This week's readings introduce several issues related to the increased use of information technology in the criminal justice system, and the many challenges that criminal justice agencies face in impl

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjqy20 “McJustice ”: On the McDonaldization of Criminal Justice Robert M. Bohm Published online: 18 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: Robert M. Bohm (2006) “McJustice ”: On the McDonaldization of Criminal Justice, Justice Quarterly, 23:1, 127-146 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07418820600552576 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions JUSTICE QUARTERLY VOLUME 23 NUMBER 1 (MARCH 2006) ISSN 0741-8825 print/1745-9109 online/06/010127-20 © 2006 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences DOI: 10.1080/07418820600552576 ESSAY “McJustice”: On the McDonaldization of Criminal Justice Robert M. Bohm Taylor and Francis Ltd RJQY_A_155240.sgm 10.1080/07418820600552576 Justice Quarterly 0741-8825 (print)/1745-9109 (online) Essay 2006 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences 23 1 000000March 2006 RobertBohm [email protected] This essay examines the “McDonaldization” of criminal justice or “McJustice.” In doing so, it provides another useful way of understanding the development and operation of criminal justice in the United States. The McDonaldization of vari- ous social institutions has succeeded because it provides advantages over other, usually older, methods of doing business. It has made McDonaldized social insti- tutions bureaucratic and rational in a Weberian sense and, thus, more efficient, calculable, predictable, and controlling over people (often by nonhuman tech- nologies). The principal problem with McDonaldized institutions, and another characteristic of the process, is irrationality or, as Ritzer calls it, the “irrational- ity of rationality.” A primary purpose of this essay is to expose some of the irra- tionalities of “McJustice” and to suggest some possible responses to them.

Keywordscriminal justice; McDonaldization; irrationality of rationality; bureaucracy; efficiency; calculability; predictability; control The purpose of this essay is to examine the “McDonaldization” of criminal justice. The concept of “McDonaldization” or “McJustice” provides another useful way of understanding the development and operation of criminal justice in the United States. 1 “McDonaldization,” as employed by sociologist George Ritzer, refers to “the [bureaucratic] process by which principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society Robert M. Bohm is a Professor of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida. He is a past president and Fellow of ACJS as well as a recipient of its Founders Award. His research interests focus on criminal justice, criminological theory, and capital punishment. Corre- spondence to: Robert M. Bohm, Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816, USA. E-mail: [email protected] 1. A popular way of understanding criminal justice in the United States is by employing metaphors.

The most frequently used metaphor depicts the criminal justice process as a “system”—a “criminal justice system.” For additional metaphors of criminal justice see Kraska (2004).Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 128 BOHM as well as of the rest of the world” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 1). The theoretical basis for McDonaldization is Max Weber’s theory of rationality and bureaucracy (Ritzer, 2004, p. 24; but see Wood, 1998, for a critique of Ritzer’s use of Weber). The concept of McDonaldization has been used to depict developments in a variety of different social institutions, including religion (Drane, 2001), education (Hayes & Wynyard, 2002; Parker & Jary, 1995), the media (Prichard, 1987), medicine (Reiser, 1978; Ritzer & Walczak, 1987), and leisure and travel (Rojek, 1993), as well as society itself (Ritzer, 2004). However, to date, the concept of McDonaldization has only rarely been employed in the analysis of criminal justice or issues related to criminal justice (see, for example, Kemmesies, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Shichor, 1997; Umbreit, 1999).

The McDonaldization of various social institutions has succeeded because it provides advantages over other, usually older, methods of doing business (see, for example, Ritzer, 2004, p. 16). It has made McDonaldized social institutions bureaucratic and rational in a Weberian sense and, thus, more efficient, calcu- lable, predictable, and controlling over people (often by nonhuman technologies).

In the case of McDonaldized businesses, it has also made them more profitable.

The principal problem with McDonaldized institutions, and another characteristic of the process, is irrationality or, as Ritzer (2004, p. 17) calls it, the “irrationality of rationality.” For example, McDonaldization does not always benefit all of the participants in the process or society in general. Indeed, McDonaldization has several important costs or dangers associated with it. A primary purpose of this essay is to expose the costs, dangers, or irrationalities of “McJustice.” In the following sections the characteristics of McDonaldized criminal justice or “McJustice”—efficiency, calculability, predictability, control, and irrational- ity—are described. Because of space limitations, only a few criminal justice examples can be provided (for other examples see Kemmesies, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Shichor, 1997; Umbreit, 1999). Efficiency: Administering Justice by Plea Bargaining Efficiency is the choosing of “the optimum means to a given end” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 43). Bureaucracies attempt to increase efficiency by requiring employees (and sometimes customers) to follow steps in a predesigned process governed by orga- nizational rules and regulations and by having managers supervise employees (and customers) to make sure they follow the rules, regulations, and process (Ritzer, 2004, p. 13). Increasing efficiency usually entails “streamlining various processes, simplifying products, and having customers do work formerly done by paid employees” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 44). Despite best efforts, however, the optimum means to a given end are rarely found because of historical constraints, financial difficulties, organizational limitations, and uncooperative human nature (Ritzer, 2004, p. 43). Therefore, most bureaucracies are relatively satisfied with the illu- sion of efficiency (Ritzer, 2004, p. 137) or an incremental increase in efficiency, knowing that maximization of efficiency is probably an unobtainable goal.Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 McJUSTICE 129 With the huge number of cases handled each year by the agencies of criminal justice, operating efficiency has long been a practical necessity, albeit often- times an unrealized goal. One of the first scholars to discuss operating efficiency in criminal justice was Herbert Packer (1968), who wrote about the topic in the context of his well-known crime control model of criminal justice. In Packer’s crime control model, which is arguably an apt description of the current opera- tion of criminal justice in the United States, the control of crime is by far the most important function of criminal justice (Packer, 1968, p. 158). (Control is another characteristic of McDonaldized institutions.) Although the means by which crime is controlled are important in this view (illegal means are not advo- cated), they are less important than the ultimate goal or end of control. To better control crime, advocates of the crime control model want to make the process more efficient—to move cases through the process as quickly as possible and to bring them to a close (Packer, 1968, p. 158). Packer (1968, p. 159) char- acterizes the crime control model as “assembly-line justice.” To achieve “quicker closure” in the processing of cases, a premium is placed on speed and finality (Packer, 1968, p. 159). Speed requires that cases be handled informally and uniformly; finality depends on minimizing occasions for challenge, that is, appeals (Packer, 1968, p. 159).

Packer’s assembly-line metaphor also describes the process by which McDonald’s sells billions of hamburgers. Consider the McDonald’s experience.

When people order a Big Mac from McDonald’s, they know exactly what they are going to get. All Big Macs are the same, because they are made uniformly. More- over, a person can get a Big Mac in a matter of seconds most of the time.

However, what happens when a person orders something different, or something not already prepared, such as a hamburger with ketchup only? The person’s order is taken, and she or he is asked to stand to the side because the special order will take a few minutes. The person’s special order has slowed down the assembly line and reduced efficiency. This happens in criminal justice, too! If defendants ask for something special, such as a trial, the assembly line is slowed and efficiency is reduced.

Even when criminal justice is operating at its best, it is a slow process. The time from arrest to final case disposition can typically be measured in weeks or months. If defendants opt for a jury trial, as is their right in most felony cases, the cases are handled formally and are treated as unique; no two cases are the same in their circumstances or in the way they are handled. If defendants are not satisfied with the outcome of their trials then they have the right to appeal.

Appeals may delay by years the final resolution of cases.

To increase efficiency—meaning speed and finality—crime control advocates prefer plea bargaining (Packer, 1968, p. 162)—the quintessential bureaucratic and McDonaldized process in criminal justice. Plea bargaining also illustrates the interrelationship of all of the characteristics of McDonaldization. Currently, about 95 percent of all convictions in felony cases are the result of guilty pleas (Durose & Langan, 2003, p. 9, table 10). Plea bargains can be offered and accepted in a relatively short time. Also, cases are handled uniformly becauseDownloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 130 BOHM the mechanics of a plea bargain are basically the same; only the substance of the deals differs. Additionally, with successful plea bargains, there is no oppor- tunity for challenge; there are no appeals. In short, plea bargaining allows cases to be disposed of quickly, predictably (another characteristic of McDonaldization), and with little of the adversarial conflict associated with criminal trials. In terms of McDonaldization, plea bargaining streamlines and simplifies the administration of justice and, thus, is the perfect mechanism for achieving efficiency.

Although plea bargaining became a common practice in state courts shortly after the Civil War and, as a result of the tremendous number of liquor law violations, was instituted at the federal level during Prohibition in the 1930s (Alschuler, 1979; Padgett, 1990), it has neither a constitutional nor statutory basis. It did not receive formal recognition until 1970 in the case of Brady v.

United States, in which the Court upheld the use of plea bargaining because of the “mutuality of advantage” it provided the defendant and the state.

Plea bargaining benefits most of the participants in the criminal justice process (Packer, 1968, p. 222) by, among other things, reducing uncertainty or unpredictability. Uncertainty is a characteristic of all criminal trials because neither the duration of the trial, which may be a matter of minutes or of months, nor the outcome of the trial can ever be predicted with any degree of accuracy. Plea bargaining eliminates those two areas of uncertainty by elimi- nating the need for a trial. Plea bargaining serves the interests of prosecutors by guaranteeing them high conviction rates, which is an indicator of job perfor- mance and a useful tool in the quest for higher political office. It serves the interests of judges by reducing their court caseloads, allowing more time to be spent on more difficult cases. In addition, if a large proportion of the approxi- mately 95 percent of felony cases that are handled each year by plea bargain- ing were to go to trial instead, the administration of justice in the United States would be even slower than it already is. Plea bargaining serves the inter- ests of criminal defense attorneys by allowing them to spend less time on each case. It also allows them to avoid trials. Trials are relatively expensive events.

Because most criminal defendants are poor, they are usually unable to pay a large legal fee. Thus, when criminal defense attorneys go to trial, they are frequently unable to recoup all of their expenses. Plea bargaining provides many criminal defense attorneys with the more profitable option of charging smaller fees for lesser services and handling a larger volume of cases. Even most criminal defendants are served by plea bargaining. A guilty plea generally results in either no prison sentence or a lesser prison sentence than the defen- dant might receive if found guilty at trial. Plea bargaining also often allows defendants to escape conviction of socially stigmatizing crimes, such as child abuse. By “copping” a plea to assault rather than to statutory rape, for exam- ple, a defendant can avoid the embarrassing publicity of a trial and the wrath of fellow inmates or of society in general. In sum, there is no question that plea bargaining has many advantages, including making the administration of justice more efficient.Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 McJUSTICE 131 Calculability: Fiscal Costs of Administering Justice Calculability refers to the quantitative aspects of McDonaldization (e.g., costs and the amount of time it takes to get the product). Calculability allows McDonaldized institutions “to produce and obtain large amounts of things very rapidly” and “to determine efficiency” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 66). Calculability also makes McDonaldized institutions more predictable and enhances control—two of the other characteristics of McDonaldized institutions (Ritzer, 2004, pp. 66–67).

Although the costs of administering justice in the United States are enormous— $167 billion in 2001 (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 1)—compared to other government expenditures, the amount spent on justice is modest. Only about 7 percent of all state and local public expenditures in 2001 were spent on criminal and civil justice (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 1). State and local governments funded about 85 percent of all direct justice system expenses in 2001 (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 1). By contrast, state and local governments spent nearly 4 times as much on education, about twice as much on public welfare, and approximately the same amount on hospitals and healthcare (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 1). Of the $167 billion spent in 2001, police protection received 43 percent; judicial and legal services 23 percent; and corrections 34 percent (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 4, table 3). Note that from 1982 to 1999, judicial and legal services always received less state, local, and total funding than either police protection or corrections (Sour- cebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2002a, pp. 3–4, table 1.2), which might also help explain the penchant for plea bargaining described above.

For the past three decades, about two thirds of the American public have believed that the amount spent on administering justice in the United States is a bargain—that too little money is spent on crime control (though in 2002, only 56 percent so believed); very few people think that too much money is spent (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2002b, p. 135, table 2.40). Thanks to efficiencies such as plea bargaining the administration of justice in the United States is generally considered cost effective. Predictability: Reducing Sentencing and Parole Discretion In McDonaldized institutions, predictability means that products and services will be uniform everywhere and at all times; there are no surprises (Ritzer, 2004, p. 14). For consumers, predictability provides peace of mind (Ritzer, 2004, p. 86). Employees of the process are also predictable in their actions because of rules and supervision (Ritzer, 2004, p. 14). For workers, predictability makes their jobs easier (Ritzer, 2004, p. 86). “To achieve predictability” McDonaldized institutions stress “discipline, order, systemization, formalization, routine, consistency, and methodical operation” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 86).

Beginning in the mid-1970s, state legislatures began replacing indeterminate sentencing—long the principal form of sentencing in the United States—with determinate sentencing, and some states began abolishing parole (federalDownloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 132 BOHM parole was abolished in 1987) (Carter, 1996, p. 148). These changes were moti- vated primarily by an increased public fear of crime, the loss of confidence in rehabilitation as a correctional goal, and the unpredictability of decisions made by judges and parole boards. The public began to believe that judges had become “soft” on crime, rehabilitation of criminal offenders was not possible, and parole boards were releasing from prison many dangerous offenders who had served only a small portion of their sentences. The hope of determinate sentencing was that it would at least get criminals off the streets for longer periods of time. Some people also considered a determinate sentence more humane (and predictable) because prisoners would know exactly when they would be released, something that they did not know with an indeterminate sentence (Griset, 1991, pp. 176–177).

Although the evidence never supported the widely held belief that judges were “soft” on crime (see, for example, Reaves, 2001), under indeterminate sentencing schemes judges did vary widely in the sentences they imposed for similar crimes and offenders. Critics argued that, besides being generally unfair (and irrational in a McDonaldized sense), such judicial disparity in sentencing resulted in discrimination against people of color and the poor (see, for exam- ple, Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Tonry, 1996, p. 7). As a result, several states and the federal government developed guidelines for determinate sentencing; other states established sentencing commissions to do so (Tonry, 1993, 1996, p. 10).

Sentencing guidelines were another way of restricting judicial sentencing discretion.

Another response to the “soft on crime” allegation, and another way that legislatures restricted judicial sentencing discretion in the 1980s, was by enact- ing “mandatory minimum” sentencing statutes (Ditton & Wilson, 1999; Tonry, 1996, pp. 6–7). “Mandatory minimum” sentences require that offenders—most frequently offenders who commit certain types of offenses such as drug offenses, offenses committed with weapons, and offenses committed by repeat or habitual offenders—serve a specified amount of prison time. All states and the federal government have one or more mandatory minimum sentencing laws.

To reduce the discretion exercised by parole boards (in those states that retained them), states in the 1980s also enacted “truth-in-sentencing” statutes that generally required prisoners to serve a substantial portion of their prison sentence, usually 85 percent of it (Ditton & Wilson, 1999). All of these changes made sentencing more predictable. Control: Rules, Regulations, Structure, and Technology Control in McDonaldized institutions involves the ability of the institution to get employees and customers to follow the rules and regulations governing the process (Ritzer, 2004, p. 15). In the case of employees, this is accomplished by training them to do a few things in a precise manner with managers and inspec- tors providing close supervision (Ritzer, 2004, p. 15).Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 McJUSTICE 133 Criminal justice officials are controlled (at least in theory) by a myriad of rules and regulations. The US Constitution, for example, prohibits police offic- ers from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth Amendment) and correctional officers from employing cruel and unusual punishments (Eighth Amendment)—to name just two constraints. State constitutions provide similar limitations. Decisions by the US Supreme Court and other courts also check the behavior of criminal justice officials. For instance, in Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the Supreme Court severely restricted police use of deadly force. The cases of Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) prescribe strict guidelines for parole and probation revocation. Statutes are another way of controlling the behavior of criminal justice officials. As described in the last section, statutes providing determinate sentencing, sentencing guidelines, and mandatory minimum sentences control judges’ sentencing decisions. Rules of evidence and criminal procedure govern practice and procedure in the various courts. Most criminal justice officials are also controlled by professional codes of conduct and departmental policies and regulations.

The military structures of both police and correctional agencies are intended to promote the control of police officers and correctional officers by those higher in the chain of command. Technology has also aided in their control. The police radio, for example, allows supervisors at the stationhouse to control patrol officers by keeping both parties in constant contact.

A new way that McDonaldization is influencing the control of police officers is through the highly touted Compstat program. Begun in New York City in 1994, Compstat is a strategic problem-solving system that combines “state-of-the art management principles with cutting-edge crime analysis and geographic systems technology” (Willis et al., 2004, p. 464; also see Mabrey, 2002; Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003). Its explicit purpose is to help police departments fight crime and improve the quality of life in their communi- ties by overcoming traditional bureaucratic irrationalities, such as loss of focus on reducing crime, department fragmentation, and lack of cooperation between units because of “red tape” and turf battles, and lack of timely data on which to base crime control strategies and to evaluate the strategies that are imple- mented (Weisburd et al., 2003, pp. 425–426; Willis et al., 2004, pp. 464, 470).

The information produced by Compstat is also used by the chief of police to judge the performance of precinct commanders and by precinct commanders to hold their officers accountable. Unlike traditional police bureaucracies, Comp- stat is supposed to make police organizations “more focused, knowledge-based, and agile” (Willis et al., 2004, p. 490). The Irrationality of Rationality: Other, Often Unanticipated Consequences According to Ritzer (2004, pp. 17, 134), McDonaldized institutions are rational systems, and rational systems inevitably produce irrationalities “that limit,Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 134 BOHM eventually compromise, and perhaps even undermine their rationality.” “At the general level,” Ritzer (2004, p. 134) notes, “the irrationality of rationality is simply a label for many of the negative aspects of McDonaldization” (emphasis in original). It is important to understand that Ritzer is describing a particular kind of rationality—one that has been pejoratively called “technological rationality” or “instrumental reason” (see, for example, Gouldner, 1976; Horkheimer, 1996; Marcuse, 1966). As applied to McDonaldized businesses, it is “rational” only as a business strategy (Schroyer, 1975, p. 26) that has as its ultimate goal profit maxi- mization. In the case of McJustice, it currently promotes “law and order” as instrumental values over alternative ideals such as justice and freedom (see Schroyer, 1975, p. 20).

McDonaldized institutions produce many irrationalities that undermine their rationality. They can be inefficient because of excess red tape and other prob- lems (Ritzer, 2004, p. 27). They can produce poor quality work and a decline in employee effort because of the emphasis on quantification (the substitution of quantity for quality and the resulting mediocrity of both the process and the product), the often mind-numbing routine, and the absence of meaningful employee job input (Ritzer, 2004, pp. 27, 66, 86). Most employees of McDonaldized institutions “are expected to do a lot of work, very quickly, for low pay” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 14). McDonaldized institutions can be unpredictable because employees, no matter how well trained and supervised, sometimes are confused, unsure about what they are supposed to do, inefficient, and apt to make mistakes. To achieve greater control, McDonaldized institutions increas- ingly attempt to replace employees with more consistent machines and nonhu- man technologies (Ritzer, 2004, p. 15). 2 Ironically, those efforts can be counterproductive and control over employees and clients can be lost because they become angry at the machines and nonhuman technologies that replace the former and frustrate the latter (Ritzer, 2004, pp. 27–28). Reliance on machines and nonhuman technologies can also reduce the skills necessary to do the job, and the opportunity, perhaps even the ability, of people to think for themselves (Ritzer, 2004, p. 133). McDonaldized institutions also can be dehu- manizing (Ritzer, 2004, p. 27). Weber especially feared what he called the “iron cage” of rationality in which people get trapped in bureaucracies that deny them their basic humanity (Ritzer, 2004, p. 28), as, for example, when crime victims are ignored or mistreated by criminal justice officials. In the remainder of this section irrationalities of plea bargaining, criminal justice fiscal policies, determinate sentencing, and efforts to control criminal justice officials are described. 2. People control human technologies (e.g., a screwdriver), while nonhuman technologies (e.g., an order window at a drive-through) control people (Ritzer, 2004, p. 106). Machines and nonhuman technologies are employed in McDonaldized institutions for other reasons besides control, such as increasing productivity, greater quality control, and lowering costs (Ritzer, 2004, p. 107).Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 McJUSTICE 135 Plea Bargaining As noted in the previous section on efficiency, plea bargaining has become the principal method of administering justice in the United States because it bene- fits most of the participants in the criminal justice process. However, two types of criminal defendants are not served by the practice of plea bargaining and both illustrate irrationalities of the process. The first are innocent, indigent, highly visible defendants who fear being found guilty of crimes they did not commit and receiving harsh sentences. Such defendants are sometimes pres- sured by overworked and inexperienced defense attorneys into waiving their constitutional right to trial. The second type is the habitual offender. In this context, a habitual offender is a person who has been convicted under a state’s habitual-offender statute (sometimes called a “three strikes and you’re out” law). Most such statutes provide that upon conviction of a third felony, a defen- dant must receive life imprisonment. Although habitual-offender statutes would seem to imprison offenders for life, they actually are used mostly as bargaining chips by prosecutors in plea negotiations and not as they were intended (see, for example, LaFree, 2002, pp. 880–881).

The irrationality of habitual-offender statutes is illustrated by the case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978). The defendant, who had previously been convicted of two minor felonies, was arrested and charged with forging an $88 check. The prosecutor in the case told the defendant that if he did not plead guilty to the charge and accept a 5-year prison sentence, which on its face seemed very harsh, then the prosecutor would invoke the state’s habitual- offender statute. The statute required the judge to impose a sentence of life imprisonment if the defendant were found guilty at trial. The defendant elected to play “you bet your life” and turned down the prosecutor’s plea offer. At trial, the defendant was found guilty of forging the check and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Clearly, the defendant in this case was not served by plea bargaining or, perhaps, was not served by refusing the prosecutor’s offer.

Crime victims are another group whose interests are not always served by plea bargaining, and their plight illustrates further the process’s irrationality. Long ignored in the adjudication of crimes committed against them, victims often feel “revictimized” by the deals that prosecutors offer offenders and believe they have been denied the full measure of justice they seek and deserve.

Another problem with plea bargaining is that it precludes the possibility of any further judicial examination of earlier stages of the process (Packer, 1968, p. 224). In other words, with the acceptance of a guilty plea, there is no longer any chance that police or prosecutorial errors before trial will be detected.

Criminal Justice Fiscal Policies The public’s belief in the general cost effectiveness of criminal justice has been described in the section on calculability. Criminal justice is not always costDownloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 136 BOHM effective, however, and the exceptions expose irrationalities of the process. For example, from the mid-1920s until the mid-1970s the costs of prisons and jails were not a major issue because the incarceration rate in the United States remained relatively stable. That did not change until the mid-1970s and the War on Drugs when the incarceration rate began to increase significantly, with each subsequent year showing a new high. By the 1980s, many states and the federal government were facing serious crowding problems. The immediate response was an ambitious and expensive prison and jail expansion program. (Other strat- egies included privatization and intermediate sanctions.) Between 1977 and 2001, total state and local costs for building and operating correctional institu- tions increased about 900 percent. 3 Between 1982 and 2001, the corresponding increase at the federal level was about 700 percent (see footnote 3). By compar- ison, between 1977 and 2001, states and localities increased expenditures to education by 448 percent, to hospitals and healthcare by 482 percent, and to public welfare by 617 percent (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 4). In 1995, for the first time ever, more money was spent building new prisons than new university structures in the United States—$2.5 billion for construction in higher education and $2.6 billion for prison construction. From 1987 to 1995, state prison expen- ditures rose 30 percent while higher education funding fell 18 percent (“More Spent on Prisons,” 1997, p. A-6).

Ironically, by 1995, while expenditures for prison construction and expansion were peaking, the overall growth of the state (but not federal) prison popula- tion began slowing (Harrison & Beck, 2003). In 2001, the 1.1 percent growth in the state and federal prison population (entirely attributable to the slower growth in the state prison population) was the lowest annual rate recorded since 1972 (Harrison & Beck, 2003). Legislators, in an effort to appear tough on crime by incarcerating increasing numbers of law violators for longer periods of time, and correctional officials, on whose projections the legislators justified their decisions, had miscalculated the confinement space that was needed.

Consequently, by the end of the century, many jurisdictions had new or expanded correctional facilities that sat empty or operated well under capacity (Blomberg & Lucken, 2000, p. 182; Camp & Camp, 2002, p. 85). Many of the new facilities could not be used (even where there was a need) because continuing budget crises precluded the hiring of personnel to operate them (Blomberg & Lucken, 2000, p. 182). Other correctional institutions utilized their excess capacity by contracting with other jurisdictions to house the other jurisdiction’s prisoners (Camp & Camp, 2002, p. 93). 3. The costs of “all correctional functions” between 1977 and 2001 increased 1,100 percent (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 4). “All correctional functions” include the costs of operation and employment for jails, prisons, probation, parole, pardon, and correctional administration for both adults and juveniles (Bauer & Owens, 2004, p. 4). Because approximately 80 percent of all funds allocated to corrections in the United States are spent to build and run institutions, and only about 20 percent are spent on community corrections (Bonczar & Glaze, 1999, p. 2), the increase in costs of prisons and jails during the period is estimated to be about 900 percent.Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 McJUSTICE 137 The costs of capital punishment illustrate another irrationality of criminal justice. As noted previously, about 95 percent of criminal cases never reach trial, but instead are resolved through the cost-effective process of plea bargaining. Capital cases are an exception; they are rarely plea bargained (Bohm, 2003, p. 137). They are also very expensive. The average cost per execution in the United States (i.e., the entire process) ranges from about $2.5 million to $5 million (in 2000 dollars) (Bohm, 2003, p. 135). Extraordinary cases can cost much more. The state of Florida, for example, reportedly spent $10 million to execute serial murderer Ted Bundy in 1989, and the federal government spent more than $100 million to execute mass murderer Timothy McVeigh in 2001 (Bohm, 2003, p. 135).

The costs of capital trials are forcing local governments to make difficult choices. For example, a recent study in Illinois found that capital trials could increase county spending by as much as 1.8 percent per trial. Such trials are often financed through increased property taxes or funds taken from police and high- way appropriations (Governor’s Commission, 2002, p. 199). A Wall Street Journal article reported that the Texas county where the three men convicted of the 1998 murder of James Byrd were tried was forced to raise property taxes by 6.7 percent for 2 years to cover trial costs (Governor’s Commission, 2002, p. 199).

Even when a capital trial does not result in a death sentence and execution, the added costs associated with the capital punishment process are incurred anyway without any “return” on the state’s investment of resources. In some death-eligi- ble cases, prosecutors forgo capital trials altogether rather than incur the expense. Based on cost effectiveness alone, capital punishment does not seem to be the most rational alternative for the most heinous crimes. Determinate Sentencing A number of problems or irrationalities have been identified with determinate sentencing schemes, described in the section on predictability. First, it has been argued that the consequences of determinate sentencing include longer prison sentences and overcrowded prisons (Goodstein & Hepburn, 1985, pp. 37–38; Griset, 1991, p. 184). In recent years, the United States has had one of the high- est imprisonment rates in the world (see, for example, International Centre for Prison Studies, 2003). Furthermore, as of 2003, the entire correctional depart- ments of 10 states were under court orders to reduce overcrowding or improve other conditions of confinement; in another 17 states, one or more institutions were under court orders for the same reasons (American Correctional Associa- tion, 2004, p. 18).

A related problem of determinate sentencing is that it produces an unusually harsh prison system (but see Goodstein & Hepburn, 1985, for another view). For example, because of prison overcrowding, many states have all but abandoned even the pretense of rehabilitating offenders. Prisons are increasingly becoming places where offenders are simply “warehoused.” This trend has been referredDownloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 138 BOHM to as the “new penology” and “actuarial justice” (Feeley & Simon, 1992, 1994).

As noted, this new penology has abandoned rehabilitation in favor of efficiently managing large numbers of prisoners. Success for this new penology is not measured by reductions in recidivism (a standard measure of correctional success used in the past) but rather by how efficiently correctional systems manage prisoners within budgetary constraints. In addition, because of the abolition of good time (the number of days deducted from a sentence by prison authorities for good behavior or for other reasons) and parole under some deter- minate sentencing schemes, prison authorities are having a more difficult time maintaining discipline and control of their institutions (Griset, 1991, p. 141).

Eliminating good time and parole removed two of the most important incentives that prison authorities use to get inmates to behave and to follow prison rules.

Also, because of the perceived harshness of some of the determinate sentencing schemes, some judges simply ignore the sentencing guidelines (Griset, 1999, pp. 322–323). Other judges have ignored the sentencing guidelines because they believe they are too lenient. In short, many judges resent sentencing guidelines and refer to their use as “justice by computer.” Third, critics claim that determinate sentencing merely shifts sentencing discretion from judges to legislatures and prosecutors (through plea bargaining) (Clear, Hewitt, & Regoli, 1978; Goodstein & Hepburn, 1985, p. 38; Tonry, 1996, p. 7; Tonry & Frase, 2001, p. 230). Whether this shift in sentencing responsibil- ity is desirable is a matter of debate. On one hand, prosecutors generally exer- cise their discretion in secret, whereas judges exercise discretion in the open.

Also, prosecutors and legislators are generally subject to more political influ- ence than are judges.

Fourth, in those jurisdictions that retain good time, sentencing discretion, at least to some degree, actually shifts from legislators and prosecutors to correc- tional personnel (Clear et al., 1978; Goodstein & Hepburn, 1985, pp. 38–39; Griset, 1991, pp. 139–141, 1999, pp. 318–319). By charging inmates with prison rule violations, correctional personnel can reduce (if the charges are upheld) the amount of good time earned by inmates and, by doing so, increase an inmate’s time served.

Fifth, critics contend that it is virtually impossible in determinate sentencing schemes for legislatures or sentencing commissions to define in advance all of the factors that ought to be considered in determining a criminal sentence (Tonry, 1996).

Controlling Criminal Justice Officials Despite all the rules, regulations, structures, and technology intended to control the behavior of criminal justice officials, mistakes or miscarriages of justice still occur. Although such “irrationalities” have probably always plagued the administration of justice, only relatively recently, with the advent of sophisticated DNA technology, has the extent of the problem been realized. ForDownloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 McJUSTICE 139 example, according to attorney Barry Scheck, co-founder of the Innocence Project at the Cardoza School of Law in New York City, “Of the first eighteen thousand results [of DNA tests] at the FBI and other crime laboratories, at least five thousand prime suspects were excluded before their cases were tried” (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2001, p. xx). That is, more than 25 percent of the prime suspects were wrongly accused. In a study of wrongful convictions conducted in the 1980s, researchers conservatively estimated that approxi- mately 0.5 percent of all felony convictions are in error (Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986). Given the annual number of felony convictions, that means there are probably thousands of people wrongfully convicted of felonies each year. 4 The researchers believe that the frequency of error is probably higher in less serious felony and misdemeanor cases. Since 1973 (as of March 28, 2005), 119 people in 25 states had been released from death row because of evidence of their innocence (Death Penalty Information Center, 2005).

Many mistakes and miscarriages of justice are a result of inadequate investi- gation by law enforcement officials, who sometimes identify the wrong person as the criminal. When law enforcement officials are unable to solve a crime within a reasonable amount of time, they sometimes cut corners and jump to conclusions (Gross, 1998, p. 133). They (or others who aid them such as medical examiners and crime lab technicians) may even go so far as to lose, destroy, or manufacture evidence against a suspect (Forst, 2004, pp. 90–92; Gross, 1998, p. 133). They may also ignore or conceal evidence that does not support their suspect’s guilt or withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors (Westervelt & Humphrey, 2002, p. 5). By using illegal coercive and manipulative methods, law enforcement officials can get innocent suspects to confess to crimes they did not commit (Forst, 2004, p. 90; Gross, 1996, p. 485; Scheck et al., 2001, p. 116; Westervelt & Humphrey, 2002, p. 5). The wrong person is sometimes identified as the culprit because of poorly administered and biased lineups (Forst, 2004, pp. 88–89; Westervelt & Humphrey, 2002, p. 5). At trial, law enforcement offic- ers (and others such as medical examiners and crime lab technicians) sometimes commit perjury (Harmon, 2001; Radelet, Bedau, & Putnam, 1992; Scheck et al., 2001, pp. 138–162, 222–236). Prosecutors ignore evidence counter to their case, withhold exculpatory evidence from the defense, suborn perjury, misuse infor- mants, and use improper evidence (Liebman, Fagan, & West, 2000; Miller- Potter, 2002; Scheck et al., 2001; Westervelt & Humphrey, 2002, p. 5). Defense attorneys fail to communicate with their clients or communicate in a dismissive, callous or hurried manner; their efforts at discovery are sometimes perfunctory or, in some cases, they make no attempt at all; they fail to investigate allega- tions or investigate them poorly; they fail to retain needed experts and/or test physical evidence; at times their preparation is minimal, their trial advocacy is 4. Although an error rate of 0.5 percent may not seem high, consider that in 2001, a typical year, approximately 14 million people were arrested in the United States (US Department of Justice, 2002, p. 232). Assuming conservatively that 50 percent of all people arrested are convicted (Huff et al., 1986, p. 523)—about 7 million convictions in 2001—then approximately 35,000 people were probably wrongfully convicted.Downloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 140 BOHM weak, and their cross-examination is superficial or tentative (Berry, 2003, p.

489). Defense attorneys have been known to sleep through long portions of a trial and not be declared ineffective (Bright, 2003, pp. 136–137; Mello & Perkins, 2003, pp. 371–372; Scheck et al., 2001, pp. 237–249). In capital and other felony trials, judges make many mistakes, including: not permitting the defense to present evidence of an alternative theory of the case; not permitting the defense to present certain mitigating evidence; deny- ing the right of defense experts to offer evidence; failing to order a psychiatric examination prior to trial; prejudging the case; incorrectly finding fact; refusing to give certain jury instructions; failing to admonish the prosecutor for an improper closing argument; allowing a highly prejudicial photograph during the penalty phase; failing to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea; and not having jurisdiction. (Burnett, 2002, p. 103) The gravest miscarriage of justice is undoubtedly the killing of an innocent person by law enforcement officials (see Forst, 2004, pp. 67–68) or by the state in the case of capital punishment (see Bohm, 2003, chap. 7).

As for Compstat, although proponents claim that it decentralizes decision making, in practice it reinforces the traditional control elements of the military model of policing (Willis et al., 2004, pp. 480, 466–467). A problem or irrationality with Compstat is that by reinforcing the hierarchical military model of policing and its emphasis on accountability and predictability, it tends to impede a police department’s ability to achieve other organizational objectives (Weisburd et al., 2003, p. 448; Willis et al., 2004, p. 468). For example, problem-oriented and community policing rely on line officers using their discretion to solve community problems (at least in theory). However, because Compstat is based on the bureau- cratic military model of policing with its centralized command and control, line officers frequently lack the flexibility to use their discretion to respond to unan- ticipated community problems or refuse to address unanticipated problems because they fear being disciplined for mistakes. A consequence is that officers appear (and sometimes are) unresponsive to the people they serve (Willis et al., 2004, p. 470; but see Firman, 2003, for a different view). In sum, the ostensible purpose of Compstat is to improve policing by overcoming traditional bureaucratic irrationalities, but bureaucracies are difficult to change. In practice it appears that Compstat, at least so far, is just another way—albeit one that employs advanced technology and different management principles—for police leadership to control mid-level managers (precinct commanders) and street-level police officers (Moore, 2003, pp. 477–478; Weisburd et al., 2003, pp. 424, 448–449). Conclusion: What to Do? Ritzer (2004, pp. 213–215) suggests three possible responses to McDonaldization that could be applied to McJustice. The first is to do nothing. Some people like living in a McDonaldized world or, as Ritzer (2004, p. 213) calls it: a “velvetDownloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 McJUSTICE 141 cage.” This is a position most likely held by people who have known no other type of world (Ritzer, 2004, p. 213). Such people crave the efficiency, calcula- bility, predictability, and control of a McDonaldized society. A second possible response to McDonaldization applies to people who live in what Ritzer (2004, p. 213) calls a “rubber cage.” These people like some aspects of McDonaldiza- tion but dislike or deplore other aspects. They realize the costs of McDonaldiza- tion and attempt to escape it when they can (Ritzer, 2004, p. 214). A third possible response characterizes people who view McDonaldized society as an “iron cage” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 214). These people dislike, even deplore, McDonaldization but do not believe they can do much, if anything, about it.

Some of these people may attempt to escape from its influence from time to time but generally they simply resign themselves to it.

Ritzer is fatalistic about the inexorable spread and domination of McDonaldization and its irrationalities (Parker, 1998, pp. 13–14; Ritzer, 2004, p. 243–244; Taylor, Smith, & Lyon, 1998, p. 106). Ritzer does not believe there are any significant collective alternatives (Jeannot, 1998, p. 141, note 3; Rine- hart, 1998, pp. 19–23; Taylor et al., 1998, p. 106). He focuses instead on more modest individualistic alternatives or ameliorations. However, a problem with individualistic alternatives, according to at least one critic, is that McDonaldiza- tion and its irrationalities are systemic. To transcend McDonaldization a systemic alternative is required (Jeannot, 1998, p. 132). But a systemic alternative is not an option for Ritzer because, as other critics claim, “Ritzer’s version of McDonaldized America is apolitical; there is no contest of viewpoints, no mobili- zation on behalf of shared interests, no imagination of a future much different than the present and worth working for” (Rinehart, 1998, p. 30; also see Taylor et al., 1998; Wood, 1998). Thus, as yet another critic observes, “people, in using McDonaldized systems, are not merely doing things but they are in practice affirming a particular way of doing things and, simultaneously, negating alterna- tive ways of doing things” (wa Mwachofi, 1998, p. 151; emphasis in original). In applying these criticisms to McJustice, accepting McJustice is not only supporting the status quo with all of its irrationalities, it is also rejecting viable, especially systemic, alternatives.

Critics fault Ritzer for failing to acknowledge the partisan and ideological nature of rationality and irrationality (wa Mwachofi, 1998). What is rational or beneficial for one person or group may be irrational or harmful for another person or group, or vice versa. What is considered rational or irrational might also take different forms depending on place, time, and culture (Wynyard, 1998, p. 163). Thus, McJustice, like McDonaldization generally, is a political enterprise in which definitions of rationality and irrationality are contested.

Critics also contend that Ritzer is too negative in his characterization of McDonaldized institutions; that he fails to fully appreciate the positive aspects and potential of bureaucracies and bureaucratic rationality (see, for example, Jeannot, 1998; Miles, 1998; Parker, 1998; Taylor et al., 1998; Wood, 1998). Thus, while it is true that McJustice manifests many irrationalities, it can also be enabling, helping people achieve things they otherwise could notDownloaded by [Florida State University] at 19:55 24 August 2013 142 BOHM accomplish. For example, it sometimes empowers individuals to protect themselves by way of laws and regulations from people and institutions that would otherwise infringe their rights (see Kellner, 1998, p. x). It also protects people from criminal behavior (when it is operating effectively) in cases where people cannot protect themselves. At the least, it can provide people with a sense of stability in a risky and, contrary to Ritzer’s contention, often- times unpredictable world (Miles, 1998, p. 53).

The concept of McDonaldization or McJustice to describe criminal justice is imperfect, as is any metaphor. Metaphors can be useful in promoting under- standing, but they can also limit “the ways in which we think about a problem” (MacCormac, cited in wa Mwachofi, 1998, p. 152). Although fast food restau- rants are ubiquitous, no one is forced to eat at them. Some people eschew fast food; other people eat it infrequently. Many people enjoy fast food on occasion, but most people prefer a home-cooked meal or a finer dining establishment.

Criminal justice is ubiquitous, too, but most people are not directly affected by it and have no desire to be involved with it. Still, most US citizens pay taxes to support it and others, for whatever reasons, cannot escape it or have a vested interest in it. Many people would prefer an improved criminal justice process or a viable alternative to McJustice that eliminated or at least significantly reduced its many irrationalities. Most people aspire to something better than McJustice. There is no shortage of alternatives, ranging from liberal reforms to more radical transformations (see, for example, Braithwaite, 1989; Currie, 1985; Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, 2002; Henry & Milo- vanovic, 1996; Palmer, 1994; Pepinsky & Quinney, 1991; Scheck et al., 2001; Sherman et al., 1997; Stephens, 1987). Hopefully, conceptualizing criminal justice as McJustice will motivate people to explore, debate, and implement alternatives that will improve justice and the quality of life. References Alschuler, A. W. (1979). Plea bargaining and its history. Law & Society Review, 13, 211–245.

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