Subject: Team ManagementQuestion 1: Write a 400 word essay (APA format & 2 latest scholarly journal article references 2016 on words) Lesson 2 focuses on performance, productivity, and rewarding team

Email: [email protected] The aim of this diagnostic analysis is to identify the weaknesses in the process of reforming policy in Jordan. This study will first present a diagnostic analysis of the characteristics of administrative reform in Jordan. Following this, weaknesses will be identified with a focus on policy roles in the policy‐making process. Administrative reform has long been an area of interest and development in Jordan since the early 1980s. Conferences were held, political and technical committees formed, and exper- tise and resources invested. The outcomes of these programs have been below expectations, with inadequate impact. This investigation paid attention on how Jordan can best invest its resources to maximize efficiency in the public sector, spe- cifically the process of reforming policy. This study concludes that the primary factor impacting efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness is the degree of authority at both national and organizational level. Recent efforts in Jordan to tackle these issues could create more conflicts that threaten the Jordanian government's stability. Other resources have been dedicated to reviewing the rules and values that govern the rela- tionship between state and society. 1 | INTRODUCTION The bureaucratic ethos that emphasizes the importance of centrally controlled rationality considers one of the most important characteristics of the political regime which Jordan has experienced during the last decades (UNDP Report, 2015). In this context, economic performance in most cases proved to be less than adequate for either ensuring self‐sustained development or, at a minimum, being able to meet the basic requirements of the populace. In Jordan, the movement away from the authoritarian past is characterized by the efforts to maintain or improve the neoliberal foundations of the economy while opening the political arena to ensure the participation of a traditionally marginalized citizenry that demands an equitable and prompt share of the benefits of economic growth.

Despite the official political structure, it is so clear that the domination of the executive branch over the judicial and legislative branch of government is eminent. The extreme centralization of managerial decision‐making surrounded by the executive branch challenges thepower of attempts at change and, more notably, to retard efforts to tackle the problems of the government bureaucracy, like that of inef- ficiency and corruption. Consequently, ministers and Prime ministers continue their involvement in routine matters at the expense of stra- tegic issues and are reluctant to send meaningful powers downward.

Researchers noticed that a significant number of senior administrators have received their jobs through patronage rather than on merit. Their longevity has conferred on them too much discretionary power and rendered them ill prepared to handle the responsibilities associated with decentralization (Amster, 2012).

The shift from government to governance, which involves the focus of administrative practice, is moving from the bureaucratic direct governmental form of services to third‐party government as it has been called lately (Duflo, 2012).

Explicitly, the way we govern is shifting outside governmental boundaries—the long‐established procedures and institutions of gov- ernment are developing into less concerned with less centralized to, which we administrate ourselves (Jacobsen, 2006).

The irresistible challenges in political environment recently, yet, have created new passageway to self‐searching among practitioners and thinkers in this field. This rethinking went alongside the subse- quent lines: Can the old official procedure of government cope with Received: 19 September 2018 Accepted: 13 October 2018 DOI: 10.1002/pa.1886 J Public Affairs. 2019;19:e1886.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa1of10 economic, political, and social transform? Is it pressed to nationwide improvement, which is basically the loud spoken objective of all former and current governments? Should not the focal point be turned from mere repair maintenance system to active and dynamic improvement? Should not more concentration be given to the dynamic development and innovative portion of governmental deci- sion making‐administrations?

2 | RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This study focused on a diagnosis of reforming the Jordanian policy‐ making process to recognize the difficulties and weaknesses that accompanied it. In this comparative procedure, the study scrutinize the individuality of rival's explanation reform of policy‐making.

Pattern‐matching is a famous method that goes with this kind of stud- ies, where quite a lot of situations are well known in having confident results, and the analysis concentrated on answering the investigated issues of how and why, which leads to this conclusion turn out in every situation. A regular problem in policy‐making is to be aware of the surroundings under which research and development can be formalized in a constructive way to the community.

Hence, this analysis is valuable in elucidation and understanding the methods and drivers of modern governmental reforms, which has been carried out and modernized. Also, this form presents theoret- ical frameworks for investigation of organizational of and public administration and modernized governance.

To solve the previous matter, this study focused on the situation under which structural government works efficiently, and how Jordan can manage material capital and human in the direction of efficient and effective governmental services.

3 | PURPOSE OF THE STUDY The aim of this study is to analyze the career public servant roles in the policy process and, more generally, how should government seek to influence the policy‐making process. These questions involve a vari- ety of difficult issues about the procedures through which government should make its decisions as well as the content of those decisions (Kugler & Kugler, 2009). Too often, those two issues are conflated, with the assumption that certain actors (civil servants) will produce certain types of policies (interventionist). Therefore, more market‐ based instruments (e.g., vouchers) that keep the bureaucrats out are preferable.

In some ways, the questions about the public sector problems are basically a reformation of the old questions regarding“governance.” How should government administrations function? How should we decide what government administrations will and can do? How should tasks be divided among career civil servants and political executive's administrators? To what degree should one branch is to have the power to check the other?

However, the economic and financial difficulties forced the gov- ernment to initiate a reform process. This reform was more urgent due to the financial crises in 2008 and globalization. This study's main purpose is to scientifically analyze policy roles to recognize its andeffectiveness and pitfalls. The expectation of this research study also is to present to government administrators with the chance to identify any variation that could be adjusted within an appropriate method. 4 | STUDY SIGNIFICANCE The significance of this study depends on both hypothetical and prac- tical forms. On the hypothetical side, investigating the policy making process development in Jordan and identifies its consequences and pitfalls. It is the first study of its kind based on the knowledge of the researchers. Hence, this study was projected to develop and study prior literatures in the policy‐making field in particular and public administration in general.

Alternatively, this study has practical importance and its outcome will offer to the policy and decision makers to recognize some of the outcomes of the managerial transformation in Jordan and be attentive of some of the pitfalls of the transformation process. Moreover, the significance of this kind of study is to attain the anticipated purpose of the transformation plan.

Understanding policy‐making in Jordan requires an understanding of policy roles and the nature of its institutional arrangements. There- fore, the importance of this study stems from its analytical framework to review and assess the policy‐making process in the Jordanian bureaucracy with special emphasis on policy roles played by different participants and command and control mechanisms as evaluation criteria.

5 | RESEARCH PROBLEM Transform programs that have come about at the political and socio‐eco- nomical levels in Jordan for the last decade, have focused on the question of the legitimacy of traditionally detained visions. It concerns the role and function of mutually the state, and those with most important roles in the policy‐making processes (Blackden & Hallward‐ Driemeier, 2013).

Efforts to transition toward democracy have focused on either reform of the constitution at a systematic level or roles played by or assigned by conventional institutions with influential power such as legislatures, executives, political parties, or external influencers.

Less consideration is given to the potential positive influencers in the development of changes processes and improvement in the pro- cess of policy making by the public sector.

Good governance should be able to control the incompatible goals of economic efficiency in a rational manner. Along this, there ought to be a force toward legality based on extensive involvement in the pro- cess of public policy‐making and fairness in the sharing of services offered by the government to the public (Adrian, 1994).

The difficulty here is in achieving an equilibrium between the demands for enhancement in the operations of a neoliberal, capitalist, free market, and the call to restore and develop conventional govern- ment and formulate a process forms that connected with a free bene- fit state (World Bank Ministerial Seminar, 2001).

The state has been instrumental in addressing a variety of challenges ranging from regulations and promotion of economical 2of10TBAISHAT ET AL . and social activities to ensure equality and integrations among the public. These have all been addressed through changes to economic policies on a national level, in response to urbanization.

Characteristically, the state develops on an institutional level with long‐enduring outcomes for public administration services. First, on an organizational level, the state expands its functional scope to include commercial, industrial, financial, economic, social security, public health, education, and welfare activities.

Second, the disorderly development of the governmental public sectors turns out to be an obstacle in attempting at answering the question of how to develop from a practical viewpoint. Governmental procedures and programs are built to respond to hesitant legality, and considerable differentiation in capital accessibility was established without congruence. There was minimal preparation, synchronization, and controlling power by policy administrators.

The growth outline in the governmental public sectors is a cumu- lative based on a combination of an incremental aggregation. No incorporated well‐studied master plan was created before the initiat- ing of determined improvement of public strategy and agendas.

Neither was expansion in the compass of the government function, cost, size, nor relative influences and authorities which is based on intellectuality planning.

In response to these issues, this analysis focuses on how the reform model can clarify how legislators, political executives, and career civil servants can share responsibility for policy‐making and implementation.

6 | LITERATURE REVIEW Within an article entitled“Globalization and public administration”by Karamack (Kamaraack, 2001), it was noted that there are four key driving forces behind the waves of reform to public administration across the world, that is, democratization, the deficit in performance, the revolution in information technology and global economic compe- tition. The modern type of administrative state can shape society and guide it, through regulations and control of social and economic devel- opment. Doubts with regard to the capacity of the state to govern do not just have a basis in concern over limited capacity in financial terms; there are also deep‐rooted disputes over ideology and percep- tions of what the nature of a state ought to be and what its purposes are, and balances of opinion shift with regard to what people feel a state ought and ought not to do. Within his argument related to strat- egies for reform, Cheng (2005) explained that many factors in combi- nation influence the reform of public administration such as traditions of national administrations, political evolution as a result of decoloni- zation, nation‐building and democratization and global trends with regard to the reinvention of government and administrative reform.

Angranof and Yildis (2006) articulated a dichotomy between administration and politics; they sought answers to issues stemming from politics being related to policies and expressions of the will of the state, whereas administration is concerned with how such policies are to be executed. Political decisions over public policy are made by political leaders, and then it is simply a case of career officials figuring out what is the most effective and efficient manner in which thosepolicies are to be implemented. It is conceptually appealing to cleanly split between labor for administration and labor for politics; however, in realty, there is a complete disconnect. The perspective of gover- nance offers another kind of solution to the issue. As Wachhaus (2012) noted, governing structure patterns are experiencing change in what is considered a shift from government to forms of governance.

Such a shift involves the movement of managerial practices focus beyond government boundaries of bureaucratic states and the provi- sion of services directly from government to what is called“third party”kinds of government. Expressed another way, the manner in which people govern is going beyond the boundaries of government and is less involved with traditional institutions and mechanisms.

The reforms that have been disseminated and inspired by the ‘new public management’new reforms have been implemented within many countries and, as Schick (2002) argued, there has been an increase in the horizontal specialization witnessed in the function- ing of administrations, which has often been coupled with more clear separation between administrative and political function. The aim has been to have sharper structural task separation in relation to policy advice, control, and regulation. Another way of looking at the shift is to consider that reform rhetoric and theories in relation to normative practice thus give the suggestion that actors in administration, such as agencies operating at arm's length, ought to focus upon the implementation of policy instead of being involved with processes of decision‐making around policy.

Talbot (2004), meanwhile, pointed out that“Next Steps”has the aim of a more precise description of the respective roles of civil servants and ministers, with the former being responsible for making policy intentions happen with the autonomy to do so, and the latter being responsible for the setting of policy in the first instance.

Reformers within the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have frequently argued that specialization of functions of public services into agencies would lead to better forms of management and better delivery of services. Also, the distancing of public services into agen- cies was thought likely to lead to more professional forms of manage- ment with greater levels of transparency through the bringing of services closer to citizens and through making, and allowing, managers to manage (Kettl, 1996). It was emphasized within an appraisal of gov- ernment reform (“Inside the Reinvention Machine”) that a need still exists for centralized coordination and control; although policy may lead to devolved activity, as long as there is an involvement of public funds, government still remains responsible for how such funding is used. A need to ensure that there is value for money leads to encour- agement for early detection and policy conflict resolution and the elimination of duplication. There is, therefore, a call for further informal procedures and suitable communication between them, in addition to change in behavior and attitudes on both parts. It was claimed by Lawson (2006) that there is a need for good governance to rest upon the ability of a system to manage conflicting goals related to rationality and efficiency in economic terms along with goals for legitimacy based upon wide participation in the processes of public policy‐making along with equity in access to, and distribution of, public services. Stolk and Wergrich (2008) have indicated that reforms search continuously for improved linkages that can reconcile the goals of budget and policy and serve to ensure that they have a mutually TBAISHAT ET AL .3of10 reinforcing nature. One development with promise is that with regard to evolving roles within budget ministries. There is a move away from traditional roles with budget ministers being perceived as“naysayers” to a culture wherein expertise is developed for identification of efficiency and cost‐cutting measures; as such, they are better placed to offer ministries advice in relation to how administrative costs can be cut without there being a need to reduce programs.

7 | FINDINGS OF THE STUDY Politically, Jordan is a constitutional system that differentiates the powers of each of the three branches of government. The Jordanian governmental system is parliamentary with an inherited monarchy.

The Mulgi government is the 84th since the founding of the Jordanian State some 95 years ago, giving the government an average life span of 11 months (www.gov.jo/byFormationdate).

Over the years, the centralization aspect has reinforced and per- petuated a status quo judged as inappropriate by researchers and practitioners. The king appoints the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for the daily operations of the domestic government, the president, and the members of the Senate. He approves and promul- gates laws. The king has the power to declare war and sign peace treaties, although treaties must be signed by the National Assembly (Jordan Constitution, article 35).

Policy‐making cannot adequately be studied apart from the environment or context in which it operates. Therefore, it is necessary to review and focus on the important actors in the policy‐making process.

7.1 | The Palace and the Cabinet In the absence of democracy, decisions have been those of the king, often in conjunction with several key advisers. On issues of foreign policy and military, the king, the Prime Minister, and the Chief of the Royal Court are the decisions‐making circle. The cabinet, as a body, is not involved, although its members may be consulted for their reac- tions or comments.

Brand also argued that in foreign policy, the major goal was to secure aid for the budget and to finance the military. In the case of the budget, the king's highest concern has been paying the salaries of the army and the security apparatus, whose members have tradi- tionally been largely recruited from the kingdom's tribes and who have long been regarded as the bedrock of support for the monarchy.

The Prime Minister has generally handled the“how”questions related to the economy and bureaucracy. The role of the Prime Minis- ter was also described as key, but his input varies depending upon the political or economic conditions at any given time (Brand, 1994).

Beyond these two figures—the king and the Prime Minister—the economic decision‐making group differs from the foreign policy group.

The king has certain advisers and confidants both within and outside government whose friendship and proximity give them access and, hence, the opportunity to lobby for certain policies. The king is described as an arbiter by nature, preferring not to interfere in policy details. However, if a complaint is voiced frequently enough eitherby officials or by nonofficial confidants, he will likely come to view it as a general problem. He may then draw the cabinet's attention to it and, if it is not solved, may replace the relevant minister. However, for domestic economic matters to have an influence on upper level decision‐making, they must be of real consequence—large loans, the devaluation of the dinar, and the like (Kernaghan, 2010). 7.2 | The Economic Security Committee One key factor that affected the development of the economy and the process of economic decision‐making in the kingdom was the pres- ence of a martial law regime during most of the 1957–1990 periods.

Symptomatic of the conditions that existed under martial law were the establishment, development, and activities of what was called the Economic Security Committee (ESC; Alfanik, 2016). This body was originally founded in 1967 to address the economic problems cre- ated by the occupation of the West Bank in 1967. With martial law already in place giving the state sweeping powers, adding such a com- mittee seemed like a natural step. Composed of the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of Transport, and the Governor of the Central Bank, and standing in effect above or outside the law, the committee initially served to help solve problems faced especially by the government and some of the public companies and institutions (UNDP, 2015).

Gradually, however, the committee's“mandate”broadened. It began to act as a kind of extraordinary legislative council. The commit- tee was permitted to make decisions that overturned existing laws; even those that had been passed after the occupation and that had taken the post‐June 1967 reality into account. In this way, the com- mittee came to be used to bypass existing laws when it was problem- atic or inconvenient from the point of view of the decision‐makers or their confidants (Brand, 1994). For example, if the Prime Minister requested something to be done quickly or something done that was officially against the law, he could refer it to the committee. The committee also made decisions about liquidating companies, borrow- ing to the ceiling of the Central Bank, and then legalizing more borrowing, allowing the Central Bank to deposit with other banks to support the currency, issuing more currency than had been allowed, expelling people from commercial organization, and consenting to someone who would or else have been banned, to be part of the board of directors of a corporation. In the days of escalating political repression in 1988, its decisions also dissolved the boards of a number of public shareholding companies including those of the major daily newspapers.

Many of the rulings the committee made are open to criticism, not only on legal grounds but also on economic and financial ones. Some of its decisions were intended to benefit a particular person, company, or bank, to enable them to undertake an activity that was against the law or to avoid procedures dictated by the law (Alfanik, 2016). More- over, only a few of the ESC's decisions were ever published in the Official Gazette, the newspaper in which all legislation is supposed to appear. Most were confidential, and for specific purposes, they were usually not general edicts. 4of10TBAISHAT ET AL . Comprising only a handful of cabinet members who were chosen by the Prime Minister in consultation with the king, the ESC appears to have been the institutionalized form of an inner circle for economic policy. Their power derived from both the cabinet positions they held and their closeness to the king and the Prime Minister at the time, to which they owed their appointment. 7.3 | The role of the ministers The type of regime that produces and perpetuates an institution such as the ESC is clearly one that is uninterested in or incapable of decentralizing decision‐making. And, indeed, even for what would appear to be relatively minor matters, economic decision‐making is highly centralized in the kingdom. Most decisions—whether important or relatively minor—are made at the cabinet level or even above, not even at the level of individual ministers.

Part of the reason for the lack of ministerial involvement is that ministerial appointments in Jordan generally owe to considerations of domestic political balancing along ethnic and regional lines. All cab- inet members must meet certain unofficial but well‐known formulae.

As a result, most ministers are appointed because of ethnicity, tribal/ family background, or regional considerations, not because of exper- tise in the field of their appointment, although there are certainly numerous notable exceptions. In such a system, where a minister's background in his or her field has generally been only a secondary consideration, a minister's power derives from a number of sources.

The first is the degree of support he or she enjoys from the Prime Minister. They therefore have no automatic political base in the Parliament or outside, as would be the case in a normal parliamentary system. Beyond his or her ties with the decision‐making group, a min- ister's power is often determined by such factors as the degree to which he or she has developed ties in the bureaucracy (both within his or her own ministry and elsewhere) and his or her own energy and involvement. Another source of power lies in the ministry itself.

For example, the Ministry of Finance is potentially very powerful, because it includes the customs bureau, the income and sales tax department, the budget, and the land and surveys bureau—all the departments responsible for domestic revenue.

At least part of the problem with ensuring implementation below the cabinet level is that many individual ministers prefer not to take responsibility, opting to leave certain issues to the cabinet. If that is the case at the level of minister, one can imagine what happens (or does not happen) at lower levels. As is the case for bureaucrats everywhere, there is no incentive (and in this case, also no authority) to make decisions without prior approval from above, even on very minor matters. If the relevant minister does not take an interest in solving a problem, no action will be taken. In general, then, because of the lack of authority to make decisions, there is little or no follow‐up.

In addition to the issue of authority and responsibility is the problem of the lack of a guiding program or policy. In more general terms, however, one reason for the lack of a coherent policy is that there have not been political parties steering the government. The appointment of the Prime Minister has always been the king'sprerogative, not a response to election results, even since the political liberalization of 1989.

Although some studies agreed that ministerial changes are disrup- tive, given the lack of a program, it is not necessarily the case that a change in minister will mean a complete change in the ministry (Kernaghan, 2010). After all, the other mid‐level and lower level bureaucrats remain in place. Instead, the change of ministers will often mean that projects in which the former minister was involved may simply be set aside as the new minister begins to establish his own pri- orities (Brand, 1994). 7.4 | The Parliament Legislative authority resides with the King and Parliament that is a bicameral national assembly consisting of the upper house (the Sen- ate) and the lower house (the Chamber of Deputies). The constitution provides that the Senate, indulging the Speaker, shall consist of not more than one‐half of the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies (Senate 65 members, Chamber of Deputies 130 members).

The King chooses all senators that meet the requirements approved in the constitution. A senator must be 40 years old and belong to one of the following classes: present or former prime ministers, per- sons who have previously held the office of Ambassador, Speaker of Chamber of Deputies, retired military officers of the rank of Lt.

General and above, president and judges of the Court of Causation and of the Civil and Sharia Courts of Appeal, former deputies who were elected at least twice as deputies, and other similar personalities who enjoy the confidence of the king in view of the services rendered by them to the nation and country. Senators serve 4‐year terms, renewable every 4 years (AL Taamneh, 2016).

The Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 members elected by secret ballot in a general and direct election. The term of office is 4 years. A deputy must be 30 years old. Unlike senators, who must meet specific qualifications, the Chamber of Deputies does not have specific requirements except potential deputies must have Jordanian citizenship, no current declaration of legal bankruptcy, and not subject to any indictable charge.

The public perception is that the Parliament, especially the Cham- ber of Deputies, is very weak and a rubberstamp for the executive branch (AL Taamneh, 2016). The majority of its members must rely on the executive branch to keep their constituencies happy, which is accomplished primarily through nepotism and political patronage.

There are no restrictions on political campaign financing, and conse- quently, getting elected to Parliament depends in part on tribal affilia- tions and wealth. The members of both houses have immunity from prosecution, which can only be lifted by a majority of votes in Parlia- ment. The Prime Minister and his ministers are jointly accountable to Parliament regarding public policy, and each minister is accountable to Parliament regarding the work of his ministry.

Another structural weakness is Parliament; in practice, it does not initiate legislation. Although Article 95 of the Constitution states that any 10 Deputies (MP's) may propose any law, in reality, the Prime Minister submits proposals for laws, which Parliament can accept, amend, or reject. In all cases, the proposed laws have to be submitted TBAISHAT ET AL .5of10 to the Senate, and they do not become laws unless approved by both houses and signed by the King.

7.5 | The judiciary Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions, they are subject to no authority other than that of the law. The judicial system is divided into two categories: civil and religious courts.

According to the constitution, the civil court has jurisdiction over all personnel in all affairs, criminal and civil, including cases brought by or against the government. Religious courts are divided into (a) the Sharia court, jurisdiction in issues of personal status of Muslims, cases concerning blood money where the two parties are Muslims; and (b) the Tribunals of Religious Communities are those for the non‐Muslims communities that are recognized by the government.

The courts have a very limited role to play in policy‐making to affect the nature and content of public policy through exercise of the powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation in cases brought before them.

In practice, the courts do not play an active role in deciding issues of administrative accountability or responsiveness. The exercise of this limited power, however, is further constrained by practical consider- ations. To avoid being either politicized or caught in the middle of a fight between branches of government, courts tend to define prob- lems as political in nature and hence beyond their jurisdiction—the basic rationale used for not questioning decisions made by the government.

7.6 | The bureaucracy The domination of the executive branch over legislative and judicial branches of government is evident. The extreme centralism of deci- sion‐making inside the executive branch resists endeavors at change and, more considerably, hinders attempts to tackle problems of the government bureaucracy like inefficiency and corruption (Pearce, 2011).

The executive branch is vested with an impressive array of formal powers that places the Prime Minister at the center of the political arena. He is called upon to carry out a number of roles that give him the opportunity to expand his ability to persuade and influence other significant actors in the political process.

The cabinet and its bureaucracy are the most important actors in the policy‐making process in spite of the fact that the legislative authority resides with the king and the Parliament (Kpundeh, 1999).

The cabinet and its authority to exercise legislative leadership is clearly established by both the constitution and legislation and accepted as a practical and political necessity (AL Taamneh, 2016). As a result, Par- liament expects the Prime Minister to present proposed legislation program. In practice, Parliament does not initiate legislation's.

Although Article 95 of the constitution states that any 10 Deputies (PM's) may propose any law, in reality, the Prime Minister submits pro- posals for laws, which Parliament can accept, amend, or reject. 7.7 | The private sector Two institutions with potential clout and interest in the economic policy arena, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have been in existence throughout much of the kingdom's history. The Chamber of Commerce is in fact a federation of local chambers of commerce.

The federation was founded in December 1955, as the representative of the private sector in all economic, commercial, and service fields (Amman Chamber of Commerce, 2015). The Amman Chamber of Industry established itself as a separate entity in 1962 (Amman Cham- ber of Commerce, 2015). Its members are public, private, and mixed sector companies. The chamber serves as a forum for formulating and expressing the views of the industrial sector in the kingdom.

The annual report of the chamber of commerce provides some insights into the influence that the institutionalized private sector has had on policy‐making. The summaries of meetings held with the ministers to discuss issues related to the role of the private sector, and development seems to be the best indicator for formal access by the chambers to the government. Rather than simply waiting to read the text of new law in the official gazette, industrialists began to initiate projects and make suggestions regarding tariff, interest rate, and rate of taxes to the government (Amman Chamber of Commerce, 2015). In general, however, it seems clear that formal meetings were few and effective input is quite limited. In short, it would be inaccurate to conclude that, in practice, the private sector plays an important role in the policy‐making process in Jordan.

8 | ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS The Jordanian policy‐making process and the roles played by the dif- ferent parties explain the Jordanian political culture, characterized by bureaucratic elitism and political–administrative centralism that tend to legitimize the moral authority of the ruling elites.

The finding reveals that the cabinet and its bureaucracy are the most important actors in the policy‐making process in spite of the fact that the legislative authority resides with the king and the parliament.

The political alliances between elected representative and bureau- cracy can be seen as a way in which the bureaucracy can generate power necessary for successful action. An exchange of bureaucratic services for political support is the norm of cooperation between legislators and bureaucracy in Jordan. Parliamentarians, who seek reelection every 4 years, certainly need the support of the bureau- cracy. Political representative who oppose the government legislations in a given policy feel that his own objection will be meaningless because of the size of the group of which he is a member. These alliances play an essential role in the success or failure of a given legislation.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of government substantially depends upon executive leadership and action in both formation and execution of policy. The authority of the Prime Minister to exercise legislative leadership is clearly recognized by both legislation and the constitution and acknowledged as a practical and political necessity.

The crumbling of power in parliament stems from lack of strong party leadership, renders and committee system, which 6of10TBAISHAT ET AL . incompetent of building a inclusive legislative program. As a result, parliament has come to expect the Prime Minister to present to it a program of proposed legislation. The parliament does not, however, do whatever the Prime Minister recommends. More than 90% of the Prime Minister Policy proposals were adopted by the parliament dur- ing the period 2010–2015 (World Bank Report, 2015). Although the Prime Minister is the head of the executive branch, he does not act alone on policy matters. The bureaucracy compromises several staff agencies' advice and assists the Prime Minister in handling his respon- sibilities, including development and implementation of policy. For example, the Budget Department assists the Prime Minister in prepar- ing the annual budget, supervising expenditures, and managing the executive branch (Jreisat, 1998). On the other hand, in foreign and military policies, the palace has the authority to decide and almost operate in freedom. Foreign and military policies in Jordan are largely the product of the King's leadership and action.

The most important institution in this respect is the palace. The King is the only figure in the kingdom that represents a national constituency.

In Jordan, the capacity of legislatures to engage effectively in policy‐making has been very limited because they lack the required professional personnel to serve the individual members of the Parlia- ment. The absence of the professional staff helps to make parliament members more dependent on others—the executive, administrative agencies, and interest groups—for information.

Because there are few policy issues, a larger proportion of them can reach the cabinet level, and the executive plays a larger role in forming public policies about most issues; because power is more highly concentrated, the political executive is free to establish policies on many more issues without worrying as much about having to build coalitions.

The courts have a very limited role to play in policy‐making to affect the nature and content of public policy through the exercise of powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation in cases brought before them. The exercise of this very limited power, how- ever, is further constrained by practical considerations. To avoid being either politicized or caught in the middle of a fight between branches of government, courts tend to define problems as political in nature and hence beyond their jurisdiction.

In short, as in many developing countries, the policy‐making struc- ture is rather simple and executive policy‐making prevails. In such countries, too, interest groups have little influence on policy‐making because of their limited independence from political institutions.

A number of reasons lie behind the apparent lack of influence by the private sector (World Bank Report, 2016). First of all is the state perception of the private sector. Public sector employees tend to view private businessmen as selfish and unconcerned with the national interest. Second and not surprisingly, the private sector, although small, is not unified in its interests. Another more general problem is that the government has in effect over the years trained Jordanians not to challenge it, but to depend on it for a whole range of services.

However, part of the explanation for private sector inactivity must be attributed to the years of martial law (1957–1990) and political repression. In a situation in which complaints were often (mis)read, whether deliberately or not, as potential assault upon the security ofthe state, few people had the courage or the power to speak out. Such an atmosphere is hardly conducive to open an effective expression of discontent, preferences, or challenging initiatives. Finally, this problem is perhaps most significant for the argument of this study; the size of the private sector's contribution to the economy, as well as its dependence upon the state for a good deal of its activity, has not given it much bargaining power vis‐a‐vis the state (World Bank Report, 2017). If one looks at the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fig- ures, one finds that the real productive sectors of the economy‐phos- phate, potash, fertilizers, and so on are public sector companies. The bureaucracy contributes another major chunk of GDP.

The media and its role in policy‐making are very limited also due to the following reasons. Sixty percent of the newspapers are govern- ment owned. Most of the broadcasts media–radio and television are owned by the government and controlled by the Information Ministry.

Radio and television documentaries are pro‐government, highlighting its achievements. Although some address issues such as poverty, unemployment, education, and health, none have focused on corrup- tion and mismanagement. The government‐owned newspapers are managed as public share‐holding companies. Major stockholders are current or former government officials. This arrangement has politi- cized the press. Dominant stockholders oftentimes use the media to promote their interests and criticize their rivals. Private newspapers that have published stories about governmental abuses and misman- agement have become targets of arrest and prosecution. Government papers glamorize high‐level government officials, especially those in the cabinet and criticize their detractors. In general, the media's role in raising public awareness has been minimal in this society. 9 | EXPLANATION Jordan politics and administration manifest the historical stamp of Jordanian political culture, characterized by bureaucratic elitism and political–administrative centralism to a substantive authoritarian political psychology that tends to legitimize the moral authority of the upper strata.

Traditionally, public policy in Jordan is totally viewed as the favor- ites and values of the governing personnel elite (Allam, 2017). The nonparticipatory Jordanian masses have long been psychologically oriented toward powerful leadership by the elite and a centralized hierarchical bureaucracy. Thus, a highly centralized administration typifies the recurrent institutional essence of Jordanian political tradi- tions. Despite the trauma of Westernization in recent centuries, the core values of Jordanian political culture have not been substantially altered by the cross‐cultural fertilization. Western patterns of liberal pluralistic ideals have had some cultural impact upon the Jordanian elite. However, as yet, the elite political culture remains highly authoritarian and still oriented toward exclusive decision‐making by a centralized government.

Since the independence of Jordan in 1946, the Western pluralist form has had a comprehensive impact on the organization of the offi- cial institutional structure of the government of Jordan (Al sabaileh, 2018). Further than the official structures of Jordanian government, however, the impact has been at a minimum, and centralization of TBAISHAT ET AL .7of10 bureaucratic rather than democratic pluralism persists in the public policy‐making. We may ascribe this to the lack of sociocultural precon- ditions of pluralism.

The strict political tradition of Jordanian government does not cultivate such pluralistic prerequisite as follows:

1. Viable groups and/or individuals competition, 2. Opportunity creation for individuals and organizations to achieve contribution in the process of decision‐making, 3. Using organized mediation between public and government, 4. Using practical approaches of masses in participating in political decisions‐making such as elections and other media of effect and access, and 5. Democratic harmony based on the free system.

Drifting to strict government in Jordan therefore should be viewed partially as historical–cultural determinism and in part as the absence of the pluralistic prerequisites.

The elite‐mass class division of Jordanian public lean to stand with a political system that maintained by domination and regulation and not by pluralist interest group balancing. The high level of political centralism or authority enforces elitist policy upon the different strata of the masses. Some other determined ideological limitations as a result of the Arab‐Israel conflict besides inhibit pluralistic prospects for political and socioeconomic development:

1. Less political freedom for individuals, 2. Less power of the judiciary and legislature over executive bureaucracy, 3. More restrictions of political parties' role and function, and 4. Military expansion role in politics.

The governing elite based upon the political passivity of the Jordanian masses may facilitate effective bureaucratic intervention in the economic and social areas but impedes the creation of autonomous centers of decision‐making authority in the develop- mental process—the democratic/political area. Recent Jordanian politics and administration manifest bureaucratic centralism, which give little encouragement to the positive projection of democratic development.

Jordan's recent move toward political democratization is expected to mature with its emphasis on socioeconomic development, a new popular consciousness, greater national self‐confidence, and a new generation of democratic leadership, if it is subjected to the precondi- tions of pluralism.

Jordanians also face the challenge of“civilizing”their politics and government, calling upon their talent to lead an increasingly complex economy and society. Jordan has already made a historic commitment to greater democratization. Consequently, there appears to be a gen- eral consensus along with Jordanians of diverse political persuasions that government institution and administrative practices up to now have been inadequate to convene Jordan's complicated current and potential demands. A drastic administrative reform will be a vital partof democratization of politics. Jordan now has the opportunity to match its socioeconomic progress with much better administrative apparatus, and by doing so, it will have laid the groundwork not only for enduring democratic progress but also for enduring economic prosperity. 10 | RECOMMENDATIONS It is clear that the bureaucracy does have significant, if not necessarily dominant, policy roles in the Jordanian government. The problem then is how to structure government in ways that recognize the reality, and even the desirability, of the enhanced policy roles for civil servants while at the same time preserving the requirements of democratic accountability.

This is a difficult balance for the designers of government institu- tions to achieve, especially given the historical legacy of thinking about Jordan politics and administration characterized by political– administrative centralism and public demands for enhanced account- ability. The politicization role of the bureaucracy, if not the members of the civil service themselves, may make the delicate balance of policy competencies mentioned above all more difficult to achieve.

However, in a national context like Jordan, the following are recom- mended to enhance the policy‐making process in an attempt to create balance between the bureaucracy and some important participants like legislatures, interest groups, and the media in policy roles and initiation.

First, the civil service should be acquiescent and respond almost entirely to the policy directives given to them by their nominal political masters. This can be achieved by enhancing the legislature's role in policy‐making by engaging them directly in the central political tasks of law making and policy formation in the political system.

In the era of democracy and free‐market policies, Jordanians are expecting from their legislatures to do more than accept, amend, or reject the proposed legislation. They are expecting them to initiate legislation's especially on matters that affect directly the life of the people such as taxation, civil right, social welfare, and economic regu- lation. The capacity of the legislatures to engage effectively in policy‐ making can be enhanced by the following:

1. Personal staff: These people serve individual members of the parliament; some of them professionals to handle policy responsi- bilities; and others to handle routine office duties.

2. Committee and subcommittee staff: The professional members of committee staffs enhance the legislature capacity to have consid- erable influence on legislation, drafting bills, and developing polit- ical support.

3. Institutional staff: Agencies that can serve the Parliament with research studies, policy evaluations, and budgetary data. In addi- tion to the Audit Bureau, we can add Parliament Research Service and Parliament Budget Office.

All of this staff assistance helps to make parliament less dependent upon others—the executive, administrative agencies, and interest groups—for information. 8of10TBAISHAT ET AL . Second is enhancing the role of the private sector in policy‐making.

Well‐organized groups have an important impact on public policy‐ making. Interest groups may perform an interest‐articulation function; that is, they express demands and present alternatives for policy action.

They may also supply legislatures with much information, often techni- cal, about the nature and possible consequences of policy proposals. In doing so, they contribute to the rationality of policy‐making. Interest groups, such as those representing organized labor, business, and agriculture, are a major source of demands for public policy action in Jordan. Civil society organization is another example, if it is free to orga- nize and act, and is an essential partner in developing and strengthening policy proposals.

Last is strengthening the role of media and publicity. Jordan has no tradition of using publicity as a mechanism for keeping bureau- cracy under control. On the contrary, secrecy has been a distinctive characteristic of the way government operates on a daily basis. The communication media—newspapers, newsmagazines, radio, and televi- sion—can participate in policy‐making as suppliers and transmitters of information and, whether deliberately or otherwise, shapers of atti- tudes. For many Jordanian people, the late afternoon news on the television is the main information source of on public affairs. Compli- ance about bias in reporting of public affairs and media coverage are familiar for Jordanian people, as are accusations that governmental officials are controlling or manipulating the news. Attempts must be made to introduce reforms aimed at expanding the scope of civilian control over bureaucracy. In general, the democratic ideal of ensuring an informed citizenry would require changes in this area of concern.

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World Bank Report. (2017). World Bank approach to sustainable development. P52–60 AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES Dr. Rami Tbaishatis an experienced assistant professor of Public Administration with a demonstrated history of working in government reform.

Dr. Ali Rawabdehis an experienced associate professor of Public Health Administration with a demonstrated history of working in public health services.

Dr. Khaled Qassem Hailatis an experienced Assistant Professor of Marketing with a demonstrated history of working in the education management industry.

Dr. Shaker A Aladwanis an experienced Assistant Professor of Public Administration with a demonstrated history of working in the excellence Models. TBAISHAT ET AL .9of10 Dr. Samir Al Balasis an experienced Assistant Professor of Public Health Administration with a demonstrated history of working in public health services.

Dr. Mohammed Iqbal Al Ajlounyis an experienced Associate Professor of business administration demonstrated history of working in human resources management and development.How to cite this article:Tbaishat R, Rawabdeh A, Hailat KQ, A Aladwan S, Al Balas S, Al Ajlouny MI. Reforming policy roles in the Jordanian policy‐making process.J Public Affairs.

2019;19:e1886. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886 10 of 10TBAISHAT ET AL . Copyright ofJournal ofPublic Affairs (14723891) isthe property ofJohn Wiley &Sons, Inc.

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