Can you write me a 500-600 word paper based on the readings? I will provide the readings after I hire you.

Just as it is important to understand how political systems work, and how democracy and authoritarianism diff er, so it is important to understand how economic systems work, as well as how and why governments take diff erent approaches to the economy.

The chapter begins with a survey of political economy and of the kinds of questions it addresses. It then looks in turn at four major perspectives on political economy, ranging from clas- sical liberalism to radicalism, economic nationalism, and modern liberalism, along with several of their more important sub-categories. Modern liberalism is the perspective found most often in liberal democracies today, although there are signs in several countries of a return to policies of economic nationalism. The chapter then continues with an assessment of the dynamics of development as it applies to emerging states, and of the welfare state as it has evolved in mainly wealthier liberal democracies. It then looks at the meaning of develop- ment in a changing global environment, and at the implications of a changing global balance of economic power. The chapter ends with a review of political economy in authoritarian states, focusing particularly on how state capitalism has taken hold in countries such as China and Russia.

KEY ARGUMENTS ◆ ◆ The revival of the study of political economy has off ered new insights into the interaction between politics and economics.

◆ ◆ The classical liberal emphasis on free markets off ers the foundation for political economy, and continues to be found in many countries in the form of neoliberalism.

◆ ◆ Radicalism arose as a reaction to the weaknesses of the free market, but its analyses were hurt by the excesses of communism and state socialism.

◆ ◆ Most democracies today are based on modern liberal views about free markets and redistribution, with a revival of economic nationalism in some. ◆ ◆ There are few agreements on the best approaches to economic development, while opinions about the welfare state have been reviewed in the wake of international fi nancial pressures.

◆ ◆ State capitalism is a distinctive approach to understanding political economy now found in many authoritarian states. Source: Pixabay political economy   343 political economy: an overview The study of political economy is the study of the intersection of politics and economics. These are two fi elds that are impossible to fully divorce from one another: to a large degree, political decisions are driven by economic needs and pressures, while a government’s economic choices are infl uenced by political considerations. Political economy is both a means of undertaking political analysis generally and also an approach to the study of any number of more focused topics, ranging from agriculture to communications, culture, education, the environment, fi nance, gender, labour, migration, trade, and war. So far in this book our attention has been focused on the political side of the relationship; in this chapter we switch to the economic perspective, referring back to the institutions and processes discussed in preceding chapters. Our interest is in how economic trends impact political decisions, and vice versa. Theorists as diverse as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx studied society from the combined perspective of politics and economics, or political economy. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there was a move to divide these perspectives as economists, political scientists, and sociologists began to head in separate directions, prompted by diff erences in their views about the appropriate role of government and about approaches to research (economists taking a more quantitative approach than most political scientists, for example). More recently, there has been a trend back towards an integrated approach, even to the point where we often see references to new political economy, a term implying a combination of the original integrated approach to politics and economics, on the one hand, and the more recent research methods developed by economists, on the other. This chapter off ers a survey of political economy, beginning with an introduction to some of the key terms involved, and a discussion of the dimensions of diff erent economic systems. It then compares the four major per- spectives on political economy. The point of departure is the classical liberal view that individuals and societies are most likely to prosper if they are allowed to pursue their interests with minimal intervention from government.

Radicals disagree, arguing that government intervention is essential in the interests of ensuring equality and justice.

Economic nationalism opts for government protection of national economies, while modern liberalism believes that government should protect rights while engaging in the redistribution of wealth and opportunity. The latter point can be seen in the work of the welfare state that has been so central to thinking about political economy in wealthier democracies. Coming to grips with political economy in authoritarian states is not just a matter of comparing dictators and dem- ocrats, or wealth and poverty, but instead of looking in more depth at the interactions between politics and economic policy. In most cases, both are used to exert control, but while it has often resulted in what is known as state capitalism, which has frequently led to ineffi ciency and corruption, the experiences of authoritarian systems are more complex and nuanced than the use of simple models suggests.

understanding political economy ‘Political economy’, claims Clark (2016), ‘was the original social science’. The use of the term dates back to seventeenth-centur y France, when it referred to the fi nancial management of the royal household. It then expanded to describe the study of the causes of the wealth of nations (refl ected in the classic work of that title by Adam Smith, 1776), assessing the policies governments should follow as they sought to build the economies of the societies they ruled. The classical liberal view of political economy was that markets worked best when left free of any government inter vention short of laws aimed at protecting propert y rights. It was not long, though, before the costs of this approach became apparent (in the industrial world, at least) in the form of problems such as pollution, child labour, urban blight, unemployment (as workers were replaced by machines), crime, and social unrest. Clearly, argued some, governments needed to take a more radical and inter ventionist approach to the management of markets. At the same time, the study of political economy fell out of favour as economists sought to divorce the study of their discipline from other related factors, including politics. They built new models based on the assumption that Political economy A branch of the social sciences that studies the relationships between markets and the state.

New political economy A resurrection of earlier approaches to economics, combining them with the tools of modern economic analysis. 344  chapter 20 people made rational decisions based on calculations of costs and benefi ts. They also argued that economics and politics had diff erent interests and points of departure (see Clark, 2016):◆ ◆ Individuals drove economic choices, while political choices were collective.

◆ ◆ Economic decisions were based on a desire to achieve prosperit y, while political decisions were targeted on the achievement of justice.

◆ ◆ Economic decisions took place within the market, while political decisions took place within government.

After several decades during which political scientists and economists followed diff erent trajectories, there was an eff ort in the 1960s to bring them back together, since when the fi eld of political economy has undergone a resurgence. The dominant view today is that politics and economics have close connections, and that studying one without the other will result in a failure to produce an accurate understanding of how societies function. Political economy must take into account the contrasting dynamics of diff erent economic and political systems, the impact of globalization on domestic and international policy decisions, and a wide array of more particular questions: for example, how rising consumer demand can be balanced against the depletion of resources, how changes in patterns of production and the organization of the workplace relate to politics, and how the diff erent priorities of democracies and authoritarian regimes are shaped. Before going into more depth, we need to come to grips with some of the key terms used in this chapter. The fi rst of these is economics. We saw in Chapter 1 that political science is the study of the theory and practice of government and politics, focusing on the structure and dynamics of institutions, political processes, and political behaviour. This is paralleled by eco- nomics, which focuses on matters such as production, the creation and distribution of wealth, the causes and eff ects of scarcity, the relationship between supply and demand, and the effi cient use of resources. The study of economics is concerned with markets, fi nance, banking, business, and trade, the scope ranging from the study of microeconomics to the study of macroeconomics.

The key actors involved range from individual consumers to small business, large business, mul- tinational corporations, and – of course – governments. The questions addressed by political economy include the following:

◆ ◆ How are economies structured and how do these structures var y?

◆ ◆ Why are some countries or societies wealthy while others are poor?

◆ ◆ How and when is government inter vention in the economy appropriate?

◆ ◆ How should governments respond to recessions and unemployment?

◆ ◆ Why do men earn more than women for the same work?

◆ ◆ What are the implications of tax policy?

We also saw in Chapter 1 that a political system consists of the interactions and organizations through which a societ y reaches and successfully enforces collective decisions. As we have seen, political systems come in many diff erent forms, beginning with the broad diff erences between democracies and authoritarian regimes, and moving to the more detailed diff erences in the way that institutions are structured, people participate in politics, and elections are organized. For its part, an economic system consists of similar sets of interactions and organizations as they relate to the market, and such systems also come in many diff erent forms. In much the same way as diff erent political systems are identifi ed by the extent to which citizens participate in government, and can expect government to protect their rights, so diff erent economic systems are characterized by the manner in which citizens participate in the mar- ketplace, and – again – can or should expect government to protect their rights. Some eco- nomic systems limit themselves to management tasks with the goal of allowing individuals to EconomicsThe study of the theory and practice of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.

MarketsThe arenas within which goods and services are bought and sold, with prices determined mainly by supply and demand.

Microecono- mics The study of small-scale or individual economic decisions, and the interactions of individual economic actors.

Macroecono- mics The study of entire economic systems and their complex internal dynamics.

Economic system The interactions and institutions through which a society chooses to manage production, distribution, and consumption, involving different degrees of interaction between governments and markets.

take the initiative in the creation of new businesses, or in deciding which goods or services they wish to buy or sell, and in what quantities. Others will take a more active role in shaping the marketplace, and in deciding what will be made, in what quantities it will be made, and at what price it will be sold. political economy   345 comparative political economy Coming to grips with political economy demands an appreciation of the diff erent opinions about how markets work, about how they interact with politics and societ y, and about how they are best managed. A useful guide through the maze is off ered by Clark (2016), who identifi es several major perspectives on the confl uence between politics and economics, each based on diff erent views about the interests of individuals and societies, and of the appropriate role of government. (Another perspective, known as state capitalism, is addressed later in the chapter.) (See summar y in Table 20.1.) Classical liberalism This is the original approach to political economy, its roots dating back to the origins of capitalism in the fourteenth centur y. The core idea here is that humans will do best, and societ y will most likely fl ourish, if individuals are allowed to pursue their own interests without the inter vention of government, which should ser ve as little more than a night- watchman state .

Where medieval thinking saw individuals situated within a social hierarchy dominated by the power of the state and the church, classical liberalism was based instead on notions of individual choice and initiative, and of the importance of private property (see Brennan and Tomasi, 2012).

In this view – developed by such thinkers and philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, and Friedrich Hayek – humans were seen to be self-interested and capable of identifying and pursuing the means best suited to meeting their needs. The free market was the best means for encouraging new discoveries and creative solutions to problems, and society was no more than an accumulation of individuals and their needs. Government served to protect the natural rights of individuals, to off er public services such as education, and to address inequalities created by the market, but not much more. As Thomas Jeff erson once famously suggested, ‘that government is best which governs least’. Classical liberalism was dealt a severe blow with the Great Depression of the 1930s, the eff ects of which led many to believe that the free market was not necessarily the best means for shaping economic activities. Capi- talism seemed to be unable to overcome macroeconomic fl uctuations in economic activity, and the market was not a level playing fi eld, containing – as it did – many structural problems, such as a tendency for monopolies to develop, and for powerful economic interests to exert more political infl uence. Classical liberalism was also (somewhat unfairly) charged with paying too little heed to the idea of community welfare: individual progress was all very well, but society and the economy itself needed good education, health care, and infrastructure, most CapitalismAn economic principle based on leaving as many decisions as possible on production, distribution, and prices to the free market.

Night- watchman state One which performs limited functions, such as maintaining law and order, providing national defence, enforcing contracts, and dealing with emergencies. Ta b l e 2 0 .1 Five perspectives on political economy Perspective Main features Application Classical liberalismIndividuals should be allowed to pursue their interests with minimal intervention from government. Fell out of favour following the Great Depression, but reborn in the 1980s as neoliberalism.

Radicalism Government intervention is essential in the interests of ensuring equality and justice. Fell out of favour after association with Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism.

Economic nationalism Government should place the needs and priorities of national economies above those of others. Mercantilism as practised once by Britain and France, and protectionism as promoted more recently by Japan and by the United States under Donald Trump.

Modern liberalism Government should protect rights, and also redistribute wealth and opportunity. The form of political economy found most often today in most liberal democracies.

State capitalism Government takes responsibility for many of the functions normally left to the free market. Recent growth in many authoritarian states, such as China and Russia. 346  chapter 20 of which was under-supplied by the free market and better or only provided by government.

Classical liberalism also failed to account for what economists describe as externalities.

These can be negative, as with pollution or drunk driving, or positive, as with the benefi ts of education and of research and development. With peace achieved after World War II, the result of such concerns was a resurgence of gov- ernment activity in the form of redistributive policies based on higher and graduated tax rates, more government regulation, and more government investments in education, health care, and social welfare. A reaction against this expansion of the state came in the 1980s when – under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States – classical liberalism was reborn as neoliberalism, an approach to political economy defi ned by Harvey (2007) as one in which ‘human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entre- preneurial freedoms and skills with an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’. This philosophy later expanded to other advanced economies, to international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Mon- etary Fund, and even to emerging countries such as China (Jones, 2012). It has often been criticized, though, as ‘capitalism without a conscience’, and for focusing too much on profi t and growth at the expense of economic and political equality (see Monbiot, 2016). Radicalism The core idea behind the radical perspective (which overlapped with – and grew out of – classical liberalism) is that societ y is more than a collection of individuals, that government represents their collective interests, and that democratic government inter vention in the marketplace is essential to ensuring equalit y and justice. Early radical thought was sparked by industrialization in Western Europe and the visible problems and inequalities it created, and was based on the argument that societ y would benefi t from trade unions, a minimum wage, and welfare, all of which could only be guaranteed by government. The key contributors to this line of thought included Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Lenin. Rousseau (1712–78) wrote of inequalities in wealth that allowed some property owners to dominate others, and of the importance of everyone participating in politics so that personal interests could be blended with public interests. For Marx (1818–83), meanwhile, capitalism was a necessary stage on the road to communism, because it undermined the ability of individuals to shape society, and created a class consciousness that would lead eventually to revolution, the overthrow of the capitalist system, and its replacement with a new communist system and the ‘withering away of the state’ (see Boucher, 2014). In the event, the revolution predicted by Marx was ‘forced’ by Lenin and his Russian Bolsheviks, and came not to the advanced industrial coun- tries, as Marx had suggested that it would, but instead to less advanced countries such as Russia and China. True communism, meanwhile, was achieved nowhere. In the Soviet case, we saw the emergence of state socialism, a system in which there was little or no economic freedom. The most extreme form was that practised by the Stalin regime between 1928 and 1953, where economic control was accompanied by the centralization of political authority, government by a single political party supported by a large bureaucracy, and little respect for individual rights. There was large-scale state intervention in the economy, the elimination of the formal free market and competition, state ownership of property, the creation of state-owned monopolies, and the use of a centrally planned command economy in which large government departments used quotas, price controls, subsidies, and fi ve-year plans to decide what would be produced, where and when it would be produced, how it would be distributed, and at what prices it would be sold. The brutality and ineffi ciency of the Stalin era was not what radicals had in mind, and nor was its later equivalent in China under Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Mao’s contribution was to rethink Marxism-Leninism for agricultural and peasant societies and to develop a populist and anti-elitist form of Marxism that inspired nationalist movements in Africa and Latin America. State socialism may have largely disappeared (often to be replaced by state capitalism – see section on authoritarian states), but Marxian ideas remain relevant to understanding how capitalism works, or does not work.

ExternalitiesThe consequences of economic activity experienced by unrelated third parties.

NeoliberalismAn economic philosophy representing a revival of classical liberalism that has been adopted by conservatives in many democracies since the 1980s.

CommunismAn ideological position which suggests that a class war will lead to power and property being held in common, with the state withering away.

State socialism The political system found in ‘communist’ states, involving wholesale centralization of political and economic control.

Command economy An economic system in which all decisions about production, supply, and costs are made by government planners. political economy   347 Economic nationalism This is a point of view that espouses a focus on the domestic economy in the national interest, and on building national economies so as to keep as much economic activit y as possible within national borders. It is critical of globalization and free trade, is open to the idea of controls on trade, and supports restrictions on the movement of labour, capital, and goods. It is refl ected in the mercantilism that was found in several European states from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, aimed at promoting the power of the state over that of rival economies, even if this meant going to war. France and Britain were leading exponents of this idea, and Adam Smith was a leading critic, arguing that it focused too much on production rather than consumption, and was a form of rent-seeking (see later in this chapter). The protectionist ideas inherent in economic nationalism might help build national industries and corporations, but they also create protected markets that allow producers to raise prices, and make them less prone to competition, as well as inviting reciprocal protectionism from other countries. The Trump administration in the United States off ers a recent example of the revival of economic nationalism, favouring as it does a more equal balance of trade with China, support for the domestic steel and coal industries, and investments in domestic infrastructure.

Modern liberalism Modern liberalism – often (and confusingly) described simply as liberalism – is an outgrowth of classical liberalism, integrating elements of radicalism, and based on arguments developed by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls (see Ryan, 2012). In spite of the recent revival of support for classical liberalism in the form of neoliberalism, and in spite of signs of a revival in some countries of economic nationalism, modern liberalism is the form of political economy found most often today in most liberal democracies. It recognizes the fl aws in capitalism and democracy, but also regards both as valuable; the purpose of government, argue modern liberals, is to protect rights so that individuals can collectively pursue the goals that the free market cannot provide, while focusing only on those activities that support the public interest.A key part of this idea is found in welfare economics, which is based on the idea that the free market does not necessarily optimize social welfare; the free market might lead to economic effi ciency while overlooking the needs of the poor, and the challenges they face in improving the quality of their lives. Governments should therefore be responsible for more than protecting property rights, but should also be involved in redistributing wealth and opportunity so as to maximize social welfare. As we saw in Chapter 10, one of the key eff ects of the Great Depression and of two world wars was to greatly increase the role of government in many democracies, and the creation of welfare states (see later in this chapter), a move mainly supported by public opin- ion in liberal democracies until the 1960s. At that point, a reaction took place in some countries against so-called ‘big government’, feeding in to the declining faith and trust in government that we have discussed in other parts of this book. As to what eff ect this had on political economy, opinion is divided. One view, the convergence thesis, holds that advanced economies and welfare states are coalescing around the modern liberal idea, helped by the pressures of an increasingly globalized economy. This relates to a more general decline in national distinctiveness; in earlier chapters, we saw a growing concentration of national political systems on codifi ed constitutions, consti- tutional courts, liberal democracy, multi-party systems, and proportional representation. Why not, then, a similar trajectory on the economic front? However, the evidence for convergence among high-income democracies is far from clear-cut (see Hay, 2017), and what we may actually be seeing is a fragmentation of perspectives on political economy. We fi nd diff erent leaders, parties, and governments espousing diff erent views about the best economic policies to pursue, and about the appropriate role of government in the marketplace. One measure of the diff erences is found in comparative data on economic freedom – see Focus 20.1. Furthermore, whatever has happened, or will happen, among liberal democracies, we cannot overlook developments in other parts of the world. These were, at fi rst, impacted by policies pursued by wealthier democracies, but the balance has changed as emerging countries became more powerful and infl uential. Changes currently taking place in China, in particular, are bringing new ideas into the debate about political economy. Welfare economics The branch of economics that focuses on the effect of the allocation of goods and services on overall social welfare.

Convergence thesis The idea that the political economies of high-income economies are adopting a common format based on a liberal, pro-market response while also restraining welfare spending and encouraging policies to expand the workforce. 348  chapter 20 Focus 20.1 Comparing levels of economic freedom Just as we have comparative indices for measuring democracy – including the Democracy Index and Freedom in the World – so we have various means for measuring and comparing different levels of government intervention in the marketplace. One of these is the Index of Economic Freedom maintained by the Fraser  Institute, a conservative Canadian think-tank (see Gwartney et al., 2016). The index is based on 42 measures that rate countries according to such factors as the size and reach of government, approaches to property rights, levels of access to sound money, and regulation of credit. Each country is given a score out of 10, with the freest economies earning the highest scores and the more controlled economies earning the lowest scores. Figure 20.1 gives examples from the 2016 index, which show that all states have some government intervention in their economies. Hong Kong and Singapore had the highest ratings, most democracies were placed in the range of 7.0 or higher, and most hybrids and authoritarian states had lower levels of economic freedom. Interestingly, the four BRICs (see Chapter 8) were only at the middle level of the rankings, ranging between India at 6.6 and Brazil at 5.8. Venezuela was placed last with a score of 2.92, while more than 30 countries were not ranked at all because of a lack of reliable information. 0 123456789 10 Venezuel a Ira n Egyp t Brazil Nigeria Chin a Russia South Afric a Indi a Tu rkey Mexico France Japa n German y US A UK New Zealand Singapore Hong Kong 159150140137 114112 100 95 95 81 76 5239 23 116 321 Score out of 10 Full/fawed democracies Hybrid/authoritarian states Figure 20.1 The Index of Economic Freedom Source: Based on data in Fraser Institute (2015).

Note: Ranking indicated at the end of each column.

the welfare state For many, the welfare state is the major policy achievement of the liberal democratic state. Even as economic fortunes ebb and fl ow, liberal democracies still manage to maintain welfare programmes, which often account for the bulk of their national budgets. This is true even in the United States, where many people mistakenly political economy   349 believe that national defence is the biggest item on the federal budget. In fact, about two- thirds of federal spending is directed at programmes such as social security, unemployment benefi ts, public health care, and related programmes, compared to the 16 per cent that is spent on the militar y (Congressional Budget Offi ce, 2018). To fully understand political economy, then, we must examine the welfare state, and also compare how states var y in terms of securing the welfare of their people, an exercise that reveals important cross- national diff erences in the substance of citizenship. Like many concepts in comparative politics, the notion of the welfare state enters public debates more often in some countries than in others. The phrase is found most often in Europe, where it is also most likely to carry positive connotations. In some respects, just as Europe is the natural arena in which to study multi-party systems and coalition governments, so too is it the home of the most developed regimes of social support. Even though the term welfare state came into use in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, its origins lie further back, in late-nineteenth century Germany (Pierson and Leimgruber, 2010). In an eff ort to off set the infl uence both of socialist parties and the Catholic Church, Otto von Bismarck (Chancellor of the German Empire, 1871–90) pioneered compulsory social insurance schemes in response to risks such as accidents and illness, at least for industrial workers. Building on these foundations, other Western European states gradually introduced and extended welfare, begin- ning with support for the poor and the unemployed, and then providing coverage that included pensions, family allow- ances, and more groups in the population (e.g. rural people and dependents of industrial workers). This complicated patchwork – see Table 20.2 – is typically funded by national government and delivered either directly, or through local government or other public or private agencies. By the 1970s, in most democracies virtually the entire population was covered for the main aspects of welfare. The transformation of developed liberal democracies to welfare states was completed in the twentieth century, and particularly in the three ‘golden decades’ following World War II. The expansion took place at diff erent rates at diff erent times in diff erent countries, resulting in diff erent levels of spending – see Figure 20.2. Among the relatively wealthy members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the average share of spending by all public bodies (local as well as national) on social programmes was 20 per cent in 2016, although shares varied from a high of 31 per cent in France to a low of 7 per cent in Mexico. Ta b l e 2 0 . 2 Forms of welfare Pensions for the retired Unemployment benefi ts Leave for new mothers (and sometimes for fathers) Insurance against workplace accidents Free or subsidized health care Free or subsidized education Support for the disabled Subsidized housing Family allowances Social services (such as residential care homes) 35 France Finland Italy Sweden Germany Spain Japan UK OECD Poland New Zealand USA Australia Canada Turkey Chile Mexico Public social spending as percentage of GDP Figure 20.2 Comparing welfare spending Source: OECD (2018b).

Note: Figures are for 2016. Includes all fi nancial fl ows from public bodies for social purposes. Does not include tax breaks or private spending, which would particularly increase fi gures for USA , UK , and Japan. 350  chapter 20 In spite of the best intentions of the welfare state, not all have benefited from economic growth, and poverty remains a widespread problem even in the wealthiest countries.

Source: iStock/CatLane. In an influential study, Esping-Andersen (1990) identified three types of welfare state found in high-income liberal democracies:

◆◆The liberal (or limited) welfare state. Here the rules for gaining benefits are strict and the benefits are relatively modest. Claimants are a small, workless and sometimes stigmatized segment of the population. This is not so much a welfare state as state welfare – a tradition reflecting the night-watchman state. The traditional examples are found in the English-speaking world, notably Australia, Canada, and the United States.

◆◆ The conservative welfare state. Here the state is the main provider but benefits are linked to occupation, depend on personal contributions, and reflect salar y levels. Positions which ser ve the state, especially jobs in the civil ser vice, often receive generous treatment in health benefits and pensions. Reflecting the influence of the church, this system favours the family and encourages parenthood. It predominates in continental Europe, with Germany being the classic case, and others including Austria, France, and Italy. ◆◆ The social democratic welfare state. This less common system is based on the principle of equal, flat rate benefits for all citizens. Based on need rather than contributions, it takes direct responsibility for caring for children and the elderly. Scandinavian countries are the best examples of this extensive, expensive, and egalitarian system. The 1980s signalled an end to the golden age of the welfare state, with recessions and then financial crises reducing the resources available. The demand for welfare has continued to grow, though, as the average age of the population has increased, raising the cost of pensions, medical care, and support ser vices. Part of the problem is that welfare states are based on open-ended commitments, with governments guaranteeing to treat ever yone who is poor, or unemployed, or disabled, or retired. In so doing, some of life’s risks are removed from the individual but are transferred to the state. International pressures also make a difference. If the cost of one country’s welfare system is higher than all the rest, its international competitiveness may suffer – or be seen to do so. Pierson (2006) suggested that the move to a more open international economy ‘curtailed opportunities for the further development of national welfare states’. Asia’s rising importance in the global economy comes with the advantage that its welfare systems are relatively inexpensive, giving it an advantage over the older and more expensive systems of Europe and North America. political economy   351 These problems have led to some retrenchment of the welfare state (Bonoli and Natali, 2012):

◆ ◆ Benefi ts have been reduced.

◆ ◆ Eligibilit y rules have been tightened, notably by raising the retirement age. ◆ ◆ Some charges have been introduced for ser vices such as medical treatment.

◆ ◆ Eff orts have been made to revive older agencies of care, notably charities and churches.

◆ ◆ Employment benefi ts have been reduced for new and part-time workers.

This edging away from a fully comprehensive welfare state has also refl ected a general shift in government priorities, from the social to the economic. In particular, eff orts to put people back to work have intensifi ed as governments have tried to raise economic output – and tax revenues – so as to address their fi scal challenges, especially since the global fi nancial crisis. Even as welfare spending remained high, unemployment benefi ts were reduced in many countries (Lev y, 2010). development and global divisions The four perspectives outlined earlier were based mainly on experiences in the industrialized West, which was the source even of the radical ideas that were adopted in China and other less-urbanized communist states. With the end of the colonial era, however, and the slow end of militar y government in Latin America, the debate over political economy changed. Now, there were a growing number of what were initially known as less developed countries ( LDCs), developing countries , or underdeveloped countries , with quite diff erent political and economic circumstances from those found in the liberal democratic West. The challenge of understanding development moved up the political economic agenda, even if there was little agreement on how it could best be understood, or on how emerging countries – most of which had long been in an unequal and exploited relationship with their colonial powers – could address the new opportunities presented by independence and improve their place in the global system, in both absolute and relative terms (see Todaro and Smith, 2016). As they applied to LDCs, the four Western perspectives on political economy took predict- ably diff erent positions (Clark, 2016). For classical liberals, the key was to leave the market to function with minimal government interference. This was hard to achieve in LDCs, given that many had ineff ective governments that were vulnerable to manipulation by particular interests, received foreign aid that created a form of dependency, found it hard to protect their markets from free trade, often lacked profi table resources, needed long-term investment to develop inad- equate infrastructure, and had communal cultures that impeded the entrepreneurial abilities of individuals. For radicals such as Lenin (1917), poorer countries had become integrated through the exploitation of cheap labour and natural resources, which was helping rich industrialists off set revolutionary discontent at home. This idea fed into a new dependency theory that became popular in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the work of Latin American economists. This argued that European colonialism undermined indigenous social and economic institutions, along with their capacity to develop independently of their relationship with European colonial powers. Development was focused on a few key resources such as minerals, timber, and agri- culture, most of the profi ts from which went to Europe. LDCs were therefore encouraged to minimize their contacts with rich countries, and to better protect home industries, so that they had a better chance of developing independently. Conservatives in the developed world accorded LDCs lower priority; their concern was political economy arrange- ments at home. Their support for traditional ideas and institutions – combined with their isolationist philosophy – spilled over in their views about LDCs, in regard to which they encouraged support for pre-capitalist values such as loyalty, authority, and the community, support for protectionism, and opposition to foreign aid. Their opposition to communism, however, encouraged them to support authoritarian governments that took anti-communist positions, such as Iran, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Turkey, and Venezuela. Finally, the modern liberal perspective suggests that the problems of LDCs stemmed from a combination of under- developed markets, ineff ective government, extremes in inequality, and the harm posed to LDCs by unequal trade relationships. Its recipe for success includes balancing growth with fairness (rising GDP combined with improvements in the life of the average person through better education and health care, for example), the expansion of opportunities DevelopmentThe improvement of the economic and social well-being of peoples, communities, or states. Often used only in the context of poorer states.

Dependency theory A perspective based on the argument that resources fl ow from a periphery of poor states to a core of wealthy states, creating political and economic dependency. 352  chapter 20 for individuals, fair trade, striking a balance between free trade and protectionism, reaching equitable free trade agreements, and providing aid that creates new opportunities rather than dependency (see Brown, 2013). The end of the Cold War in about 1989–91 not only signalled the collapse of the commu- nist bloc as a distinctive actor in the global system, but also emphasized and accelerated the economic emergence of Asia and Latin America. The potential of many countries in these regions had long been understood, but their strengthening global positions now became more obvious, helped by trends towards greater democracy in several of them. As we saw in Chapter  4, the changing economic balance was exemplifi ed by the invention in 2001 of the acronym BRIC to summarize the strengthening roles of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. By 2012, Jim O’Neill – the investment banker who had invented the acronym – was talking of the Next 11, or N11: a secondary group of emerging markets that included Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, and Vietnam (Martin, 2012). While there were positive trends in these countries, however, many others continued to lag behind, suff ering underdeveloped economies, inadequate primary education and health care, environmental unsustainability, and – in the worst cases – extreme poverty and hunger. A shock came to the international system in 2007 with the breaking of a global fi nancial crisis that was the worst of its kind since the Great Depression of the 1930s. More a North Atlantic crisis than one with truly global proportions, it had its origins in inadequate fi nancial regulation in the United States. The problem expanded to Europe when banks and fi nancial institutions there took advantage of opportunities for quick profi ts. When the housing market collapsed in the United States, many institutions on both sides of the Atlantic either went bank- rupt or turned to the government for help, stock prices plummeted, many people lost their jobs and their homes, and shrinking consumer demand led to fi nancial woes for business. The rapid spread of the crisis emphasized the extent to which wealthier capitalist democra- cies had failed to develop and implement eff ective domestic fi nancial regulations. At the same time, the extent to which many emerging economies were relatively unaff ected emphasized how far they had gone in achieving their own momentum. Meanwhile, the persistence of poverty and economic dysfunction in numerous countries that long ago emerged from the unbalanced relationship inherent in colonialism underlines how much remains to be done to understand the dynamics of political economy. We live in a world that is transforming rapidly in economic terms, and that is increasingly globalized, and yet is also one that still contains enormous inequalities and much unmet economic potential. political economy in authoritarian states It might be supposed that just as authoritarian regimes use political means to keep control, so they also use economic means, and that both their political and their economic development suff ers as a result. The picture is not this simple, though. True enough, dictators are usually less concerned than democrats with promoting the general welfare of citizens, and we often fi nd authoritarian states blighted by privilege, nepotism, and corruption, and lagging economically. At the same time, some of the fastest-growing economies of recent years have been authoritarian states such as China, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. The challenges of understanding the links are illustrated by Haddad (2012) in his case study of Syria and of how political economy played into the Arab Spring. Criticizing the eff orts made to frame the Arab uprisings in terms of ‘generic economic arguments about poverty and destitution’, and to see the uprisings as a reaction to decades of authoritarian rule, he argues the importance of assessing the role in these uprisings of the interaction between eco- nomic and political variables. He describes the dynamic that played out in Syria as follows: When authoritarian elites began to build relations with capitalists or the business class in the 1970s and 1980s they were doing more than simply pursuing their own interests. They were tr ying to respond to growing economic troubles or crisis. However, with time, these political elites and their off spring were increasingly becoming the economic elite. Their interests were refl ected in their policy preferences, their lifest yles, and their changing social alliances (if not tastes).

With new abilities to transform economic wealth into political power, Haddad continues, more state offi cials and their families were drawn into a ‘crony-dominated market’ in which economic policy was shaped by the mutual interests Fair tradeThe idea that producers in poorer countries should earn a bigger share of the profi ts from the sale of their commodities.

Global fi nancial crisis The crisis sparked in 2007 by fi nancial deregulation and speculation in the United States, which spread quickly to Europe. political economy   353 of business and the authoritarian government of Hafez al-Assad (in offi ce 1971–2000) and his son Bashar al-Assad (in offi ce from 2000). The pressures that helped to trigger the Syrian civil war, in other words, were about more than democrats versus dictators, and lay in a more nuanced set of factors related to political economy. The political economy of authoritarianism has taken on a more predictable structure in the form of state capitalism, a phenomenon found in several hybrid and authoritarian states, including China, Russia, and Turkey; see Spotlight Turkey. While this is far from a new idea, and is not limited to authoritarian states (it has been found also in France, Japan, and South Korea at diff erent times), and can be seen as a fi fth perspective on political economy to add to the four discussed earlier in this chapter, it has undergone a revival in recent decades. The approach is based on the state taking a more hands-on approach to economic management, mainly through its ownership of large companies – known as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – that are active in strategically important fi elds, such as energy and technology. (They were once also important in Europe, as in the case of the British and Dutch East India Companies.) Instead of seeing them as a step in the direction of liberal capitalism, many such countries now see these SOEs as per- manent, even if they operate on the basis of small profi ts. Kurlantzick (2016) points out that state capitalist principles can be found in democracies (albeit mainly fl awed ones) such as Brazil and India, but that it has developed furthest in more authoritarian states such as Russia and China. He argues that this trend has contributed to declines in democracy, as governments have tightened their political control. State capitalism, he warns, is ‘more pro- tectionist, more dangerous to global security and prosperity, and more threatening to political freedom’ than free market economics. In the case of China, state capitalism has redirected a policy of privatization that was instituted by Mao’s succes- sors in the 1980s, instead encouraging the creation of enormous SOEs such as State Grid, Sinopec, and China National Petroleum; in 2018, these three energy companies occupied three of the four top slots on the Fortune Global 500 list of the world’s biggest companies (Fortune, 2018). Helped by a law that requires that all industries of strategic value (such as energy and arms manufacturers) be owned by the state, such corporations have accounted for more than 80 per cent of the value of the Chinese stock market in recent years (Li, 2015). Although often ineffi cient, they have nonetheless helped China to become more competitive at a global level, while strengthening the grip of the Communist Party over the Chinese economy. Similar patterns can be found in Russia, where the share of the state sector grew from 35 per cent of gross domestic product in 2005 to 70 per cent in 2015 (Aslund, 2017). Vladimir Putin, argues Djankov (2015), has encouraged state ownership of key sectors such as energy and fi nance, has used Russia’s exports of oil and natural gas as a tool in foreign policy, has used plentiful revenues from Russia’s natural resources as an excuse for failing to make reforms to health care and welfare, has neglected to address the problem of extreme wealth accumulating in the hands of a growing number of billionaires with whom he has close links, and has been able to weather sanctions imposed on Russia by the Euro- pean Union and the United States (which have actually had the eff ect of increasing the level of state ownership in the economy). All of which, of course, has played into Putin’s style of strong and assertive leadership. For Aslund (2017), Russia’s SOEs – including the energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft, and the technology company Rostec – are little more than a cover for the development of the kind of crony capitalism discussed in Chapter 10. They give the impression of being run in the fashion of modern businesses, issuing annual reports and holding annual shareholder meetings, for example, but appearances deceive: They are not even really run by the state. Instead, they are controlled by a small group of cronies – former KGB offi cers, ministers, and senior offi cials in the president’s administration – who act as Putin’s personal representatives.

Loyal executives enjoy long tenures in these companies (regardless of their management abilities), managers favour friends and associates through the awarding of contracts and the selling of assets, and family members are appointed to senior positions regardless of age or experience. The result, Aslund suggests, is a form of ‘neo-feudal capitalism’ that poses a threat to Russia’s social and political stability. More generally in authoritarian states, the key challenge for dictators is to play off domestic political forces against each other so as to ensure their own continuation in offi ce. Economic means play a key role in these eff orts, and – as a result – coherent economic development usually suff ers. The public sector often becomes bloated, as we saw in Chapter 10, with poorly paid employees seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of business. A company’s success, and its tax burden, comes to depend more on its political contacts than its business strengths. Economics and politics State capitalism A system in which the state wields a high degree of control over the economy, taking responsibility for many of the functions and activities that would be left – in a capitalist system – to the free market. Brief profi le Once the centre of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is a secular republic that straddles Asia and Europe. It has long sought membership of the European Union, but its efforts have stalled over concerns about its human rights record and democratic trajectory. Matters have worsened in recent years as Recep Tayyip Erdogˇ an, who came to power in 2003 and spent 11 years as prime minister, was elected president in 2014 and set about converting the previously ceremonial role into an executive position with strong powers. An attempted coup in 2016 sparked a crackdown that strengthened Erdogˇ an’s powers, and a fl awed 2017 referendum narrowly approved a switch to a presidential system of government. Freedom House downgraded Turkey from Partly Free to Not Free in 2018, concerned about abuses of free expression, freedom of association, and the rule of law. It is ranked as a hybrid in the Democracy Index.

Form of governmentUnitary presidential republic. State formed in 1923. The 1982 constitution was the sixth since 1876, and it has been amended nearly 20 times.

Executive Presidential, in the process of a transition from a parliamentary system. A president directly elected for no more than two fi ve-year terms, supported by several vice-presidents and a Council of Ministers. Offi ce of prime minister abolished in 2017.

Legislature Unicameral Grand National Assembly with 600 members elected for renewable fi ve-year terms.

Judiciary Constitutional Court with 17 members serving non-renewable 12-year terms, with three elected by the Grand National Assembly and the rest appointed by the president based on nominations from lower courts.

Electoral system The Grand National Assembly is elected using proportional representation with a (relatively high) 10 per cent threshold. The president has been directly elected only since 2014. Presidential candidates must be nominated by at least 20 members of the Grand National Assembly and compete against each other using a majority system.

Parties Multi-party, with the conservative and Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) (formed in 2001) dominating and the social democratic Republican People’s Party as the major opposition. SPOTLIGHT TURKEY Population Full Democracy Flawed Democracy Hybrid Regime Authoritarian Not Rated Free Partly Free Not Free Not Rated Very High High Medium Low Not Rated Gross Domestic Product Per capita GDP Democracy Index rating F reedom House rating Human Development Index rating 81m $851bn $10,540 The political economy of Turkey Turkey is an emerging economy that occupies an important strategic position between Europe and the Middle East. With a population almost as big as that of Germany, it has seen steady growth in recent years, quickly recovering from the effects of the global fi nancial crisis, making signifi cant inroads into its poverty rate, witnessing rapid urban growth, and earning a ranking by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country (on a par with China, Brazil, and Mexico). For Önis and Kutlay (2013), Turkey is a ‘near-BRIC’. The International Monetary Fund, meanwhile, classifi es Turkey as an emerging market economy, or one that has some but not all of the economic features of a developed economy. In short, Turkey’s economic potential is signifi cant.

Questions hover, though, over its political economy trajectory. Turkey had been moving towards strengthening its democratic credentials, and making efforts to amend laws and regulations in the interests of its long-held hope of joining the European Union. Since coming to power in 2003, however, Recep Tayyip Erdogˇ an has undone many of the democratic gains, accumulating new powers for a redesigned presidency, and pursuing a policy platform that has been variously described as populist, nationalist, Islamist, conservative, and anti-Western. The political doubts raised by his administration have raised economic doubts as well. Fuelled in part by Erdogˇ an’s claims that he plans to take control over the setting of interest rates, and in part by growing infl ation, the Turkish currency lost one-fi fth of its value in early 2018. Many have seen signs of neoliberalism in Turkey, refl ected – for example – in a policy of privatization, and a move away from an already modest welfare state towards greater support for private health care and private social insurance. However, Karadag (2010) summarizes trends in Turkish political economy as a move away from state capitalism towards what he describes as ‘an oligarchic form of capitalism’. He defi nes this as consisting of political fragmentation and the establishment of closed elite political business cartels, a trend that helps explain Turkey’s persistent problems with corruption.

There is, in short, an unsurprising overlap between current political and economic trends in Turkey. Further reading Bas ¸er, Bahar, and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (eds) (2017) Authoritarian Politics in Turkey: Elections, Resistance and the AKP (I.B. Tauris).

Finkel, Andrew (2012) Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press).

Genç, Kaya (2016) Under the Shadow: Rage and Revolution in Modern Tur ke y (I.B. Tauris). A poster announces an election rally in Istanbul for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogˇ an, who has increased his grip on power since fi rst coming to national offi ce in 2003.

Source: Getty Images/Chris McGrath. TURKEY RUSSIA Blac k Sea Mediterr anean CYPR US SYRIA IRAQ IRAN Istanbul ANKARA 356  chapter 20 do not marry well, resulting in the ineffi cient use of capital. Alternatively, rulers may just want to enrich themselves, their families and their ethnic or religious group by taking resources out of the economy and often out of the country.

Inherent corruption, among leading offi cials as well as bureaucrats dealing directly with the public, is a tax on both economic growth and regime legitimacy. Such problems are particularly acute when states suff er a resource curse – see Focus 20.2. Focus 20.2 The resource curse A particular problem that has skewed economic policy in several authoritarian states is the so-called resource curse (Auty, 1993; Collier and Bannon, 2003), or the ‘paradox of plenty’ as it is sometimes known. This exists when a country is well endowed in a resource that could and should be the foundation for sound economic development, but instead alters the economic and political balance such as to focus attention on a single sector, reducing economic growth below the expected level. Several wealthy democracies, such as Canada and Norway, have faced similar risks but have been able to avoid its worst effects by pursuing careful and transparent policies, and making sure their economies were based on a broad foundation. In the case of many poorer (and often authoritarian) countries, however, their rush to develop has produced different results. Oil has turned out to be a problem, for example, for several sub-Saharan African states, such as Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan. The resource curse is also a factor in countries rich in easily exploitable minerals such as copper or uranium, or in precious gems such as diamonds. The policy element of the ‘curse’ stems from four main factors:

◆ ◆ Because these resources are usually relatively easy to exploit and can bring quick and often profi table returns, a state will focus its development efforts almost entirely in that sector, investing little in other sectors. This is the so-called ‘Dutch disease’, named for the effects of the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea off the coast of the Netherlands in the 1970s (Humphreys et al., 2007). It will thereby have an imbalanced economy and will become dependent on a product whose value may be held hostage to fl uctuations in its price on the international market.

◆ ◆ When a government can raise adequate revenue from simply taxing a major natural resource, it lacks incentive to improve economic performance by developing the skills of its people, thus damaging growth over the long run.

◆ ◆ The profi ts that come from these commodities can encourage theft and corruption, ensuring that they fi nd their way into the bank accounts of the rich and powerful rather than being reinvested back into the e co n o my.

◆ ◆ The effect of the curse is to encourage internal confl ict, when poorer regions of the country fi nd that they are not benefi tting equally from the profi ts of resources found in other parts of the country. In the most extreme cases, the outcome can be violence and civil war.

One country that might have been hurt by a resource curse, but that has instead pursued coherent economic policy, is Botswana. One of the poorest countries in the world at the time of its independence in 1966, it also discovered that it was sitting on enormous diamond wealth. It could have misused this asset for a quick fi nancial return, but it instead set up the Debswana Mining Company, a joint venture between the government of Botswana and De Beers, a company which at the time had a monopoly on the global diamond trade. Diamond mining has since fuelled the economic development of Botswana, which now ranks as a middle-income country. Resource curse A phenomenon by which a state that is well endowed in a particular natural resource, or a limited selection of resources, experiences lower economic growth thanks to unbalanced policy, extensive corruption, and internal confl ict. political economy   357 Stagnation is reinforced, in many authoritarian states as well as in democracies, through a habit known as rent-seeking (Congleton and Hillman, 2015). This might be pursued by an individ- ual, a company, or even an entire regime. For example, governments might take over control of valuable natural resources and charge citizens for their use, or they might require import licenses for companies bringing new products into a country, or charge visitors fees for visas. Equally, gov- ernment offi cials might take bribes to provide a licence to a company, or a passport to a citizen.

In all these cases, resources are being used unproductively to generate unearned benefi ts, hidden taxes are imposed on the economy and society, and no value is added to the wider marketplace.

For governments reliant on rent-seeking, there is less motivation to set up the formal structures needed to collect taxes, expand the economy, and develop human capital. Rather, a stand-off of mutual distrust develops between rulers and ruled, creating a context which is incompatible with the more sophisti- cated policy initiatives found in many liberal democracies. Rent-seeking is related to the phenomenon of the rentier state. This label applies to coun- tries that earn most of their revenue from exporting a natural resource. In economic terms, the rentier state makes an income from owning an asset which it exports, usually through licensing private and often foreign contractors, making a profi t but adding little value to the local econ- omy. For example, agricultural commodities may be exported raw, with processing taking place elsewhere. The authoritarian rulers of these rentier states receive a direct income from overseas, reducing their need to raise taxes, and reducing pressures for representation. A portion of the resource ‘rent’ can be distributed to the population as hand-outs or through providing jobs in a swollen public sector, thus buying popular acquiescence to a non-democratic regime, and delaying a transition to democracy. The phenomenon of the rentier state is one of the explanations for the lack of democracy in many states rich in key resources such as oil. Most of the major Middle Eastern oil states – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States – have at various times earned the label rentier state. This has applied most obviously at times when the global price of oil has been high, though, and the long-term decline in the place of oil in the world economy may be having important implications for Saudi Arabia, among others. Its recent budget defi cits have been exacerbated by the falling price of oil, encouraging the government to cut subsidies, to impose its fi rst-ever general tax (in the form of a value added tax), and even to think about privatizing Aramco, the world’s largest oil company. The long-term result, suggests Seznec (2016), might be that Saudi Arabia’s political economy moves away from being ‘the epitome of a rentier state’ and instead begins to resemble those of more advanced industrial democracies. Rent-seekingEfforts to make a profi t or an income from selling a resource without using that resource to generate wealth or to benefi t society.

Rentier stateOne which derives most or all of its national revenues from exporting raw materials or leasing natural resources to foreign companies. 358  chapter 20 discussion questions ◆ ◆ What are the key benefi ts of studying the interaction between politics and economics?

◆ ◆ To what extent are classical liberal views still refl ected in the modern practice of political economy in liberal democracies?

◆ ◆ To what extent are radical views still refl ected in the modern practice of political economy?

◆ ◆ What is the future likely to hold for the welfare state?

◆ ◆ What are the diff erences between state socialism and state capitalism?

◆ ◆ Why have well-endowed liberal democracies managed to avoid the eff ects of the resource curse, while many authoritarian systems have not?

key concepts ◆ ◆ Capitalism ◆ ◆ Command economy ◆ ◆ Communism ◆ ◆ Convergence thesis ◆ ◆ Dependency theor y ◆ ◆ Development ◆ ◆ Economic system ◆ ◆ Economics ◆ ◆ Externalities ◆ ◆ Fair trade ◆ ◆ Global fi nancial crisis ◆ ◆ Macroeconomics ◆ ◆ Markets ◆ ◆ Microeconomics ◆ ◆ Neoliberalism ◆ ◆ New political economy ◆ ◆ Night-watchman state ◆ ◆ Political economy ◆ ◆ Rent-seeking ◆ ◆ Rentier state ◆ ◆ Resource curse ◆ ◆ Social security ◆ ◆ State capitalism ◆ ◆ State socialism ◆ ◆ Welfare economics further reading Castles, Francis C., Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson (eds) (2010) The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford Universit y Press). An edited collection on the welfare state, including chapters on its underlying justifi cation, policy goals and outputs, the established welfare states of Europe, and welfare states emerging in other parts of the world.

Clark, Barr y (2016) Political Economy: A Comparative Approach , 3rd edn (Santa Barbara, CA:

Praeger). An over view of political economy, including chapters on contending perspectives, and on topics such as unemployment, infl ation, trade, and the environment.

Clift, Ben (2014) Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism (Red Globe Press). An outline of the approaches and analytical tools used to understand contemporar y capitalism.

Kurlantzick, Joshua (2016) State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism is Transforming the World (Oxford Universit y Press). An assessment of the origins and eff ects of state capitalism, and its implications for studies of political economy.

Ravenhill, John (ed.) (2017) Global Political Economy , 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford Universit y Press). A textbook on political economy as it applies to trade, fi nance, and development at the global level.

Ryan, A lan (2012) The Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Universit y Press). A detailed assessment of the origins, evolution, and contemporar y features of modern liberalism.