Conduct research using at least two of the articles on handling project conflict management. 3 articles attached to select from.In your paper, identify the different styles you found in your research,

How NOT to Manage a Project: Conflict Managemen t Lessons Learned from a DOD Case Stud y J. Scott Sutterfield Florida A&M University School of Business and Industry Shawnta S. Friday-Stroud Florida A&M University School of Business and Industry Sheryl L. Shivers-Blac kwell Florida A&M University School of Business and Industry Abstract This is a case study of a failed Department of Defense (DOD) project, even though it was fully justified and badly needed. Pr oject management within the DOD is a complicated process. Projects are beset by the agenda of various stakeholders within the DOD organizational struct ure. When this occurs, strong project management leadership is necessary for success. This paper analyz es the potent ial causes of the project failure resulting from the three domains of organi zational conflict, and identifies lessons learned from the failure via a conflict manageme nt perspective. Lessons learned are presented to facilit ate the management of inter personal-based, task-based, and proces s-based conflicts on the part of proj ect managers and project sponsors, thus increasing the likelihood of successful proj ect management outcomes. This case study fills a void in the project management literature by exa m ining the relationsh ip between the three dimensions of organization conflict and the increase in various project costs, and then offering a Project-C onflict Management Framework. Introduction Project management within the United States Department of Defense (DOD) has been aptly described as the one of the world’s mo st complicated processes. Completion of projects may require several years, and th ey can be difficult to manage under the best of circumstances. If organizational conflic t is superimposed upon the normal project © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 218 management difficulties, successful projec t outcomes are rendered immensely more difficult. The complexity of DOD projects st ems from the fact that various stakeholders from above and below are likely to besiege t he project manager. Fr om above, there are the senior financ ial executives whose jobs cons ist of constantly re-alloc ating resources. More specifically, they typically re-alloca te funds that have been awarded to a project manager for his or her program. Within the DOD, the comple xity also stems from the appearanc e or perception that there have been times when the re-allocation of funds has been d one without any regard for nationa l secu rity or for those military missions that might be of strategic impor tance to the military. From below, there are the depar tmental or organizational m anagers who are vested in protecting their own interests in th e project, whether directly or i ndirectly. Ofte n times, these managers consider the authority and latitude for i ndependent action accorded by senior DOD management to the project manager to be an encroachment upon their authority. Along with this, such department al managers are concer ned with preserving their own organizations, and therefore attempt to compel the project manager to comply with each and every regulation pertaining to their separate areas. This was es pecially true in the l ate 1980s and early 1990s when the emphasis in the DOD was on streamlining acquisition strategies to reduc e the funding outlay and the time required for fielding a system. A t the time the Lighter Amphibian Heavy-Lift (LA M P-H) Project, which will be des cribed below, was ext ant, the time to field was typically 10 – 15 years, which continues to be an issue and a matter of conc ern (Griffard, 2002; Office of In spector General, 2001). Departmental managers have been and still ar e concerned that any attempt to shorten the acquisi tion process represents a thr eat to their various areas, and are highly resistant to any appr oach to acquisition streamlining. Consequently, departmental m anagers do everything within their power to compel full complianc e with all regulations, ev en though in many cases such compliance c an be a direct barrier to acquisition streamlining, gr eatly increase project cost and extend the project sch edule. All this results in systems that are unaffordable and frequently do not satisfy their operational require ments. An environment with organizational conflict from above and below is the type of environment within whic h most DOD project managers frequently must functi on. Literature Revie w Organizational Conflict Organizational conflict management is “ … a phenomenon that occurs between interdependent parties as they experience negative emotional reactions to perceived disagreem ents and interference wit h the attainment of their goals” (Barki & Hartwick, 1991). It has three main domains: inter personal-based conflict, task-based conflict, and process-based conflict (Coser, 1956, Guetko w & Gyr, 1954; Hearn & Anderson, 2002; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Pinkley, 1990) . Interpersonal-based conf lict deals with relationship tension between inter departmental and in tradepartmental individuals (Hearn & Anderson, 2002). © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 219 Three dimensions of interpersonal conf lict have been identified: interdependence, disagreem ent, and interference (Barki & Ha rtwick, 2001; Putnam & Poole, 1987; Thomas, 1992). Interdependenc e, a key structur al pre-conditio n of any conflict, occurs when the attainment of one party’ s goals depends in some way on the actions of another party (Barki & Hartwick, 2001). Dis agreement, a key cognitive component of interpersonal conflict, exists when one party’s values, needs, intere\ sts, opinio ns, goals, or objectives are divergent from those of the other party (Barki & Hartwick, 2001). Interference, the central behav ioral characterist ic of any conflict, refers to the oppositio n that one party has with another party’s attainm ent of its interests, objectives or goals (Barki & Hartwick, 2001). Task-based conflict deals with tension that stem s from whether or not certain tasks, or requirements in the case of projec t management, should be pursued (Hearn & Anderson, 2002). Pro cess-based conflict deal s with tension that stems fro m how tasks should be c ompleted (Hearn & Anderson, 2002). Although there is extensive research regarding organizational conflict and its domains , there is a lack of research examining the three domains of organizational conflic t in the project management literature. Therefore, this case study fills a void in the project management lit erature by examinin g organizational conflict and its three dom ains, and offering a Project-Conflict Management Framework. The next section will identify the potent ial costs associated with conflic t, followed by the specific forms of conflict along with t he symptoms of that conflict. The subsequent section will review the conflict process and conflict handling intention strategies, and identify a Pr oject-C onflict Management Framework.

Costs Associated w ith Conflict The major l esson lear ned from the problem of organizational conflict identified in this case study is that conflict stems from dev iations. Those deviations can be with the people, the plan, or the proc ess. Kerzner (2003) stated that “…good up front planning may reduce the number of changes required. ” The minimization of changes or deviations can enhance the chances of effective project execution. Unfortunately, the various types of organizational conflict that arose concurrently throughout the LAMP-H project, which will be identif ied and analyzed below, were not resolved or managed in a way that led to effectiv e project execution. The problem of organizational conflict comes with a cost. The cost of the conflict is in large part determined by the extent to whic h the conflict can be managed or resolved. The costs associated with not effectively resolving or m anaging conflict in a complex project setting are always detrimental, and c an be fatal, as will be demonstrated below by the eventual demis e of the LA MP-H project. The cost of organizational conflict may be viewed from a mathematical perspective. Consider a symmetric hyperbola of the form … x*y = c © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 220 with only positive values for “x” and “y.” The pl ot of this equation is in the first quadrant. As “x” becomes small, “y” becomes very large, which causes the curve to become asymptotic to the “y” axis, w hereas if “y” becomes small, “x ” becomes large, causing the curve to become asymptotic to the “x” axis. Consider a si milar function to describe the relationship among the risk of conflict, the cost of conflict, the scheduling deviat ions due to conflict, and expected performance. The function is as follows: r = f(c,s,p) where r – overall risk of conflict c – cost o f conflict s – scheduling deviations due to conflict p – expect ed performance This four dimensional equation would yield a hyper-surface where the risk of conflict could be thought of as surfaces of constant va lue, analogous to the constant in the first equation. T hese surfaces would be comprised of points such that f(c,s ,p) = r = constant. Any attempt to change one of the variabl es, say expected performance, without a corresponding change in the other variables would move the resulting point to another risk surface. For example, if one attemp ted to increase the expect ed performance without corresponding increases in cost and scheduling, one would move to a new surface with an increa sed level of risk. As will be described belo w, this is precisely what occurred as a result of the interpersonal -, task-, and process-based conflict that occurred throughout the LAMP-H project.

The Conflict Process The conflict process can be viewed as hav ing five stages: (1) potential oppos ition or incompatibility, (2) cognit ion and personalization, (3) in tentions, (4) behavior and (5) outcomes (Robbins & Judge, 2005). S tage 1 is characterized by the presenc e of conditions that create opportuniti es for conflict to arise, for example, communication, structure, and personal variables. Stage 2 occurs when the potential for opposition or incompatibility negativ ely affect s another party or becomes ac tualized. Stage 3 occurs when a dec ision is made to act in a certain way. This stage is characterized by two- dimensional cooperativ eness (the degree to which one party attempts to satisfy the other party’ s concerns) and assertiveness (the degree to which one party attempts to satisfy his own concer ns). From these two dimensions five conflict handling int entions are identified: avoiding (unassertive and unc ooperative) , com peting (assertive and uncooperat ive), accommodating (unassertive and cooperative), compro misin g (midrange on both assertiveness and cooperativeness), and collab orating (assertive and cooper ative) (Robbins & Judge, 2005; Thomas, 1992). Hocker and Wilmot (1998) note that avoiding occurs when people physically or © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 221 psychologically remove themselves from the conflict scene or epis ode often by denying the conflict, being indirect and evasive, c hanging and/or avoiding topics, employing noncommittal remarks, and making irrelevant remarks or joking as a way to avoid dealing wit h the conflict (Gross & Guerro, 2000, p. 207). The com peting style relies on the use of position power, aggression, verbal dominance, and perseverance. Hocker and Wilmot (1998) state that behaviors associat ed with this style incl ude confrontational remarks, accusations, personal criticism, re jection, hostile imperatives or threats, antagonistic jokes or teasing, aggressive ques tions, presumptive remarks, and denial of responsibility at the expense of others (G ross & Guerro, 2000, p. 206). Papa and Canary (1995) sugges t that the competing styl e may be effective however inappropriate in organizational contexts where there ar e production-related goals (Gross & Guerro, 2000). Hocker and Wilmot (1998) note that the accommodating style is associated with putting aside one’s own needs to please others, passi vely accepting the dec isions of others, making yielding or conceding statements, and explic itly express ing harmony and cooperation during a conflict epis ode (Gross & Guerro, 2000). The com promising style is characterized as being focused on individu al goals as well as the needs of others (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Gross & Guerro, 20 00). Hocker and Wilmot (1998) state that this style requires searching for an intermedi ate position, through strategies such as splitting the difference, meeting th e partner halfway, suggesting a trade-off, max imizing wins while minimizing losses, and offering a quick, short-term resolution to the conflict (Gross & Guerro, 2000, p. 208). Lastly, the collaboration style is viewed as both effective and appropriate in managing confli ct because it provides disputants with access to other’s perceptions of incompatib le goals, thereby enabling them to find a solution that integrates the goals and needs of both parties (Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988; Gross & Guerro, 2000).

Stage 4 is considered the behavior stage and includes statements, actions, and reactions made by the conflicting parties . Lastly, Stage 5 occurs when the action- reaction interplay results in functional or d ysfunctional c onflict (Robbins & Judge, 2005). The next section will identif y conflict handling intention st rategies for each symptom based on the domain classification in the context of a Project-Conflict Management Framework.

Project-Conflict Management Frame work Given the need for project managers to make decisions in the midst of organizational conflict, the conflict management proce ss and decision-making process have been merged and modified to fit the field of project management, and its step-by-step approach (Kimmons, 1992). The resulting Project-Conflict M anagement Framework suggests the following: 1. Identification of c onflict as the problem 2. Identification of symptom s of the problem and cla ssification of them as interpersonal-, task- , o r process-based conflict © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 222 3. Setting strategy selection criteria 4. Identification of alternativ e conflict handling intention st rategies for each symptom based on domain clas sification a. Avoiding (Neglecting, Withdrawing) b. Competing (Asserting, Distri butive, Dominating, Forcing) c. Accommodating (Appeasing, Obliging) d. Compromise (Sharing) e. Collaboration (Integrat ion, Problem-Solving) 5. Selection of conflict handling intention strategies for each symptom identified, many of which may need to be employed concurrently 6. Implementation of selected conflict handling intention st rategies, concurrently if necessary. Following the introduc tion and overview of the DOD LAMP-H case study below, the Project-Conflict Management Fr amework will be used to articulate conflict management lessons learned from the LAMP project. The practical applic ati ons will be delineated from the case analysis usi ng the Project-Conflict Managem ent Framework to provide project managers with a guide for how to ident ify and resolve interpersonal-, task-, and process-based conflict. LAMP-H Case Stud y This paper articulates the LAMP-H project’s history based on the use of archival data and observ ations (Eis enhardt, 1989). Next, various project phases are analyz ed, along with departmental concerns at each phase. T hen, specific project conflicts and their symptoms are identif ied and analyzed based using t he Project-Conflict Management Framework. Lastly, practical less ons learne d are shared in an effort to enhance future decision-making and improve the management and resolution of conflicts for successful project outcomes. The Lighter Amphibian Heavy-Lift (LAMP-H) Project was initiat ed by the U. S. Army to acquire amphibious heavy-lift capability. T he term “lighter” refe rs to the functi on performed by a craft in moving s upplies from large carrier ship s to the shore. The term “amphibian” refers to the motion of the craft, that is, its capability of moving over the surface of water and then transitioning to movement over land. Because of the requirement to move over both water and land, amphibians are usually, though not always, air-cushioned vehicles. This means t hat such a vehicle glides on a cushion of air, an inch or two above the surface over which it moves. The requirement for this capability had been identifi ed as essential for the Army’s logistic re-supply mission for numerous areas of strategic interest in t he world. The purpose of the LAMP-H was to support the ground troops duri ng amphibious assault missions. The operational concept of the LAMP-H was that it would follow the troops on to the beach and provide them with the supplies necessary to sustain their ground ass ault. Although the need for the LAMP-H had been i dentified, the project had languished for © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 223 approximately 10 years due to internal disput es about what the capabilities of such a vehicle should be. In particular, tw o poi nts of contention were the payload and the speed. Some thought that it should be capabl e of carrying two M-70 tanks, a payload of approximately 140 tons, at a relatively low airspeed. Others argued t hat it should have a lower payload and be able to fly at a greater airspeed. Some believ ed that it should be powered by paddlewheels that would propel it through the water until it reached the beach, and thereafter by lar ge deeply treaded tires over t he sand. Others believed that two large Archimedean screws s hould power it. It was argued t hat this would suffice for propulsion over sea or sand. Still others ar gued that the LAMP-H should be driven with ducted propellers. Along with this diversity of opinion, there was also wide dis agreement as to just how many LAMP-H units should be purchased and at what unit price. Finally, the user of the system , the Transportation School (T-School ), was no longer c ertain that it wanted or needed the LAMP-H system. Al though the program had floundered along for about 10 years, it i s likely to have surviv ed as a result of the “seductive appeal of collectiv e belief” (Royer, 2003) by those in volved with the project because of their perceptions regarding the im portance and significanc e of having LAMP-Hs in the Army’s arsenal. While a description of highlighted project events is delineated below, Table 1 is a timeline that delineates the chr onology of the events to be described. Table 1. Chronology of LAMP -H Activitie s and Events Activity /Event Date Identification of LA MP-H Requirement Year 1 Deputy Project Manager Appointed Sept, Year 10 Requirements Analysis (RA) Undertaken Sept, Year 11 RA Results are Forthcoming Nov, Year 11 - May 87, Year 12 PEO Structure Established Mar, Year 12 New PEO Appo inted Apr, Year 12 New Projec t M anager Appointed July, Year 12 RA results in Project Funds Restoration Aug, Year 12 RA Refinement and Proj ect Coordination in DOD Sep, Year 12 – Jun, Year 13 Matrix Management Team Formed Jul, Year 13 Program Management Documents Preparation Jul, Year 13 – Dec, Year 14 IPR to Enter Development Phase Dec, Year 14 Continuing Conflict Over Requirements Jan – Jun, Year 15 New Projec t M anager Appointed Jul, Year 15 Deputy Project Manager Reassigned Mar, Year 16 Request for Proposal (RFP) Released Jan, Year 16 LAMP-H Project Termi nated Jun, Year 16 © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 224 Program Development Infancy The project manager of the LAMP -H Project was surprised at the great diversity of opinion surrounding the LAMP-H project, and wondered how this project became so controversial given its potential us efulness to the Army’s arsenal. Not only was there great diversity as to the te chnical requirements for the LA MP-Hs, but there was also an equally great divergence as to the Acquisition Strategy for the system. Manag ement at the Army Watercraft R&D Ce nter at Fort Belvoir, VA, believ ed that no R&D was necessary for the LAMP-H. They believed that it could be purchased “off-the-shelf ” from a commercial firm, and that the propul sion system could then be integrated. This would have necessitated only a single In-Process Review (IPR), th us greatly simplifying production approval for the proj ect. It was evident, however , that there were some signific ant problems with this approach. Firs t, not all of the technology required was state-of-the-art. Second, the subsystems to be used for the LAMP-H had never been integrated before. It seemed, t herefore, that the LAMP-H Project could best be executed as an Army Streamlined Acquisitio n Program (ASAP) that would inv olve two IPRs: the first to obtain approval for proceeding wi th the R&D phase, and the second upon completion of the R&D phase, to approve the LAMP-H as having s atisfied all R&D re- quirements, and as being ready for trans ition into the production phase. A third issue that had plagued the LAMP-H Project since it s inception was that of funding cuts. It was discovered that th is was due to the fa ct that performance characteristics for the LAMP-H had never been defined. Hence, it became evident that a requirements analysis would be needed in or der to provi de documented rationale for funding the LAMP-H in order to put an end to all speculat ion as to the LAMP-H configuration specific ations. The requi rements analys is would also determine the number of craft to be acquired in order to best satisfy th e LAMP-H mission. Since the Department of Army w as threatening to wit hdraw funds, a requirements analys is was immediately initiated with an independent systems analysis or ganization. Soon positive results were forthcomi ng, and they imm ediately began to breathe new life into the LAMP-H project. To understand the vital im portance of the requirements analysis in defending the LAMP-H project budget, it is necessary to understand the organizational structure wi thin the DOD’s Department of Ar my, which is described pictorially by the organization chart in Figure 1. © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 225 Figure 1. Arm y Stru cture before Implementing PEO DoD Arm y Navy Air Force Arm y Materiel Comma nd Te st & Eval uatio n Tr aining & Doctrine Com mand Other Troop Suppo rt Comma nd Tran sportati on Sch ool (T-School ) Other Ft. Bel voi r R& D Center Watercraft PM Within the Department of Army’s organizatio nal structure, the li ne of authority for the Watercraft project manager reached thr ough the Troop Support Command, through the Army Materiel Command to the D epartment of Army staff. In practi cal terms, this meant that the Army Materiel Command contro lled the funds for all Watercraft Product Managers' programs and projec ts. Although the Departm ent of Army staff had been generally favorable toward the LAMP-H pr oject, in the absenc e of a requirements analys is, they had no basis for defending against the Army Materiel Command management for LAMP-H funds. However, as results from the requirements analys is were forthcoming, they were used in a majo r consensus building effort to demonstrate the need for the LAMP -H project. The cons ensus building was done by briefing high levels of Department of Army management and the DOD staff on the requirements analys is results. Once the Department of Army staff had a sound rationale for supporting the LAMP-H project, the Army Materiel Com m and was no longer able to arbitrarily cut funds, w hich enabled progress to be made on the project. An Acquisition Strategy was developed based on the results of the requirements analys is, consistent with the technical requirement s shown to be necessary for the LAMP-H craft, which further solidified the program. As requirements analysis results became availa ble, it became obvious that the LAMP-H should not carry two A brams tanks at a rela tively low sp eed. Instead, it needed to have a payload of about 90 tons, 50 tons less than t hat for two Abrams tanks, and to be capable of traveling about 15 to 20 knots in a fully loaded condition. These characteristics maximized the off-load capabi lity of the craft, and minimized the number of LAMP-H craft required to exec ute t he off-load mission, which as the analysis indic ated, was about 30 craft. Another very signific ant result from the requirements analys is was that the craft would have to be propelled by ducted airscrews in order to © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 226 satisfactorily complete the mission. Lastly, the results indicated that each LAMP-H craft could be ac quired for approximately 15 millio n dollars. An Army Streamlined Acquis ition Progr am (A SAP) appr oach wou ld be required because of the need to further develop some of the technology and to perform a systems integration effort. The results from th e requirements analys is made it possible to move quickly to ensure that adequate f unds were programmed for the acquisition, and to refine the Acquisition Strategy. Once t he results from the r equirements analys is became available, the Transportation Scho ol (T-School) became an enthusiastic supporter of the program. T he management at Watercraft R&D Center, however, was very much annoyed at having been shown to be technically inc orrect; thus, they only half-heartedly supported the pr ogram. Even so, the LAMP-H project appeared at last to have been established as a viable project. Ho wever, as it turned out, it was only the beginning of the problems with the LAMP-H project. Program Development Maturation Two very significant senior leader ship c hanges occurred shortly after the LA MP-H project was solidified as a viable project. First, a senior position called the Program Executive Officer (PEO) was established thr oughout the Department of Army to provide an exec utiv e sponsor for each program. A visual of how the new PEO structure affected the lines of authority in the Departm ent of Army organizational structure is shown in Figure 2. Figure 2. Arm y Structur e after Implementing PEO DoD Arm y Navy Air For ce Arm y Materiel Comma nd Te st & Eval uatio n Tra ining & Doctrin e Comma nd Other Troop Suppo rt Comma nd Tran sport ation School (T-School ) Other Program Executive Offi cer Ft. Bel voi r R&D Center Watercraft PM © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 227 The implementation of the PEO structure led to the P roject/Program Managers being taken from under the Troop Support Comma nd, and being placed under the authority of the new PEO. This same organi zational change was made with all Product/Project/Program Managers under the Army Materiel Com m and. As a result, the PEOs reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Developme nt and Acquisitio n (ASARDA), whic h meant that the PEOs were placed in charge of all programs/projec ts, and that the Army Mate riel Command no longer had any management control of t he programs. H ence, the Army Command could no longer take funds from programs, which was an early try at achieving what Matta and Ashkenas (2003) call “Balancing Vertical and Ho rizontal Activities.” Combined with a matrix management approach, this theoretically provided the capability to achieve rapid results both vertically and horizontally, whic h was precisely what the Department of Army had envisioned when it reorganized in to the PEO structure (Kerzner, 2003). The Program Executiv e Officer (P EO) positi on over the Watercraft project manager was filled by a man who came from a senior pos ition on the Department of Army staff. Although he was supposed to have been the LAMP-H program sponsor and to have supported the program at the senior levels in the Depar tment of Army and the DOD, he came to his new position with no acquis ition experience. As the project drew on, it became apparent that he neither understood the signific ance of the program nor it’s Acquis ition Strategy. The second leadership change that occurre d in the Watercraft Product Manager organization (the LAMP-H’s home) was t he appointment of a new Product Manager (PM). This new PM had also come directly from the DOD. But un like the PEO, this new project manager had come with an excellent acquisition backgrou nd. He had completed the DOD Program Management School where he had learned many new ideas as to how systems should be acquired. As a result of his training, he believed that he should be firmly in control of his programs. He was a staunch advocate of the Army Streamline d Acquisitio n Progr am (ASAP) ap proach to system s acquisitio n, which led him to be an enthusias tic supporter of the LAMP-H Acquisition Strategy. The new PM, as it turned out, proved to be a very e ffective manager. He had come to accept new approaches regarding concurrent engineerin g and the need to build prototypes on production tooling in order to minimize the number of system confi guration changes. Shortly thereafter, the LAMP-H project manager was promoted to Deputy Product Manager (DPM) and began to enthusiastic ally promote these new approac hes. This resulted in the new PM and his Deputy being in direct conflict with their new boss, the PEO, and departmental manager s and workers on w hom the project/product managers relied for matrix support (K erzner, 2004; Killian, 1971). Although the PEO ostensibly supported the LAMP-H program, he obscurely entertained great reservations about it. The PEO’s lack of knowledge about the basic acquisition process prevented him from understanding any new innovations to the acquisition process. Additionally, the PEO preferred to abstain from conflict with departmental managers and workers, and thus, became very nervous with disagr eements th at the departmental managers and workers had with the new PM and the DPM regarding the new approaches taken with respect © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 228 the project. The PEO, as it turned out, valued politic al favor above his mission. The PEO's true intentions about the LAMP-H project w ere reveale d when the R&D funds for the LAMP-H project were cut. It was essential t hat the R&D funds be restored, so as to not cause the program to suffer a break in activity. Although the PEO had the power to restore the funds, he continually delayed the restoration, which caus ed slippage and the need for the entire Acquisition Strategy to be revised and re-justified. It later became clear, that he was hoping his beni gn neglect of the LAMP-H project would cause program termination because the comp lexity of an R&D pr ogram with two IPRs made him very nervous.

Another factor that delayed the program was the T-School’s untim ely completion of the Required Operational Capab ility (ROC) Document (Metzger, 2003), which is indis pensable in DOD acquisitions. The RO C legitimiz es a project by specifying the exact capabilities to be acquired. ROC approval was required before R&D funds could be spent on further project development. To this point, the ROC had only been circulated in draft form, and had existed in this unapprov ed form for seven years with almost no attention. Revision and staffing of this document were handled in a very nonchalant way even though the T-School had been told on several occasions that the ROC had to be approved before funds coul d be spent on the LAMP-H program.

IPR Approv al Process The in-process review (IPR) period proved to be an interesting time for the project manager and his deputy. The IP R authorized the release of the R equest for Proposal (RFP) to invite submissions detailing how a c ontractor w ould, if selected, construct a vehicle to satisfy the LAMP-H requirements. The preparations requ ired for the IPR and the release of the RFP incl uded four principal program management documents: the ROC; the Test and Evaluatio n Master Plan (TEMP); the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) ; and the A cquisition Strategy. The TEMP and the ILSP could be taken to the IPR in draft format; however, it was necessary that the ROC and the Acquisition Strategy be approved prior to the IPR. A ma trix team was formed and a small contract exec uted for preparation of the A cquisition St rategy, the ILSP, and some of the program management documents, so that the outputs needed would be completed in time for the IPR. The Watercraft R&D Ce nter in coordination with the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) was tasked with preparing the TEMP.

Program Destruction In order to proceed wit h t he development for the LAMP -H system was to have been released just after the in-proce ss review (IPR). After al l of the effort exerted on the LAMP-H by various stakeholders, unfortunatel y, this deadline was not met. The PM and the DPM moved on to other positions sh ortly after the missed deadline. T he RFP still had not been relea sed at the time of their departure. Subseq uen tly, a new inexperienc ed project managem ent team was formed, a nd unfortunately willing to accommodate whatever might be requested by various stakeholders, regardless of © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 229 whether the requests were supp orted by the requirements analys is. Finally, the RFP, which was expanded to includ e all of the special intere sts and additional requir ements, was releas ed twelve months late. When the bi ds arrived from the contractors, it was evident that something was terri bly wrong. It seemed that the inflated requirements had led the contractors to bid fr om 175 millio n to 225 million dol lars for the R&D po rtion of the project while only 50 m illion d ollars had been budg eted and approved. Also, the unit cost of the LAMP-H as bid by the contractors ranged from 30 millio n to 43 million dollars wherein on ly 15 million dollars per unit had been budget ed. An attempt was made by the new PM to obtain more R&D funds and to extend the program by another year. This resulted in withdrawal of the production f unds and cancellation of the LAMP-H project within a short time after the request. And so, after the expenditure of many thousands of man-hours and dollars over a 15 y ear time period, a fully just ified system that was badly needed by the military was terminat ed at a cost of 5 million dol lars to U.S. taxpayers. LAMP-H Case Anal ysis & Conflict Identification The major problem identified an d the focus of this case st udy is organizational conflict management, which has three main domains as previously discus sed: interpersonal- based conflict, task-based conflict, and proc ess-based conflict (Coser, 1956, Guetkow & Gyr, 1954; Hearn & Anderson, 2002; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Pinkley, 1990). As articulated above, the inab ility to manage or resolve the various types of organizationa l co nflicts that occurred throughout the LAMP-H projec t led to costly people, plan, and process deviations. More spec ifically, the attempts by the various stakeholders to increase the expected performance of the LAMP-H without corresponding increases to the budget and timelines to account for the increased costs and scheduling, led to an increased level of risk, and ultimately, the demise of the LAMP-H project. The next section will describe the interpersonal-, task-, and pr ocess-based conflicts that took place throughout the LAMP-H project, which will be followed by practical conflict management lessons that managers can learn fr om the D OD LAMP-H project. Interpersonal-Based Conflict Symptom #1: Interpersonal/Interdepartment al Conflict between Project Manager and TECOM & Project Sponsor The Acquis ition Strategy required that t he R&D phase of the LAMP-H program be exec uted within 36 months. This was done in order to conform to the three years of R&D appropriation that had been programm ed, and the guidelines of the Army Streamline d Acquisitio n Progr am (ASAP). This meant that the TECOM community had to tailor its test program so that it could be completed within the ASAP structure, which is a process-based conflict that led to an interpersonal/interdepartmental conflict. This led to a sharp reaction from Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) personnel who insisted upon having a “business -as-usual” test program. Though it was demonstrated that a perfectly satisfactory test program could be achieved by tailoring the standard test program to the demands of t he A SAP and th at acquisition regulations provid ed for such a program, the testers were completely inflex ible on the matter . Even after it was © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 230 pointed out that lengthening the te st program would cause the program to sli p and result in the loss of the LAMP-H pr oject, the testers were still not willing to tailor the test program. A ll of this led to a sharp c onflict between the PM and TECOM. Although the PEO was the program sponsor and should have mediated this problem, he exh ibited an aloof indifference and avoided lending any help to the PM in terms of problem resolution. This conflic t continued betw een TECOM and the PM, thru the In-Process Review (IPR) period, until the LAMP-H program was eventually terminated. Symptom #2: Interpersonal/Interdepartmental Conflict between W atercraft R&D Center and Contractor R&D Center Another area of serious conflict was in the preparation of the Request for Proposal (RFP), which is a task-based conflict that led to an interpersonal/interdepartmental conflict. In order to expedite preparation of the RFP, the ai d of a support contractor had been enlisted. About the time that the RFP was complete, the Watercraft R&D Center protested that it must pr epare the RFP. Although the Pr ogram Ex ecutive Offi cer (PEO) could have prevailed against this protes t, he failed to do so, supporting the R&D Center’s position, and permitted them to pre pare the RFP. Instea d of taking the then complete RFP and making any refinements that might have been required, the Watercraft R&D Center start ed over, entirely from the beginning, completely redoing the RFP. This ultimately resulted in a program delay of about twelve months. Symptom #3: Interpersonal/Interdepartment al Conflict between T ransportation Schoo l and Legal Advisory Department The Sourc e Selection Plan was an area of conflict between the Transportation School and the Legal Advis ory Department because of the Legal Advis ory Department’s objection to the Source Selection Plan hav ing been bas ed upon a “best value” selection criterion. Although the acquis ition regulations provided for a “best value” approach to source selection, it seems that legal advisory personnel had never been involv ed in any such approach to source selection and were af raid to attempt it because, “We’ve never done it that way before.” T herefore, this process-bas ed conflict led to another interpersonal/interdepartmental conflict. The legal adv isor, subsequently, ins isted upon a complete revision of the Source Selection Plan. So it was wit h great dissention, a sharply divided state of affair s, and great reservations upon the part of the PM that the LAMP-H project was taken to the Milestone II In-Process Review to obtain approval for entry into the development phase.

Task-Based Conflict Symptom #1: Task Conflict as to the Logistic al Support System This area of conflict had to do with the logist ical support system fo r LAMP-H. Since the LAMP-H was to have been a low-density syst em, the requirement s analysis disclos ed that 30 LAMP-H systems should have been purchased. With no repurchase contemplated, a tailored logistic al support concept had been developed in which testing © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 231 of the logistical support package was to have been done during dev elopmental testing of LAMP-H. This also provoked a reaction from the logistical community. As had been the case with the tester s, the logis ticians wer e also un willing to tailor their desir es to meet the demands of the ASAP program for the LAMP -H project. This problem area was never entirely resolved befor e the first IPR. Symptom #2: Task Conflict about Data Requirements Another area of conflict that arose as t he program management documents were being prepared had to do with the amount of data that would be requested by the government in the RFP. The testers, the logisticians, and the engineers all want ed large quantities of data, far more than was reasonably require d. The project manager was emphatic that such large quantities of data we re far too costly and were not required for a project such as the LAMP-H. This dispute continued unt il well after the first IPR, and eventually delayed the release of the RFP.

Symptom #3: Task Conflict about Product Requirements When the T-School finally pr oduced its approved ROC, it was evident that it had become an enthusiastic suppor ter of the LAMP-H progr am. The T-S chool had become so enthusiastic that it had inflated require ments in the R OC far beyond what could be operationally justified. It in sisted upon having a payload of two Abrams tanks, even though this was not supported by the requirem ents analysis. It also insisted that the LAMP-H be decontamination survivable, an immensely expens ive requirement. A third requirement that had never been contempl ated during the program planning was a computerized maintenance diagnostic system. When it was pointed out to the T-school that previous planning had never included these requirements and that there was not sufficient funding progr ammed to pay for them , the reaction was one of indifference. Even admonitions that the program might be canceled failed to elic it any change of attitude.

Process-Based Conflict Symptom #1: Conflict pertaining t o Timing of the Requirements Analysis in the Process The requirements analysis is typically done ear ly in the project management process so that all product and project specifications an d funding requirement s are defined. In this case, a requirements analys is was not comple ted at the incepti on of the project. Unfortunately, the requirements analys is was not initiated until the Department of Army threatened to withdraw funds for the proj ects. The requirements analysis was eventually conducted and the results were used to support the continuation of the project. © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 232 Symptom #2: Conflict regarding the Pr ocess of Awarding Scoring Weights The Sourc e Selection Plan also proved to be another area of sharp contention. In order to emphasize logistica l supportab ility and low operatio n and main tenance costs, the DPM had written the plan so as to reward th e greatest scoring weight in the area of supportability, with performance having a le sser weight. The Transportation School insisted, however, that performance have t he greatest scoring weight. Even though it was pointed out that this was in conflict wit h the requirement to minimize operation and maintenance costs, Transporta tion School personnel r efused to retract their position. Symptom #3: Process Conflict withi n the Matrix Support Structure Theoretically, the matrix management approac h should have provided the capability to achieve rapid results both vertically and ho rizontally, which was precisely what the Department of Army had envisioned when it reorganized to the PEO structure. Howev er, the PEO’s lack of knowledge abo ut the basic acquisition process and his preference to avoid conflict with department al managers and workers led to a l ack of consensus in decis ion- making at the necessary authority levels. As previously stated, this resulted in the new PM and his DPM being in direct conflict with their new boss, the PEO, departmental managers and workers upon whom PMs relied for matri x support (Kerzner, 2004; Killian, 1971). Practical Implications of the D OD LAMP-H Project Interpersonal-Based Conflict Management Less on – Use Compromise or Collaboration Strategy It is vitally important to the success of a project that the proj ect manager effectively manages his or her rel ationships with the proj ect sponsor, other relevant organizational managers, and contractor s. Oftentimes, the management of these relations hips must take place concurrently throughout the life of the project. As evidenced by this case analys is of the LAMP-H projec t, the project manager, for vari ous reasons, was unable to successfully manage the multiple relationshi ps with the various entities that were involv ed in the project. In the case of managing his or her relations hip with the project s ponsor, it is suggested that the project manager execute a collaboration strategy. While this strategy may take the longest of all of the conflic t management strategies to impl ement, it is very important that the project manager and t he project sponsor are in fu ll agreement about all details regarding the project i f a successful outco me is desired . With respect to the management of his or her relationships with other relevant organiz ational managers and contractors, the project m anager may want to employ a compromi se strategy or a collaboration strategy when necessary. Without the c ooperation of the other managers and the contractors, it is unlike ly that the project will be a success. © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 233 Task-Based Conflict Management Lesson – Use Competing, Compromise, or Collaboration Strategy Another critical conflict ar ea for a project manager to manage is pr oject requirements or tasks. Typically, project require ments are sti pulated at the onset of a project. When the requirements, whether they are product require ments or data requirements, as in this case, are changed significantly late in the pr oject process or much beyond the original scope of the project, it puts t he completion of the project at risk. The project manager needs to determine the power, position, or influence of the stakeholder to determine which conflict management strategy to employ . If the project stakeholder has very little power or influence, and is not in a position to detrimentally impact the project, then the project manager may want to us e the competing strategy. If the project stakeholder holds a fair amount of power and influenc e, and is in a posit ion to detrimentally impact the project, the projec t manager would want to use the collaboration strategy i f time permits or the compromise strate gy if time is of the essence. Process-Based Conflict Management Less on – Use Competing or Compromise Strategy A third potential area for conflict is with t he project process. In project management, there are sequences of events t hat must take place in orde r for the project to progress successfully. In many cases, the steps in the process are not controlled by the project manager because they are mand ated or required from abov e. When steps in the process are mandated, the proj ect manager should use a competing strategy to get all project stakeholders to comply with the requir ed steps. It would be hel pful if the project manager educates the project stakeholders as to why the steps are required and as to why he or she is forcing everyone to comply with the steps. In so me cases, th e steps may consist of general guidelines and not mandates. When the steps allow for flexib ility in the guidelines, then the pr oject manager has some leeway , and therefore, may want to use a compromising strategy so that all project stakeholders have some input in the process where possible.

Another area of process-based conflict was t he organiz ational struct ure. The goal of the matrix support structure is to help bal ance the necessary authority levels between functional and project managemen t so that a consistent message is communicated from one organizational lev el to another. Thus, ea ch authority level mu st adopt a group or consensus- based appr oach to decision making to ensure that a workable compromising strategy is achieved, thus avoiding authorit y conflicts and reducing the risk of projects becoming politic ized. Dooley , Lupton, and O’Sullivan ( 2005) note that management can address potential conflicts bet ween authority levels by maki ng the reporting lines in the matrix structure transparent; otherwise wor kers will fin d themselves answering to multiple bosses and attempting to reconcile varying directions. Thus, the matrix structure could not achieve its intended pur pose which was to balance operational issues (functionality driven) wit h developmental issues (project driven) due to the lack of a compromising strategy.

© 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 234 Inter-Domain Conflict Management Lesson Conflict as articulated mathematically abov e, if not managed properly, can be detrimental to a project. Mo st projects cannot withstand signific ant overruns due to change in time and costs as a result of in terpersonal-based conflict, task-based conflict, process-based conflict, or inter-domain conflic t, which is some combinatio n of three. Although change, risk, and conflict are inev itable in any project, “unmanaged c hange” (Kerzner, 2003), unmanaged risk, and unmanaged conf lict are likely to contribute to a project’s demise. Kerzner (2003:695) states that … Another critical interdependenc y is the relationship between change management and risk management. …Ri sks and Changes go hand in hand, which is one of the r easons companies usually integrate risk management and change m anagement into a si ngular methodology . … If changes are unm anaged, then more time and money are needed to perform ris k management, which often takes on the appearance of and behav ior of crisis managem ent. Al-tabtabai, Alex, and Abou-alfotouh (2001) discuss some of the causes of organizational conflict. One such cause, a ccording to these authors, is that of managerial conflict. Managerial c onflict is said to arise from “… differing practices advocated by respective organiz ations under different managerial units” (Al-tabtabai et al., 2001), which is an example of the inte rpersonal-based conflicts that took place within the LAMP-H project. Concurrently, task-based conflicts with conflicting product and data requirements and various process-bas ed conflicts discussed above were also occurring. Thus, by the very nature of comp lex projects, whether large-, medium-, or small-scale, project managers of today mu st learn to develop effective conflict manageme nt skills an d employ appropriate c onflict han dlin g intention strategies concurrently if they are to be successful in accomplishing their desired outcomes. Additionally , they must exerci se individual strategic flexib ility, which is defined as the “…capability to identify major changes in the external environment … to quickly commit resources to new courses of action in res ponse to change …” (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Project managers must also be able to ident ify and effectively manage major and subtle internal environmental changes, which are likely to include inter-domain conflict. Conclusion The effectiveness of individual employees , teas and entire organizations depends on how they manage conf lict at work (Tjosvo ld, 1998). Managers spend an average of 20 per cent of their time m anaging conflict (Thomas, 1992), and evidence suggests conflict and conflict management substantially influ ence individual, group and organizational effectiveness. Managers must re cognize that the deployment of situationally appropri- ate responses to conflict should produc e more positive individual, group, and organizational outcomes (Callanan & Perri, 2 006). Given the practi cal importance of conflict management in organizat ions, it is vital to use and develop theory in this area to offer project managers practical frameworks that can enable them to make better © 2007 In stitute of Behavioral an d Appl ied Mana gem ent. All Rights Re se rved. 235 decisions ( Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, Nauta, 2001) . It has been stated previously that project management within the DOD is likely one of the most complex processes in the world. The LAMP-H project is an excellent example of how not to manage conflic t within a project. Almost every conceivable obs tacle relating to the three domains of conflict and inter-domain conflict t hat might be found in project management was encountered on the LAMP-H projec t. In fact, the organiza- tional conflicts continued throughout the life of the project. The organizational conflict pitfalls illust rated in this case study can l ead to the failure of a project. The conflicts identified in this case stemmed from conflicting re lations hips between and among various project stakeholders around inter personal/inter departmental, task and process requirements. Nevertheless, practical conflict management lessons can be learned from this case study to enhance the likelihood of successfully managing and/or resolving conflicts that are likely to emerge while working on a projec t. Some factors that could contribute to the successful management of conflict on a proj ect that can be learned from this case study are the need for a project manager to be able to identify the types or domains of conflict that are likely to take place concu rrently and implement the appropria te conflict handling int ention strategies conc urrently to resolve or manage the conflicts. The pitfalls identified, the Project-Conflict M anagement Framework offered, and the lessons learned from this case study should fa cilitate project managers in making better decisions when dealing with conf lict that can significantly increase the likelihood of a successful project management outcome. Reference s Al-tabtabai, H., Alex, A. P., & Abou-alfot ouh, A. (2001). 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