All reading materials: International Relations 1. InternationalRelations_ReadMe (Requirements of Assignment) 2. Everyone Reads 1) A New Video Game Drops Players Into the Chaos of the Iranian Revolutio

The R epr esentation and Self-R epr esentation of I slam and Muslims in Video Games Existing research on Islam and video games can be divided into three clusters: (a) the representation of Mu slims in Western games, (b) the construction of i dentity in Muslim games, and (c) the communication of I slamic moral and ethical values. Early research on the representation of Mu slims in mainstream Western games was often entangled with research on the representation of A rabs. Ibrahim Marashi in “The Depiction of A rabs in Combat Video Games” has outlined the stereotypical modes of re presenting A rabs and Muslims in video games focusing on the A rab-Israeli conflict. Philipp Reichmuth and Stephan Werning in “Pixel Pashas, Digital Djinns” have described the exploitation of O riental topoi in various genres of W est - ern video games. 7 Johan Höglund in “Electronic Empire” has discussed representation of t he Middle East and Muslims in U.S. action games in This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 111 relation to “war on terror” discourse. The results of t his research indicate that the dominant mode of re presentation of Mu slim cultures in West - ern video games (a) exploits stereotypical generalizations and clichés, (b) presents most followers of I slam as a threat, (c) most likely links Islam with terrorism, and (d) marginalizes the representation of “ ordi - nary Muslims.” 8 Sahar K hamis in “The Role of ‘ New’ A rab Satellite Channels in Fos - tering Intercultural Dialogue” argues that although the distorted images of A rabs and Muslims in the West have existed and have been studied for a long time, new international developments necessitate readdressing this issue.9 In the post-9/11 world, polarized rhetoric of “ us” and “them” has intensified in Western media, reinforcing simplistic ideas of a collec - tive self a nd its hostile Other. A rab and Muslim identities have become politicized through an ascribed interrelationship between Islam, A rab identity, and terrorism.10 As a result, most Muslims now find themselves misperceived as an isolated and excluded minority that resists integra - tion with other cultures and faiths, or as a group of “ terrorists,” who vio - lently attack others and threaten their safety. 11 In turn, since 9/11, many Muslims have made their identities more salient, mainly because they feel the need to educate people about Islam and also to justif y being Mus - lim.1\b K hamis suggests that the introduction of n ew digital technologies signified the start of a n ew era of s elf-definition and self-representation for A rabs and Muslims.13 Correspondingly, research on the construction of i dentity in Mus - lim games has focused on games produced in the Muslim world and on the issues of s elf-representation and identity. David Machin and Usama Suleiman in “A rab and A merican Computer War Games” have com - pared how two A rab and A merican games recontextualize and frame real-world events. Helga Tawil-Souri in “The Political Battlefield of P ro- A rab Video Games” has presented an ethnographic account of h ow Pal - estinian children play, comment, and make sense of A rab video games.

In “Digital A rabs,” I have provided exploratory research on how Muslim and other identities are constructed and communicated to players in A rab games. The question of a s pecific A rab or Muslim identity and its construction in video games seems to be important to the majority of p roducers I interviewed in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. 14 Most A rab This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 112Vít Šisler games available on the market today deal primarily with the identity of t he main hero; they use different concepts and values, including Islam and its ethics, in the construction of t hat identity. As a result, research on the communication of I slamic moral and ethical values deals with Islam as an organized system of re ligion and its relation to video games. K rystina Derrickson in “Second Life and the Sacred” has explored how virtual worlds recreate Islamic holy sites and rituals. In “Video Games, Video Clips, and Islam,” I have analyzed how video games are appropriated by the emerging Muslim consumer cul - ture. In “Islamogaming,” Heidi Campbell discusses how video games are used to teach the basic tenets of I slam and to communicate Islamic moral and ethical values. A ll of t his research indicates that the appropriation of v ideo games in the A rab world has, from the beginning, been “engaged” in the sense that it focuses on the issues of c ultural and religious identity as well as on the educational aspects of v ideo games. This must be kept in mind when exploring the different modes of r epresentation of I slam in A meri - can and A rab games. On one hand, we have a mainstream, commercial, A merican production designed with its consumer base and its tastes and expectations in mind. On the other, we have an emerging, enthusi - astic, engaged industry in the A rab world. It is this asymmetrical nature of t he frameworks that led Campbell to label A rab and Muslim video games as “alternative storytelling” that counters the dominant cultural narratives about their religious community promoted by the dominant media cultures.15 Pla\fing w ith R eligion: Methodolog\f a nd A ims The scholarly work done to date on Islam and video games has mostly been written from the perspectives of M iddle Eastern or Islamic studies, cultural studies, and communication studies. Despite the importance of t he research in these fields (primarily in expanding boundaries and exploring new ethical dimensions), from the perspective of g ame studies the existing research provides mostly anecdotal evidence on the subject matter and rarely analyzes the content of t hese games in detail. In this This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 113 chapter I attempt to fill that void (theoretically as well as empirically) by investigating the possible ways in which video games utilize their core representational layers: audiovisual, narrative, and procedural. (By the “procedural layer,” I mean how Islam is embedded into the rule systems governing the player’s interaction with the game.) Each of t he three following sections analyzes how the virtual rep - resentation of I slam is constructed in one of t hese layers. For content analysis in each section I have used one A merican and one A rab video game in which the representation of I slam or Muslims is central to the respective layer. Both games for each analysis have been chosen from within the same genre. As Simon Egenfeldt-Nielsen and his colleagues in Understanding Video Games note, genres are to a large extent arbitrary.

Yet they are useful as analytical constructs imposed on a group of o b - jects in order to discuss the complexity of t heir individual differences in a meaningful way.16 Games of t he same genre arguably share similar expressive forms and thus a similar method of a nalysis may be applied to them. For the audiovisual layer, I have chosen the first-person shooter genre and a shot-by-shot analysis; for the narrative layer, the real-time strategy genre and a textual analysis; and for the procedural layer, the turn-based strategy genre and a rule-system analysis (see table 5.1). Beyond playing the games in question, I have examined related booklets, manuals, and websites and interviewed two A rab game pro - ducers. Substantial portions of t he materials were gathered during field - work trips to Damascus in 2005, Beirut in 2006 and Cairo in 2007. A ll the A merican games were played in English; the A rab games were played in A rabic. Interviews with producers were recorded in A rabic.

Table 5.1. Video Games Used for A nalysis of Each Layer La\fer G enr e A mer ican Ga me A r a b Ga me M ethodolog\f audiovisual first-person K u m a\Wa r (K u ma Special Force 2 shot-by-shot s hooter R eality Games, 2004) (W3DTEK , 2007) a nalysis narrative real-time Age of Empires 2 Quraish (A fk ar t ex t ua l s trateg y ( Ensemble, 1999) M edia, 2007) a nalysis procedural t urn-based, Civilization IV Arabian Lords rule-system r eal-time ( Fira x is, 2005) ( Break Away Games a nalysis s trateg y / Quirkat, 2007) This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 114Vít Šisler The Audiovisual La\fer: Meeting Virtual Heroes and Enemies in First-Person Shooters As Jay Bolter and R ichard Grusin argue in Remediation, the desire for immediacy leads digital media to borrow from each other as well as from their analog predecessors, such as film, television, and photography. 17 Video games have a long-standing connection to cinema, deploying sim - ilar visual syntax, grammar, and vocabulary in introductions, cutscenes, and in-game graphics. As technological capabilities have improved, many video games utilize photorealistic imagery in order to create a believable universe. This applies in particular to the first-person shooter genre with its emphasis on visual realism.18 Since 9/11, video games released by the U.S. gaming industry have increasingly sought to mirror real-world conflict scenarios, particularly the U.S. military interventions in Iraq and A fghanistan. One such game is K u m a\Wa r, a tactical first- and third-person shooter game with down - loadable missions available for free online. K u m a\Wa r was developed by Kuma Reality Games, which was set up in 2004 in New York by a group of re tired military officers. 19 According to the authors, K u m a\ Wa r is “more than just a game; it is an interactive chronicle of t he war on terror with real news coverage and an original video news show for each mission.”\b0 In recreating real-world events, K u m a\Wa r uses information culled from Fox News reports, military experts, Depart - ment of D efense records, and original research. Each episode consists of a p layable mission, extensive background text, satellite photos, and a multimedia library, often including interviews with event participants.

The transcript in table 5.2 describes part of t he trailer for the Mission 29: Fallujah: Operation al-Fajr game (2004), which aims to recreate the coalition forces’ ground attack on the Iraqi city of F allujah in November 2004. The game closely mimics the visual style of TV news coverage. It provides a “real-world hook ” by offering privileged glimpses from the front lines (taken directly from video footage of l andscapes in which the U.S. military has been engaged).\b1 This gritty realism centers on the authenticity of w eapons, sounds, and combat scenarios. Yet the same principles of “ realism” are not extended to the enemy as the Other. This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 115 Virtual newsroom. We see a female reporter in front and images of a U.S.

soldier, a militar y helicopter, and the U.S. flag in the background. The head- line says: “Kuma\War Jack i Schechner.” Real-world footage from Iraq. U.S.

Humvees move on road in a rural landscape.

Close-up of two Sunni militants in plain clothes, their faces wrapped in kufiyas , wielding machine guns and R PGs.

A group of Iraqi soldiers enters the city.

Citizens welcome them and wave Iraqi flags.

Close-up of a masked Sunni militant firing an RPG.

Black-and-white photo of Zarqawi.

Cut. A glimpse of real footage of Berg’s beheading.

A l Jazeera footage. Five masked militants, armed with machine guns and scimitars, read a statement to the camera. In front of them sits a civilian prisoner. His face is blurred. In the background, a black banner with the shahadah , the Islamic declaration of faith, in A rabic: “There is no god but God and Muhammad is His messenger.” Virtual newsroom. Close-up of Schechner.

Close-up of Wilkerson. A com - puter screen and a map of Iraq are in the background.

Table 5.2. Transcript of Trailer for Kuma\War’s “Fallujah: Operation al-Fajr” (excerpt) Jack i: “Hello and welcome. I am Jack i Schechner and this is K u m a\Wa r.” Dramatic music J: “April 6, 2004. U.S. Marines launched a massive offensive campaign in Fallujah in an attempt to suppress the Sunni insurgents.” J: “By the end of the month, political agreements bring an end to the assault.

Marines withdraw, and the Iraqi Fal - lujah brigade takes over.” J: “But the Iraqi unit quick ly dissolves, leaving this key city under insurgent cont rol .” J: “In May Jordanian militant Abu Moussa Zarqawi, believed to be operat - ing out of Fallujah, beheads A merican Nick Berg.” J: “The terrorist and his followers launched a campaign of beheadings, k idnappings, assassinations, and car bombings throughout Iraq.” J: “General Wilkerson, what sort of resistance can U.S. troops expect to encounter?” W: “Well, I think all of you gamers have been watching the news . . . and noticed that the innocent civilians and perhaps This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 116Vít Šisler The enemy is depicted as a set of s chematized attributes which refer to A rab Muslims – h ead cover, loose clothes, dark skin color, and so on.

Distinctive clothing and head covers are used when the enemy’s Shia or Sunni identity needs to be emphasized in connection with the real- world campaign. The in-game narrative then links these visual signi - fiers to international terrorism or Islamic extremism. Thus, the player is navigated through “insurgent-infested Fallujah” where “Sunni terrorists hide in mosques” (Fallujah: Operation al-Fajr ); has to infiltrate Karabi- lah “where terrorists wage war . . . from homes and stores, mosques and schools – n one of w hich are sacred in the eyes of t he insurgents” ( Mission 53: Operation Spear); and is confronted with “vicious killers” in a “violent urban assault, one that uncovers the resourcefulness, determination, and sheer brutality of t he terrorists” ( Operation Spear). Virtual newsroom. Close-up of Schechner.

Close-up of A nderson. A soft ware devel - opment studio is in the background.

Actual in-game footage. Close-up of a U.S. Marine in desert camo aiming an assault rifle. Cut. Close-up of two masked Sunni militants hiding behind a car and wielding machine guns and RPG s.

Close-up of Schechner. some of the operative insurgents are all streaming out of Fallujah. With that, I suspect when the assault actually begins there might be less resistance than we have expected. A nd the end result will be not a standoff battle but rather the anticlimactic control of the city passing to coalition forces.” J: “Thank you, General. Now, let’s talk to Dante A nderson, Kuma’s head of prod - uct development, about our recreation of the latest offensive in Fallujah.” J: “Events are developing in Fallujah as we speak. W hat’s going to be the most challenging part of this mission for your development team?” A: “We’ve spent a lot of time tr ying to figure out what is really real. We’ve built it, and we spent a lot of time also redoing things that we had done initially because we got better information. Our main chal - lenge is to get it out as quick ly as possible when the operation concludes and to make sure that it is as accurate as possible.” J: “Thank you, Dante. . . . For Kuma Reality Games, Jack i Schechner.” This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 117 Marcus Power in “Digital War Games and Post 9/11 Geographies of M ilitarism” argues that the A rab Muslim culture in K u m a\Wa r is portrayed as savage, terroristic, and uncivilized, constructing racialized meanings which in turn provide an ideological sanction for the war on terror.\b\b The link between terrorism and Islam is emphasized in particu- lar by the game’s audiovisual layer, for example, the appropriated footage of b eheadings with Quranic verses played in the background during the game’s introduction or the photorealistic reconstructions of I raqi mosques, which serve as terrorist hideouts in the actual game. As is the case with most Western video games, the representation of o rdinary Muslim citizens is marginalized. In the game there is no possibility for civilian casualties caused by the U.S. war effort – b ecause the Iraqi cities are mostly depicted as uninhabited.\b3 K u m a\Wa r presents a clean, sani- tized, and enjoyable version of w ar for popular consumption, obscuring the realities, contexts, and consequences of a ctual war. \b4 The existence of s uch games and the (mis)representation of I slam they promote are of c oncern to many in the Muslim world. A prime ex - ample is the following statement by the Central Internet Bureau of t he Lebanese Hezbollah movement: “The problem behind video games is that most of t hem are foreign made, especially A merican. Therefore, they bear enormous false understandings and habituate teenagers to violence, hatred and grudges. In addition, some cause humiliation to many of o ur Islamic and A rab countries, where battles are running in these A rab countries, the dead are A rab soldiers, whereas the hero who kills them is – the player himself – an A merican.” \b5 In response, the Hezbollah movement has produced several games based on “A rab and Islamic val - ues” that aim to foster national pride and glorif y the movement’s struggle with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. I will examine the first-person shooter game Special Force 2 (W3DTEK, 2007), aka Al-wa’d as-sādiq (Ta l e of th e Truthful Pledge ), which is a sequel to the Hezbollah game Special Force (Al-quwwa al-khāsa; Solution, 2003). The new game retells a story from the 2006 war between Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah (see t a b l e 5 .3) . A lthough the video is completely rendered through 3D, in-game computer graphics, it closely approximates the visual style of “ real” pro - motional and propaganda video clips used by the Lebanese Hezbollah This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 118Vít Šisler movement. Correspondingly, the emphasis on Islam is central to the au - diovisual layer of t he game. The mission starts with basmala\b6 followed by verses from the Quran taken from the s ūra A l-A nfal (“The Spoils of W ar”). The introductory videos are accompanied by Ta k b i r (the call “A llāhu A kbar”) or a religious nashid (hymn) in the background. Simi - larly, the Muslim identity of t he main hero is emphasized by the visual Table 5.3. Transcript of Trailer for Special Force 2 W3DTEK company logo appears on a green background.

Text (in A rabic): “In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate. A mong the believers are men who have been true to their covenant with A llah; of them some have completed their vow and some wait, but they have never changed in the least.” Text (in A rabic): “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of A llah, and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not k now, but whom A llah doth k now. W hatever ye shall spend in the cause of A llah shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.” Background changes to red flames.

In the distance, an Israeli militar y truck moves fast on a road in a hilly landscape.

It is followed by a ty pical Israel Defense Forces jeep.

Suddenly, the jeep explodes. Close-up of its wreckage and the dead bodies of Israeli soldiers.

The backs of Hezbollah soldiers running toward the road. A jeep arrives, and the soldiers get in. The jeep continues to the site of the explosion and then disappears. Dramatic music Music reaches a clima x: drums, male chorus Dramatic music Crescendo. Male chorus repeats:

“A llahu A kbar! A llahu A kbar!” Male voice: “A llahu A kbar! Oh Invincible Lion! The Truthful Pledge!” This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 119 signifiers used in the game, for example, the Quran, a prayer rug, posters of t he Dome of t he Rock and the A l-Aqsa Mosque, and so on. At the same time, the game borrows from its A merican counter - parts. It simply reverses the polarities of t he narrative and visual stereo - types observed, for example, in K u m a\Wa r. It substitutes an A rab Mus - lim hero for the A merican soldier and substitutes the Israeli forces for the enemies. But unlike the A merican games, where the hero is usually individualized, Special Force 2 promotes a higher obligation to a collec - tive spiritual whole.\b7 By situating the player in the immersive simulation of re al conflict in Palestine and Lebanon, and by framing this conflict in primarily religious terms, the game contributes to the notion of a g lobal Muslim identity. The focal point is defending Muslim ummah against outside aggression, with emphasis on the just and moral cause of t he fight and the glorification of t he Muslim fighters. By schematizing com - plex and diverse conflicts into a single, bipolar scheme of g ood and evil, these games mirror their Western blueprints, including the collectiviza - tion and functionalization of e nemies, the exclusion of c ivilians from the virtual battleground, and legitimizing the authors’ point of v iew through highly selective references to real-world events. Despite their fundamentally different ideological backgrounds, K u m a\Wa r and Special Force 2 share many similarities in the audiovi - sual layer. Both games are unrealistic, yet still cinematic. They don’t reproduce the real-world experience of w ar; instead, they theatrically romanticize war. Death and bodily dismemberment have been banished from both games. Both K u m a\Wa r and Special Force 2 thus reinforce the image of a c lean war with clear battle lines; no moral questions are put forward, and no consideration is given to the reality of t aking a life. \b8 The way Islam as a religion is depicted, however, is significantly different.

W hereas K u m a\Wa r presents Islam as a threat and schematizes Muslims as religious fanatics and “enemies to democracy and freedom,” Special Force 2 honors the Muslim identity of t he hero and links Islamic values to the heroic and legitimate defense of r ights. Regarding our understanding of re ligion and digital gaming, analy - sis of t he audiovisual layer shows that both A merican and A rab games construct their virtual representations of I slam by using signifiers bor - rowed from their media predecessors, particularly TV news coverage and This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 120Vít Šisler propaganda video clips. This observation fits with Bolter and Grusin’s concept of re mediation mentioned earlier. More important, in order to create a believable universe for their audiences, these games appropri - ate not only the visual imagery, but also the schematizations and clichés surrounding Islam in their respective media cultures. The visual “real - ism” of t hese games legitimizes these schematizations, simultaneously recreating the real world and obscuring it.

The Nar r ative La\fer: Encounter ing Islam in R eal-Time Str ategies A number of g ames, especially those in the adventure genre, contain strong narrative elements. Even in genres where stories are not part of the gameplay, such as strategies or simulations, fictional worlds prompt players to imagine that their actions take place in a meaningful set - ting.\b9 Several real-time strategy games present the player with complex and well-elaborated storylines, which are typically told in the cutscenes between missions and amended through the in-game scripts. The A meri - can game I have chosen for my analysis of t he narrative layer, Age of E m - pires 2 (Ensemble, 1999), goes back to the roots of n arrative since it tells the story by framing its campaigns with recorded voiceovers and a few sketched images. The “Saladin Campaign” offers the player the opportu - nity to “encounter” Islam through the eyes of a C rusader knight impris - oned by the Saracen army. Saladin and his Muslim warriors are depicted in an unusual way in the realm of d igital entertainment. As the opening scene states: Eg y pt. A month since I entered the Holy Land. . . . A nd I was dying. I wan - dered the cold desert for four nights before the horse archers found me. . . .

They were Saracens, the rulers of t he Middle East. I had ridden to the Holy Land with the Crusaders from France and Normandy, so I was by all rights these Saracens’ enemy. Yet they gave me water and a spindly horse and led me back to their leader. A nd that was how I met Saladin. The paintings in Europe show Saladin as demonic, barbarian. Yet he is more chivalrous than any k night I’d met before and prefers the palaces of D amascus to slaughtering Normans in the desert. I had not expected hospitality from Saracens – w e Normans execute any armed A rab we capture. But Saladin left me free to explore this camp.

This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 121 In a classic narrative scheme, the main hero becomes attached to his jailers and adopts their culture and manners. The game deliberately incorporates hints of A rab and Muslim cultural heritage and their con - tribution to world civilization: “A lthough I am still a prisoner, Saladin and his generals dine with me. Over meals we discuss mathematics and astronomy. I never imagined a race of d esert folk could be so wise. Bagh - dad, the Saracen capital, is the most civilized city in the world, with free hospitals, public baths, a postal service, and banks with branches as far away as China.” Nevertheless, as the game progresses and the violence of t he war increases, the “once noble Muslim warriors” become cruel and fanatical. Here, for the first time, the game introduces the concept of j ihad: “In reaction to European hostility and fanaticism, the Saracens have steadily become more resolute . . . more bloodthirsty. Their love of a rt is replaced by a love for battle. Now, in answer to the Crusade, they have adapted their principle of J ihad for warfare.” Finally, in a fierce battle over Jerusalem, Saladin subdues the army of h is rival, R ichard the Lionheart. The game finishes with both adver - saries signing a peace treaty and the end of t he Third Crusade. Yet, as the narrator predicts, the “war that has been fought over religion and land” is not over. The narrative of Age of E mpires 2 resembles medieval travelogue and constitutes something of a n exception in the dominant representations of I slam in historical and fantastical video games. These games typically construe the “Orient” as an exotic and ahistorical entity and schematize Muslims in the framework of a rbitrary cruelty, barbarism, and religious fanaticism.30 Yet when we examine the story of Age of E mpires 2 c losely, as it is presented in both the cutscenes and the gameplay, we see that it remains to a certain extent within the cultural stereotypes that sur - round the Crusades in European popular culture. Choosing Saladin, oft e n de p icted as “the noble prince of I slam,” to be the virtual Muslim representative does not in fact contradict Orientalist tendencies. The characterization of S aladin as “far nobler than any competitor” can be easily incorporated into the narrative of E uropean knighthood. 31 Other Muslims in the game remain within the typical scheme, for example, Sal - adin’s Mamluks, who mock the “Franks” as “the infidel dogs of t he West,” or the “treacherous Egyptians,” who betray the player’s noble master. This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 122Vít Šisler Perhaps it was the unusually positive framing of I slam and the rich - ness of t he story in Age of E mpires 2 that inspired A rab developers (the Syrian company A fkar Media) to craft Quraish, released in 2007. The latter is a real-time strateg y game dealing with pre-Islamic Bedouin wars and the early Islamic conquests (A l-Futūhāt al-Islāmīya). The game is clearly inspired by Age of E mpires 2 and it similarly utilizes introductory sequences, which are narrated in classical A rabic and accompanied by simple visuals. The first campaign, A l-Jāhilīya (“First Encounter”), can be played from the perspective of p agan Bedouin chieftains Hani and Abu Qatada, and narrates a story from a war between two A rab tribes, the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids. More important, as the name sug - gests, it revolves around the “encounter” of t he pagan A rabs with Islam.

It starts with the young hero, Hani, being appointed by his father as the new leader of t he Shaiban tribe in a time of f amine and on the brink of t ribal war: My father pointed to me as he clenched the reins of h is horse, which had been provoked by the running of t he other one and begun hitting the ground ner vously. . . . The sound of h is hooves mi xed with my father’s voice. “O Hani!

O people of S haiban! Keep your promise, your promise!” I have never imag - ined being the leader of S haiban so quick ly, and under these circumstances.

. . . Now I am responsible for a thousand mouths to feed and guard during a sharp drought where the goats are all dr y. Moreover, the A rab tribes are fighting each other because of hu nger. “O Lord of M ecca, what do you want?

W hat’s your order? If t here is no other choice, so let it happen as you wish.” The narrative style of t he game bears a striking resemblance to clas - sical A rab literary genres, including the Ayyām al-Arab (“The Days of t he A rabs,” stories of t he tribal wars) and Muhammad Ibn Ishāq’s Sīrat rasūl Allāh (“Life of A llah’s Messenger,” a biography of t he Prophet Muham - mad). Through the unusually long and well-developed introduction, many concepts of p re-Islamic A rab culture and early Islamic history are communicated to the player, for example, sharaf and ’ ird (Bedouin honor codes), thar (retributive justice), and muruwa (manliness). The game navigates the player through many real-world events and historic places (including the cities of U kaz, Mecca, and Medina) and recounts a complicated story designed along the lines of c lassical A rab oral and literary heritage, including scenes of p oetry contests, blood revenge, oaths, and tribal alliances. This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 123 Finally, in the last mission, the main hero’s tribe is asked to fulfill their oath and help the Quraish tribe in their war with a newly emerged power – Mu slims led by a prophet called Muhammad. The game mod - els the historical Battle of t he Trench (627 CE) in which the outnum - bered Muslim forces successfully defended the city of M edina, partly because of t he trench they dug around it. The game’s main narrative fol - lows these historical events, so after an unsuccessful charge the leaders of t he Quraish tribe decide to withdraw from the battle. The player then has the choice to accept Islam and join the Muslim forces of M edina in their victorious battle. If h e accepts, the campaign ends and makes way for the second part of t he game, based on the history of e arly Muslim conquest.3\b The final narrative sequence then describes the religious conversion of A bu Qatada to Islam: Thank God, the mighty and omnipotent, who let his poor ser vant, Abu Qatada, live and embrace Islam, and see the Shaiban embracing Islam in huge numbers. The Bedouins who fought for a poem, a date, or a horse saw the revealed message of A llah descended to Man from them. He came to complete their ethics and convert them to believers who didn’t prostrate except to one mighty God. They changed from worthless shepherds to great leaders of a ll nations. At night, they read the holy book Quran and by day they are k nights to free mank ind from the tyranny and falsehood of o ther creatures.

Regarding religion and digital gaming, I find it significant that the narrative layers of b oth the A merican and the A rab game appropriate traditional literary genres in order to present the concept of I slam to the player. Thus, we have on one hand a European medieval travelogue, and on the other A rab prophetic literature (sira). In comparison to the audiovisual layer, the narrative layer offers more space for developing the plot and presenting Islam. It thus arguably provides a more multifaceted image of t he latter. Yet again, the traditional narrative figures and schematized concepts associated with these literary genres are passed to the games deriving therefrom. Despite structural similarities, the two games present Islam in fundamentally different ways. W hereas in Age of E mpires 2 Islam is initially presented as the Other, then humanized through the character of a n oble Muslim ruler, and finally problematized again through the acts of v iolence conducted in its name, in Quraish Islam begins as the player’s enemy, but in the end the player’s avatar embraces Islam. This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 124Vít Šisler The Procedur al La\fer: Incor por ating Islam into Game Rules A lexander Galloway in “Social Realism in Gaming” suggests that it is no longer sufficient to talk about the visual or textual representation of m eaning in game studies. Instead, computer-enabled simulation and its rules, which both facilitate and limit a player’s actions and choices, have to be studied. Similarly, Gonzalo Frasca in “Videogames of t he Op - pressed” argues: “Video games not only represent reality, but also model it through simulations. This form of r epresentation is based on rules that mimic the behavior of t he simulated systems. However, unlike narrative authors, simulation authors do not represent a particular event, but a set of p otential events. Because of t his, we have to think about their objects as systems and consider what laws govern their behaviors.” 33 There exist only a few games that deliberately embed Islam into their game rules. One of t he few A merican games dealing procedurally with Islam is Sid Meier’s Civilization IV. The Civilization series (1991–) consists of t urn-based strategy games that allow players to act on the part of v arious civilizations and engage in building cities, establishing trade routes, and interacting with others on a diplomatic or military basis throughout thousands of y ears of v irtual history. The fourth in the series incorporates seven world religions into its gameplay. It enables players to “found” these religions, build the religions’ holy sites, and spread the reli - gions through missionary work. The most important aspect of t he game’s representation of re ligion is that all the religious systems available to the player – B uddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Confucianism, Taoism, and Islam – a re procedurally equal and generally presented in a “neutral” way. As Civilization IV’s Manual states: “Through religion, man has sought to make sense of t he universe around him and to determine his place in it. Religion has always played a critical part in human history.

Religion has inspired, enlightened and ennobled man; in its name men have erected beautiful buildings, written books of g reat wisdom, and made music of s urpassing beauty. In its name men have also murdered and enslaved their fellows.” 34 Essentially, all religions in the game have the same effects; the only difference is their technological requirements. Thus, Buddhism This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 125 is founded when the first player invents “meditation,” Christianity is similarly linked with “theology,” and Islam with “divine rights.” Gen- erally speaking, religion is deeply embedded in the game rules and is represented via a complex system of e ffects and bonuses. Once found - ed, a religion spreads automatically between cities connected via trade routes. However, players can also spread it actively through the use of m issionaries. The player can adopt a particular religion as a state religion, boosting its positive effect on her cities’ culture and happiness.

The state religion also has further implications for in-game diplomacy.

Civilizations that follow the same official religion tend to have friendlier relations. The game also allows for forced conversions since the player can threaten weaker civilizations, coercing them to adopt the religion of he r choice. From the way religion, including Islam, is implemented in the game rules, it is clear that the authors strived to be religiously sensitive, while maintaining challenging and balanced gameplay. As they state: “Given the importance that religions have had in human development, we didn’t want to just leave them out of t he game altogether; instead we have tried to handle them in as respectful, fair and even-handed [a] manner as pos - sible. . . . We offer no value judgments on religion; we mean no disrespect to anyone’s beliefs. We’re game designers, not theologians.”35 As a result, religion as presented in Civilization IV is essentially a database of e ffects, bonuses, and penalties; religion is about relations between quantifiable processes, where everything is a question of t he acquisition and allocation of r esources and their proper management. As McKenzie Wark argues in Gamer Theory, games in the Civilization series erase the difference between the everyday and the utopian and embrace all differences by rendering all space and time quantifiable. The Civiliza- tion IV algorithm can produce every possible combination of re sources mapped in the database, dividing everything into manageable chunks of d ata. Wark suggests that this insistence “on the reality of t he pos - sible, on what resides within resources, is the A merican dream.” In other words: “W hen playing Civilization . . . , it doesn’t matter if t he civilization you choose to play is Babylon or China, Russia or Zululand, France or India. W hoever wins is A merica, in that the logic of t he game itself i s A merica [sic].” 36 This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 126Vít Šisler It has to be emphasized here that all simulations intrinsically trans - code historical realities into specific mathematical models, thus making any axiological judgments problematic. As I argued in “Digital A rabs,” despite the possible contradictions in the ideological setting of Civiliza - t i o n I V, the game is one of t he rare exceptions in which Muslims are not functionalized as enemies nor depicted in an Orientalist manner. Rather, the game constitutes a possible representation of t he player’s self. 37 In this respect, it is crucial to explore the ways in which Islam is embedded into the game rules of A rab games. As far as I know, the only A rab game that deals with Islam on the level of g ame rules is Arabian Lords.

Arabian Lords (Sādat as-sahrā‘ ) is a PC strategy game inspired by the R ise of I slam (during the seventh to thirteenth centuries) and de - veloped by the U.S. company Break Away Games in close collabora - tion with the Jordanian company Quirkat in 2007. From the beginning Arabian Lords was intended to be shipped primarily to regions in the Middle East and is available in A rabic and English. According to the developers, maintaining appropriate content, historical accuracy, and cultural sensitivity was crucial for the game’s design. As the introduc - tion to the game states: Before the birth of I slam, A rabia stood at the crossroads of t rade between A frica, Asia, and Europe. Its desert was a harsh place but its people k new how to navigate caravans between the oases so they benefited from the trade that crossed their land. These people were the nomadic A rabs, the merchant lords of t he desert. During the seventh and eighth centuries Islam grew and Muslims spread north into Syria, West to the Atlantic, and East to the river Indus. W herever Muslim armies went traders followed. . . . At its height in the ninth centur y the Islamic world rivaled the great empires of t he past.

Now it is your time to help expand the rule of I slam between the seventh and thirteenth centuries. Can you succeed as a merchant lord during this rise of wealth and power?

Surprisingly, although the game invites the player to “ help expand the rule of I slam,” most of t he gameplay revolves around harvesting re - sources, building, trade, and city management, that is, activities typi - cal for the strategy game genre. Islam is integrated into the game rules only through the existence of a s ingle building, the Mosque, and a single unit, the Vizier. The only procedural action a player can perform in - This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 127 volving religion is donating money to the Mosque, which increases the player’s popularity and her chances of p roducing a Vizier. The Vizier then provides the player with several bonuses, for example, speeding up the productivity of n earby workers, improving nearby units’ statistics, and so on.

W hen comparing Arabian Lords and Civilization IV we find that the fundamental difference in the way Islam is included in the game rules evolves primarily from the scale of t he model. The procedural role of I s - lam in Arabian Lords is seriously limited. This could be the result of t he cultural sensitivity of t he game’s developers. As they state: We k new that culturally religion played a major role during this time span covered in the game, and that it still does today. We wanted to make sure to include this in a way that would honor its significance, while being sensitive to all religious and cultural concerns. At one point in the design we had included an “Imam” unit that players would be able to control. Because this seemed inappropriate to a number of o ur experts, we made significant changes to the design in order to remove it so as to not offend. In general, we always tried to error on the side of c aution when it came to cultural issues. 38 The cultural and religious sensitivity of t he game, manifested in the very limited presence of I slam in the game rules, can thus be perceived both as a token of re spect for Islam and as a pragmatic step aiming to ease the acceptance of t he product in the more conservative societies of t he A rab world. As we have seen, similar caution regarding the repre - sentation of re ligion was expressed by the team behind Civilization IV. Yet in both games religion is essentially schematized as a mere system of a dvantages and bonuses. By forsaking a deeper integration of I slam and its ethics and moral values into the rules, both games deliberately fail to utilize the strength of t he medium. In other words, both games miss out on gameplay that would allow the player to experience ethical dilemmas related to religion and draw her own conclusions. 39 It re - mains an open question whether this is the result of t he developers’ inner constraints and religious and cultural sensitivities or the inherent limitations of t he strategy and simulation game genre. As far as I know, no game today offers players a fully procedural representation of I slam, integrating its ethics and values into the game’s rule system.40 This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 128Vít Šisler Conclusion: Genr e, R emediation, and Procedur e This chapter has analyzed how mainstream A merican and A rab video games construct the virtual representation of I slam and Muslims. I have examined three representational layers of v ideo games and analyzed two different games of a s imilar genre (one A merican and one A rab) for each layer. In the audiovisual layer, examined in two games of t he first-shooter genre, the representation of I slam was seen to be schematized and mono - lithic. It doesn’t change throughout the game. W hile the A merican game, K u m a\Wa r, presents Islam as a threat, the A rab game, Special Force 2, links Islamic values with heroism and a legitimate defense of r ights. Both games offer racialized representations of e nemies and schematize com - plex, real-world events into a bipolar frame. In the narrative layer, examined in two games of t he real-time strat - egy genre, the representation of I slam was seen to be more multifaceted and, following the traditions of s torytelling, it evolves throughout the game. In the A merican game, Age of E mpires 2, Islam is initially por- trayed as the Other, then humanized through the character of a n oble Muslim ruler. Islam ultimately becomes once again problematic through acts of v iolence conducted in its name. The A rab game, Quraish, presents Islam in the beginning as the enemy, while in the end the player’s avatar embraces it. Finally, in the procedural layer, examined in two games of t he strat - egy genre, Islam was seen to be embedded in the games’ rule systems.

Yet both in the A merican game, Civilization IV, and in the A rab game, Arabian Lords, religion is represented as a mere system of a dvantages and bonuses. The games’ authors abstained from a deeper integration of I slam and its ethics and moral values into the gameplay. On a more theoretical level, the analysis presented in this chapter can be summarized in the following remarks:

First, a game’s genre seems to fundamentally determine the way Islam, and perhaps religion in general, is presented in the game. Since most of t he A rab games examined here utilize genres established by their successful A merican counterparts, their authors had to appropri - ate the existing patterns of re presentation and refashion them along the This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 129 lines of I slamic principles. In other words, although contemporary A rab games vary significantly in their background, aims, and design and of - fer multifaceted concepts of I slam and of Mu slim identity, they do not transcend the patterns established by a global, in most cases A merican, video game industry.

Second, video games seem to borrow a lot from their media prede - cessors. The audiovisual layer in the A merican first-person shooter genre appropriates the cinematic representation of w ar known from Holly - wood movies and the hyperrealism of TV news coverage. Meanwhile, an A rab game of a s imilar genre appropriates the language of H ezbollah’s video clips and martyr videos. In the narrative layer the A merican and A rab games similarly borrow from their cultures’ traditional literary genres, that is, travelogues and prophetic literature. Third, it seems that the schematized images of I slam associated with the remediated genres are passed on to video games. Erkki Huhtamo in Media Archaeology describes how topoi (clichés found in any form of l it - erature) spread to all spheres of l ife addressed by literature and to which it gives form. As he argues: “No matter how dominant ‘media culture’ may have become in the contemporary world, it does not constitute an all-encompassing realm. It coexists with and may even be embedded in other cultural formations. One may therefore expect topoi from other realms, including ancient ones, to reappear within [a] media-cultural conte x t .”41 The quasi-historical representations of I slam found in the narrative structure of Age of E mpires 2 are similar to the Orientalist discourses of E uropean novels and nineteenth-century paintings, whereas the au - diovisual representations of I slam and Muslims found in K u m a\Wa r follow the hyperrealistic schematizations of t he U.S. military-entertain - ment complex. W hile the A merican game presents Islam as a threat, flat - tens out diverse Muslim identities, and reconstructs them into a series of s ocial stereotypes, the A rab game uses a distinctive Islamic narrative to frame its gameplay and communicate Islamic principles and moral values to the players.

In the games’ procedural layer, which is not directly appropriated from other media, Islam as a belief s ystem and an organized religion is transcoded into a mathematical model, seemingly taking into account This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 130Vít Šisler no ethical considerations. In Huhtamo’s terms, there are no topoi as - sociated with Islam in the procedural level. Therefore, arguably, no cli - chés or schematizations of I slam are communicated to the player in this particular layer. Nevertheless, the very rules of t he simulations I have analyzed, which model the world as consisting of q uantifiable variables and offer everyone an equal possibility to “win” the game, bear culturally significant meaning. In this respect, Wark poignantly argues that the rule system in Civilization stems from the ethics and values of P rotestant A merica.4\b As Huhtamo suggests, topoi are not limited to literary traditions, but can also manifest as designs. 43 Regarding our understanding of re ligion and digital gaming, it is of c rucial importance to study video games’ rule systems and investigate how they are shaped by their developers’ cul - tures and religious traditions. Moreover, rule systems migrate between cultures and significantly influence local production. As we have seen, many A rab game designers have been directly inspired by particular A merican games and have appropriated their patterns. We can conclude that the way Islam, and perhaps any other religion, is represented in a video game is fundamentally shaped by (a) the power relations in global cultural exchange, (b) local religious and cultural topoi and media tradi - tions, and (c) the video game’s rule system, which is used to convey such representations.

Notes 1. B ogost and Poremba, “Can Games Get Real?,” 12–21. 2. Š isler, “Digital A rabs.” 3. Ibid. 4. Š isler, “Video Games, Video Clips, and Islam.” 5. Bogost, Persuasive Games, 45. 6. Sabr y, Cultural Encounters in the A rab Worl d , 11. 7. R eichmuth and Werning, “Pi xel Pashas, Digital Djinns,” 46–47. 8. Š isler, “Digital A rabs.” 9. K hamis, “The Role of ‘ New’ A rab Satellite Channels,” 39. 10. W itteborn, “The Situated Ex - pression of A rab Collective Identities.” 11. e l-Nawaw y and K hamis, Islam Dot Com, 3. 12. W itteborn, “The Situated Expression of A rab Collective Iden - tities.” 13. K hamis, “The Role of ‘ New’ A rab Satellite Channels,” 41.

14. I bid.; Šisler, “Video Games, Video Clips, and Islam.” 15. C ampbell, “Islamogaming.” 16. E genfeldt-Nielsen, Smith, and To s c a , Understanding Video Games, 41. This content downloaded from 35.8.11.2 on Sun, 06 May 2018 13:50:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms From K u m a\Wa r to Quar ish 131 17. B olter and Grusin, Remediation, 9. 18. Halter, From Sun Tzu to Xbox. 19. S ims, “W hen Reality Is Just an I l lusion .” 20. http://w w w.kumawar.com/about .php (accessed July 30, 2012). 21. P ower, “Digital War Games.” 22. I bid., 208.

23. I n a few missions, civilians are present as “ hostages, whose fate lies in your hands,” since they have been “ne - glected, beaten and left to die” by the insurgents ( Operation Spear ).

24. P ower, “Digital War Games.” 25. http://web.archive.org/web /20050105091655/w w w.specialforce .net/english/indexeng.htm. 26. Th e phrase bismi-llāhi ar-rahmāni ar-rahīmi (“In the name of G od, Most Gracious, Most Merciful ”) constitutes the first verse of e ver y sūra (chapter) of the Quran (but one) and is often used as an opening phrase in letters, books, and public speeches.

27. M achin and Suleiman, “A rab and A merican Computer War Games.” 28. P ower, “Digital War Games,” 210. 29. E genfeldt-Nielsen, Smith, and To - sca, Understanding Video Games, 171. 30. Š isler, “Digital A rabs.” 31. Stanley, Saladin. 32. A lthough the player is given the option to reject Islam, it seems the last mission is then impossible to win, and there is no campaign prepared for that case. See Šisler, “Digital A rabs.” 33. F rasca, “Videogames of t he Op - pressed,” 21. 34. Civilization IV’s Manual, 7 7. 35. Ibid. 36. Wark, Gamer Theory, 73. 37. Š isler, “Digital A rabs.” 38. http://w w w.arabianlords.com /Public/public_master.aspx?Site_Id =2&Page_Id=922&Path=66. 39. N ewgren, “ Bioshock to the Sys - tem,” 145. 40. H owever, a few such games are in development. See Šisler, “Video Games, Video Clips, and Islam.” 41. H uhtamo, “Dismantling the Fair y Eng ine,” 35.

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