Each response should be at least 150 words. Do you think appeals to the Bible or God's will can be good arguments for ethical views on particular issues? Why or why not? Do you think it's good, or bad
1Racialized Discrimination in Dating:
It’s Not Just a Personal Preference
by C.E. Abbate
Abstract:
Is it wrong for a person to consider dating people only of particular races or refuse
to consider dating people of particular races? Many people say that racialized
attraction is just a matter of personal preference. Against this view, it will be argued th at
it often constitutes wrongful discrimination. It would be wrong for an employer or school
to discriminate against people in comparable ways, and so it’s wrong to engage in similar
racial discrimination in seeking romantic relationships. 1
Introduction
Sarah is a white, female college student who decides to enter the dating scene. Much to her
delight, there is an app called Tinder. After reviewing the profile of a potential match, which
includes a few photos and a short biography, Sarah can swipe left i f she’s not interested, right if
she is. When she swipes left on someone — say, James — James’s profile disappears and he can
never contact Sarah on Tinder. If Sarah swipes right on James, and James swipes right on Sarah,
the two match. They now have the chanc e to talk with one another.
Sarah — like so many other people — often makes her swiping decisions based on the photos that
appear. She has a habit of instantly swiping left on:
● Black men
● blond men
● men she deems physically unattractive
● men who hunt or fish
● men who love football
Are any of Sarah’s habits morally problematic? In the dating context, is there a moral
difference between skipping over Black men and skipping over men who like football?
Many people say that dating preferences are just that: preferences . Some people prefer to date
white people, while others prefer to date Black people, and we shouldn’t judge the dating
1 This is a shortened version of a chapter in College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues that Affect You , 2nd
Edition. The original title of this paper is “It’s not just a personal preference: Racialized Discrimination in
the Tinder Context.” The above is an edited title and abstract.
2
preferences of others. But Sarah’s habit of swiping left on Black men certainly feels different
from her other habits. After examining it more closely, we can return to the others.
Sarah is discriminating between people, even if not fully intentionally. This isn’t necessarily a
criticism. You discriminate when you draw a distinction between people on the basis of some
traits they possess or lack, and Sarah draws distinctions between prospective partners on the
basis of traits she finds attractive or unattractive, appealing, or unappealing, such as race or hair
color. Obviously, not all instances of discrimination are wrong. At an amusement p ark, people
under a certain height aren’t allowed to go on some of the rides. The park is discriminating based
on height, but that is justified based on a safety concern -- you have to be tall enough to have the
harness protect you from falling out. So, th ere’s no moral issue there.
How should we think about Sarah’s discrimination? Is it wrongful or permissible?
Charles Herbert Stember (1978) worries that, in the dating context, something that’s “just a
preference” is actually a cover for harmful racial pr ejudice. Research shows that racialized
attraction is closely associated with generic racist attitudes, which challenges the idea that racial
attraction is just a matter of taste (Callander et al. 2015). Thus, instead of talking in terms of
sexual preferen ce, some use the notion of sexual racism to describe the sexual rejection of racial
minorities (Callander et al. 2015; Stember 1978). Can we make this charge stick?
Consequentialist Concerns
If sexual racism is wrong, there are going to be cases where we won’t be able to explain the
wrongness by appealing to negative consequences. The people Sarah swipes left on won’t be
harmed by Sarah’s habits. For instance, if Sarah swipes left on a Black m an, he’ll never find out
that Sarah swiped left on him, nor will he ever find out that Sarah swiped left on him because he
is Black. (We can safely assume that Sarah’s profile doesn’t say that she dates only white men,
so that isn’t a potential source of o ffense to Black people.)
One serious concern, though, is that Sarah’s Tinder habit will perpetuate racist tendencies or, at
the very least, implicit biases — i.e., unconscious negative attitudes about people who aren’t
members of her own “in group.” While ha ving implicit biases is distinct from being an overt
racist, implicit biases still negatively affect human behavior and cause unintended harm (Banaji
et al. 2015 ; Levinson and Smith 2012 ). For ins tance, it’s widely known that implicit bias in the
hiring process leads to the unconscious favoring of white applicants over equally qualified Black
applicants. Sarah’s Tinder behavior, then, may unconsciously cause her to foster negative
attitudes towards Black people that may have real -life consequences later. This alone gives Sarah
a moral reason to rethink her dating norms.
But let’s stipulate that Sarah’s swiping behavior won’t cause her to have racist tendencies or
implicit biases. Say that her swipi ng behavior won’t encourage her to be rude, unkind, or unfair
to the Black people she encounters outside of Tinder. Let’s also assume that Sarah never tells
anyone that she automatically swipes left on Black men, and thus her swiping behavior doesn’t
norma lize or perpetuate racism or implicit bias in society. Assume Sarah’s race -based Tinder
policy is completely private, so it doesn’t bring about any negative felt consequences. 3
Given all that, if Sarah’s behavior is wrong, the wrongness can’t be explained in terms of felt
harm. But I think that some of the things Sarah does on Tinder are wrong. They are wrong
because they deny the equal worth of persons — and this is true even if t hose who are
discriminated against don’t experience harm from the discriminating act or policy.
Equality
My argument is based on a simple moral principle that we can all get behind: all people should
be treated as having equal inherent value and equal m oral worth . Call this the Equal Inherent
Value & Worth Principle .2 This principle entails that (1) all persons have inherent value, and (2)
all persons have equal moral worth. That is, you don’t have more moral worth than others even if
you’re smarter, better looking, richer, and so forth.
There are two ways we can violate the Equal Inherent Value & Worth Principle . First, we can
deny that a person has inherent val ue. To say that a person has inherent value is to say that the
person is valuable in herself, regardless of her usefulness to others and regardless of whether
others see her as useful. So, we deny that a person has inherent value when we treat her as if sh e
lacks inherent value — that is, when we treat her just as we would treat a mere tool or instrument
(Regan 1983). Because people have inherent value, we ought to treat them with respect, which is
just to say that we ought to treat them in a way that recogni zes their inherent value (Regan 1983).
Call this the Respect Principle .
The second way we violate the Equal Inherent Value & Worth Principle is by failing to treat
people as having equal moral worth. Some people, for instance, might recognize that both
Br itney and Lindsey have inherent value, insofar as they agree that it would be wrong to treat
them like mere resources. Still, they might say that Britney has more value than Lindsey, and
thus they might treat Lindsey and Britney differently — for instance, b y giving extra weight to
Britney’s interests. Say, for instance, you encounter Lindsey and Britney while out hiking.
Lindsey and Britney have been lost for days and are equally famished. Say you have four granola
bars with you, and you give three to Britne y and only one to Lindsey, because you find Britney
to be more attractive. In doing this, you haven’t treated Lindsey like a mere resource; in fact, by
giving her one granola bar, you recognized that she is a creature with morally important interests,
incl uding the interest in eating. But, still, your behavior is problematic because you fail to treat
Britney and Lindsey as having equal moral worth.
Because people have equal inherent value, it’s wrong to treat some as if they have greater moral
value than o thers. Call this the Principle of Equal Treatment . This principle, unlike the Respect
Principle , is a comparative principle; it becomes relevant only when the treatment of one person
can be contrasted with the treatment of another.
2 Note: This view is motivated by and draws on the rights -based theories developed by Tom Re gan
(1983 ) and Deborah Hellman ( 2008 ).
4
The Equal Inherent Value & Worth Principle doesn’t require us to treat everyone in exactly the
same way. It doesn’t entail that it’s always wrong to draw distinctions between racialized groups.
Consider affirmative action laws, which often draw a distinction between Blacks and wh ites in
order to make some form of restitution for past injustices done to Black people. Affirmative
action laws often attempt to raise the status of Black people to the status that white people enjoy,
and thus they are often created and enforced in the na me of equality . This involves
discrimination, but it’s discrimination for the sake of justice. It isn’t wrongful .
Deborah Hellman (2008) argues that we deny the equal moral worth of persons when we draw
distinctions that demean — that “stamp a person or gro up with a badge of inferiority” (Hellman
2008, 41). When we demean others, we put down, diminish, and denigrate them. And when we
do this to some but not to others, we deny the equal worth of the demeaned. Drawing demeaning
distinctions thereby violates th e Equal Treatment Principle and, consequently, the Equal
Inherent Value & Worth Principle .
Racial Discrimination (in the Dating Context)
Consider Mariah, who opens a small business. If Mariah wants to single -handedly run her
business instead of hiring empl oyees, this doesn’t violate anyone’s inherent worth. No one has a
right that Mariah hire them. But if Mariah decides to hire an employee, the Equal Treatment
Principle requires her to treat applicants as equally worthy. For instance, it would be wrong of
M ariah to dismiss or write off applicants solely because of their race.
Likewise, if you altogether refuse to date, this doesn’t violate anyone’s inherent worth. No one —
Black or white, blond or brunette — has a right that you date them. But once you decide t o begin
dating, the Equal Treatment Principle requires you to treat potential suitors as equally worthy.
It’s wrong to dismiss or write off possible partners solely because of their race.
Someone might say that the dating context is relevantly different from the employment context.
After all, when it comes to dating, Sarah is looking for someone she sexually desires. Physical
traits, which are often associated with racial identities, are re levant to her sexual desires. Is it
wrong for someone who finds blonds sexually appealing to pursue blonds over brunettes? If not,
then what’s so bad about preferring certain racial identities?
We should distinguish between preferences and deal breakers . S ure, many people prefer to date
blonds over brunettes, and they may choose to date blonds over brunettes if given the option. But
this choice doesn’t necessarily exclude brunettes from consideration. Sarah, though, expresses
more than just a preference for white men. For her, being Black functions as a deal -breaker; she
instantly swipes left on Black people. And when she draws a distinction based on race alone, she
expresses that there’s nothing more to being a Black person than being Black and that Black
people are undesirable because of their race. She fails to see Black people as individuals who
have unique identities, value systems, and preferences — identities, value systems, and
preferences that may fit perfectly with hers.
Through her race -based discrim ination, Sarah reduces Black people to their “Blackness,” while
at the same time, she recognizes that white people are more than just their “whiteness.” Sarah’s 5
distinction drawing, then, expresses that white people are, while Black people aren’t, people w ith
unique identities, values, and interests. There is thus a sense in which Sarah’s race -based
distinction stamps Black people with a “badge of inferiority” in comparison to white people —
and this expresses a rejection of the equal moral worth of humans . A nd, on the other hand,
the person who swipes right on profiles without considering race is the kind of person who sees
Black people and white people as moral equals — persons with unique value systems, interests,
and identities that go beyond the color of th eir skin.
Interest -Based Discrimination (in the Dating Context)
Now, recall that Sarah also draws a distinction between men who love football and men who
aren’t football fans. When she encounters dating profiles that include photos of men in football
jers eys, she habitually swipes left.
Does my argument imply that this distinction drawing is demeaning too? After all, it seems to
express the view that men who love football have less moral worth than men who aren’t football
fans.
But there is an important d ifference between Sarah’s race -based distinction and Sarah’s football -
based distinction. Sarah’s football -based distinction is made by considering that, beyond being
people , super -football fans have interests and values that likely will conflict with her o wn. In the
dating realm, it’s one thing to draw distinctions based on someone’s interests in sports; it’s
another to draw distinctions based on physical appearance.
Consider, for instance, Sarah’s Tinder behavior in a little more detail: While browsing th rough
profiles of potential partners, the profile of Jake, a white man, catches Sarah’s attention. Sarah
finds Jake to be attractive, and in his first photo, he is captured smiling with his grandfather.
Sarah then skips to Jake’s second photo, in which he is seen at a Packers game wearing a Packers
jersey. Sarah finally reads Jake’s short “bio,” and, to her dismay, finds that it’s all about his love
for football. Sarah swipes “no,” and Jake disappears from her life forever.
In this situation, Sarah recogni zes Jake as a person with a unique identity and interests. When she
sees the first photo of Jake, she wants to learn more about his identity — she wants to know, for
instance, what his hobbies are. She thus recognizes that Jake is more than just a white man.
Unfortunately for her, he’s a white man who loves football too much and too deeply for her.
Sarah’s Other Distinctions
What I’ve suggested is that, when choosing potential romantic partners, we ought to consider
potential partners as persons — that is, as individuals with unique values, preferences, interests,
hobbies, likes, and dislikes. And we should, for the sake of a lasting relationship, pursue
relationships with individuals whose preferences, values, and interests sufficiently overlap with
our own.
If a vegan swipes left on someone because of that person’s interest in hunting and killing
animals, it doesn’t constitute wrongful discrimination. Rather, it’s a smart dating practice, as 6
hunters and vegans have deeply conflicting value systems that re nder them incompatible. If you
think that animals have rights, and you swipe left on someone because he likes to take pictures of
himself with the carcasses of the animals he’s killed and apparently enjoys killing animals, then
you’re definitely recognizin g that the man in the picture is more than just the color of his skin.
You fully understand that he’s a person with interests and values — they just happen to be ones
that aren’t compatible with those of vegans.
When Sarah rules out potential partners based on their football or hunting interests, she does not
automatically dismiss these men based on their appearances; rather, she recognizes their
personhood . For these reasons, Sarah’s interest -based distinctions don’t constitute wrongful
discrimination. On t he other hand, when Sarah writes off men based on their race, hair color, or
general appearance, she demeans them. She expresses that, because of their appearance, it’s not
important to consider who these men are as persons — that is, as individuals with uni que interests,
values, and preferences.
My view entails that the distinctions Sarah draws between attractive men and unattractive men
and blond men and non -blond men constitute wrongful discrimination. While this might strike
you as implausible, remember that wrongness comes in degrees. For inst ance, while it’s wrong to
cut off a piece of someone’s hair without their permission, it’s a much graver wrong to chop off
their leg without their permission. Relatedly, some instances of wrongful discrimination are more
egregious than others. For instance , it’s wrong for an employer to refuse to hire people with
blond hair. But there is something even more problematic about an employer who refuses to hire
Black people. Likewise, the wrongness of discriminating against blond people in the dating
context isn ’t as problematic as discriminating against people because of their race. As I will now
argue, given the historical significance of race -based discrimination, Sarah’s discrimination
against Black men is particularly troubling.
The Social Nature of Discrimination and Sarah’s Swiping Habit
When determining how wrong a particular instance of wrongful discrimination is, we must look
at the meaning of the distinction drawing (Hellman 2008). The meaning of an act often stems
from the context in which the act is performed , as some contexts “invest” distinctions with a
meaning that other distinctions don’t have (Hellman 2008). As Hellman (2008) argues, when
there is a history of mistreating people with a particular characteristic, we sho uld take this into
account when evaluating discrimination that’s based on that characteristic.
For instance, as Hellman notes, there’s a relevant difference between denying someone a job
because her last name begins with the letter A and denying someone a job because she is a
woman. To deny a woman a job because of her “womanness” is to discriminate on the basis of
an attribute(s) that define a group (i.e., women) that has been mistreated in the past or is
currently of lower social status — and this explains why discriminating on the basis of “minority
traits” (e.g., “womanness”) just feels different than drawing distinctions based on other attributes,
such as the attribute of having a last name that begins with A (Hellman 2008). This feeling can
best be expl ained by the claim that the history of mistreatment or current social status of the
involved parties are relevant to determining the meaning of distinction drawing (Hellman 2008). 7
In this case, refusing to hire women is conventionally understood to suggest that the role of
women is in the home and/or that women are not competent to be employed in the workplace.
And this understanding stems from our knowledge of the historical oppression and wrongful
discrimination of women in the workplace.
As a result of a ll this, as Hellman points out, discriminating against women in the workplace is
symbolically significant in a way that other discrimination isn’t. The historical and current social
significance of gender discrimination means that, in the employment contex t, discriminating
against women has a different meaning than does the discrimination against people with last
names that begin with A (Hellman 2008).
Relatedly, given the ways in which racial distinctions have been historically, and are currently,
used to hurt and demean Black people, we must be especially careful when we classify people on
the basis of race. “Black people,” or even just “Black men,” form a group that has been, and still
is, subordinated in our culture. So, drawing distinctions based on Bl ackness often expresses that
Black people are inferior to whites even when the speaker didn’t intend for his distinction to
carry this meaning (Hellman 2008). There is thus a legitimate worry that Sarah’s distinction
drawing demeans the Black men in the pr ofiles she views on Tinder.
Using race to draw distinctions in the dating context is highly problematic because of the terrible
history of interracial relationships in the United States. For instance, in 1691, Virginia ( Loving v
Virginia ) banned interraci al marriage — a decision that was duplicated in many other states. It
wasn’t until 1967 that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state bans on interracial marriages,
commonly referred to as “miscegenation laws,” violate the 14th Amendment’s equal protection
clause.
Miscegenation laws reflect the deeply held view that Black people are inferior to white people,
and that, because of this, they shouldn’t “mix.” Although such laws are deemed unconstitutional
today and many people claim to be accepting of interracia l relationships, interracial relationships
are still, to this day, viewed as abnormal in our society. According to a 2018 YouGov poll, 17
percent of Americans deem interracial marriage “morally wrong.” Moreover, a recent study
demonstrates that Black and w hite interracial couples still elicit disgust in many white college
students — including those students who claim to accept interracial marriage (Skinner and Hudac
2017 ). Feelings of disgust are associated with dehumanization, a nd this implies that many white
college students implicitly dehumanize Black and white interracial couples.
While 17 percent of all US marriages are interracial, over 40 percent of these marriages involve a
Hispanic spouse and a white spouse. Black and wh ite interracial marriages, on the other hand,
are rare occurrences. In fact, it’s estimated that Black and white couples represent only 1 percent
of all marriages in the United States (Gallup 2013), which makes marriages between Blacks and
whites the least common kind of interracial marriage. As Rockquemore and Brunsma (2001, ix)
argue, “[b]lacks and whites continue to be the two groups with the greatest social distance.” This
gives us reason to think that Sarah’s choice to swipe left on Black men, and not Hispanic men, is
morally significant. 8
The meaning attached to the expressed “preference” against interracial relationships between
Blacks and whites is, as Hellman puts it, “symbolically loaded” in a society with a “painful and
complicated history attache d to Black –white unions” (Childs 2005, 545). And it’s in part because
of this painful and complicated history that when Sarah swipes left on a Black person just
because of his race, she expresses a devaluation of Black men because of their race. She
expres ses that Black men are not the kind of men white women should date even if she doesn’t
intend to express this . For these reasons, there is a relevant difference between swiping left on a
person because he has blond hair and swiping left on a person because he’s Black. While both
acts are wrong, there is an additional, deep wrongness attached to race -based discrimination in
the dating context.
Conclusion
There will always be people who insist that it’s their “right” to date only white people, if this is
wha t they prefer. And that might be true. But, still, this doesn’t mean that they’re in the moral
clear. After all, as philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse (1991) puts it: you can exercise a right
viciously . Those who draw race -based distinctions in the dating con text may act within their
“rights,” but they still date in a manner that constitutes deeply wrongful discrimination.
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