Based on the File attached Write one 1.5 pages of BATNA ( BATNA should be linked to CASE nad the NEGOTIATION Case Topic https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/international-negotiation-daily/top-10-inter

Challenges and Solutions in Cross-Cultural Negotiation

Sukhraj Kaur Brar (1814906)

Lakshmi Mutyala (1711456)

Gagandeep kaur (1814562)

Harpreet kaur (1810262)

Rakesh Chaganti (1812790)

University Canada West

MGMT 645: Negotiations

Professor: Dalton Grady

September 18, 2020

Word Count: 5056

Introduction

Negotiations are part and parcel of our everyday life, and since time immemorial, people from different backgrounds, cultures, gender, and social status have been involved in negotiations. Negotiations help people, countries, or businesses build better relationships, find solutions to problems, or end conflicts (Lewicki et al. 2016). When people from different cultures negotiate, it is referred to as an intercultural or cross-cultural negotiation. The current world encourages the country to country trade, capital flows, technology spread, and foreign investments, and thus, governments have to draw up agreements/treaties to regulate bilateral/multilateral issues. Before signing the treaties, countries need to negotiate the issues to be agreed on and thus engage in cross-cultural negotiations (Lewicki et al. 2016). According to Thompson (2020), negotiation ignites emotions due to the differences in values and beliefs. Therefore, the negotiating parties need to uphold Cultural Intelligence (C.Q.) if the negotiations are to be effective.

Cultural differences are challenging for negotiations. In our report, we will analyze the U.S.A-Russia negotiation in 2013 between the former U.S. President Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin, the present Russian president, which, unfortunately, reached an impasse. Our analysis of the negotiation will be rooted in the topic ‘Challenges and Solutions in Cross-Cultural Negotiations.’ Russia and America are the two countries having completely different cultures. Although the two countries are potent countries, with large economies, and socially and culturally diverse, our report will show how cultural differences played a part in the failed negotiations.

According to Thompson (2020) cross-cultural negotiations are challenging, and the differences in behaviours, values, and beliefs of the parties affect the possibility of reaching integrative agreements. U.S-Russia negotiation is an excellent example of such a situation. To illustrate, the U.S.A.'s values and beliefs regarding the LGBTQ community affected the negotiation process.

Through research, the report will highlight the difference in culture between Russia and the U.S. A when it comes to their involvement in international negotiations with people from other cultures and builds a case analysis on why the 2013 summit was cancelled between the two nations. The analysis will show how the negotiations could have improved and possibly create a solution to the issues and recommendations of what should have happened using negotiation concepts and strategies based on cross-cultural negotiations.

Summary of the Case

Barack Obama, the serving president of the United States of America in the years 2009 to 2017, was involved in a negotiation in the year 2013 with the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, who assumed the position in 2012 and is still is the President of Russia to date. The negotiation issues comprised arms control, human rights and civil society, trade and commercial relations, and proposal to cooperate in the Syrian war and missile defense (Tapper & Cohen, 2013). The two presidents, however, did not reach an agreement, and according to Pon Staff (2017) on August 7, 2013, Barack Obama announced the cancellation of the summit that was due in September the same year, revealing that he was disappointed in how the negotiation was progressing. Putin's assistant also told the press that Putin was equally disappointed by Obama's decision during a press conference. Still, they were ready to continue working together to solve the bilateral and multilateral issues at hand.

Barack Obama’s Reasons for Cancelling the Talks

Barack Obama publicly revealed why the U.S. administration was unwilling to continue with the talks. Firstly, the president announced gaps of trust between the two countries that had not yet closed, making the negotiations hard. Obama, for example, identified the anti-gay laws that Russia had recently passed. He termed the move as "a way to mistreat the LGBTQ" community (Marcus, 2013). The law did not favor the two countries' shared plans to tackle issues that revolved around human rights, which created a trust issue. Obama also acknowledged that Russia was a U.S. ally. Yet, they had offered Edward Snowden a one-year asylum in Moscow and continued to provide him with a three-year residency. Snowden, an ex C.I.A. employee, and an American citizen facing espionage charges in the U.S., disclosed highly classified National Security Agency (N.S.A.) to the Americans and fled the country (Marcus, 2013). Russia's decision to offer him asylum was not taken by the U.S. kindly as it was an indication of a cold war mindset by Russia. Snowden was in possession of U.S. surveillance information that could be used against the country, thus creating trust issues between Washington and Moscow (Tapper & Cohen, 2013).

Secondly, Obama also revealed his administration had not identified significant progress when it came to the bilateral agenda with Russia. The White House had before Putin's term been involved in negotiations with the then-president Dmitry Medvedev, and some progress had been observed. Still, Putin's term had proven futile concerning talks with the U.S. (Tapper & Cohen, 2013). The statement suggests Putin's administration may have been not cooperative, or Putin's perceptions about the U.S. president may have been misconstrued.

Thirdly, Obama was serving his last term, and he wanted to concentrate on other issues affecting Americans instead of engaging in talks that he felt were 'unlikely to advance' (Pon Staff, 2017). The decision may have been a strategy to sway Russia's decision. The president may have had a heuristic and cognitive bias when it involved Putin, considering he had made progress with Dmitry Medvedev.

Lastly, assistants of Obama revealed Putin's administration was delaying their responses to the U.S. regarding proposals. Therefore, it brought the idea to cancel the talks as it seemed the Putin administration was disinterested in the summit (Shonk, 2013).

Vladimir Putin’s Perceived Reason why U.S. Cancelled the Talks

Firstly, the Russian president believed his country's decision to house Snowden was the main reason as to why the U.S. administration cancelled the summit that was to be held in September 2013 (Tapper & Cohen, 2013). Additionally, according to Tapper & Cohen (2013), Putin believed the move to cancel the talks was an indication by the U.S. that they were not ready to 'build equal relations with Russia.'

Secondly, the Russian officials believed Obama was not committed to the talks as he was running for the presidency. Therefore, domestic politics divided his attention from the planned negotiations (Shonk, 2013).

Insights into the U.S.A and Russian Cultures

Russia

U.S. A

Government type

Federal state with low scores when it comes to political and civil rights.

Federal government with a strong democratic tradition.

Communication

Prefer direct spoken word during negotiations and are offended by indirectness.

Find written clear- to- the point communication fast and efficient.

Power

Those higher in the hierarchy are the decision-makers and sending a low-ranking official to negotiations is not appreciated.

Low-level officials can be used to serve as representatives in negotiations.

Dress Code

Prefer dressing in formal, expensive suits. They expect elegance dressing during meetings with people from other cultures.

Much emphasis is not put on dressing expensive rather, and they should be formal in business meetings.

Business Meetings

The meetings are formal and being casual is seen as disrespectful.

Meetings are less casual.


Challenges in the USA-Russia Summit 2013

Expanding the Pie

It is a method in which parties from different cultures can interpret integrative agreements. The difference in cultural communication styles may have been a barrier to expanding the pie in the negotiation between the U.S. and Russia. According to Thompson (2020), parties can create value by communicating their underlying interests. The U.S. believed Dmitry Medvedev was a better negotiator than Putin, and that is why the two countries' relations had negotiated since Putin had assumed power in 2012. The situation could have been caused by the parties' failure to expand the pie. The two parties did not determine their opponent's underlying interests and priorities, thus limiting their communication. For instance, the Russian government did not understand the U.S.A.'s human rights issues involving gay rights issues were of importance. On the other hand, the U.S. government did not understand Russia imposed the law to protect children's innocence, a belief that is highly held in Russia.

Stereotyping

Semnani-Azad et al. (2012) point out that stereotypes affect perception, and it may therefore affect the emotions directed towards a social group. Russia is a collectivist culture, and thus, their values and beliefs are rooted to protect the community and family values over individuals. Russia's administration termed the illegalization of marriage as a move to uphold traditional values and protect the Russian children from encountering unhealthy information. However, Obama addressed his concerns, saying the enactment of an anti-gay law was an open invitation to intimidate the LGBTQ community in Russia. He had no patience for such countries (Marcus, 2013). The U.S. president stereotyped the Russian government as a group that was traditional and their laws as backward, and therefore, they had negative emotions towards the negotiations. The stereotype thus prompted the U.S. administration to cancel the planned September 2013 talks.

Biased Punctuation of Conflict

According to Aje et al. (2018), Russia and the U.S. have a long history of distrust, struggle for dominance, and suspicion. Biased punctuation conflict enhances misunderstandings since one party believes the other is to blame for an action. The U.S. expressed Russia's decision to offer Snowden was because Russia had a cold war mindset. It shows that the U.S. believed Russia’s actions were always hostile and aggressive towards the U.S. And therefore, Russia was to blame for the challenges they were experiencing in the negotiation. On the other hand, Russia blamed Obama for being too distracted by domestic politics as he was running for his second term as president. He was not giving all the attention to the planned summit (Shonk, 2013).

Dividing the Pie

Both the U.S. and Russia had high aspirations. The negotiating parties failed to see their need for cooperation as all parties wanted the bigger pie for themselves. The U.S. and Russia are in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SART) that limits the number of nuclear warheads each state possesses. The treaty was supposed to be reviewed in 2013 since it was to expire in 2012. The cancellation of the summit may have been because Russia has advanced technology for controlling nuclear weapons and changing/limiting their missile defense and arms control, which increases their economic gains; the idea may have been met with resistance as they wanted the bigger pie for themselves.

Sacred Values

The two countries failed to realize they have different beliefs and values. For instance, the Russian view that open discussions in front of children regarding gays is a taboo created a challenge for the negotiation process.

Distrust

According to Alexandra et al. (2017), the Russians are low on social cynicism than the Americans. Social cynicism controls an individual's trust levels and testing high on it shows likeliness of having distrust for an opponent in negotiation. Obama's reaction when Russia offered Snowden asylum was that he did not trust the Russians. The ex C.I.A. and N.S.A. employee faced espionage charges in the U.S., and Obama was concerned that Putin was using him to declare a cold war as he owned important political and military information of the American intelligence. Distrust from the U.S. government challenged the negotiation proceedings.

Naïve Realism

The U.S. believed their way to approaching issues was better compared to that of Russia. The White House belief that talks with Russia was not constructive shows they thought Putin had negative attributes compared to his predecessor Dmitry Medvedev. That is why progress had slowed down when it came to bilateral agreements between the two countries.

Faulty perceptions of conciliation and coercion

Obama's move to cancel the talks may have been a negotiation strategy to coerce Putin into putting more effort into the negotiations or putting them in an ambiguous position, which according to Russia, is not appreciated. According to Shonk (2013), Putin's administration was not responding to the U.S. proposals. Still, on the contrary, Putin expressed he was not ready to agree to any terms or make any compromises. The president expressed he would only go back to the negotiating table if the U.S. administration wished to do so by saying Obama’s invitation to St. Petersburg was still open.


The Reservation and Target Points

The United States of America remained steadfast in the commitment of ending the Islamic State in Syria. However, intentions on other developing issues has become ambiguous. In 2017, U.S President Donald Trump informed the news reporters that the United States has "no interest with Syria other than killing and eradicating the Islamic State." However, at that point, it was rooted deeply in the involvement in the conjuring of a peace deal between opposition forces and government. The administration of the Current president Trump sends mixed signals on whether the US would oppose a peace deal that kept Bashar-al Assad in power (DW News, 2017)

Washington supported the Geneva United Nations peace talks that were held in 2012; between the Bashar-al Assad government representatives and the Syrian rebellious opposition (DW News, 2017). The negotiations have proved to be futile and disappointing as they have failed to reach a successful breakthrough. Both sides disagree on Bashar-al Assad's departure and any coverings of this in the final settlement.

Moscow has for the longest supported the Bashar-al Assad regime. It has made provisions of government troops equipped with artillery and air support and weapons; as well as a strong diplomatic backing in the United Nations and in the international peace talks. Russia has also provided troops on the ground.

Russia first intervention for Syria began in September 2015 when it initiated airstrikes intended for the "terrorist" targets. While Moscow holds claim in targeting Islamic State and any terrorist groups, United States continuously reject that claim by saying Russia’s airstrikes are mainly directed towards the non-Islamic State rebel forces fighting the Bashar-al Assad’s government. meanwhile, The Kremlin, accused the United States for using campaigns rebuking The Islamic State as a crafty device to slow down the Syrian and Russian military advances (DW News, 2017).

Russia wants to maintain Bashar-al Assad as a close ally based in the Middle East, mainly for assurances in power and security for its military affluence in various regions (DW News, 2017). It already has an airbase in the western province, Latakia as well as a naval base in Tartus in the port city. The Russian officials support a peace deal with a wide and open-minded consensus among the Syrian moderate factions to ensure Bashar-al Assad to retain Syria’s power. It has also implied that support may be limited autonomously for opposing forces only in certain regions in Syria.

While in support of the Geneva negotiations, Russia has as well sponsored new talks between the Syria’s government and the opposition. The talks began in January 2017 and strive for creation of no conflict zones (DW News, 2017).

However, this is highly unlikely especially in the cases where the personality of the Russian president is vague and little background information about him is known. Putin has a distaste and loath for both the United States of America and the former president Barrack Obama himself, heck, lets put NATO in the picture (James Stavridis, 2016). Putin has the tendency to pour all his contempt to the West, personally the thought of these tendencies and his involvement and ranks in the KGB might be a factor of consideration. With an unclear mindset and self-feeding ego, the point of reservation cannot be arrived upon smoothly and as such the battle of the wits while negotiating need to come into play as they are uttermost necessary.


BATNA in The Syrian Civil War and Crisis Negotiations

According to the theory of negotiation, the best alternative to negotiated agreements mainly refers to the most advantageous course of action a negotiation partisan can take in the case the negotiations prove futile and signs of reaching an agreement seems impossible. Many at times, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is the realization that the negotiation themselves may be worthy of the risk. Back in May 2012, the United States and Russia made the announcement of plans to hold a peace conference whose main agenda was to end the civil war occurring in Syria, which had left more than 70,000 dead during that time.

The BATNA could be inclusive of a diverse array such as; suspending the negotiations, transition to other negotiating partners, appealing in courts of law, and formation of other alliances. The best alternative negotiating agreement’s main area of concern is to ensure success of negotiations by offering the way forward. The negotiating party should generally reject resolutions if they are worse, than as when compared to its BATNA.

The disputing parties must willingly come to agree to the belief that neither party “is likely succeed and achieve total victory, the only practically realistic outcome is the use of a negotiated settlement,” according to Hill. They rely on the aid of external parties that includes the United States government, to make necessary arrangements and ensure they find common grounds.

A lot has changed in Syria, and the relations between the United States and Russia since then, however, there remains a lot of lessons to learn, The Program on Negotiation Chairman Robert Mnookin analyzed a common dilemma of when to engage and avoid an unsavory party in times of negotiations. Its is common for people to hastily decide to avoid disputes and walk away from negotiations, they may also turn to the courts of law to resolve the disputes. Irrational emotional outbursts are responsible for clouding judgement causing us to err, mostly favoring no negotiations (Mnookin 2010).

In his book, Mnookin acknowledges that principles of integrity, honor and identity are significant contributing factors on deciding whether to hold negotiations with the enemy whom we perceive as irrational. However, when we rely on neutral judgments to aid in analyzing situations, as they could become dangerous snares. The vitality in negotiating, according to Mnookin, is to mainly recognize the moral judgments that should involve the interaction between acentric intuition and analysis. On the other hand, rejecting negotiations may lead to the indirect harm your representatives leaving one to have a greater moral obligation to negotiate.

Impact of Dimensions of Cultures on the Negotiation

According to Hofstede (2011), there are five dimensions to culture. These cultural dimensions affect negotiations as it shapes the perceptions of negotiators. We have linked some of these dimensions to culture and their impact on the U.S.A-Russia negotiation.

Power Distance

The Russians believe individuals are not equal, and those in power have the capacity to decide on behalf of the less powerful. On the other hand, the U.S. believes although there are influential people in society, people should be involved in decision making. The difference in the level of power distance between the two countries created tension between the two countries as the U.S. believed Russia should engage public opinion before enacting laws such as the ‘banning gay marriages’ laws.

Individualism/Collectivism

The Russians are a collectivist society. The leaders' decisions are interdependent on the community while the U.S. is an individualistic state; therefore, the in-group members do not affect negotiation outcomes. Therefore, the Russian president has to make decisions based on family and societal values and norms, and thus it may affect their decision process and time taken to make decisions.

Uncertainty Avoidance

The Russians do not like ambiguous situations, and therefore, they are always finding strategies to ensure they remain in control. That may have been a critical factor in why they decided to offer Snowden asylum to avoid being manipulated by the U.S. during the negotiation. In contrast, the U.S. is a country that is reasonably open to new ideas and believes in freedom of expression of individuals; however, attacks from terrorists (such as the 9/11 attack) makes them distrust any country that does show signs of manipulation. Therefore, the fear may have affected their perception of Russia when they could not agree on nuclear arms control issues, and they housed Snowden, a former employee of the American Central Intelligence Agency.

Recommendations that would have helped the Negotiation Parties

Intercultural negotiations are challenging, and their success depends on the parties' actions and understanding of their opponents. Our team has some recommendations that would have seen the U.S-Russia negotiation reach an integrative agreement.

Learning the other Parties’ Culture

Both the U.S. and Russia are countries with different cultures, and therefore their beliefs, behavior, language, and practices are different. The differences in culture affect negotiators' bargaining practices (Hofstede et al. 2012). Familiarizing oneself with the opponent’s culture helps to smoothen the communication process. For instance, Thompson (2020) informs us U.S.A is an individualistic culture and Russia is a collectivist. The two countries, therefore, may assume different motivations when negotiating due to the leaders’ beliefs. The U.S. may consequently assume a competitive approach and Russia cooperative. Putin's sentiments show they were willing to go back to the negotiating table if U.S. A changed their mind; however, Obama revealed he was impatient with countries that have anti-gay laws.

The U.S. administration was supposed to research and learn that Russia makes laws while considering the impact on the community and family values since it is a collectivist state. They would have, therefore, instead of cancelling the negotiations, sat at the table and come up with a law that would enhance the human rights of the LGTBQ community if they better understood the Russian culture.

Therefore, from the illustration, the U.S. and Russian governments have not efficiently learned each other's' culture. Other important aspects of culture that may affect negotiations are such as the form of communication (direct/indirect), power considerations (how they view power and hierarchy), way of dressing during negotiations (formal/informal), level of emotional constraint, and the opponent's sense of time.

Cultural-Perspective Taking

Cultural perspective-taking helps parties claim more value since they know how the other party behaves during negotiations. Lee et al (2013) suggests, negotiators who engage in cultural perspective taking are more likely to consider their opponent's interests, priorities, and alternatives before a negotiation. Therefore, it will increase their ability to adapt to bargaining strategies that are not normal according to their culture and thus easing the interaction of the two parties. For instance, the White House revealed no significant progress between the two states concerning their bilateral agenda (Tapper & Cohen, 2013), an indication the two countries' communication was ineffective. Perspective-taking by both Russia and the U.S. may have helped the parties understand what the opponent wanted since they would have decreased their stereotypic tendencies and distrust and communicated efficiently.

Learning about the U.S. and Russia's History

According to Charap (2010), the U.S. and Russia have had issues, and only in the Obama's and Dmitry Medvedev presidential errors did they seem to reduce. The author points out the sources of tension between the U.S. and Russia. Firstly, the two countries do not agree when it comes to issues dealing with international security. The U.S. has always opposed Russia's proposal to implement a new European Security treaty.

Secondly, the U.S. and Russia have always conflicted due to their differences in values. The U.S. feels Russia's administrations limit people's freedoms since their political rules restrict the public's participation and enhance human rights violations. Lastly, under Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian government insisted the Soviet Union states should be free to make personal decisions despite the foreign policies in place.

Putin's and Obama's government should have first try to solve the three issues before bringing in more issues to the negotiations table. Understanding the history of conflict would have aided in easing their bilateral relationship and reduce its impact on negotiation.

Building Bridges across the two Cultures

The U.S. and Russian administrations could have focused on the commonalities they have, such as the joint effort to help the Syrian economy regain its strength. According to Wittenkamp (2018), there is a learning curve to negotiations, and it has four distinct phases.

These are:

Stage/Phase

Illustration

1.The unknown unknowns

Refers to when a negotiator is ignorant.

2. Known unknowns

Interaction with the negotiator reveals the need to learn.

3.Known knowns

A negotiator understands the opponent's culture.

4. Knowns

The learner is ad versant with their opponent's culture, and it is no longer an issue.

The U.S. and Russia administrations are not in the 'knowns' phase yet, and therefore, it makes it hard for them to adapt to each other's culture and, thus, comfortably understand each other's interests and goals. Judging from Putin and Obama's administrations' animosity, their perceptions of each other do not enhance mutual understanding. Understanding what your opponent wants by learning their motives by asking relevant questions also reduces the trust issues between the parties. The two governments should have first negotiated the most critical issues and coming to a consensus would motivate them to continue negotiating on other issues.

Adopting new negotiation Processes

The U.S. administration should not have compared Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev but rather try to work with Putin. The White House reached progress on negotiations as quicker when Medvedev was president. Negotiators need to understand that in as much as people are from the same culture, they may also have different ideologies, beliefs, personalities, and attitudes. It may therefore affect other negotiation instances and having the same expectations every time one negotiates with a person from the same culture is not advisable. Obama's administration should have strived to understand Putin as an individual that is his way of thinking, communicating, and decision-making. They should have also adopted new strategies since the previous administration was not the same. Thompson (2020) warns stereotyping affects negotiation since cultures change and grows, and therefore individuals are likely to change their economic, social, and political thinking. It is, therefore, essential for negotiators to maintain flexibility in negotiations.

Learn about the Other Parties’ Language

Earlier, an insight into the Russian and U.S. culture revealed the two countries operate differently when it comes to communication culture. The U.S. culture allows for written communication, while the Russians prefer face-to-face communication. According to Jackson (2014), communication efficiency is enhanced when one is conversant with the other party's language, both verbal and non-verbal. One of the U.S.A.'s administrations for cancelling the planned summit was because the Russian officials were not replying to their proposals. The Russians may have wanted the U.S.A to talk to them instead of sending written proposals directly. The move to not respond to the proposals may have been a non-verbal way of Russia demanding face-to-face meetings with the U.S. administration. It is, therefore, important that parties understand how their opponents communicate.

Additionally, the U.S. complained of delayed negotiations with little progress. Language may have played a big part in delaying negotiations. Most negotiations are conducted in English (Jackson, 2014), and it may have affected how the Russians understood the message. The country's official language is Russian. Therefore, written English may not have been the best way to communicate since the interpretations may have been different in their language, thus causing delayed responses.

Conclusion

Cross-cultural negotiations are challenging, and reaching integrative agreements needs negotiators to have Cultural Intelligence (C.Q.). C.Q. is essential as intercultural negotiations evoke emotional feelings due to the beliefs and values of negotiators. U.S. and Russia's September 2013 cancelled summit is an example of a cross-cultural negotiation that reached an impasse. Obama cancelled the meeting due to some challenges such as ineffective pie expanding and dividing strategies that failed to create value, stereotyping, blame games, distrust, and belief in sacred values. Their cultural dimension may heavily impact the two countries' lack of agreement regarding power distance, individualism/collectivism, or their level of uncertainty avoidance.

In future negotiations, the two countries may be recommended to learn each other's cultures, adopt new negotiation processes, and build bridges across the U.S. and Russian cultures to find a commonality in their issues. It is also vital for the two countries to practice cultural perspective-taking and learn their history regarding relations and negotiations. In this way, future negotiations may be successful and bear fruits compared to 2013 failed one.






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