Assignment 3: America as a Superpower For History 105: Dr. Stansbury’s classes (7 pages here) Due Week 9 and worth 120 points. The formal deadline is on Monday morning at 9am Eastern Time; this is

SYMPOSIUM JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES, Volume 9, Number 2, 2015 © 2015 University of Phoenix View this article online at wileyonlinelibrary.com • DOI:10.1002/jls.21367 63 The Cuban missile crisis abides in the imagination much as the President who guided it to its extraor- dinary conclusion. Robert McNamara, a surviving member of Ex Comm 1 at the time of the 40th anni- versary of the crisis, maintained until the end of his life that in the ﬁ nal analysis “luck” played a critical part in the outcome, luck that may well have been squan- dered under a diﬀ erent authority ﬁ gure (Blight & Lang, 2005 , p. 61, as cited in Scott, 2012 , p. 263). Just as President Kennedy ’ s image today is tragically frozen in time as a young, energetic head of state imbued with the brightness of unfulﬁ lled promise, so too was the missile crisis of October 1962 mercifully unfulﬁ lled in its dark promise of what Graham Allison has called the “partially thinkable” (Allison, 1969 , p. 689). As Sherwin ( 2012 ) has written, “It was neither Vietnam nor Watergate, nor was it Dallas on November 22, 1963. It was just the most devastating event in world history … that somehow didn ’ t happen” (p. 6). Janis ( 1982 ) has written a seminal case study analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, and juxtaposed it effec- tively with the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, using the latter episode as a pernicious example of “groupthink.” In the consideration of the Cuban missile crisis that is oﬀ ered here, I also draw upon notions of history, group dynamics, and adaptive leadership. While the scope of the current paper does not permit a compre- hensive treatment of the crisis, or even a full analysis of the group dynamics that were present in the situation, Janis ’ s excellent analysis informs my thinking. As Janis has already written about the two “Cuba ’ s” using his own particular lens, it is appropriate to oﬀ er a some- what different analysis, especially in light of recent world events (i.e., the normalization of U.S.–Cuban relations).

Th e purpose of the current paper is to analyze the Cuban missile crisis (hereafter referred to as either “the missile crisis” or “CMC”) through the lens of history THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: LEADERSHIP AS DISTURBANCE, INFORMED BY HISTORY SARAH CHACE The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 cannot be over-studied for the lessons it teaches about leadership. As documents have become declassiﬁ ed, it has now become known that President Kennedy and his team of advisors considered the crisis from multiple angles, ranging from a tradi- tional response to perceived aggression to transactional leadership —in this case, secretly trading the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for the removal of American missiles in Turkey. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis involved more than transactional leadership, however. In the complex negotiations that followed the discovery of the missiles, President Kennedy and his team of advisors experienced an evolution in their thinking, while operating under intense strain. The conceptual frameworks that best describe Kennedy ’ s leadership in this context are Voegelin ’ s notion of historical consciousness and Heifetz ’ s conceptions of adaptive leadership. 64 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 9 • Number 2 • DOI:10.1002/jls SYMPOSIUM and the lens of Heifetz ’ s model of adaptive leadership (Heifetz, 1994 ). Summary of the Cuban Missile Crisis Fifty-three years ago, the CMC unfolded with star- tling speed. While the scope of the current paper does not permit complex analysis of the multiple factors that caused the crisis to arise and subside, the essential facts are captured here—albeit within the not entirely accurate construct of the crisis as an isolated event.

Within days of their discovery, the oﬀ ensive nuclear missiles placed in San Cristóbal, Cuba, were perceived by oﬃ cials in the Kennedy Administration as an aggres- sive intervention by the Soviet Union into the strategic balance of power (May & Zelikow, 2001 ). “Cuba” came to symbolize an attempt at hegemony on the part of the Soviet Union and Communist forces throughout the world. Symptomatic of the charged symbol Cuba had come to represent on the international political stage of the early 1960s, President Kennedy had in fact invoked the “loss” of Cuba to a Communist regime as a theme during his presidential campaign (Hilsman, 1996 ). A subsequent failed invasion of Cuba in April 1961, the infamous “Bay of Pigs” ﬁ asco (cf., Janis, 1982 ) was a striking foreign policy failure that occurred within the ﬁ rst 100 days of his administration.

As is now well known, during the summer of 1962, JFK had a secret taping system installed in the White House in both the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room, which he could turn oﬀ and on unbe- knownst to others—with the exception of his brother, the Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, and his secretary, Evelyn Lincoln (Bredhoff, 2012 ). These recordings are the main artifacts for historians to draw upon when considering the vagaries of the decision- making process during the crisis. Th e tapes reveal a range of opinions regarding the correct response to the placement of the missiles, from advocates of a sur- prise air attack on the island ’ s military bases followed by a land invasion to a peaceful diplomatic solution.

Th e action upon which the President ﬁ nally settled was to establish a blockade 2 around Cuba, the osten- sible purpose of which was to prevent the shipment of further nuclear warheads onto “that imprisoned island” (Bredhoﬀ , 2012 , p. 41)—the deeper purpose of which was to respond to the Soviets’ placement of the missiles in the Western hemisphere with a restrained show of force.

Although the blockade seemed to work initially, with several Soviet tankers turning back after approach- ing the American blockade line, there were numerous moments of confusion and tension that occurred before the crisis resolved peacefully. 3 Th e confusion spawned by contradictory communications from the Soviet Union ’ s Premier Krushchev, as well as actions of perceived aggression on both sides of the conﬂ ict, led to what is termed by historians as “Black Saturday,” October 27, 1962 (S. Bredhoﬀ , personal communi- cation, July 29, 2014). On this day, an American U-2 pilot dispatched to take photographs of the missile site was shot down and killed by a Soviet surface-to-air missile. Later that day, the President succeeded in com- municating with Krushchev that he would pledge pub- licly to refrain from invading Cuba and privately to dismantle Jupiter missiles placed in Turkey in exchange for the dismantling of the Soviet missiles in Cuba fol- lowed by U.N. inspections (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997 ; R. F. Kennedy, 1969 ). Premier Krushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles; 37 years later, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War was ostensibly over.

Fifty-two years later, relations between the United States and Cuba began to be normalized by the Obama Administration. Great Man or Group Dynamic?

According to the “great man” theory propounded by early scholars of leadership (Burns, 1978 ; Nort- house, 2013 ; Rost, 1991 ), leadership is associated with certain traits such as charisma, physical prowess, intel- ligence, and optimism. Certainly, JFK was in posses- sion of many of these traits, not least of which were his physical attractiveness and photogenic family. While he may be seen and credibly analyzed through this lens, President Kennedy ’ s most useful trait as a leader may have lain with subtler aspects of his personality:

He was a realist who was able to delegate authority (Ghaemi, 2012 ; Schlesinger, 1965 ). His realism at times rested with his perception of what lay beyond his control, and how to “give the work back to the group” by ceding a certain amount of authority (cf., Bion, 1961 ; Heifetz, 1994 ; Smith & Berg, 1987 ). Th is is certainly what he did with regard to the formation JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 9 • Number 2 • DOI:10.1002/jls 65 SYMPOSIUM of the ad hoc advisory committee formed to address the crisis, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (“Ex Comm”), and with his reliance on Robert Kennedy—although the latter impulse may be seen as the use of his brother as a trustworthy conﬁ - dant, and a way of maintaining control as opposed to releasing it. Careful analysis of the conversations that took place around the table during these deliberations reveals disparate points of view, the antidote to group- think. President Kennedy ’ s absence from a number of these conversations also allowed for a freer range of thinking, which Kennedy desired—perhaps, as sug- gested by Janis and others, in reaction to the debacle of the Bay of Pigs, where groupthink was ever-present (Janis, 1982 ). From these impulses to cede control and allow for the possibility of events unfolding beyond his ken, we nonetheless have a sense of the dynamics that led to a peaceful resolution of the missile crisis.

Recollections of the moment in history demonstrate Kennedy ’ s unwillingness to think he could control events. During the weeks leading up to the crisis, Defense Secretary McNamara ordered the military to prepare for an invasion of Cuba, while clearly artic- ulating the President ’ s reluctance to begin a conﬂ ict in that region. As the White House became aware that the Soviets were shipping “mysterious cargoes” to Cuba in the fall of 1962, President Kennedy began to prepare for any eventuality regarding confrontation with the Soviet Union through the proxy conﬂ ict with regard to Cuba:

The president moved on two fronts to improve the situation. He had Robert McNamara alert the armed services on October 2 [1962] that they should start preparing for military operations against Cuba. “The President wants no military action within the next three months, ” McNamara told the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], “but he can ’ t be sure as he does not control events . ” (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997 , p. 217, italics added) McNamara ’ s comment that the President “does not control events” reﬂ ected the temperament of a president willing to “give the work back” to some degree; how- ever, the ﬁ nal decisions with regard to the crisis rested formally with him. Interpreting the Crisis through the Lens of Adaptive Leadership Th e Cuban missile crisis is a case study with multiple facets, each of which may be viewed kaleidoscopi- cally—which is to say, through diﬀ erent interpretive lenses. Th us far, these interpretations have been his- toric, theoretical, and psychological. Heifetz ’ s notion of adaptive leadership ( 1994 ) combines these three facets as it builds on previous leadership theory using history and, when taught in the classroom, tenets of group psychology (R. Heifetz, personal communication, May 2001). To quote Rost ’ s analysis of the protean nature of leadership theory as it evolved throughout the twentieth century, an apt metaphor is that of the scientist working on an experiment. It is not the case, Rost has stated, that leadership scholars have failed so many times to uncover the secrets of leadership, but that they have been acting like scientists all the time and doing exactly what scientists are supposed to do. If one experiment does not work the scientists go on to the next until they ﬁ nd the combination that works—just as Edison did with the electric light bulb. (Rost, 1991 , p. 23) Th e same might be said of how to interpret the Cuban missile crisis that was resolved over half a century ago.

ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP Heifetz ’ s theory of adaptive leadership rests on a series of distinctions and deﬁ nitions, such as the diﬀ erence between technical and adaptive work; diagnosing stake- holder values; managing disequilibrium; and giving the work back to the group (to name a few). President Ken- nedy ’ s handling of the Cuban missile crisis may be seen as a vivid example of these concepts, as the remainder of the paper will discuss. (For further discussion of the Cuban missile crisis in the context of adaptive leader- ship see Heifetz, 1994 .) Adaptive Challenge Versus Technical Work In parallel to the parsing of the difference between management and leadership (Rost, 1991 ), Heifetz has deﬁ ned his model of leadership primarily in terms of the diﬀ erence between what constitutes an adaptive challenge as opposed to “technical work” (Heifetz, 1994 ). Technical work is comprised of clear problems 66 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 9 • Number 2 • DOI:10.1002/jls SYMPOSIUM with clear solutions. A ﬂ at tire, for example, requires a new tire to replace it. Adaptive challenges are murkier:

unclear problems with unclear solutions. Climate change is an example of an adaptive challenge, for while there is a fair amount of certainty that the climate is changing, the root cause has been argued, and the solu- tion is as yet unclear. Too often, however, problems that are inherently adaptive are mistakenly perceived as technical.

Certainly the initial military impulses to respond with overt force to the placement of the missiles in Cuba were based on technical thinking. While there were genuine reasons to employ technical work (e.g., the use of spy planes to discern the placement of missiles), the reﬂ exive impulse to use military force was, in hind- sight, a technical response to an adaptive challenge.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who attended only one of the many Ex Comm meetings during that time, embodied this sort of technical approach to a profoundly adaptive challenge. As President Kennedy recalled on day 3 of the missile crisis (Th ursday, Octo- ber 18, 1962 ), Dean Acheson, with whom I talked this afternoon, stated that while he was uncertain about any of the courses [of action discussed in response to the placement of the missiles], favored the first strike as being most likely to achieve our result and less likely to cause an extreme Soviet reaction. That strike would take place just against the missile sites.

( May & Zelikow, 2001 , p. 107) In Acheson ’ s response—again, with the aid of many years of hindsight, we have what could be interpreted, using Heifetz ’ s construct, as the mistaken impulse to substitute technical for adaptive work.

It is important to note, however, that in the fall of 1962 the threat of nuclear war between the two super- powers was a turning point because it military aggres- sion was met with diplomacy. Here we can insert Voeglin ’ s argument in favor of leaders’ consciousness of history. For while we may rightly credit Kennedy with leadership in guiding the crisis away from military escalation, credit is also due to Soviet Chairman Nikita Krushchev, who invoked the specter of war ’ s destruc- tion in a crucial communication to JFK sent 2 days before the crisis was resolved. If indeed war should break out [Krushchev wrote], then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars, and I know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruc- tion. (Department of State, 1962 ) Diagnosis of Stakeholder Values. Th e boundary blurs between the notion of diagnosing stakeholder values and that of managing disequilibrium. Certainly JFK appreciated that by “walking in the other fellow ’ s shoes” the disequilibrium was far more likely to diminish as opposed to increase. Indeed, as part of the oral history project Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. undertook in the after- math of President Kennedy ’ s assassination, Jacqueline Kennedy spoke repeatedly of her husband ’ s preoccupa- tion with allowing others to save face under virtually any circumstances (J. Kennedy, 2011 ). While both Arthur Schlesinger and Jacqueline Kennedy may be criticized as biased sources, historical events, I believe, largely bear these assertions out. Th us, the values being held by Krushchev were of paramount concern to JFK, as were the values of the United States’ allies around the world. A ﬂ ashpoint for both superpowers at the time was Berlin, a city that then contained within its literal partitioning the divide between the “free world” and the Communist forces that ruled behind the “iron curtain.” Any tipping of the scales in either direction disturbed the balance of power, which was at best precarious. In exercising leadership, Kennedy was endeavoring to maintain that balance in a way that was tolerable to the factions of the East (i.e., the Soviet Union) and the factions of the West (i.e., the United States and its allies). While Kennedy may have been criticized at the time for abandoning his alliances with NATO in order to resolve the conﬂ ict (T. Wil- liams, personal communication, March 2, 2015), he managed to disturb them at a rate they could tolerate (cf., Heifetz & Linsky, 2004 ). Management of Disequilibrium. Th e overt means by which the crisis was managed had to do with managing disequilibrium. While the phrase may be used for any sort of disturbance to a given system, it is a vast under- statement for what was happening during the “second Cuba”—that is, the second crisis with Cuba during JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 9 • Number 2 • DOI:10.1002/jls 67 SYMPOSIUM the brief tenure of the Kennedy administration. It is, nonetheless, an apt phrase that captures the notion of history as a series of disturbances and counter-distur- bances (cf., Voegelin, 2006 , as cited by Th omas, in press ).

Th e tragedies of history, it may be argued, have occurred when the disequilibrium was not properly managed. A careful reading of the recordings made during October 1962 oﬀ ers a sense of how vital it was to Kennedy and his advisors to manage the disequilibrium of an all-out nuclear war. With the possible exception of General Curtis LeMay and some of his like-minded peers, none of the actors in this drama wanted that to happen. As Kennedy’s National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy stated when the crisis was resolved, “Today was the day of the doves” (May & Zelikow, 2001 , p. 405). Discussion and Summary Th e Cuban missile crisis cannot be over-studied and the importance of its resolution cannot be overstated.

I have ventured to touch upon the event using the conceptual lenses of history, psychology, and Heifetz ’ s theory of adaptive leadership.

Yet multiple readings may, to borrow an analogy from Deleuze (alluding to notions of physics) bring two distant points together in contiguity after much kneading over of an idea, such as a pastry-maker might do with dough (Deleuze, 1988/2013 ). Th e dough of history was, I venture to speculate, being kneaded over and over in Kennedy ’ s mind as he weighed his options throughout the crisis, for history was being consid- ered throughout. It was invoked when he alluded to Barbara Tuchman ’ s book, Th e Guns of August (Janis, 1982 ); it was invoked when he considered the opposite of a successful outcome, the specter of the Bay of Pigs; and, ﬁ nally, history was invoked when President Ken- nedy pressed the hidden recording button to capture for future historians the deliberations of his team. Notes 1 Th e Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

2 Th e blockade was, in essence, a quarantine, although Kennedy and his advisors were careful to eschew this terminology as it implied “an act of war” (W. Th omas, personal communication, March 2, 2015).

3 It is important to note here that the complexity of this event did not just lie with the enormously high stakes that were in play (i.e., the possible use of nuclear weapons). The connection between Soviet aggression in Cuba and the abiding tensions in Berlin as a city divided between East and West were ineluctable. Again, space does not permit full treatment of the complications that contributed to both the escalation of this crisis and its dénouement. References Allison , G. T. ( 1969 ). Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis . Th e American Political Science Review , 63 ( 3 ), 689 – 718 . Bion , W. R. ( 1961 ). Experiences in group life and other papers . New York, NY : Routledge . Blight , J. G. , & Lang , J. M. ( 2005 ). Th e fog of war: Lessons from the life of Robert S. McNamara . Oxford, England : Rowman & Little- ﬁ eld . Bredhoﬀ , S. ( 2012 ). To the brink: JFK and the Cuban missile crisis .

Washington, DC : National Archives . Burns , J. M. ( 1978 ). Leadership . New York, NY : Harper & Row . Deleuze , G. ( 1988 /2013). Abecedary: N is for neurology (English sub- titles). Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcowydLOZkE Department of State Telegram Transmitting Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962 . Retrieved from http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct26/doc4.html Fursenko , A. , & Naftali , T. ( 1997 ). One hell of a gamble . New York, NY : W.W. Norton . Ghaemi , N. ( 2012 ). A ﬁ rst-rate madness: Uncovering the links between leadership and mental illness . New York, NY : Penguin . Heifetz , R. ( 1994 ). Leadership without easy answers . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Heifetz , R. , & Linsky , M. ( 2004 ). When leadership spells danger .

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Westport, CT : Praeger . Janis , I. L. ( 1982 ). Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and ﬁ ascoes . Boston, MA : Houghton Miﬄ in . Kennedy , J. ( 2011 ). Historic conversations on life with John F. Kennedy: Interviews with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 1964 . New York, NY : Hyperion . Kennedy , R. F. ( 1969 ). Th irteen days: A memoir of the Cuban missile crisis . New York, NY : W.W. Norton . May , E. , & Zelikow , P. D. ( 2001 ). Th e Kennedy tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban missile crisis . New York, NY : W.W.

Norton . Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 20, 1962 . Retrieved from http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/ cmc/oct20/doc1.html 68 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 9 • Number 2 • DOI:10.1002/jls SYMPOSIUM Northouse , P. G. ( 2013 ). Leadership: Th eory and practice ( 6th ed. ).

Th ousand Oaks, CA : Sage . Rost , J. C. ( 1991 ). Leadership for the twenty-ﬁ rst century . Westport, CT : Praeger . Schlesinger , A. M. ( 1965 ). A thousand days: John F. Kennedy in the White House . New York, NY : Houghton . Scott , L. ( 2012 ). Should we stop studying the Cuban missile crisis? International Relations , 26 ( 3 ), 255 – 266 . doi:

10.1177/0047117812451837 . Sherwin , M. J. ( 2012 ). One step from nuclear war . Prologue:

Quarterly of the National Archives , 44 ( 3 ), 6 – 16 . Smith , K. K. , & Berg , D. N. ( 1987 ). Paradoxes of group life: Under- standing conﬂ ict, paralysis, and movement in group dynamics . San Francisco, CA : Jossey-Bass . Th omas , O. (in press). Eric Voegelin, reﬂ exive distance, and harness- ing the beneﬁ ts of metaxy: Th e leader ’ s imperative to participate in history and becoming . Journal of Leadership Studies . Voegelin , E. ( 2006 ). The collected works of Eric Voegelin . In Autobiographical reflections (Vol. 24 ). Columbia : University of Missouri Press . Sarah Chace, EdD, is an Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies at Marian University in Wisconsin. She completed her dissertation in 2013 at Teachers College, Columbia University. She has written and presented on adaptive leadership in a variety of venues. Her current interests lie with the exploration of group dynamics, both in the class- room and in the ﬁ eld. Communications can be directed to [email protected] . Copyright ofJournal ofLeadership Studiesisthe property ofJohn Wiley &Sons, Inc.andits content maynotbecopied oremailed tomultiple sitesorposted toalistserv without the copyright holder'sexpresswrittenpermission. However,usersmayprint, download, oremail articles forindividual use. Copyright ofJournal ofLeadership Studiesisthe property ofJohn Wiley &Sons, Inc.andits content maynotbecopied oremailed tomultiple sitesorposted toalistserv without the copyright holder'sexpresswrittenpermission. However,usersmayprint, download, oremail articles forindividual use.