What are the two end results discussed in the assigned reading of an effective surveillance system? From both an external and internal perspective, what security measures are needed to accomplish thes

195 The Outer Defenses Building and Perimeter Protection OBJECTIVES The study of this chapter will enable you to:

1. Recognize the basic tools of perimeter security.

2. Discuss the various types of lighting fixtures and systems.

3. Know the specifics in designing various types of barrier protection.

Introduction Delay and deny are two of the major tenets of good security system design, beginning at a planned outer perimeter premises barrier. These premises should then be further protected from criminal attack by denying ready access to interior spaces in the event that a determined intruder surmounts exterior controls. This must be the first place to start in security planning. This basic concept is being applied to facilities such as water treatment plants and electric substations, where in the past security was rarely considered. Basic security protection is being implemented by these operations as a result of federal guidelines established following the events of 9–11. For additional information on these guidelines see Chapter 5. Each security program element should be interconnected into an integrated whole pro - gram. Each element must grow out of the specific needs dictated by the circumstances affect - ing the facility to be protected. The first and basic defense is still the physical protection of the facility. While planning this defense is neither difficult nor complicated, it does require metic - ulous attention to detail. The development of computer protection programs, anti-embezzlement systems, or even the establishment of shipping and receiving safeguards generally requires some particular sophistication and expertise. The implementation of an effective program of physical security most often starts with the application of common sense and a lot of legwork expended in the inspection of the facility and surrounding area. Physical security concerns itself with those means by which an organization protects its facilities against intrusion, theft, vandalism, sabotage, unauthorized entry, fires, accidents, and natural disasters. And in this context, a facility might be a plant, building, office, institution, or any commercial or industrial structure or complex with all the attendant structures and func - tions that comprise an integrated operation. An international manufacturing operation, for example, might have many facilities within its total organization. 9 Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

2013 10.1016/B978-0-12-385057-7.00009-9 196 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY With the ever-increasing sophistication of criminals, it is evident that the use of the burglar alarm and padlocks alone may not be enough to constitute a good security program. Good sys - tems combine controlled access with advanced security technologies such as intrusion detec - tion sensors, video monitoring, and perhaps smart cards and biometrics. When these security elements are integrated through physical security information management (PSIM) platforms along with sound security policies, you have an excellent beginning to a total asset protection program. Physical security planning includes protection of (1) the grounds around the building, (2) the building’s perimeter surfaces, (3) the building’s interior, and (4) its contents. Figure 9-1 illustrates these four lines of protection.

Barriers, Fences, and Walls A facility’s perimeter will usually be determined by the function and location of the facil - ity itself. An urban office building or retail enterprise will frequently occupy all the real estate where it is located. In such a case, the perimeter may well be the walls of the building itself.

Most industrial operations, however, require yard space and warehousing even in urban areas. In that case, the perimeter is the boundary of the property owned by the company.

But in either case, the defense begins at the perimeter—the first line that must be crossed by an intruder.

Barriers Natural and structural barriers are the elements by which boundaries are defined and penetra - tion is delayed or deterred. Natural barriers comprise the topographical features that assist in FIGURE 9-1 The four lines of protection. (From Don T. Cherry, Total Facility Control [Boston: Butterworth- Heinemann, 1986], p. 100.) Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 197 impeding or denying access to an area. They may consist of rivers, cliffs, boulders, canyons, dense growth, or any other terrain or feature that is difficult to traverse. Structural barriers are permanent or temporary devices such as fences, walls, grilles, doors, roadblocks, screens, or any other construction that will serve as a deterrent to unauthorized entry. It is important to remember that structural barriers rarely if ever prevent penetration. Fences can be climbed, walls can be scaled, and locked doors and grilled windows can eventu - ally be bypassed by a resolute assault. The same is generally true of natural barriers. They almost never prevent a determined and resourceful criminal from intrusion. Ultimately all such barriers must be supported by addi - tional security layers. Structural barriers of some kind should further strengthen most natural barriers. It is a mistake to suppose that a high, steep cliff, for example, is by itself protection against unauthorized entry.

Fences The most common type of structural barrier, familiar to most, is the fence. The most common type of fencing normally used for the protection of a facility is chain link. Barbed wire and con - certina barbed wire are often added to the top of the fence to deter attempts to climb the bar - rier. In situations where aesthetics is the driving force, there may be fencing that is not visible.

In this situation the barrier is not physical, but rather it is composed of some type of sensing system, and the governing physical security design principle shifts from “deter or delay” to ”rapid detection.” Chain Link Chain-link fencing should meet the specifications developed by the U.S. Department of Defense in order to be fully effective. (See Table 9-1 for common characteristics of chain-link fences.) It should be constructed of a 9-gauge or heavier wire with twisted and barbed selvage top and bottom. The fence itself should be at least 6 feet tall and should begin no more than 2 inches from the ground. The bottom of the fence can be stabilized against crawling under or Table 9-1 Common Chain-Link Fence Characteristics Characteristic Option Gauge #9 (3.8 mm), #11 (3.0 mm) Mesh 2 in. (50 mm), 1.6 in. (40 mm), 2.4 in. (60 mm) Coating vinyl, galvanized Tension wires wire, rail, cable (attached at top or bottom) Support posts metal posts (see Federal Specifications RR-F-191H/GEN and RR-F-191/33\ ) Height 6 ft. (1.8 meters), 7 ft. (2.1 meters), 8 ft. (2.4 meters) Fabric tie-downs buried, encased in concrete, staked Pole reinforcement buried, encased in concrete Gate opening swing, slide, lift, turnstile Source: Gary R. Cook, “The Facts on the Fence,” Security Management (June 1990): 86. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

198 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY lifting by tying it to rigid metal poles or concrete sills. The sills are usually precast with AWF #9 wires for ties. If the soil is sandy or subject to erosion, the bottom edge of the fence should be installed below ground level. The fence should be stretched and fastened to rigid metal posts set in concrete with additional bracing as necessary at corners and gate openings. Mesh open- ings should be no more than 2 inches square. In addition, the fence should be augmented by a top guard or overhang of three strands of stretched barbed wire angled at 45 degrees away from the protected property (see Figure 9-2). This overhang should extend out and up far enough to increase the height of the fence by at least 1 foot to an overall height of 7 feet or more. To protect the fence from washouts or channeling under it, culverts or troughs should be provided at natural drainage points. If any of these drainage openings are larger than 96 square inches, they too should be provided with physical barriers that will protect the perimeter with - out, however, impeding the drainage. High-strength welded metal or wire mesh fencing solutions are common, although more expensive, alternatives to chain-link fencing. They are generally made of heavier gauge metal and therefore offer greater ability to resist cutting. The mesh spacing may sometimes be smaller than chain link, in which case they become more difficult to climb. If buildings, trees, hillocks, or other vertical features are within 10 feet of the fence, it should be heightened or protected with a Y-shaped top guard.

FIGURE 9-2 D.T.R. taut-wire intrusion detection systems—the solution for airport security and h\ igh-risk facilities.

(Courtesy of Safeguards Technology, Inc.) Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 199 Another extension of chain-link technology has been developed by Amico (Alabama Metal Industries Corporation). The fence, similar in appearance to traditional chain-link fencing, is actually a solid sheet of steel with holes cut in it. The construction makes this fence a less attractive target for many thieves. For more information see www.amico-online.com .

Some security plans use the standard chain-link fence and incorporate monitoring tech - nology, putting the monitoring cables into the fence fabric. This allows early detection of climbing or cutting of the fence fabric. The fence is not noticeably different from standard chain-link fencing except in its built-in telemetry. 1 Barbed Wire When a fence consists of barbed wire, a 13.5-gauge, twisted double strand with 4-point barbs 4 inches apart is generally used. These fences, like chain-link fences, should also be at least 6 feet high and they should in addition carry a top guard. Posts should be metal and spaced no more than 6 feet apart. Vertical distance between strands should be no more than 6 inches, preferably less.

Concertina Wire Concertina wire is a coil of steel wire clipped together at intervals to form a cylinder (see Figure 9-3). When it is opened, it forms a barrier 50 feet long and 24, 30, 36, 40, or 60 inches high. Developed by the military for rapid laying, it can be used in multiple coils. It can be used either with one roll atop another or in a pyramid with two rolls along the bottom and one on the top. Ends should be fastened together, and the base wires should be staked to the ground.

Concertina wire is probably the most difficult fence to penetrate, but it is unsightly and is rarely used except in a temporary application, although in recent years, concertina wire has replaced traditional barbed wire as fence “top guards.” FIGURE 9-3 Concertina wire. (Courtesy of American Security Fence Corporation.) Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

200 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY With the exception of concertina wire, most fencing is largely a psychological deterrent and a boundary marker rather than a barrier. In most cases such fences can be rather easily pen - etrated unless added security measures are taken to enhance the security of the fence. Fences may deter the undetermined, but they will only delay the determined.

Walls In some instances, masonry, stone, brick, or block walls may be used to form all or part of the perimeter barrier. Such walls may be constructed for aesthetic or strength reasons to replace the less decorative barriers within that part of the facility. In those areas where masonry walls are used, they should be at least 7 feet high with a top guard of three or four strands of barbed wire, as in the case of chain-link fences. Since concealment of the inside activity must be paid for by also cutting off the view of any activity outside the wall, extra efforts must be made to prevent scaling the wall. Ideally, the perimeter line should also be staggered in a way that permits observation of the area in front of the wall from a position or positions inside the perimeter. (Think Great Wall of China.) Gates and Other Barrier Breaches Every opening in the perimeter barrier is a potential security hazard. The more gates, the more security personnel or surveillance devices must be deployed to monitor the traffic through them.

Obviously, these openings must be kept to the minimum number needed to support the work - flow of the organization and to remain in compliance with any prevailing regulations or codes. During shift changes, there may be more gates open and in use than at other times of the day when the smallest practical number of such gates are in operation. Certainly there must be enough gates in use at any time to facilitate the efficient movement of necessary traffic.

The number can only be determined by a careful analysis of needs at various times of day, but every effort must be made to reduce the number of operating gates to the minimum, balancing safety concerns with business efficiencies. If some gates are not necessary to the operation of the facility or if changing traffic patterns can eliminate them, the openings should be sealed off and retired from use. Barriers can also include walk-in entrances where vehicle access must be restricted (see Figure 9-4 ). Padlocking Gates used only at peak periods or emergency gates should be padlocked or otherwise secured. If it is possible, the lock used should be distinctive and immediately identifiable. It is common for thieves to cut off the plant padlock and substitute their own padlock so they can work without alarming a passing patrol that might have spotted an otherwise missing lock. A lock of distinctive color or design could compromise this ploy. It is important that all locked gates be checked frequently. This is especially important where, as is usually the case, these gates are out of the current traffic pattern and are remote from the general activity of the facility. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 201 Personnel and Vehicle Gates Personnel gates are usually from 4 to 7 feet wide to permit single-line entry or exit. It is impor - tant that they not be so wide that control of personnel is lost. Vehicular gates, on the other hand, must be wide enough to handle the type of traffic typical of the facility. They may handle two-way traffic, or if the need for control is particularly pressing, they may be limited to one- way traffic at any given time. Good security planning must account for the types of vehicles that will be using the gate. Gates needed to accommodate large cargo trucks will be different from those needed for small passenger cars or motorcycle only traffic. A drop arm or railroad crossing type of barrier is normally used to cut off traffic in either direc - tion when the need arises. The gate itself might be single or double swing, rolling or overhead.

It could be a manual or an electrical operation. Railroad gates should be secured in the same manner as other gates on the perimeter except during those times when cars are being driven through them. At these times, the operation should be under inspection by a security guard. Another effective traffic direction control device is the spiked security track that allows for one-way traffic to egress the facility, but is designed to puncture tires of vehicles attempting to travel into the facility (unless the spikes are retracted by security personnel).

Miscellaneous Openings Virtually every facility has a number of miscellaneous openings that penetrate the perime - ter. All too frequently these are overlooked in security planning, but they must be taken into FIGURE 9-4 Raised stainless steel bollards protect access to the U.S. Department of State headquarters. (Courtesy of Delta Scientific, Inc.) Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

202 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY account because they are frequently the most effective ways of gaining entrance into the facil - ity without being observed. These openings or barrier breaches consist of sewers, culverts, drainpipes, utility tunnels, exhaust conduits, air intake pipes, maintenance hole covers, coal chutes, and sidewalk eleva - tors. All must be accounted for in the security plan. Bars, grillwork, barbed wire, or doors with adequate locking must protect any one of these openings having a cross-section area of 96 square inches or more. Sidewalk elevators and maintenance hole covers must be secured from below to prevent their unauthorized use.

Storm sewers must be fitted with deterrents that can be removed for inspection of the sewer after a rain.

Barrier Protection In order for the barrier to be most effective in preventing intrusion, it must be patrolled and inspected regularly. Any fence or wall can be scaled, and unless these barriers are kept under observation, they tend to neutralize the security effectiveness of the structure. Such observa - tion can be in person, through video surveillance, or through other perimeter incursion detec - tion sensors.

Clear Zone A clear zone should be maintained on both sides of the barrier to make any approach to the barrier from the outside or any movement from the barrier to areas inside the perimeter immediately visible. Anything outside the barrier, such as refuse piles, weed patches, heavy undergrowth, or anything else that might conceal someone’s approach, should be eliminated.

Inside the perimeter, everything should be cleared away from the barrier to create as wide a clear zone as possible. Where possible, methods should be deployed to limit the ability to drive vehicles up to the fence, stopping them from being used as a platform to aid an intruder in scaling the fence. Unfortunately it is frequently impossible to achieve an uninterrupted clear zone. Most perimeter barriers are indeed on the perimeter of the property line, which means that there is no opportunity to control the area outside the barrier. The size of the facility and the amount of space needed for its operation will determine how space can be given up to the creation of a clear zone inside the barrier. It is important, however, to create some kind of clear zone, how - ever small it might be. In situations where the clear zone is necessarily so small as to endanger the effectiveness of the barrier, thought should be given to increasing the barrier height and strength in critical areas. In such areas, the installation of intrusion detection devices to give due and timely warning of an intrusion attempt to an alert guard force may also be warranted.

Inspection Having established the perimeter defense and the clear zones to the maximum that is pos - sible and practical, it is essential that a regular inspection routine be set up. Gates should be Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 203 examined carefully to determine whether locks or hinges have been tampered with; fence lines should be observed for any signs of forced entry or tunneling; walls should be checked for marks that might indicate they have been scaled or that such an attempt has been made; top guards must be examined for their effectiveness; miscellaneous service penetrations must be examined for any signs of attack; brush, trees and branches, and weeds must be cleared away. Erosion areas must be filled in; and any potential scaling devices such as ladders, ropes, oil drums, or stacks of pallets must be cleared out of the area. Any condition that could even in the smallest degree compromise the integrity of the perimeter must be both reported and cor - rected. Such an inspection should be undertaken no less than weekly and possibly more often if conditions so indicate.

Hydraulic Defenses Hydraulic defenses (barricades) are used to protect gates. These devices are designed to deploy in 1 to 3 seconds and can stop a 15,000-pound vehicle moving at 50 mph. In most cases the devices are installed in the roadway, where they are unobtrusive except for the outline of the top of the barrier, which is level with the surface into which it is installed.

Fence Protection Devices Over the past decades, various devices have been designed to protect the integrity of fences.

The earliest systems used electrification. Since those early days, the introduction of sensors to alert security staff of the presence of intruders has supplemented the use of fencing and in some cases replaced it. The most commonly used external intruder detection sensors are described below.

Fluid Pressure In this system, a fluid-pressure sensor (a small diameter tube sealed at one end and filled with fluid) is placed in the barrier. If a load is applied to the barrier, the tubes compress, placing force on the monitored fluid. This is useful in detection of persons crossing open ground and is commonly used in military installations and tank farms.

Electromagnetic Cable This sensing device (see Figure 9-5 ) operates on the principle of electromagnetic capaci - tance. In simple terms, the cable creates an electromagnetic field that is constant in output.

If the field is interrupted by cutting or pressure on the cable, it can be sensed and reported. The cable is normally mounted on inner chain-link or mesh fences.

Buried Cable Detection Various technologies may be used for this type of sensing system. Generally a cable is buried along the perimeter path. When an intruder crosses or walks over the buried cable the system senses a disturbance and sends an alarm condition.Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

204 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY Fiber-optic Cable A beam of pulsed light is transmitted through the cable, and this is sensed at the other end. If the cable is cut or interfered with, the pulsing stops and there are changes in amplitude. The appli - cation of the cable is similar to the electromagnetic cable. Some manufacturers of high-security fences, however, have incorporated the fiber-optic cable into the hollow strand of their normal fence material, making it impossible to detect. Fiber-optic cable is finding many uses as a sensor.

The sensing cable may be attached to a fence, buried alongside a pipeline, or used in conjunc - tion with power or communications lines. The use of fiber-optic cable allows for the monitoring of miles of fence, pipe or transmission lines with no electronics or power in the field.

Capacitive Field Effect This sensor (see Figure 9-6 ) operates on the same principles as do the electromagnetic systems but uses electrical rather than magnetic fields. These systems are extremely sensitive and can be affected by snow and ice. Weeds and paper debris contacting the sensor wire will also give rise to false alarms.

Active Infrared System (AIRS) While more will be said about this system in Chapter 10, the basic premise behind it is a beam of infrared light sent to a sensor. If the beam is interrupted, the indicates an alarm condi - tion. These systems come in a variety of configurations from a single beam (transmitter and receiver) to a tower of multiple beams with crossing patterns.

External Microwave Whether used internally or externally, this system relies on sending microwaves and on the Doppler effect. When the sensor receives an unfamiliar return of waves, an alarm condition FIGURE 9-5 A sensing device. (Courtesy of Southwest Microwave, Inc.) Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 205 is noted. Most external systems, however, rely on the transmission of a microwave beam to a receiver. If the beam is interrupted or changed, the system goes into alarm. More will be said about microwave sensors used internally in Chapter 10.

Taut Wire This sensor, which is placed on the wires of a fence, relies on a pendulum that is in the off posi - tion until tension on the taut wire forces the pendulum to swing into the on position, tripping the alarm. 2 Vibration Sensors This sensor technology can be used on multiple fence types and materials. Vibration sensors are attached to the fencing material, spaced out along the entire fence line at specific intervals.

They detect particular amounts and types of vibrations that indicate a possible climbing or cut - ting activity.

FIGURE 9-6 Capacitive field effect. (Courtesy of Southwest Microwave, Inc.) Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

206 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY Inside the Perimeter Unroofed or outdoor areas within the fenced perimeter must be considered a second line of defense. These areas can usually be observed from the outside so that targets can be selected before an assault is made. In an area where materials and equipment are stored in a helter-skelter manner, it is difficult for guards to determine if anything has been disturbed or taken. On the other hand, neat, uniform, and symmetrical storage can be readily observed, and any disarray can be detected at a glance. Discarded machinery, scrap lumber, and junk of all kinds haphazardly thrown about the area create safety hazards and provide cover for any intruder. Such conditions must never be permitted to develop. Efficient housekeeping is basic security.

Parking The parking of privately owned vehicles within the perimeter barrier creates a serious secu - rity risk. Facilities that cannot or will not establish parking lots outside the perimeter bar - rier are almost invariably plagued by a higher incidence of pilferage because of the ease with which employees can conceal goods in their cars at any point during the day. In addition, with today’s heightened security concerns over terrorism, allowing unscreened cars into the perim - eter introduces yet another risk to the organization. In cases where the perimeter barrier encompasses the employee and visitor parking areas, additional fencing should be constructed to cordon off the parking areas. Appropriate guarded pedestrian gates or turnstiles must, of course, be installed to accommodate and monitor the movement of employees to and from their cars. The fenced parking lot should be patrolled to protect against car thieves and vandals. An unprotected parking area in a crime-ridden neighborhood can create feelings of insecurity that quickly damage organizational morale. According to Liability Consultant, Inc., the great - est number of negligent security lawsuits filed between 1992 and 2002 were the result of poor parking lot security. 3 Company cars and trucks—especially loaded or partially loaded vehicles—should be parked within the fenced perimeter for added security. This parking area should be well lighted and regularly patrolled or kept under constant surveillance. Loaded or partially loaded trucks and trailers should be sealed or padlocked and should be parked close enough together and close enough to a building wall (or even back to back) so that neither their side doors nor rear doors can be opened without actually moving the vehi - cles. Valuable materials should be removed from the vehicle each night or at a minimum they should not be visible from outside of the vehicle.

Surveillance The entire outside area within the security perimeter barrier must be kept under surveillance at all times, particularly at night. Goods stored in this area are particularly vulnerable to theft or pilferage. This is the area most likely to attract the thief ’s first attention. With planning and study, in cooperation with production or operations personnel, it should be possible to lay out Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 207 the yard area so that there are long, uninterrupted sight lines that permit inspection of the entire area with a min- imum of movement. (Surveillance is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.) Lighting Depending on the nature of the facility, protective light - ing will be designed either to emphasize the illumination of the perimeter barrier and the outside approaches to it or to concentrate on the area and the buildings within the perimeter. In either case, it must produce sufficient light to create a psychological deterrent to intrusion in addition to making detection virtually certain in the event an entry is made. The Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) in its Guideline for Security Light for People, Property, and Public Spaces (2003) recommends a minimum of 3 footcandles in all parking facilities. 4 A foot - candle is a unit for measuring the intensity of illumination equal to 1 lumen per square foot— that is, the amount of light a single candle provides over 1 square foot (see Figure 9-7). While light must provide a specified level of illumination, creating glare to deter intruders, it must also avoid casting annoying or dangerous light into neighboring areas. This is particu - larly important where the facility abuts streets, highways, or navigable waterways. The system must be reliable and designed with overlapping illumination to avoid creat - ing unprotected areas in the event of individual light failures. It must be easy to maintain and service, and it must be secured against attack. Poles should be within the barrier, power lines should be buried, and the switch box or boxes should be secure. There should be a backup power supply in the event of power failure. Supplementary light - ing, including searchlights and portable lights, might also be a part of the system. These lights are provided for special or emergency situations, and although they should not be used with any regularity, they must be available to the security force. The system could be operated automatically by a photoelectric cell that responds to the amount of light to which it is subjected. Such an arrangement allows for lights to be turned on at dusk and extinguished at daylight. This can be set up to activate individual lamps or to turn on a lighting zone, or the entire system at once. Other controls are timed, which simply means that lights are switched on and off by a clock schedule. Such a system must be adjusted regularly to coincide with the changing hours of sunset and sunrise. The lights may also be operated manually. Types of Lighting Lamps used in protective lighting are either incandescent, fluorescent, metal halide, mercury vapor, quartz, or high- or low-pressure sodium. Each type has special characteristics suitable for specific assignments. Each lamp type offers differing effects on natural colors. The effect of FIGURE 9-7 Footcandle. (From Richard Gigliotti and Ronald Jason, Security Design for Maximum Protection [Boston:

Butterworth-Heinemann, 1984].) Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

208 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY the light on the color appearance of objects is measured by the color-rendering index (CRI).

Light with a low CRI makes colors appear less normal. The higher the CRI, the more the object appears normal. Sodium light has a low CRI, whereas metal halide has a high CRI. 5 Incandescent These are common lightbulbs of the type found in the home. They have the advantage of pro - viding instant illumination when the switch is thrown and are thus the most commonly used in protective lighting systems. Some incandescents are manufactured with interior coatings that reflect the light and with a built-in lens to focus or diffuse the light. Regular high-wattage incandescents can be enclosed in a fixture that will give much the same result. Because of their inefficient power-to-effective-light ratio, recent federal law will soon make the purchase of incandescent bulbs more difficult, driving the consumer to other forms of lighting.

Fluorescent These are generally of a mercury vapor type and are highly efficient, giving off approximately 62 lumens per watt. Most fluorescent lamps are temperature sensitive and thus have lim - ited value for outdoor use in colder climates. In addition, the common flickering effect cre - ated by these lamps can have a disorienting effect on both security personnel and intruders.

Fluorescent lamps sometimes interfere with radio, audio and other data transmissions.

Mercury Vapor Lamps These common security lamps give out a strong light with a bluish cast. They are more efficient than are incandescents and have a considerably longer lamp life. In general, these lamps can tolerate power dips of up to 50 percent. The time for these lights to reach full luminance after start up can be considerable.

Metal Halide These lamps are also very tolerant of power dips. As with mercury vapor lamps, the start-up time is long. A power outage as short as 1/20th of a second may be enough to knock this lamp off-line.

Sodium Vapor Lights Sodium lamps give out a soft yellow light and are even more efficient than are mercury vapor lamps. They are widely used in areas where fog is a frequent problem because yellow pene - trates the mist more readily than does white light. They are frequently found on highways and bridges. 6 Quartz Lamps These lamps emit a very bright white light and snap on almost as rapidly as do incandescent bulbs. They are frequently used at very high wattage—1,500 to 2,000 watts is not uncommon in protective systems—and are excellent for use along the perimeter barrier and in troublesome areas (see Table 9-2 ). Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 209 Light-Emitting Diodes (LEDs) These lights are very small and energy efficient. LEDs provide a sharper image than their incandescent predecessors. They have a very long useful life but are more expensive. LED technology has advanced greatly in the past few years and is now becoming more common - place in high-efficiency applications.

Electroluminescent These lights are similar to their fluorescent cousin. However, they do not contain mercury and are more compact. 7 Types of Equipment No one type of lighting is applicable to every protective lighting situation. Amid the great profusion of equipment in the market, there are four basic light types that are in general use in security applications: floodlights, searchlights, Fresnel lenses, and street - lights (see Figure 9-8 ). (The first three of these might in the strictest sense be considered as a single type because they are all basically reflection units in which a parabolic mirror directs the light in various ways. We will, however, deal with them separately.) Streetlights Streetlights are pendant lighting units that are built as either symmetrical or asymmetrical.

The symmetrical units distribute light evenly. These units are used where a large area is to be lighted without the need for highlighting particular spots. They are normally centrally located in the area to be illuminated. Asymmetrical units direct the light by reflection in the direction where light is required. They are used in situations where the lamp must be placed some distance from the target area.

Because these are not highly focused units, they do not create a glare problem.

Table 9-2 Types of Luminaire Lamps Found in a Maximum-Security Environment Lamp Type Mean Lume ns per Watt Start Restrike Nominal Life of Lamp (hrs.) Percent Lumen Maintena nce at Rated Life Color Discrimination Incandescent 4 (21) 22 * Instant Instant 750–1,000 85–90 Excellent Fluorescent 35 (62) 100 Rapid Rapid/Instant † 7,500–10,000 70–90 Excellent Metal halide 68 (80) 100 3–5 min. 10–20 min. 10,000–15,000 65–75 Excellent Mercury vapor 20 (48) 63 3–7 min. 3–6 min. 16,000–24,000 50–75 Good Sodium 92 (127) 140 4–7 min. Instant ‡ 16,000–24,000 75–85 Fair Xenon ARC __ Rapid/Instant Instant 1,500 — Excellent *4 (21) 22:4 = minimum mean; (21) =nominal rating for most protective lighting applications; 22 = maximum mean. †Low-temperature ballast must be considered.‡Instant for most lamps if less than 1 minute of power interruption but a\ reduced lumen output.__Used for searchlights only.Source: Richard Gigliotti and Ronald Jason, Security Design for Maximum Protection (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1984), p. 138. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

210 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY Streetlights are rated by wattage or even more frequently by lumens and in protective light- ing applications may vary from 4,000 to 10,000 lumens, depending on their use. Floodlights Floodlights are fabricated to form a beam so that light can be concentrated and directed to specific areas. They can create considerable glare. Although many floodlights specify beam width in degrees, they are generally referred to as wide, medium, or narrow, and the lamp is described in wattage. Lamps run from 300 to 1,000 watts in most protective applications. However, there is a wide latitude in this, and the choice of one will depend on a study of its mission.

Fresnel Lenses Fresnel lenses are wide-beam units, primarily used to extend the illumination in long, hori- zontal strips to protect the approaches to the perimeter barrier. Unlike floodlights and searchlights, which project a focused round beam, Fresnel lenses project a narrow, horizon - tal beam that is approximately 180° in the horizontal plane and from 18° to 30° in the vertical plane.

FIGURE 9-8 Typical equipment for protective lighting. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 211 These units are especially good for creating a glare for the intruder while the facility remains in comparative darkness. They are normally equipped with a 300- to 500-watt lamp.

Searchlights Searchlights are highly focused incandescent lamps that are used to pinpoint potential trouble spots. They can be directed to any location inside or outside the property, and although they can be automated, they are normally controlled manually. They are rated according to wattage, which may range from 250 to 3,000 watts, and to the diameter of the reflector, which may range from 6 inches to 2 feet (the average is around 18 inches). The beam width is from 3° to 10°, although this may vary in adjustable or focusing models.

Maintenance As with every other element of a security system, electrical circuits and fixtures must be inspected regularly to replace worn parts, verify connections, repair worn insulation, check for corrosion in weatherproof fixtures, and clean reflecting surfaces and lenses. Lamps should be logged as to their operational hours and replaced at between 80 and 90 percent of their rated life.

Perimeter Lighting Every effort should be made to locate lighting units far enough inside the fence and high enough to illuminate areas both inside and outside the boundary. The farther outside the boundary the lighted areas extend, the more readily guards will be able to detect the approach of an intruder. Light should be directed down and away from the protected area. The location of light units should be such that they avoid throwing a glare into the eyes of the guard, do not create shadow areas, and create instead a glare problem for anyone approaching the boundary. Fixtures used in barrier and approach lighting should be located inside the barrier. As a rule of thumb, they should be around 30 feet within the perimeter, spaced 150 feet apart, and about 30 feet high. These figures are, of course, approximations and will not apply to every installa - tion. Local conditions will always dictate placement. Floodlights or Fresnel lenses are indicated in illuminating isolated or semi-isolated fence boundaries where some glare is called for. In either case, it is important to light from 20 feet inside the fence to as far into the approach as is practical. In the case of the isolated fence, this could be as much as 250 feet. Semi-isolated and non-isolated fence lines cannot be lighted as far into the approach because such lighting is restricted by streets, highways, and other occu - pancies. Because glare cannot be employed in illuminating a non-isolated fence line, street - lights are recommended. Where a building of the facility is near the perimeter or is itself part of the perimeter, lights can be mounted directly on it. Doorways of such buildings should be individually lighted to eliminate shadows cast by other illumination. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

212 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY In areas where the property line is on a body of water, lighting should be designed to elimi - nate shaded areas on or near the water or along the shoreline. This is especially true for piers and docks, where both land and water approaches must be either lighted or capable of being lighted on demand. Before finalizing any plans for protective lighting in the vicinity of navi - gable waters, however, the U.S. Coast Guard must be consulted.

Gates and Thoroughfares It is important that the lighting at all gates and along all interior thoroughfares be sufficient for the operation of the facility. Because both pedestrian and vehicular gates are normally staffed by guards inspecting cre - dentials as well as checking for contraband or stolen property, it is critical that the areas be lighted to at least 2 foot-candles. Pedestrian gates should be lighted to about 25 feet on either side of the gate if possible, and the range for vehicular gates should be twice that distance.

Street lighting is recommended in these applications, but floodlights can also be used if glare is strictly controlled. Thoroughfares used for pedestrians, vehicles, or forklifts should be lighted to 0.10 fc for security purposes. Much more light may be required for operational efficiency, but this level should be maintained as a minimum, no matter what the conditions of traffic may be.

Other Areas Open or unroofed areas within the perimeter, but not directly connected to it, require an overall intensity of illumination of about 0.05 fc (up to 0.10 fc in areas of higher sensitivity).

These areas, when they are nonoperational, are usually used for material storage or for park - ing. Particularly vulnerable installations in the area should not, according to many experts, be lighted at all, but the approaches to them should be well lighted for at least 20 feet to aid in the observation of any movement. Searchlights may be indicated in some facilities, especially in remote mountainous areas or in waterfront locations where small boats could readily approach the facility.

General A well-thought-out plan of lighting along the security barrier and the approaches to it ; an adequate overall level of light in storage, parking, and other nonoperational areas within the perimeter; and reasonable lighting along all thoroughfares are essential to any basic security program. The lighting required in operational areas will usually be much higher than the mini - mums required for security and will, therefore, serve a security purpose as well. Can better lighting be sold to security management on the basis of cost-effectiveness? High- pressure sodium lighting uses about 50 percent less energy to produce the same light as older, incandescent streetlights. Sodium systems have a lumens-per-watt efficiency five or six times that of incandescent lighting and produce 106 percent more light than do the most common mercury streetlights, but use about 14 percent less electricity. Table 9-3 compares wattage ranges, lumens, and rated life for six basic lamp families. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 213 Planning Security No business exists without a security problem of some kind, and no building housing a busi - ness is without security risk. Yet few such buildings are ever designed with much thought given to the steps that must eventually be taken to protect them from criminal assault. A building must be many things in order for it to satisfy its occupant. It must be functional and efficient, achieve certain aesthetic standards, be properly located and accessible to the markets served by the occupant, and provide security from interference, interruption, and attack. Most of these elements are provided by the architect, but all too frequently the impor - tant element of security is overlooked. Good security requires thought and planning that results in a carefully integrated system. Most security problems arise, in large part, because no one has anticipated and planned for them. This is especially true where a company building is concerned. Only now are many archi - tecture credentialing programs providing any training on security matters. Therefore, many building designs do little to deter burglars or vandals. When building owners give insufficient consideration to security during the planning stages, buildings are erected that may inadver - tently provide opportunities for crime.

Summary Physical security devices are the most commonly thought of security measures. The discussion in this chapter covered security measures that are as old as security, as well as new technolo - gies that are improving these basic concepts. Clear zones, moats, and fences still exist, but are Table 9-3 Six Basic Lamp Families Type of Lamp Wattage Range Initial Lumens † per Watt Including Ballast Losses Average Rated Life (Hours) Sodium 35–1,000 15–130 7,500–24,000 * Metal halide 70–2,000 69–115 5,000–20,000 Mercury vapor Standard 40–1,000 24–60 12,000–24,000 * Self-ballasted 160–1,250 14–25 12,000–20,000 Fluorescent 4–215 14–95 6,000–20,000 * Incandescent 15–1,500 8–24 750–3,500 *Data are based on the more commonly used lamps and are provided for comparison purposes only. Actual results to be derived depend on factors unique to the specific products and installation involved. Consult manufacturers for guidance.†Lumens (of light output) per watt (of power input) is a common measu\ re of lamp efficiency. Initial lumens-per-watt data are based on the light output of lamps when new. The light output of most lamps declines with use. The actual efficiency to be derived from a lamp depends on factors unique to an installation. The actual efficiency of a lighting system depends on far more than the efficiency of lamps or lamps/ballasts alone. More than efficiency should be considered when evaluating a lighting system.Source: John P. Bachner, “The Myths and Realities Behind Security Lighting,” Security Management (August 1990): 109. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

214 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY now augmented with state-of-the-art sensors and computerized monitoring stations. The next two chapters focus on specific basic security measures that protect the interior as well as the exterior of facilities. These basic tools are the fundamentals of which all security professionals should have at least conversational knowledge.

CASE STUDY You are the security director for IBID International, a large manufacturer. You have assigned one of your staff to conduct a security survey of the company’s exterior grounds. You have received the report and now must approve or disapprove each recommendation. Your approved recommendations will be presented to senior management for final approval and funding.

CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 1. Senior management requires all expenditures over $10,000 to go to the capital expenditure committee (a 6-month process). 2. Senior management is concerned about your large head count.

3. Your personal bias is for security operations to be “low profile.” 4. Your plant is in a low-threat environment.

5. If approved, expensive items can be costed out over six years according to company policy.

PHYSICAL SURVEY REPORT 1. There are no perimeter lights around company property. The city provides streetlights, causing deep shadow along the perimeter.

RECOMMENDATION: Initiate a major perimeter lighting program involving placement of mercury vapor lights in such a manner as to effectively illuminate the property perimeter. COST:

$45,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE 2. The property presently lacks any perimeter fence.

RECOMMENDATION: Install 7-foot high steel chain link fencing topped with triple-strand barbed wire. This will prevent access to all but authorized personnel, visitors, etc. COST: $800,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE 3. At present, employees and visitors park in three separate unguarded, unlighted and open parking lots.

RECOMMENDATION: To insure protection of visitors and personnel and their vehicles, the following recommendations are made:

l Establish regular security patrols of parking lots. COST: $0 (change in patrol patterns) APPROVE DISAPPROVE l Light parking lots to a level where vehicles can be observed clearly 24 hours a day. COST: $15,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE l Use closed circuit cameras to monitor parking areas. COST: $7,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE l Place an emergency phone in each parking lot. COST: $ 400 APPROVE DISAPPROVE Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Chapter 9 l The Outer Defenses 215 Review Questions 1. What four lines of protection should be included in physical security planning?

2. How can the various openings in a perimeter be effectively protected and secured?

3. Why should parking not be allowed inside the controlled perimeter?

4. Discuss the different security applications for the various types of lighting equipment.

5. What considerations must be taken into account when installing a security lighting system?

References [1] Security and the chain link fence. Security December 1996:91.

[2] Cumming N. In: Security: the comprehensive guide to equipment selection and installation. London: Architectural Press; 1987. pp. 70–109. [3] Anderson T. Laying down the law: a review of trends in liability lawsuits. Secur Manage October 2002:43–51.

[4] Illuminating Engineering Society of North America, Guideline for Light for People, Property, and Public Spaces, Security Lighting Committee, 2003. [5] Kangas S. Lighting the way to better business. Secur Manage September 1996:85.

[6] Ibid., p. 84.

[7] Ibid., pp. 85–6. l Establish a vehicle sticker program to aid in identifying authorized vehicles. COST: $1200 APPROVE DISAPPROVE l Combine all parking areas into one large lot for better overall protection. COST: $125,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE l Fence in the two existing parking areas for employees using electronic gates operated by an electronic pass system. COST $62,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE l Purchase a scooter-type vehicle for parking lot patrols. COST $3,650 APPROVE DISAPPROVE 4. There is no access control at any of the four points of vehicle entry and exit.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish all-weather entry control points staffed 24 hours a day to control access on and off the plant property.

l Five all-weather guard huts @ $10,000 each. COST: $50,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE l Sixteen new positions to staff all entry points. COST: $200,000 APPROVE DISAPPROVE NARRATIVE: You need to succinctly, clearly and logically explain the rationale for each decision. The narrative should strive to briefly present each problem, and why the suggestions are being approved or disapproved. Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:21:18.

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