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The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus WINKELMAN, A MINOR , BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND LEGAL GUARDIANS , WINKELMAN ET UX ., ET AL . v.

PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 05–983. Argued February 27, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007 Respondent school district receives federal funds under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Act or IDEA), so it must provide children such as petitioner Winkelmans’ son Jacob a “free appropri- ate public education,” 20 U. S. C. §1400(d)(1)(A), in accordance with an individualized education program (IEP) that the parents, school officials, and others develop as members of the student’s IEP Team. Regarding Jacob’s IEP as deficient, the Winkelmans unsuccessfully appealed through IDEA’s administrative review process. Proceeding without counsel, they then filed a federal-court complaint on their own behalf and on Jacob’s behalf. The District Court granted re- spondent judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit entered an order dismissing the Winkelmans’ subsequent appeal unless they ob- tained an attorney, citing Circuit precedent holding that because the right to a free appropriate public education belongs only to the child, and IDEA does not abrogate the common-law rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from representing minor children, IDEA does not allow nonlawyer parents to proceed pro se in federal court.

Held: 1. IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which are not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but en- compass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their child. Pp. 4–17.

(a) IDEA’s text resolves the question whether parents or only children have rights under the Act. Proper interpretation requires considering the entire statutory scheme. IDEA’s goals include “en- 2 WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST.

Syllabus sur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education” and “that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected,” 20 U. S. C. §§1400(d)(1)(A)–(B), and many of its terms mandate or oth- erwise describe parental involvement. Parents play “a significant role,” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 53, in the development of each child’s IEP, see §§1412(a)(4), 1414(d). They are IEP team members, §1414(d)(1)(B), and their “concerns” “for enhancing [their child’s] edu- cation” must be considered by the team, §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). A State must, moreover, give “any party” who objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the IEP’s construction, or related matter the op- portunity “to present a complaint . . . ,” §1415(b)(6), and engage in an administrative review process that culminates in an “impartial due process hearing,” §1415(f)(1)(A), before a hearing officer. “Any party aggrieved by the [hearing officer’s] findings and decision . . . [has] the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A). A court or hearing officer may require a state agency “to reimburse the parents . . . for the cost of [private school] enroll- ment if . . . the agency had not made a free appropriate public educa- tion available to the child.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). IDEA also governs when and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees, see §1415(i)(3)(B), including an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Pp. 5–9.

(b) These various provisions accord parents independent, en- forceable rights. Parents have enforceable rights at the administra- tive stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal court at the adjudication stage. Respondent argues that parental involve- ment is contemplated only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests, but this view is foreclosed by the Act’s provisions. The grammatical structure of IDEA’s purpose of protecting “the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children,” §1400(d)(1)(B), would make no sense unless “rights” refers to the par- ents’ rights as well as the child’s. Other provisions confirm this view. See, e.g., §1415(a). Even if this Court were inclined to ignore the Act’s plain text and adopt respondent’s countertextual reading, the Court disagrees that sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of par- ents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not novel for parents to have a recognized legal interest in their child’s education and upbringing. The Act’s provisions also contradict the variation on respondent’s argument that parents can be “parties aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s findings and decision relating to certain procedures and reimbursements, but not “parties aggrieved” with regard to any Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 Syllabus challenge not implicating those limited concerns. The IEP proceed- ings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational program. The Act also allows expansive challenge by parents of “any matter” related to the proceedings and requires that administrative resolution be based on whether the child “re- ceived a free appropriate public education,” §§1415(f)(3(E), with judi- cial review to follow. The text and structure of IDEA create in par- ents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by the process but also in the substantive decision to be made. Incongruous results would follow, moreover, were the Court to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to cer- tain nonsubstantive matters. It is difficult to disentangle the Act’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights from its substantive ones, and attempting to do so would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any ex- press guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might differentiate between these matters. This bifurcated regime would also leave some parents without any legal remedy. Pp. 9–16.

(c) Respondent misplaces its reliance on Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___, when it contends that be- cause IDEA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, it must provide clear notice before it can be interpreted to provide independ- ent rights to parents. Arlington held that IDEA had not furnished clear notice before requiring States to reimburse experts’ fees to pre- vailing parties in IDEA actions. However, this case does not invoke Arlington’s rule, for the determination that IDEA gives parents inde- pendent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condi- tion or obligation on States that they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery is not ex- panded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Increased costs borne by States defending against suits brought by nonlawyers do not suffice to invoke Spending Clause con- cerns, particularly in light of provisions in IDEA that empower courts to award attorney’s fees to prevailing educational agencies if a parent files an action for an “improper purpose,” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). Pp. 16–17.

2. The Sixth Circuit erred in dismissing the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Because parents enjoy rights under IDEA, they are entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. In light of this holding, the Court need not reach petitioners’ argument concern- ing whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se. Pp. 17–18.

Reversed and remanded. 4 WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST.

Syllabus K ENNEDY , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and S TEVENS , SOUTER , GINSBURG , BREYER , and A LITO , JJ., joined. S CALIA , J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dis- senting in part, in which T HOMAS , J., joined.