the spirit of African morality. •For him, thus, these were going to be the challenges that Africans would need to stamp out to achieve progress. (pp. 162-163). Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196)Notable West African nationalists of the 1950s: •Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana)•Ahmed SékouTo u r é(Guinea-Conakry)•Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria (p. 164)•E.F. Small (The Gambia) (p. 170)•Amilcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau)•Notable East and Southern African nationalists of the 1950s:•Jacques Rabemananjara(Madagascar) (p. 164)•Dr. Kamuzu Banda(Malawi) (p. 167)•Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) (p. 175) Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196)The legacy of colonial institutions was transferred to Africans virtually intact at the time of independence and Africans did not yet have a full understanding or mastery of what they had inherited. (p. 163)The partition of Africa introduced a number of challenged and problems into the new African countries that were created at independence time:•Harmfulartificial borders;•A petit-bourgeois nationalism that erupted from an educated elitethat was bound to be subservient to external powers organized on a capitalistic basis, and that was to rely on the extractive institutions and economies left behind by colonial powers as tools that would continue tohelpthem organize and maintain the fleecing and plundering of African manpower and natural resources (p. 163) Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196)•Nationalism as a conscious ideology of mobilization of the masseshad little meaning in the Africa of the 1950s. •This is because, aside from a few exceptions, such as in the case of the Asante of the Gold Coast, few African elites were thinking about the implications of nationhood (on an ethnic basis). (pp. 163-164) Paradoxically, African nationalism did not take on an immediate ethnic contour politically. Because Africans in the decolonization period (1930s-1950s) had one common enemy (colonialism), most efforts were concentrated on removing the colonial master and this for a while muted some of the ethnic rivalries that were brewing underneath. This peculiar form of nationalism took the dual form of•A continental, pan-Africanist nationalism as well as •A nationalism based on the configurations of the new nation-statesthat were seeking independence (National Identity based on borders and sovereignty, not culture), as opposed to one based on a form of ethnic nationalism similar to those of Europe in the 19thand early 20thcenturies. •This is because, when it came to fighting for independence, the enemy was the Europeans, not the Africans.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Unlike in Europe where ideologues purposefully promoted a form of ethnic nationalism meant to push the interests of one ethnic group within the same national boundaries, African continental identity became paramount in Africa as an engine of continental nationalism (pan-Africanism) at the time of independence than ethnic nationalism (p. 164)•African nationalism thus became an anti-colonial nationalism that also focused on social and economic demands that looked to repair the social and economic harm done by colonialism through independence (p. 164)•Some nationalists, like Malagasy Jacques Rabemananjaraeven spelled out in clear terms that what defined African nationalism was its anticolonialism, which was not and could not be confused with the type of ethnic-based or race-based nationalism that the word had acquired in Europe (p. 164)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •The downside of this anticolonial struggle by African nationalists was that, because virtually all of them were absorbed by the fight against European domination, they did not pay attention to the model of the nation-state that they were being given as a vehicle towards independence. •First, Africans did not have much of a deciding voice on the configurations of the territories that they were inheriting; •Secondly, not many had the time to think ideologically about the countries they were being given:they were too busy trying to undo the chains of oppression as they sought social and moral justice (p. 164)•So, the language of nationalism, which, in Europe, was tribal and ethnic based, could not and did not apply the same way in Africa.It was thus misleading to confuse African nationalism at the time of independence with tribal nationalism (even though it was brewing underneath); but Africans did not conquer their independence from Europeans on the basis of ethnic or tribal nationalism, rather, they did so on the basis of anticolonial, continental nationalism (p. 164-165);Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •For Davidson, this may have been a blessing in disguise for Africans since the ethnic/race-based nationalism of Europe only resulted in death and mass murder in Europe. •Africans were thus spared ideologies of this nature in the 1950s thanks to the fight for continental freedom taking precedence over the fight for ethnic-based supremacy or sovereignty. •So, even as they thought for independence in their own areas as defined by the colonial powers, the leading factor for African nationalism became freedom from Europeans. No one was seeking ethnic-based sovereignty. (p. 165)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Freedom, thus, became the slogan, not the nation as an ethnic grouping of members of the same tribal kinship (. 165)•Calls for political freedom, thus, became the same, in the African context, as calls for social freedom and justice.•While the struggle became a social struggle akin to the earlier expressions of nationalism in the Europe of the 1840s where the goal was freedom from the despotism of the monarchies and the enlargement of middle classes, especially when it took the form of a class struggle within the same sociopolitical polities, Africans were not engaged in a class struggle with themselves and from within:they were engaged in an anticolonial struggle against external forces (p. 165-166).•This may have paradoxically saved Africans from early forms of ethnic warfare during colonial times and immediately after independence. (p. 166).Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •One of the interesting and perhaps unexpected consequences of the nation-state model in Africa is that in virtually more than forty years (or now almost 60 years or so), there have virtually been no interstate/intercountry wars on the continent (very few exceptions). •This is proof that Africans never really engaged in ethnic based nationalism that would have, for instance, waged war to reunited tribes that had been divided by the colonial borders (p. 166)Note:very few cases exist in Africa of country to country war for reasons of ethnic nationalism. The annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia in 1962 or the Rwandan quasi occupation of Southern Congo to protect the ethnic Tutsi minorities there are rare.•So, very few wars in African have been cross-border, ethnic-related wars and few countries have been in war against one another over the need to save or reunite with their isolated kinspeopleacross the border (p. 166)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •And that’s because African political landscape remained focused on the socioeconomic struggles and inequities that colonialism had triggeredand independence became more and more synonymous with the socioeconomic justice that Africans were seeking in their struggle against the white occupiers. This prevented a focus on internal issues and political divisions along ethnic lines. (p. 166)•In other words, the focus was on ending the rule of one race (of invaders) over another as opposed to the rule of one ethnic group over another. •This anticolonial “truce” gave Africans a chance to begin independences with a focus on redressing the socioeconomic imbalance left behind by the colonizer (p. 167)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) The Southern African exceptionIn southern Africa, where whites had settled but did not intend to leave (settler colonies), the reality was different.•Self-government in countries like Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africaoften meant, according to Malawian nationalist Dr. Kamuzu Banda, delivering Africans into the hands of white minorities. •So, in Southern Africa, thus, African nationalism developed into a more vivid expression of black vs. white racial nationalism.And so here, the struggle of blacks would continue to be about racial nationalism and confine itself to a social struggle that sought socioeconomic, educational and political equality, rather than independence. (p. 167)In other words, other parts of Africans developed anticolonial nationalism, but southern Africans developed racial nationalism along the lines of, and as a reaction to, white nationalism. This was a way of seeking justice for their race in countries that would never become independent on black terms, but on terms fixed by the white settler minorities.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •But, instead of working on social and economic advancement before independence in order to prepare the new countries they created to self-rule, the colonial powers worked mostly on preparing a very small elite to the transfer of power, but with little consideration for underlying issues that the colonial structures still in place, structures that severely limited and restricted political and economic freedom among the masses of Africans that had always been and continued to remain excluded from earlier attempts to reform the colonial legacy in Africa (pp. 167-168)•Furthermore, many African nationalists confused the nation-states they were inheriting with structures that would be conducive to democracy. For them, it would suffice that the new African rulers and leaders concentrate their efforts on ushering in education for all, health services, opportunities for all, political freedom, economic freedom, etc. for all to be good and peaceful and democratic.•This may have been a big mistake (p. 168)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Another factor is that Europeans did not think of their nation-states as a potential problem in Africa: In fact, due to their willful ignorance of African customs and realities, and their refusal to learn them, true knowledge of Africa up until the 1950s and beyond tended to be limited to a small number of Europeans(priests mostly, and some colonial administrators) (p. 168-169)•The British seem to have believed more strongly that the French in the ideals of the nation-state in Africa, although this may be debatable as they used different tools and methods to attain the same goals. But the British asserted the need for nation-building much more explicitly than the French.(p 169)•But even as they experienced a war that had its root in nation-statismof the worst kind with Germany, the Europeans did not implement the lessons learned from their two world warsin Africa. (p. 169-170).Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •And because African nationalism was anticolonial,it was perceived by the Europeans as subversion and agitation when it began to express itself more visibly in the 1930s. •“Dangerous” was the term that Europeans used to describe African anticolonial nationalism and, therefore, African nationalists who advocated for an end to white occupation. Such was the case of Gambian nationalist E.F. Small. (p. 170)•Many such-called “agitators” became labelled as “communists” (p. 170)•The French began to show distrust for those that they called “half-civilized” Africans in West Africa (paradox of the acculturated African intellectual), who were suspected of adopting the Marxist doctrine. (p. 170-171)•So, even as Europe just came from Nazism and Fascismafter World War II, communism paradoxically became defined as even worse and even more dangerousthan those murderous ideologies. (p. 170)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Ye t , v e r y f e w A f r i c a n s a c t u a l l y e m b r a c e d communism or any of the other European ideologies that became prevalent in the 1930s-1950s. Their struggle around this period remained essentially anti-colonial. (p. 171-172)•So, it seemed that it was by design that the British and the French consolidated the arbitrary territories that they “imprisoned” inside of the various borders that now became entirely separate nation-states: there was never really any type of concern given to the possibility of creating, maybe, some types of interrelated states. (p. 172)•These arbitrary dispositions were seen as serving both the British and French national interests(p. 172)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Even as independence became inevitable, Europeans never intended to organize large-scale education for the masses of Africans.•They did not offer social, economic and political freedoms for the Africans while colonialism was still in place. •The goal was to simply groom a small elite of Africanswho would become the leaders of the new nation-states (p. 172)•But this grooming often failed because those that they groomed with the intent to turn them into collaborationists often were not as popular with the African masses as those who truly militated for true freedom for Africans (pp. 172-173)•Another interesting factor: most colonial officials’ training as they were prepared for colonial office was military and administrative in nature.Few really had the political skills to understand the political implications of their colonial policies. All they knew was how they needed to “rule” the colonies to keep “order”(pp. 173-174)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) So, these colonial administrators had no idea how to really prepare Africans for independence, (and maybe that was their whole intention from the start?) (p. 174) •So, even as the 1950s saw the birth of the African political parties that were supposed to be sued by Europeans to prepare Africans for governing the new nation-states, the leaders of these parties were more often than not perceived as “trouble-makers” by the colonial administrations. •Colonial administrators thus became more likely to suppress these early expressions of “party-based” political competition (and democracy?) (pp. 174-175).•In Tanzania for instance, the British tried to “suppress” “trouble-making” nationalist Julius Nyerere because of his his nationalistic political pronouncements. (p. 175-176)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •The way colonial officials treated “African Politicians” when interacting with them was apparently to “bark at them” (This would be later learned by African leaders as the way a true and strong leader talks to his people) (Read p. 176).•Colonial administrators did not trust in the ability of Africans to run their own governments either. So, even as the independences of African countries loomed, the debate between governors and governed often remained absent. •The “governors” often made decisions about how to run the projected nation-states without associating the “governed” to these decisions (p. 177). •Note: Such was the case with the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 in which the French discussed the possible autonomy of their colonies without associating Africans themselves.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •In fact, there was never really a clear planfor an orderly imperial withdrawal from the colonies and real decolonization was never really considered because the Europeans had assumed colonization was forever and they would never have to leave those lands that they have conquered and invaded (p. 177)•And in 1945, some European empires still thought independence and the birth of independent African states would not come before another century(p. 177)•This means that the talks about decolonization and independence that began to become prevalent after World War II were done under pressure and precipitation as well as under the pressure of events (p. 177)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Paradoxically, talks about African independence in colonial offices were more talks about how essential it was to prolong colonial rule as opposed to shorten or end it. And the French would resist the prospect until the very last minute (p. 177-178) (Although they did give independence to their colonies in bulk (1960 for most) whereas some of the British colonies became independent much later)•It was however quite evident that most colonial powers felt the need for some type of continuityand this was perceptible in most talks about African independences. •In other words, the goal of African independence became less about the demise of colonial rule than about how to make it more effective: hence the confinement of the discussions to unilateral decisions by the European colonizers (p. 178)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •This paradox whereby European colonial empires talked about Africa independences without associating Africans to the discussions, but allowed African political parties (in the 1950s) while at the same time making colonial government even more intensive and oppressive explains why they failed to enlarge African direct experienceand involvement with governing their own lands. (p. 178)•Even more paradoxically is the fact that at the very time that independences were being discussed, recruitment of Europeans into colonial service increased by 59% between 1947 and 1957 as opposed to being reduced or extended to Africans in a way that would begin to prepare them for running their own countries. (p. 178)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) KENYAEuropean hesitations were such that even in 1959, the British colonial administrators were still thinking it impossible to envisage a time when it would be possible to totally relinquish the control of Kenya to the natives themselves (p. 178) (Kenya independent in 1963; the Kenyans had to fight a war against the British(the Mau Mau uprising 1952-1959) to end British rule).•Some colonial administrators were hoping for a more gradualist approach that would push independence for much later to prepare Africans, but these proposals to prepare Africans were often rejected. For instance, the British governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, rejected one such proposal, saying that the liberals in London were naïvein thinking that these primitive people still in their primitive state could actually rule themselves (Read p. 179).•But Mitchell also betrayed an important idea that is part of colonial discourse: Europeans were not in Africa to develop independent states, but to “develop and civilize” this continent as part of… Western European civilization and economies(p. 179)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) But the anticolonial pressures from Kenyan and other Africans forced the British and other European colonial powers to decolonize and many countries became independent (pp.179-180).From Britain•South Africa (1910, under white minority rule; never became independent as a black nation)•Egypt(1922, but Republic declared in 1953)•Sudan (1956)•Ghana (1957; republic proclamation, 1960)•Nigeria (1960)•Somalia(1960, although a history of Italian occupation until 1941)•Sierra Leone (1961)•Tanzania (1961, 1963, then 1964)•Uganda (1962)•Kenya (1963)•Malawi (1964)•Zambia (1964)•Zimbabwe (1965)•The Gambia (1965)•Botswana (1966)•Lesotho (1966)•Swaziland (Now Eswatini; 1968)•Maurituius(1968)•Seychelles Islands (1976)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) From FranceIn French Africa, after Morocco and Tunisiain 1956, most French-speaking sub-Saharan African countries became independent in 1960: •Gabon, •Cameroon, •Congo-Brazzaville, •Madagascar, •Central African Republic•Chad•Benin (as Dahomey)•Burkina Faso as (Haute-Volta)•Côte d’Ivoire•Mail•Mauritania•Niger•Senegal•To g o•Note:Only Guineabecame independent from France in 1958 after refusing autonomy under French rule)•Algeriabecame independent in Africa following a long war of independence (1954-1962), but the Comoros Islandbecame independent in 1975 and Djibouti in 1977.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) From Italy•Libya(1947, but under French and British oversight until 1951)•Ethiopia(occupied 1936, but had retained sovereignty; Italians did declare it Italian Ethiopia in 1941 even though it continued to have an underlying Ethiopian monarchy in power)•Somalia(1960, although a history of British occupation after 1941)From Ethiopia•Eritrea (1941 after Italian war defeat, but real independence from Ethiopia in 1991 and proclamation of formal state in 1993)From Belgium•Congo-Kinshasa (1960)•Burundi (1962, Belgium took over from the Germans in 1916)•Rwanda (1962, Belgium took over from the Germans in 1916)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) From Portugal•Guinea-Bissau (1973, recognized 1974)•Mozambique (1975, following a war of independence 1961-1974)•Angola (1975, following a war of independence 1961-1974)•São Tomé and Príncipe (1975)•Cape Verde (1975)From Spain •Equatorial Guinea (1968)From South Africa•Namibia(1990, but German colony until 1915, then British administration through South Africa; war of independence 1966-1989)From the United States•Liberia(Settlement in 1822; recognized by United States in 1862)Most of these countries adopted constitutions inspired by their respective colonial power.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) So, the end of colonialism was not really a honest move meant to give Africans the “best possible start towards independence”. But Europeans cunningly presented it as plannedand explained any issues that arose in Africa later on as resulting from the primitive nature of Africans (pp. 180-181)Interestingly, anything that could have led to other forms of cross-border nationalisms in Africa (religious or ethnic) became naturally blunted for a while by the new-nation state borders due to the pervasiveness of the anticolonial struggle(p. 180)•Islamcould not thrive as a religious movement capable of giving birth to an Islamic ideology built across national borders as a factor of cultural identity;•Ethnic groupscould not organize cross-border nationalist movements either: So, this prevented cross-border wars based on ethnic/tribal nationalism.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •But the real plan of the Europeans had always been to conserve as much of the colonial legacy in Africa as possible, especially in the French (and British) colonies (p. 181)•In fact, there seems to have been some insistence that the new nation-states created at the time of independence should remain as created and not changed. Even federalist approaches were rejected (p. 181)•Even African nationalist leaders of the 1950s who fought for independence fell into the nation-state trapby accepting the borders of their countries as they were given to them by Europeans. •They also accepted the arsenal of bureaucratic and dictatorial laws that went with keeping those new countries together within those borders. •They naively thought they would be able to quickly master those territorial units(p. 181)•But instead of them mastering of their colonial legacy,it is their colonial legacy that mastered them.(p. 181)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Even the African leaders who took over these new countries at the time of independence suffered from the ambivalences that came from trying to navigate the conditioning they were subjected to and the need to adjust the new nation-states to African realities. (pp. 181-182)•But in reality, did the new African nationalist leaders even have a choice? In most cases, they were forced to work within the framework of imperialist policies and could not help but seek independence within the existing power structure, especially when considering the fact that these new countries were created without their input. •So, for instance, in the Congo, Senegal and other parts of Africa, leaders were forced to work with the borders they inherited: they had no choice and no real say in the definitions of those states to begin with. (p. 183) •It simply proved too hard for them to change these borders, especially because that would sometimes mean having to break countries apart that were built by a rival colonial power.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Some African leaders did try to propose alternatives that would be regional multi-states or federationsthat would, at least, keep older ethnic nationalities together. But they could not achieve this goal before independence since they had no say in the matter. Europeans decided it all on their own. (p. 183). •Julius Nyerere, a nationalist leader from Ta n z a n i a, for instance, had proposed before independence thatEast Africans create a federation made of Uganda, Kenya and Ta n z a n i a .•This proposal was not accepted by other Africans and, thus, failed, just as many other pan-African initiatives of the time prior to and after independence had failed: The colonial masters saw these pan-Africanist leaders as dangerous “trouble-makers”. •These large federations, if created as suggested, were seen as detrimental to both British and French national interests (p. 183-184)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) But even after independence, it became clear at times that enlarging the borders could change the balance of ethnic power in some countries, which may have made some leaders hesitant. So, once independence was obtained, these ideals and desire to change the borders and create regional and/or federal entities became lostin the midst of the governmental anarchies that followed after independence: A sign that the nation-state model left behind by the Europeans was going to bring lots of internal turmoil to each of the new countries. •The 1970s (but also the 1980s) would thus become years of political anarchy in Africa (pp. 183)So, while the 1950s made nationalist leaders concentrate on the anticolonial struggle, this helped Africans to temporarily put issues of ethnic and tribal identity in the backburner of their preoccupations. But, after independence, these issues came back in full force, triggering a need for military dictatorships, corruption, clientelism and patronage, practices that were going to wreak havoc in the ability of African countries to be politically stable and develop economically. In other words, all hell broke loose! (p. 183)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •What Nyerere had feared did happen: once the African beneficiaries of the new political units found themselves in power, it became difficult to convince them to restructure the borders of their new nation-states. Many did not want to see a dilution of their powers. (pp. 184-185)•The attachment of the new African leaders to their new African states became indeed surprising: Before independence, most groups in these territories were less preoccupied by the notion of a national flagthan by issues of bread and butter, health, schools, social justice, etc.: Under colonization, there were no African-nation states run by Africans, let alone run exclusively by Africans themselves. •And because colonialism deprived them of these opportunities, they generally saw in independence the only way of bringing justice to African people and allowing them to enjoy the opportunities and well-being that the whites had kept to themselves. So, their preoccupation was not with a national flag as an ideology of national identity. Independence meant socioeconomic justiceand an opportunity for a development not hindered by colonial rule. It was an anticolonial struggle for socioeconomic justice rather than an issue of national identity: this was impossible in the new nation-states. (p. 185)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •There was therefore at the time of independence no real sense of “national consciousness” that would have made these nationalist Africans think they belonged to the same nation: What united them was not the search for national identity, but the search for justice that only the anticolonial struggle and, thus, independence, could bring about (p. 185)•Thus, Africans were not demanding a “nation” like the Romanians did in Europe,but freedom, opportunity, and justice, things that only independence could bring about. They simply could not do this struggle with ethnic considerationsin mind, at least not as their primary goal (p. 185)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Before independence, the struggle was easy because Africans looked to the common goal of fighting a common foreign enemy. So, they looked outward. After independence, they were now forced to look inward, and what they saw was not pretty. They became horrified by what they would have to now deal with inside of their colonial borders. And so, less than 10 years after their independences, most African countries began to unravel(p. 185)•So, for the first decade after independence, the hope had existedthat the new African leaders would be able to bring in the long-sought justice and begin to satisfy the socioeconomic needs kept these countries together and somewhat helped to blunt ethnic rivalries. But by the 1970s, the rivalries over the redistribution of state resources within the nation-states became a curse. (p. 185)•And as soon as rivalries over the redistribution of resources began, they caused a fall-backto kinship politics and the practice of tribalism in African politics was born. (p. 185)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) In other words, •There was really never a tribal problem in Africa before colonialism. •Its first real manifestation was in the colonial era and mostly under colonial rule once Africans began to be amalgamated inside of territories that Europeans began to put together before and after the Berlin Conference. •While some of it began to also be witnessed during the time of Islamizationas Africans began to participate in the slave trade and create multiethnic slave states and empires in West and East Africa as well as in the Sahelian region, it is truly after independence that tribalism became a problem for Africans across the continent. •As such, tribalism is a truly colonial phenomenonthat went dormantas Africans fought for independence, but then erupted again once Africans found themselves forced to share power and resources within the borders of their new nation-states. •In this sense, tribalism became, also, a postcolonial phenomenontriggered and maintained by the colonial borders. Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Of course, the new nation-states failed and were bound to fail: Within these entities, too many crisscrossing issues were triggered that guaranteed failure from the start:•In addition to Africans never being associated to the running of these territories prior to independence and also not having had a say in the configuration of the territories that they now lived in, the tribal phenomenon arose out of the phenomenon of rivalries among elites over the spoils of the state, rivalries that quickly devolved into kinship rivalries. •And these kinship rivalries, in turn, triggered the patronage system that was going to sustain, but also imperil, most of the new political regimes of post-independence Africa. •The patronage system itself thrived out of the need by the ruling ethnic groups (some of which were minorities who go that power from the colonial master at the time of independence) to control rival group leaders and prevent them from becoming threats. (p. 186)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Thus, African moved from an anticolonial ideology that blunted their tribal differences to a period of ethnic rivalries which, after independence, gradually led to a form of ethnic/tribal consciousness that did not exist before.During colonization, the manipulations of the whites and their attempts to antagonize African tribes were of limited effect since the favored groups were not in power. They were, in that context, mere instruments in the hands of the colonial master. So, the ethnic problem was indirect, not direct. As such, it could not trigger tribal consciousness. After independence, these rivalries became direct and as they became more and more pronounced, they led to ethnic/tribal consciousness and, thus, kinship associations that divided Africans politically along ethnic lines. In other words: •Tribalism did not flourish in African because the new states were weak. •It flourished because the new nation-states were not made of homogenous nations (ethnic groups) that matched the territories upon which they lived. Rather, these states were multiethnic states by default and, as such, were doomed to experience power struggle along ethnic lines: rivalries among the elites often coincided with ethnic rivalries depending on what group each of the leaders belonged to. (p. 186)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Tr iba lism vs. N at iona lism in A f r icaUnlike in Europe, tribalism did not however evolve into ethnic/tribal nationalism in most African countries. While tribalism assumes policies that take into account ethnic differences and, thus, may favor one group over the other in the redistribution of state resources, ethnic/tribal nationalismassumes the need and, therefore, an ideology of domination whereby one group sets out to dominate and even destroy or even exterminate the other in order to assert its supremacy (ethnic/tribal supremacy). The rare cases of this type of ethnic based tribal ideology known in Africa today were seen in Rwanda and also in Sudan (which explain why the new country of South Sudan was created in 2011, although this had a Muslim vs. Christian connotation as well).Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Tr iba lism vs. N at iona lism in A f r icaThus, when analyzing the notion of nationalism in Africa, once has to distinguish between:•Anticolonialnationalism (1930s-1950s)•Continental/Pan-African/AfricanNationalism (1950s-present) •Tr iba lism(clientelist tribalism, non-nationalistic)•Tr iba l/Et hnic N at iona lism(an entirely post-colonialand very rare type of tribalism); Africans have never really tried to impose their language and culture to others due to absence of proselytizing cultures and religions.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Compare this to Europe and America:Due to earlier conquests dating back to Roman times and even before, by the 19thcentury, most European states were multiethnic states. Nationalismthus acquired shifting meanings that evolved over time:Nationalism and National Ideals in Europe:19thCentury: (The Garibaldi inspired reunification of Italy backed by Britain in its attempt to promote the fall of absolute monarchies in Europe); In this case, there was a form of nationalism aiming to push for the pursuit of the ideals of liberty. The British conceived of the notion of “The White Man’s Burden”, the French that of “Civilizing Mission” and the Americans of “Manifest Destiny” a way of sharing their ideals of liberty and civilization with the world.-Manifest Destiny (USA):Expression coined in 1845 by the American journalist and politician John O'Sullivan. It proclaims the divine right of Americans (roughly, whites from Europe) to conquer and own the American continent in its entirety. This ideology, which builds on the religious foundations of the American nation, justifies US expansionism and imperialism.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Compare this to Europe and America:-White Man's Burden (Great Britain):Inspired by the title of the poem (1899) by the English writer Rudyard Kipling, this expression translates the notion of a charge, an inevitable responsibility entrusted by destiny to the English/British, the burden given by God to the English/British white man, to conquer and civilize the world. But these conquests have often been implemented in the name of the racial superiority of the English man than of God.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Compare this to Europe and America:Civilizing Mission (France): It is an ideology that borrows both the Christian morality of evangelization and the secular republican mission to spread throughout the world the values ​​of the Republic as proclaimed by the 1789 French Revolution. These values ​​are those which, in the end, contributed to the construction of a consolidated national identityaround a nationalist utopia, that of the love and the fraternity between French people of all walks of life reunited by the republican values, values ​​that France now a Nation-State could now export by colonizing the peoples of the world for their good. Suddenly, the citizen became the one who defends the Nation and its ideals. To oppose the civilizing destiny of France became a betrayal.This nationalist sentiment has therefore contributed to the appropriationby each French person of his/her national identity, an identity built first of all on the shared notion of French citizenship, and secondly on the duty to defend this citizenship and the land that gave itto each French person. Hence the need to defend the “Patrie” (French for “fatherland”) both by protectingits republican ideals inside of Franceand spreading its strength and ideals around the world. This, thus, became the natural mission of every Frenchman.These outward-looking ideologies are often seen as forms of nationalism mixed with patriotic ideals. Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Nationalism and National Identity: Within each European state that was multiethnic, many contradictory and crisscrossing processes often emerged :•Assimilation to Republican Ideals: The need to create a sense of “one-ness” (to artificially manufacture one national cultureand one nationout the ethnic differences in the country); this meant imposing one national language (and culture), which is often the language of the dominant ethnic group); everybody is taught to read and write and to become a citizen who, because he/she is educated, can defend the deals of liberty that were born out of the revolutions; •Tribal Consciousness and Resistance:But this very forceful attempt often triggered nationalist reactions by the groups that felt threatened by the dominant group socially, politically, culturally and economically. This, thus, created a nationalistic reaction that would trigger “tribal consciousness” and lead to ethnic/tribal nationalismwhereby each group had to promoted its own interests even if that meant destroying the other.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Nationalism & National Identity (continued):•National Consciousness and Patriotism:To prevent devolution and degeneration of tribal nationalism into national warfare/civil war, the middle classes used colonialism and foreign projects (wars, conquest) as a way of promoting national unity and concentrate everybody’s attention to the outside. In this case, national identity led to “national consciousness” and both merged to become patriotism. Thus, the sense of one-ness (French-ness, British-ness, etc.) was reinforced through patriotic “projects” outside of the “nation” (nation-state), thus facilitating the assimilation of all into the Republican mold sustained by the drive to consolidate national identity).Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Nationalism & National Identity (continued): •Nationalism vs. Patriotism:while nationalism tends to look inside as a way to consolidate the nation-state around one (often imposed) national cultureand, therefore, national identity (which posits an essentialized, utopian national identity), patriotism tends to look outward and often expresses itself in international context where rivalry with other nations defines the relationship. •In these cases, “citizens” often see themselves as patriots whose mission is to defend the “fatherland” against foreign rivals and enemies (latin“pater” = father àFrench àPatrie). But at times patriotism and nationalism can merge and become indistinguishable:German nationalism was looking both inward in the form of racial/ethnic nationalism as well as outward in the form of a patriotism built around a strong sense of national identity, one that was used to assert the greatness and superiority of Germany and German people (German nation) over all other nations in Europe.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Nationalism & National Identity (continued): Tribalism:Within each of the European states that were multi-ethnic (as a result of conquests and counter-conquests), the Europeans were, as a result of such multi-ethnicity, forced to use clientelist methodologies that catered to the interests of the most nationalistic groups to prevent the collapse of the state.•The choice was often either war or military action to crushany type of emerging nationalism, or patronage.•But over time, the class system that emerged after the Revolutions, and this became reinforced thanks to the industrial revolution, gradually replaced pure ethnic tribalism with socioeconomic associations.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Nationalism & National Identity (continued): Ethnic/Tribal/Racial Nationalism: As certain ethnic-groups (nations) become powerful inside of the artificial European nation-states, they begin to project their own specific identity, at time using such dominant identity as synonymous with the national identity of the nation-state. The Germans, for example, began to useGerman identityinside as a way of assimilating everyone, but also excluding persecuting those who were not seen as real Germans. This confusion of National Identity and Ethnic/Tribal Identity in such context is done with the specific goal of asserting the domination of one group over all others and sometimes is used as a pretext for conquering others, waging war or annexing lands where their “tribesmen” live as a minority (German invasion of Poland, for instance). Nazism, thus, was a form of political ideology that contain a strong dose of racial/tribal consideration whose goal was to promote one group over others, even if that meant destroying the others (antisemitism, the holocaust) Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Nationalism & National Identity (continued): White Supremacy (White nationalism): •At times, when Europeans react as a block to other races, they would tend to begin to see themselves as one and, thus, project a sense of European nationalism that would contain the desire to dominate the world to promote European ideals. •In this case, the white, European race would be promoted as a superior race, and Europe’s Judeo-Christian civilization as a superior civilization, and, thus, hep to justify such phenomena as colonialism and imperialism. •Within European/Western countries themselves, xenophobiaas well as anti-immigrant sentiment often lead to the expression of white nationalism, which is an extreme form of ethnic-tribal nationalism. South Africa and the United-States’ segregationistpolicies towards blacks were one form of such white supremacist ideologies.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) In AfricaOf all these, Africans have known mostly the Tr ib a lis m type, but mostly limited to its clientelist aspects. Most Africans did not develop tribal consciousness of the nationalistic type (desire to dominate and destroy the other). Tr ib a l/ R a cia l Nat ion a lis mis, thus, a new phenomenon that emerged only recently and has been seen only in Rwanda and in Sudan. It was seen in South Africa also, but as a result of white manipulations that sought to oppose the Zulus to other groups in order to ensure the survival of the apartheid system.But it is not African nationalism that caused tribalism in Africa. Colonial legacy did.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) So, in essence, the very concept of nationalism in the post-colonial era has been a rather complex notion to pin down. In postcolonial Africa, issues of nationalism and identity became complicated:National Identity:African history of colonial domination did not make it possible for National Identity as a definer of ethnicity and/or culture to emerge. In the post-colonial context, it simply marked a form of cross-border elitist rivalries that used the new territories (the new nation-states) as markers of elite power as opposed to issues of national identity in the ethnic sense. •So, to say I am Gabonese is not the same as saying I am French: French-ness carries with it a sense of a specific cultural identitythat being Gabonese cannot carry. Being Gabonese simply means I am from a territory called Gabon, whereas being French means I am not only from a territory called France, but also of a specific French culturethat is an intrinsic part of French identity. •In other words, the notion of National Identitycould not take on an ethnic/tribal connotation in Africa: Since the new nation-states were multi-ethnic, the idea of the nation became a mere cross-border definer of territorial difference. In other words: a simple expression of state and territorial sovereignty rather than a marker of ethnicity and/or culturesince not many countries in Africa are ethnically or culturally homogenous(even if, paradoxically, Rwanda and Burundi are, yet the Belgians managed to promote ethnic/tribal nationalism in there). Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Continental/Pan-African Nationalism(Pan-Africanism): The prevalent marker of cultural nationalism in Africa is often simply continental. Because of the impossibility to promote ethnic/tribal nationalism within their borders without leading to a collapse of the state, Africans tend to continue to wage a “war” that is both overt and covert against Western domination (neocolonialism and imperialism). This creates a sense of “continental consciousness” that moves beyond ethnic differences to embrace continental identity as a marker of difference between Africans and the outside world.•African Nationalism:So when we talk about African Nationalism, we actually mean, mostly, African anticolonial nationalismduring the decolonization period (1930s-1950s), but also, since the 1950s, Pan-Africanism(the idea of African solidarity and resistance against neocolonialism, imperialism, racism, and white supremacy not only in Africa, but also around the world wherever people of African descent are confronted to the same). Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Tr ib a lis m :So, when we say ethnic/tribal wars in Africa, the wars are less about ethnic/tribal nationalism(the need for one group to dominate and exterminate the others) rather than conflicts over power sharing and redistribution of state resources(which patronage and clientelism attempt to resolves via policies meant to buy out rival groups to avoid coups and civil wars). In fact, any attempt to develop ethnic/tribal nationalism would inevitably lead to the collapse of any such regime and trigger an immediate civil war or coup. So, this has tended not to be the pursuit of many regimes. •Islamic Fundamentalism/Extremism: Due to the influence of the worldwideWest/Christian vs. Arabs/Islam/Muslim rivalry and warsthat have opposed Christians to Muslims since the 7thcentury, some Africans in some countries have embraced Islamic fundamentalism/extremism ideology, but turned mostly towards the outside world, that is, against Europeans and Americans (even though Africans are bearing the brunt of it according to whether they are “sold out” to Western religion (Christianity) or Islam. Boko Haram in Nigeria is one such instance.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) In other words, Ethnic/Tribal Nationalism and Tr ib a lis mare not necessarily the same thing. And most civil wars in Africa are actually due to non-nationalistic tribalism(when power is not shared and resources not redistributed properly) as opposed to Ethnic/Tribal nationalism (most Africans do not fight over the desire to impose one’s culture to someone else; everybody sticks to their own and refuses to yield, which often makes it easier for Western languages to continue to dominate).In other words: •These ethnic conflicts would easily be resolved if resources were better shared and the political systems reorganized around power-sharing institutions that would give a political voice to all groups.•And it is the fact that they could be so easily resolved that suggests the absence of ethnic/cultural fundamentalism in Africa.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) African Nationalism and Liberation MovementsA number of liberation movements that emerged throughout Africa had to take up arms to fight militarily for their independence (Kenya, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, etc.).For instance: •Portugal and Spain had repressive regimes at home during colonial times. They simply reproduced the same structures in their colonies and sought to repress African nationalism. The two largest Portuguese colonies in Africa had to fight wars of independence against the colonial master. (p. 186-187)•Belgians did not even begin to consider the possibility of Congo becoming independent until pressured into it by African nationalists.This desire to prevent the independence of the Congo led to the rise of Lumumba as a nationalist who fought and died for the independence of the Congo (p. 186-187).Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Decolonizationwas a long process that lasted from the 1930s to the independence of Namibia in 1990, of which the decolonization of Libya in 1951 is an important marker (p. 187). But one could even argue that the end of Apartheid in South Africa in 1994and the presidency of Nelson Mandela as the first black president of South Africa could be the real end marker.The reason why the new nation-states in Africa were a problemwas that there was no history of Africans conquering and forcefully assimilating others. Africa knew relatively few wars of conquests prior to the Arabs and Europeans, so they had a harder time accepting the rule of “foreigners,” whether in the form of Arabs and Europeans during the colonial era or other Africans after independence. (p. 188)So, while in Europe some wars used ethnic nationalism as an ideological engine to justify the need to recreate or recover the “old state” that was lost when one’s group was conquered and absorbed by the conquering nation (we saw this in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union), no such wars were seen in Africa). (p. 188)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) This is because it was virtually impossible to engage into such a tribe-fueled nationalistic war without basically waging war against several other nations. The Rwandan civil war (1990-1994) is one of the few cases, if not only real time in Africa history when several nations became involved in a cross-border war that had ethnic connotations: The countries of the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Uganda) and even Angola basically became either involved or destabilized because of the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. This led to what is known as Africa’s Great War, which actually happened in two great phases known as the “First Congo War” (1996-1997) which was triggered by Rwanda’s invasion of Congo with the backing of Uganda) and the “Second Congo war” (1998-2003) over the same Rwanda-related issues. This instability continues to mar some of them today, Eastern Congo. Note: More than 5.4 million people have died directly (war) and indirectly (starvation and disease) as a result of this Congo conflict, which is seen as the deadliest conflict in the world since World War II (50-85 million deaths in Europe in just 5 years). More than 2 million inside and outside Congo have been displaced as a result of this unending “war” and more that 1000 people have continued to die daily as a result of the lasting effects of the “war”, which became and continues to be enmeshed into diamond and minerals related conflicts. It is probably also the deadliest and longest conflict in African history (with multiple African and non-African actors).Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) So, if there were ever any “old states” that Africans would have wanted to go back to, these were swallowed entirely not only into the European “zones of influence” that were formed following the Berlin Conference, but also later into the new nation-states that were created at the time of independence. The overall colonial assumption of the colonial powers was that these “old African states” never existed(Africans were not a people, but a bunch of stateless tribes), which of course justified European “nation-building” using the tool of the “nation-state” to fabricate “multiethnic nations” where there were none before, even if that meant forcing people together that had nothing to do with each other (p. 188).Interestingly indeed, once established as new rulers of these new states, Africans were forced to turn to their colonial masters for guidanceas to how to run and rule over these new artificial states/countries. (p. 188)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) So, faced with their incapacity to run these countries, Africans were forced into “cooperation agreements” that they had to sign if they wanted to benefit from the guidance of their former colonial master. This paved the way for the former colonial master to come back to Africa as an “advisor” who generously was offering his services to the “primitives” and teaching them how to run a state (p. 188). The era of neocolonialismwas born.“A i d ” a n d “ D e v e l o p m e n t A i d ” suddenly became altruistic gestures by the former colonial power when, in fact, the idea behind it all was to continue to plunder the former colonies with the complicity of the African elites that had been groomed into power as agents of European neocolonialism. (p. 188-189)In the end, it is the African populations, especially the peasants, that became the victims of export and import terms of tradedictated by those who controlled world markets (Americans and Europeans), which led to poverty and collapse of African economies (p. 190)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) The nation-state was thus structurally condemned to malfunction, and the transfer of powerto the Africans became, simply, a transfer of crisis. (p. 190)The new African leaders, amongst whom we find some of Africa’s fiercest nationalists with good intents, thus inherited a “crisis of social disintegration” that meant (p. 190):•A breakdown of tribal customs and value systems;•An inflation of the bride-price, that became a corrupt custom);•Spread of prostitution (things that would have been unknown in Africa prior to the Arabs and Europeans)•Collapse of African agricultural practices and economic systems•Savage and ill-planned urbanizationthat emptied villages (rural exodus), further killing the ability of countries to self-sustain in terms of agriculture; •Rural exodus further ruined villages and killed African traditions (oral, cultural, legal, moral);•The countryside and peasants became impoverished;Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Urban populations became indigent (dependent), relying on salaries and jobs that were not there, further creating a layer of poverty in the cities;•Loss of economic power by womenwho became “housewives” as opposed to producers of wealth they used to be in old Africa•The political systems(legal and institutional) became pale copies of European ones and ill-adapted to African realities, further causing confusion and chaos at the social, cultural, economic and political level;•The party-system became a problem; it did not promote sound democratic principles, but rather exacerbated the tribal problem as political parties became organized along ethnic lines.•Patronage and clientelism along ethnic lines further ruined African economies and where it did not work, civil wars and military coups ensued, causing further instability.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Of course, with the transfer of power to educated Africans, it is with the urban people that political power based on European models was bound to reside. And most governments policies prioritized the development of the cities rather than the countryside. The countryside became neglected and alienated in favor of urban areas and cities, and development projects misdirected to the cities as opposed to the countryside, further decimating farming and traditional production systems and networks (p. 191)By the 1960s, Black Africa was having to import substantial amountsof basic foods(p. 191).This triggered the funny conclusion that Africa was overpopulatedand this overpopulation would explain why the continent was poor and unable to feed itself. (pp. 191-192)Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Yet, just 450 million people lived in Africa in the 1980s. (p. 192)Africa was actually and is still underpopulated by world standards, especially when considering that it is the second largest continent mass in the world:•Africa: 1.2 billion people today •India: 1.3 billion •China: 1.4 billion•The crisis that Africans encountered was not a crisis of overpopulation, but a crisis of underproduction. (p. 192), all that caused by foreign control of African terms of trade.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) The Cold War(1946-1989/1991)American foreign policy or disposition towards Africa may have also played a detrimental role, especially during the cold war. America feared “radical innovation” in the Third World, including in Africa. This came as a surprise because America had also at times been seen by African elites as a potential ally of “innovative forces”. T h e y c o u l d n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h y America preferred the continuity of colonial policyin Africa to such “radical innovation”, especially if it meant, simply, the pursuit of liberty everywhere. This was because of the need for a collective “Cold War Policy”, which heavily depended on an alliance between the United States and Western Europe (p. 193)So, the interests of the Cold War far outweighed the interests of African development, even if it meant opposing or preventing African economic and democratic development. Africa, thus, had to remain subordinated to the imperatives of world markets and geopolitical politics as controlled by the Euro-American allies, and such world markets and politics depended for their existence on the continuity of the colonial/neocolonial order.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Ghana and the Cold WarGhanawas the first Black African country to gain independencefrom Britain in 1957.•Kwame Nkrumah was elected the first Prime Minister of Ghanafirst when Ghana was called the Gold Coats under British rule in 1952, then again in 1957 in the wake of his unilateral declaration of Ghana’s independence from Great Britain in 1957. He then was elected Ghana’s first president in 1960.•But Nkrumah was also a nationalist whose aura came from the fact that he had advocated for “self-government within the shortest possible time” when the British Gold Coast became ensnarled in the decolonization fever.•Nkrumah is also one of the early promoters of “pan-Africanism”, especially as perhaps the first African head of state to make it an ideological purpose (notion said to have been invented by Henry Sylvester-Williams of Tr in id a dwho organized the first-pan African conference in London in 1900, but many people consider Edward Wilmot Blyden, a black settler from the West Indies who established himself in Liberia in 1850).Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) Nkrumah’s role as a pan-Africanist and leader of the first independent Black African country made him a star around the world and brought Ghana wide international recognition, especially among African nationalists and black pan-Africanists.•He also sought to eradicate “tribalism” because he saw it as generating a set of loyalties that favored kinship over “nationhood” (in the nation-state sense), and this, to him, would always be a source of divisions in Africa at a time when Africans needed unity in order to fight the forces of neocolonialism and imperialism. As such, he weakened the powers of traditional chieftaincies (such as those of the Akan people) and even banned tribal flags. This contributed to his loss of support from the chiefs that he destooled, and many supported his overthrow as a result.•But he was overthrown in a military coup in 1966, sending him into exile in Guinea. Although Ghana is now an example of stable democracy in West Africa, it was not spared the civil-war coup trap. It experienced a period of a series of coups between 1966 and 1981, until Jerry Rawlings took over, also through a coup. Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196) •Angola and Ethiopia were two other cases, among many, that were ensnarled into the West vs East rivalry, with civil wars that clearly reflected the Cold War paradigm. Many African countries, thus, became victim to the Cold War and the West vs. East conducted their proxy wars through the nations of the world that were now forced to choose their side. (p. 195)•In the end, no matter the choice one made, political instability from civil wars and coups was always guaranteed.Davidson, “The Challenge of Nationalism” (pp. 162-196)