Psychology Research Paper

Short Report

Self-memory biases in explicit and incidental encoding

of trait adjectives

David J. Turk *, Sheila J. Cunningham, C. Neil Macrae

School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, King’s College, William Guild Building, Aberdeen, AB24 2UB Scotland, UK

Received 12 July 2007

Available online 18 April 2008

Abstract

An extensive literature has demonstrated that encoding information in a self-referential manner enhances subsequent

memory performance. This ‘self-reference eﬀect’ (i.e., better memory for self-referent than other-referent information) is

generally elicited in paradigms that require participants to evaluate the self-descriptiveness of personality characteristics.

Extending work of this kind, the current research explored the possibility that explicit evaluative processing is not a nec-

essary precondition for the emergence of this eﬀect. Rather, responses to self cues may enhance item encoding even in the

absence of explicit evaluative instructions. We explored this hypothesis by testing memory for items encoded in either an

evaluative or relational context. The relational context was achieved by requesting participants to report the spatial rela-

tionship between target stimuli, and visual or verbal referent cues. The results revealed a self-referent memory advantage,

regardless of the encoding context or triggering cue. The theoretical implications of these ﬁndings are considered.

Keywords:Self; Memory; Self-reference eﬀect; Social cognition

1. Introduction

As the self is a fundamental construct that guides key aspects of behavior (James, 1890; Neisser, 1988), it is

unsurprising that considerable empirical eﬀorts have been expended in attempts to chart the inﬂuence it exerts

on cognition. Much of this work has focused on the manner in which self modulates memory function and has

revealed an important memorial eﬀect. When it comes to recollecting experiences from the past, self-referential

thinking aﬀords material a reliable advantage in memory (Symons & Johnson, 1997). Termed theself-refer-

ence eﬀect(SRE), this memory bias emerges in task contexts in which people link to-be-encoded items with

self through explicit experimental instruction (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). For example, in the standard

self-referencing paradigm, participants are required to report whether personality characteristics are descrip-

tive of self or another person, usually a familiar celebrity (e.g., ‘are you creative?’, ‘is George W. Bush reli-

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.004

*Corresponding author. Fax: +44 (0) 1224 273426.

E-mail address:[email protected](D.J. Turk).

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2008) 1040–1045

Consciousness

and

Cognition

www.elsevier.com/locate/concog able?’). When memory is subsequently tested for the presented items, a recognition (and recall) advantage is

found for material that was encoded with reference to self (i.e., self memory > other memory).

It has been argued that the SRE is underpinned by the enhanced elaboration and organization of material

that is encoded in relation to self (Klein & Loftus, 1988). This process distinguishes self-referential encoding

from other types of associative processing (Keenan, Golding, & Brown, 1992; Rogers et al., 1977; Symons &

Johnson, 1997), perhaps linking the SRE to diﬀerences in depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). How-

ever, recent neuroimaging studies suggest that self-referential mental activity may be functionally distinct from

other-referential processing (seeNorthoﬀ et al., 2006). Speciﬁcally, self-referential processing is associated

with activity in medial prefrontal cortex (Heatherton et al., 2006; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae, Moran, Heath-

erton, Banﬁeld, & Kelley, 2004; Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006). In addition, func-

tional imaging data also speak against the levels of processing account for the memory bias (Kelley et al.,

2002). If the SRE is not a standard depth of processing phenomenon, it may emerge under conditions that

do not necessitate the explicit evaluative appraisal of self-relevant information. That is, self-memory eﬀects

may emerge under encoding conditions in which non-elaborative associations are forged between self and

to-be-processed items. The extant literature focuses largely on encoding contexts in which self-cues are explic-

itly linked with to-be-remembered items, but such directed associations may not be a necessary prerequisite for

enhanced memory. Incidental links between self and stimuli would better reﬂect the incidental, undirected con-

texts in which self and external stimuli become associated in everyday life (seeCloutier & Macrae, 2008; Cunn-

ingham, Turk, MacDonald, & Macrae, 2008). The extent to which self-memory eﬀects might emerge under

such indirect encoding conditions was the subject of the current investigation.

In order to measure the impact of incidental self-referencing, associations between self and information

must be forged in settings that do not demand the explicit appraisal of the self-descriptiveness of material,

or even an explicit link to be formed between self and the to-be-encoded items. Extant research reveals that

attention is automatically oriented self-relevant information such as one’s own name (Bargh, 1982; Gray,

Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Moray, 1959; Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997) or one’s own face

(Tong & Nakayama, 1999; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006). As a result, we propose to utilise names and faces in an

incidental context to activate the self-construct. To assess the conditions under which a self-memory eﬀect may

arise, we compared memory for trait adjectives associated with self through a standard explicit evaluation

task, with similar information encoded in a task that linked self with stimuli in a more incidental manner.

The explicit task involved a standard self-referencing paradigm (Kelley et al., 2002) in which participants rated

the extent to which personality trait adjectives described both self and a familiar other (Angelina Jolie) follow-

ing the presentation of self- and other-referent cues. The incidental task, in contrast, required participants to

report whether trait adjectives appeared above or below self- and other-referent cues. Replicating previous

work of this kind, a standard SRE was expected to emerge under conditions of explicit self-item association

(seeSymons & Johnson, 1997). We also predicted an SRE to emerge under conditions of incidental associa-

tion, although overall memory performance in this perceptual-level task was expected to be lower (seeCraik,

2002; Craik & Lockhart, 1972).

2. Method

2.1. Participants and design

Forty-eight females (mean age 20.7 years, range 18–25 years) took part in the experiment. All participants

were native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Participants gave informed

consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the University of Aberdeen’s Psychology Ethics Committee.

The experiment had a 2 (Target: self or other) 2 (Encoding Condition: Explicit or Incidental) 2 (Cue: face

or name) mixed design, with repeated measures on the ﬁrst factor.

2.2. Procedure and stimulus materials

Each participant was randomly assigned to either the Explicit or Incidental encoding condition and the

face- or name-cued version of the task. All participants completed an encoding and a recognition memory

D.J. Turk et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2008) 1040–10451041 task, both of which were presented on a PC using Superlab experimental software. For the encoding task, each

trial began with a target being presented centrally for 2000 ms (e.g., a face or name). In the face-cue version of

the task, self-referent trials were cued by presentation of a photographic image of the participant’s own face.

For other-referent trials, a photographic image of a sex-congruent familiar other (Hollywood actressAngelina

Jolie) was presented. The images were all 300 300 pixel (resolution 72 dpi) frontal full-face digital photo-

graphs. In the name-cue version of the task, the referent cues comprised the participant’s own full name

for self-referent trials (e.g., ‘Jennifer Smith’) and that ofAngelina Joliefor other-referent trials. Names were

presented centrally in black capital letters (Chicago size 48 font). The self- and other-relevant cues were each

presented 60 times.

Five hundred milliseconds after the onset of the referent cue, a trait word was presented 20 mm either above

or below the name, in red Arial size 48 font. A total of 180 trait words taken fromAnderson’s (1968)set were

used in the experiment. These were divided into three equal lists matched for likeability, meaningfulness,

word-length, and syllabic-length. Traits from two of the lists (i.e., 120 words) were presented in the encoding

phase (one list being paired with self-referent cues and one with other-referent cues), with half of the list items

presented above and half below each referent cue. The third list was retained for use as foils in the subsequent

memory test. The order to which trait lists were assigned to experimental conditions was counterbalanced

across participants.

Although all participants were presented with the same experimental materials, task instructions varied

between experimental conditions. In the explicit encoding condition, participants were asked to decide

whether each trait adjective described the referent person with which it was presented, responding ‘yes’or

‘no’ by means of a keypress. This task replicated standard self-referencing encoding paradigms (e.g.,Kelley

et al., 2002). In contrast, participants in the incidental encoding condition were instructed simply to indicate

whether the trait adjective appeared above the referent cue, again making a ‘yes’or‘no’ response using the

keyboard. Following completion of this task, a surprise memory test was administered in which traits from

all three lists (i.e., two presented in the encoding phase and one previously unseen) were presented in the centre

of the computer screen in black Arial size 48 font. Participants were asked to make ‘Old’or‘New’ judgments

using the keyboard. Following completion of the memory test, participants were thanked, debriefed and

dismissed.

3. Results

Recognition memory data were converted into proportional accuracy scores and corrected for guessing by

subtracting the proportion of false-alarms from the proportion of hits. These data were submitted to a 2 (Tar-

get: self or other) 2 (Encoding Condition: Explicit or Incidental) 2 (Cue: face or name) mixed model anal-

ysis of variance. This analysis revealed the expected main eﬀect of Encoding Condition [F(1, 44) = 101.23,

p< .001], with memory performance being signiﬁcantly higher in the explicit than the incidental encoding con-

dition (Ms: .49vs..19, respectively). A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Target also emerged [F(1, 44) = 38.89,

p< .001], with traits paired with self cues better remembered than those presented with other-referent cues

(Ms: .38vs..29, respectively). There was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of Cue [F(1, 44) = 2.94,ns].

In addition, a signiﬁcant Target Encoding interaction was observed [F(1, 44) = 4.10,p< .05] (seeFig. 1).

Simple main eﬀects analysis revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of encoding condition on both self [F(1, 44) = 85.52,

p< .05], and other [F(1, 44) = 78.89,p< .001] trials, such that memory was better in the explicit than inciden-

tal encoding condition. In addition, an eﬀect of target was observed in both the explicit [F(1, 44) = 34.13,

p< .001] and incidental encoding condition [F(1, 44) = 8.87,p< .005], revealing better memory for items

paired with self than a familiar other. These results demonstrate that although both explicit and incidental

forms of encoding generate a reliable self-memory advantage, the magnitude of this memory bias is larger

under explicit forms of encoding.

4. Discussion

The current results demonstrate that both explicit and incidental associations between self and target stim-

uli can impact on memory performance. Target stimuli presented with self cues were subsequently better

1042D.J. Turk et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2008) 1040–1045 remembered than those presented with other-referent cues, regardless of cue-type (faces or names). This self-

memory eﬀect emerged under standard self-referencing conditions (i.e., when the task required explicit eval-

uation of the trait word in relation to each referent), and also under incidental encoding conditions (i.e., in

which participants reported the spatial relationship between trait adjectives and target cues). Although the

magnitude of the self-memory eﬀect was greater in the explicit encoding condition, the emergence of a signif-

icant incidental self-memory eﬀect is noteworthy because it reveals less direct conditions under which self can

impact on cognition. Despite previous research suggesting that elaborative processing is required to produce a

SRE (Keenan et al., 1992), the present ﬁndings show that incidental pairings between self and target stimuli

are suﬃcient to enhance memory performance.

This incidental self-memory eﬀect is important because it reﬂects the contexts in which self is likely to form

associations with external stimuli in everyday life. Cognitive processing is guided by numerous heuristics that

function to ensure important information (e.g., that which is goal-relevant or danger-signalling) is attended to

and preferentially processed (Folk & Remington, 1998; Lipp & Waters, 2007; Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies,

1948). The current ﬁndings suggest that the mere presence of a self cue is suﬃcient to enhance encoding pro-

ﬁciency. There are clear advantages to such a system being in place, as it increases the likelihood that poten-

tially important self-relevant information is retained.

The emergence of incidental self-memory eﬀects points to inherent diﬀerences in the encoding of self- and

other-relevant stimuli. One intuitive quality of self that might account for observed memory biases is its high

level of aﬀective importance (Bargh, 1982; Zajonc, 1980). Self is associated with positive aﬀect, as demon-

strated by such phenomena as the various self-serving biases that pervade social perception (e.g.,Bradley,

1978; Klein, 2001; Miller & Ross, 1975) and the endowment of self-relevant objects with positive value (Kahn-

eman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Knetsch & Sinden, 1984). These aﬀective processing biases are paralleled by

autonomic arousal to self-relevant stimuli, including increased galvanic skin response (GSR) in response to

mirror reﬂections of self (Williams, Diehl, & Mahoney, 2002), and with activity in the neural systems associ-

ated with aﬀective processing of self cues (Kircher et al., 2000; Kircher et al., 2001). Such aﬀective responses

enhance encoding by aﬀecting limbic system neurobiology, increasing amygdala activity and hippocampal

functioning (McGaugh, 2004, 2006). This may therefore provide a possible route through which the presen-

tation of incidental self cues might impact on memory performance. It may also account for attenuation of the

memory bias when self is contrasted with persons that evoke a similarly high aﬀective response (e.g.,mother—

Bower & Gilligan, 1979).

The attentional capture associated with self cues presentation (e.g.,Bargh, 1982; Bre´

dart, Delchambre, &

Laureys, 2006; Geller & Shaver, 1976; Gray et al., 2004; Moray, 1959; Shapiro et al., 1997) is also likely to be

Fig. 1. Face-cued self-memory eﬀects under explicit and incidental self-association conditions. The graph shows a signiﬁcant

Encoding Target interaction. Error bars represent one standard error from the mean.D.J. Turk et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2008) 1040–10451043 relevant to self-memory biases. As with arousal responses, an increase in attentional focus elicited by self cues

should enhance encoding proﬁciency. Indeed, the two may be intrinsically interrelated, with fast aﬀective

responses triggering attentional capture. In combination, we suggest that they create an enhanced encoding

context that can account for the incidental self-memory eﬀects found in the current study. Future research

should therefore attempt to explore the importance of aﬀective and attentional processes in self-referential

encoding and memory.

The existence of incidental self-memory eﬀects raises the intriguing possibility that the standard SRE

emerging from explicit evaluation tasks reﬂects a similar autonomic encoding enhancement, as well as the

elaborative enriching of self-relevant material proposed elsewhere (seeKlein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & John-

son, 1997). This reasoning is consistent withKelley et al.’s (2002)argument that the encoding of self-relevant

information is not just ‘deeper’ but is functionally distinct from other-referent processing. However, it is also

possible that explicit and incidental self-memory biases comprise two completely separate channels through

which self impacts on cognition. After all, several functionally distinct systems specialised for self-processing

have been identiﬁed (seeBoyer, Robbins, & Jack, 2005), from sensory feedback systems (Blakemore, Wolpert,

& Frith, 2002) and perceptual biases (Tong & Nakayama, 1999) to higher-order social cognition heuristics (see

Fiske & Taylor, 1991). A third possibility is participants in the incidental encoding condition engaged in spon-

taneous evaluative processing, rendering the incidental and evaluative self encoding tasks indistinguishable.

While these participants’ relatively poor memory performance, as well as their post-test debrieﬁng reports,

belie this explanation it cannot be excluded in the current design. The extent to which disparate or overlapping

self-systems contribute to explicit and incidental self-memory eﬀects remains an open question, towards which

functional neuroimaging techniques may provide the best route for future research.

Notwithstanding this unresolved issue, what can be concluded from the current inquiry is that when it

comes to memory enhancement, the self does not need directed evaluative processing; simple incidental pre-

sentation will suﬃce. Thus, the incidental self-memory eﬀect exempliﬁes the fundamental importance of self in

everyday cognition (James, 1890; Neisser, 1988). As self encounters incoming stimuli and information, it must

identify that which is of potential relevance. Enhanced encoding of stimuli associated even incidentally with

self constitutes one method of ensuring that potentially important information is retained. The incidental self-

memory eﬀect is in this sense a typical product of the biases that ensure cognitive processing remains ‘‘a ser-

vant of one’s interests, needs and values”(Postman et al., 1948, p. 142).

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