Speech Communication.....Celebrity Media.......Must read attached reading and answer the question

The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory Author(syf Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke Source: Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, Special Millenium Issue on the State of Sociological Social Psychology (Dec., 2000yf S S 7 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695840 .

Accessed: 08/11/2013 18:45 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp .

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

. American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toSocial Psychology Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Social Psychology Quarterly 2000, Vol. 63, No. 4,284-297 The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory* SHELDON STRYKER Indiana University PETER J. BURKE Washington State University Among the many traditions of research on "identity," two somewhat different yet strongly related strands of identity theory have developed. The first, reflected in the work of Stryker and colleagues, focuses on the linkages of social structures with identi- ties. The second, reflected in the work of Burke and colleagues, focuses on the internal process of self-verification. In the present paper we review each of these strands and then discuss ways in which the two relate to and complement one another Each pro- vides a context for the other: the relation of social structures to identities influences the process of self-verification, while the process of self-verification creates and sustains social structures. The paper concludes with examples of potentially useful applications of identity theory to other arenas of social psychology, and with a discussion of chal- lenges that identity theory must meet to provide a clear understanding of the relation between self and society. The language of "identity" is ubiquitous in contemporary social science, cutting across psychoanalysis, psychology, political science, sociology, and history. The common usage of the term identity, however, belies the consid- erable variability in both its conceptual meanings and its theoretical role. Even when consideration is restricted to sociology and social psychology, variation is still consider- able.' Three relatively distinct usages exist. Some use identity to refer essentially to the culture of a people; indeed they draw no dis- tinction between identity and, for example, ethnicity (see the collected papers in Calhoun 1994yf Thus they obscure the theo- retical purpose of its introduction. Others use identity to refer to common identification with a collectivity or social category, as in social identity theory (Tajfel 1982yf or in con- temporary work on social movements, thus creating a common culture among partici- pants (Snow and Oliver 1995yf Finally, some use the term, as we do in the work underlying this paper, with reference to parts of a self *Send all correspondence to Peter J. Burke, De- partment of Sociology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4020; email: [email protected]. 1 See the extended discussion, most of which lies outside the concerns of this paper, in Cerulo (1997yf or the more limited treatment in Stryker (2000yf composed of the meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically play in highly differentiated contemporary societies. This last usage, of course, is not unique to our prior work. In some ways, it is shared by all who claim Mead (1934yf and symbolic interactionism as important to their intellec- tual heritage, and who recognize the com- plexity of contemporary social life; those who take a situated identity perspective are a case in point (e.g., Alexander and Wiley 1981yf McCall and Simmons (1966yf develop ideas closely related to the earliest published pre- sentation (Stryker 1968yf of the ideas basic to this paper,2 yet different in more than nuance and in approach to theory development. Specifically, the frame within which identity is conceptualized here is shared (for exam- pleyf by affect control theorists and researchers (Heise 1977, 1979; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988yf who are motivated by theoretical problems related 2 Identity theory was first presented at the 1966 meetings of the American Sociological Association. At the end of the presentation, McCall approached Stryker and exclaimed "You've just presented our book!" (The book had not yet appeared.yf Clearly, the fundamental ideas involved were in the air at the time. Not yet in place was a body of research testing and extending these ideas. 284 This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IDENTITY THEORY 285 but not identical to those underlying the pre- sent paper, and by students of multiple roles and identities and their consequences (e.g., Reitzes and Mutran 1995; Thoits 1983; Wiley 1991yf We limit our attention here to the strand of theorizing and research represented by, and developing from, our earlier work. Since 1966, this work has appeared under the label identity theory; in the rest of this paper we retain that usage to simplify presentation. Identity theory has evolved in two some- what different but closely related directions. Both are instantiations of a theoretical and research program labeled structural symbolic interactionism (Stryker 1980yf whose goal is to understand and explain how social struc- tures affect self and how self affects social behaviors. The first aspect, however, concen- trates on examining how social structures affect the structure of self and how structure of the self influences social behavior, whereas the second concentrates on the internal dynamics of self-processes as these affect social behavior. Thus, relatively speaking, the first neglects internal dynamics of self- processes, while the second neglects ways in which external social structures impinge on the internal processes. The first is represented by work of Stryker and colleagues (e.g., Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1982yf the second by work of Burke and colleagues (e.g., Burke 1991; Burke and Reitzes 1991; Burke and Stets 1999yf By explicitly articulat- ing the relation between these two bodies of work, we can refine and expand the scope of the structural symbolic interactionist frame and suggest new applications of the frame and derivative theories. The present paper is directed to these purposes. We begin by presenting the variant of identity theory and related research focusing on links between external social structure and the structure of self; we provide metathe- oretical considerations necessary to under- standing the concepts and propositions. In the next section we present the variant focus- ing on the internal dynamics of self-process- es. We then articulate the two variants. Finally, we discuss extensions and applica- tions of the articulated frame, as well as new questions opened by the articulated frame. EXTERNAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE STRUCTURE OF SELF Identity theory traces its roots to the writings of George Herbert Mead (especially 1934yf which present a framework underwrit- ing the analyses of numerous sociological and social psychological issues. In them- selves,however, they do not present a testable theory of any issue. Many observers believe that this situation is due to the ambiguity of central concepts and to the attendant difficul- ty of operationalizing such concepts (Meltzer 1972; Stryker 1980yf In highly simplified form, Mead's framework asserted a formula: "Society shapes self shapes social behavior." Identity theory began by attempting to speci- fy and make researchable the concepts of "society" and "self" in Mead's frame and to organize these as explanations of specified behaviors; such putative explanations could be tested in systematic empirical research (Stryker 1968yf This specification accepts the utility of Mead's framework, but departs from Mead to adopt a view consistent with contemporary sociologist's imagery: society is seen as a mosaic of relatively durable patterned inter- actions and relationships, differentiated yet organized, embedded in an array of groups, organizations, communities, and institutions, and intersected by crosscutting boundaries of class, ethnicity, age, gender, religion, and other variables. In addition, persons are seen as living their lives in relatively small and specialized networks of social relationships, through roles that support their participation in such networks. The embeddedness of pat- terned interactions and relationships implies a structural symbolic interactionist argu- ment: the probability of entering into the concrete (and discreteyf social networks in which persons live their lives is influenced by larger social structures in which those net- works are embedded. That is, social struc- tures outside given social networks act as boundaries affecting the probability that per- sons will enter those networks. These considerations led to the initial identity theory specification of Mead's for- mula. Mead's "social behavior" became "role choice behavior." The theory sought to answer this quintessential question: Given This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 286 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY situations in which there exist behavioral options aligned with two (or moreyf sets of role expectations attached to two (or moreyf positions in networks of social relationships, why do persons choose one particular course of action? (Stryker 1968,1980yf Acceptance of Mead's "self reflects soci- ety" dictum implies that the self is multifac- eted, made up of interdependent and independent, mutually reinforcing and con- flicting parts. Identity theory thus adopts James' (1890yf vision of persons possessing as many selves as groups of persons with which they interact. To refer to each group-based self, the theorists chose the term identity, asserting that persons have as many identities as distinct networks of relationships in which they occupy positions and play roles. In iden- tity theory usage, social roles are expecta- tions attached to positions occupied in networks of relationships; identities are inter- nalized role expectations. The theory asserts that role choices are a function of identities so conceptualized, and that identities within self are organized in a salience hierarchy reflecting the importance of hierarchy as an organizational principle in society. Identity salience is defined as the proba- bility that an identity will be invoked across a variety of situations, or alternatively across persons in a given situation. Borrowing from cognitive social psychology (Markus 1977yf theorists understand identities as cognitive schemas-internally stored information and meanings serving as frameworks for inter- preting experience. As such, they are cogni- tive bases for defining situations, and they increase sensitivity and receptivity to certain cues for behavior. With self thus specified, identity theorists hypothesized that the high- er the salience of an identity relative to other identities incorporated into the self, the greater the probability of behavioral choices in accord with the expectations attached to that identity.

The building of identity theory also required specification of the concept of "soci- ety." Theorists found that specification in the concept of "commitment." Persons, as stated above, tend to live their lives in relatively small, specialized networks of social relation- ships. Commitment refers to the degree to which persons' relationships to others in their networks depend on possessing a par- ticular identity and role; commitment is mea- surable by the costs of losing meaningful relations to others, should the identity be for- gone. The theory hypothesized that the salience of an identity reflected commitment to the role relationships requiring that identi- ty. Thus we arrive at identity theory's specifi- cation of Mead's formula: commitment shapes identity salience shapes role choice behavior. Various researchers have examined that specification. The general conclusion is that the propositions of identity theory are sup- ported reasonably well. Accomplished research, however, also suggests the need for refinements of concept and measurement for amplifications of the theory. Thus, for example, Stryker and Serpe (1982yf demonstrate that the salience of reli- gious identities predicts time spent in reli- gious activities, and the salience of religious identities is predicted by commitment to role relationships based on religion. Callero (1985yf shows that the salience of a donor identity predicts the frequency of blood donations; he also presents evidence that commitment to others in the blood donor community affects the salience of the donor identity. Nuttbrock and Freudiger (1991yf pro- vide evidence that the salience of the mother identity among first-time mothers explains, (although to a limited degreeyf whether they accept the burdens of motherhood and make sacrifices for their child. The identity theory conceptions of iden- tity and identity salience suggest stability in identities and their salience across time and situations. Such stability is demonstrated by Serpe (1987yf in a longitudinal study of new students who move from home to a universi- ty in a small city. At the same time, Serpe shows that students experience changes in prior commitments by entering new social relationships at the university, and these changes in commitments have the expected effects on the salience of identities. In related research, Serpe and Stryker (1987yf find that on entering the university, students seek new relationships by joining organizations that provide opportunities to behave in accord with highly salient identities held before entrance. When they succeed in This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IDENTITY THEORY 287 doing so, their self-structures remain stable; changes in the salience of their identities occur when they are unable to find or use such opportunities.

INTERNAL MECHANISMS Identity theory began with questions about the origins of differential salience of identities in persons' self-structures and why identity salience may change over time (e.g., Stryker 1968; Wells and Stryker 1988yf These questions led to the development of theory concerning ways in which people are tied into social structure and the consequences of these ties for their identities. The theory then asserted a link between identity salience and behaviors tied to roles underlying the identi- ties; theorists argue that expectations attached to roles were internalized and acted out. This last link, later strengthened by con- ceptualizing identities as cognitive schemas (Stryker and Serpe 1994yf remained theoreti- cally underdeveloped. Another side to the study of identities remained, one concerning the nature of identities and how they operate within the contexts in which they are held. The problem required a clearer under- standing of the way in which identities pro- duced behaviors expressing the identities. The solution was based on the traditional symbolic interactionist ideas that identities are self-meanings and that self-meanings develop in the context of meanings of roles and counter roles (Burke 1980; Burke and Tully 1977yf From a symbolic interactionist perspective, behaviors also can be character- ized as meaningful; Burke and Reitzes (1981yf proposed that the link between identity and behavior existed in the meanings they shared. Implementation of these ideas required measurement procedures applicable to both identities and behaviors. Burke and Tully (1977yf found these in work by Osgood and colleagues (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957yf who developed the semantic differen- tial measurement procedure reflecting their view of meaning as internal, bipolar respons- es to stimuli. This idea was incorporated into earlier work on self (Schwartz and Stryker 1970yf and is fundamental to the evolution of affect control theory (Heise 1977; Smith- Lovin and Heise 1988yf which also has sym- bolic interactionist roots.3 Burke and Tully (1977yf showed that self-meanings, as reflex- ive responses to self-in-role, could be mea- sured reliably with semantic differential scales. Using the semantic differential to mea- sure college students' identities and behav- iors along the same dimensions, Burke and Reitzes (1981yf found that shared meanings was the link between identity and behavior: identities predicted behavior only when the meaning of the identity corresponded to the meaning of the behavior. For example, stu- dents' self-view as sociable (one dimension of the student identityyf did not predict col- lege plans because sociability and the student identity did not share meaning. In contrast, students' self-views of academic responsibili- ty (another dimension of the student identi- tyyf were a strong predictor of college plans. The question "How do self-meanings relate to meanings of one's behavior?" was elaborated later in a cybernetic model of per- ceptual control based on the work of Powers (1973yf Affect control theory (Heise 1979yf and the models of Carver and Scheier (1990yf developed along similar lines. For identity theory, the model consists of four central components (Burke 1991yf the identity stan- dard, or the set of (culturally prescribedyf meanings held by the individual which define his or her role identity in a situation; The per- son's perceptions of meanings within the sit- uation, matched to the dimensions of meaning in the identity standard; the com- parator or the mechanism that compares the perceived situational meanings with those held in the identity standard; and the individ- ual's behavior or activity, which is a function of the difference between perceptions and standard. Behavior, in this model, is organized to change the situation and hence the perceived self-relevant meanings in order to bring them into agreement with those in the identity standard. Bringing situationally perceived 3 Affect control theory used the semantic differen- tial to measure the meaning of identities along the universal dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity, whereas identity theory chose to measure the meanings of role identities as they related to counter roles in situations. This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 288 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY self-relevant meanings into agreement with the identity standard is self-verification; This is accomplished by altering the current situa- tion or by seeking and creating new situa- tions in which perceived self-relevant meanings match those of the identity stan- dard. This model clarifies several processes, none unique to the model, which now are brought together in a common framework. First, by seeing behavior as a function of the relationship between what a person per- ceives in the situation and the self-meanings held by the individual (Burke 1997; Heise 1979; Stets 1997yf one can view behavior as goal-directed: behavior changes the situation in order to match meanings perceived in the situation with meanings held in the standard. This view gives agency to the individual (Burke and Gray 1999; Tsushima and Burke 1999yf Second, emotion can be incorporated directly into the model, as with affect control theory (Heise 1979yf and self-discrepancy the- ory (Higgins, et al. 1986yf The model views emotion as due in part to the relationship between perceived self-meanings in the situ- ation and the self-definitional meanings held in the identity standard (see Carver and Scheier 1990; Stryker 1987yf A mismatch or increasing an discrepancy (i.e., problems in self-verificationyf results in negative emotion; a match or a decreasing discrepancy (self- verificationyf results in positive emotion (Burke and Stets 1999; Ellestad and Stets 1998; Smith-Lovin 1995; Stets and Tsushima 1999yf For example, Stets and Tsushima (1999yf find that the intensity of anger and how long anger lasts are functions of the kinds of interruptions of the self-verification process. Yet, in addition to emotion and affect as outcomes of self-processes, emotions are rec- ognized as having their own consequences, both directly on the individual who experi- ences them and on others as outward expres- sions of the individual's state. Emotions signal to self and to others what that state is, making the state part of the situation to which all parties, including the self, respond (Frank 1988; Stryker 1987yf For example, Burke and Stets (1999yf find that depression and distress, which result from problems in verifying the spousal identity, lead to reduced commitment to that identity. Scholars expanded the focus on mean- ings to include not only symbolic meanings (as traditionally understood in symbolic interactionismyf but also sign meanings, which are not necessarily shared (Lindesmith and Strauss 1956yf Drawing on the work of Freese (1988yf Freese and Burke (1994yf showed that meaning derived from signs allows one to act on the environment in order to alter the level and flow of resources present in a situation, so as to match standards held in an identity. The inclusion of resources in identity theory allows the theory to take advantage of work on exchange and to tie it into relatively recent emphases on meanings in exchange theory. Such meanings were first introduced by Emerson (1969, 1981yf and later entering into Molm and Cook's (1994yf treatment of exchange theory. As a result, identity theory is able to consider the more mundane expec- tations for a person occupying a role, such as using materials, preparing food, earning a liv- ing, and buying goods and services (Burke 1997yf PUTTING TOGETHER THE TWO STRANDS In this section we move towards integrat- ing the two parts of identity theory: one emphasizes the social structural sources of identity and the relations among identities, and the other focuses on internal, cognitive identity processes. The two meet at behavior that expresses identities, often in interaction with others.4 The former arrives at behavior by moving from social structures to commit- ments to relationships through the conse- quent salience of the identity to behavior. The latter moves from internalized identity standards and perceptions of self-relevant meanings, through a comparison of the two that either verifies the identities or indicates a discrepancy, to behavior that repairs the discrepancy by altering the situation or creat- ing new situations. This description suggests that these lines of theorizing developed independently of 4 McCall and Simmons (1966yf also note the meet- ing of self-processes and social structure in interac- tion. This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IDENTITY THEORY 289 one another. In fact, however, they did not. The structural approach conceived identity in cognitive terms and understood that identi- ties sought confirmation by finding or creat- ing situations in which they could be expressed. The cognitive approach under- stood that identities were embedded in and affected by social structural contexts. Both understood self as partially a structure of multiple identities. Both understood identi- ties as linked to roles and to behavior through meanings. In the first approach, it is argued that salient identities are cognitive schemas affecting how persons define situa- tions and making them more sensitive to cues calling for identity-relevant behavior (Stryker and Serpe 1994yf This argument is given greater force and precision by the argu- ment of the second approach: that the tie between identity and behavior exists in their common meaning (Burke and Reitzes 1981yf One can see the complementary nature of structural and cognitive identity theory by examining how these two emphases fit together. The concept of identity salience implies that persons are more likely to define situations they enter, or in which they find themselves, in ways that make a highly salient identity relevant; this process enables them to enact that identity (Burke and Franzoi 1988yf Situations, however, involve relations to others; the extent to which persons can verify their identities depends on the identi- ties of those others, on how the others respond to identity claims, and on whether behaviors that could alter the situation to align perceptions with standards of self- meanings in fact are viable (Riley and Burke 1995yf Thus, identities may or may not be con- firmed in situationally based interaction. Again, if the identity confirmation process is successful, the salience of the identity will be reinforced; if the process is unsuccessful, the salience of the identity is likely to diminish, perhaps considerably. Relevant to further elaboration of the links between the two parts of identity theory is a view of social structures in which identi- ties exist. Identity theory generally has focused on role identities.5 That term implies 5 Social identity theory, on the other hand, focuses on category-based identities. We discuss the relation a duality. Role is external; it is linked to social positions within the social structure. Identity is internal, consisting of internalized mean- ings and expectations associated with a role. From this perspective, social structure is made up of interconnecting positions and associated roles, each linked through the activities, resources, and meanings that are controlled mutually or sequentially. In addition to the roles themselves, each role or set of roles is embedded in one or more of a variety of groups that provide con- text for the meanings and expectations asso- ciated with the role. Examples include groups and networks, as well as organizations, class- es, unions, and other social units (insofar as these units involve concrete relationships and interactionsyf The structure or connect- edness of the roles and groupings provides the first level of social structures' impact on identities. One component of commitment is the number of others to whom one is connected by possessing a particular identity (Stryker 1980yf This aspect of commitment reflects density of ties, a characteristic of the social structure in which an identity is embedded. Connectedness increases the salience of the identity, making it more likely that the identi- ty will be activated in a given situation: per- sons occupying densely connected positions and holding related roles will have identities associated with those position and roles that are more salient. This increased salience is reflected in role performances that accord more closely with the meanings and expectations attached to that identity. Burke and Reitzes (1991yf found that the ability to predict from identity meanings to performances was greater for those with more strongly committed identi- ties. Students with a more strongly commit- ted student identity work more effectively to verify and maintain that identity-that is, to keep perceptions of self-relevant meanings in the situation in line with self-meanings in their identity standard. Some aspects of social structures, howev- er, are more problematic from the viewpoint of commitment to particular role relation- between identity theory and social identity theory later in this paper. This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 290 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY ships, identities attached to those role rela- tionships, or the potential gap between self- relevant perceptions in situations and identity standards. Persons typically are embedded in multiple role relationships in multiple groups and they hold multiple iden- tities. These multiple roles and multiple iden- tities may reinforce one another, but perhaps more often do not (Reitzes and Mutran 1995; Thoits 1983; Wiley 1991yf When they do not, they introduce identity competition or con- flicts that complicate the reciprocal relation- ships between commitments, identity salience, identity standards, and self-relevant perceptions (Stryker 2000yf If the competing or conflicting identities reflect greatly different commitments and consequently differ greatly in salience, the identity based on greater commitment and higher salience will be reflected (in situations where alternative identities can be invokedyf in the operative identity standard and per- ceived self-meanings. If the pressures of the immediate situation require low commitment and a low identity salience, we expect that a gap between identity standard and perceived self-meanings will lose motivational force, and will become inconsequential for behav- ior. If multiple competing or conflicting iden- tities involve high and roughly equivalent commitments and salience, considerable stress is likely to be generated, and to stall or prevent behavioral repair of a gap between standards and perceived self-meanings (Burke 1991yf The variety of structural locations of identities implies that varying resources will be available for their construction and func- tioning, including achievement of self-verifi- cation (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972; Ridgeway and Berger 1988yf Tsushima and Burke (1999yf distinguished between lower- level identity standards, which pertain to pro- grams of behavior, and higher-level identity standards, which pertain to general principles and values guiding the lower-level standards for behavior. They found that mothers pos- sessing fewer resources (with less income or education, or unmarriedyf had less well-devel- oped higher-level identity standards. Further, mothers without such standards encountered more problems of control and confrontation regarding their children, and suffered feel- ings of lower self-worth and efficacy. In addi- tion, these mothers tended to use child-rear- ing practices that led to children's failure to develop higher-level identity standards. While the above concerns the influence of social structure on identities, some research is beginning to show how social structures depend on the functioning of iden- tities. Burke and Stets (1999yf present evi- dence that when several persons interacting in a common situation mutually verify the identities held by each, their commitment to one another increases. Further, they begin to view themselves as a group-that is, as a new social structure. Alternatively, when persons interacting in a common situation have diffi- culties in verifying their identities, existing ties are broken and structures dissolve. For example, Cast and Burke (1999yf have shown that divorce is more likely when the hus- bands' and wives' spousal identities are not verified. APPLICATIONS AND NEXT CHALLENGES Applications Identity theory has the potential to illu- minate a wide range of sociological and social psychological arenas and issues; we have already suggested some of these. Here we focus on two opportunities for the applica- tion of identity theory concepts and models, which have remained relatively unexploited until now.

Opportunities inherent in the "multiple identities" conceptualization of self Sociology has long conceptualized persons as occupy- ing multiple positions in organized sets of social relationships, and as playing out the diverse roles associated with those multiple positions (Linton 1936; Merton 1957; Parsons 1949; Turner 1978yf The related idea that these diverse roles can present competing or conflicting expectations for persons' behav- ior is widely understood and has entered much sociological and social psychological theory and research (Gross, McEachern, and Mason 1958; Hill 1949; Stryker and Statham 1985yf More recently these ideas have been displayed quite prominently in literature on working women's conflicts and dilemmas concerning role demands of work and of fam- This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IDENTITY THEORY 291 ily (Thoits 1987yf Earlier, scholars addressed related themes regarding the existence and consequences of status inconsistency (Jackson and Burke 1965; Lenski 1954; Stryker and Macke 1978yf Yet, conceptualizations of persons as occupying multiple statuses or multiple social positions with divergent role expectations do not fully incorporate or anticipate a "multi- ple identities" conception of self, nor the the- oretical and research possibilities inherent in such conceptualizations. These require the internalization of role-related expectations and their ordering in a hierarchy of salience. They also require the filtering of identity standards through perceptions relevant to the self; the existence of such perceptions is one compelling reason why identity and identity salience cannot simply be inferred from social locations. In brief, the identity-theoretic model is different from role-conflict and status incon- sistency models and opens up different opportunities than do those models. The pos- sibilities of this model are exhibited in recent work on gender-related topics (Simon 1995; Stets 1995a, 1995b; Thoits 1986yf Ever here, however, the opportunities are not exploited thoroughly, in part because of limitations in current measurement approaches to multiple identities. To visualize those opportunities, we review a recent attempt to apply identity the- ory to theorizing and research on social movements (Stryker 2000yf As noted earlier, students of social movements recently have borrowed from social identity theory the concept of identity as identification with a social category (Tajfel 1982yf This concept, and the concept of collective identity as a cul- tural emergent from the interaction of social movement members, are keys to the litera- ture on "new social movements" (Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield 1995yf Indeed, some sociological students of movements have used identity theory's concept of identity salience to explain why persons join social movements (McAdam and Paulsen 1993yf None of these efforts, however, adequately treat variations in rates and kinds of move- ment members' participation in movement activities. None deal successfully with ques- tions such as the reasons for variation in members' willingness to contribute money, time, or other resources-including risk of life-to a movement. Such questions can be approached with a conception of self composed of multiple identities tied to participation in networks of social relationships or in groups with poten- tially different agendas and expectations for members, each affected by perceptions rele- vant to the self. This conception visualizes the possibility, even the likelihood, of competi- tion among identities. By recognizing the interplay of multiple identities, an analyst can account for variation in persons' participa- tion in social movements by reference to ways in which commitments and identities reinforce, conflict with, or are independent of one another.

This illustration can be generalized. Any social network or group is likely to contain members (and the larger the network or group, the more likely it is to include such personsyf whose membership in other net- works or groups may create identities that either reinforce or impede various forms of participation. Although this insight is not new, its use has been limited; it could be applied widely not only to spousal and par- ent-child relationships, but also to broader kin, religious, voluntary associational, politi- cal, and any other type of relationship that allows variation in levels or kinds of partici- pation. Amplifying Expectation States Theory and Status Characteristics Theory. Sociological social psychologists currently run the risk-visible in the work of our psy- chological counterparts-of creating numer- ous specialized theories to deal with equally numerous specialized research topics. These theories do not appear to bear much relation- ship to one another. That risk must be avoid- ed if possible; thus the relating of ideas across specialized theoretical and research tradi- tions is valuable. Bringing identity theory into the framework of expectation states the- ory (Berger 1988; Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1995; Ridgeway and Berger 1986yf and status characteristics theory (Berger, et al. 1972; Foschi 1989; Wagner and Berger 1993yf can help clarify central processes emphasized in these theories (see Stets and Burke 1996yf This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 292 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY Within the identity theory formulation, value or worth can be conceived as a cogni- tive attribution made to those resources that allow self-verification. Among the important resources incorporated into participant's identity standards for the accomplishment of a shared goal are the skills and the perfor- mance levels of the participants themselves. Participants may attribute value to the indi- viduals (including themselvesyf who possess these resources, thus according status, respect, and esteem to those individuals (again including themselvesyf Participants who receive status, respect, and esteem from other participants will themselves be aided in the self-verification process. In turn, they are likely to accord status, respect, and esteem to others who help in their own self-verification. Identity theory reinforces the idea that in the absence of specific information about skills and performance levels relevant to the task, participants in a group that seeks to solve a collective problem will draw upon cultural memory contained in previous status and esteem allocations to obtain information about possible resources available for the task at hand. In this sense, status, respect, and esteem are symbolic; they represent resources potentially available for successful accomplishment of the task and thus for self- verification (Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway, Johnson, and Diekema 1994yf Manipulation of symbols and resources in order to obtain goals is an important function of identities (Freese and Burke 1994yf In doing this, identities create value; and by cre- ating value, identities can both increase the level of commitment to groups that underlie the identities and increase their salience- that is, the likelihood that these identities will be activated in other situations. Challenges An immediate challenge is entailed in suggesting ways in which the two parts of identity theory are linked. It lies in designing and conducting research examining how commitment to networks of social relation- ships and identity salience affects identity standards and perceptions of self-relevant meanings, and vice versa. Here, however, we are interested in a larger question: What work needs to be done beyond this immedi- ate challenge to extend the range and applic- ability of identity theory? One critical task is to find ways of imple- menting in research designs the conceptual and theoretical insights attached to a view of self as composed of multiple identities.6 There is good reason to believe that the feed- back processes modeled by Burke need to accommodate such multiple identities. We suggest that self-verification processes involving a single identity will themselves be affected by the existence of other identities implicated in self-relevant meanings and/or identity standards.7 Neither social life nor self-cognitions consist of elements complete- ly isolated from one another other than aena- lytically. Certainly there is reason to believe that the postulated links between commitment and identity salience, and between identity salience and role behavior, for a given identi- ty tied to a given network of social relation- ships will be affected by other identities and other group memberships. As suggested ear- lier, however, research to date generally has not faced squarely the implications of the "multiple identities" conceptualization except in the limited case of pairs of conflict- ing identities such as of spouse and labor force participant. In such a case, oppositional role expectations, identity standards, and per- ceptions of self-relevant meanings can be ascertained fairly readily. The reason is so is obvious: the greater the number of related identities, the greater the difficulty of dealing simultaneously with relationships among them. There is no clear way of attacking the issue at hand. Perhaps this issue could be handled by adapting the Burke and Reitzes (1981yf technique of estab- lishing commonality of meanings of identity and behavior to establish commonality of meanings among large(ryf numbers of identi- ties.8 Or perhaps this challenge could be met 6 Again, one must keep in mind that "multiple iden- tities" is not equivalent to "multiple roles." 7 This iS one area in which Burke's (1997yf simula- tion of network exchange with an identity theory model needed further development to match some empirical outcomes. 8 Stets (1995byf suggested linking identities through shared meanings. This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IDENTITY THEORY 293 by following the procedures adopted in expectation states theory to combine the sta- tus implications of multiple status character- istics (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980yf A second critical challenge is to develop measures of identity meanings and identity salience that are independent of self-reports and that can be utilized in nonexperimental research. Given the conceptions of identity and identity salience as cognitive schemas, as well as contemporary interactive computer- based interviewing technology, we envision an interesting possibility: the use of priming procedures and response latency measures common in experimental cognitive social psychological research to measure both the existence and the salience of identities (Baldwin 1994; Fazio, et al. 1982; Higgins, Strauman, and Klein 1986; Markus and Wurf 1987yf Cognitive schemas enhance the speed and accuracy of recognizing stimuli related to the schemas (relative to unrelated stimuliyf as well as increasing storage and recall of these cues; it can be argued that greater respon- siveness to identity-related cues increases the likelihood that identity-relevant behavior will be enacted-that is, that latency is a direct measure of identity salience. Again, given contemporary technology, we see no great difficulty either in presenting verbal or pictorial cues related and unrelated to identities, or in measuring intervals between exposure to cues and recognition of cues. In addition, by using similar procedures and requiring rapid evaluation of identity- related cues as affectively positive or nega- tive, we can obtain a measure of the psychological centrality or importance (Rosenberg 1979yf of an identity, which mea- sure is accomplished in a manner that avoids self-reports and that is independent of identi- ty salience.

Another challenge lies in developing a clearer and more complete understanding of different bases of identity. Social identity the- ory has focused on category-based identities (e.g., black or white, Christian or Jewyf identi- ty theory has focused primarily on role-based identities (e.g., parent or child, teacher or stu- dentyf To some extent, both have discussed person-based identities such as dominance, honesty, or perseverance. It may be that each basis of identity has stronger or weaker ties to various psychological outcomes. A princi- pal outcome of category-based identities, for example, may be self-esteem or the lack thereof, depending on whether the category is valued positively or negatively by the per- son or by others in the person's environment. Self-efficacy especially may reflect successful role performance and the approbation of role partners; feelings of authenticity may result from the ability to verify personal iden- tities across roles and situations. A further, critical challenge lies in the need to detail more explicitly how emotions fit into the framework of identity theory. The resources for meeting this need are diverse: they include Cooley's (1902yf distinction between the more biologically based emo- tions and the more socially based sentiments; Goffman's (1959yf ideas regarding the cen- trality of self in the production of sentiments; Kemper's (1991yf structural theory arguing the emotional consequences of changes in persons' changes in power and status posi- tions in social structure; and the modeling of the role of sentiments in the management of identity meanings in affect control theory (Smith-Lovin 1995yf Relevant to this challenge is the work of Higgins, Bond, et al. (1986yf showing that dif- ferent types of identity standards lead to dif- ferent types of emotional response when self-verification fails. This resarch focuses on failures to meet standards composed of oth- ers' expectations of what one ought to do, which result in anxiety, and failures to meet self-generated ideal standards, which result in depression. Perhaps other types of identity standards can be distinguished, implicating other kinds of emotional responses. Researchers should explore the emo- tional consequences of failures in self-verifi- cation in relation to various other dimensions of identity standards-public and private, individual and group, supervised and unsu- pervised, practiced and new, higher and lower in the identity hierarchy. Certainly, too, the other side of the self-verification and emo- tional response needs to be explored. What are the emotional products of successful ver- ification of self-standards? Is it necessarily and generally correct to assume that self-ver- ification produces positive affect? This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 294 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY Finally, Stryker (1987yf has proposed that emotional outbursts during social interaction can serve as surprise signals, to the self, of the previously unrrecognized salience of identi- ties underlying the interaction. Yet, we need to explore more generally and more fully the implications of a wide variety of emotions and their expression for commitment, salience, self-verification, and the buffering of stress. We believe that the great variety of ideas about emotion implicated in the fore- going discussion can be integrated into an identity theory that includes both social structural and internal self-processes. Working on the premise that this belief is sound, whether or not it is, promises to deep- en understandings of both self-processes and emotional responses and to clarify how they relate to one another. Much work remains to be done in the next millennium to meet these challenges, and by doing so to bring us closer to complet- ing the task begun by Mead (1934yf providing a clear understanding of the reciprocal rela- tionships between self and society. REFERENCES Alexander, C. Norman and Mary Glenn Wiley. 1981. "Situated Activity and Identity Formation." Pp. 269-89 in Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives, edited by Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner. New York: Basic Books. Baldwin, Mark W. 1994. "Primed Relational Schemas as a Source of Self-Evaluative Reactions." Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 13:380-403. Berger, Joseph. 1988. "Directions in Expectation States Research." Pp. 450-74 in Status Generalization: New Theory and Research, edited by Murray Webster, Jr., Martha Foschi, et al. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1972. "Status Characteristics and Social Interaction." American Sociological Review 37:241-55. Berger, Joseph, Susan J. Rosenholtz, and Morris Zelditch. 1980. "Status Organizing Processes." Annual Review of Sociology 6:479-508. Burke, Peter J. 1980. "The Self: Measurement Implications From a Symbolic Interactionist Perspective." Social Psychology Quarterly 43:18-29. * 1991. "Identity Processes and Social Stress." American Sociological Review 56:836-49. * 1997. "An Identity Model for Network Exchange." American Sociological Review 62:134-50. Burke, Peter J. and Stephen L. Franzoi. 1988. "Studying Situations and Identities Using Experiential Sampling Methodology." American Sociological Review 53:559-68. Burke, Peter J. and Louis N. Gray. 1999. "Where Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking Models Meet." Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 5:75-96. Burke, Peter J. and Donald C. Reitzes. 1981. "The Link Between Identity and Role Performance." Social Psychology Quarterly 44:83-92. 1991. "An Identity Theory Approach to Commitment." Social Psychology Quarterly 54:239-51. Burke, Peter J. and Jan E. Stets. 1999. "Trust and Commitment Through Self-Verification." Social Psychology Quarterly 62:347-66. Burke, Peter J. and Judy Tully. 1977. "The Measurement of Role/Identity." Social Forces 55:881-97. Calhoun, Craig. 1994. Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Callero, Peter L. 1985. "Role-Identity Salience." Social Psychology Quarterly 48:203-14. Carver, Charles S. and Michael F. Scheier. 1990. "Principles of Self-Regulation: Action and Emotion." Pp. 3-52 in Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behavior, Vol. 2, edited by E. Tory Higgins and Richard M. Sorrentino. New York: Guilford Press. Cast, Alicia D. and Peter J. Burke. 1999. "Integrating Self-Esteem into Identity Theory." Presented at the annual meetings of the Pacific Sociological Association, Portland, OR. Cerulo, Karen A. 1997. "Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions." Annual Review of Sociology 23:385-409. Cooley, Charles H. 1902. Human Nature and Social Order. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Ellestad, June and Jan E. Stets. 1998. "Jealousy and Parenting: Predicting Emotions From Identity Theory." Sociological Perspectives 41:639-68. Emerson, Richard M. 1969. "Operant Psychology and Exchange Theory." Pp. 379-405 in Behavioral Sociology, edited by Robert L. Burgess and Don Bushell Jr. New York: Columbia University Press. 1981. "Social Exchange Theory." Pp. 30-65 in Social Psychology: Sociological This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IDENTITY THEORY 295 Perspectives, edited by Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner. New York: Basic Books. Fazio, Russell H., J. Chen, E.C. McDonal, and Steven J. Sherman. 1982. "Attitude Accessibility, Attitude-Behavior Consistency, and the Strength of the Object- Evaluation Association." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 18:339-57. Fisek, M. Hamit, Joseph Berger, and Robert Z. Norman. 1995. "Evaluations and the Formation of Expectations." American Journal of Sociology 101:721-46. Foschi, Martha. 1989. "Status Characteristics, Standards, and Attributions." Pp. 58-72 in Sociological Theories in Progress: New Formulations, edited by Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: Norton. Freese, Lee. 1988. "The Very Thought of Resources." Presented at annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta. Freese, Lee and Peter J. Burke. 1994. "Persons, Identities, and Social Interaction." Pp. 1-24 in Advances in Group Processes, vol. 11, edit- ed by Barry Markovsky, Karen Heimer, and Jodi O'Brien. Greenwich, CT: JAI. Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Gross, Neal, Alexander W. McEachern, and Ward S. Mason. 1958. "Role Conflict and Its Resolution." Pp. 447-59 in Readings in Social Psychology, edited by Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley. New York: Henry Holt. Heise, David R. 1977. "Social Action as the Control of Affect." Behavioral Science 22:163-77. 1979. Understanding Events: Affect and the Construction of Social Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Higgins, E. Tory, Ronald N. Bond, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strauman. 1986. "Self- Discrepancies and Emotional Vulnerability How Magnitude, Accessibility, and Type of Discrepancy Influence Affect." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51:5-15. Higgins, E. Tory, Timothy Strauman, and Ruth Klein. 1986. "Standards and the Process of Self-Evaluation: Multiple Affects from Multiple Stages." Pp. 23-63 in Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behavior, edited by Richard M. Sorrentino and E. Tory Higgins. New York: Guilford Press. Hill, Reuben. 1949. Families Under Stress: Adjustment to the Crises of War Separation and Return. New York: Harper. Jackson, Elton F and Peter J. Burke. 1965. "Status and Symptoms of Stress: Additive and Interaction Effects." American Sociological Review 30:556-64. James, William. 1890. Principles of Psychology. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. Kemper, Theodore D. 1991. "Predicting Emotions From Social Relations." Social Psychology Quarterly 54:330-42. Larana, Enrique, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. 1995. New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lenski, Gerhard E. 1954. "Status Crystallization:A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status." American Sociological Review 19:405-13. Lindesmith, Alfred R. and Anselm L. Strauss. 1956. Social Psychology. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. Linton, Ralph. 1936. The Study of Man. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. MacKinnon, Neil J. 1994. Symbolic Interaction as Affect Control. Albany: SUNY Press. Markus, Hazel. 1977. "Self-Schemata and Processing of Information About the Self." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35:63-78. Markus, Hazel and Elissa Wurf. 1987. "The Dynamic Self-Concept: A Social Psychological Perspective." Annual Review of Psychology 38:299-337. McAdam, Doug and Ronnelle Paulsen. 1993. "Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism." American Journal of Sociology 99:640-67. McCall, George J. and J.L. Simmons. 1966. Identities and Interactions. New York: Free Press. Mead, George H. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Meltzer, Bernard N. 1972. "Mead's Social Psychology." Pp. 4-22 in Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology, edited by Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Merton, Robert K. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Molm, Linda D. and Karen S. Cook. 1994. "Social Exchange and Exchange Networks." Pp. 209-35 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by Karen S. Cook, Gary Alan Fine, and James S. House. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Nuttbrock, Larry and Patricia Freudiger. 1991. "Identity Salience and Motherhood: A Test of Stryker's Theory." Social Psychology Quarterly 54:146-57. This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 296 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY Osgood, Charles E., George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum. 1957. The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Parsons, Talcott. 1949. The Structure of Social Action. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Powers, William 1. 1973. Behavior: The Control of Perception. Chicago: Aldine. Reitzes, Donald C. and Elizabeth J. Mutran. 1995. "Multiple Roles and Identities: Factors Influencing Self-Esteem Among Middle- Aged Working Men and Women." Social Psychology Quarterly 57:313-25. Ridgeway, Cecilia L. and Joseph Berger. 1986. "Expectations, Legitimation, and Dominance Behavior in Task Groups." American Sociological Review 51:603-17. 1988. "The Legitimation of Power and Prestige Orders in Task Groups." Pp. 207-31 in Status Generalization: New Theory and Research, edited by Murray Webster, Jr., Martha Foschi, et al. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ridgeway, Cecilia L., Cathryn Johnson, and David Diekema. 1994. "External Status, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Male and Female Groups." Social Forces 72:1051-1077. Riley, Anna and Peter J. Burke. 1995. "Identities and Self-Verification in the Small Group." Social Psychology Quarterly 58:61-73. Rosenberg, Morris. 1979. Conceiving the Self. New York: Basic Books. Schwartz, Michael and Sheldon Stryker. 1970. Deviance, Selves and Others. Washington, DC: American Sociological Association. Serpe, Richard T. 1987. "Stability and Change in Self: A Structural Symbolic Interactionist Explanation." Social Psychology Quarterly 50:44-55. Serpe, Richard T. and Sheldon Stryker. 1987. "The Construction of Self and Reconstruction of Social Relationships." Pp. 41-66 in Advances in Group Processes, edited by Edward Lawler and Barry Markovsky. Greenwich, CT: JAI. Simon, Robin W. 1995. "Gender, Multiple Roles, Role Meaning, and Mental Health." Journal of Health and Social Behavior 36:182-94. Smith-Lovin, Lynn. 1995. "The Sociology of Affect and Emotion." Pp. 118-48 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by Karen S. Cook, Gary Alan Fine, and James S. House. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Smith-Lovin, Lynn and David R. Heise. 1988. Analyzing Social Interaction: Advances in Affect Control Theory. New York: Gordon and Breach. Snow, David A. and Pamela E. Oliver. 1995. "Social Movements and Collective Behavior: Social Psychological Dimensions and Considerations." Pp. 571-600 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by Karen Cook, Gary A. Fine, and James S. House. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Stets, Jan E. 1995a. "Job Autonomy and Control Over One's Spouse: A Compensatory Process." Journal of Health and Social Behavior 36:244-58. * 1995b. "Role Identities and Person Identities: Gender Identity, Mastery Identity, and Controlling One's Partner." Sociological Perspectives 38:129-50. * 1997. "Status and Identity in Marital Interaction." Social Psychology Quarterly 60:185-217. Stets, Jan E. and Peter J. Burke. 1996. "Gender, Control, and Interaction." Social Psychology Quarterly 59:193-220. Stets, Jan E. and Teresa Tsushima. 1999. "Identity Theory, Emotions, and Mental Health." Presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Chicago. Stryker, Sheldon. 1968. "Identity Salience and Role Performance." Journal of Marriage and the Family 4:558-64. 1980. Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin Cummings. 1987. "The Interplay of Affect and Identity: Exploring the Relationships of Social Structure, Social Interaction, Self, and Emotion." Presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Chicago. 2000. "Identity Competition: Key to Differential Social Movement Involve- ment." in Identity, Self, and Social Movements, Pp. 21-40 edited by Sheldon Stryker, Timothy Owens, and Robert White. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Stryker, Sheldon and Anne Macke. 1978. "Status Inconsistency and Role Conflict." Annual Review of Sociology 4:57-90. Stryker, Sheldon and Richard T. Serpe. 1982. "Commitment, Identity Salience, and Role Behavior: A Theory and Research Example." Pp. 199-218 in Personality, Roles, and Social Behavior, edited by William Ickes and Eric S. Knowles. New York: Springer- Verlag. 1994. "Identity Salience and Psychological Centrality: Equivalent, Overlapping, or Complementary Con- cepts?" Social Psychology Quarterly 57:16-35. Stryker, Sheldon and Anne Statham. 1985. "Symbolic Interaction and Role Theory." Pp. 311-78 in Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by Gardner Lindzey and Eliot Aronson. New York: Random House. This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IDENTITY THEORY 297 Tajfel, Henri. 1982. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Thoits, Peggy A. 1983. "Multiple Identities and Psychological Well-Being." American Sociological Review 49:174-87. 1986. "Multiple Identities: Examining Gender and Marital Status Differences in Distress." American Sociological Review 51:259-72. 1987. "Negotiating Rules." Pp. 11-22 in Spouse, Parent, Worker: On Gender and Multiple Roles, edited by Faye J. Crosby. New Haven: Yale University Press. Tsushima, Teresa and Peter J. Burke. 1999. "Levels, Agency, and Control in the Parent Identity." Social Psychology Quarterly 62:173-89. Turner, Ralph. 1978. "The Role and the Person." American Journal of Sociology 84:1-23. Wagner, David G. and Joseph Berger. 1993. "Status Characteristics Theory: The Growth of a Program." Pp. 23-63 in Theoretical Research Programs: Studies in the Growth of Theory, edited by Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., et al. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Wells, L. Edward and Sheldon Stryker. 1988. "Stability and Change in Self Over the Life Course." Pp. 191-229 in Life-Span Development and Behavior, vol. 9, edited by Paul B. Bates, David L. Featherman, and Richard M. Lerner. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Wiley, Mary Glenn. 1991. "Gender, Work, and Stress: The Potential Impact of Role-Identity Salience and Commitment." Sociological Quarterly 32:495-510. Sheldon Stryker, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Indiana University-Bloomington, has long-standing interests in a symbolic interactionist perspective in social psychology emphasizing structural constraints on self and the consequences of self and in the develop- ment and test of Identity Theory, deriving from that perspective. Past editor of Sociometry (now Social Psychology Quarterlyyf and the American Sociological Review, recipient of the ASA's Section on Social Psychology's Cooley-Mead Award for lifetime contribution to social psychology and the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction Mead Award for Lifetime Achievement, his current research, with Richard Serpe and Matthew Hunt, inves- tigates the impact of social structural location on commitments to social relationships. Peter J. Burke is Professor and Research Scientist at Washington State University and Chair of the ASA Social Psychology Section. His current work extends identity theory into areas of emotion, group relations and social learning. Recent publications include "Levels, Agency, and Control in the Parent Identity" (with T Tsushimayf in Social Psychology Quarterly, 1999, "Trust and Commitment in an Identity Verification Context," (with J. Stetsyf in Social Psyc'hology Quarterly, 2000, and "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory" (with J. Stetsyf in Social Psychology Quarterly, 2000. This content downloaded from 128.97.27.21 on Fri, 8 Nov 2013 18:45:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions