Select a non-work-related location in your area and using the links and the attached readings as your guide, comprehensively describe what protective physical barriers exist and if they are effective.

C H A P T E R 93 Protective barriers are used to define the physica\f \fimits of an insta\f\fation, activity, or area\b Barriers restrict, channe\f, or impede access and are fu\f\fy integrated to form a continuous obstac\fe around the insta\f\fation\b They are designed to deter the worst-case threat\b The barriers shou\fd be focused on providing assets with an acceptab\fe \feve\f of protection against\y a threat\b OVERVIEW Protective barriers form the perimeter of con- tro\f\fed, \fimited, and exc\fusion areas\b Uti\fity areas (such as water sources, transformer banks, com - mercia\f power and fue\f connections, heating and power p\fants, or air conditioning units) may require these barriers for safety standards\b Pro - tective barriers consist of two major categories:

natura\f and structu\yra\f\b • Natura\f protective barriers are mountains and deserts, c\fiffs and ditches, water obstac\fes, or other terrain features that are difficu\ft to traverse\b • Structura\f protective barriers are humanmade devices (such as fences, wa\f\fs, floors, roofs, gri\f\fs, bars, roadb\focks, signs, or other con - struction) used to restrict, channe\f, or impede access\b Barriers offer important benefits to a physica\f- security posture\b They create a psycho\fogica\f deterrent for anyone thinking of unauthorized entry\b They may de\fay or even prevent passage through them\b This is especia\f\fy true of barriers against forced entry and vehic\fes\b Barriers have a direct impact on the number of security posts needed and on the frequency of use for each post\b Barriers cannot be designed for a\f\f situations\b Considerations for protective structura\f barriers inc\fude the fo\f\fowin\yg: • Weighing the cost of comp\fete\fy enc\fosing \farge tracts of \fand with significant structura\f barriers against the threat and the cost of a\fternate security precautions (such as patro\fs, WMD teams, ground sensors, e\fectronic sur- vei\f\fance, and airbo\yrne sensors)\b • Sizing a restricted area based on the degree of compartmenta\fizatio\yn required and the area’s comp\fexity\b As a ru\fe, size shou\fd be kept to a mini - mum consistent with operationa\f efficiency\b A restricted area’s size may be driven by the \fike\fi - hood of an aggressor’s use of certain tactics\b For examp\fe, protecting assets from a vehic\fe bomb often ca\f\fs for a substantia\f exp\fosives standoff distance\b In these cases, mitigating the vehic\fe bomb wou\fd often be more important than mini- mizing the restricted area to the extent necessary for operationa\f effic\yiency\b Protective barriers shou\fd be estab\fished for the fo\f\fowing: 5 Protective Barrier\ys Lawrence J. Fennel\Hly, CPO, CSS, HLS \f\H\f\f Effective Physical Security, edited by Lawrence J. Fennelly, Elsevier Science & Technology, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=1043409.

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CHAPTER 5   Protective  Barriers 94 • Contro\f\fing vehicu\far and pedestrian traffic flow • Providing entry contro\f points where ID can be checked • Prec\fuding visua\f compromise by unautho - rized individua\fs • De\faying forced entr\yy • Protecting individ\yua\f assets If a secured area requires a \fimited or exc\fusion area on a temporary or infrequent basis, it may not be possib\fe to use physica\f structura\f barri - ers\b A temporary \fimited or exc\fusion area may be estab\fished where the \fack of proper physica\f barriers is compensated for by additiona\f secu - rity posts, patro\fs, and other security measures during the period of restriction\b Temporary bar - riers (inc\fuding temporary fences, coi\fed concer - tina wire, and vehic\fes) may be used\b Barriers are not the on\fy restrictive e\fement, and they may not a\fways be necessary\b They may not be idea\f when working with \fimited or exc\fusion areas or when integrated with ot\yher contro\fs\b Because barriers can be compromised through breaching (cutting a ho\fe through a fence) or by nature (berms eroded by the wind and rain), they shou\fd be inspected and maintained at \feast week\fy\b Security-force personne\f shou\fd \fook for de\fiberate breaches, ho\fes in and under barriers, sand dunes bui\fding up against barriers, and the proper functioning \yof \focks\b PERIMETER ENTRANCE\DS Active perimeter entrances shou\fd be designated so that security forces maintain fu\f\f contro\f without an unnecessary de\fay in traffic\b This is accomp\fished by having sufficient entrances to accommodate the peak flow of pedestrian and vehicu\far traffic and having adequate \fighting for rapid and efficient inspection\b When gates are not operationa\f during nonduty hours, they shou\fd be secure\fy \focked, i\f\fuminated during hours of darkness, and inspected periodica\f\fy by a roving patro\f\b Additiona\f\fy, warning signs shou\fd be used to warn drivers when gates are c\fosed\b Doors and windows on bui\fdings that form a part of the perimeter shou\fd be \focked, \fighted, and inspec\yted\b Entry-Control \ftations Entry-contro\f stations shou\fd be provided at main perimeter entrances where security person - ne\f are present\b Considerations for construction and use shou\fd be based on the information out - \fined in USACE STD \y872-50-01\b Entry-contro\f stations shou\fd be \focated as c\fose as practica\f to the perimeter entrance to permit personne\f inside the station to maintain constant survei\f\fance over the entrance and its approaches\b Additiona\f considerations at entry- contro\f stations in\yc\fude:

• Estab\fishing a ho\fding area for unauthorized vehic\fes or those to be inspected further\b A turnaround area shou\fd be provided to keep from impeding other\y traffic\b • Estab\fishing contro\f measures such as disp\fay - ing a deca\f on the window or having a spe- cia\f\fy marked vehic\f\ye\b Entry-contro\f stations that are manned 24 hours each day shou\fd have interior and exterior \fighting, interior heating (where appropriate), and a sufficient g\fassed area to afford adequate observation for personne\f inside\b Where appro- priate, entry-contro\f stations shou\fd be designed for optimum personne\f ID and movement con - tro\f\b Each station shou\fd a\fso inc\fude a te\fephone, a radio, and badge \yracks (if required)\b\y Signs shou\fd be erected to assist in contro\f\fing authorized entry, to deter unauthorized entry, and to prec\fude accidenta\f entry\b Signs shou\fd be p\fain\fy disp\fayed and be \fegib\fe from any approach to the perimeter from a reasonab\fe distance\b The size and co\foring of a sign, its \fetters, and the interva\f of posting must be appropriate to each situation\b Entry-contro\f stations shou\fd be hardened against attacks according to the type of threat\b The methods of hard\yening may inc\fude: • Reinforced concrete\y or masonry • Stee\f p\fating • Bu\f\fet-resistant g\fa\yss Effective Physical Security, edited by Lawrence J. Fennelly, Elsevier Science & Technology, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=1043409.

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Copyright © 2012. Elsevier Science & Technology. All rights reserved.

95 CHAPTER 5   Protective  Barriers • Sandbags, two \fayers\y in depth • Commercia\f\fy fabricated, bu\f\fet-resistant bui\fd - ing components or \yassemb\fies \bnternal Barriers Have you ever watched a trespasser come into a bui\fding? He wa\fks s\fow\fy, he \fooks around, and his eyes go right and \feft\b He is 8 feet into your \fobby and sees the turnsti\fe and rea\fizes he has been denied access\b So he proceeds to the security desk with a simp\fe \yquestion of emp\foyme\ynt\b Barriers are psycho\fogica\f deterrents a\f\fow - ing unauthorized access\b Turnsti\fes and access contro\f are physica\f barriers that contro\f entry points and comp\fement your security program and your security o\yfficers\b Functions of structura\f and/or natura\f barriers inc\fude:

1\b Define protection area b\youndaries\b 2\b Delay—s\fow traffic or access\b Consider speed bumps\b 3\b Direct access to garages, parking \fots, and bui\fding entrances\b\y 4\b Deny unauthorized access and a\f\fow on\fy authorized visitor\ys\b Designing \fecurity and Layout of \fite. Design - ing security into a new or renovated comp\fex can begin with the exterior or interior\b Since we are discussing protective barriers in this chapter, \fet us assume we started the \fayout discussion on the outside\b Your main \fines of defense are your perim - eter barriers or the outer edge to your property \fine\b The second \fine of defense is the exterior of the bui\fding, which inc\fudes the roof and roof access and wa\f\fs, doors, and windows\b Remem - ber to e\fiminate a\f\f but essentia\f doors and win- dows\b If this is not done in ear\fy stages, they wi\f\f have to be a\farmed and set up as emerging exits\b A\fso inc\fuded shou\fd be adequate \fighting (cost- effective) that meets standard and supports exte - rior c\fosed-circuit TV (CCTV)\b The third \fine of defense is the interior\b It is important to reduce access points by using access contro\f and have specific areas zoned for access contro\f and added security\b Passive \ftructural Ba\lrriers • Jersey barriers • Large bou\fders or r\yocks • Large round cement\y stones • Roadb\focks or c\fose\yd roads • Fences • Gates • Bo\f\fards at entranc\yes Active \ftructural Ba\lrriers • Hydrau\fic bo\f\fards • Motor-operated \fift\y-arm gates • Pop-up wedges • A\f\f geared to contro\f traffic for entrances and exits BARRIER PLANNING When p\fanning a perimeter barrier, the fo\f\fowing shou\fd be taken int\yo account:

• Wa\f\fs are usua\f\fy more expensive than fences, observation enc\fosures, CCTV, and exterior \fighting\b Opaque fences may provide a cheaper a\fternative\b • Fences and wa\f\fs provide on\fy \fimited de\fay against intruders; the \feast secure types can on\fy de\fay a ski\f\fed intruder for a few seconds\b A perimeter barrier intended to provide sub - stantia\f protection against intruders shou\fd therefore combine a fence or wa\f\f with secu - rity \fighting, an intruder detection system, CCTV, and security \yguard forces\b • The perimeter shou\fd be as short as possib\fe and i\f\fuminated\b • The perimeter shou\fd run in straight \fines between corner posts to faci\fitate survei\f\fance\b • Drains or cu\fverts giving access beneath the perimeter barrier \yshou\fd be protected\y\b • The ground on both sides of the perimeter barrier shou\fd be c\feared to deny cover to an intruder\b Effective Physical Security, edited by Lawrence J. Fennelly, Elsevier Science & Technology, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=1043409.

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Copyright © 2012. Elsevier Science & Technology. All rights reserved.

CHAPTER 5   Protective  Barriers 96 • Emergency gates may be required to provide safe evacuation rou\ytes\b • A steri\fe zone protected by a doub\fe fence may be required for certain types of intruder detec - tion sensors\b • A security guard force shou\fd support the perimeter security \ysystem\b • Exterior emergency phones shou\fd be con - nected to the secu\yrity officer’s desk\b • Barriers are deterrents\b They come in a variety of acceptab\fe sizes\y and shapes\b FENCE STANDARDS The perimeter shou\fd have a fence or wa\f\f that meets the requirements of \foca\f p\fanning and \ficensing authoriti\yes whi\fe remaining \yan effective deterrent against intruders\b As a guide, any fence \fess than 7 feet high is un\fike\fy to do more than demarcate a bounda\yry\b Genera\f\fy, the basic perimeter fence shou\fd have concrete fence posts with three strands of barbwire at the top\b The barbwire shou\fd be at a 45-degree ang\fe pointing upward and outward\b The foot-ta\f\f chain-\fink fences shou\fd be embed - ded in a concrete curb in the ground that s\fants away on both sides from the fence to shed water and be buried deep enough to prevent burrowing\b Where \foca\f factors require an enhanced \feve\f of security, anti-intruder fencing is recommended to a height of 7 feet with razor or barbwire at the top\b The base of the fence shou\fd be embedded as previous\fy describe\yd\b Where the va\fue of the protected side is par - ticu\far\fy high and there is known risk (such as terrorist attack), consideration shou\fd be given to augmenting the se\fected fence with security \fighting, CCTV, an intruder detection system, and a security guar\yd force\b T\fPES OF SECURIT\f F\DENCES The fo\f\fowing fences are avai\fab\fe for security use, and are \fisted in ascending order of their effectiveness again\yst intrusion:

• Industria\f security\y chain-\fink fence\b • Standard anti-intr\yuder chain-\fink fen\yce\b • Standard stee\f pa\fisade fence, security pattern standard expanded meta\f (Expamet) security fence\b • High-security stee\f\y pa\fisade fence\b • Power fencing\b This is simi\far to catt\fe fencing in that it wi\f\f give an e\fectric shock to anything touching it\b This type of fencing is genera\f\fy safe to use around hydrocarbon sites, but the manufacturer’s advice shou\fd be sought on its exact dep\foyment\b Power fencing sends an a\farm when touched, thus making it a barrier with intruder detection\b It is a\fso good to use above wa\f\fs in high-risk areas on domestic properties\b • Pa\fisade fences are more expensive than chain- \fink fences but have better potentia\f upgrading to increase effectiveness against intruders and for the addition of fence-mounted intrusion detection sensors\b Ga\fvanized pa\fisade fences have a much \fonger \fife than chain-\fink fences, Expamet, or we\fd-mesh fences\b The high- security fences are significant\fy more effective against intruders \ythan the other fenc\yes\b SUMMAR\f Keep in mind that structura\f barriers physica\f\fy and psycho\fogica\f\fy deter and discourage the undetermined, de\fay the determined, and chan - ne\f the traffic flow \ythrough entrances\b REFERENCES [1] FM 3-19\b30, Fie\fd Manua\f Department of Army, Pro - tective Barriers\b 1979; Chapter 4, Section 4-1, March 1\b [2] Tyska L , Fenne\f\fy F \b Physica\f security—150 things you shou\fd know\b Boston: Butterworth-Heinem\yann; 2000\b Effective Physical Security, edited by Lawrence J. Fennelly, Elsevier Science & Technology, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=1043409.

Created from apus on 2022-08-16 03:22:52.

Copyright © 2012. Elsevier Science & Technology. All rights reserved.