Social Marketing Plan based on wisdom literature review for increasing practical wisdom and behaviour change in POSITIVE COPING BEHAVIOUR, To summarise the 5 journal articles provided on LMS. Then cho
Practical Philosophy, 10:1, (web edition, 20 11; originally published July 2010) 47
Philosophical Counselling as a Process of
Fostering Wisdom in the Form of Virtues
Arto Tuk iainen
Abstract
The main theme of this article is that an adequate understanding of the concept of wisdom
enables philosophical counsellors to identify their proper tasks. The concept refers to a great
number of cognitive and practical virtues, and philoso phical counselling is a process where
the counsellee's powers of virtue are examined and encouraged. This is often therapeutic in
the sense that it enhances the counsellee's well -being .
Keywords: Philosophical Counselling, wisdom, virtue, well -being, thera py
Introduction
It has often been said that the goal of philosophical practice is wisdom
(Achenbach, 1998 and 2002; Lahav, 2001 and 2006). This is of course not a
surprising view, given the original notion of philosophy as love of wisdom. But
wisdom is a p hilosophically challenging concept: it is by no means obvious what
we mean by it. Since we do not wish to be ignorant about our aims, some
explication is necessary. 1
I will first provide a virtue -based account of wisdom, and then discuss some
of the implic ations of this view to philosophical counselling. The first implication
is that philosophical counselling is a process of fostering virtues. The second
implication is that philosophical counselling can be therapeutic.
Virtues as Wisdom
Robert Nozick (1989, p.267) characterises wisdom in these terms: 'Wisdom is what
you need to understand in order to live well and cope with the central problems
and avoid the dangers in the predicament(s) human beings find themselves in.' He
says that a wise person needs to u nderstand many things: the most important
goals and values of life; what means will reach these goals without too great a
cost; what limitations are unavoidable and how to accept them; knowing when
certain goals are sufficiently achieved; how to tell what is appropriate at a given
time. John Kekes (1983), Sharon Ryan (1999) and Gerd Achenbach (2000, 2001)
similarly emphasise that wisdom has to do with knowing how to live well.
1 We cannot know whether the conceptions of wisdom of different people overlap each other without examining them together. This article can be seen as a contribution to such an effort. On the one hand I do not s ee any reason to assume a priori that all readers have the same conception of wisdom. Philosophy as love of wisdom may correspondingly mean different things to different people. On the other hand I do not believe that agreement of conceptions is impossible ; and perhaps there are even now more similarities in our conceptions of wisdom than one might initially assume. Such an agreement might bring a sense of unity to a field that can appear bewilderingly varied. Arto Tukiainen Philosophical Counselling as Fostering Virtues
Practical Phi losophy, 10:1, (web edition, 20 11; originally published July 2010) 48
The conception that wisdom is concerned with knowing how to live well
means that philosophers have to set emphasis on the skills, dispositions and
mental states that make living well possible. The concept of virtue should occupy
a central position in our account: any effort to live well depends crucially on
virtues. 2 Attachment to virt ues has of course been a part of the philosophical self -
understanding from the very beginning, and we do not have any reason to sever
this link.
The following is not a complete catalogue of the virtues that belong to wisdom
but rather examples from a vast set with fuzzy borders. Let us first briefly discuss
cognitive virtues and then practical virtues. As will become evident, the difference
between these two categories is not sharp.
Self -knowledge is an important virtue. This importance derives at least par tly
from the fact that self -knowledge enables us to pursue goals that we find
personally fulfilling instead of being controlled by external, to some extent
haphazard, influences. The idea that philosophical counselling is essentially
'world view interpreta tion' (Lahav, 1995 and 2008a) or 'critical examination of life -
directing conceptions' (Schefczyk, 1995) becomes understandable from the stand -
point of self -knowledge: the self that philosophical counsellors wish to elucidate
by their questions and remarks certainly includes the counsellees' conceptions. But
we do not have to reduce the philosophically interesting self to beliefs and other
such relatively cognitive elements. The virtue of self -knowledge also concerns our
bodies and emotions.
Knowledge of the external world can be seen as a virtue to the extent that it
enables us to lead personally satisfactory and morally acceptable lives (Cohen,
2005; Maxwell, 2000 and 2007; Ryan, 1999 and 2007). The truth of our beliefs about
physical and social realities i s important because the success of our activities
depends on it. Ignorance may also lead us astray with respect to morally required
ends. In our time knowledge of ecological threats and disasters, for example,
might be seen as morally important.
Nozick say s that a wise person needs to know what means will reach the most
important goals of life without too great a cost. The ability to form balanced
overall judgments concerning the feasibility and appropriateness of different
courses of action to worthy ends can be called good judgment. Good judgment is
both a cognitive and a practical virtue. Technological know -how can be a part of
this virtue, but a person with good judgement takes into account many additional
factors in her deliberations.
Openness to new wa ys of understanding ourselves and our world is a
cognitive virtue (Lahav, 2001, 2006, 2008c and 2008d; Mattila, 2001a; Tukiainen,
2000). Occasionally we need radically new perspectives and novel concepts, and
some of these notions may not be logically dedu cible from our present views.
Such changes in point of view may be identical with, or at least lead to, re -
evaluations of our situation. Reframing can also affect our feelings and behaviour,
as Epictetus and many other philosophers have recognised (see for instance
Cohen, 2003, p p.53–56; Mattila, 2001b).
Cognitive virtues like knowledge, good judgment and openness to new
conceptions are only a part of wisdom. Philosophical practitioners should be able
2 A stronger claim would be that wisdom equals virtues. Although this is not far -fetched view, the present claim is a more modest one: virtues are necessary for wisdom. Arto Tukiainen Philosophical Counselling as Fostering Virtues
Practical Phi losophy, 10:1, (web edition, 20 11; originally published July 2010) 49
to see a wider vista which includes virtues like sinceri ty, patience, mercy and
justice (see Achenbach, 2001, p.36). Ran Lahav (2008b) says that wisdom excludes
being petty and self -involved, and there seems to be no reason not to count many
other vices among philosophically repulsive character traits. Cruelty, ruthlessness,
thoughtlessness, manipulativeness, treachery, recklessness, irascibility, stub born -
ness, ingratitude, bitterness, dishonesty, malice, greed, gluttony and hubris surely
do not fit our conception of wisdom. Let us take a few more examples of these
moral and existential virtues.
Considered as a practical virtue, objectivity means distancing oneself from
one's immediate concerns and seeing them in a larger context of human and non -
human life, or even from a cosmic perspective. Plato's lofty view that human
things seem puny from a 'satellite perspective' of soul's flight is a good
imaginative -pictorial representation of this virtue (Hadot, 1995, p p.238 –250). The
virtue of justice may presuppose, or at least benefit from, an objective view of
thing s. And as Plato remarked, the aerial perspective gives rise to greatness of soul
(Hadot, 2004, p.68). Bertrand Russell (2006, p.159) says that a person with greatness
of soul sees 'himself and life and the world as truly as our human limitations will
permi t', and realizes 'the brevity and minuteness of human life'. Russell also writes
in a rather Platonic and Stoic manner that a person 'who has once perceived,
however temporarily and however briefly, what makes greatness of soul, can no
longer be happy if h e allows himself to be petty, self -seeking, troubled by trivial
misfortunes, dreading what fate may have in store for him.'
The virtue of disinterestedness is an ability to experience the world as it is in
itself , and not only as it is for us and our proje cts (Hadot, 1995, p.254; see also
Curnow, 2000). Disinterestedness requires that we are able to disengage ourselves
from our everyday cares and motives of action, and this means that we have to let
go of an evaluative attitude towards our experiences and t he world. Any
genuinely philosophical attitude involves a dimension of disinterested perception
of life and the universe.
Nozick's definition of wisdom suggests that our conceptions of virtue should
have room for skills and dispositions that are oriented t owards avoiding dangers
to our personal well -being and enabling us to cope with difficulties in our own
lives. Some practical virtues like flexibility in one's aims and hopes are not so
much moral virtues as ways of securing a personally tolerable or even satisfactory
life. This does not mean that moral virtues do not enhance our sense of personal
well -being. Often they do; and in many cases one and the same virtue —objectivity,
disinterestedness, forbearance, foresight, moderation, carefulness or courage, f or
example —has both moral aspects and aspects that have more to do with the
health of our own souls (von Wright 1963, ch. 7).
To take some historical examples of these self -regarding virtues and their
objectives, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Cynicism deepene d our understanding of
the ideals of ataraxia (tranquillity) and euthymia (a steady, contented state of mind);
and of course they were also concerned with the practical means of attaining these
ideals. Autarkeia (self -sufficiency), for example, was valued because it was seen to
lead to a calm state of mind without disturbing emotions. Other important virtues
included moderation in one's expectations of worldly success, the readiness to
accept failure, and the ability to maintain one's mental independence fr om
unreasonable social conventions. Arto Tukiainen Philosophical Counselling as Fostering Virtues
Practical Phi losophy, 10:1, (web edition, 20 11; originally published July 2010) 50
In the contemporary philosophical counselling movement Elliot D. Cohen (2005;
see also 2003 and 2008) has drawn attention to many virtues that are clearly self -
regarding in the sense we are discussing. For instance, an a bility to accept
imperfections in ourselves and external reality is conducive to peace of mind.
Authenticity and temperance will similarly enhance a person's capacity to lead a
satisfactory life. 3
To complete this cursory overview of the great domain of vi rtues, let us recall
that wisdom and virtue are also concerned with ways of preserving bodily health
and attaining pleasure. For instance, Schopenhauer (1995, p.50) counsels physical
exercise as a means of preserving good health, and Seneca frequently gave the
same piece of advice to his counsellees. The centrality of the notion of 'living well'
in philosophy appears to make their advice quite understandable. Bodily pleasure
was the objective of the Cyrenaics, and perhaps we should have some place for
this notion in our philosophical thinking as well. Even Seneca —generally a
defender of an austere way of life —writes to Serenus that we should occasionally
relax properly and drink ourselves 'to the point of intoxication' because this will
wash away our cares ( 2004, p.105).
Although there may not be any exhaustive, final list of the virtues that belong
to wisdom, we should not assume that the virtues we need must be invented on a
case -by -case basis. This would amount to forgetting that the worries and difficulti es
of different people are often the same, and that very similar virtues apply to a
great number of individual cases. It would also amount to overlooking the fact
that the human condition is in its main features much the same as it was two
thousand years a go. The major world religions seem to get along through
centuries with the same old virtues, and to a certain extent this is also true in
philosophy. The view that there is 'nothing new under the sun' with respect to
virtues is probably closer to truth tha n the idea that we should, or even could,
invent something genuinely new.
Different social environments and situations of life may of course require and
highlight different virtues (see Fleming, 2000). For example, military virtues like
being prepared to k ill are not relevant in the lives of the majority of contemporary
Europeans, and neither do they appear to believe that silent submission to
political authorities is a virtue.
If virtues are the essence of wisdom, the core of philosophy is love of virtues.
It is important to bear in mind in this connection that philosophy does not always
mean any kind of discussion —and still less lecturing or research. It is also a way of
life and an 'existential attitude' (Hadot, 1995 and 2004; Curnow 2006). Philosophers
do not necessarily write anything, and some of them do not even discuss our
concepts and lives in way that could be characterised as philosophical (Hadot,
2004, p.173). But they show their love and understanding of wisdom by their acts
and manner of living.
3 Cohen (2005) states that the eleven cardinal virtues he mentions 'define the concept of happiness' in the kind of philosophical cou nselling he practices (Logic -Based Therapy), and that an individual is happy to the extent that these virtues are attained. Happiness is clearly one of the traditional aims of philosophy. This article does not claim that virtues are sufficient for happines s, but only that they increase the likelihood of a tolerable and even satisfactory life. Arto Tukiainen Philosophical Counselling as Fostering Virtues
Practical Phi losophy, 10:1, (web edition, 20 11; originally published July 2010) 51
Philosophical Counselling as a Process of Fostering Virtues
Counselling is an invitation to a philosophical way of life with its inevitable
emphasis on virtues. An attempt to separate philosophical practice from virtues
would lead to an impoverished and u nnatural image of counselling. Impoverished,
because without them philosophical thinking loses much of its power to reduce
our sufferings and to guide our lives. Unnatural, because philosophy has always
been inspired by life -orienting ideals, and if philos ophers are asked to remain as
virtue -neutral as possible, they are quite simply asked to be something else than
they are. All, or at least most, forms of philosophical counselling subscribe to
cognitive virtues like self -knowledge; but these are just a par t of a much larger set
of moral and non -moral virtues.
The point of philosophical counselling is not so much to discuss virtues but to
help the counsellee to modify her thoughts, feelings or behaviour through the
power of virtues. Philosophical counsellors ought to assume that all kinds of
predicaments provide opportunities for virtues to show their force. Examples
include increasing the counsellee's self -understanding and authenticity through
questions; enabling the counsellee to see that her anxiety -produ cing beliefs about
some social facts are distorted; assistance in finding the best course of action in a
complicated family situation; mentioning the pleasures of disinterested contem -
plation; discussing the thoughtlessness of a companion and how to avoid getting
disturbed about it; finding good reasons not to feel that a personal failure implies
total worthlessness; helping the counsellee to see that a professional disaster
might also offer opportunities; inducing the counsellee to assume a tolerant,
accep ting attitude towards her seemingly bad situation when there is little hope of
improving it; indicating that acquiescence to negative emotions one cannot get rid
of might be the best available option; showing how the counsellee can be less
driven by social pressure and commercial influence. This is what many
philosophical counsellors have been doing for decades. The concept of virtue
gives coherence and historical depth to these activities.
One good way of understanding philosophical counselling is this: we seek to
clarify together what a wise person would think and do in the counsellee's
situation. On the one hand, virtue -oriented counselling must of course take into
account the counsellee's unique circumstances and way of thinking. We have to
start from th e understanding we have and strive to find and foster what is good
within us. The idea that philosophical counsellors should suggest to their
counsellees notions that have no connection whatever —logical or associative —
with their present way of seeing thing s, or views that they cannot adopt as their
own, is surely misguided (see Zinaich 2005). On the other hand, it seems that the
counsellor has an obligation to try and give voice to her own perception of what
'Lady Wisdom' would counsel. This is what Seneca did in his letters, and this is
what contemporary philosophical counsellors should do. Seneca's letters were
probably intended for large audiences despite seemingly being addressed to a
friend, but philosophical counsellors can, and ought to, tailor their proposals to
each individual case. Counsellors cannot know in advance what kinds of inner
powers of virtue need to be examined and stimulated to grow.
In some cases a virtue might be present in the counsellee's mind and heart in a
hidden or nascent form to be amplified and encouraged. It is my experience that
most people have thoughts and attitudes that are not a part of their mainstream Arto Tukiainen Philosophical Counselling as Fostering Virtues
Practical Phi losophy, 10:1, (web edition, 20 11; originally published July 2010) 52
self (see also Lahav, 2008d). For example, a person might not have given much
thought to virtues like flexibility, patien ce and disinterestedness, but this does not
mean that she does not or cannot understand their meaning and importance. If
she begins to hope that these virtues could help her towards peace of mind, she
may want to accord them a larger role in her life.
Phil osophical Counselling Can Be Therapeutic
Virtues can help us either to avoid or to accept many sources of anxiety and
irritation. For instance, a capacity to take a distant, objective look at our lives
enables us to see the smallness of our worries. Mercif ulness with respect to our
own shortcomings and those of others soothes our feelings of anger and
disappointment, and an attitude of benign indifference towards external matters
makes us readier to accept our circumstances even when they appear distressing .
Forward -looking virtues like prudence protect us from many sorrows and causes
of resentment, and a realistic appreciation of all the contingencies that can ruin us
will enable us to maintain our composure when we actually end up in disasters. 4
The fact t hat virtues enable us to cope with actual and potential problems of life
entails that the distinction between philosophy and therapeutic alleviation of
suffering is not sharp; and since philosophical counselling is a process of fostering
virtues, it can of ten be regarded as therapy.
Lahav (2006) has argued that philosophy should not be seen as therapy. He is
right when he says that philosophers should avoid a pampering attitude that
causes them to refrain from questioning their counsellees' wishes, desires and
views (see also Fastvold, 2006; Tuedio, 2008). In particular, the consumer ideology
of‖ trying‖ to‖ find‖ the‖ means‖ of‖ reaching‖ the‖ counsellee’s‖ goals‖ irrespective‖ of‖ their‖
specific nature is unsuitable for philosophy. Lahav is also right when he writes
that philosophers should try to help their counsellees to escape from narrow
conceptions of their lives, and encourage them to open their minds to new ways of
understanding themselves and the world. But these points do not justify a
complete break with the c oncept of therapy. 5 Philosophy as love of wisdom is
therapeutic in essence, not through a clever add -on for marketing purposes. This
view accords with the age -old analogy between medicine and philosophy: while
medicine treats our bodily ailments, philosoph y heals our souls (see for example
Nussbaum, 1994, p p.13–47).
4 Peter B. Raabe (2000, p.171) points out that philosophical thinking may enable us to prevent problems of life from arising. This is true; but we should add to hi s view that some problems cannot be solved, eliminated or avoided but only tolerated and endured; and from the Stoic perspective we need philosophy precisely when we cannot solve our problems —when we run against something that will not yield and that canno t be circumvented. According to Epictetus (2005) the basic philosophical problem is our attitude towards things that are not in our power: the starting point of philosophy is the awareness of our own weakness and helplessness. As the example of Boethius sh ows, philosophical ideas may offer consolation and enable us to 'take a kindly view even of misfortunes' (Seneca, 2004, p.98). Endurance and acceptance are virtues. As Nozick says (see above), wisdom includes knowing what limitations are unavoidable and ho w to accept them.
5 Lahav (2006) says that wisdom means richness of understanding and non -egocentric openness to realities beyond one's world view. A wise person lets a great number of realities speak through her attitudes, emotions, views and actions. The se are very abstract descriptions of wisdom. Awareness of a wide range of virtues enables us to adopt a more concrete and practical conception of philosophy and philosophical counselling. It also enables us to see more clearly how philosophy can be therape utic. Arto Tukiainen Philosophical Counselling as Fostering Virtues
Practical Phi losophy, 10:1, (web edition, 20 11; originally published July 2010) 53
Virtues do not seem to belong to the vocabulary of psychological theories and
psychotherapeutic techniques in any essential way, and this is an important
difference between philosophy and these therapies. But the difference does not
imply that philosophy is not therapeutic. Virtue is the distinctively philosophical
contribution to therapeutic activities.
However, if the central therapeutic aim is thought to be alleviation of
suffering, regarding philosophy merely as therapy would be an error. Wisdom as
the goal of philosophy may necessitate many enquiries and actions that this aim
neither requires nor justifies. For instance, understanding the place of mental
phenomena in a seemingly material univ erse may not offer any therapeutic gains,
and even if some therapists might be interested in politics, the dominating
professional attitude appears to be one of exclusion; but politics and the
ontological status of mental events can be seen as philosophica lly important
issues. The philosophical emphasis on moral and cognitive virtues even when
cultivating them does not heighten our sense of personal well -being appears to be
foreign to the notion of philosophy as therapy. In sum, we have to avoid the
simplis tic view according to which philosophy either is or is not therapy. In some
ways it is, in some others it is not.
There is no simple way of dividing philosophical enquiries into those that can
have therapeutic value and those that cannot. Philosophy of min d in particular
can have a therapeutic dimension even if it may initially seem like a very abstract
and theoretical pursuit. For example, the idea that our minds and selves are not
separate from what we usually think of as external reality can have a calmi ng
effect, because it leads us to let go of self -centred thoughts. If we do not stand
opposite to the world, we do not have to assert our will against it. The distinction
between the subject and the object of thought and perception can become either
blurre d or obliterated; and this is not always merely a theoretical insight but also
an experience, an aspect of life. Wittgenstein has a concise description of this
experience: 'The world and life are one' (2001, remark 5.621). Although Lahav
makes a strict dis tinction between philosophy and therapy, he has presented
similar statements that could be regarded as potentially therapeutic. For instance,
he says that 'you are in everything there is, and everything is in you' (Lahav
2008e).
Conclusion
This article has suggested that virtues are essential to wisdom, and that
philosophical counselling can find a sense of identity and direction by paying
attention to them. Philosophical counselling should be seen as a process where the
counsellee's inner and often neglect ed powers of virtue are unearthed and allowed
to modify her thoughts, feelings and behaviour. While virtues can be therapeutic
in the sense of alleviation of suffering, they might also necessitate enquiries and
actions without any obvious connection to the rapeutic aims.
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About the Author
Arto Tukiainen earned his doctoral degree in 1999 from the Department of Practical
Philosophy at t he University of Helsinki, Finland, and now works as a system
designer at the IT department of the Finnish Board of Customs. He has written
several articles on philosophy as a way of life rather than a theoretical, specialised
profession.
