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In a Different Voic e Psychological Theory and Women's Developmen t Carol Gilliga n Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp . 24-39 . In 1914, with his essay "On Narcissism," Freud swallows his distaste at the thought o f "abandoning observation for barren theoretical controversy" and extends his map of th e psychological domain . Tracing the development of the capacity to love, which he equates wit h maturity and psychic health, he locates its origins in the contrast between love for the mother an d love for the self . But in thus dividing the world of love into narcissism and "object" relationships , he finds that while men's development becomes clearer, women's becomes increasingly opaque . The problem arises because the contrast between mother and self yields two different images o f relationships . Relying on the imagery of men's lives in charting the course of human growth , Freud is unable to trace in women the development of relationships, morality, or a clear sense o f self . This difficulty in fitting the logic of his theory to women's experience leads him in the end t o set women apart, marking their relationships, like their sexual life, as "a `dark continent' fo r psychology" (1926, p . 212) .. Thus the problem of interpretation that shadows the understanding of women' s development arises from the differences observed in their experience of relationships . To Freud , though living surrounded by women and otherwise seeing so much and so well, women' s relationships seemed increasingly mysterious, difficult to discern, and hard to describe . While thi s mystery indicates how theory can blind observation, it also suggests that development in women i s masked by a particular conception of human relationships . Since the imagery of relationship s shapes the narrative of human development, the inclusion of women, by changing that imagery , implies a change in the entire account . The shift in imagery that creates the problem in interpreting women's development i s elucidated by the moral judgments of two eleven-year-old children, a boy and a girl, who see, in th e same dilemma, two very different moral problems . While current theory brightly illuminates th e line and the logic of the boy's thought, it casts scant light on that of the girl . The choice of a gir l whose moral judgments elude existing categories of developmental assessment is meant t o highlight the issue of interpretation rather than to exemplify sex differences per se . Adding a ne w line of interpretation, based on the imagery of the girl's thought, makes it possible not only to se e development where previously development was not discerned but also to consider differences i n the understanding of relationships without scaling these differences from better to worse . The two children were in the same sixth-grade class at school and were participants in th e rights and responsibilities study, designed to explore different conceptions of morality and self . Th e sample selected for this study was chosen to focus the variables of gender and age whil e maximizing developmental potential by holding constant, at a high level, the factors of intelligence , education, and social class that have been associated with moral development, at least as measure d by existing scales . The two children in question, Amy and Jake, were both bright and articulate and , at least in their eleven-year-old aspirations, resisted easy categories of sex-role stereotyping, sinc e 1 Amy aspired to become a scientist while Jake preferred English to math . Yet their moral judgment s seem initially to confirm familiar notions about differences between the sexes, suggesting that th e edge girls have on moral development during the early school years gives way at puberty with th e ascendance-of formal logical thought°in boys . ' ° .. °" The dilemma that these eleven-year-olds were asked to resolve was one in the series devise d by Kohlberg to measure moral development in adolescence by presenting a conflict between mora l norms and exploring the logic of its resolution . In this particular dilemma, a man named Hein z considers whether or not to steal a drug which he cannot afford to buy in order to save the life o f his wife . In the standard format of Kohlberg's interviewing procedure, the description of th e dilemma itself — Heinz's predicament, the wife's disease, the druggist's refusal to lower his price — is followed by the question, "Should Heinz steal the drug?" The reasons for and against stealin g are then explored through a series of questions that vary and extend the parameters of the dilemm a in a way designed to reveal the underlying structure of moral thought . Jake, at eleven, is clear from the outset that Heinz should steal the drug . Constructing th e dilemma, as Kohlberg did, as a conflict between the values of property and life, he discerns th e logical priority of life and uses that logic to justify his choice : For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if th e druggist only makes $1,000, he is still going to live, but if Hein z doesn't steal the drug, his wife is going to die .

(Why is life wort h more than money?) Because the druggist can get a thousand dollar s later from rich people with cancer, but Heinz can't get his wife again . (Why not?) Because people are all different and so you couldn't ge t Heinz's wife again . Asked whether Heinz should steal the drug if he does not love his wife, Jake replies that h e should, saying that not only is there "a difference between hating and killing," but also, if Hein z were caught, "the judge would probably think it was the right thing to do ." Asked about the fac t that, in stealing, Heinz would be breaking the law, he says that "the laws have mistakes, and yo u can't go writing up a law for everything that you can imagine .

" Thus, while taking the law into account and recognizing its function in maintaining socia l order (the judge, Jake says, "should give Heinz the lightest possible sentence"), he also sees the la w as man-made and therefore subject to error and change . Yet his judgment that Heinz should stea l the drug, like his view of the law as having mistakes, rests on the assumption of agreement, a societal consensus around moral values that allows one to know and expect others to recogniz e what is "the right thing to do .

" Fascinated by the power of logic, this eleven-year-old boy locates truth in math, which, h e says, is "the only thing that is totally logical ." Considering the moral dilemma to be "sort of like a math problem with humans," he sets it up as an equation and proceeds to work out the solution . Since his solution is rationally derived, he assumes that anyone following reason would arrive a t the same conclusion and thus that a judge would also consider stealing to be the right thing fo r Heinz to do . Yet he is also aware of the limits of logic . Asked whether there is a right answer t o moral problems, Jake replies that "there can only be right and wrong in judgment," since th e parameters of action are variable and complex . Illustrating how actions undertaken with the best o f intentions can eventuate in the most disastrous of consequences, he says, "like if you give an ol d 2 lady your seat on the trolley, if you are in a trolley crash and that seat goes through the window, i t might be that reason that the old lady dies .

" Theories of developmental psychology illuminate well the position of this child, standing a t the juncture' of childhood and .

adole e scence,' at what Piaget describes as .

the pinnacle of childhoo d intelligence, and beginning through thought to discover a wider universe of possibility . Th e moment of preadolescence is caught by the conjunction of formal operational thought with a description of self still anchored in the factual parameters of his childhood world -- his age, hi s town, his father's occupation, the substance of his likes, dislikes, and beliefs . Yet as his self- description radiates the self-confidence of a child who has arrived, in Erikson's terms, at a favorabl e balance of industry over inferiority -- competent, sure of himself ; and knowing well the rules of th e game -- so his emergent capacity for formal thought, his ability to think about thinking and t o reason things out in a logical way, frees him from dependence on authority and allows him to fin d solutions to problems by himself . This emergent autonomy follows the trajectory that Kohlberg's six stages of mora l development trace, a three-level progression from an egocentric understanding of fairness based o n individual need (stages one and two), to a conception of fairness anchored in the share d conventions of societal agreement (stages three and four), and finally to a principled understandin g of fairness that rests on the free-standing logic of equality and reciprocity (stages five and six) . While this boy's judgments at eleven are scored as conventional on Kohlberg's scale, a mixture o f stages three and four, his ability to bring deductive logic to bear on the solution of moral dilemmas , to differentiate morality from law, and to see how laws can be considered to have mistakes point s toward the principled conception of justice that Kohlberg equates with moral maturity . In contrast, Amy's response to the dilemma conveys a very different impression, an imag e of development stunted by a failure of logic, an inability to think for herself . Asked if Heinz shoul d steal the drug, she replies in a way that seems evasive and unsure : Well, I don't think so . I think there might be other ways beside s stealing it, like if he could borrow the money or make a loan o r something, but he really shouldn't steal the drug -- but his wif e shouldn't die either . Asked why he should not steal the drug, she considers neither property nor law but rather the effec t that theft could have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife : If he stole the drug, he might save his wife then, but if he did, h e might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, an d he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good . So, the y should really just talk it out and find some other way to make th e money . Seeing in the dilemma not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships tha t extends over time, Amy envisions the wife's continuing need for her husband and the husband' s continuing concern for his wife and seeks to respond to the druggist's need in a way that woul d sustain rather than sever connection . Just as she ties the wife's survival to the preservation o f relationships, so she considers the value of the wife's life in a context of relationships, saying that i t would be wrong to let her die because, "if she died, it hurts a lot of people and it hurts her ." Sinc e 3 Amy's moral judgment is grounded in the belief that, "if somebody has something that would kee p somebody alive, then it's not right not to give it to them," she considers the problem in the dilemm a to arise not from the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of response . As the-interviewer proceeds .

with-the-series-of questions-that follow from-Kohlberg' s construction of the dilemma, Amy's answers remain essentially unchanged, the various probe s serving neither to elucidate nor to modify her initial response . Whether or not Heinz loves his wife , he still shouldn't steal or let her die ; if it were a stranger dying instead, Amy says that "if th e stranger didn't have anybody near or anyone she knew," then Heinz should try to save her life, bu t he should not steal the drug . But as the interviewer conveys through the repetition of questions tha t the answers she gave were not heard or not right, Amy's confidence begins to diminish, and he r replies become more constrained and unsure . Asked again why Heinz should not steal the drug , she simply repeats, "Because it's not right ." Asked again to explain why, she states again that thef t would not be a good solution, adding lamely, "if he took it, he might not know how to give it to hi s wife, and so his wife might still die ." Failing to see the dilemma as a self-contained problem i n moral logic, she does not discern the internal structure of its resolution ; as she constructs th e problem differently herself, Kohlberg's conception completely evades her . Instead, seeing a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of rules, she finds th e puzzle in the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to respond to the wife . Saying that "it i s not right for someone to die when their life could be saved," she assumes that if the druggist wer e to see the consequences of his refusal to lower his price, he would realize that "he should just giv e it to the wife and then have the husband pay back the money later ." Thus she considers the solutio n to the dilemma to lie in making the wife's condition more salient to the druggist or, that failing, i n appealing to others who are in a position to help . Just as Jake is confident the judge would agree that stealing is the right thing for Heinz t o do, so Amy is confident that, "if Heinz and the druggest had talked it out long enough, they coul d reach something besides stealing ." As he considers the law to "have mistakes," so she sees thi s drama as a mistake, believing that "the world should just share things more and then peopl e wouldn't have to steal ." Both children thus recognize the need for agreement but see it as mediate d in different ways — he impersonally through systems of logic and law, she personally throug h communication in relationship . Just as he relies on the conventions of logic to deduce the solutio n to this dilemma, assuming these conventions to be shared, so she relies on a process o f communication, assuming connection and believing that her voice will be heard . Yet while hi s assumptions about agreement are confirmed by the convergence in logic between his answers an d the questions posed, her assumptions are belied by the failure of communication, the interviewer' s inability to understand her response . Although the frustration of the interview with Amy is apparent in the repetition of question s and its ultimate circularity, the problem of interpretation is focused by the assessment of he r response . When considered in the light of Kohlberg's definition of the stages and sequence o f moral development, her moral judgments appear to be a full stage lower in maturity than those o f the boy . Scored as a mixture of stages two and three, her responses seem to reveal a feeling o f powerlessness in the world, an inability to think systematically about the concepts of morality o r law, a reluctance to challenge authority or to examine the logic of received moral truths, a failur e even to conceive of acting directly to save a life or to consider that such action, if taken, coul d possibly have an effect . As her reliance on relationships seems to reveal a continuing dependenc e 4 and vulnerability, so her belief in communication as the mode through which to resolve mora l dilemmas appears naive and cognitively immature . Yet Amy's description of herself conveys a markedly different impression . Once again, th e hallmarks-of-the preadolescent -child' depict 'a-child-secure-in-her-sense-of herself ;' confident in th e substance of her beliefs, and sure of her ability to do something of value in the world . Describin g herself at eleven as "growing and changing," she says that she "sees some things differently now , just because I know myself really well now, and I know a lot more about the world ." Yet the worl d she knows is a different world from that refracted by Kohlberg's construction of Heinz's dilemma . Her world is a world of relationships and psychological truths where an awaremenss of th e connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a perception of the need for response . Seen in this light, her understanding of morality as arisin g from the recognition of relationship, her belief in communication as the mode of conflict resolution , and her conviction that the solution to the dilemma will follow from its compelling representatio n seem far from naive or cognitively immature . Instead, Amy's judgments contain the insight s central to an ethic of care, just as Jake's judgments reflect the logic of the justice approach . He r incipient awareness of the "method of truth," the central tenet of nonviolent conflict resolution, an d her belief in the restorative activity of care, lead her to see the actors in the dilemma arrayed not a s opponents in a contest of rights but as members of a network of relationships on whos e continuation they all depend . Consequently her solution to the dilemma lies in activating th e network by communication, securing the inclustion of the wife by strengthening rather tha n severing connections . But the different logic of Amy's response calls attention to the interpretation of th e interview itself . Conceived as an interrogation, it appears instead as a dialogue, which takes o n moral dimensions of its own, pertaining to the interviewer's uses of power and to th e manifestations of respect . With the shift in the conception of the interview, it immediatel y becomes clear that the interviewer's problem in understanding Amy's response stems from the fac t that Amy is answering a different question from the one the interviewer thought had been posed . Amy is considering not whether Heinz should act in this situation ("should Heinz steal the drug?" ) but rather how Heinz should act in response to his awareness of his wife's need ("Should Hein z steal the drug?") . The interviewer takes the mode of action for granted, presuming it to be a matte r of fact ; Amy assumes the necessity for action and considers what form it should take . In th e interviewer's failure to imagine a response not dreamt of in Kohlberg's moral philosophy lies th e failure to hear Amy's question and to see the logic in her response, to discern that what appears , from one perspective, to be an evasion of the dilemma signifies in other terms a recognition of th e problem and a search for a more adequate solution . Thus in Heinz's dilemma these two children see two very different moral problems — Jake a conflict between life and property that can be resolved by logical deduction, Amy a fracture o f human relationship that must be mended with its own thread . Asking different questions that aris e from different conceptions of the moral domain, the children arrive at answers that fundamentall y diverge, and the arrangement of these answers as successive stages on a scale of increasing mora l maturity calibrated by the logic of the boy's response misses the different truth revealed in th e judgment of the girl . To the question, "What does he see that she does not?" Kohlberg's theor y provides a ready response, manifest in the scoring of Jake's judgments a full stage higher tha n Amy' s in moral maturity ; to the question, "What does she see that he does not?" Kohlberg's theor y has nothing to say . Since most of her responses fall through the sieve of Kohlberg's scorin g system, her responses appear from his perspective to lie outside the moral domain . 5 Yet just as Jake reveals a sophisticated understanding of the logic of justification, so Am y is equally sophisticated in her understanding of the nature of choice . Recognizing that "if both th e roads went in totally separate ways, if you pick one, you'll never know what would happen if yo u went the other way, ZZ she explains that "that's-the-chance you-have-to take, and like I said, it's jus t really a guess ." To illustrate her point "in a simple way," she describes her choice to spend th e summer at camp :

I will never know what would have happened if I had stayed here , and if something goes wrong at camp, I'll never know if I stayed her e if it would have been better . There's really no way around it becaus e there's no way you can do both at once, so you've got to decide, bu t you'll never know . In this way, these two eleven-year-old children, both highly intelligent and perceptive abou t life, though in different ways, display different modes of moral understanding, different ways o f thinking about conflict and choice . In resolving Heinz's dilemma, Jake relies on theft to avoi d confrontation and turns to the law to mediate the dispute . Transposing a hierarchy of power into a hierarchy of values, he defuses a potentially explosive conflict between people by casting it as a n impersonal conflict of claims . In this way, he abstracts the moral problem from the interpersona l situation, finding in the logic of fairness an objective way to decide who will win the dispute . Bu t this hierarchical ordering, with its imagery of winning and losing and the potential for violenc e which it contains, gives way in Amy's construction of the dilemma to a network of connection, a web of relationships that is sustained by a process of communication . With this shift, the mora l problem changes from one of unfair domination, the imposition of property over life, to one o f unnecessary exclusion, the failure of the druggist to respond to the wife . This shift in the formulation of the moral problem and the concomitant change in th e imagery of relationships appear in the responses of two eight-year-old children Jeffrey and Karen , asked to describe a situation in which they were not sure what was the right thing to do : Jeffre y When I really want to go to my friends an d my mother is cleaning the cellar, I think abou t my friends, and then I think about my mother , and then I think about the right thing to do . (But how do you know it's the right thing t o do?) Because some things go before othe r things . Kare n I have a lot of friends, and I can't always pla y with all of them, so everybody's going t o have to take a turn, because they're all m y friends . But like if someone's all alone, I'l l play with them .

(What kinds of things do yo u think about when you are trying to make tha t decision?) Urn, someone all alone , loneliness . While Jeffrey sets up a hierarchical ordering to resolve a conflict between desire and duty, Kare n describes a network of relationships that includes all of her friends . Both children deal with th e issues of exclusion and priority created by choice, but while Jeffrey thinks about what goes first , Karen focuses on who is left out . The contrasting images of hierarchy and network in children's thinking about moral conflic t and choice illuminate two views of morality which are complementary rather than sequential o r 6 opposed . But this construction of differences goes against the bias of developmental theory towar d ordering differences in a hierarchical mode . The correspondence between the order o f developmental theory and the structure of the boys' thought contrasts with the disparity betwee n existing theory and'the`structure'manifest`in"the thought of the"girls Yet'in neitheryc'omparison doe s one child's judgment appear as a precursor of the other's position . Thus, questions arise concernin g the relation between these perspectives : what is the significance of this difference, and how d o these two modes of thinking connect? These questions are elucidated by considering th e relationship between the eleven-year-old children's understanding of morality and thei r descriptions of themselves : Jake Am y (How would you describe yourself to yourself? ) Perfect . That's my conceited side . What do You mean my character? (What do yo u you want — anyway that I choose to describe think?) Well, I don't know . I'd describ e myself? myself as, well, what do you mean ? (If you had to describe the person you are in a way that you yoursel f would know it was you, what would you say? ) Well, I'd say that I was someone who like s school and studying, and that's what I want t o do with my life . I want to be some kind of a scientist or something, and I want to d o things, and I want to help people . And I thin k that's what kind of person I am, or what kin d of person I try to be . And that's probabl y how I'd describe myself . And I want to d o something to help other people .

(Why i s that?) Well, because I think that this worl d has a lot of problems, and I think tha t everybody should try to help somebody els e in some way, and the way I'm choosing i s through science . I'd start off with eleven years old . Jake [las t name] . I'd have to add that I live in [town] , because that is a big part of me, and also tha t my father is a doctor, because I think tha t does change me a little bit, and that I don' t believe in crime, except for when your nam e is Heinz ; that I think school is boring , because I think that kind of changes you r character a little bit . I don't sort of know ho w to describe myself, because I don't know ho w to read my personality .

(If you had t o describe the way you actually would describ e yourself, what would you say?) I like corn y jokes . I don't really like to get down to work , but I can do all the stuff in school . Ever y single problem that I have seen in school I have been able to do, except for ones that tak e knowledge, and after I do the reading, I hav e been able to do them, but sometimes I don' t want to waste my time on easy homework . And also I'm crazy about sports . I think , unlike a lot of people, that the world still ha s hope .

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. Most people that I know I like, and I have the good life, pretty much as good a s any I have seen, and I am tall for my age . 7 In the voice of the eleven-year-old boy, a familiar form . of self-definition appears , resonating to the inscription of the young Stephen Daedalus in his geography book : "himself, hi s name and where he was," and echoing the descriptions that appear in Our Town, laying out acros s the coordinatesµof'time-and-space a hierarchical order in which-to-define one's'place . Describin g himself as distinct by locating his particular position in the world, Jake sets himself apart from tha t world by his abilities, his beliefs, and his height . Although Amy also enumerates her likes, he r wants, and her beliefs, she locates herself in relation to the world, describing herself throug h actions that bring her into connection with others, elaborating ties through her ability to provid e help . To Jake's ideal of perfection, against which he measures the worth of himself, Am y counterposes an ideal of care, against which she measures the worth of her activity . While sh e places herself in relation to the world and chooses to help others through science, he places th e world in relation to himself as it defines his character, his position, and the quality of his life . The contrast between a self defined through separation and a self delineated throug h connection, between a self measured against an abstract ideal of perfection and a self assesse d through particular activities of care, becomes clearer and the implications of this contrast extend b y considering the different ways these children resolve a conflict between responsibility to others an d responsibility to self . The question about responsibility followed a dilemma posed by a woman' s conflict between her commitments to work and to family relationships . While the details of thi s conflict color the text of Amy's response, Jake abstracts the problem of responsibility from th e context in which it appears, replacing the themes of intimate relationship with his own imagery o f explosive connection :

Jake Am y (When responsibility to oneself and responsibility to others conflict , how should one choose? ) You go about one-fourth to the others and Well, it really depends on the situation . I f three-fourths to yourself you have a responsibility with somebody else , then you should keep it to a certain extent, bu t to the extent that it is really going to hurt yo u or stop you from doing something that yo u really, really want, then I think maybe yo u should put yourself first . But if it is you r responsibility to somebody really close t o you, you've just got to decide in that situatio n which is more important, yourself or tha t person, and like I said, it really depends o n what kind of person you are and how you fee l about the other person or persons involved . ( M T ?

) Because the most important thing in you r decision should be yourself ; don't let yoursel f be guided totally by other people, but yo u have to take them into consideration . So, i f what you want to do is blow yourself up wit h an atom bomb, you should maybe blow Well, like some people put themselves an d things for themselves before they put othe r people, and some people really care abou t other people . Like, I don't think your job i s as important as somebody that you reall y love, like your husband or your parents or a 8 Jake (cont) Amy (cont ) yourself up with a hand grenade because you very close friend . Somebody that you reall y are thinking about your neighbors who would care for – or if it's just your responsibility t o die also . –your-job -or somebody tha t , you barely know , then maybe you go first – but if it' s somebody that you really love and love a s much or even more than you love yourself , you've got to decide what you really lov e more, that person, or that thing, or yourself . (And how do you do that?) Well, you've go t to think about it, and you've got to thin k about both sides, and you've got to thin k which would be better for everybody or bette r for yourself, which is more important, an d which will make everybody happier . Like i f the other people can get somebody else to d o it, whatever it is, or don't really need yo u specifically, maybe it's better to do what yo u want, because the other people will be jus t fine with somebody else so they'll still b e happy, and then you'll be happy too becaus e you'll do what you want . (What does responsibility mean? ) It means pretty much thinking of others when That other people are counting on you to d o I do something, and like if I want to throw a something, and you can't just decide, "Well , rock, not throwing it at a window, because I I'd rather do this or that ." (Are there othe r thought of the people who would have to pay kinds of responsibility?) Well, to yourself .' I f for that window, not doing it just for yourself ; something looks really fun but you might hur t because you have to live with other people yourself doing it because you don't reall y and live with your community, and if you do know how to do it and your friends say , something that hurts them all, a lot of people "Well, come on, you can do it, don't worry, " will end up suffering, and that is sort of the if you're really scared to do it, it's you r wrong thing to do . responsibility to yourself that if you think yo u might hurt yourself ; you shouldn't do it , because you have to take care of yourself an d that's your responsibility to yourself . Again Jake constructs the dilemma as a mathematical equation, deriving a formula tha t guides the solution : one-fourth to others, three-fourths to yourself . Beginning with hi s responsibility to himself ; a responsibility that he takes for granted, he then considers the extent t o which he is responsible to others as well . Proceeding from a premise of separation but recognizing . that "you have to live with other people," he seeks rules to limit interference and thus to minimiz e hurt . Responsibility in his construction pertains to a limitation of action, a restraint of aggression , guided by the recognition that his actions can have effects on others, just as theirs can interfere wit h him . Thus rules, by limiting interference, make life in community safe, protecting autonom y through reciprocity, extending the same consideration to others and self . 9 To the question about conflicting responsibilities, Amy again responds contextually rathe r than categorically, saying "it depends" and indicating how choice would be affected by variation s in character and circumstance . Proceeding from a premise of connection, that "if you have a responsibility with'somebody-else,-you-should keep it," .

she then consider s , the-extent to which sh e has a responsibility to herself Exploring the parameters of separation, she imagines situation s where, by doing what you want, you would avoid hurting yourself or where, in doing so, you woul d not thereby diminish the happiness of others . To her, responsibility signifies response, an extensio n rather than a limitation of action . Thus it connotes an act of care rather than the restraint o f aggression . Again seeking the solution that would be most inclusive of everyone's needs, sh e strives to resolve the dilemma in a way that "will make everybody happier ." Since Jake i s concerned with limiting interference, while Amy focuses on the need for response, for him th e limiting condition is, "Don't let yourself be guided totally by others," but for her it arises whe n "other people are counting on you," in which case "you can't just decide, 'Well, I'd rather do this o r that .' " The interplay between these responses is clear in that she, assuming connection, begins t o explore the parameters of separation, while he, assuming separation, begins to explore th e parameters of connection . But the primacy of separation or connection leads to different images o f self and of relationships . Most striking among these differences is the imagery of violence in the boy's response , depicting a world of dangerous confrontation and explosive connection, where she sees a world o f care and protection, a life lived with others whom "you may love as much or even more than yo u love yourself" Since the conception of morality reflects the understanding of social relationships , this difference in the imagery of relationships gives rise to a change in the moral injunction itself . To Jake, responsibility means not doing what he wants because he is thinking of others ; to Amy, i t means doing what others are counting on her to do regardless of what she herself wants . Bot h children are concerned with avoiding hurt but construe the problem in different ways -- he seein g hurt to arise from the expression of aggression, she from a failure of response . If the trajectory of development were drawn through either of these childrens' responses, i t would trace a correspondingly different path . For Jake, development would entail coming to see th e other as equal to the self and the discovery that equality provides a way of making connection safe . For Amy, development would follow the inclusion of herself in an expanding network o f connection and the discovery that separation can be protective and need not entail isolation . I n view of these different paths of development and particularly of the different ways in which th e experiences of separation and connection are aligned with the voice of the self, the representatio n of the boy's development as the single line of adolescent growth for both sexes creates a continua l problem when it comes to interpreting the development of the girl . Since development has been premised on separation and told as a narrative of faile d relationships -- of pre-Oedipal attachments, Oedipal fantasies, 'preadolescent chumships, an d adolescent loves -- relationships that stand out against a background of separation, onl y successively to erupt and give way to an increasingly emphatic individuation, the development o f girls appears problematic because of the continuity of relationships in their lives . Freud attribute s the turning inward of girls at puberty to an intensification of primary narcissism, signifying a failure of love or "object" relationships . But if this turning inward is construed against a background of continuing connection, it signals a new responsiveness to the self, an expansion o f care rather than a failure of relationship . In this way girls, seen not to fit the categories o f relationships derived from male experience, call attention to the assumptions about relationship s 1 0 that have informed the account of human development by replacing the imagery of explosiv e connection with images of dangerous separation .

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