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Thread: Analyze the problem of evil. Do you think Augustine o rLeibniz offer an adequate solution to the probelm?

Joshua

Based on the two solutions provided from Augustine and Leibniz I personally would think that Leibniz’s solution offers an adequate solution to the problem. I think Leibniz’s has a better solution because It follows a similar motto that I firmly belive in: everything happens for a reason. We assume the principle of sufficient reason and that god exists as a perfect being. God is omnipotent: god can create any possible world, God is omniscient: god can survey all possible worlds and select which world to create, God is omnibenevolent: god would choose to create the best possible world and evil exists under Leibniz’s solution. This solution that God chooses the best of all possible worlds just makes sense to me more out of the two given solutions.

Katelyn,

L2. Consider Aquinas' Cosmological Arguments (Argument from Motion and Argument from Cause). Do you think either argument is successful in proving God's existence? If so, why? If not, why not?

COLLAPSE

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The Objections introduced in lecture challenge fundamental aspects of Aquinas' Cosmological Arguments.

As indicated in lecture, Objection #1 references a challenge to Premise 3 of the "Argument Based on Cause". Premise 3 states the following: "The chain of causes of things coming into existence cannot be infinite." That challenge indicates the reflection that an idea of infinitiude may be "perfectly coherent".

I question the role of faith in this circumstance, as a definition of infinitude applies in both a physical and mental context when introduced through mathematics. David Hume's discussion regarding causality expresses that causal relationships may be appropriately understood only as they might have occurred in the past, which complicates an understanding of infinitude within a temporal framework.

Should God exist atemporally, how might Premise 3 in the causally focused Cosmological Argument enhance or affect a notion of a god-like being?

I continue this question in reference to Objection #2, as mentioned in lecture; with the following stipulation: God-like is understood to be an implication of perfect-ness, recognizable in this framework by the characteristics of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. The Big Bang might be definitive as God, or represented in a conjunctive, or congruent; knowledge, or understanding.

How might an articulation of logical laws; as mentioned, be conducive to proving God's existence?

Premise 5 of the "Argument Based on Change" is noted in lecture to state that: "If someone/thing responsible for initial motions/changes ... then - then God exists as that some one or thing," as that someone or something is to be called God. How does calling a God-like being: "God", change who or what God is to be?

Meghan,

Evaluate the Ontological Argument. Do you think it is successful in proving the existence of God? If so, why? If not, why not? Where does the argument go wrong? Is the form invalid or is there at least one false premise?

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I do not believe that the Ontological Argument is successful in proving the existence of God. From the lecture, we learned two objections against this argument, one stating that existence is not a property. I agree with this objection against the argument because I do not believe that the existence of God is truly considered a property. The question of a winged horse actually existing or not is what made me agree with this objection. Just because there is a belief that God exists, does not necessarily mean God does exist. In my opinion, the argument goes wrong when we learned from the lecture that experience is not needed to relate these ideas. Personally, I believe in such arguments where there is experience and evidence, and rarely have a belief in a reasoning system unless I can understand facts to back it up. I believe the false premise in the Ontological Argument is to assume existence to be a property.

Evaluate Hume’s version of the Teleological Argument (as an Argument by Analogy). Do you think it is successful in showing the likelihood of God’s existence as the intelligent designer? If so, why. If not, why not? Where does the argument go wrong? Do you agree or disagree with Hume’s critiques?

Meghan,

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I believe Hume’s version of the Teleological Argument is successful in showing the likelihood of God’s existence as the intelligent designer. One reason I believe this is because the premises are derived from observation, perception, and experience. Hume believes that knowledge comes from the senses, and by using senses through observation, perception, and experience, accurate knowledge is obtained. Hume’s argument by analogy I agree because if there are observed similarities between more than two events, processes, persons, locations, etc. then there must be larger reasoning behind it, rather than coincidences. Lastly, I somewhat agree with Hume’s critiques, specifically the inductive argument being a weak analogy. I agree with Hume that there are analogies that are unwanted that follows from the comparison. Also, Hume critiques that it is unclear whether the effects are analogous, and I can agree with that as well.

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