Please read the attached file.

Introduction

Learning Objectives

Reading Assignments

Commentary

3. 2 Chapter 4 by Heilbroner

Study Questions

Supplementary Materials/Suggested Reading

References C ourse G uide

U nit 3: A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo

In t r o d u c t io n

A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo are considered by m any to be the founders of the classical

approach to political econom y. Their theories, w hich rem ain a point of ongoing debate, have inspired both

radically conservative and socialist theories of political econom y. From Sm ith’s “labour theory of value” to

R icardo’s theory of “com parative advantage,” and M althus’s pronouncem ents of “over-population” and the

possibility of “general gluts,” m any of the discussions of their tim e rem ain relevant today. This unit

contextualizes the period in w hich they w rote, highlights the theoretical strengths and w eaknesses of their

theories, and looks at how these ideas m ay have influenced later political econom ists. C ourse G uide

U nit 3: A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo

L e a r n in g O b je c t iv e s

A fter com pleting this unit, you should be able to

1. define and discuss Sm ith’s theory of the “invisible hand” and “laissez-faire” m arkets.

2. discuss Sm ith’s view s concerning the role of the state.

3. define M althus’s “law of dim inishing returns” and discuss its relationship to population grow th.

4. describe “general glut,” and discuss the significance of the English Corn Law s.

5. outline Ricardo’s theory of com parative advantage.

6. define the follow ing term s:

7. absolute advantage

8. m arket price

9. natural price

10. technical division of labour C ourse G uide

U nit 3: A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo

R e a d in g A s s ig n m e n t s

From H istory of Econom ic Thought, read

1. “Chapter 3, A dam Sm ith”

2. “Chapter 5, D avid Ricardo” (pp. 98-103; 119-124)

From The W orldly Philosophers, read

1. “Chapter IV, The G loom y Presentim ents of Parson M althus and D avid Ricardo”

V ie w in g A s s ig n m e n t

1. “N oam Chom sky on A dam Sm ith & the Invisible H and”

A vailable via YouTube.com at http://w w w.youtube.com /w atch?v=eaZO RYaygo0& feature=related

[U ploaded on M ay 22, 2011 http://w w w .am ericanfeud.org/ C opyright 2008. A n extra scene from the 2008

docum entary: Am erican Feud: A H istory of C onservatives and Liberals.] C ourse G uide

U nit 3: A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo

C o m m e n t a r y

3 .1 C h a p te r 3 b y H u n t & L a u tz e n h e is e r

A dam Sm ith (1723-1790) w rote during a tim e of m ajor socioeconom ic, technological, and political

transform ation. D uring his life, he w itnessed the gradual disintegration of the feudal system , the height of the

m ercantilist period, and the birth of the Industrial R evolution. H e w rote at a tim e w hen the capitalist m ode of

production w as gaining dom inance. H e sought to understand the underlying social relations that governed the

w ay in w hich society functioned. Sm ith differed from earlier political econom ists in that he w as the first to

develop a com prehensive, yet abstract, “m odel of the nature, structure, and w orkings of the capitalist system ”

(H unt & Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 40). H is m ost im portant ideas are outlined in his tw o m ajor w orks: The Theory

of the M oral Sentim ents (1779) and An Inquiry Into the N ature and C auses of the W ealth of N ations (1776).

A dam Sm ith, the originator of the

“invisible hand” argum ent. B asselm an

and D rouart, etching, 1854. A fter an

enam el m edallion by Jam es Tassie,

1787. Vanderblue C ollection, H arvard

U niversity. A s foreign dem and for m anufactured English products grew , technological innovations, w hich w ere spurred in

good part by profit-seeking behaviours, encouraged entrepreneurs to look for w ays to reduce labour costs w hile

increasing outputs. This search for greater profits led to “a veritable outburst of inventive activity” and the

reorganization of the labour process (H unt & Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 41). W hile the putting-out system still

allow ed for som e degree of w orker autonom y, m anufactories becam e the dom inant form of industry. These

w ere sites w here the w ork w as com pleted at one location for a w age and w here m erchant-capitalists ow ned the

tools, the m achinery, and the buildings. C entral to m anufactories w as the large-scale introduction of a technical

division of labour, w hich involved breaking dow n the production process into specialized com ponent parts

w here w orkers laboured under the direct supervision of the ow ners or supervisors. The m anufactory signified

the reorganization of the production process based on a new set of social relationships— w orkers sold their

labour to capitalists in exchange for w ages.

This reorganization of the production process, coupled w ith vast technological advancem ents, quickly led to

im provem ents in m echanization, particularly in the textile and iron ore industries. A s H unt and Lautzenheiser

(2011) point out, “U ndoubtedly, the m ost im portant of these innovations w as the developm ent of the steam

engine [w hich] becam e the chief source of pow er in m anufacturing” (p. 42). This developm ent led to m ajor

boom s in population and in the output of m anufactured goods. Sm ith w as im pressed w ith the increases in labour

productivity and output; he noticed that “the three principle categories of incom e— profits, rents, and w ages—

corresponded to the three m ost im portant social classes in the capitalist system of his day— capitalists,

landlords, and the ‘free’ laborers” or w age w orkers (H unt & Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 43).

Sm ith noted, how ever, that the three principle sources of incom e w ere not distributed equally am ong the three

social classes. This signified an im plicit recognition of the unequal pow er relationships in society–in short, class

conflict. B ut rather than view ing class conflict as harm ful or destructive, Sm ith believed it to be in keeping w ith

the “law s of nature” that w ere guided by an “invisible hand” that tended to “a benevolent harm ony” (H unt &

Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 44). H e believed that despite the inherently selfish, self-aggrandizing, and profit-

m axim izing “nature” of individuals, the m arket w orked for the betterm ent of all classes.

Sm ith believed that the m anner in w hich a society “produced and distributed the m aterial necessities of life”

determ ined its institutional m akeup and social relation, including “property relationships,” w hich for Sm ith

w ere central “in determ ining the form of governm ent in any society.” Sm ith suggested that “there w ere four

distinct stages of econom ic and social developm ent: hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and com m erce” (H unt &

Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 44). W hile Sm ith’s understanding of the first three stages are of great insight, for the

purposes of this course, w e focus m ainly on the fourth stage, com m erce.

O nce cities had been transform ed into m anufacturing hubs that increased the efficiency of com m ercially

oriented agriculture and created new m arkets, Sm ith w as confident that the com petition em bedded in capitalism

w ould ensure that the pursuit of self-interest benefited the w elfare of all. W hen guided by an “invisible hand,”

not only does the m arket inherently (or naturally) increase w ealth for all, but it also ensures equilibrium

betw een the supply and dem and of goods and services. A s com petition betw een individuals and industries

intensified, the m arket w ould ensure that the dem and and supply of goods and services w ould produce a price that both buyers and sellers w ould agree on. If prices w ere too high, the m arket w ould encourage m ore

com petition and prices w ould drop. If prices w ere too low , the m arket w ould com pel capitalists to look for other

w ays of increasing their profitability or force them into areas w here higher profits could be m ade.

A ccordingly, Sm ith w as a cham pion of laissez-faire (leave it alone) m arkets. G iven the alleged benevolence of

the m arket, he felt that any form of governm ent intervention in the econom y— from price controls and

regulations to m onopoly grants and subsidies— w as harm ful and w ould negatively influence the “natural path”

of capital investm ent and the cost of goods. In his view , the m arket naturally directed capital tow ard the m ost

productive m eans of accum ulation. Thus, it is no surprise that Sm ith w as adam antly opposed to the m ercantilist

policies that sought to protect crow n industries and encourage dom estic developm ent, and he protested against

im port duties and restrictive trade treaties.

Sm ith’s theory of absolute advantage proposed that if it w as cheaper to produce goods abroad than it w as

dom estically, then governm ents ought to let the m arket be and focus instead on dom estically producing those

goods that w ere cheapest to m ake. A s you w ill see, D avid R icardo w ould later expand on these ideas in his

stance against the English C orn Law s and the developm ent of his theory of com parative advantage.

N otw ithstanding, Sm ith argued that the state had three m ain responsibilities:

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1. m ilitary defence and ensuring a m inim um level of violence in society,

2. the adm inistration of law, and

3. the building and m aintenance of public w orks.

Em bedded in Sm ith’s theories w as the assum ption of an equal pow er relationship in the m arket (recall W ood,

U nit 2). Sm ith assum ed that all buyers and sellers w ould have the sam e know ledge, understanding, access to

inform ation, bargaining pow er, political clout, and property holdings so as to obtain “fair value” w hen

purchasing or selling goods. W hile Sm ith claim ed that the self-interest and com petition of the m arkets

benefitted all, he w as clear that the struggle betw een the classes w as by no m eans a struggle am ong equals. H e

goes to som e length to show how the capitalists’ greater w ealth, their ability to influence public opinion, and

their pow er to pressure governm ents to enact legislative changes, adversely affected w orkers (see H unt &

Lautzenheiser, 2011, pp. 48-49). O n the w hole, there are som e inconsistencies betw een Sm ith’s view of the

alleged benevolence of the m arket and the unequal pow er relationships betw een capitalists and w orkers.

A t tim es, Sm ith’s labour theory of value appears to contradict the general thrust of his other argum ents.

N evertheless, it form s the basis on w hich later political econom ists, particularly D avid R icardo and K arl M arx,

w ould develop m ore sophisticated theories. W here earlier theoreticians had argued that labour alone w as the

sole creator of value, Sm ith argued that “the exchange value of a com m odity is determ ined by the am ount of

labor em bodied in that com m odity” (H unt & Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 50). Sm ith distinguished betw een “value

in use” and “value in exchange” in w hat cam e to be know n as the “w ater-diam ond” paradox (see H unt &

Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 53) in w hich one good has m ore value in use than in exchange, w hile the other good has

m ore value in exchange than in use. B ut Sm ith w as m ore concerned w ith exchange value than he w as w ith use

value. Sm ith confused things further w hen he suggested that the labour theory of value w as only valid in prim itive

societies w here labour w as the predom inant factor in production. H e argued that once tools and m achinery

becam e w idely used, the products sold had to earn enough to cover both the w ages of the labourers and the cost

of the tools/m achinery used. This becam e know n as “Sm ith’s cost-of-production theory of prices” (H unt &

Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 52). The cost-of-production approach attem pted to explain how the “m arket price” (in

the short-run) and “natural price” (in the long-run) differed. For Sm ith, m arket price w as determ ined as

follow s: If supply w as sm all relative to dem and, then the price w ould increase, but if supply w as large relative

to dem and, then the price w ould decrease.

N atural price, on the other hand, w as the relative total cost of production “sufficient to provide the landlord,

capitalist, and the w orkers w ith rent, profit, and w ages equivalent to the ordinary or the socially average rates of

rent, profit, and w ages” (H unt & Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 52). In other w ords, the natural price w as an

“equilibrium price determ ined by the costs of production,” w hereas the m arket price w ould fluctuate above or

below the natural price, based on the forces of supply and dem and. W hat you see, then, is an inherent

contradiction betw een Sm ith’s labour theory of value and his cost-of-production approach.

So how did profits and rent arise then? Sm ith offered no clear-cut answ ers other than those that w ere often

contradictory. H e rejected the idea that profits arose through the act of buying cheap and selling dear in the

arena of exchange; instead, the source of profit m ust be in hum an labour pow er. Sm ith never fully developed

this idea. Instead, he found him self caught betw een the labour theory of value and the cost-of-production

approach. (R icardo and M arx w ould later develop the idea that profits w ere a portion of the unpaid labour of the

w orking class.)

N evertheless, Sm ith rem ains the founder of the labour theory of value and the creator of “m arket equilibrating”

theories. H is general theory w as never able to overcom e the contradiction betw een class conflict and unequal

pow er relations on the one hand, and his faith in the ability of the “invisible hand” to contribute to the com m on

good on the other. Sm ith understood that the state did not act as a neutral arbiter betw een labour and capital but

that, in reality, “governm ent exists to protect the rich from the poor” (H unt & Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 63). B ut

this too, w as inconsistent w ith his defence of lim ited governm ent intervention and quest for the greater w elfare

of society. H ow ever, Sm ith’s ideas had an im portant influence on Thom as M althus and D avid R icardo’s ideas.

TO P C ourse G uide

U nit 3: A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo

3 .2 C h a p te r 4 b y H e ilb ro n e r

Thom as R obert M althus, the original of the

“overpopulation” thesis. A fter an original by

John Linnell, 1833.

Thom as R obert M althus’s (1766-1834) ideas cam e som e tw enty years after A dam Sm ith. In 1798, he published

his Essay on the Principle of Population As it Affects the Future Im provem ent of Society, a docum ent that w as

im m ediately m et w ith controversy. In short, M althus argued that if left unchecked, “there w as a tendency in

nature for a population to outstrip all possible m eans of subsistence” (i.e., its food supply) (H eilbroner, 1999,

p.78). For M althus, the m ain cause of poverty and suffering w as population grow th relative to dim inishing

agricultural returns. H e argued that population tended to increase geom etrically (1, 2, 4, 8, 16), w hile food

production increased arithm etically (1, 2, 3, 4).

A lthough the evidence he based these claim s on is never fully specified, M althus expanded on his theory by

suggesting that as population increases, m ore land of inferior quality is used, w hich then causes the net produce

per unit of land to dim inish. M althus called this the “law of dim inishing returns in agriculture.” H e argued

against charity, w orkhouses, and increasing the incom e of the poor. M althus asserted that poverty could be

overcom e only by m oral restraint; in other w ords, by delaying m arriage and practicing sexual restraint. O nly a few of M athus’s ideas w ere strongly supported by his friend and contem porary D avid R icardo (1772-

1823), w ho w as w riting som e forty years after Sm ith’s W ealth of N ations. H eilbroner (1999) notes that at that

tim e,

England had divided into tw o hostile factions: the rising industrialists, busy w ith their factories and fighting for

parliam entary representation and social prestige, and the great landow ners, a rich, pow erful, and entrenched

aristocracy, w ho looked resentfully at the encroachm ents of the brassy nouveaux riches. (p.79)

In 1815, w ith m ore w heat and corn being im ported from abroad, the English landow ners w ho w ere seeking to

m aintain their dom inance w ere able to legislate “an ironclad system of protection” called the E nglish C orn

L aw s. The C orn Law s “im posed a sliding scale of im port duties on the im portation of grain; the low er the

foreign price fell, the higher w ent the duty” (H eilbroner, 1999, p. 80). The effect of the law w as to protect the

pow er of the aristocracy by keeping low -priced w heat out of the English m arket. For the capitalists how ever, as

the price of grain rose higher, so too did their costs for labour (although they w ere very creative in keeping

w ages low ). B ut the industrialists w ould not stand for this, and business interests soon organized. A s a

testam ent to the pow er of the gradually declining landholding class, it w ould take nearly thirty years for the

C orn Law s to be repealed.

M althus and R icardo disagreed on the defence of the landow ners. For M althus, the landow ners w ere a source of

unproductive consum ption, and in the event of a general glut, landow ners could assist in stabilizing supply

and dem and by increasing their consum ption. For R icardo, the interests of the capitalists and the landow ners

w ere fundam entally at odds. H e argued that although the C orn Law s protected England’s grain producers from

cheaper com petition, it kept food prices high, forced capitalists to pay higher w ages, and caused profits to fall.

M althus countered by suggesting that cheap grains w ould ultim ately harm w orkers by inducing excessive

procreation, thus w orsening the population problem . H e also believed that it w as reckless for a country to

depend on foreign sources that could be interrupted in tim es of w ar or recession. N evertheless, after m uch

debate, R icardo’s argum ents proved to be the m ore convincing ones, especially as they tended to support the

interests of the ever-m ore pow erful industrialists and the w orkers (in term s of cheaper food).

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U nlike Sm ith and R icardo, M althus argued that over-production could lead to recessions and/or depressions,

that is, periods of high unem ploym ent and low econom ic grow th. These view s w ere m ost clearly laid out in

M althus’s Principles of Political Econom y (1820). B efore M althus, econom ists generally agreed that “supply

creates its ow n dem and. Say’s L aw , w hich is nam ed after J. B . Say (1767-1832), a contem porary of M althus

and R icardo, suggested that the over-production of goods could not occur, because those w ho produced the

goods, by their act of producing, also produced the purchasing pow er to buy other goods. Like Say, w ho

supported Sm ith’s view s at the tim e, R icardo believed that the m arket w ould eventually correct any oversupply

of goods. M althus countered this idea by suggesting that if the existing dem and w as not sufficient to purchase

all the goods that had been produced, then there w as indeed the possibility that capital w ould not find outlets for

profitable investm ent. In other w ords, dem and m ight be insufficient w hen consum ers preferred to hoard or save

their m oney. The resulting drop in dem and w ould cause a general glut. M althus’s overall claim w as that the

m arket w as not self-adjusting, a notion that w ould be further exam ined by John M aynard K eynes. D avid R icardo, expositor of “com parative

advantage.” Thom as Phillips. “Portrait of

D avid R icardo.” D etail. O il on canvas. C irca

1821. N ational Portrait G allery, London.

A s the 18th century drew to a close, the transition from m anufactories to factories began. A rapid string of

inventions had com pletely overhauled production and the labour process. O ne of the m ost im portant

technological developm ents w as the use of the steam engine in m ining, m anufacturing, and transportation, and

the use of coal and coke in the sm elting process greatly reduced the cost of m etals and increased their

applicability. In the early 19th century, the developm ent of synthetic m aterials and the introduction of new

m achinery also low ered production costs, displaced w orkers (technological displacem ent), and reduced prices.

In 1817, R icardo published his Principles of Political Econom y and Taxation. For R icardo it w as not production

that determ ined distribution, but rather distribution that determ ined capital accum ulation and econom ic grow th.

This w as the beginning of the m ovem ent aw ay from concerns w ith the relationships and forces of production to

concerns over distribution. It w as an im portant, but often conflicting, theoretical notion that w ould culm inate in

later utilitarian and neoliberal thought.

R icardo’s labour theory of value proposed that the prices of com m odities w ere proportional to the labour that

w as em bodied in them during the production process. U nlike Sm ith, how ever, his approach to political

econom y w as largely ahistorical. H e view ed the social relationships of capitalism as natural and eternal.

H ow ever,

H is definitions of natural prices and m arket prices w ere identical to Sm ith’s, w ith the exception that rent w as

not a com ponent of the necessary costs of production. H is discussion of how supply and dem and, by equalizing

all rates of profit, tended to push the m arket price into equality w ith the natural price w as also m uch the sam e as

Sm ith’s. (H unt & Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 103) D espite the increasing use of tools and m achinery in the production process, R icardo did not think that this in

any w ay devalued the applicability of his labour theory of value. A fter all, tools and m achinery w ere them selves

products of labour, w hich w ere m ade for the purpose of assisting in the production of other goods. In other

w ords, the m achinery and tools contained stored labour, w hich depreciated as it w as used to produce new

goods. For R icardo, the value of a given com m odity w as the total of all present and past labour (m achinery,

tools, buildings, etc.) that w as em bodied in the production of that com m odity, and profits w ere thus a portion of

the value created by the products of the labour. H ow ever, profits and w ages w ere inversely related: as w ages

rise, a sm aller portion of the value created rem ains as profit. R icardo feared that as w ages increased and profits

decreased, econom ic grow th w ould com e to a standstill. H ence, in an effort to reduce the possibility of sm aller

profits, R icardo strongly advocated for international free trade (e.g., the English C orn Law s).

C entral to R icardo’s view s on international trade w as his theory of com parative advantage. U nlike Sm ith,

“R icardo argued that a country need not have an absolute advantage in the production of any com m odity,” but

rather that “both countries could benefit from trade if each had a relative advantage in production” (see H unt

& Lautzenheiser, 2011, pp. 119-120 for an explanation of term s). In other w ords, if one country w as a m ore

efficient producer overall than another country, then free trade could benefit both countries as long as each

country specialized in producing the goods w hose relative costs w ere the low est. Thus, free trade shifts

resources aw ay from low productivity industries and tow ard high productivity industries to generate greater

profits.

B ut how can less affluent countries hope to com pete w ith the giant m ultinationals unless they are protected by

tariffs that allow them to develop and then enter the m arket? A nd, in the case of an im ported agricultural good,

w hat w ould happen if a disaster struck and export restrictions w ere put in place? W hat is the im pact on the

exporting country w hen it has no dom inant com m odity to export? In the early 19th century, Freidrich List noted

that England began advocating free trade only after it becam e a dom inant industrial producer. The sam e

occurred in other European countries and later in the U nited States as w ell (see C hang, 2003, for a

contem porary analysis). B efore advocating free trade, England w as a staunch defender of protectionist tariffs

and im port duties.

W hile R icardo’s theories em phasized the labour theory of value, he also believed that relationships of pow er,

conflict, inequality, and w ealth never changed. Strangely, considering his position that an increase in w ages

m eans a decrease in profits (or class conflict), R icardo denied the possibility of further socioeconom ic change;

he believed that civilization had reached its apex w ith the advent of capitalism

Every argum ent that R icardo gave show ing how coercive restrictions in the free m arket could benefit the

m other country at the expense of the colony could just as easily dem onstrate how exchange betw een capitalists

and laborers could be regulated by coercive restrictions that benefitted the capitalist at the expense of the

laborer (or vice versa, as m any of the leaders in the rising labor m ovem ent of R icardo’s tim e hoped. (H unt &

Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 123)

R icardo did not consider labour pow er itself to be a com m odity w hose value w as determ ined in the sam e

m anner as other com m odities. This w as one of the principles that K arl M arx added to R icardo’s (and Sm ith’s)

labour theory of value. H e suggested that labour pow er w as in fact a com m odity w hose value could be

explained in the sam e w ay. W ith the benefit of hindsight, you can see that M althus’s theory failed to predict the significant drop in the birth

rates of industrialized countries and the developm ent of scientific m ethods of agriculture. Pregnancy prevention

m ethods, such as birth control and contraception, have played a central role in low ering birth rates. A s

H eilbroner (2009) also points out that “on the farm children m ight be an asset,” but the sam e cannot be said of

populations in urban centres (p. 93). In the next unit, K arl M arx and Freidrich Engels argue that M althus had

m istaken the cause of the population problem for one of its affects— over population w asn’t sim ply a result of

poor people’s natural inclination to reproduce beyond their m eans, but instead it is a consequence of the very

dynam ics of the capitalist system . It is the structure of production (that is, the underlying social relationships

and forces of production) that places dem ographic pressures on resources and the environm ent, and not the

other w ay around (see A ngus & B utler, 2011, for a contem porary version of this argum ent).

TO P C ourse G uide

U nit 3: A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo

S t u d y Q u e s t io n s

W hen you have finished the assigned reading for this unit, test your com prehension of the m aterial by

review ing the unit’s learning objectives and preparing brief w ritten responses to the questions below . If you

have any difficulty w ith the m aterial presented, contact your tutor for assistance as soon as possible.

1. H ow did the transition from m anufactories to factories change the technical division of labour?

2. W hat is the significance of Sm ith’s “invisible hand” and his avocation for “laissez-faire” m arkets?

3. A ccording to Sm ith, w hat w ere the m ain responsibilities of the state? D oes he neglect to include any im portant

responsibilities?

4. D efine M althus’s “law of dim inishing returns” and explain its significance to population grow th.

5. W hat is a “general glut”? W hy did M althus and Ricardo disagree over the potential for one?

6. W hat w ere the English Corn Law s? W hy did M althus and Ricardo disagree over the advantages and

disadvantages of such law s?

7. O utline Ricardo’s theory of com parative advantage. H ow could this theory potentially affect developing or less

affluent countries?

8. W hy do you think Ricardo m ay have shifted his em phasis aw ay from the forces and relationships of production

and onto concerns about the distribution of goods? W hat m ay have been som e f the ideological and political

reasons for doing so? C ourse G uide

U nit 3: A dam Sm ith, Thom as M althus, and D avid R icardo

S u p p le m e n t a r y M a t e r ia ls /S u g g e s t e d R e a d in g

In addition to the required readings for this unit, you m ay w ant to consult the follow ing list of readings to

broaden or deepen your understanding of the concepts relevant to this unit. U se the m aterials listed here and in

the “PO EC 302 C ourse B ibliography” to research your responses to the course assignm ent questions. C onsult

the A thabasca U niversity Library’s online catalogue and indexes for these and other pertinent books and

articles.

A ngus, I. & B utler, S. (2011). Too M any People? Population, Im m igration and the Environm ental C risis.

C hicago: H aym arket B ooks.

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