Weight: 15% of your final course grade Suggested Due Date: At the end of Unit 6 Length: Seven (7) sources (including a minimum of 5 academic sources). 2–3 paragraphs per source (around 1,100–1,200 wor

Unit 6: Overview

Overview

This unit takes up the question of the changing role of the voluntary sector in Canada and its place in the ongoing transformation of Canada’s governance framework. For decades, the role of the overall governance framework of Canada’s voluntary sector evolved in response to the priorities of policymakers and to overall societal attitudes. In the meantime, policymakers, the media, and the academic community have for the most part ignored the contributions of the voluntary sector to the social and economic health of society, focussing instead on the private and public sectors. Similarly, little attention was paid to civil society, which can be broadly understood as the space between public and private life, and which includes both organizations and individuals. Diverse dynamics during the 1970s, notably the rise of anti-authoritarian politics on the left and the growing crisis of the Keynesian welfare state, contributed to a rediscovery and valorization of civil society and the voluntary sector embedded within it (Ilcan & Basok, 2010, pp. 133–134). These events took place in a period of so-called “government failure,” and civil society increasingly came to be conceived of as a source of “big ideas” and more effective governance (Edwards, 2004, p. 2). During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a movement to “reinvent government” with neoliberal solutions, in view of the crisis of the welfare state. This movement enhanced the role of voluntary organizations in the lives of communities. Civil society organizations are now doing more of the work that was once the responsibility of governments. As is the case in other sectors, the situation for Indigenous Peoples with respect to the voluntary sector is both unique and complex. In this unit, we will examine the nature of the changing relationship between the state and the voluntary sector, and the implications for governance.

Learning Objectives

When you have completed Unit 6, you should be able to achieve the following learning objectives.

1. Explain what is meant by the voluntary sector.

2. Describe the principal characteristics of the voluntary sector in Canada.

3. Outline the evolution of the relationship between the voluntary sector and the Canadian state since the 1940s, with an emphasis on the key turning points.

4. Explain a decolonial approach to philanthropy.

5. Describe the principal challenges to the voluntary sector with respect to neoliberal governance.

Required Readings

Elson, P. R. (2007). A short history of voluntary sector–government relations in Canada . The Philanthropist, 21(1), 36–74. https://thephilanthropist.ca/original-pdfs/Philanthropist-21-1-358.pdf

Frumkin, P. (2002). The idea of a nonprofit and voluntary sector . In On being nonprofit: A conceptual and policy primer (pp. 1–28). Harvard University Press.

Jamieson, R. (2020). Decolonizing philanthropy: Building new relations . In P. R. Elson, S. A. Lefèvre, & J.-M. Fontan (Eds.), Philanthropic foundations in Canada: Landscapes, Indigenous perspectives and pathways to change (pp. 157–172). PhiLab.

Unit 6: Commentary:

Commentary

Voluntary sector organizations are said to be part of the “third” sector (with business and government comprising the first two sectors). As such, they are part of civil society, which can be conceived as occupying that space in society where “uncoerced human association” and “relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interests, and ideology” (Walzer, 1991, p. 293). In this sense, we may think of civil society as being the “space between official public life (government) and private life (especially the market)” (Swift, 1999, p. 15). The term voluntary sector can be used interchangeably with non-profit or not-for-profit sector.

Voluntary sector organizations are engaged in a wide array of activities, can comprise of a few to thousands of volunteers, and are often referred to as non-profit organizations and charities. The services offered by these organizations contribute significantly to the social, cultural, economic, and other dimensions of the health and welfare of Canadians (Voluntary Sector Task Force, 1999). Voluntary sector organizations often fulfill special needs that private businesses do not satisfy and that government programs have not covered. Voluntary organizations play a strategic role in “helping Canadians help Canadians.”[1]

Broadly speaking, voluntary organizations are bodies that serve either the public or a defined membership, such as a professional association (Quarter, 1992, p. 42). Established by the federal government in 2000, the Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) created a team—or joint table—with representatives from the voluntary and public sectors to establish a framework and principles that regulate this third sector–public sector relationship. The Joint Accord Table[2] defined the voluntary sector as

organizations that exist to serve a public benefit, are self-governing, do not distribute any profits to members, and depend to a meaningful degree on volunteers. Membership or involvement in these organizations is not compulsory, and they are independent of, and institutionally distinct from the formal structures of government and the private sector. Although many voluntary sector organizations rely on paid staff to carry out their work, all depend on volunteers, at least on their boards of directors. (Government of Canada / Voluntary Sector Task Force, 2001, p. 3)

This definition encompasses organizations that provide services, as well as advocacy organizations of all sizes. Also, they are not-for-profit, thus any profit realized by the organization will not be distributed among its stakeholders.

The voluntary sector experienced major shifts throughout its history that are closely linked with political, economic, and attitudinal shifts. The sector was initially focused on charity and was originally and almost exclusively tied to religious organizations. These organizations had considerable influence, as is evident by the Church-run Indian Residential School system in Canada. In the mid-twentieth century, the focus evolved to an emphasis on citizen’s rights and participation. With the rise of neoliberalism and the decline of state funding, organizations sought support from private donors, which has created multiple challenges for the sector. In this context, it is important to distinguish between voluntary groups who are registered with the government as a charity and those who do not have this designation. The primary benefit of obtaining charitable tax status from the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) is that it allows private donors to claim their donations as a non-refundable income tax deduction, which is a powerful incentive to donate, particularly for those with significant disposable income. However, registered charities are restricted to very specific activities as specified by government; these activities are closely scrutinized by the government to monitor compliance.

The growth of voluntary sector groups has seen a move from being focused primarily on service provision (charity) to providing services that empower recipients, which is arguably a more democratic and participative approach to address service gaps. The shift to participative approaches for providing services recognizes that providing charity does not address the systemic and institutional reasons that create the conditions for poverty and other disadvantages (such as appropriation of land, racism, sexism, and ableism to name a few). Participative approaches to resolving problems also moves toward the reciprocal nature of Indigenous social relations, as opposed to the Western transaction-based approach in which one person gives and the other receives (see Jamieson, 2020, pp. 160–162).

The Third Sector in Historical Perspective

Despite the relative obscurity of policies pertaining to the voluntary sector, there have been several periods during which the voluntary sector took on a more prominent role as a result of changes in state policy. Importantly, these changes were a consequence of wider socio-economic developments and political imperatives. The view of the voluntary sector in the nineteenth century was substantially different from the one of the twenty-first century, as the former was entirely focused on the charity element (provision of goods and services to the “deserving poor”), while the latter included a more comprehensive emphasis in citizens’ agency, empowerment, and participation.

The first charity initiative implemented in what became the Atlantic provinces and New France was based on England’s Poor Relief Act (1601). Charities multiplied over time, with most of them affiliated with churches (Elson, 2007, p. 37). Women played an important role as the ones who coordinated these charity organizations by providing unpaid labour for the provision of services, often to other women and their children who were left destitute by the lack of a social safety net and state policies that disadvantaged them. Social reproduction theorists note that the unpaid (and often unacknowledged) labour of women in providing social services to their families and beyond is critical to the reproduction of existing gender inequality (Dorow, 2015).

In the early twentieth century, the voluntary sector experienced major shifts. World War I and the Great Depression triggered social and financial uncertainty that led to reforms to social security systems. In 1942, Britain released the Beveridge Report (Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd. 6404), which contained important reforms to the social security system and constituted the basis of the welfare state. Influenced by the Beveridge Report, the Canadian government issued its Marsh Report on Social Security in 1943.

The Marsh Report contained six main proposals: 1) a national employment program; 2) sickness benefits and access to medical care; 3) occupational disability and care giver support; 4) a comprehensive system of old age security and retirement benefits; 5) premature death benefits; and 6) children’s allowances. (Marsh, 1943, as cited in Elson, 2007, p. 45)

Social programs, such as unemployment insurance, family allowances, old age pensions, and hospital insurance, emerged between the 1940s and 1950s with the realization that the need for assistance could be structural, not simply due to personal failure (Elson, 2007). Generally, none of these benefits were available to First Nations persons until much later, and even then it was at a lower levels. The reasons for this were two-fold: Initially, poverty was viewed as a local, even personal, issue, and thus the provision of social services was situated in the Constitution Act, 1867 as a provincial responsibility. “Indians and land reserved for the Indians” were placed under federal jurisdiction, which constitutionally excluded them from provincial relief. More importantly, federal law and policy was squarely aimed at assimilating all Indigenous Peoples in the body politic, a strategy made infamous by Duncan Campbell Scott (an architect of Indian Residential Schools), which allowed Canada to weaponize social programs as a means of forced assimilation. The 40-billion-dollar “Jordan’s Principle” settlement announced in 2022 to address federal shortfalls in funding for First Nations children (as only one example) demonstrates the staggering impact of government failure (Indigenous Services Canada, 2022).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Pierre Trudeau’s government increased funding to voluntary organizations to spur the modernization of Canadian society and to reinforce its identity in view of growing tensions over national identity. At the same time, policy to eliminate Indigenous identity altogether was also introduced by this same government, albeit unsuccessfully, which would have eliminated the established fiduciary responsibility of the Crown for the well-being of First Nations people. Although the Trudeau government’s conception of the voluntary sector remained firmly within the liberal paradigm, it was during this period that the voluntary sector came closest to the notion of social citizenship as a complement to the Keynesian welfare state. According to Hall et al., the role of the voluntary sector was inseparable from the role of the public sector:

The relationship between charities and government social policy was synchronous in many ways and fostered the development of an interdependent partnership. Governments needed specific types of programs and services to be provided and regulated while also maintaining a ‘window’ on community needs and trends. (Hall et al., 2005, as cited in Elson, 2007, p. 46)

Thus, in that period funding for the voluntary sector mostly came from the state.

As part of the wider ideological shift towards neoliberalism, public funding for the voluntary sector came to be questioned—there were growing demands that voluntary organizations search for funding from private donors. There was less tolerance for the advocacy role of voluntary organizations among policy elites, and Brian Mulroney’s Conservative government made cuts to voluntary sector funding during the 1980s. The voluntary sector was crippled by these cuts and fell off the policy radar until the end of the 1990s. The debate around the voluntary sector was revived by the Liberals as part of a “Canadian Way” to balance the market imperatives of neoliberal reforms with social cohesion. Significantly, the voluntary sector was conceptualized as a social buffer against the more deleterious consequences of neoliberalism and significant funding was provided to serve this purpose. The Voluntary Sector Initiative program received over $95 million from the government and lasted from 2000 to 2005. When the Conservative government came into power in 2006, the program was not renewed (Phillips, 2009, pp. 22–23).

In the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the voluntary sector faced greater demand for its services. Approximately half of all charities reported increased demand for their products and services, and increased difficulty in providing them (Imagine Canada, 2011). Charities reported being stressed by higher demand for their services, fewer resources, a complex regulatory framework, and increased demands for accountability (Spence, 2011). However, during Prime Minister Harper’s administration (2006–2015), control mechanisms over charitable and civil society organizations increased. As Patterson (2015) points out, CRA conducted extensive audits of groups such as The David Suzuki Foundation, Tides Canada, West Coast Environmental Law, The Pembina Foundation, Environmental Defence, Equiterre, Ecology Action Centre, and Amnesty International. A civil society coalition called Voices-Voix released a report called Dismantling Democracy: Stifling Debate and Dissent in Canada (2015). In this report, the coalition of 200 organizations and 500 individuals argues that the Canadian federal government was targeting and intimidating charities for their political inclinations. The coalition says:

As we have carefully documented, the current government has targeted dozens of charities it deems too “political” for its tastes—meaning that they have been vocal in their opposition to policies that put people, nature and rights at risk. Several among our number have been served notice they will lose their charitable status. (Voices-Voix, 2015, p. 4)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s administration set up measures to face the economic effects of the crisis. The response included the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS), a wage-subsidy program for small businesses, which later on expanded to all—large or small—profit, non-profit, and charity organizations that had suffered a 30% drop or more in revenue as a result of the pandemic (Fife & Curry, 2020). While celebrated by the private sector, this wage subsidy faced criticism by charity organizations because the 30% drop requirement excluded most of them. On April 7, 2020, 314 non-profits and charities sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau and some of his key government officials, requesting that the wage subsidy be made available to all charities and non-profits with no eligibility requirement of 30% loss. They wrote:

Most charities and non-profits are not primarily in the business of selling goods or services. Their revenues typically arrive at various key points in the year in response to fundraising appeals and events, membership fees, grants from institutional funders (including governments and foundations), and business sponsorships. Requiring them to show a 30 per cent drop in gross revenues compared to a year ago in order to access the wage subsidy doesn’t make sense. Relief should be extended to non-profits and charities proactively, before they are forced to lay off staff, abandon leases, or even shutter permanently. (Daub et al., 2020, pp. 1–2)

The next day, the federal government made new changes to CEWS, including reducing the eligibility requirement of 30% loss to 15%. In addition, it made adjustments to the application of this requirement to registered charities and non-profit organizations:

Registered charities and non-profit organizations would also be able to benefit from the additional flexibilities being provided to employers with respect to the revenue loss calculation. In addition, to recognize that different types of organizations are experiencing different types of funding pressures, it is proposed that charities and non-profit organizations be allowed to choose to include or exclude government funding in their revenues for the purpose of applying the revenue reduction test. (Department of Finance Canada, 2020)

CEWS ended on October 23, 2021, and was replaced by the Tourism and Hospitality Recovery Program (THRP) and the Hardest-Hit Business Recovery Program (HHBRP).

The Voluntary Sector: Characteristics and Categories

The commonly held defining characteristics of the voluntary sector are that the activities of its organizations are not constituted to earn a profit. Charity organizations “exist primarily to serve others, to provide goods or services to those in need and exhibit some aspect of voluntary action, behaviour or shared commitment of purpose” (Scott, 1992, pp. 35–36).

According to Salamon (1995), voluntary sector organizations can be classified into four basic categories:

1. Funding agencies or fund-raising intermediaries (for example, the United Way) that generally do not provide services themselves, but “channel resources to those who do.”

2. Member serving organizations (for example, trade unions, or business and professional associations) that provide services to their immediate members rather than the public at large.

3. Public benefit organizations (for example, nursing homes, daycares, and other social service organizations; and cultural institutions) that “exist primarily to serve others, to provide goods or services (including information or advocacy) to those in need or otherwise to contribute to the general welfare.”

4. Religious organizations (for example, churches and religious societies) that are involved in the pursuit of “essentially sacramental religious functions.”

(Salamon, 1995, p. 54)

The voluntary sector is constituted by a diversity of organizations with varying aims and perspectives; attempts to characterize them according to one single definition are misplaced. Most voluntary sector organizations are small, such as a local community hall, although there are some very large ones, including the Red Cross Society and World Vision Canada. Voluntary sector organizations are not only heterogeneous in terms of the issues they address and the functions they perform, but they also vary widely in terms of their size and the resources they command.

Due to the heterogeneous nature of the voluntary sector, and despite efforts to constitute it into a single policy community, grievances articulated by voluntary organizations vary according to their size and goals. As with other sectors of Canadian society, there are unequal power relations within the voluntary sector. These affect the ability of its constituent organizations to mobilize resources and make themselves politically heard (Laforest, 2011, p. 3). As well, although governments have attempted to convey an attitude of neutrality vis-à-vis voluntary organizations, they have often shown their preferences for particular types of organizations through funding (Phillips, 2009, p. 28). The scrutiny of charities or advocacy groups, based on political reasons by Harper’s administration as previously explained, illustrates government bias regarding the third sector. Another example is the federal environment minister’s 2012 criticism of environmental organizations (who were opposed to Alberta oil sands extraction and the construction of pipelines) for being “foreign funded.” In 2020, the provincial government of Alberta also accused environmental organizations of attacking Alberta’s oil and gas industry, and appointed an independent commissioner to investigate so-called “foreign-funded campaigns targeting Alberta’s oil industry” (Allan, 2021).

These conflicts point to underlying tensions about the advocacy role that is played by voluntary organizations, and to an unsettling trend of stifling comments from voluntary organizations that are critical of government policies. Although there have been pressures to de-politicize voluntary organizations as part of a broader transition towards neoliberal governance in Canada, the day-to-day interactions of voluntary organizations among themselves and with the state remain very much fraught with politics.

The Voluntary Sector (II): Roles and Functions

Voluntary sector organizations in the post-Second World War era performed a number of key functions within society that stretched beyond the charity role of earlier decades—a role heavily informed by the social and moral regulation of society. This is an important observation to keep in mind when considering how voluntary organizations interact with Indigenous Peoples. As noted in a required reading for this unit, the Canadian Philanthropic sector has “often advanced colonial enterprise at the expense of Indigenous peoples” (Jamieson, 2020, p. 159). That said, the voluntary sector plays four primary roles:

1. Community Service

First, the mandate of contemporary non-profits is “to do good works” to provide service to the community (Cappe, 1999, p. 2). The voluntary sector is engaged in the delivery of a wide variety of services that are both tangible (clothing, shelter, food, training, health) and more intangible (counselling, support, collective worship). While some of the service activities of the sector still fit into a traditional charity model, much of the service provision is offered through grassroots community-based organizations that are close to the concerns and perspectives of the communities they serve.

2. Advocacy

Advocacy is a second area of non-profit activity, which can take a number of forms. These include public education about issues or societal problems, as well as more direct advocacy / lobbying focused on improving the conditions of a particular client group or aimed at laws or policies that are seen as unjust or against the public good. Voluntary sector organizations contribute to an ongoing “public policy dialogue” (Cappe, 1999, p. 2; Phillips, 1995, p. 4). It is important to note, however, that CRA regulations dictate that, for voluntary organizations to qualify to be registered as a charity under the Income Tax Act, they must not devote more than ten percent of their total activities to political advocacy (CRA, 2000). How the CRA enforces this regulation and the manner in which it measures political advocacy is dependent on whether the government of the day sees third sector organizations as a source of policy advice or prefers to confine them to a role of service delivery. Enforcement also reflects whether the government of the day perceives the registered charity as hostile to its policy agenda.

The advocacy role of voluntary sector organizations has been crucial in expanding democracy in the post-war period. Community groups served to facilitate involvement and voice within the political process. During the long post-war boom, a publicly supported advocacy role for voluntary organizations helped to facilitate greater societal inclusion. Of course, powerful interests have also long had their voice expressed through non-profit advocacy organizations. The voluntary sector is in no way isolated from broader social dynamics and power relations.

3. Fostering Social Capital and Social Cohesion

Thirdly, voluntary organizations can often play a “mediation” role within society. That is to say, voluntary organizations can bring people together across the spectrum, such as a geographic area encompassing various neighbourhoods where they are able to work out issues and develop a common understanding, a consensus or compromise (Thayer-Scott, 1997, pp. 46–47). This mediation role is very important to third-sector organizations’ part in the building of social capital and the maintenance of social cohesion. Social capital “refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Voluntary organizations foster the kinds of relationships that enable groups of people to work efficiently together in the pursuit of their shared goals—they contribute to the development of social capital (Maxwell, 1997, p. A25).

Social capital is also closely connected with social cohesion. In fact, social cohesion can be viewed as one of the numerous dimensions of social capital. According to Judith Maxwell, founding President of the Canadian Policy Research Networks,

social cohesion may be defined as involving building shared values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same community (Lahey & Nymark, 1996, p. 44)

Social cohesion is about “how well institutions manage diversity and resolve conflicts by finding mutually satisfactory accommodation” (Murray, 1999, Chapter 3). Conflict is an inevitable fact of life, and societies with strong levels of social cohesion are able to manage these differences. A cohesive society is one where public, private, and voluntary institutions are able to manage conflict, where institutional supports exist to foster inclusion.

An important development of social cohesion is the rise of social entrepreneurship. This approach to economic development prioritizes the benefit to communities over profits in such diverse areas as healthcare and the mitigation of poverty. Companies that embrace social entrepreneurship have a double bottom line: in addition to measuring fiscal performance, they measure the positive social impact. In his 2016 book, An Army of Problem Solvers: Reconciliation and the Solutions Economy, Shaun Loney makes the case that social entrepreneurs are in the best position to solve some of Canada’s most complex and difficult social problems, focusing on development activities within local economies, and in particular, local communities.

4. Building Citizenship

A fourth role of voluntary sector organizations is that they help to build citizenship. Citizenship is ultimately about participation and membership in a community (Barbalet, 1988, p. 2). In the second half of the twentieth century, citizenship came to be defined as social citizenship—that is, the entitlement to basic social and economic rights associated with the welfare state, as well as civil and political rights (O’Connor, 1998, pp. 184–185). Moreover, according to this model, citizenship came to entail more active participation within society. However, it is not clear how racism is accounted for in this model.

In Canada before 1960, for example, in order to become a full citizen within the Canadian state with the right to vote, status Indians were forced to give up their identity as Indians (and therefore abandon their connections to family, community, and social, economic, and cultural activities). Yet, non-Indigenous Canadian citizens who became citizens in other countries were not forced to renounce their Canadian citizenship, nor did the Canadian state force immigrants to Canada to renounce their citizenship nor abandon their cultural identities in another country. Interestingly, shortly after this blatantly racist institutional inequity was addressed, the voluntary sector’s role in building citizenship began to dissipate with the implementation of neoliberal reforms vis-à-vis the welfare state. There has been a shift in emphasis away from the social aspect of citizenship toward individualized notions of citizenship. On the opposite side, Indigenous communities have moved toward restoring a more collective identity, which has materialized in the push for national reports such as the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) or international instruments such as UNDRIP. Thus, the differences between Indigenous communities and the larger Canadian community in which they exist are notable at this juncture; Indigenous communities in Canada and elsewhere are moving toward building collective identities that were assaulted during colonization. One of the recommendations of RCAP is that Indigenous Peoples be recognized as dual citizens, and that Aboriginal nation citizenship be noted on their Canadian passports (see Erasmus & Dussault, 1996, p. 149).

As noted at the outset of this unit, voluntary sector organizations are a central part of civil society. Engagement in civic organizations offers a form of community-based involvement and decision-making that takes us far beyond simply voting in elections (Walzer, 1991, pp. 299–300). In this respect, citizen involvement in civil society is often viewed as the “dynamic side of citizenship” (Marshall, 1994, p. 56). As such, it is critical to fostering the “ties that bind” citizens together.

Conclusion

The contributions of the voluntary sector to citizenship and civil society have not been adequately acknowledged for not only providing services, but as important sources of advice for policy makers and for strengthening the bonds of citizenship. At the same time, the role of this sector in reinforcing state-making forces inherent in colonization due to its exclusive and normative nature is also insufficiently acknowledged. Phillips (2009) explains that there has been an inadequate level of policy discussion in relation to the voluntary sector’s role and importance in Canadian society. Debates at a political level in Canada about the voluntary sector pale in comparison with the ones that have taken place in the United Kingdom, where the voluntary sector has been at the centre of the policy platforms of both the Labour Party, with its “third way” program in the 1990s, and the Conservative Party, with David Cameron’s “Big Society” project. This paucity of policy debate in Canada has meant that many of the challenges facing the voluntary sector—such as funding, complicated regulations, uncertainty about political advocacy, and so on—have not been adequately addressed (Phillips, 2009, pp. 13–20).

Unit 6: Key Concepts

Key Concepts

Note: Many of these key concepts are defined in the course glossary  .

advocacy

charity

civil society

community service

decolonizing philanthropy

government failure

non-profits

social capital

social cohesion

voluntary sector

Unit 6: Study Questions

Study Questions

Once you have completed Unit 6, test the depth of your familiarity with it by answering the following study questions.

1. According to Jamieson (2020), what does it mean to decolonize philanthropy? Provide two examples.

1. What is the third sector? The voluntary sector?

2. What are the roles and functions of the voluntary sector?

3. Explain the major shifts to the relationship between the voluntary sector and the Canadian state since the 1940s.

4. In your opinion, what are the current main challenges of the voluntary sector in Canada?

Unit 7: Overview

Overview

This unit explores the changing nature of the media in Canada and beyond, considering media’s place in the evolving landscape of democratic governance. The seemingly monolithic communications industries, usually called the mass media or old media, which dominated the latter half of the twentieth century, have been challenged by the new media, which has emerged as a result of the internet and the computer applications or websites (or platforms) that enable peer-to-peer communication. This unit examines two interrelated issues that problematize the relationship between media and governance.

New media (or digital media) facilitated the fragmentation of the media landscape by providing a plethora of choices for citizens seeking information from non-traditional sources. Previously, the concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few people suggested that business interests had a decided advantage in influencing public policy and, more importantly, in shaping the pattern of dominant social ideas and values in society—that is, over ideology. While journalists have considerable freedom in liberal democracies, they are still constrained by professional codes of ethics and by the media organizations that employ them. Their work is vetted by editors and others within the organization who must answer to those who own the media outlets. This gatekeeping process stands in sharp contrast to news that is disseminated (and often created) by users of social media. In a new age where the public can access information that anyone can post, what can a consumer do to ensure the accuracy of posted news?

A second important question is whether the new media enhances or derogates democratic governance. The use of social media during the 2010 Arab Spring in the Middle East and the Occupy movement in North America contributed to an optimistic view that new media enhances democratic governance by opening up media to new voices and creating alternative spaces for communication. A decade later it was very apparent these same alternative spaces also create room for those whose apparent purpose is to overthrow democratically elected governments outside of the usual channels of elections. These online spaces can also be used to spread misinformation and hate, in so-called “echo chambers,” which are devoid of alternative viewpoints. The end result is political polarization. Critics such as Gurevitch et al. (2009) anticipated these problems over a decade ago; they worried about the ramifications of the new media for democratic governance, since it contributes to an “absence of socially cross-cutting exchanges of experience, knowledge, and comment”—these being essential to a democratic polis (Gurevitch et al., 2009, p. 170). Given the speed with which communications technology has changed, and continues to change, the political, economic, and social landscape, this unit will not attempt to answer the question of whether or not new media is good for democratic governance. Rather, it confines itself to providing a theoretical and applied introduction to the role of media in both enhancing and inhibiting democratic governance. It also considers how so-called “news” spreads, and what can be done to contain “news” that is inaccurate by accident or by decision.

This unit begins with a discussion of the importance of freedom of speech to democratic governance and some of the theoretical approaches that have informed our understanding of how old media functions. The unit addresses the changing nature of the media and its effects upon democratic governance in Canada. The first two required readings are from two independent newspapers. In the first, Katherine Viner discusses the role of independent media in an ecosystem of private ownership. She provides an overview of the development of the Guardian newspaper as a counterweight in promoting alternative ideological perspectives. In contrast, Derek Fildebrandt of the Western Standard identifies government regulation and grants as the central problem for the independence of the media. Moving from concerns over bias, Christina Nicholson tackles the problem of “fake news.” She explains how individuals scrolling their social media feeds contribute to the proliferation of disinformation and suggests what we can collectively do to stop its spread. Picking up on this theme, Michael Cusumano et al. tackle the thorny problem of free speech and how to contain disinformation and hate speech by examining the possibilities for technology platforms to self-regulate. Finally, Sofiya Noble explains how platform algorithms work, and how they ultimately reify existing power relationships.

Learning Objectives

When you have completed Unit 7, you should be able to achieve the following learning objectives.

1. Discuss the relationship between the old media and the new media, and its impact on governance.

2. Identify the major ideological approaches to understanding the media; explain the central assumptions and how those ideological approaches have shifted over time.

3. Explain the ways in which both old and new media have shaped conventional ideas and values in Canada and beyond.

4. Identify the major filters through which the news passes, and explain their significance for democratic governance.

5. Discuss the consequences of using new media as a primary source of news and its impact on shaping ideas and values.

Required Readings

Viner, K. (2017, December 8). A mission for journalism in a time of crisis  [Audio podcast]. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2017/dec/08/a-mission-for-journalism-in-a-time-of-crisis-podcast

Note: A text version  of this podcast is also available.

Fildebrandt, D. (2020, October 10). How Trudeau bought the media  . Western Standard Online. https://www.westernstandard.news/features/how-trudeau-bought-the-media/article_58fdf7e6-39b9-5e78-a174-4a132b58a767.html [updated 21 April 2022]

Tedx Talks. (2018, Nov. 12). Fake news: It’s your fault. | Christina Nicholson | TEDxBocaRaton  [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRPDwSSjdOM

Cusumano, M. A., Gawer, A., & Yoffie, D. B. (2021). Can self-regulation save digital platforms?  Industrial and Corporate Change 30(5), 1259–1285. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab052

Metis Data Science Training. (2021, February 12). Tech won’t save us: Reimagining digital information for the public | Safiya Noble Ph.D. #DemystifyDS  [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4tRyNiHXgU

Athabasca University Library. (2022, March 16). Internet Searching . https://libguides.athabascau.ca/internetsearching

• Webinar: Critically Evaluating Internet Sources and Workshop Materials

• Evaluating_media_checklist

• Also, check out the blue tabs on the home page of this guide for additional information:

  • “Selecting a Search Tool”

  • “How to Search”

  • “Evaluating Web Information”

  • “Webinars.”

You may wish to take the free AU library course: Search Like a Pro! 

Unit 7: Commentary

Commentary

Ideological Perspectives on the Press

Thus far, this course has explored the relationships between business, government, and the voluntary sectors. Media can be seen as the conduit that circulates ideas and culture between sectors, thus providing the lubricant for good governance and, ultimately, for democracy. The assumption of a “free press,” or freedom of the press as expressed in the Canadian Charter of Rights suggests the free exchange of ideas, which, most importantly, facilitates resistance to abuses of power, including by governments. Freedom is not an absolute right, however: Section 1 of the Charter allows governments to restrict those rights where the restriction can be justified. Given earlier theoretical discussions, it should not come as a surprise that there are starkly contrasting views of the press, the media, and their role in the democratic process.

This unit begins with an examination of the liberal, neoconservative, and neo-Marxist perspectives on media. These perspectives provide a framework for understanding the influence of both old media (e.g., newspapers, radio, and television) and new media (e.g., online news sources, podcasts). The recent emergence of new media is a system disruptor, but it can generally be described as amplifying the central assumptions of each perspective discussed in this section.

Note: The use of “liberal” and “conservative” in theory and practice can cause considerable confusion. When talking about a political party, a capital letter is used: the Conservative Party of Canada, the Liberal Party, etc. When talking about a “liberal” ideology or theoretical perspective, a small “l” is used. Small “l” liberalism refers to the 17th century enlightenment philosophy of John Locke, who is known as the father of liberalism. Other thinkers would build on his ideas to extol the virtues of free market capitalism. When the prefix “neo” is added to an ideology, it means the ideology is the updated, modern version. A quick summary of the trajectory of liberal ideology demonstrates how political and economic theories adapt to changing priorities and circumstances.

After Locke’s liberal free market capitalism became entrenched in Western democracies, it became obvious that there was a role for the state to provide a social safety net for those citizens who, through no fault of their own, were unable to compete in the marketplace (such as children, the elderly, widows, and persons with disabilities). “New” liberalism saw the rapid expansion of the welfare state in the 20th century to provide social safety nets for citizens. Predictably, this expansion of the state created its own sets of problems, causing critics to call for a “roll back” of state interventions. Liberalism thus has evolved over the centuries into the “small state” neoliberalism that is discussed in this course. Lockean liberalism in its original form looked to the free market for liberation from the concentration of power in the hands of the monarchy and the British upper class; neoliberalism looks to the market for liberation from state regulation. Neoliberalism does not, however, recognize that the concentration of power within the capitalist class can create market dysfunctions. While the monarchy is held accountable through the potential for citizen revolt, in the era of globalization, transnational capital has no “home,” thus making it difficult for states to regulate. Because capital can quickly move across state borders, there are very few mechanisms to hold the financial elite accountable. Growing inequality within and among countries has once again seen demands for state intervention to regulate markets and the free flow of capital. Perhaps we will see the emergence of a new-neoliberalism?

Small “c” conservatism (the ideology) refers to traditional values, which in the 17th century referred to the monarchy and class system in the United Kingdom, which were an impediment to the free market. What becomes confusing is that while Conservative parties are neoconservative in that they adhere to traditional, conservative social values, they embrace neoliberalism with respect to economic values. As such, neoconservatives believe in a free market with very little state regulation, while also believing that the state should regulate social matters (e.g., abortion, who is allowed to marry, etc.). Thus, neoconservatism refers to modern conservative thinking that promotes the preservation of traditional social values and the 17th and 18th century ideas of free market capitalism. It should also be noted that, for American neoconservatives, the word “liberal” is a pejorative term (pro-choice, pro-LGBTQ—lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer), so even though they may be “liberal” with respect to economic matters, they reject the liberal moniker.

Neoliberalism refers to the modern-day application of those ideas by Conservative parties in liberal democracies. Small “c” conservatism refers to traditional values, which in the 17th century referred to the monarchy and class system in the United Kingdom that was an impediment to the free market. In the section below, neoconservatism refers to modern conservative thinking that promotes the preservation of traditional social values and the 17th and 18th century ideas of free market capitalism.

The Liberal Perspective

There are various contending perspectives on how “free” our press actually is, and how well the news media performs its democratic mandate. The mainstream liberal perspective holds that the press in Canada is independent and committed to allowing the free flow of ideas so that the truth may be revealed (note again that the small “l” in liberal refers to the ideology, not the Liberal Party of Canada). The arena in which the press in “a free society” operates is thought to be, in short, a neutral zone where information crucial to the good of the public is freely available; where discussion is open and not dominated by powerful groups. That is to say, public debate takes place among equal parties (Curran, 1996, p. 82). News choices, according to the liberal perspective, are based on unbiased professional and objective criteria (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. xi).

Along with established professional standards (including ethical considerations), media separated from government ownership and control ensures that the press can fulfill its democratic function. The liberal ideal is for the press to be a privately owned institution so that it can play its role as a watchdog over government. The assumption is that the primary threats to democracy emanate from the power of the state. So, for example, Ezra Levant, media personality on the far right of the political spectrum, created Rebel News and Western Standard as alternatives to mainstream media. The 2020 news article titled “How Trudeau Bought the Media,” which is required reading for this unit, claims that, through government grants, subsidies, and tax deductions, Justin Trudeau managed to bring nearly the entire Canadian media under government supervision (Fildebrandt, 2020). Consequently, the liberal perspective underplays the dangers that exist to democratic governance from powerful private interests such as big business (Curran, 1996, pp. 83–85), focusing its attention on the power of the state.

The press is sometimes referred to as the “fourth branch of government,” or the “Fourth Estate,” because it addresses the needs of citizens by offering them a forum and the information necessary for engaging in public debate. The press is expected to play the role of disseminator of information about vital government services and about the accomplishments and policies of the government, while at the same time providing opposition parties with a medium in which they can criticize government and offer alternative policies to the public. Moreover, the media is expected to offer commentary on public affairs from a wide array of perspectives, including those of minorities, which might be unpopular. In fact, given the difficulties that opposition parties have often had in presenting an effective and consistent countervailing force to the government of the day, the press has increasingly been viewed as taking on the role of the real “official opposition” to government—of taking up the opposition’s task of keeping the government honest and accountable. Early liberal theorists were of the view that, with the advent of the mass media—first with the mass circulation of daily newspapers, and later with radio and television—the scope of ideas and public discussion would be broadened; that real competition of ideas and vigorous contests between contrasting political perspectives would allow for more democratic decision-making (Babe, 2000, pp. 101–103).

In 1787, Thomas Jefferson expressed his views on the democratic importance of the press: “Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, . . . I should not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter” (as cited in Fotheringham, 1989, p. 58). From this perspective, the press “is billed as one of the great bulwarks of democracy, dedicated to keeping the government honest” (Fotheringham, 1989, p. 58). The investigative journalism that unearthed the 2020 WE charity scandal is just one example of the media exposing potential conflicts of interests and cronyism that cause governments to be scrutinized by the Ethics Commissioner. The fall of American President Richard Nixon as a result of the Watergate scandal, which revealed his administration’s involvement in illegal activities, is perhaps the most widely cited example of the effective political functioning of liberal democratic media.

In summary, the liberal idea of the “pluralistic press” is one that maintains that the press simply reflects the interests of its readers, viewers, and listeners; that it neutrally disseminates information to the public; and that it acts as a watchdog against the abuse of political power by those who occupy positions within the state. In a liberal democracy, the press, and the media more generally, are essential for the effective governance of democratic society. From a liberal perspective, new media is simply another tool in which different perspectives can freely compete in the marketplace of ideas.

The Neoconservative Perspective

Other perspectives on the news media embrace a much more critical point of view. In the 1970s and 1980s, a powerful and influential critique of the role of the media in liberal democracies was launched by the so-called “new right” or neoconservatives. Again, a reminder that the neoconservative perspective can be indistinguishable from the neoliberal approach with respect to economic issues. What follows is the neoconservative perspective on the media, which identifies the primary problem of mainstream media as its co-opting by left-leaning thinkers.

Neoconservative critiques of the press tended to characterize the media as the champion of those on the left of the political spectrum who attack the democratic capitalist system. From this perspective, the press provides an ongoing assault upon the established order. The argument is that the press has become irresponsible; that it has become interested only in challenging authority, in undermining long-established values and institutions, regardless of the consequences for society (Crozier et al., 1975). For neoconservatives, the modern media and especially the press have become too “progressive” in orientation, overly critical of such things as the American policy in Vietnam and policies in the Third World. More generally, it has become too “soft” on the left and is supportive of the interventionist state in areas such as equity and the rights of labour and the poor. The neoconservative perspective on the media in the 1970s and 1980s might be summarized best in the words of Richard Nixon: “The press is the enemy” (as cited in Fotheringham, 1989, p. 198).

For neoconservatives, the question has become whether the media has exceeded its proper boundaries, even to the point of challenging the foundations of democratic institutions, and thus undermining democratic governance. In fact, neoconservatives contend that the liberal capitalist world during the era of the Keynesian welfare state faced nothing less than a “crisis of democracy” caused by the actions of parts of the population who were demanding too much of government—that is, overloading the system with demands and expectations, and thus preventing the proper functioning of the democratic system. Excess demands on government had become the source of both government debt and of problems of excessive government regulation and interference in society. An adversary culture had been generated among intellectuals, students, minorities, women, and progressives of all types; this adversary culture was being spread and promoted by the mass media (Crozier et al., 1975, pp. 6–7, 12; Pharr & Putnam, 2000, pp. xv–xviii). According to the new right, the media constituted a significant part of a “new class,” dubbed the “university-government-media complex,” composed of “special interests,” a progressive left-leaning elite corrupted by the adversary culture, self-possessed, self-interested, and disdainful of authority (McBride & Shields, 1997, p. 29). An example of this outlook is the oft-repeated accusation that “cancel culture” is preventing free speech, and in part explains the repeated attacks of right-leaning politicians on universities and the professors that teach within them.

From the perspective of neoconservatives, new media presents a great opportunity to bypass the gatekeepers of the old media in order to provide alternative viewpoints very quickly. Neoconservative dubbing of mainstream media as producers of “fake news” is emblematic of this change. It is important to recognize that there is a difference between “fake” news that is factually incorrect, and “fake” news that is produced by assembling facts in a manner consistent with a particular perspective that differs from that of the individual consuming the news. While social media has created a space for different perspectives, it has also created a space where propaganda and factually incorrect news circulates through the manipulation of images and the production of opinions masquerading as fact, resulting in the proliferation of, at best, misleading statements or, at worst, outright lies. Both factually incorrect and alternative news are easily created and spread by individuals using social media; it is reproduced quickly by algorithms that feed particular news stories to receptive individuals who, in turn, repost it, triggering yet more algorithmic targeting of other individuals. While Christina Nicholson may overstate the case by claiming “it’s your fault,” every click of a user’s mouse feeds an algorithm that amplifies particular messages. The next section illustrates how media is conceived by some as being crucial to the creation and sustenance of hegemonic thought.

The Neo-Marxist Perspective

The critique of the press offered by neoconservatives raises the question of whether the media is in fact the source of an adversarial culture, and whether it does in fact challenge established order and power in capitalist society. Arguing from the left side of the political spectrum, neo-Marxists answer a definitive no. From their perspective, the media is a significant component of the established system of power, serving to promote the dominant ideology and justifying values and ideas that reinforce the social, economic, and political status quo. To put it plainly, from this perspective, media is always biased in favour of power and money.

John Porter, in his influential The Vertical Mosaic (1965), noted that culture (the ideological system) is absolutely crucial to the maintenance of societal cohesiveness. The dominant values in our system do not appear out of thin air. The press and the media play a central role in promoting some ideas and values over others. The “ideological elite”—in this case the media—legitimizes the existing system of unequally held authority and power (Porter, 1965). In focusing on the mass media, especially the press and broadcasting, Porter identifies three important factors:

1. The media is big business.

1. There is a high degree of corporate concentration (very few corporations own most of the media outlets).

2. In most cases, there is a high degree of cross-ownership or convergence, either between various types of media or with other kinds of businesses.

It is important to keep in mind that the Canadian mass media is one of the most concentrated in the world, as a result of the concentration of ownership among a small number of major companies: Bell Canada Enterprises, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Quebecor, Rogers Communications, Shaw Communications, and Telus Communications (Statista, 2015). The digital age, however, provides consumers with alternative sources of news from independent outlets (such as The Guardian or the Western Standard) that rely primarily on subscriptions for revenue, as opposed to corporate sponsorship through advertising. These outlets are not owned by corporate conglomerates.

According to perspectives such as Porter’s, the mass media is the major societal institution shaping what Curran calls the “main formative conversations of society” (1997, p. 132). The discussion and debate that take place within the public sphere determine the shape of public opinion. From the neo-Marxist viewpoint, the problem is that the media has come to be about making profit, and hence is driven by the logic of the market. The capitalist media have little to do with creating a space for a genuine “pluralistic” public debate about issues and values (Artz, 2003, pp. 16–23). The logic of capitalist markets works against democratic discourse in a number of ways. For one, there is a tendency for media corporations to grow larger and squeeze out competition, hence reducing the diversity of information sources. Moreover, market-driven media is concerned with attracting and entertaining mass audiences, so that other corporations will pay large sums of money to media owners in order to advertise in their medium. This process inevitably results in the oversimplification of news and information programming by focusing on entertainment over substantive analysis. Thus, a reflective and informed discussion of public issues and values becomes seriously compromised (Brownlee, 2005, pp. 44–46; Leys, 1999, pp. 318–323).

These problems are exacerbated by social media and the very powerful tech companies that produce the platforms that allow social media applications to operate. As noted earlier, while algorithms are useful in targeting content, they also continually feed the same types of news to receptive audiences to the exclusion of news that provides different perspectives. This produces an “echo chamber” of ideas that can increase political polarization and online bullying of individuals and groups of individuals. While this might be conceptualized as simply a negative externality of algorithms, algorithms can be used deliberately to create division, as chaos seeds the environment where power functions more freely. Social media giants such as Twitter and Meta (Facebook) were loath to intervene in situations where free speech provided protection for hate speech and other nefarious activities. Eventually, however, the disinformation campaign launched by the Russians in support of the election of President Trump in 2016 forced the hands of social media giants to regulate content. Social media giants were quick to react to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the spread of inflammatory “news” circulated by the Russian government. Cusumano explains the self-regulation model of the internet in the context of previous self-regulatory models in other sectors. One wonders, however, if the editorial role of old media will be replaced by a new form of editorial control embedded in the self-regulation model of new media.

The next section moves from theory to practice; it explores the role media plays in promoting governance.

The Media and Democratic Governance

The right to freedom of expression is a cherished right in liberal democratic nations, including in Canada where this right is entrenched as a fundamental freedom in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, at Section 2 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Nevertheless, at this point in the course, it should be apparent that freedom of expression is in part determined by your social, economic, and political location. For example, consider the so-called “Freedom Convoy” in 2022 that illegally occupied downtown Ottawa and blocked border crossings between Canada and the US, preventing the daily flow of tens of thousands of dollars of goods trade. This protest centred on COVID-19 health measures that protesters felt constricted their freedom of choice. Police used a “hands off” approach, and in the weeks that followed, used remarkable restraint when finally breaking up the occupation and the border blockades. Contrast this to the 2021 Fairy Creek old-growth logging protest in a remote area of British Columbia, where a judge would later deem the aggressive RCMP response to be “unlawful .” It is notable that the Fairy Creek protest leaders were Indigenous, and the protest challenged the activities of one of the most important economic industries in British Columbia. In contrast, Indigenous people and other people of colour were noticeably underrepresented in the so-called Freedom Convoy, which demanded the dissolution of a democratically elected government. Notably, however, while the occupation wreaked havoc on Ottawa residents and small businesses, as well as disrupting trade and supply chains, it did not target any particular industry.

Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms stipulates that one of the fundamental freedoms that Canadians enjoy and have the indisputable right to exercise is the “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.” This includes the right to be misinformed and confused, something that was demonstrated by some Freedom Convoy participants (including the husband of one of the organizers), who claimed they had a “First Amendment Right” to free speech, not realizing that they were referring to the American Constitution which has no jurisdiction in Canada. That said, it is useful to remember that liberty of opinion and freedom of the press are among the defining characteristics of liberal democracies and set countries such as Canada apart from more authoritarian or “closed” societies. The importance of press and media freedom, in terms of democratic function, is so central to “open” societies that they have been referred to as “democracy’s oxygen” (Winter, 1997). Upon more careful consideration, however, larger questions arise, such as What do we actually mean by freedom of the press? And just how free is the press in liberal democratic countries such as Canada?

Although the emergence of the new media has, in some instances, opened up circumscribed spaces for “free” communication in authoritarian states, it must be noted that liberal democracies operate very differently from societies in which little true freedom of expression and opinion exist. As the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Assad regime in Syria demonstrated during the “Arab Spring,” closed societies go to considerable lengths to ensure that the media is heavily controlled, and that the circulation of ideas is strictly limited. This is especially true during times of war; like other authoritarian leaders, the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, shut down social media platforms like Twitter and Meta (Facebook) in order to tightly control what information Russian citizens could access about the war in Ukraine.

Some critics of liberal democracy have gone so far as to contend that, for all intents and purposes, there is no real difference between closed societies and liberal democracies; that freedoms of expression, opinion, and the press in so-called open societies are superficial, or more form than substance. Such a contention, however, is difficult to reconcile with reality. Witness, for example, the fate of dissidents during the uprising that began in 2011 in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria or the fate of anti-war demonstrators in Putin’s Russia during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, to name just two examples from authoritarian regimes. The views of extreme critics of liberal democracy fail to mesh with the perceptions of the media of ordinary citizens in open societies. More significantly, they fail to explain how liberal democracies might actually work to limit which ideas are allowed to circulate and which are not, “so as to determine what can and can’t be said in our society” within the norms of “legitimate” dialogue (Hall, 1986, p. 5).

Technological innovations such as smartphones, social networks, text messaging, and hacking have in some cases rendered it more difficult for authoritarian regimes to crack down on dissent and on the free circulation of ideas. Digital attacks are a new tool to undermine an adversary. For example, a loosely connected group of global hackers named Anonymous claimed to have disabled and hacked the websites of major Russian industries, leaking documents and emails, and showing footage of scenes of missiles killing non-military citizens.

Other authoritarian regimes have also demonstrated resiliency and adaptability in order to remain in power. The outcome of the 2009–2010 Green Revolution—or Twitter Revolution—in Iran affirmed that states with repressive apparatuses had the capacity to adapt to this new context and were not entirely helpless in repressing cyberspace and the “real world.” The coordinated effort of states to limit the fundraising capacity of WikiLeaks in the wake of the release of its Diplomatic Cables was another example of the ability of states to constrain communication (Al-Jazeera English, 2011). These tools are not just confined to authoritarian states. In Canada, the police asked the fundraising site GoFundMe to freeze the 10 million dollars of Freedom Convoy donations because of illegal activities. When fundraising switched to the Christian platform GiveSendGo in the USA, the Ontario government asked and received a court-ordered injunction preventing GiveSendGo from distributing millions of dollars to convoy protests and blockades (Ibrahim, 2022). At the very least, these developments demonstrate that “real world” institutions continue to matter when it comes to the new media and freedom of expression, and that states have an important role in shaping both, despite the seeming “transnationality” or “placelessness” of cyberspace.

Freedom is an abstract concept. As noted earlier, freedoms are never absolute, but are always limited; freedoms are specific to “time, place and history” (Hall, 1986, p. 6). As opposed to the old pre-capitalist feudal order (an order marked by rigid hierarchies where the vast majority of people were formally bound to those above them in social rank), liberal capitalism was able to establish an array of liberties. In particular, citizens were given the right to be “sovereign consumers”—that is, the right to marketplace freedoms—the right to buy or not to buy, to listen or not to listen, to turn on or to turn off (Hall, 1986, pp. 6–8). In the era of the old media, and, as an example, in the case of Canadian national newspapers, the inalienable right to choose between The Globe and Mail and the National Post represented consumer freedom of a type, but it might be said that that is not the kind of freedom “which noticeably expands the mind or diversifies to any significant degree the range of options allowed to circulate publicly” (Hall, 1986, p. 8).

In Rich Media, Poor Democracy (2000), Robert McChesney observes, with reference to old media, that there is a “massive paradox” in the West. At one level, we enjoy enormously rich sources of information from traditional media—for example, the number of channels on cable television. Yet these sources are owned by a small number of global media giants that circulate a limited number of ideas and messages. The result, according to McChesney and others, is a lack of true choice and diversity in the old media, contributing to an alarming state of civic decline and depoliticized society (McChesney, 2000, pp. 17–18).

The advent of the new media in the twenty-first century has expanded the number of sources available to citizens through mediums such as blogs, podcasts, or online news sites. Not only have the new mediums diversified sources, but they also allow more people to intervene in the production of information. For example, old-media mediums such as television and newspapers present closed or complete items of information, which citizens can either receive or reject. New mediums, however—for example, digital texts—allow citizens to act or react to media content; this means that “digital communication” is never complete (Gurevitch et al., 2009, pp. 171). New media also facilitates and increases the capacity for selectivity of media sources, allowing citizens to avoid messages that they may disagree with, thus further individuating citizens into the sovereign consumers referred to previously. This selectivity is acerbated by the algorithms that determine what consumers are exposed to on their news feeds—when users click on a post, the algorithm will find similar posts for their review. These posts are not vetted for accuracy and relevance to the reader: they only respond to a perceived interest of a reader by providing more of the same.

For example, American anti-government and anti-COVID restriction activists were very active in helping their Canadian allies to raise funds for the occupation of Ottawa in the winter of 2022. Canadian participants were mobilized by social media; those who clicked on the copious American social media protest content on social media would be fed more of the same on their social media feeds by algorithms, which determined this content was of interest to them. Because this content is determined by algorithms, it is not vetted for relevance to those who live in countries different from those who created the post. Perhaps this explains why the person offering surety and posting bail for one of the arrested leaders of the Ottawa Occupation framed his argument with reference to the First Amendment of the American Constitution, believing this guaranteed the imprisoned leader’s right to free speech. The presiding judge had to point out to him that because the protest was in Canada, this institutional protection was not applicable. Despite the massive change to how individuals consume news, one should not underestimate the continued influence over public discourse of old-media mediums that still retain important numbers of viewers and readers—for example, television and newspapers (both of which are now available online).

As Gurevitch et al. (2009) explain, technology’s relationship to democracy and freedom is one of ambivalence. Specifically, technologies such as the internet are neither inherently good nor inherently bad for democracy and freedom. They can certainly create new spaces and opportunities for democratizing political action, such as the ones witnessed during the Arab Spring, but they can also reinforce political disengagement or civic decline by highlighting the gap between the interactivity of cyberspace and the seemingly inaccessible and unresponsive “real world” institutions such as the state (Gurevitch et al., 2009, pp. 174–175). It is important, therefore, to study different mediums, as well as the technologies that serve as their platforms, not as entities unto themselves, but rather as a set of actors and / or institutions conditioned by the social contexts in which they operate. Hence, the governance context—whether democratic or not—still matters when it comes to understanding how media operates.

Authors from critical theoretical perspectives such as neo-Marxism would argue that the way in which values, attitudes, and ideas—that is, culture—come to be communicated, developed, and consumed within society is critical because culture helps to structure social relations and determine the patterns of power distribution and conflict within societies (Magder, 1989, p. 278). Ideas and values transmitted through the media help to frame thinking about how the world works. Although, as Winseck (2008) explains, it is difficult to determine the actual extent to which the media influences people’s beliefs, since the connection is mostly anecdotal (p. 44). At the very least, it can be said that the media contributes to our responses to questions such as whether taxes on the wealthy should be increased, or what responsibility the oil sands in Alberta bear for the collapse of the manufacturing sector in southwestern Ontario. Whether we consume old corporate media products or regularly consult alternative media sources on the internet, we absorb ideas that shape the way we think about the world. Nevertheless, it is important to be conscious that not all forms of media are created equally since sources vary in the scale of their diffusion and in their financial resources. A decade ago, it was easier for Bell Canada Enterprises to diffuse information and opinions throughout a large audience than it was for independent bloggers in their basement who are commenting on current affairs. While this is still true to some extent, individuals use social media to create a movement based on a resonating message, which can be picked by and amplified by other people. Often these so-called viral posts and appeals for money are viewed and reposted at a speed beyond the wildest dreams of the original poster. For example, the 2022 Ottawa Occupation discussed earlier raised millions of dollars online in a few days; half of that money came from outside the country (Thompson et al., 2022).

If we believe the old axiom that “knowledge is power,” then the ability of the media and the press to mediate and define the issues that are important and reported in society is a very powerful position indeed. Ideally, the press in a democratic society would have at least two key roles:

1. To provide citizens with accurate information and a wide range of perspectives to allow them to reach sound conclusions.

1. To act as a watchdog in order to ensure that governments “behave” in the public interest.

These roles are dependent on a receptive audience. Just as trust in government has declined over the decades, trust in traditional forms of media (and journalists in particular) has declined as people look to social media for news. New media challenges the central role of traditional media to mediate and define issues; while gatekeepers may be gone, other challenges arise.

New Technologies and Governance

The movement toward e-government—that is, governments’ use of digital technology to communicate and interact with citizens—developed rapidly. New information technology (IT) is being used to disseminate government-related information, to offer services to clients, and as a way for government to connect with citizens and interest groups. For some, the promise of the application of IT to modern governance is that democracy will be greatly strengthened as the barriers between the governors and the governed are overcome by the new means of communication. Two decades ago, e-government enthusiasts projected that the internet would allow for greater citizen participation in decision-making, and thus the emergence of “digital democracy” or “e-democracy” (Hague & Loader, 1999). Some analysts went so far as to say that e-government would contribute to meaningfully reducing the “democratic deficits” in Western societies by re-engaging citizens and increasing trust in government (Lacharite, 2011, p. 1).

Given the 2022 blockade of Ottawa and the ensuing bitter division it created among Canadians, it is arguable that the democratic deficit has improved with increasing e-government initiatives. Canadian governments at all levels have implemented digital technology within their administrative apparatus. However, this effort has been geared more towards improving administrative capacity than engaging citizens in the policy-making and implementation process in order to reduce citizen disengagement. As Lacharite (2011) explains, the early expectations for e-democracy may have been too high with insufficient attention paid to the context in which these initiatives were implemented. For example, such hopes did not take into account the growing supremacy of the executive in Canadian politics wherein members of Cabinet make important decisions and backbencher members of the legislature support the decisions. As well, Parliamentary traditions such as party discipline and cabinet solidarity do not foster direct citizen engagement (Lacharite, 2011, p. 9).

As such, the implementation of technology platforms in government does not inherently lead to an enhancement of democracy through citizen engagement, although it can facilitate administrative efficiency. For example, the implementation of COVID-19 vaccine e-passports was held by some as a significant overreach of government into personal health decisions. The mobilization of citizens against these technology-dependent policies demonstrates how administrative efficiency can morph into concerns about invasive technologies being used to restrict personal freedoms. Again, with respect to democratic governance, the impact of new technologies can only be properly understood with reference to the context in which they are implemented.

Finally, it is important to remember that the realization of a more inclusive “deeper democracy” is likely to continue to be thwarted by the problem of inequitable access to new technologies. Two classes of citizens are being created: those connected to the information highway and those who are not. One of the major challenges for democratic governance in the information age is this “digital divide” between haves and have-nots—a growing source of social exclusion in Canadian society (Lister et al., 2003, pp. 199–200; Smith, 2001). While all levels of government in Canada have worked tirelessly to improve the physical reach of the internet into remote locations, the cost of these technologies to individuals remains a barrier to many, even those who live in densely populated urban areas.

The New Media and the Political Process

One area in which the new media has had a significant impact is in the world of partisan politics. Rare is the politician who does not ensure that they have a significant presence on the web. While Canadian politicians have used social media since the 1990s, the best examples come from the United States. Obama’s grassroots campaign during the 2008 United States presidential election was rooted in social media, which was credited with playing a significant role in fundraising and in mobilizing supporters. As well, his seeming embrace of social media helped to “brand” him positively for “connected” voters (Zavaterro, 2010, p. 123). Eight years later, Donald Trump’s campaign sought to brand him to “disconnected” voters (disconnection being defined as disaffected). Setting himself up as an anti-establishment leader who would crusade against vested interest, Trump famously vowed to “clean the swamp” in Washington in a bid to “Make America Great Again.”

In Canada, blogs, Twitter, and social networks also are used by politicians and commentators. Political blogs occupy an important place in the media for impacting governance, since political blogs can act as a “watchdog” with regard to the way in which the old media covers politics. Nevertheless, there is a lot of cross-pollination between both spheres, since many mainstream journalists have blogs and Twitter accounts. The difference between blogs and micro-blogs—such as Twitter—is that blogs tend to foster interactivity with ongoing conversations, while micro-blogs are more geared toward providing real-time updates (Small, 2011, pp. 873–878). In terms of social networks, several significant campaigns have been organized in Canada, such as the one mobilized against Stephen Harper’s proroguing of Parliament in 2010. More recently, the Occupation of Ottawa and border blockades in Canada quickly spread to countries all over the world. However, the degree to which such campaigns impact “real world” politics remains in question.

Conclusion

This unit has critically assessed the role of media as the lubricant that allows the reporting of current events and the dissemination of analysis to flow among political, social, and economic actors. Quality analysis of governance depends on free speech, but how one analyzes a given event will depend on one’s social and economic location within society. The review of liberal, neoconservative, and neo-Marxist perspectives of the media demonstrates how different actors created narratives in very different ways, based on a particular way of assembling evidence. Different ways of looking at the same “fact” is the essence of critical thinking, something that all students in a social science course such as this should become proficient at doing. It is critical to evaluate the quality of evidence that underscores alternative narratives of the same events. The final section of this unit will provide some insights into how to critically evaluate sources.

Unit 7: How to Critically Assess The Quality of Sources

How to Critically Assess the Quality of Sources

This unit has illustrated the importance of critically analyzing the quality of new sources. The same is true when writing an academic paper for publication or when writing a paper for a class at university. How does one determine the quality of the sources that are used to support an argument?

Papers that are published in academic journals go through rigorous vetting. After the author submits the paper to a journal, the editor identifies experts in the field and asks them to assess whether or not the paper meets the standard for publication. The author and the assessors are unknown to each other; this is referred to as a doubly anonymous peer review that serves to negate the power imbalance when a junior, unknown scholar reviews a paper by a senior scholar with a huge reputation. Typically, assessors not only identify problems but make suggestions as to how to improve the paper. Once the assessments and responses to criticisms have been completed, the paper is published.

Papers that are peer reviewed are evaluated in much the same way a professor grades a term paper. The professor looks at the sources the student used to determine if the paper relies primarily on peer-reviewed sources. If the article is found in an academic journal that is accessed via the Athabasca University Library, there is a good chance that it is peer reviewed and a solid source. If newspaper articles are used, the reader might question whether the media outlet is a well-established, balanced purveyor of news or whether they are known to favour sensationalism over thoughtful analysis. If information from a website, blogs, or podcasts are used, the same can be asked about the organization hosting the site where the information is found.

While it might be a fairly easy task for a professor to assess the quality of sources and their biases, beginning students might find this assessment more challenging. The place to begin is to look for information about the source—an About Us page is typically listed on the horizontal menu at the top of the home page and generally has information about the origins of the organization, its mission, its size and location, the members of its Board of Directors, and the authors of the articles published by the organization.

These types of inquiries don’t take a lot of time, but they can be very revealing. Note also that there are many fact-checking websites that analyze news and grade its veracity. Like any website, before using a fact-checking site, investigate who the authors are and what type of organization it is. These sites try to distinguish between facts, analysis, and opinion. While a fact might be easily verifiable (“a bomb was dropped on an apartment building in Kyiv, Ukraine, causing massive destruction”), the line can blur between analysis (why did this happen?) and opinion (“this was justified because Nazi leaders lived there” versus “this is a war crime”). The English adage “where you stand depends on where you sit” speaks volumes. The Athabasca University Library website has information to assist, and librarians are also a good source of information and assistance.

Return to the two newspaper articles that are required reading for this unit (i.e., Viner, 2017, and Fildebrandt, 2020). Using the techniques described in the previous paragraph, do some research on the media outlets that published the articles. Who are the authors and what biases might they have? Does your research change your perspective on the articles? While all authors are biased, knowing what the bias is assists the reader in parsing out analysis from opinion.

Unit 7: Key Concepts

Key Concepts

Note: Many of these key concepts are defined in the course glossary  .

adversary culture

blogging

concentration of media ownership

cyberspace

democratic deficit

digital divide

e-government

Fourth Estate

freedom of expression

ideological elite

mass media

micro-blogging

new media

old media

pluralistic press

social media

technology

technology platform

web-based campaigning

Unit 7: Study Questions

Study Questions

Once you have completed Unit 7, test the depth of your familiarity with it by answering the following study questions.

1. What are some of the consequences of the emergence of new media on political communications, politicians / governments, and citizens? Overall, is the impact positive or negative?

1. Discuss whether new media has created spheres of communication that are beyond the control of states.

2. What are the consequences of information technology on governance in Canada?

3. How would liberal, neoconservative, and neo-Marxist perspectives address the emergence of new media? Why are these theoretical perspectives still relevant today?

4. Is media ownership the most important factor that influences the trajectory of political discourse in democratic societies? What other factors should be taken into account?

Useful Websites:

The Blogging Tories 

Canadian Association of Black Journalists 

The Canadian Association of Journalists 

Independent Media Centre 

Media Matters for America 

OpenMedia 

Progressive Bloggers