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Strategic and Moral Dilemmas of Corporate Philanthropy in Developing Countries: Heineken in Sub-Saharan Africa Katinka C. Van Cranenburgh •Daniel Arenas Received: 29 October 2012 / Accepted: 7 June 2013 / Published online: 17 June 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 AbstractThis case study illustrates the dilemmas facing multinational companies in meeting social challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa (especially health-related ones). It also discusses the purpose, responsibilities and limitations of business involvement in social development. From a business standpoint, social challenges in developing countries differ greatly from those in nations where governments or markets effectively provide for the popu- lation’s health needs. The case illustrates what led a mul- tinational to set up a corporate foundation and focuses on three strategic and operational dilemmas it ran up against.

The case discussion shows that the ethical issues inter- twined with these dilemmas are best understood using a variety of ethical approaches. We also show that Ethics of Care are just as relevant to analysing corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy as the Deonto- logical and Utilitarianism theories commonly used in business ethics.

KeywordsCorporate philanthropy Development Health-care Heineken Ethical theories Ethics of Care Sub-Saharan AfricaIntroduction With rising numbers of corporations taking up quasi- governmental roles (Valente and Crane2010) in develop- ing countries, managers are confronted with operational, strategic and ethical decisions that were formerly the pre- serve of government. This study gives a glimpse into the black box of decision making by the managers of a cor- porate foundations (‘CF’ hereinafter) operating in Sub- Saharan Africa. In this case, the CF is closely linked to its sponsor, a large multinational beer brewer. The rm set up the foundation as a result of its growing role in society.

Managers faced operational and strategic dilemmas con- cerning the host-countries’ poor public healthcare provi- sion and in coming up with effective solutions. Unique access to the Foundation Board’s decision making let us analyse management through the lenses of several business ethics theories.

This article falls into four parts. The rst part is a literature review on problems encountered by CFs in gen- eral and in the developing world in particular. It discusses how these problems can be solved and what the underlying ethical, strategic and operational perspectives are. The second part covers methodology. The third part looks at Heineken and the Heineken Africa Foundation (‘HAF’ hereinafter) in Sub-Saharan Africa and their healthcare initiatives, highlighting three operational dilemmas facing the Foundation’s managers. The fourth part contains the discussion, providing the authors’ view on: the dilemmas found in the case; the boundaries of private and public responsibilities; the underlying ethical principles guiding managers when dealing with social issues. In the last sec- tion, we review the main contributions of the paper, brie y discuss its limitations and make suggestions for future research.

K. C. Van Cranenburgh (&) Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] D. Arenas ESADE Business School, Ramon Lull University, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected] 123 J Bus Ethics (2014) 122:523–536 DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1776-1 Corporate Philanthropy in Developing Countries This section presents literature bearing on the status of and challenges in corporate philanthropy in general and the problems encountered by CFs dealing with development aid, how these problems can be solved and the underlying ethical, strategic and operational perspectives.

Corporate Philanthropy Literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) gener- ally distinguishes between two approaches. The rst calls for the integration of CSR programmes in the company strategy with a view to boosting both the business’ ‘bottom line’ and to bringing social and environmental bene ts for society at large. Rather than stressing companies’ and managers’ ethical duties towards society, this approach sees CSR as part of the drive for corporate competitiveness (Lee2008; McWilliams and Siegel2001; Wood and Jones 1995). This has been called ‘strategic CSR’ (Baron2001; Burke and Logsdon1996). Craig Smith (1994) used the concept of ‘shared value’, in arguing that philanthropic and business units should join forces to pursue charity strate- gies that would give their rms a big competitive edge.

More recently, Porter and Kramer (2011) stressed the nexus between corporate philanthropy and business strat- egies and linked social and environmental gain to pro ts.

They argued that fostering this nexus could boost the competitiveness of both society and companies. Expecta- tions go beyond just ensuring that rms’ products and services do not harm society to embrace the notion that rms should contribute to society’s general welfare and development (Valente and Crane2010). Either way, for many businesses, philanthropy and CSR are increasingly underpinning their business strategy. Growing corporate interest in CSR often stems from pressure from stake- holders—governments, NGOs, international entities, shareholders (both individual and institutional) and activ- ists. Through stakeholder management, companies aim to enhance their reputations and maintain their ‘social licence’ to operate. Companies are expected to both com- ply with the law and meet social expectations or duties (Van Tulder et al.2008).

The second approach is to see corporate philanthropy in terms of activities that serve society and entail little or no business gain—which could be called ‘altruistic CSR’ (Lantos2001) or ‘philanthropic responsibility’ (Carroll 1991). In turn, philanthropy can also be conducted strate- gically, as highlighted by the Erasmus Centre of Strategic Philanthropy 1(ECSP). The ECSP de nes philanthropy as‘voluntary action for the public good’ (Meijs2010). Meijs notes the impact of both philanthropic time and money, and mentions ‘controlled grant-making endowments from operating organisations’ as one of the planks of modern philanthropy. Whilst ‘corporate philanthropy’ is variously de ned, we will focus on CF as institutions serving society for little or no business gain.

Discussing the challenges of CF implies a wider ranging debate on corporate lobbying. Over the years, Arnove (1980,2007) has criticised CF for meddling in public policy and subverting the democratic process. Arnove (2007) researched three large CF in the US and found that whilst those foundations claimed to attack the root causes of ills of humanity, they essentially engaged in ameliorative practices to maintain social and economic systems that generate the very inequality and injustices they wish to correct(2007, p. 389). Arnove found that the main criti- cisms levelled at CF are their lack of public accountability, tax breaks, impact and the way they concentrate power into the hands of the few. According to Arnove (2007), CF pursue their own ends in lending support to civil society actors. If this were not damning enough, there is strong, growing criticism that philanthropic activities only bene t their sponsors. Smith (1994) noted various examples of social initiatives undertaken by corporations that make great PR but yield no social change. On the one hand, the private sector is under pressure to shoulder some of the world’s burdens such as HIV/AIDS, poverty and reaching the Millennium Development Goals (to mention just a few). On the other, it is criticised for playingPrima Donna and/or pursuing its own narrow aims. Most people would agree that a private company or its foundation cannot and should not usurp government’s role in providing public healthcare. However, over the last couple of decades there has been an unprecedented shift towards greater private sector involvement in achieving public goals (Maak2009; Valente and Crane2010). According to Kolk and van Tulder (2002), multinationals must not only serve as role models in their specialist business elds in developing countries but also take a much more generalist, all- embracing approach. In countries where the state is weak and con ict rife, governance problems are the most pressing ones (Kolk and Lenfant2012). The absence of effective government bodies and the limited capacity of NGOs have put pressure on large multinationals to step into the breach (Valente and Crane2010). However, 1The Erasmus Centre for Strategic Philanthropy (ECSP) aims to contribute to the overall performance and effectiveness of the Footnote 1 continued philanthropy sector. ECSP addresses the challenges and needs of all philanthropic organizations in Europe, which annually contribute over €50,000 m to a large variety of projects. The services are backed by an academic research program focused on practical and impact-ori- ented issues within philanthropy. (http://www.erim.eur.nl/research/ centres/strategic-philanthropy/). 524K. C. Van Cranenburgh, D. Arenas 123 usurping government powers and crowding out the state may have negative consequences for the corporation. As Arnove (1980,2007) noted, foundations can be accused of interfering with national approaches to and governmental strategies for public healthcare provision. Where do the company’s responsibilities end and the government’s begin? The question remains open.

The criticisms that CF wield excessive in uence and are ineffectual in achieving their social goals pose practical challenges for carrying out and managing philanthropic activities. Meijs (2010) identi ed two challenges CF face in trying to play a strategic role: (1) making philanthropic engagement more sustainable; (2) careful execution of operations, projects and activities to ensure they make an impact. Let us take a closer look at those challenges and review the pros and cons for different actors.

The rst challenge relates to practical issues in managing philanthropic activities so they have a long-term impact and money can be harvested now and in the future (Meijs2010).

Sustainability requires long-term commitment and tight project implementation and monitoring. Longer term com- mitments may also encourage other donors to pitch in. In some sectors, such as healthcare and education, nancially self-sustainable business models have proven well-nigh impossible, especially in underdeveloped countries. When funding running costs of projects, a corporate philanthropy organisation would commit support to the recipient over a longer period of time. This makes life more predictable for recipients and makes it likelier their work will prove effec- tive. Funding running costs means the recipient can focus on getting the job done instead of grubbing for money. It also gives recipients greater leeway and means they no longer have to fret about when the donor will turn the aid tap off (Barder2009). Arguments made against funding of running costs are that less funds will be available for new projects and that on-going funding on fewer projects could lead to fewer local initiatives, and less local capacity-building.

Fewer projects may dishearten company staff (nothing new to ‘sell’). Commitment to long-term projects also limits a foundation’s scope for manoeuvre (no way out). By avoid- ing funding operational costs, one can avoid the dependence often created by development aid (Valente and Crane2010).

Yet many authors have also claimed that cross-sector col- laboration is key (Kolk and Lenfant2012; Valente and Crane2010; Selsky and Parker2005), which implies longer term commitments.

Meijs’ second challenge concerns the need for proper execution to increase operational effectiveness. One might reasonably think that strong involvement of corporations’ subsidiaries raises the chances of proper execution and hence of project success. If a subsidiary is closely involved in the execution of philanthropic activities, a sense of ownership can develop—which motivates staff and spursgreater involvement. Furthermore, subsidiary managers and staff are often better placed to grasp the local community’s speci c needs than are the foundation’s managers, who wander from country to country or are headquarters-based.

Therefore, on-the-spot managers and staff can play a vital role in making projects more responsive to local needs.

Allowing local decision making shows the donors’ respect for local managers, cuts down on red tape and boosts local capacity-building (Barder and Birdsall2006). Arguments against local management of philanthropic activities relate to local human resource limitations. Furthermore, CSR in general and philanthropy in particular may motivate some business managers but not others (De Renzio and Woods 2008; Rodrigo and Arenas2008).

Another problem is de ning and measuring success.

Philanthropy can have different functions (Frumkin2006) and its success has been measured in terms of ef ciency as well as effectiveness (Gordon et al.2009; Stork and Woodlilla2007). One can express effectiveness in terms of social impact (Burdge and Vanclay1996; Latane´ 1981; Freudenburg1986). It is a challenge to strike the right balance between spending on measuring results and keep- ing overheads low. Measurement of results helps when deciding strategy, funding, delivery and communication.

External pressure might be another reason for measure- ment, as aid organisations are increasingly pressed to demonstrate their effectiveness (Ebrahim and Rangan 2010; Saxton and Guo2011 ; Murray2005; Carman and Fredericks2010). It could also help the recipient because rigorous reporting would attract future donors and allow them to see what works and what does not. Time scale is an important factor and scholars stress the need to measure long-term effects (Maas and Liket2011).

Developing Countries and Aid It is worth focusing on developing countries because multinationals are expanding there (Kolk and Lenfant 2012) and many CF focus on development and aid (Arnove 2007).

In the late 2000s, there was growing criticism, especially in The Netherlands, of ‘North–South’ philanthropy, charity and development aid (Easterly2001; Moyo2009; Murray 2005; Carman and Fredericks2010). The general public, as well as policy-makers, questioned the effectiveness of pouring tax revenue and donations into development aid.

Taxpayers and politicians are less willing to give aid when they cannot see results in far-away countries of which they know next to nothing. According to the critics, the millions of Euros lavished on aid did not raise GDP in recipient nations one iota.

There is erce debate on the barriers facing developing countries and little agreement on how to overcome them. Heineken in Sub-Saharan Africa525 123 Many see weak local government as the cause for under- development (Bauer1972), whilst others focus on: rampant corruption (Sachs2005), lack of control (Reinikka and Svensson2004), the failure of economic and political institutions [described in Acemoglu and Robinson’s book ‘Why Nations Fail’ (2012)]. Of one thing we can be sure— many parts of the world are cursed with: social, economic and political unrest; poverty; weak, unfair international systems; poor healthcare and education systems; woefully inadequate infrastructure. The developed world has been responding to these challenges in different ways.

The ‘from aid to trade’ credo gained ground in devel- oped countries, particularly in The Netherlands and many dismissed aid and philanthropy as old-fashioned. 2Yet multinationals have been doing ever more business in developing countries (London and Hart2004; Kolk and Lenfant2012), greatly broadening both the challenges and the scope for corporate philanthropy. Businesses came under increasing pressure from society to help solve Earth’s social and environmental problems, especially in The Third World. The next section presents a case study of a CF set up in response to societal demands. Although unique and not generalisable, the challenges faced by this foundation will prove relevant for scholars and practitio- ners studying and pursuing corporate philanthropy in developing countries. Before looking at the case, we shall outline the methodology used in this study.

Methodology This case study is based on material gathered during a 4-year organisational ethnography, covering the period August 2008 to July 2012. The ethnography was conducted by the rst author in her role as a manager of the Heineken Africa Foundation (HAF), a position created by Heineken when HAF was founded. She had unique access to the internal and external stakeholders at both headquarter and subsidiary level. Her unique position spanning actors in the company and the whole chain from the corporate centre to a clinic in Africa provided both deep engagement with the project and full access to qualitative and quantitative data.

The authors are fully aware of the risk of bias and did their best to be impartial. Even so, system thinking theory tells us that all researchers and authors are biased to some extent since they are all shaped by the system. Speaking of aca- deme’s role, Roome (2011) noted:We also become part ofthe system. This means I am not simply describing the system, rather I am ‘constructing’ the system.

The study data comprised: internal documents from the Heineken Africa Foundation (16 Minutes of advisory and trustee board meetings; 9 country visit reports; 73 general documents; theory of change; impact measurement; the- matic discussion papers; decision owcharts; organisation and structure discussion papers; articles of association; governance descriptions; nancial reports; quarterly project reports; audit reports; project submission, reporting and evaluation templates; publicly available documents, as well as a video and published material from the Heineken Health Symposium of the 3rd of October 2007) (Heineken 2007). We also used a documentary on Heineken’s healthcare provision in Nigeria by the Dutch TV pro- gramme2Vandaagas well as numerous publicly available documents from (research) organisations, media publica- tions and websites.

Ethnographies can be classi ed under a spectrum of descriptors ranging from ‘full observer’, ‘observer as par- ticipant’, ‘participant as observer’ to ‘full participant’ (Hammersley and Atkinson1997). The data collection used for our case might best be labelled as a ‘retrospective organisational ethnography’, in which the rst author’s role could be described as that of ‘full participant’. In his de - nition of ethnographies, Van Maanen (1988, ix) includes the need for a recorded set of observations. In this case, the researcher kept notes of events and had access to meetings, reports and minutes and re ected on the social processes at play inside the company and HAF. Whilst the role of a ‘full participant’ can create lack of distance between researcher and research subject, the supporting data and the joint analysis of the two authors of the paper strikes a balance between proximity to and distance from the subject. The case has been reconstructed and presented into a narrative form 3and the identi ed strategic and operational dilemmas are presented at the end of the case description. In the ‘‘Discussion’’ section, we use three ethical theories to pro- vide further insight into these dilemmas as well as into the wider role of a multinational CF in a developmental context.

The Case In June 2012, after a few years of working on improving health standards in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Heineken 2After her visit to Ethiopia in March 2013, Dutch minister of Development Aid, Liliane Ploumen was quoted inDe Volkskrant (Dutch newspaper) of the 2nd of March 2013 as saying that ‘trade works better than aid’, pointing out to investments leading to job creation, stable incomes and provision of food. 3After collection of data a teaching case was developed primarily for business ethics and corporate responsibility courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels. It has been successfully used in class room settings in MBA courses. After each trial, the case was revised and detailed by the authors taking into account the feedback of both the students that participated as well as the course managers and professors in charge. 526K. C. Van Cranenburgh, D. Arenas 123 Africa Foundation (HAF) was re-evaluating its strategy and performance. It faced three big dilemmas related to project funding, project monitoring and participation by Heineken subsidiaries. The answers to those dilemmas would help shape HAF’s overall strategy and future. At the same time, discussion of these dilemmas could not be untangled from ethical issues on multinationals’ responsibilities in devel- oping countries.

Heineken had set up the foundation as a trust fund so that it would not be affected by the business’ uctuating pro ts. HAF’s mission was improving healthcare in the communities in the vicinity of Heineken’s subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa. Heineken had great con dence in HAF’s trustees (supported by a committee of expert advisors) to make the right choices and was not pressing for an evidence-based or objective-oriented approach to planning. However, several external stakeholders (such as NGOs, governmental agencies and academic institutions) were asking for a clearer view of the Foundation’s impact and its stance on development.

Even though HAF was (and still is) a legally indepen- dent entity, it depended on Heineken’s subsidiaries for the execution of its activities and therefore any strategy had to carefully weigh up the subsidiaries’ organisational culture, opportunities and constraints. Decisions could not be taken lightly given that HAF clearly represented Heineken—a company with one of the most valuable global brands and a world-wide presence.

Given growing healthcare needs in the developing world and rising expectations of corporate behaviour, HAF had to make some strategic decisions. This meant choosing from amongst diverse options, each with its own implications.

HAF faced three big issues: (1) the scope of its involvement in HAF-funded projects; (2) the level of involvement of the local Heineken subsidiaries; (3) how much should be spent on measuring impact. In seeking ways out of these dilemmas, more fundamental issues concerning business ethics and business taking up quasi-governmental roles emerged.

Heineken: History and Background Heineken was the world’s most international brewer, with a wide network of breweries and distributors and was one of the leading brewers in terms of sales, volume and pro t- ability. The group owned and managed one of the top portfolios of beer brands with Heineken as the main international brand but also with over 250 premium, regional, local and specialty beers and ciders. The story of Heineken started in a small Amsterdam brewery founded in 1867 by Gerard Adriaan Heineken. His vision of fostering a ‘beer culture’ amongst Amsterdam’s elites quickly came to pass. Demand for high quality premium beer grew apace wherever Heineken set up its breweries. The rm grew fast, rst in The Netherlands, then in Germany, France and other European markets. By the mid-twentieth century, it had become an international company. The core values upon which it was built—consistent top quality, engaging people through their own culture, social awareness—allowed the company to renew itself again and again.

Early on in its history, the company was plagued with labour disputes as trade unions beefed up their shop- oor presence. The unions demanded wage increases and better working conditions. Stress on workers safety and health became the norm as The Netherlands moved into a new era of worker rights at the end of the nineteenth century. This early social awareness came to the fore during The Great Depression of the 1930s when Heineken decided no workers would be red. The rm set up The Heineken Staff Foundation in 1937 to give workers hit by the slump a helping hand. This initiative lasted and adapted to workers’ changing needs over time. At the end of 2011, Heineken had 70,000 staff working at 140 plants in 71 countries.

Heineken’s international expansion was boosted by buying up local breweries. The rm forged long-term, deep-rooted relationships with local communities so as to ensure sustainable sourcing, production, distribution and business success. Heineken invested in Asian, Latin American and African countries despite the economic problems many of them were going through at the time. By the end of 2010, these regions represented 68 % of the company’s beer sales and 57 % of its earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). These investments continued to be part of an overall strategy for growth.

Heineken had been listed on the Dutch Stock Exchange AEX since 1939 and its shareholders comprised an extre- mely varied group of individuals and nancial institutions:

mainstream investors, socially responsible investors, active and passive shareholders, known and unknown sharehold- ers and Heineken family member shareholders (through a holding company). In 2011, its revenues came to €17,123 million. 4 Heineken in Sub-Saharan Africa Heineken was one of the few multinational companies that had enjoyed success in Africa for over a hundred years.

The company owned breweries and had substantial market positions in several African countries. As well as brewing a variety of local brands, it also brewed and exported the Heineken and Amstel brands across the region. Most of Heineken’s African subsidiaries also produced and mar- keted soft drinks that appealed to local tastes.

As of 2011, Heineken operated in 15 African countries, out of which 11 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. The African 4www.annualreport.Heineken.com(visited 19 October 2011). Heineken in Sub-Saharan Africa527 123 markets were a signi cant source of revenue for Heine- ken—€1,900 million in 2010, making up almost 13 % of total revenues.

The economies of these countries were growing fast whilst those in traditional markets (such as Western Eur- ope) were sluggish. So Heineken focused more effort on boosting sales in the new markets. However, given the fragile socio-economic conditions in several sub-Saharan countries, Heineken found itself acting as both an agent of social and economic change and decided to earmark resources so that it could ful l these roles.

Heineken invested in fostering responsible business policies throughout its African subsidiaries. Areas covered included moderate drinking, ethical standards and respon- sible sourcing. All CSR managers in the Sub-Saharan region received training in Heineken’s CSR policies and had a corporate mandate to train staff in CSR at their respective subsidiaries.

Several of the Central and West African countries where Heineken operated were amongst the world’s poorest nations. Major challenges included infrastructure, health- care and education in Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, South Africa and Namibia. Heineken’s CSR policy mainly focused on healthcare (public healthcare system is very limited in these sub-Saharan nations and private care is very dear).

Heineken’s Healthcare System According to a study by Bloom et al. (2006), in countries with an HIV-AIDS prevalence of between 5 and 20 %, less than half of companies in Sub-Saharan Africa said they had an HIV policy in 2005. Only 26 % of the corporations that had HIV policies provided anti-retroviral treatment to their workers in 2005 (Bloom et al.2006). Most employers chose to refer staff to government-supported healthcare programmes, whose coverage and implementation were woefully inadequate. A sense of moral duty sparked He- ineken’s healthcare initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. The consciences of Dutch expatriates were pricked when they saw they enjoyed huge healthcare advantages compared with local staff. Heineken’s managers at the time felt the company should guarantee a minimum quality of life to staff. In countries with limited public healthcare, that meant providing company healthcare (Van Cranenburgh et al.2010). Heineken’s subsidiaries increasingly provided health services to ensure healthy, motivated staff. This was especially important in many African countries where HIV-AIDS was (and is) endemic.

Besides moral considerations, Heineken also grasped that a thriving business needed a healthy workforce. Proper healthcare can slash: sick leave, replacing workers who areill, training new people, hospital fees, funerals, paying for ‘alternative medicine and so on. Having an in-house healthcare service also cut down on absenteeism arising from the need to trek to outside doctors, wait at their clinics, etc. In-house healthcare service means workers stayed on the spot—something that facilitated quality control, supervision and continuous improvement. It might also slash staff turnover, boost productivity and morale and make it easier to recruit workers. 5Furthermore, responsible investors were showing growing interest in Heineken’s health initiatives and how they tted into the company’s strategy (Van Cranenburgh et al.2010). As a result, health and safety-related indicators were incorporated into man- agers’ bonus system. Heineken’s healthcare system was formalised in the 1990s when its network of in-house clinics with their attendant doctors, nurses, lab technicians, midwives and pharmacists became part of Heineken’s regular staff.

Having set up the healthcare system, Heineken needed to decide how far it was willing to go. Some internal and external actors felt that the system widened the gap between the ‘haves’ (those with access to the health ben- e ts—staff, their spouses and children) and ‘have-nots’ (outsiders living in nearby communities). Yet others con- sidered general health care to be a government responsi- bility. Given stakeholder pressures, new social demands (mostly by NGOs and international institutions) and gov- ernment failures, there seemed to be a need to review the boundaries of Heineken’s healthcare system. Widening the health gap between the haves and the have-nots was an unwelcome result. If Heineken wanted to bring prosperity to local communities, it needed to nd a way of helping those living close to the company’s plants but who were denied the bene ts enjoyed by Heineken staff.

Heineken’s managers realised that they could tackle broader healthcare issues through partnerships with NGOs and governments. The rst move in this direction was in 2008, when Heineken announced generous community healthcare support 6through the Health Insurance Fund set up by PharmAccess International. 7As health became a bigger part of the corporate agenda, agreement was reached on the need to address health issues in local communities.

Heineken established HAF to this end. 5Unpublished research carried out in a Heineken operating company in Congo questioned employees and dependents on the main reasons for working for the company; healthcare was the third most important reason after training and salary.

6Support was given through a€500,000 donation.7PharmAccess International is an international organization foster- ing access to affordable quality basic health care in low-income countries in Africa (www.pharmaccess.org). 528K. C. Van Cranenburgh, D. Arenas 123 HAF’s Beginnings and its Relationship with the Company Heineken set up HAF at the end of 2007 as an independent legal entity to administer a€10 million company-funded endowment. In 2010, Heineken made another€10 million donation. By creating an endowment fund rather than providing grants based upon pro ts and losses, Heineken aimed to prevent short-term economic conditions derailing their long-term commitment to improving the quality of life for local communities. HAF’s mission was to improve the health of those living in Sub-Saharan African com- munities where Heineken was active. Its articles stated that it was to pursue its aims by funding health-related projects to be implemented by local partners. The model used He- ineken subsidiaries given their considerable local experi- ence, knowledge and cultural understanding—all vital factors for partnering with local NGOs. It was also a way of keeping overheads low. Subsidiaries would also be better placed to judge the most effective responses in each local setting and decide whether to lobby government for better public healthcare or enlist its support in private health initiatives.

Heineken gave HAF’s three-member Board of Trustees free rein to take decisions and follow them up. Two of the Board members had previously worked at Heineken. An independent Advisory Board with the requisite knowledge and experience in tropical medicine, NGO work and development initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa was set up.

The Advisory Board and Board of Trustees often held joint meetings. HAF’s new manager had worked at Heineken headquarters for over 13 years, of which the last eight had been spent in the Global Health Affairs department, implementing workplace HIV/AIDS and Health and Safety programmes in Africa and Asia. The rst projects were approved in the second half of 2009.

The relationship between HAF and Heineken was taken further through the ‘Brewing a Better Future’ plan, laun- ched in 2010. With this 10-year sustainability agenda and goals, Heineken set out the role it should play in creating abetter future for local communities. The agenda focused on improving the environmental impact of brands and busi- nesses, empowerment of employees and communities and promoting drinking in moderation or, as it was called by the company, ‘responsible consumption’. There were twenty-three programmes altogether, covering the three focus areas. Each programme had its own set of aims and measures for the next 10 years. Heineken positioned healthcare provision and HAF as part of the ‘Heineken Cares’ area (Table1) within ‘Brewing a Better Future’.

HAF’s remit tted nicely into the aims set out in the ‘Heineken Cares’ chapter.

The HAF Projects Between 2009 and June 2012, HAF made eight calls for proposals. It had thirty-six projects approved with a total budget of€3.5 million. Local Heineken subsidiaries (partnering with NGOs and/or local governments) sub- mitted funding requests to HAF. The subsidiaries provided a broad spectrum of support to local partners in the form of expertise in the purchasing, management and nancial elds. All projects had to meet HAF’s qualifying criteria (Table2). HAF had also developed tools and services for healthcare project design, application, approval, imple- mentation and communication (and, to a limited extent, for their monitoring and evaluation). Projects included anti- malaria campaigns, local production of bed mosquito nets, HAART resistance detection, 8building of clinics, training of medical staff, medical care and health promotion for farmers. HAF stressed local capacity-building in the form of training and education support for public healthcare staff. HAF preferred projects in smaller cities or villages and funding requests had to be directly linked to the community’s speci c needs. Apart from involving Heine- ken subsidiaries and forming partnerships, one of the cri- teria was that the projects had to be self-sustaining after Table 1Heineken cares: the strategy of ‘‘brewing the better future’’ Procurement through local sourcing for a majority of agricultural products, because locally produced ingredients shorten the supply chain and reduce risk which is both bene cial to local farmers and suppliers as well as for Heineken Commitment to sustainable agriculture, which is key given that beer is produced from natural products. Heineken needs suf cient, high quality raw materials, which is why it views farmers as strategic partners who must be paid a fair price Environmental impact assessments should be conducted in order to measure the company’s economic contributions or potential negative impacts to the communities in which it operates. The results should enable Heineken to take informed decisions in order to maximise positive impacts Focus on health: Heineken aims for all employees and dependents to have access to basic medical care, it understands that doing business in developing countries requires different skills, thinking, approaches and services than in developed countries which is why it strives to combat the endemic poverty diseases (malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS) in order to guarantee the continuity of its operations in these countries 8HAART is ‘Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy’ for people diagnosed as HIV positive. Heineken in Sub-Saharan Africa529 123 HAF bump-starting. The average funding was€100,000 per project and the average timeframe about 3 years.

In the rst stage, HAF focused on setting up its structure and qualifying criteria. The next stages covered ensuring impact through projects with a clear end-point and on developing an attractive project portfolio (Table3). A project in Burundi stood out as an example of a HAF project. With€80,000 in funding and in partnership with the government and the local community, the project sought to build and equip a health centre and dispensary, and stock a pharmacy in Bugendana in the rural province of Gitega. This project was considered appropriate as there was no primary health care facility serving this community and the HAF-funded facilities would allow the government to provide local primary health. The land for the health centre and the salaries of quali ed health staff were to be provided by the government. The next challenge was to de ne the period over which HAF would provide clinic supplies and who would be responsible for keeping it stocked in the future.

Another project was the ‘Mister Sister’ project for pro- viding healthcare services to remote, rural farming com- munities in Namibia. It was a partnership among HAF, Namibia Breweries Limited 9and PharmAccess Foundation Namibia. HAF agreed to spend€225,000 for three mobile clinics providing primary healthcare services for scattered settlements. The core target group for this programme wasfarmer hands and their dependents in rural areas; their employers contributed through an annual subscription and premium contributions. In addition, communities in resource-poor settings, pensioners, orphans and vulnerable children on the clinic’s route were also covered by the scheme through additional contributions made by The Ministry of Health, donors and corporate sponsors.

HAF’s Dilemmas After getting some results on project implementations, the HAF boards re ected on HAF’s activities and modus operandi. HAF would need to pin down what constituted effective use of its endowment fund and how to get ‘the most bang for the buck’. Three main dilemmas were dis- cussed by The Board of Trustees and The Advisory Board.

Dilemma 1. The autonomy of HAF-sponsored projects:

Should HAF fund operational costs?The rst dilemma bore on the long-term autonomy of HAF-sponsored projects.

HAF’s goal was to select projects likely to be nancially self- sustaining in 1–3 years. However, in many countries where HAF operated, sustainable business models were a pipe dream. In highly impoverished areas such as the Bugendana region of Burundi, it was unrealistic to expect local villagers to pay for medical treatment. In addition to adults not buying medicine, the HAF-funded Bugendana clinic was making losses on medicines because the national regulations stipu- lated free medicine for children under ve. HAF had deliv- ered the clinic, the equipment, and the rst batch of medicine and the local government paid staff salaries. However, the Table 2Heineken Africa Foundation initial selection criteria 1. The proposal must be directed at serving the health of the people who live in the environment of a Heineken Sub-Sahara African organizationThe geographical criteria of operating only in the near surrounding of Heineken organizations was made (1) to engage with the community surrounding the local operation as part of a wider stakeholder engagement approach, (2) to form a ‘connectedness’ with the local employees and (3) to gain reputational bene ts for the local organization 2. The proposal must include a partnership between the local Heineken operation and a non-governmental or governmental organizationThis criteria was added as a means to (1) ensure availability of expertise, (2) diminish resources needed from the local Heineken operation, (3) build local capacity with the argument that communities must be end-responsible for their healthcare and (4) take advantage of the resources available at Heineken breweries that could be used for maximising the project’s impact 3. HAF’s exit from the project must be guaranteed and the proposal has to demonstrate how the project will continue to run after funding endsThe aim of this criterion was twofold: (1) to see sustainable continuity of the project and (2) to ensure a clear conclusion of HAF’s direct involvement in the project (between 1 and 3 years) 4. The project must be able to demonstrate that it can have an effective positive impactThis criterion relates to the expected results of the projects for affected individuals. Clear metrics had to be established from the offset to understand what will be measured and how 5. Commitment of the General Manager of the local Heineken operation is requiredThis criterion was included to (1) increase the chances of success because of the involvement of Heineken local staff, (2) promote employee motivation and (3) guarantee close levels of monitoring and control 9Namibia Breweries Limited is a joint venture between Heineken and the Ohlthaver & List Group of Companies.

530K. C. Van Cranenburgh, D. Arenas 123 recurring cost of medicine meant the clinic would never be nancially self-sustaining. Given this context, it was unclear whether HAF should stick to its initial criteria of selecting self-sustaining projects or agree to fund operational costs and if the latter, for how long. One possibility could be to make the criteria more exible and categorise countries and pro- jects as short-term funding versus long-term programmes.

On the other hand, adopting exible criteria could add complexity to the organisation and cause grievances.

The HAF Board was split on the issue. One option was to identify one or more local and international NGOs that HAF could support on a long-term basis. However, thisoption might make Heineken subsidiaries lose interest given that they would play a lesser role in drawing up projects and selecting partners. Less commitment by subsidiaries was not to be taken lightly. Another option was to look at projects that had been shown to work (for example, primary health clinic projects) and replicating them where possible and needed. Finally, the boards also had to consider whether they would accept project ‘lock-in’ given that subsidiaries’ capabilities and long-term presence easily outstripped those of governments and NGOs. In 2012, HAF chose to make more commitments to fund running costs and prolong successful partnerships.

Table 3Summary of running HAF projects (per June 2012)# Name Country Type 1 HIV prevention Congo HIV/AIDS 2 Kill Malaria Dead Nigeria Malaria 3 Community Health Centre Burundi General 4 Bednets to Control Malaria Rwanda Malaria 5 Blood Bank Unit Democratic Republic of Congo Sickle cell anaemia 6 Prenatal Equipment Sierra Leone Paediatric 7 Bednets Nigeria Malaria 8 VVF Clinic Nigeria Fistula 9 Midvaal Mobile South Africa Mobile clinic 10 Mister Sister Namibia Mobile clinic 11 Panzi Paediatrics Democratic Republic of Congo Paediatric 12 St Gerard Nigeria General 13 VVF Training Nigeria Fistula 14 SCF Haemoglobin Laboratory Nigeria Sickle cell anaemia 15 SCF Genetic Counselling Nigeria Sickle cell anaemia 16 SCF Prevention of Stroke Nigeria Sickle cell anaemia 17 Blood Transfusion Centre Democratic Republic of Congo Sickle cell anaemia 18 Wellington Sierra Leone General 19 Community Health Centre Nigeria General 20 Farmers and Families Health Sierra Leone General 21 King’s Hope South Africa General 22 Bonnes Routes! Democratic Republic of Congo General 23 PASER Nigeria HIV/AIDS 24 Ergo therapy Simama Democratic Republic of Congo Physiotherapy 25 Jaundice in Babies Nigeria Paediatric 26 Radiography Equipment Nigeria General 27 Eziama Health Centre Nigeria General 28 Physical Rehab Christina Burundi Physiotherapy 29 CT Scan St Gerard Nigeria Trauma care 30 New Storey SCA clinic Democratic Republic of Congo Sickle cell anaemia 31 Hygiene for Health Democratic Republic of Congo Hygiene 32 Managing HIV in workplace Burundi HIV/AIDS 33 Dialysis Machines Nigeria Kidney 34 Traumatic patients wards Democratic Republic of Congo Trauma care 35 Finkele Health Centre Ethiopia General 36 Teachers against sexual abuse Democratic Republic of Congo Sexual health Heineken in Sub-Saharan Africa531 123 Dilemma 2. The level and type of involvement of the local subsidiary: Should HAF projects become compulsory and part of the measurement of local management per- formance?The second dilemma concerned the level and type of involvement by subsidiaries in project selection, implementation and monitoring. In most countries, HAF depended on Heineken subsidiaries and their interest, expertise, knowledge and motivation. This reliance may have caused delays but it also ensured quality and profes- sionalism. Moreover, HAF costs could never have been so low without subsidiary support. Some subsidiaries felt strong ownership of their HAF projects, whilst others had to be pushed to take the next step, act, report and com- municate. Although all managers wanted ‘their’ projects to succeed, managers had plenty of other duties to perform and HAF projects were not the highest priority.

The Board had to bear in mind that HAF activities were voluntary. Making HAF initiatives compulsory might alienate leaders in the subsidiaries. Yet it was unclear how and where to boost commitment. Some of the questions that needed answering were: Should HAF include project indicators in calculating bonuses as a way to ensure com- mitment?; Would such bonuses lessen motivation to take part in socially oriented projects?; Could brewery manag- ers handle the added burden of monitoring social projects and do so competently?; Should they be put in full charge of the funding (which would mean changing from a single CF structure into several local foundations adopting local criteria)? In 2012, HAF carried on its initial strategy, leaving the decisions up to subsidiary management and providing support rather than exerting pressure.

Dilemma 3. The dif culty in de ning and measuring success: How long should project performance be mea- sured and who should do the measurement?The third dilemma was the dif culty in de ning and measuring success. An important criterion for project selection was that the project had to have a positive impact on healthcare.

Yet with the pressure to keep overheads low and with a limited budget and time frame, to what extent should HAF spend time and effort on measuring performance? Con- sidering the cost and resources involved in monitoring results, what needed to be measured, if anything? Mea- suring the outputs (for example, the extent to which a clinic building meets quality standards and time frame), out- comes (for instance, can one detect improved care or behavioural change?) and impact (for example, has malaria been reduced in the targeted community?) would imply a great deal of research and resources. If the Board decided to measure all levels of output, outcome and impact, it would probably mean the kind of randomised control trials used by medical and development research teams (Baner- jee and Du o2011). Besides the depth of measurement, there was the issue of time frames and (in)dependence. IfHAF decided to engage in long-term projects, should it work with independent external research organisations to develop different measurement methodologies and tools for each kind of project?

HAF had to ensure that its work improved local health- care whilst avoiding over-burdening Heineken headquarters and its subsidiaries with measurement requirements. Even so, keeping overheads low (the aim was under 5 %) only made sense if the rest of the money (95 %) was well spent. In 2012, a tool was introduced to measure projects at the levels of output and outcome.

Discussion This case outlines the main challenges arising from the growing societal role of corporations when operating in countries and regions characterised by weak governance.

Heineken considered the poor public healthcare system as a signi cant problem in the developing countries it operated in (a problem worsened by epidemics such as HIV/AIDS).

This posed a challenge requiring a different approach to the so-called strategic CSR, which looks for opportunities to combine social performance and economic competitive- ness. Rather, the situation led the company to engage in what has been called ‘Direct corporate humanitarian investment’ (Dunfee and Hess2000) (which also differs from ‘passive corporate philanthropy’ in that more than just money is given towards a good cause). This case re ects the practical challenges for managing philanthropic activities as stated by Meijs (2010): ensuring sustainability, execution of activities and optimisation of the foundation’s work. The HAF managers agreed to tweak their strategy to allow for longer term commitments, exibility on sub- sidiary involvement and measurement of success in terms of outcomes and outputs rather than impact, as described in the case.

HAF also had to think about the effectiveness of aid to developing countries—something that is widely debated.

The HAF manager received requests from various stake- holders (such as NGOs, governmental organisations or academic institutions) to furnish information on the Foundation’s impact and to share its views on develop- ment. In March 2011, the Dutch State Secretary for Eco- nomic Affairs, through The Netherlands’ Social and Economic Council (SER), asked HAF to share its vision on how Dutch businesses foster economic development that leads to social progress. Meanwhile, the Erasmus Centre for Strategic Philanthropy asked if HAF measured its philanthropic activities and demonstrated the impact of its activities. These requests challenged HAF to nd good arguments to justify its allocation of resources to stake- holders and society at large. 532K. C. Van Cranenburgh, D. Arenas 123 In addition to operational and strategic decisions, this case study begs the broader ethical question as to the nature of CSR and corporate philanthropy and how a multi- national should act in a developing country with grave health problems. Given the absence of institutional solu- tions, what are the ethical principles driving CF to improve social conditions in the countries in which the mother company operates? The answers proposed here link the case with two ethical theories commonly used in the eld of business ethics: Deontological Ethics and Utilitarianism.

In this paper, we contribute a third—the Ethics of Care. We shall illustrate that Ethics of Care is just as important when applying business ethics to corporate philanthropy. The discussion based on these theoretical frameworks is not exhaustive, since other perspectives could be added. Yet the preliminary discussion in this paper shows the need to adopt different ethical approaches if one is to fully grasp what underlies the challenges faced by Heineken and HAF in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Let us rst consider Deontology or ‘Duty Ethics’, which has been used by various business ethicists (Bowie1999).

It argues that the moral value of one’s actions does not come from its rewards or outcomes (such as higher pro ts, social approval, reputation, or the happiness and self-sat- isfaction of those making the decisions). Moral judgement should not be in uenced by an external party (for example government, NGOs) but rather stem from the moral prin- ciples of agents (in our case, managers or the corporation as a whole) (Smith and Dubbink2011). Deontological Ethics, and in particular Kantian moral philosophy, also contends that the moral value of one’s actions lies in making decisions according to the moral law that says one should assess one’s conductin the light of it becoming a principled way of living that others also accept(Kant cited by Smith and Dubbink2011, p. 209). In this case, the expatriate managers of Heineken working in Sub-Saharan subsidiaries felt that the difference between their access to health care and that of local employees and surroundings was at odds with their moral principles and that something had to be done. The workplace health provision programme (the rst stage in Heineken’s scheme) did not arise from outside pressures to change the status quo, nor did it come about because either the rm or its managers hoped for any reward. It stemmed from the Deontological Ethics of expatriate managers.

Boatright (1999), however, argues that managers cannot operate from a moral perspectivebecause the economic aim, contractual origin, and bureaucratic nature of busi- ness con icts with the individual motives and sense of responsibility required for genuine moral management (Smith2005, p. 130). Our case provides a more optimistic view that managers and rms will act in a morally responsible way where systematic institutional rules andexplicit contracts are incomplete and do not guide decision making. Kostova and Zaheer (1999) distinguished between the legitimacy of the corporation as a whole and that of its parts, whilst Smith (2005) stated that addressing the moral failures of business requires morally responsible managers as well as institutional solutions—that is to say, both ‘moral markets’ and ‘moral managers’. Personal values have been found to make a difference in the adoption and implementation of CSR by companies (Hemingway and Maclagan2004). For HAF, the ethical dilemmas became apparent at the individual and organisational levels, whereas legislation and the institutional context in general did not provide clear answers.

The case also shows that Deontological Ethics is not meant to provide an unthinking application of principles to all given circumstances. Rather, it requiresthe creative use of judgment to apply principles in speci c cases to render a decision about what principles mean and how they interact with one another in the midst of particular circumstances (Smith and Dubbink2011, p. 210). Heineken’s expatriate managers had to spend time and resources to put their views on healthcare into practice, think and re ect on those views and, at a later stage, how to apply them to local communities. However, even if Deontological grounds can explain that managers feel that something needs to be done by the rm in dif cult social contexts, it does not seem able to give justi cations about how much the company needs to do. Other ethical perspectives can be helpful here.

Utilitarianism is often used to discuss the ethical grounds of CSR and corporate philanthropy and is one of the main theories used in the business eld (Beauchamp et al.2012). In Utilitarianism, the guiding principle for any decision by individuals, governments or private organisa- tions is the maximisation of overall good or happiness in quantitative terms. There is a debate within Utilitarianism as to whether the maximisation of happiness necessarily implies strict impartiality as to the bene ciaries. Some argue that it is consistent with a duty to help one’s nearest and dearest rst or, put another way, that there is an impartial justi cation for partial affections (Singer2002).

So should corporate programmes be limited to staff or be extended to the communities where the rm operates and in which people’s needs may be greater than those of com- pany staff and their families? Would this entail costs and dif culties that would endanger the ‘good’ or utility pro- vided by the company as an economic agent? Might it help mitigate the rm’s business risks? How can these different ways of bringing about social good be reconciled? Our case study will not settle the issue one way or the other but it does underscore why it is hard to overlook the sum of the consequences of company actions. This is despite the fact that the initial workplace healthcare provision initiative taken by Heineken’s expatriate managers was not based on Heineken in Sub-Saharan Africa533 123 any calculation of costs and bene ts. At any rate, the Utilitarian perspective became more evident in addressing HAF’s dilemmas. The arguments on funding running costs and on the level of autonomy for HAF-sponsored projects took place against the need to strike the right balance between inputs and outputs and to think about the bound- aries of HAF’s involvement. The extent to which man- agement in subsidiaries should be involved was left up to those on the spot, who knew what other pressures they were facing. The measurement issue in our case study is an example of a debate within the utilitarian perspective.

Thus, Utilitarianism bore on many aspects of the discussion of HAF’s operational and strategic dilemmas.

Philosophical literature has discussed the problem that ethical theories make unreasonable demands on individu- als, which they can never wholly ful l (Williams1981, pp. 17–18). In business ethics, there are not only limits in terms of costs but also of potential con ict with the rm’s duciary responsibilities towards shareholders. In addition, a corporation should bear in mind where it could most effectively focus its efforts. Given daily constraints, the impossibility of foreseeing the consequences of all one’s decisions, and stubborn social problems, it makes sense for the rm to coddle those it can in uence most—namely, its staff, and then the communities closest to the facilities or those that the local staff thinks they deserve more attention.

However, even if Utilitarianism explains how a corporation might go about making decisions concerning its philan- thropic activities, it does not provide a way out to all the dilemmas seen above. In particular, the dilemma con- cerning HAF’s long-term involvement with the projects is best analysed according to the perspective of the Ethics of Care.

The Ethics of Care is a third major approach and one that is highly applicable to CF. It stresses the care-giver’s responsibility to others with whom he or she is connected and focuses on their needs rather than on the giver’s interests. It has been described as a mode of responsiveness rather than a form of decision making (Liedtka1996)—a feature it shares with Deontological Ethics. Yet, it is often portrayed as a more exible approach to speci c problems (French and Weis2000). In fact, it criticises deontology for being disengaged and abstract, and contends that not all rational individuals have the same moral meaning to each of us. At the same time, it departs from Utilitarianism insofar as it refuses to make calculations as to which alternative maximises overall welfare. By contrast, the Ethics of Care is based on the notion of ‘nurturing’ as the basis of ethical relationships (Liedtka1996), which, as it has been argued, is not intended to foster dependence but, on the contrary, to encourage autonomy based on respect:

The best care-taker offers a combination of challenge and support. To be nurturant is not always to concur andcomfort, to stroke and atter and appease; often, it requires offering a caring version of the truth, grounded in reality(Bateson, cited by Liedtka1996).

These concepts are highly relevant to corporate philan- thropy and lead to searching questions: What does it mean to be ‘a caring organisation’? What is the appropriate ‘care circle’ for an organisation? How can a CF be a caring organisation without fostering community dependence and foster autonomy? These questions are closely related to the strategic issues concerning the self-sustaining of projects funded by HAF, the long-term involvement of the CF, and the measurement of caring relationships. The ‘Ethics of Care’ approach might be likened to a mother who cares for her child but who also wants him to mature. From this perspective, the question here is not about maximising overall social utility (as it was in Utilitarianism) but rather about focussing on what is best for the particular recipients and bene ciaries. When HAF management made the decision to commit to longer term support of projects and project partners, it realised that more time was needed for healthcare provision to mature. It opened the door to remaining involved for a period closer to a person’s life- cycle instead rather of cutting off support whilst the project was in its infancy. Given that HAF refrained from setting xed time-boundaries to its involvement and instead made an open-ended commitment to funding running costs, it could be argued that the decision was based on care rather than on Deontological Ethics or Utilitarianism.

Debate rages on what is best for recipients’ self-devel- opment and on whether corporate social initiatives bring about social advancement and are self-sustaining. Some scholars doubt whether the principles triggering company managers to act can become universal (Arnove1980, 2007). One of the main claims is that CF shape public policy through their activities without ever having been democratically elected to do so. HAF needs to consider this challenge, which would affect the task of any NGO.

However, in the context of weak government and weak civil society, corporations are increasingly expected to shoulder responsibilities that elsewhere are seen as the preserve of the State (Valente and Crane2010; Maak 2009). It is true that companies need to be careful not to overstep the mark—not only because this would incur excessive costs but also because it could prove politically counter-productive. To avoid this risk and to boost ef - ciency and develop countries’ social capital, Meijs (2010) has stressed the need for collective governance in the philanthropic sector. In the absence of governance struc- tures, CF like HAF are likely to continue encountering dilemmas like those discussed above and will continue to make decisions based on different theories of ethics. Whilst Deontological and Utilitarian Ethics are often stressed in business literature, through this case study, we show that 534K. C. Van Cranenburgh, D. Arenas 123 the Ethics of Care is a third theory that needs to be taken into account when studying corporate philanthropy.

Concluding Remarks This case study illustrates three of the main strategic and operational challenges to CF working in developing countries: (1) making social initiatives and projects self- sustaining; (2) involvement of the company subsidiaries; (3) resource allocation and impact measurement. It also emerged that these challenges are intertwined with ethical debates on the role of business in society—upon which greater light is shed if one adopts a variety of ethical approaches. Whether philanthropy is regarded as strategic to the business or altruistic, managers of CF have to deal with practical challenges that affect the strategy of the foundation and impact development aid. Whilst the debate between the bene ts of development aid versus trade grinds on, managers are confronted with the consequences of operating in weak governance zones and have Deonto- logical, utilitarian and caring reasons to take up and con- tinue quasi-governance tasks. Whilst the business ethics literature mainly stresses utilitarian and Deontological Ethics for CF, our study contributes by highlighting the concepts of nurturing and caring and their relevance for corporations and their managers.

In terms of the methodology and ndings from the research, some important limitations should be mentioned.

Our case study serves us merely for illustrative purposes, rather than explanatory ones. In addition, this study focuses on the case of one CF as seen from its perspective. We know the case and the analysis could have been cut many other ways—from the viewpoint of the recipient, the grant- maker, the company and its subsidiaries, the eld as a whole, a comparison of the viewpoints of the actors in the eld and so on. Another angle would be to research the nature of the company, given that many scholars have identi ed the brewing industry as controversial (Wilson and West1981). Each of these approaches has its own research purposes, methodological opportunities and limi- tations. Furthermore, this study presents a limited set of statements about the ethical grounding of CSR and cor- porate philanthropy programmes. The authors have chosen to limit the study to the three main ethical theories; Deontology, Utilitarianism and Ethics of Care, whilst including the ethical grounding for moral markets versus moral managers.

In the absence of other studies, this paper is a rst attempt to present results from a longitudinal study of the challenges facing a given CF from the standpoint of the foundation’s management and boards. We make no claims about the generalisability of our ndings but it is highlylikely that other CF face similar challenges. Although our case is unique, our ndings are far from trivial. Given the dearth of theory and empirical evidence on the subject, we sought to explore one case in depth. Our observations should help scholars add similar cases and so lay the foundations for a ‘grounded theory’ of strategic corporate philanthropy in developing countries. Our paper will also help practitioners and researchers wishing to compare our case with others. One could study whether the identi ed ethical approaches are relevant for analysing other CF with similar or different dilemmas. Moreover, the ethnographi- cal methodology used for this case study could be applied by other practitioners with an academic background or purpose.

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