I posted a question a few days ago and my tutor didn't answer correctly. Looking over the rubric the paper was supposed to be on a specific battle. I need help and I spent a lot of money on it.
Running he ad: MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 1 Battle Analysis The Meuse -Argonne Offensive, 1918 SSG Anthony Calvi Maneuver Senior Leader Course MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 2 Table of Contents i. Abstract……………………………………………………………………………3 ii. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..4 iii. Strategic Setting…………………………………………………………………5 -6 iv. Tactical Situation…………………………………………………………...........7 -9 v. Describe the Action……………………………………………………... .......... ..9-13 vi. Significan ce……………………………………………………………………..… 13 vii. Analys is………………………………………………… ……............................ 14 -15 viii. Conclusion … ………………………………………………………………… …… .16 ix. Append ix……………… …………………………………………………… … ...17 -18 x. References … ………………… ……………………… ………………………………. 19 MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 3 Abstract The Meuse -Argonne Offensive was the last and most crucial campaign for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). The offensive lasted for forty -seven days, from September 26 to November 11, 1918. The Meuse -Argonne Offensive, or otherwise known as the Battle of the Argonne Forest, was a critical part of the Final Allied Offensive that led to the end of World War I. The Offensive extended from the middle of the Argonne Forest to t he Meuse River. The battle became the largest and bloodiest battle in American history. The AEF comprised of 1.2 million American soldiers commanded by General John J. Pershing. The Battle of the Argonne Forest was a very complex operation that forced the AEF forces to fight in rough, hilly terrain, which the Germans fortified over the previous four years. The battle consisted of three phases which ultimately led to the retreat of Germans and the end of The Great War. The Meuse -Argonne Offensive cost the A EF 122,063 casualties, 26,786 of which were killed and cost the Germans approximately 28,000 lives (Doughboy Center , 2000 ). MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 4 Introduction World War I lasted from June 28, 1914, to November 11, 1918 (Grotelueschen , 2014 ). The Great War began after a Serbian assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro -Hungarian Empire. The war divided Europe into the Triple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria -Hungary, and Italy, and the Triple Entente made up of France , Great Britain, and Russia. What began as a European war, quickly turned into a global war earning the nickname, The War to End All Wars. The Triple Alliance became the Central Powers, and the Triple Entente turned into the Allied Forces. The United Sta tes entered World War I on April 6, 1917, raising the largest combat force in American history. The U.S. joined the allied powers in their fight against Germany. Although the U.S. enlisted the last 18 months of the war, the American Expeditionary Forces (A EF), comprised of 29 combat divisions had a crucial role in the offensives of 1918. The most critical role for the U.S. was the Meuse -Argonne Offense, the last 47 days of the Allied Final Offensive or the Hundred Days Offensive. The Meuse -Argonne Offensive was the largest and bloodiest operation of WW1 for the AEF and became one of the deadliest battles in American history. The AEF’s objective was to aid in the capture the railroad hub at Sedan. The AEF had to break the rail net supporting the German army in France and Flanders, and ultimately force Germany’s withdrawal. The battle proved to be costly for the AEF due to the lack of tactical knowledge and experience from the draftees of 1917. The Argonne Forest’s rough, hilly terrain, German’s defensive l ines and tactics, and the AEF’s fighting capabilities cost many American lives. The AEF outlasted the Germans and pushed them into retreat due to the constant replenishing of the lines with fresh soldiers. The victory of the battle cost 26,786 American liv es and 95,277 injuries. The Germans suffered approximately 28,000 deaths in the battle. MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 5 Strategic Setting At the start of World War I, the United States chose to stay neutral. Although most of the American opinion was negative toward Germany, President Woo drow Wilson did not engage in choosing sides and attempted brokering peace between both parties. Even after the sinking of the Lusitania, which killed 128 U.S. citizens, President Wilson still kept the U.S. out of the war. It took the Zimmermann Telegram, the sinking of 7 US merchant ships from German submarines, and the abdication of the Russian Tsar for President Wilson to call to Congress for a declaration of war on Germany on April 3, 1917. Congress voted in favor of the declaration of war on April 6, 1 917. At the time of the declaration of war, the United States regular army was smaller than 13 other nations with approximately 130,000 soldiers (Grotelueschen , 2014 ). It didn’t have organized combat divisions and had about 45,000 stationed overseas. U.S. milit ary stocks included 285,000 rifles, 550 artillery pieces, and 55 obsolete aircraft, and no tanks. Britain and France sent high -level missions to the U.S. to advise what the U.S. needs to do to join the war effort effectively. France and Britain suggested the amalgamation of U.S. forces within their ranks, but the U.S. rejected it because it can lead to the US not getting credit for the victory. The U.S. committed to creating the first modern, industrial, and independent army in U.S. history. The U.S. passed the Selective Service Act of 1917 requiring all males between the ages of 21 and 30 to register for military service. By September 12, 1917, almost 24 million men had registered. The U.S. Army drafted approximately four million men (Simkin , 2014 ). With fo ur million new service members and limited training supplies, the Army issued soldiers wooden sticks instead of rifles for training. Most instructors did away with the wooden sticks and focused MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 6 their only training on drilling and marching. The only combat -related training most draftees, or doughboys, were getting was bayonet drills. Having completed training in the U.S., the doughboys were sent to France to join their AEF divisions. The plan was to receive one month of training in small unit tactics, one month of training under the mentorship of a French or British division, and one month of training in open warfare. Although the last four years there have been mostly trench warfare, none of the training included trenches. Regardless, the offensives the Ge rmans launched in the spring and summer of 1918 forced all the divisions to cease the training program. After the German offensives began in the spring of 1918, Britain and France recommended that American soldiers get embedded within their units as rep lacements or as tactical level units serving under Allied command. It was the amalgamation controversy all over again. General Pershing insisted the U.S. forces will only fight as an independent army serving alongside the Allies. The 24 mile front from the Argonne Forest to the Meuse River was a sector that would fulfill General Pershing’s request and create the Meuse -Argonne Offensive. The Germans had taken the Argonne Forest at the early stages of the war. During the years that led up to the Meuse -Argon ne Offensive, the Germans fortified their defensive positions with networked trenches, wired trenches, shell holes, barbed wire, listening posts, and several battle lines. The Germans had set up both machine -gun -covered position and pre -sighted artillery targets. The entire sector was designed for a defensive force, one that had turned back Allied attacks over the last four years. The U.S. First Army was officially committed to a battle of unprecedented scale, duration, and intensity in its history (ABMC1 , 2015 ). MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 7 Tactical Situation Mission: The Meuse -Argonne offensive was part of the Final Allied Offensive. General in chief of the Allied armies, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, tasked the French Fourth Army and the U.S. First Army with attacking the Meuse -Argonne German defensive l ines. The Fourth Army’s overall objective was the key railroad hub of Mezieres which was one of two in the Western Front. Capturing it would ultimately hinder Germany’s ability to resupply quickly and effectively. To aid the French take the ke y railroad hub, General Pershing designated the AEF the interdiction of the rail line between Carignan and Sedan as the ultimate objective. General Pershing referred to the AEF’s sector as “second to none on the Western Front… the most sensitive part of th e German front being attacked” (Allen , 2015, p. 115 ). The Germans objective was to hold the line. The Germans had fortified their defensive positions over the years and never allowed an Allied force to penetrate their defensive lines and obstacles. This position wa s critical for the Germans because it defended one of their two railroad hubs that supplied Germany’s entire Western Front. Although the AEF outnumbered the Germans, the Germans had the fortified defensive positions that no one had breached, clearly having the advantage. Equipment: AEF soldiers carried a Model 1903 Springfield .30 caliber rifle and bayonet. With the AEF being a brand new force, they were not able to support themselves. Allied forces provided most of the AEF's heavy equipment. The Allied f orces provided the AEF with 189 tanks, 840 aircrafts, and over 2,000 artillery pieces (Grotelueschen , 2014 ). Germany on the other side had similar equipment. German defensive lines had their rifles, machine gun nests, artillery, and barbed wire. Although the AE F seemed stronger with more equipment, their inexperience MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 8 with the use of the equipment and the German’s overall defensive position still gave the Germans the advantage. Terrain: The Meuse -Argonne Offensive encompassed the Argonne Forest, the Meuse Rive r, and everything in between. At the start of the offensive, the front was approximately 18 miles wide. The Argonne Forest was rough and hilly terrain that the Germans had fortified for four years. When imagining a forest, one might expect a dense vegetati on with poor visibility. The Argonne was the complete opposite. It had uneven ground, sharp cliffs, ravines, and streams that made it ideally suited for a defensive force, which the Germans took full advantage of it. The Meuse River came inward in the sect or as it got closer to the German lines, hindering the AEFs maneuverability. Simply put, the Meuse -Argonne Offensive was ideal terrain for the defending German force. Troops: The Meuse -Argonne Offensive began with the AEF replacing 220,000 French troops with 600,000 Americans. German forces only had about 50% of their initial force with approximately 3,300 men. Eventually, the AEF grew to 1.2 million soldiers, and the Germans resistance increased to somewhere around 300,000 Germans. The AEFs fresh bodies and high morale was a much -needed strength for the upcoming battle with lacking experience and training. The Germans moral was both high and low, but their experience, training, and tactics were amongst the best. The German soldiers that had been fighting on the western front for years had their morale at the lowest point, but the German soldiers who had come from the Eastern fronts had their morale high from previous victories. General Pershing even said, “In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the mora le or the offensive spirit to overcome the difficulties to be met in the Meuse -Argonne sector.” (Allen , 2015, p. 112 ). The difference in each forces will MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 9 to fight and the AEFs overwhelming force placed the AEF at an advantage over the German Army. Time: The Meuse -Argo nne Offensive lasted 47 days. The longer the battle lasted, the more of an advantage the AEF had. In those 47 days, General Pershing and other commanders could continue to replenish their front quickly with able and fresh bodies. All AEF reinforcement or replacements could arrive the day they were needed. For the Germans, it was more difficult.Although they maintained their defensive positions, their reinforcements or replacements were limited since Germany was fighting a war on many fronts. This overall p ut the AEF in an advantage over the German forces. Civilian Considerations: Although there were no civilian casualties during the Meuse -Argonne Offensive, the Germans were concerned with their families. The unknowns of whether or not their families were s afe only affected the morale of the German Army. The AEF’s advantage was that they had no concerns regarding civilian casualties and can therefore just worry about the enemy across the Argonne Forest. The Meuse -Argonne Offensive The Meuse -Argonne Offensive was the most important offensive of the Final Allied Offensive. It was a battle between the U.S. AEF and the German Army. The total offensive consisted of 22 American divisions and 47 German division. At the start of the battle, German forces were operati ng at approximately 50% of their initial strength after fighting for four years. The German forces were spread out between their three defensive lines. The first line included the destroyed village of Montfaucon. The second and strongest line included the heights of Romagne and Cunel and the village of Grandpre. The third line was farther north and was the MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 10 German’s weakest line. Each defensive line consisted of an interlocking network of trenches that were protected by barbed wire, machine gun nests, pill boxes, and predesignated artillery. It was considered “No Man’s Land” (ABMC2 , 2015 ). Although No Man’s Land placed the German’s at an advantage, the AEF had death as their motivation to attack. General Alexander with the AEF gave a “no retreat” command for his d ivisions told them if they hear such a command, to shoot the offender on the spot. He said, “We are not going back but forward.” The AEF deployed 600,000 troops to the Meuse -Argonne Offensive and began phase one of the battle with a three -hour bombardment of artillery. It is estimated that the AEF was dropping $1,000,000 of artillery per minute. At 5:30 AM on September 26, 1918, the AEF began their advancement with 120,000 Americans and the village of Montfaucon as their primary objective (Appendix A). Whe n the AEF came close to taking Montfaucon, the Germans began dropping their pre -targeted artillery which halted the AEF in the “killing zone.” After taking heaving casualties, the AEF broke the first German line and seized the key hill mass of Montfaucon a dvancing a total of 6 miles in two days. The far advancement was mostly because the Germans let the AEF have it. The roads leading to the front lines were narrow or in disrepair. The support and supplies were getting jammed in the traffic of the narrow ro ads. Soldiers were going days without eating at the front lines. Commanders began to protest that their regiments were too weak to advance without food. By this time, the Germans had an additional six divisions join their defenses to stop the Americans. Ge neral Pershing persisted that the divisions continue advancing. The disorganized 35 th Division, comprised of fatigued and hungry men without food or water, attacked a couple of hundred yards beyond and were met with a replenished German division MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 11 counteratt ack, sending the 35 th in a panic as they fled. The 35th's Engineers and Machine Gun Battalion saved them. General Pershing’s persistence got the division so shattered that the division had to be relieved early. By the end of phase one, the Meuse Argonne Offensive had cost the U.S. 26,000 casualties. General Pershing was working soldiers to death. Germany reali zed this battle could bring the war to an end and therefore began pouring as many divisions as it could spare to Meuse -Argonne. The Second phase began on October 04, with the 91 st, 79 th, 37 th, and 35 th green Divisions replaced by the 1 st, 3 rd, and 32 nd veteran Divisions. Within the first day, the 1 st Division had gained the ground the 35 th Division lost at the cost of 2,057 men. Unfortunately, this created a gap in the lines because the Divisions to the east and west were not able to keep up. The gap betw een them resulted in the "Lost Battalion" affair. The 1 st Division held off the Germans for several days, giving the 28 th and 82 nd Divisions enough time to rescue them (Appendix B). Their rescue resulted in the abandonment of the Argonne Forest by the Germ ans. Although it worked out in the end, this lost battalion was a result of General Alexander insisting his division attack with no regard to flanks or losses. 194 soldiers of the lost battalion were able to walk out while 144 of them were carried on stret chers. The remainder were killed. General Pershing expanded the Meuse -Argonne offensive to the east of the Meuse River. His objective was to seize the Heights of Cunel which had German artillery that was wreaking havoc on the 3 rd, 4 th, and 80 th Divisions. After a series of AEF costly frontal assaults, the AEF seized the Heights of Cunel and broke through the main defenses of the German’s second line.
By the end of phase two, Americans had advanced 10 miles and cleared the Argonne Forest reaching the Aisne River. They were able to accomplish this by wearing out the German forces MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 12 with the constant replacing of AEF Divisions. General Pershing eventually promoted himself reorganized the AEF by appointing two generals to take over the First and Second Armies. During the end of phase two, the German army’s morale was at an all -time low. The Germans kept seeing newspapers mentioning possible German talks for peace. During the third and final phase of the Meuse -Argonne Offensive, the AEF seized the crest of Barri court Ridge and the western and eastern slopes. The German army fled north with the remaining survivors. Private Rush Stephenson Young of the 1 st Battalion, 318 th IN, 80 th Division bore witness to the death and destruction of the German Fifth Army and sai d As we advanced, the roads and fields were strewn with dead Germans, horses, masses of Artillery, transports, ammunition limbers, helmets, guns, and bayonets. The whole earth had been gassed by shells from our artillery. The small streams were flowing r ed with blood from the dead bodies of German soldiers and horses. They had been trying to take cover along the banks of the roads and streams. All along the road were bodies that had been half buried, some with their feet sticking out of the ground (Allen , 2015, p. 130 ). On Americans seemed almost unstoppable. An American officer had found a German officer’s letter to his wife stating “The Americans are here… we can kill them, but we can’t stop them” (Allen , 2015, p. 120 ). No matter how many Americans the Germans killed, General Pe rshing always had fresh soldiers ready to join the fight. The continued advancement of the AEF and the continued retreat of the German forces led to the French forces conquering the main objective. The French forces captured the critical railroad hub in Se dan while the AEF captured its surrounding hills. The AEF was successful in reaching their objecting and cutting off one of the German’s main supply railroad for the Western Front. A week later, on November 11, 1918, Germany MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 13 signed the armistice at 5:10 AM, officially ending the war effectively at 11:00 AM. When General Pershing received the news that the armistice had been signed, he decided that he would keep fighting until the last minute. General Pershing had General Liggett and the First Army fight u ntil 11:00 AM costing the lives of 320 Americans for absolutely no reason. The Meuse -Argonne Offensive ultimately cost the lives of 26,277 Americans and wounded 95,786. During the offensive, the AEF claimed to have killed or wounded 100,000 Germans. Capt ain Bozier Castle, with B Co, 325th Reg., 82nd Division, said, "The military government of the United States has nothing to be proud of because of victories won on the Meuse -Argonne Front, but because of the courageous and unskilled heroic efforts displaye d by her soldiers, and that her numerical strength was greater than the effective bullets of the enemy." (Allen , 2015, p. 135 ). Significance Short Term: The Meuse -Argonne Offensive was the most critical offensive of the Final Allied Offensive. Pushing the German forces back and ultimately capturing the interdiction of the rail line between Carignan and Sedan was critical for the successful capturing of the Sedan railroad hub. Without the AEF reaching the interdiction, the French would have never been able to advance to c ut off the Western Front’s supply. This offensive would give the entire Allied Forces a tactical advantage in the Western Front. Long Term: Strategically, the Meuse -Argonne Offensive led to the Great War’s end. The Battle of Argonne Forest was the decidin g factor that ultimately took away Germany’s most sensitive front costing them one of their two supply routes for the Western Fronts. It was the success in the first half of the offensive that led to possible peace talks during October. The successful MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 14 offe nsive led to the World War I victory, which in turn led to the birth of a new superpower and the need to build and maintain a strong military in comparison to all other world powers. Analysis The Meuse -Argonne Offensive was a nearly an impossible task. The terrain was not only suited for a defensive force, but it had been improved and fortified throughout the four years the German forces held it. The Allied forces were never able to break the German defense, but several key variables during the 47 -day offen sive led to the American Expeditionary Force’s victory. The AEF began the offensive with such an overwhelming force and with perfect timing. The German forces were not prepared because the AEF surprise caught them during a changeover. These initial var iables led to the AEF reaching the German’s first line on the first day. The most important variable that led to the AEF’s victory was the total use of their force. By the end of the offensive, 1.2 million AEF soldiers had participated in the fight. German y’s inability to replace their dead at the rate that the AEF did, forced them to continue to move back day by day until the objective was seized. General Pershing focused his entire force on one objective , the capturing of the interdiction of the rail line between Carignan and Sedan. He began his offensive effort by using mass and surprise to his advantage. He attacked with 120,000 soldiers on the first day. He used the economy of force war principle to hi s advantage by not allowing the French and British forces to take parts of his units in their lines. He realized that with the little training most of his men had received in preparation for the war, a unity of command under him was best for his overall ob jective. He kept his plan to his subordinate commanders simple ; he continued to order MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 15 frontal attacks until the enemy was overwhelmed and had to retreat. General Pershing followed most if not all the principles of war which led to the victory of the Meuse -Argonne Offensive. The most important element of combat power that influenced the victory were leadership , fire support , and sustainment . Although General Pershing’s decision -making is questioned after the fact, his decisive actions and the organization and employment of his forces led to a successful offensive. An offensive that was thought to be impossible. The use of artillery for three hours before the original advancement was critical in keeping the Germans away from their defensive positions that m ost had temporarily left. The fires were critical for AEF forces reaching the first German defensive line. Sustainment was overall the key factor in the Battle of the Argonne Forest. The ability for the AEF to outlast the German force in both supplies and personnel was the difference that led to AEF’s victory. The Battle of the Argonne forest affected warfighting through at least three aspects. The Army’s policy has changed since this battle. The U.S. learned from the consequences of sending men with lim ited training to war. Policies were added to grow the U.S. military from the 17 th largest in the world to a superpower. Army doctrine has been affected as well. When fighting alongside other elements, you don’t move so forward that you get in their sectors of fire or create a gap between your units. The lost battalion taught the U.S. the importance of moving as one unit. Lastly, the need for technology was the biggest take from the battle. The U.S. sent their soldiers with a rifle and a bayonet. Without the tanks, aircraft, machine guns, and artillery that the AEF was given by other Allied forces, the AEF would have never overpowered the Germans. Conclusion The Meuse -Argonne Offensive turned out to be the most critical offensive in World War I. The American Expeditionary Force outlasted and overwhelmed the German forces in what MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 16 appeared to be an impenetrable defense. The AEF used 1.2 million soldiers to constantly replenish their lines and outlast the German forces pushing them back behind their fortified lin es until the AEF reached their objective. This action played a key role in ending the Great War by cutting off the supplies to most of the German forces in the Western Front. The Meuse -Argonne Offensive lasted 47 days and cost the United States 122,063 casualties and Germany around 100,000 casualties. The battle became the largest and bloodiest battle in American history. I believe the same outcome could have come with fewer casualties. Had the AEF learned from their Allied forces and what worked and didn’t work before the arrival of the AEF, the high amount of casualties at the beginning of the offensive could have been avoided. However, I believe it demoralized the German forces by making i t seem as if they were fighting an unlimited force. In my research, the fact that most German forces temporarily left their post to be relieved gave the AEF the foothold of the first German defensive line and ultimately had them on their heels from then on . A critical lesson learned from the Meuse -Argonne Offensive is to not underestimate the enemy. The German forces underestimated the American forces by not overestimating their fortress -like positions. They relied more on the idea of their defense inste ad manning it. Having a proper relief in place will maintain the combat effectiveness. Leaders can learn to communicate with adjacent units. Lack of communication with adjacent units is still something we experience. If the “lost battalion” coordinated th eir advancements with their left and right fri endly units, they would know to stop advancing to avoid fratricide and a gap in the lines. MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 17 Appendix Appendix A MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 18 Appendix B MEUSE -ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 19 References Allen, B.H. (2015) The Greatest Battle Never Told: The Meuse -Argonne Offensive, 1918 retrieved from http://meuse -argonne.com/wp -content/uploads/2016/01/The_Greatest_ Battle_Never_Told_The_Meuse.pdf American Battle Monuments Commission (AB MC1) (2015) The Meuse -Argonne Offensive, a World War I Online Interactive, Released retrieved from https://www.abmc.gov/news events/news/meuse -argonne -offensive -world -war -i-online - interactive -released American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC2) (2015) Teaching and Mapping the Geography of the Meuse Argonne Offensive:Where?Why There? Retrieved from https://www.abmc.gov/learning -resources/lesson -plans/teaching -and -mapping geography - meuse -argonne -offensive -where -why Doughboy Center (2000) The story of the American Expeditionary Force retrieved from http://www.worldwar1.com/dbc/big show.htm Grotelueschen, Mark E. (2014, Oct 08) Warfare 1914 -1918 (USA) ret rieved from https://encyclopedia.1914 -1918 -online.net/article/warfare_1917 -1918_usa Simkin, John (2014) The United States Army and the First World War retrieved from http://spartacus -educational.com/FWWusa.htm
