Week 4 Learning JournalAssignment Due July 21 at 11:59 PM Your Learning Journal is where you will post six insights every week, highlighting new knowledge you gained from both the reading assignments

Chapter 22 (Choose three insights you learned from this text, and quote and site them)

For the time being, Zhang Zhidong’s arguments won the day. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Manchus attempted to modernize the military and build an industrial base without disturbing the essential elements of traditional Chinese civilization. Railroads, weapons arsenals, and shipyards were built, but the value system remained unchanged. In the end, the results spoke for themselves. During the last decades of the century, the European penetration of China intensified. Rapacious imperialists began to bite off the outer edges of the empire. The Gobi Desert north of the Great Wall, Central Asia, and Tibet, all inhabited by non-Chinese peoples and never fully assimilated into the Chinese Empire, were gradually lost. In the north and northwest, the main beneficiary was Russia, which forced the court to cede territories north of the Amur (ah-MOOR) River in Siberia. Competition between Russia and Great Britain prevented either power from seizing Tibet outright but enabled Tibetan authorities to revive their local autonomy. In the south, British and French advances in mainland Southeast Asia removed Burma and Vietnam from their traditional status as vassals to the Manchu court. Even more ominous were the foreign spheres of influence in the Chinese heartland, where local commanders were willing to sell exclusive commercial, railroad-building, or mining privileges. The disintegration of the Manchu dynasty accelerated as the century came to an end. In 1894, the Qing went to war with Japan over Japanese incursions into the Korean peninsula, which threatened China’s long-held suzerainty over the area (see ‘‘Joining the Imperialist Club’’ later in this chapter). The Chinese were roundly defeated, confirming to some critics the failure of the policy of selfstrengthening by halfway measures. In 1897, Germany, a new entry in the race for spoils in East Asia, used the murder of two German missionaries by Chinese rioters as a pretext to demand territories in the Shandong (SHAHN-doong) (Shantung) peninsula. The imperial court granted the demand, setting off a scramble for territory (see Map 22.3). Russia demanded the Liaodong (LYOW-doong) peninsula with its ice-free port at Port Arthur, and Great Britain obtained a hundred-year lease on the New Territories, adjacent to Hong Kong, as well as a coaling station in northern China.

Duiker, William J.. The Essential World History, Volume II: Since 1500: 2 (p. 575). Cengage Textbook. Kindle Edition.

Chapter 23 (choose 3 insights you learned from this text, and site them)

Militarism, nationalism, and the desire to stifle internal dissent may all have played a role in the coming of World War I, but the decisions made by European leaders in the summer of 1914 directly precipitated the conflict. It was another crisis in the Balkans that forced this predicament on European statesmen. As we have seen, states in southeastern Europe had struggled to free themselves from Ottoman rule in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia for domination of these new states created serious tensions in the region. By 1914, Serbia, supported by Russia, was determined to create a large, independent Slavic state in the Balkans, while Austria-Hungary, which had its own Slavic minorities to contend with, was equally set on preventing that possibility. Many Europeans perceived the inherent dangers in this explosive situation. The British ambassador to Vienna wrote in 1913: Serbia will some day set Europe by the ears, and bring about a universal war on the Continent. . . . I cannot tell you how exasperated people are getting here at the continual worry which that little country causes to Austria under encouragement from Russia. . . . It will be lucky if Europe succeeds in avoiding war as a result of the present crisis. The next time a Serbian crisis arises . . . , I feel sure that Austria-Hungary will refuse to admit of any Russian interference in the dispute and that she will proceed to settle her differences with her little neighbor by herself. 2 It was against this backdrop of mutual distrust and hatred that the events of the summer of 1914 were played out. THE ASSASSINATION OF FRANCIS FERDINAND: A ‘‘BLANK CHECK’’? The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, Sophia, on June 28, 1914, was carried out by a Bosnian activist who worked for the Black Hand, a Serbian terrorist organization dedicated to the creation of a pan-Slavic kingdom. Although the Austrian government did not know whether the Serbian government had been directly involved in the archduke’s assassination, it saw an opportunity to ‘‘render Serbia innocuous once and for all by a display of force,’’ as the Austrian foreign minister put it. Fearful of Russian intervention on Serbia’s behalf, Austrian leaders sought the backing of their German allies. Emperor William II and his chancellor responded with the infamous ‘‘blank check,’’ their assurance that Austria-Hungary could rely on Germany’s ‘‘full support,’’ even if ‘‘matters went to the length of a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia.’’ Much historical debate has focused on this ‘‘blank check’’ extended to the Austrians. Did the Germans realize that an Austrian-Serbian war could lead to a wider war? If so, did one? Historians are still divided on the answers to these questions. DECLARATIONS OF WAR Strengthened by German support, Austrian leaders issued an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23 in which they made such extreme demands that Serbia had little choice but to reject some of them in order to preserve its sovereignty. Austria then declared war on Serbia on July 28. Although the Austrians had hoped to keep the war limited to Serbia and Austria in order to ensure their success in the Balkans, Russia was determined to support Serbia’s cause. Thus, on July 28, Tsar Nicholas II ordered partial mobilization of the Russian army against Austria. The Russian General Staff informed the tsar that their mobilization plans were based on a war against both Germany and Austria simultaneously. They could not execute partial mobilization without creating chaos in the army. Consequently, the Russian government ordered full mobilization of the Russian army on July 29, knowing that the Germans would consider this an act of war against them. Germany quickly responded with an ultimatum that the Russians must halt their mobilization within twelve hours. When the Russians ignored it, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1. At this stage of the conflict, German war plans determined whether France would become involved in the war. Under the guidance of General Alfred von Schlieffen (AHL-fret fun SHLEE-fun), chief of staff from 1891 to 1905, the German General Staff had devised a military plan based on the assumption of a two-front war with France and Russia because the two powers had formed a military alliance in 1894. The Schlieffen Plan called for a minimal troop deployment against Russia while most of the German army would make a rapid invasion of France before Russia could become effective in the east or before the British could cross the English Channel to help France. This meant invading France by advancing through neutral Belgium, with its level coastal plain on which the army could move faster than on the rougher terrain to the southeast. After the planned quick defeat of the French, the German army expected to redeploy to the east against Russia. Under the Schlieffen Plan, Germany could not mobilize its troops solely against Russia and therefore declared war on France on August 3 after issuing an ultimatum to Belgium on August 2 demanding the right of German troops to pass through Belgian territory. On August 4, Great Britain declared war on Germany, officially over this violation of Belgian neutrality but in fact over the British desire to maintain world power. As one British diplomat argued, if Germany and Austria were to win the war, ‘‘what would be the position of a friendless England?’’ By August 4, all the great powers of Europe were

Duiker, William J.. The Essential World History, Volume II: Since 1500: 2 (p. 599). Cengage Textbook. Kindle Edition.

Duiker, William J.. The Essential World History, Volume II: Since 1500: 2 (p. 598). Cengage Textbook. Kindle Edition.