Unit 3 DB: Freedom and Happiness How is it possible that people cannot be happy as long as they and everyone around them have the freedom to act as they choose? Provide examples in which someone else'

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The various arguments and theories supporting determinism go far back in time, but they have become increasingly compelling as they have extended their reach into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These arguments and theories arise out of all aspects of human endeavor and concern: from religion; from the physical and natural sciences; and from history, economics, and psychology. Let’s examine the arguments for determinism that have arisen from each of these areas.

Religious determinism, or predestination, is derived from the attributes assigned, especially in the chief Western religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), to some supernatural being. These attributes are omnipotence (being all-powerful) and omniscience (being all-knowing). According to such religions, because an all-powerful and all-knowing being created the universe and everything in it, including human beings, it has the power to do anything and knows everything that has happened, is happening, and will happen. Because of these attributes, then, everything in the world’s history—past, present, and future—can be seen as being predestined and foreknown.

If, for example, this being has decided that I will lead a good life and “go to heaven,” then I will; if, on the other hand, it has decided I will lead a bad life and “go to hell,” then I will do that instead. I have absolutely no say over what I or anyone else does because everything has been predestined, programmed, “predetermined” by an almighty supernatural being. This theory, for reasons that soon will become evident, is not generally accepted by the three major Western religions, although it has been held to be true by some theologians. The theory of predestination was most strongly presented by the Protestant minister and theologian John Calvin (1509–1564), who said that individuals can do nothing to ensure their own salvation.

There are several problems with this theory. There is the difficulty, of proving the existence of a supernatural being and, even if we could, of proving that it created the world, that it is indeed all-powerful and all-knowing, and, last, that it predestined everything so that it would happen in a certain way. Even if we take all of the preceding on faith, however, the theory of predestination still presents some real difficulties with regard to the characteristics of the supreme being, the world, and human beings.

First, if the universe and everything in it was created by a supernatural being, then that being must also have created evil, and this constitutes a definite problem for theologians holding to the predestination viewpoint. Most theologians are not willing to assign the responsibility for evil to this being, even though the problem of evil’s existence, given an all-powerful and all-good supernatural being, is a real moral dilemma.1

Second, such a being seems to be very strange indeed—especially in view of the emphasis the three major Western religions place upon salvation—if it predetermines that some humans will be good and some will be bad, and then punishes and rewards them for something over which they have no control! Such a characterization of the supernatural being’s relationship with its creatures certainly does not square with the image of an all-merciful, all-just being that the three religions also accept. Furthermore, the concept of salvation doesn’t really mean much if it cannot be assumed that human beings are free to choose to do the good rather than the evil act. None of these problems, of course, actually refutes the theory of religious determinism, but all do indicate why the theory is generally not held, at least in any extreme form, by any of three Western religions. There is no conclusive proof or argument that indicates that this theory is anything but one based upon very weak assumptions indeed.

Because the physical and natural sciences depend upon experiments, constancy, and prediction in their search for truth, they must accept universal causation. This has led many scientists to presume further that such causation means that there is absolutely no freedom in the universe at all. Not all scientists accept this extreme point of view, although the strongest arguments and evidence for determinism have arisen in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from the natural and physical sciences, especially as these have affected modern psychology.

The greatest exponent of physical determinism was Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727). He believed that the entire realm of nature and the universe is governed by natural laws (e.g., the law of gravity) and that there is, therefore, no such thing as freedom. Because everything observable—even things unobservable to the naked eye, such as atoms and molecules—is physical in nature, everything that occurs to these things and everything they do is caused by one or another physical law or event. According to Newton, because human beings also are physical in nature, they are subject to physical causes both within and outside them; for them, freedom is simply an illusion. This argument is a very compelling one, for even though the law of gravity, for example, does not state a certainty but rather a probability, has anyone ever observed any exceptions to what the law states?

Despite the attractiveness of the theory of physical determinism, there is a problem in assuming that because natural physical laws hold, there can be no freedom. Critics of Newton argue that humans are not merely physical but are also mental (and/or spiritual) beings, and that because they are more than physical, they are able to “transcend” physical laws. Furthermore, the discoveries of modern physics, exemplified most pertinently by Werner Heisenberg’s (1901–1976) quantum theory of physics, have raised serious doubts about Newtonian views of nature and the universe. The door has been left open for the possibility of freedom even for nonconscious entities such as atoms and molecules.

Biological determinism is best exemplified by Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which he presented in his most famous work, The Origin of Species. Darwin (1809–1882) believed that various species in nature evolve at different stages in the history of the world and that only the fittest survive. For example, even though some prehistoric animals (dinosaurs, for example) were extremely large and powerful, their brain capacity and mental ability were so limited that they did not survive, whereas smaller and more intelligent beings, such as humans, did. Darwin suggested that this process of natural selection essentially has nothing to do with freedom. He believed that it is nature that governs, through its various processes, the makeup, strength, and survival potential of the various species, and that the species that emerge as dominant are determined by the stage along the evolutionary scale at which they appear.

A more modern and sophisticated version of this theory is concerned with genetic makeup, especially that of human beings. None of us has any say over the identity of our parents, from whom we inherit our genes; and because our genes determine so much of our makeup—our sex, mental potential, and eye, hair, and skin color—how can we be said to be free in any real sense of the word?

Yet the problem with biological determinism is identical to the problem with physical determinism, in that both theories tend to limit human beings strictly to their physical and biological makeup and structure, ignoring the possibility that a mental or spiritual side may exist.

Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) developed a deterministic theory that was based upon history. He believed that the various periods of the world’s history are manifestations of an “absolute mind” that is trying to realize itself in a state of perfection. He also believed that the basic nature of reality and the world is rational and mental and that the physical is merely a manifestation of the absolute mind’s intellectual growth toward perfection. The implications of his theory are that we are neither responsible for nor able to control the period of history or the culture into which we are born. Rather, the character and actions of all individuals are determined by their own culture and all preceding cultures and historical events. Furthermore, because history is a manifestation of an absolute mind that exists in the universe and is attempting to realize itself, we too are a result, or manifestation, of that absolute mind.

Obvious problems exist with this theory, too. First, it would be difficult at best to prove that any such absolute mind exists and, furthermore, that a mind can exist without a body. Second, even though a rational and evolutionary theory of history has some plausibility, no conclusive proof exists to support it; there are many other theories of history and culture that are equally plausible, if not more so. Third, even though human beings are influenced by their culture and past history, this does not necessarily mean that their development is totally determined or governed by this

Karl Marx (1818–1883), following in Hegel’s theoretical footsteps, believed that our characters and actions are not so much historically determined as they are economically and socially determined. Marx’s theory, called “dialectical materialism,” states that...

human beings are determined by an evolutionary economic class struggle.

 According to Marx, this evolutionary process has led from early agrarian economics, through monarchies and feudalism, through the rise of the middle class and industrialism, to capitalism and eventually to socialism. He further believed—much like Hegel—that there is an inevitable force in nature (economic rather than historical) that human beings cannot control and that will eventually lead to the ultimate goal, a classless society.

The problems with this theory are similar to those raised by Hegel’s theory. First, dialectical materialism is based upon unproved assumptions, and there are other theories of economics that are just as plausible and yet do not espouse determinism. Second, even though there is no doubt that people are influenced by their individual economic status and that of their society, there are, as we have seen, many other influences that affect economics as well as human beings. For example, scientific and technological developments have a great deal of influence on the economic status of cultures and their members—probably more than economics itself has upon science and technology. Also, economic influence is not the only influence that affects human beings; in fact, one could argue that human beings affect or determine changes in economics, at least to some extent.

Some of the most convincing of the arguments developed in the twentieth century in support of determinism, especially determinism as it affects human beings, have come from the field of psychology. In the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), the founder of psychoanalysis, put forth the theory that human beings are determined, even prior to birth in the womb, by their unconscious minds and by various natural drives that their society’s mores and customs required them to repress. For example, one of Freud’s theories is that all sons are basically in love with their mothers (Oedipus complex) and all daughters basically in love with their fathers (Electra complex). Because incest is forbidden in most societies, these unconscious yet natural drives must be repressed, causing human beings to be affected in different ways. Therefore, if mothers or fathers give too much, too little, or the wrong kind of love to their sons or daughters, the entire mental and emotional lives of the children can be affected to the point where they become neurotic or psychotic.

This theory has been used many times in defending criminal killers—when, for example, the defense claims that a certain man who has raped and killed a number of women has done so because they all resembled his mother and that his unconscious hatred of her compelled him to commit the crimes. Just as this man was “determined” by his unconscious drives of love and hate for his parents to perform terrible acts, so, a Freudian would argue, all human beings are determined by inner drives and unconscious motivations to behave in the ways they do.

The major criticism of Freud’s theories is that they are too generalized to have any real basis in fact. That is, he has taken his experiences with a few abnormally disturbed patients as a basis for establishing theories that apply to all human beings. It certainly may be true that some sons are in love with their mothers and that some daughters are in love with their fathers and, further, that these emotions have caused them a great deal of difficulty in their lives. There is, however, little conclusive evidence to show that these problems affect all human beings and therefore that their lives can be said to be determined by such influences.

In the twentieth century, psychological determinism has been most significantly argued not from the point of view of the inner psyche, as in Freudianism, but, rather, from the point of view of behaviorism. This approach is best exemplified by the work of B. F. Skinner (1904–1990), who described his theories in two books, Science and Human Behavior and Beyond Freedom and Dignity, and in his utopian novel Walden II. Skinner based his work upon that of Ivan P. Pavlov (1849–1936), the Russian physiologist who first developed the concept of “conditioned reflex.” In his experiments with dogs, Pavlov discovered that they would react to the sound of a bell by salivating if he conditioned them to do so by ringing the bell every time he gave them food. Once the dogs had been conditioned, Pavlov could ring the bell without giving them food and they would begin to salivate nonetheless. This led him to posit the theory that all animals, human beings included, could be conditioned to act in certain ways—and in fact were and are conditioned by various external forces.

Skinner’s theory is more involved and complex than Pavlov’s in that he believes that human beings are totally physical beings and that the behavior they exhibit is strictly the result of years of haphazard conditioning from their environments, both physical and social or cultural. Skinner feels that all traditional statements about soul, psyche, self, or mind are merely superstitious, outdated concepts based upon a lack of scientific knowledge. He further theorizes that freedom is an illusion and that once this illusion has been abandoned, human beings will be able to eliminate all of the problems (e.g., poverty, violence, war, cruelty) that now plague humanity. Even though human beings have been totally and haphazardly conditioned down through the ages, Skinner maintains that now that we have a complete science of human behavior, we can create the perfect society.

There are several problems with this theory, the most important of which is that its very basis is a thoroughgoing materialism. That is, Skinner believes that human beings are strictly material, or physical, beings, possessing no mind, self, soul, or ego. This theory reduces mind to brain and body, a reduction that will not work because mental events do differ from physical events in that the former are private and not locatable in space, whereas the latter are public and easily locatable in space.2 Another problem with Skinner’s theory is that, as is also true of Freud’s theories and the concept of psychological egoism, it carries essentially sound premises too far. Skinner is quite right in stating that people can be conditioned by various methods so as to make them behave in certain ways or to change certain aspects of their behavior. Weight-, smoking-, and alcohol-control clinics, among others, are perfect examples that this can be done.

The fact that conditioning works under some circumstances does not necessarily mean, that human beings merely react to external stimuli all the time or that conditioning always works or even that it should be applied in all instances. Many of Skinner’s critics are not overly concerned about whether his theories are accurate portrayals of what does and can happen in the realm of human behavior; what truly disturbs them is that he completely denies the existence of human freedom and wants to apply conditioning to everyone in an acculturation process that will alter their behavior. Behavior-control techniques probably should be applied in certain instances and to certain people, but—his critics state—not to a total population in an attempt to attain a utopian society of the behaviorist’s design. This latter ideal is especially disturbing to his critics, because his theories are based upon a questionable, if not totally false, premise (materialism). Further criticisms of Skinner’s theories will be discussed in the last section of this module, in which we will examine arguments for the existence of human freedom.

We have seen that there are many arguments in favor of determinism, coming from almost all areas of human endeavor: religion, the natural and physical sciences, and the social sciences. But before we accept the arguments for determinism, let us look more deeply into what determinism means and what it implies for morality.

1. 6.3 Distinguish between fatalism, determinism, and indeterminism

For the sake of clarity, a restatement of the definition of determinism is in order. Determinism is the same thing as universal causation. Stated positively, universal causation means that for every result, effect, or occurrence, there is a cause or causes; stated negatively, it means that there is no such thing as an uncaused event. Before going on to discuss hard and soft determinism, it is important that we make a distinction between fatalism and determinism.

Fatalism is the view that all events are irrevocably fixed and predetermined, that they cannot be altered in any way by human beings, and that the future is always beyond our control. In wartime, human beings have expressed this view by saying, “If there’s a bullet or bomb with my name on it, then I’ll die; if not, then I won’t. There’s nothing I can do about it.” Certainly it is true that many events are outside of human control. For example, even when people have taken the precaution of getting into a foxhole or bomb shelter, they still may receive a direct hit from a bullet or bomb and die. Are not their chances of being killed increased, however, if they merely stand up in the street or on the battlefield, doing nothing to protect themselves? Therefore, it does not seem to be true—certainly not in all cases—that it makes no difference what a person does; that “whatever will be, will be.”

There are very few true fatalists (if any at all); otherwise, people would not “be careful” or “take precautions” against getting hurt or killed. True fatalists would never worry about stop signs or hesitate to play Russian roulette; they would never take medications when they were sick or protect themselves when confronted by a dangerous situation. This may not be a total refutation of the theory of fatalism, but it does illustrate the theory’s impracticality. It is important to realize that the determinist, especially the soft determinist, is not really saying the same thing as the fatalist, for to say that everything has a cause is not the same as to say that every single thing that happens is completely and irrevocably outside of human control.

Hard determinism essentially maintains that if all events are caused, then there can be no such thing as freedom or free will. That is, if you trace causes back far enough in history or in any person’s life, you will find that the basic causes are not within human control. Hard determinists are not saying exactly the same thing as the fatalists here: They do not maintain that humans cannot change the future. They are saying, rather, that certain causes that are not within human control have determined both the way human beings are and the way they act. Hard determinists do not maintain that humans can affect nothing; rather, they say that the way humans affect things is caused by their personal makeup and environment and that these, in turn, are caused by factors over which human beings have no control. In presenting their position, hard determinists will use evidence and arguments from every aspect of human existence.

For example, let us say that Mary Smith is born in the 1930s to a middle-class working family, during the Great Depression. Already she has no control over the century or culture into which she is born, the depression her country is in, her economic class, or, most important, the genetic makeup inherited from her parents. She could be born crippled, blind, or quite normal; she has no control over this, either. Let us say that she is born blind and that her father is an alcoholic and her mother a child abuser. Let us also assume that, due to these factors, she endures a miserable childhood that leads to a miserable adult life.

Mary may react, out of anger at her lot, by becoming a criminal, resorting to violence against both men and women in an attempt to avenge herself for the treatment she received from her mother and father. On the other hand, she may lead a blameless life. In this case, freedom advocates would point out that Mary, who had a terrible childhood and was born blind, overcame all of this, whereas her sister Elaine, for example, who was not blind but who also had an unhappy childhood, became a drug addict and prostitute. They would argue that both women had at least some say in determining the outcome of their lives.

Hard determinists would answer, however, that neither Mary nor Elaine was responsible for the way she turned out. There must have been some important differences in the women’s genetic makeup or in the way they were treated by their parents, or, hard determinists would argue, some other influence from outside—perhaps a teacher who encouraged Mary or a prostitute who influenced Elaine’s choice of career. The fact that hard determinists cannot trace all of the causes doesn’t refute their theory. On the contrary, they would argue, the mere fact that there are causes and that many, if not most of them, are outside the control of Mary and Elaine would indicate that we cannot, and indeed, should not hold the two women morally responsible for the courses their lives take.

What the hard determinist is saying, then, is that if every event, action, result, and effect—everything—has a cause, then everything, including human desires, feelings, thoughts, choices, decisions, and actions, is “determined.” The hard determinist says further that if human beings are born into a world that has been determined by prior causes over which they have no control, that if their genetic makeup is not theirs to choose freely, and that if their early environment is governed by physical events and human actions over which they have no say, then none of us can be said to be free. He argues that if you keep pushing back far enough in analyzing any human action or choice, you will eventually arrive at a cause that is outside the control of the person who is choosing or acting.

Because human beings have no control over their genetic makeup or their early environment; they cannot be responsible for their original character nor can they control what desires they have. They are, in effect, programmed to choose and act in certain ways because of these earlier forces, as well as the present forces of their environment, which are also determining them at every turn. The heart of the hard determinist’s argument is summed up by John Hospers (1918–2011) as follows:

We can act in accordance with our choices or decisions,” he will say, “and we can choose in accordance with our desires. But we are not free to desire. We can choose as we please, but we can’t please as we please. If my biological or psychological nature is such that at a certain moment I desire A, I shall choose A, and if it is such that I desire B, I shall choose B. I am free to choose either A or B, but I am not free to desire either A or B. Moreover, my desires are not themselves the outcomes of choices, for I cannot choose to have them or not to have them.3

Soft determinists maintain that there is universal causation, but, unlike hard determinists, they believe that some of this causation originates with human beings, thus giving meaning to the phrase “human freedom.” If human beings can be said to cause some of their actions by means of their own minds and wills, then they can be said to have some freedom. It is important to note that when we use the word freedom here, we mean freedom in a limited sense. No one is completely free. We cannot freely act on all of our desires. We cannot, for example, change ourselves into other beings or live without oxygen or snap our fingers and make people disappear; nor is it necessary that a human being have the freedom to perform such actions in order to be morally free. If there is freedom, we have to recognize that it is by nature limited. That is one reason why the soft determinist can argue that not only within causation but because of it, human beings are free. If human beings can be shown to be the originators of some causes, then—the soft determinist argues—there is human freedom within universal causation, and this is all we can hope to attain and indeed all we really need.

The strongest criticism of soft determinism comes, of course, from the hard determinists. They ask how any causes can be said to originate with human beings when the series of causes leading up to a particular effect can be traced back to factors outside of a particular human being’s control. The hard determinists do not make the claim that human beings never cause anything to happen, but they do maintain that ultimate causes are always beyond an individual’s control. Another criticism of soft determinism comes from a group calling themselves “indeterminists,” and we will examine their theories before discussing determinism in more detail.

Indeterminists hold that there is a certain amount of chance and freedom in the world—that not everything is caused and that there is a real pluralism in reality. Furthermore, the indeterminist believes that most of the freedom or chance that exists can be found in the area of human deliberation and choice, especially moral deliberation and decision making. William James (1842–1910), the noted American psychologist and philosopher, is the most prominent exponent of this view. James desires that there be novelty and spontaneity in the world, allowing human beings to exercise their faculties of choice and creativity. He suggests that “our first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are free.”4 Our strivings for good and our regrets over bad deeds are, he feels, indications that there is freedom, for if a bad act, for example, were fully predetermined, then there would be no point in feeling regret.5 James further maintains that because we can’t always predict in advance whether a human being is going to take path A or path B, chance and spontaneity evidently play at least some part in the nature of reality, and such freedom does therefore exist, at least to some extent.

The hard determinists offer several strong criticisms of the theory of indeterminism. First, isn’t James’s theory really based on wishful thinking rather than actual evidence or logic? Wanting to be free or wanting the world to be spontaneous does not make it so, any more than wanting the earth to be the center of the universe makes it so. Evidence and logic, say the hard determinists, point toward the conclusion that universal causation rather than indeterminism accurately describes the way things are. Hard determinists have to admit that there is no absolutely conclusive evidence for determinism, but they maintain, nevertheless, that the evidence points overwhelmingly toward universal causation rather than chance.

Journal: Act of Freedom

Analyze any act that you have committed about which you have strong feelings (e.g., of regret or of pride). To what extent do you believe that this act was freely done by you or determined by forces working within or outside you?

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1. 6.4 Recall the arguments against hard determinism

We could argue against hard determinists that because morality is not possible given their viewpoint and because we do have morality, hard determinism does not hold. We could also argue that because human beings feel free some of the time, they must therefore be free. However, hard determinists would counter both of these arguments with the “facts” of universal causation; they would assert that both morality based upon freedom and the feeling that we are free are illusions, not facts.

When we are bad or good, they would argue, it is because we have been determined to be so by forces outside of our control. Even the actions of praising, blaming, rewarding, and punishing are useless, unless we can change someone’s behavior programming; that is, unless we either strike a “goodness” chord that is already embedded in the person’s original character or override some earlier determining factor by means of a stronger one.

What we are doing, hard determinists would say, is not getting people to freely respond and make moral decisions but merely changing the way in which they are determined. The intimation is that we would not be able to do even this if their characters were not set up in such a way as to cause them to acquiesce to such determinism. Hard determinists might advocate reward and punishment if they felt that such means could stop someone from killing people, for example. However, they would feel that it is really impossible to morally blame people for the way they act because they are, after all, determined. One can try to change the way in which a person is determined, but one cannot morally blame someone for acting in a way in which he or she has been determined to act. From the hard determinist’s viewpoint, there is no moral responsibility in the experience of human beings; there is only the illusion of it.

Hospers agrees with the hard determinist that people very often fall victim to inner urges and desires that they do not want and cannot escape from, but he argues very effectively in rebuttal that nevertheless, to a very limited extent (varying considerably from person to person) and over a considerable span of time, we are free to desire or not to desire. We can choose to do our best to get rid of certain desires and to encourage other ones; and to a limited extent we may be successful in this endeavor. People who greatly desire alcohol sometimes succeed, by joining Alcoholics Anonymous or by other means, in resisting the temptation to drink until finally they no longer desire to do so. So, it is not true that we are never free to desire or that we are always the victims of whatever desires we happen to have.6

Hospers also argues effectively against the hard determinists’ inaccurate use of language, claiming that they tend to push words such as freedom right out of the context in which they make sense. For example, according to Hospers, the hard determinist maintains the impossible position that if human beings aren’t completely free in an unlimited sense, then there can be no freedom at all. The hard determinist argues that in order for human beings to be free, they must have control over their own genetic makeup, their early childhood, and their “original character.” This type of argument, says Hospers, simply puts too great a strain upon language. He agrees with the hard determinists that we cannot have caused our original characters, but he goes on to examine the logical fallacies that they have built around this belief. In order to cause our original characters, we would have to already have existed, and how could we exist without an original character? Hospers concludes that this whole argument is in fact self-contradictory.7

Hard determinism does not account for the complexity of the nature of human beings, especially of human minds and consciousness; rather, it tends to oversimplify and reduce everything to the lowest common denominator. Psychological egoist’s believe that all human actions are performed by human beings in their own self-interest, regardless of the altruistic motives they may claim to have. All we require in order to refute this claim is one case of someone’s stating that he or she truly performed an action strictly in someone else’s interest. In the same way, we must show that human beings have enough control over causation so that they can be said to originate some causes themselves. Then we can speak of freedom, at least in the limited sense mentioned earlier.

When talking about universal causation, we must first take into consideration the great complexity of the human mind. A rock is dependent upon outside forces for its movement, change in shape, and change in color. Plant life is subject to forces outside and within it, and a plant grows, changes, and dies in reaction to these forces, which, as far as we can determine, operate at all times on a basis of some sort of biological (or botanical) instinct. Animals, too, although closer to human beings in their bodies and minds, are often governed by instinctual actions programmed down through the years by hereditary and genetic changes.

As we move along the evolutionary scale from inanimate to animate beings and from vegetative to animalistic beings, we see the element of freedom increase with each step. The rock, which has no freedom at all, is drastically different from the plant, which is affected by its own internal workings as well as by outside forces. Animals are much more mobile than plants, have a greater observable consciousness, and can even be said to make some limited choices. For example, if a forest is on fire, the instinct to survive will cause an animal to attempt to escape by running away from the fire. Assuming that the fire is covering the 180 degrees of ground behind the animal, there are 180 degrees in front of him. Because he has a 180-degree range of directions in which to run, what makes him choose a particular direction? There may be obstacles that narrow the number of possible directions, but even within the narrow range of possibilities, doesn’t the animal, in a limited sense at least, “choose” a pathway of escape?

Journal: Determinism in Humans, Plants, and Animals

When you analyze the world around you, to what extent do you believe that human beings are subject to the same types of determinism as plants and animals are? Explain your reasoning.

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When, on the evolutionary scale, we reach human beings, who have a much more sophisticated consciousness and whose minds and emotions are developed far beyond those of any other observable beings, the possibility of freedom increases greatly. It is the area of consciousness, or the human mind and its power of reason, upon which most soft determinists and indeterminists base their arguments for human freedom.

One of the best arguments for freedom comes from the existentialists, especially the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980).8 Sartre believed that there does exist a limited determinism in that people cannot help that they are born, how they are born, in what century, or to which parents they are born; but he also believed that people can help to determine how they live. Sartre maintained that human beings have freedom because human perception is open ended. He agreed with the philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) that consciousness is directional and creative. (The word Husserl used is intentional, in the sense that consciousness “intends” things rather than merely passively receiving them.) In other words, a person may drive along the same route from work every day for a year, yet each trip will be different in the sense that the person’s mind notices different objects along the way. Naturally, some of the external objects along the route change from day to day, but even if they didn’t, the human mind could direct itself in different ways, selecting among the objects and thus, in a sense, create its own experience. If the possibilities are open ended, there is a myriad to choose from; because the human mind can select and direct itself differently, there are many more possibilities of choice available to the human being than there are to the forest animal with the fire at its back. The level of sophistication of choices is also, of course, much higher.

If the human mind can, even in part, create its own experience, then experience is not just waiting in a deterministic sense to impinge itself upon human consciousness. As Sartre pointed out, you may have been born crippled or blind, and you were not free to choose otherwise, but you are free with regard to how you choose to live with your infirmity. You are determined in your physical limitations, you are even determined by the culture, economic level, and family into which you are born, but you are not completely determined—unless you choose to be—with regard to how you live out your life, even though it has been influenced, in part, by all of these factors. Building upon the Hospers example cited earlier, we can see that this means that although I may have been born with a physical or psychological lack or urge that causes me to become addicted to alcohol when I drink it, I may become aware of this lack or urge and—with or without help—override this deterministic factor in my life.

One might say that my consciousness is directing itself to a new life experience, one free from addiction to alcohol and all of its attendant difficulties. I, then, to some extent, create that life experience for myself, even though I have, in my physical and psychological nature, formerly been determined very strongly toward the completely different life experience of a person addicted to alcohol. Almost all of the groups that have been successful in helping people to overcome the various drug addictions have stated that all they can really do is to try to make people strong enough so that they can make the choice for nonaddiction themselves and then to support them at every point along the way; the choice, however, has to be the addicts’. And until they actively choose the new life experience, their lives probably will not change very much. This argument should convince us that there is such a thing as human freedom. And once we have accepted that it does exist, it is only logical to assume that it applies to morality as well as to choosing what clothes we will wear or where we will spend this year’s vacation.

1. 5.1 Recognize the different ways of understanding the concept of the absolute

In one sense, the word absolute means “perfect in quality, and complete”; in another, it means “not limited by restrictions or exceptions”; in still another, it means “not to be doubted or questioned—positive, certain, and unconditional.”1 The word has been, and is, used to describe a supernatural being, “laws” of nature, propositions concerning truth and falsity, and law and morality. The question of whether an absolute supernatural being exists and the difficulty of proving its existence conclusively have already been discussed.

It is also difficult to prove conclusively the assumption that there are certain absolutes (“laws”) in nature. One of the problems with so-called scientific natural laws is that although they have held for as long as we can remember and as often as we have observed them, they are still only probable (although very strongly probable), rather than certain. For example, the law of gravity would seem to be an absolute “law” of nature, but its validity still depends upon our ability to see it verified again and again. In other words, we don’t know for certain whether the law of gravity will still hold in the next minute until we have lived through this time and observed it holding. Putting it more specifically, we don’t know whether a ball will fall back down to the ground until we have thrown it up in the air and tested the “law” once again. This doesn’t mean, of course, that there are no absolutes in nature, but it does mean—especially because our empirical knowledge of nature and of the universe is limited—that we don’t know conclusively that any exist.

Even harder to prove or discover is the basis for any sort of “natural moral laws.” Our previous discussion of the possibility of such laws revealed to us the difficulty of discovering any such moral laws and brought out the importance of distinguishing between them and descriptive natural laws. It would seem that there is no clear basis or justification for holding that natural moral laws exist.

5.1.1: Cultural Absolutism

LISTEN TO THE CHAPTER AUDIO:

Cultural absolutism, is the view that says ultimate moral principles do not vary from culture to culture. This does not mean that all cultures have the same moral rules and standards, which obviously would be a false empirical statement; what it does mean is that the ultimate principles underlying all of the varying rules and standards are the same. For example, the cultural absolutist might argue that in all cultures there is some principle concerning the value of human life, but that there are many different rules and standards when it comes to protecting it or authorizing its destruction.

With this distinction in mind, cultural absolutists cite the following “facts” to support their theory:

1. Similar moral principles exist in all societies, such as those concerning the preservation of human life, governing sexual behavior, prohibiting lying, and establishing reciprocal obligations between parents and children.

2. People in all cultures have similar needs, such as the need to survive, to eat and drink, and to have sex.

3. There are a great many similarities in situations and relationships in all cultures, such as having two parents of opposite sexes, competing with brothers and sisters, and participating in the arts, languages, religion, and family.

4. There are a great many intercultural similarities in the areas of sentiment, emotion, and attitude, as with jealousy, love, and the need for respect.

Journal: Cultural Absolutism

Discuss the extent to which you think the rule “Rape is always wrong” is an absolute. Can there be any exceptions to this rule? Give reasons.

Submit

First, just because moral principles are similar in all societies does not mean that they are valid or absolute. Second, even if people have similar needs, sentiments, emotions, and attitudes, there is still a question of whether these should or should not be satisfied. And finally, just because there are similarities in cultural situations and relationships does not mean that these are the only morally correct situations and relationships in existence or that they are morally correct at all.

1. 5.2 Define relativism

Relativism states that there are no absolute values at all and that all values are relative to time, place, persons, and situations. In other words, there are no values that cut across all cultures and peoples; all are relative to the specific place in which they are held, according to the relativist. In its milder forms, relativism merely states that morality varies from culture to culture and from individual to individual and that we ought to respect each other’s moral views. In its extreme form, relativism means that anything goes; whatever anyone asserts is moral is definitely moral, and we cannot dispute or refute his or her morality. This means that if one person thinks it’s all right to kill other people and the rest of us don’t, we cannot argue with this morality—he or she is as moral as those of us who don’t believe that killing is moral.

Are there any anthropological “facts” that prove conclusively that either cultural relativism or cultural absolutism is true? If so, what are they? Those anthropologists who believe in cultural relativism cite the following empirical “facts”:

1. Studies of both primitive and modern cultures reveal an extreme variation in customs, manners, taboos, religions, moralities, daily habits, and attitudes from culture to culture.

2. The moral beliefs and attitudes of human beings are absorbed essentially from their cultural environments, and people tend to internalize—at least a great deal of the time—what is socially accepted or sanctioned in their cultures.

3. People in different cultures tend to believe not merely that there is only one true morality, but also that that one true morality is the one they hold.

1. 5.3 Analyze the controversy of absolutism versus relativism

What this controversy boils down to is that merely because things, situations, and people exist or behave in certain ways, there is no necessary connection between what is or what people do and what should be or what they ought to do. We have returned again to the earlier distinction made between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to morality. Anthropologists have given us important information about human and cultural behavior, but they have not proved conclusively that everything is either relative or absolute nor have they shown what is or is not moral.

Journal: Moral Rules

Discuss the extent to which you believe the rule “Adults should never sexually molest children” is absolute. Do you think it is right to violate this rule? If so, under what conditions and why?

1. 5.4 Relate propositions to states of affairs

As far as morality is concerned, however, the most important way in which the term absolute is used is in connection with propositions as they relate to truth and falsity. Propositions are meaningful statements describing states of affairs, and they must be either true or false. A state of affairs is an occurrence, an event, or a happening. It is neither true nor false; it either occurs or it does not occur. A proposition describes a state of affairs, and if it is true, then it describes a state of affairs that did occur (past tense: “It rained yesterday”); that is occurring (present tense: “It is raining right now”); or that will occur (future tense: “It will rain tomorrow”). When a proposition is false, it describes a state of affairs that did not occur, is not occurring, or will not occur. Only propositions are true or false, never states of affairs.2

The question that concerns us is this: “Are there any absolute truths or falsities, or are truth and falsity always relative?” Let’s take an example. Suppose that on January 1, 2012, I state the proposition “It will rain tomorrow, January 2, 2012, in Los Angeles, California.” In order to discover whether truth and falsity are relative or absolute, we need to ask what the status of this proposition is on the day I stated it (January 1, 2012). There are a number of possibilities. At the time I state it, is it true until proven false, or false until proven true? Is it true to me because I believe it and false to someone else because he or she doesn’t believe it? Is it false or true because no one knows on January 1, 2012, whether it actually will rain on the following day? Or is it really neither true nor false because January 2, 2012, isn’t here yet?

Let us now suppose that it is January 2, 2012, and that it is raining in Los Angeles. Looking back to the proposition stated on January 1, wasn’t it actually true when I stated it? On the other hand, if it doesn’t rain on January 2 in Los Angeles, then wasn’t the proposition false when I stated it on January 1? In other words, the proposition had to be either true or false when I stated it on January 1; we just didn’t know at the time which condition applied to it.

The point to grasp here is that truth does not slip around because of time or because of what anyone believes or even knows. Let us suppose that I believe the proposition to be true (after all, I stated it), but Mary does not. What difference does this make as to whether it is actually true or false? Also, on January 1 neither one of us knows it is either true or false, but, again, what difference does that make? None whatsoever—whether the proposition is true or false is based upon whether or not the state of affairs actually occurs.

Truth and falsity, then, are indeed absolute. They do not shift around depending upon belief, time, feelings, or even knowledge. Propositions, carefully and accurately stated, are not just true or false when they are stated but are in fact true or false for all time. We may not know which propositions are true and which are false, but that really has nothing to do with whether propositions really are true or false.

The real problem associated with the search for absolute moral truths, however, seems to be centered upon the area of knowing. There may be absolute truths, moral or otherwise, but do we know of any for sure? At this point it is important that we distinguish among different types of propositions.

First there are analytic propositions, such as “No circles are squares,” “A is A,” “Everything is either A or not A,” “Nothing can be both A and not A,” “All triangles are three-sided,” “All bachelors are unmarried,” and so on. To deny the truth of this type of proposition would be to contradict oneself; therefore, given the definitions of the words and the meaning of these propositions, they are absolute truths, and we know they are. For example, given the definitions of a circle and a square, it is not logically possible that one could be the other. Also, assuming that A stands for anything, it is a basic and ultimate truth (called a “law” or “principle of logic”) that whatever else may or may not be said truly about anything, a thing must by its very definition be what it is (a car is a car, a dog is a dog, a table is a table). Therefore, any analytic proposition is a truth that is known to be absolute.

There are also propositions that human beings assert about their own internal senses or states (feelings, moods, emotions), such as “My head hurts,” “I feel sick,” “I am in a bad mood,” “I believe in God,” “I am frightened.” Such propositions also are always true (assuming that they are honestly spoken) because we alone truly know our own internal states. A doctor can talk all day about how there is no reason or cause for you to have a headache, but he or she cannot deny that you have one. Only you know whether you do or not, and when you do have one, merely having it is enough for you to state unequivocally, “I have a headache.” You are simply describing what you feel, and you need no further evidence. These two types of propositions, then, state truths that we know are absolute. These propositions can be known to be true in what John Hospers (1918–2011) calls “the strong sense of knowing,” if the latter fulfills the following requirements:

1. I must believe that the proposition is true.

2. The proposition must actually be true.

3. I must have absolutely conclusive evidence that it is true.3

In order for us to know that the two types of propositions discussed are true, in the first type we need no evidence other than our knowledge of the definitions of words and the meanings of sentences, and in the second type no evidence other than our actual experience of the internal state we are describing.

Another type of proposition, an empirical, or external sense, proposition, is different from the first two, in that it describes a state of affairs that occurs in the external world of which we have evidence through our senses (sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste) or, indirectly, through our reasoning. “Her hair is brown,” “There is a table at the front of this room,” “There is life on other planets,” and “Man has landed on the moon” are examples of empirical propositions. The question of whether empirical propositions can ever be known to be absolutely true has been a source of controversy in philosophy throughout the ages. Norman Malcolm (1911–1990) and other like-minded philosophers believe that some empirical propositions can be known to be absolutely true or false. For example, if the light is good, if your eyes are normal, if you understand what the words you are using mean, and if you have carefully examined an object in front of you and have found it to be a table, then the statement “This is a table here before me” would seem to be an absolutely true proposition that you know to be true. So, for the purpose of this course, at least, the operating assumption is that some empirical propositions can be known to be true—and therefore, that there are some empirical propositions that are absolutely true.

A fourth type of proposition is a moral proposition, or a proposition that has moral import. Some examples of this type of proposition are “Human beings should never kill other human beings,” “You should not treat people badly,” “Martin Luther King was a good man,” and “Abortion is evil.” This type of proposition differs from the other three types we have discussed, in that it contains value judgments as to the morality of human actions or character. It also contains such key words as good, evil, wrong, right, bad, should, and ought, among others. The first distinction is the most important because many propositions containing the words just cited have no moral import at all. One example of such a proposition is “You should make a right turn at the next corner.” There can be, of course, situations in which making a turn when asked could have moral import, but something other than the use of should and right would have to be involved. In short, making or not making the turn would have to have some moral implication, such as that if you did not make the turn, you would run down a child.

1. 5.5 Recall Moore's naturalistic fallacy with respect to the emotive theory

The questions now confronting us are these: “Are moral propositions ever absolutely true, and, further, can any human being know whether they are or not?” In our discussion of the basis of act nonconsequentialism, it was noted that some philosophers have stated that moral propositions have only “emotive,” or “noncognitive,” meanings. That is, they express only feelings or attitudes. For example, when people utter a moral proposition, such as “Tom is a good man” or “One should never steal,” they are either voicing their approval or disapproval of an entity, trying to evoke certain feelings or attitudes in others, or perhaps both. Proponents of this theory, called the “emotive theory,” maintain that unlike other types of propositions, such as “Tom is six feet tall” or “If you steal my car, I will be unhappy,” moral propositions have no real basis in fact.

In Human Conduct, John Hospers points out some discrepancies inherent in this theory that raise some serious questions about its assumption that moral propositions are only emotive.4 Hospers does not deny that moral propositions are used emotively; he does, however, question the theory that they have only that use or meaning. He sees moral propositions as having three aspects:

1. The purpose or intention of the person who utters moral propositions.

2. The effect the propositions have on their hearers.

3. The actual meaning of the propositions.

These three aspects should be carefully distinguished from one another because they all may be present in a particular moral proposition. For example, even though a moral proposition I state may express approval or disapproval, or may be intended to evoke certain feelings or attitudes, it may also have a meaning separate from those other two aspects or functions. Hospers further argues that even though we use moral propositions for emotive purposes, we don’t always use them in that way.5

Like other ethical theories, such as psychological egoism in its strong form and the theory that there are natural moral laws, the emotive theory exaggerates its claims. For example, if one examines the moral proposition “It was wrong of Brutus to kill Caesar,” it becomes clear that there is no way the proposition can be said to evoke a feeling in Brutus that he should not kill Caesar because the act already has been committed.6 Even if one tries to translate this proposition into the generalization “Human beings shouldn’t kill other human beings,” there is a difficulty: One cannot necessarily infer the second proposition from the first. True, one can say that the speaker is expressing his disapproval of Brutus’s act, but must the speaker always be doing this when he makes the statement? Might not the speaker simply mean, “Look what followed historically from Brutus’s action,” a statement that expresses neither approval nor disapproval?

If we try to state that moral propositions are no different from empirical propositions, we run into the “naturalistic fallacy” problem [so named by the philosopher G. E. Moore, (1873–1958)]: the problem of “getting an ought from an is.” This problem can be seen when considering the difference between the descriptive or scientific approach to ethics and the prescriptive or philosophical-normative approach. Moore states that a proposition such as “I will be angry if you steal my wife,” which can be considered to be factual (because it describes an actual state of affairs that will take place in the future), has no necessary connection to the proposition “You should not steal my wife.” That is, if the person I am talking to wishes to say, “So you’ll be angry; so what? I still think I should steal your wife,” how can I logically say, “Therefore, you shouldn’t”? However, aren’t some moves from the descriptive is to the prescriptive ought clear and logical, such as, “AIDS is a sexually transmitted fatal disease; therefore, people ought to practice safe sex if they don’t want to get sick and die”? Although it is not possible to get an ought from an is, careful examination of a series of pertinent facts surrounding a moral situation may lead to some significant moral propositions about good, bad, right, and wrong and also enable one to prescribe what people should do in various situations in which morality is at stake.

1. 5.6 Examine the tenets of the alternative that moral statements are indeed propositions of the empirical type

These assumptions lead to a third alternative that is at least worthy of examination and argument, even though it is not conclusively provable. This alternative is the position that moral statements are indeed propositions of the empirical type, except that they contain either value judgments or moral prescriptions. Let’s examine this alternative as objectively as we can.

Normative moral statements, such as “He is a good man” or “What she did was right,” could conceivably be considered to be propositions much like “That is a green table” and “She cleaned her house.” There is a greater problem in establishing what good and right mean than what green and cleaned her house mean, but if we can set up some standards as to what it means for a person to be good and an act to be right, we ought to be able to say, at least in theory, that these are propositions having moral import.

However, what about those moral statements that are prescriptive, such as “Human beings should never kill other human beings except in self-defense” and “A woman ought to have an abortion for any reason she thinks valid?” They certainly assert something about reality, even though they include a value judgment as part of that assertion, but can they ever be known to be true or false? In Jesse Kalin’s defense of ethical egoism there are prescriptive propositions that are nonmoral and could nonetheless certainly be considered to be propositions. That is, they are meaningful statements that assert something about reality and that are either true or false.

In Kalin’s chess-game example, John sees that Tom ought to move his bishop in such a way so as to put John’s king in check. The proposition here is simply, “Tom ought to move his bishop to position A.” This can also be stated as, “According to the rules for playing chess, Tom’s next move ought to be to move his bishop to position A.” This means that within the confines of chess-game rules to state that “Tom ought to move his bishop to position A” is to state a true proposition. To say the opposite, that “Tom ought not to move his bishop to position A,” would be a false proposition, again within the structure of chess-game rules. Of course, there could be times when the former proposition might be false—for example, under the condition that if Tom won the game, his opponent would kill him, having threatened to do so previously. However, this would be an extenuating circumstance outside the confines of the chess game itself. In this case, therefore, the proposition would be based upon more than chess-game rules.

Can we now make the same kind of case as in the foregoing for the proposition “Human beings should never kill other human beings” because it is similar in structure although moral rather than nonmoral? It is obvious that we can set up rules for moral behavior as well as for chess games and that within the framework of that set of rules we can state true and false propositions about what human beings or chess players should or ought to do. But can evidence be brought forth to conclusively show that such a proposition can be known to be true, as in the propositions “All triangles are three-sided,” “This table is green,” and “I have a headache.” Let’s examine this type of moral proposition and its implications.

First, kill means “taking another human being’s life against the person’s will.” Perhaps murder would be a more accurate term, because kill means “to put to death, slay, deprive of life, put an end to, or extinguish,” whereas murder means “the unlawful killing of one human being by another, especially with malice aforethought.”7 Second, given the way in which this proposition is worded, it applies only to killing or murdering other human beings, even though there are ethical codes (pacifism and Jainism to name two) that believe in the sanctity of all life, not just human life. Now is there any evidence that this proposition can be known to be true? If we look to our experience of the world and especially of human life, we must come to the conclusion that life, or being alive, is the one basic thing we all have in common. Furthermore, there can be no real morality or immorality involved in dealing with a human being who is no longer alive. Even when we are opposed to the mutilation or cannibalism of dead human bodies, it is out of respect either for the human being that once was or for the feelings of other human beings still alive.

Because all the qualities we attribute to human beings are based upon their being alive, life or “aliveness” is a fundamental necessity for any moral system. There can be no human beings, moral or immoral, if there is no human life; there can be no discussion of morality, a setting up of codes, or even concern about what is or is not moral if there are no live human beings around. We cannot possibly state that “all human beings should kill each other” because (in true Kantian fashion) this would end up being inconsistent and illogical in much the same way as is the statement “Everyone should always be a parasite.” There would be no human beings left to follow the rule encompassed by the statement.

All of this, however, merely proves that life, or being alive, is a necessary precondition of morality. Are there any other reasons why human beings ought not to kill one another?

And indeed, when it is accompanied by our desires for survival, peace, happiness, and stability, the urge to do and be good seems to be stronger in most of our lives than the impulse toward evil. It also seems to be a good thing most of the time that human beings not kill other human beings because if they do, they will deprive those whom they kill of any possible good they might attain while alive (this in addition to the basic and obvious good of continuing to possess life itself). Therefore, if life is basic to human beings, to their morality, their drive for survival, their desire for peace, happiness, and stability, and their urge to be and do good, then to destroy life is tantamount to destroying the ultimate basis of humanness, which includes morality. “Human beings should never kill other human beings” can therefore be seen as a true proposition, and it can be known to be true because the evidence for it can be observed and we can reason consistently from that evidence.

It is generally assumed by reasonable human beings that if we know certain propositions to be true, then we will seek to live our lives by them. Following up this assumption, we can say that human beings who kill other human beings are not living their lives in accordance with a true proposition. They may, of course, not be aware of the proposition, or they may be aware of it but disregard it. We do this many times with other propositions. We know, for instance, that “if you drive too fast and recklessly on a crowded freeway, you will endanger human life” is a true proposition, yet some people drive recklessly anyway. Here we have another moral problem, the matching of propositions that are known to be true with human actions. Many people know that propositions having to do with not killing or not lying or not raping, for example, should be adhered to, but some people still do not act in accordance with such propositions. Of course, that people do not act in accordance with propositions has nothing to do with whether or not they are true. Still another problem arises when propositions conflict—when, for instance, the absolute “Do not kill” conflicts with the absolute “Do not lie.” We must have a way of choosing not only between true and false propositions but also between propositions that conflict.

Furthermore, we must distinguish between the term absolute as it is used to imply the existence of moral laws outside of human beings and moral absolutes (moral laws), which human beings establish based upon reason and evidence. It is not suggested here that these arguments have proved conclusively that there are moral propositions that can be known absolutely to be true or false. However, we can discover and present evidence for the existence of such propositions and, in reasoning from that evidence, perhaps arrive at some near or almost absolutes (if there can be such things) and establish basic moral principles similar to Ross’s Prima Facie Duties. It is also important to recognize that no moral system or code can exist without at least one basic principle (near or almost absolute). Every ethical theory we have examined so far has had one or more basic principles; even total relativism is based upon at least one near or almost absolute: That there are no absolutes!