Case Brief Assignment

1 (Slip Opin ion) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s NOTE: Wh ere it i s feas ible, a s yllab us (head note) wil l be rel eased, as is bein g done in con necti on with this cas e, at the ti me the op inion is issued. The syllabu s con stitu tes no part of the opinion of the Court bu t h as be en pre pare d by the Re porter of Decisions for the conveni ence of t he reade r. See United States v. Detr oit Timbe r & Lumb er Co., 200 U. S . 321, 337 . SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES Sy llabu s SAFF OR D UNIFIED S CHOO L DI STRICT #1 ET AL . v.

REDDING CERTIORA RI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 08–4 79. Ar gued Apr il 21, 200 9—Dec ided Ju ne 25, 200 9 After es cort ing 1 3-yea r-old S avana R edding from he r m iddle s chool classr oom to h is offic e, Assi stan t Pr incipal Wilson sh ow ed h er a day plan ner contain ing kn ives an d oth er contraban d. Sh e admitte d own - ing the pla nner, b ut s aid tha t she ha d lent it to her friend Ma ris sa an d th at th e c ontraban d was n ot h ers. He th en pr odu ced four pr e- scription-strength, and one over-the-c ount er, pain relief pill s, a ll o f which are banned under s chool rule s w ithou t adv ance per mission . She denied knowledge of the m, but W ilson said that he had a report that she was giving pills to f ellow st udent s. She denied it and agreed to let h im sear ch her belon gings. He an d Helen Romer o, an admin is- trativ e as sista nt, sear ched Sav ana’s bac kp ack, fin ding noth ing. Wil - son then had Romer o take Sav ana to the sc hool nurse’ s offic e to search her clothes for pills . Aft er Rom ero a nd t he nurs e, Pe ggy Schwallier, had Savana rem ove her outer clothing, they told her to pu ll h er br a ou t an d sh ake it, an d to pu ll ou t th e elastic on h er un - derpa nts, thus expos ing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree. No pill s were found. Sava na’s mother fi led suit again st pe titioner school district (Safford), Wilson , Romero, and S chwallier, alleging that the strip search violated Sa vana’ s Four th Amendment r ights. Clai ming qual ified im munity , the indiv iduals (her einafter petition - ers) mov ed fo r summar y ju dg ment. The Distr ict Cour t granted the motion, finding that ther e was no Fourth Amendment violation, and the en b anc Nint h Circuit re vers ed. Following the proto col for evalu - ating qualif ied immunity cl aims, see Sau cier v. Katz , 533 U. S. 1 94, 200, th e c ourt held th at th e str ip sear ch was u njustifie d under th e Fourth Amendment test for searches of chil dren by school officials set out in New Je rsey v. T. L. O ., 469 U. S. 32 5. It th en applied th e tes t 2 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Sy llabu s for qualified immunity. Finding th at Savana ’s right was clea rly es - tabl ished a t the time of th e sear ch, it r eversed the summar y judg - ment as to Wil son, but affirmed as to Schwallier and Romero because they wer e not independent dec isionmaker s. Held: 1. The search of Savana’s u nderwear viol ated the Fourth Amend - men t. Pp. 3–11. (a) For sc hool sear ches, “th e pu blic in ter est i s be st ser ved by a Fourth Amendment standard of reas onableness that stops short o f probable c ause.” T. L. O. , 469 U. S., at 34 1. Un der th e resu ltin g rea- sonable suspic ion stand ard, a school se arch “will be permiss ible . . . when the measures adopted are reas onabl y related to the objectives of the search and not excess ively in trusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the natu re of the infraction.” Id. , at 342. Th e r e- quired knowle dge component of reas onabl e suspicion for a school ad - minis trat or’s evidence s earch is that it raise a m oderat e cha nce of fin ding ev idenc e of wr ong doin g. Pp. 3–5. (b) Wilson had sufficient su spic ion to just ify searching Savana’ s bac kpac k an d ou ter cloth ing. A week ear lier, a stu den t, Jor dan , h ad told the principal and Wil son that stu den ts w ere br inging dr ug s an d weapon s to sc hool an d th at he had g otten sic k fr om so me pill s. O n the day of the search, Jordan gave Wilson a p ill that he said came from Ma ris sa. Lea rning t hat the pill was pres cript ion s trengt h, Wil - son ca lled Maris sa out of cla ss and was ha nded t he da y pla nner. Once in his office, Wils on, wit h Rom ero pres ent , ha d Ma ris sa turn out her pockets and open h er wallet, pro ducing, inter alia , an over - the-counter pill that Mariss a claime d was Savana’s. She also denied knowing a bout the da y planner ’s contents . Wils on did not a sk her when she rece ived the pill s from Savana or where Savana might be hiding t hem . Aft er a search of Ma ris sa’s underwea r by Rom ero a nd Schwallier revealed no add itional pil ls, Wil son called S avana into h is office. He s howed her t he da y pla nner a nd confirm ed her rela tion - ship w ith M arissa. He kn ew th at the girls had been identified as pa rt of a n unu sually rowdy g roup a t a school da nce, duri ng w hich a l- cohol a nd ciga ret tes were found in t he gi rls ’ bathroom . He ha d ot her reason s to c onnect th em with th is c ontraban d, for Jor dan had tol d the pr inc ipal that befor e the danc e, he had a ttended a pa rty a t Sa- vana ’s hous e where a lcohol wa s served. Thus , Ma ris sa’s statem ent that the p ills came from Sav ana wa s sufficiently plausi ble to warrant suspicion that Savana was involved in pill distribut ion. A student who is reasonably suspecte d of g iving out contraband pills is rea - sona bly suspect ed of ca rrying t hem on her pers on a nd in her b ack- pack. Looking into Savana’ s bag, in her presence and in the relative privacy of Wilson’s office, was no t excessively intrusive, any more 3 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Sy llabu s than Romer o’s su bsequ ent se arch of h er ou ter cloth ing . Pp. 5–8. (c) Bec ause the suspec ted fa cts pointing to Sav ana did not indi - cate tha t the drug s pr esented a dang er to students or were concealed in her unde rwear, Wils on did not ha ve s ufficient s uspicion to wa rra nt extending the sear ch to the point of ma king S avana pul l out he r u n- derwear. Ro mero and Schwallier sai d that they did not see anything wh en Sav ana pu lled ou t her underwear, bu t a s trip search an d it s Fourth Amend ment cons equences are not defined by who was looking and how muc h was seen. Savana’s actio ns in their presence neces - sar ily ex posed h er br easts a nd pelv ic ar ea to some deg ree, an d both subjec tiv e an d r eason able soc ietal ex pec tation s of per son al pr ivacy support the t reatment of s uch a search as ca tegorica lly dist inct , re - quiring distinct elements of j ustific ation on the part of school authori - ties for going b eyond a search of out er clo thing a nd b elongings . Sa- vana’s subjective expectatio n of priv acy is inherent in her a ccount of it as em barra ssing, fr ightening, and humili ating. The reasonable - nes s of her ex pecta tion is in dica ted by the common reaction of other youn g people s imilarly s earched, w hose adolescent vulnerabili ty in - tensifies the ex posur e’s patent intr usivene ss. Its indignity does not outlaw the sea rch, but it doe s im plic ate th e r ule that “th e sear ch [be] ‘reasonably re lated in scope to th e ci rcum stances which justified th e interference i n the first p lace.’ ” T. L. O., supra, at 34 1. Her e, th e content of the suspicion f ailed to match the degree of intrusion. Be - cause Wilson knew that th e pill s were common pa in relievers, he must have known of their nature an d limi ted th reat an d had n o rea- son to su spec t th at lar ge amou nts w ere bein g passed ar ou nd or th at individua l students ha d grea t q uantities . Nor could he ha ve s us- pected that Sa vana was hidi ng co mmon painkillers in her underwear. Wh en su spec ted fac ts mu st suppor t the categorically extreme intru - siv eness of a search down to an adolesc ent’s body , petit ioners’ general belief th at s tuden ts h ide c ontraban d in th eir cloth ing falls sh ort; a reason able search th at ex ten sive c alls for suspicion tha t it wil l suc - ceed. Non dang erous sch ool contraban d does n ot c onjure u p th e spec - ter of stashes in intimate places, an d there is no evidence of such be - ha vior a t the s chool; neit her J orda n no r Ma ris sa sugges ted t hat Savana was doing t hat, a nd t he s earch of Ma ris sa yielded not hing. Wils on als o never det erm ined when Ma rissa ha d received t he pills from Savana; had it been a few days before, that would weigh heavily again st an y reason ab le c onclusion th at Sav ana pr ese ntly h ad th e pills on her person, much les s in her underwear. Pp. 8–11. 2. Alt hough t he s trip s earch vi olated Savana’s Fourth A mendment rights, petitio ners Wilson, R omero, and Sc hwallier are p rotected from liab ility by qu alified immun ity beca use “clearly esta bli shed law [did] not show that the sear ch violated the Fourth Amendment,” Pearso n 4 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Sy llabu s v. Callahan , 555 U. S. ___, _ __. The intr usiveness of the strip search here ca nnot, under T. L. O., be seen as justifia bly related to th e c ir- cum stances , b ut lower court ca ses viewing school s trip s earches dif - ferently are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majo rity and dis - senting opinions , to couns el doub t a bout the cla rity with which the right was pr eviou sly stated. Pp. 11–1 3. 3. The issue of petitioner Safford’s liab ility under Mon ell v. New York City D ept. of So cial Se rvs. , 436 U. S. 658, 694, sh ou ld be ad - dres sed on re mand. P. 13. 531 F. 3d 10 71 , affir med in par t, reversed in par t, an d r eman ded. SOUTER , J., delivered the o pinion of the Cour t, in whic h R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALI A, KENNED Y, BREYER , an d A LITO , JJ., joined, and in which S TEVENS an d G INSBURG, JJ., joined as to Parts I–III. STEVENS , J., filed an opini on concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a n opinion concurring in part and dissentin g in part. THO MAS, J., filed an opinion co ncurring in the judgment in p art and dissen ting in part. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court NOTIC E: This op inion is su bjec t to f orma l rev ision bef ore pu blicat ion in the preliminary p rint of th e U nited States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the R eporter of D ecisions, Su preme C ourt of the United States, Wa sh- ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ ogra phical or other formal err ors, in or der that corrections may be mad e before the prelim inary print goes to press. SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S CHOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR IL REDDING ON WRIT OF CERTIORA RI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [Ju ne 25, 2009] JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the C ourt. The issue here is whether a 13-ye ar-old stude nt’s Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra a nd underpants by school officia ls acting on reasonable s uspicion that she had brought for - bidden prescription and over-the -counter drugs to school . Because there were n o reasons to suspect t he drugs pre - sented a da nger or were concealed in her un derwear, we hold that the search did violate the Cons titution, b ut because there is reason to question the clarity with which the right was established, the official who ordered the unconstitutional searc h is entitled to qualified immunity from liabilit y. I The events immediatel y prior to the search in question began in 13-year-old Savana Redding’s math class at Safford Middle School one October day in 2003. The assis - tant princi pal of the school, Kerry Wilson, c ame into t he room and asked Sava na to go to his office. There, he showed her a day plan ner, unzipped and open flat on his desk, in which there were several knives, lighters, a per - 2 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of the Court manent marker, and a cigarette. Wilson as ked Savan a whether the planner was hers; s he said it was, but that a few days b efore she had lent it to her friend, Mariss a Glines. Savana stated that none of the items in the plan - ner belonged to her. Wilson then showed Savana fou r white prescription - strength ib uprofen 400-mg pills, and one ov er-the-counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, all us ed for pain and inflam - mation but banned u nder school rules with out advance permission. He asked Savana if she knew anything about the pills. Savana answered that she did not. Wilson then told Savana that he had received a report that she was giving thes e pills to fel low students; Savana denied it and agreed to l et Wilson search her belongings. Helen Ro - mero, an administrative assistant, came into the office, and together with Wilson they s earched Savana’s back - pack, findin g nothing. At that poi nt, Wilson ins tructed R omero to take Savan a to the school nurse’s office to search her clothes for pills. Romero and the nurse , Peggy Schwallier, asked Savana to remove her jacket, soc ks, and shoes, leaving her in stretc h pants and a T-shirt (both without pockets), which she was then asked to remove. Finally, Savana wa s told to pull her bra out and to the side and s hake it, and to pull ou t the elastic on her und erpants, thus exposing her breast s and pelvic area to some degree. No pills were found. Savana’s mother filed suit against Safford Unified School District #1, Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier for conducting a strip search in violat ion of Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights. The individu als (herein after petition - ers) moved for summary judg me nt, raising a defense of qualified immunity. The Distric t Court for the District of Arizona granted the motion on the ground that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 504 F. 3d 828 (2007). A closely divided Circuit si tting en banc, however, re - 3 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court versed. Following the two-st ep protocol for evaluating claims of qualified im munity, see Saucier v. Katz , 53 3 U. S. 194, 200 (2001), the Ninth Circuit held t hat the stri p search was unjustified under the Fourth Am endment test for searches of children by school officials se t out in Ne w Jersey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985). 531 F. 3d 1071, 1081–1087 (2008). Th e Circuit then applied the test for qualified immunity, and found that Savan a’s righ t was clearly est ablished at the time of the search: “ ‘[t]hese notions of personal privacy ar e “clearly established” i n that they i nhere in all of us, particularly m iddle school teenagers, and are inherent in the privacy component of the Fourth Amendment’s proscri ption against unreason - able searches.’ ” Id. , at 1088–1089 (quoting Brannum v. Overton Cty. School Bd. , 516 F. 3d 489, 499 (CA6 2008)). The upshot was re versal of summary ju dgment as to Wilson, whi le affirming the judgments in favor of Schwal - lier, the school nurse, and Romero, the ad ministrativ e assistant, since they h ad not acted as independent deci - sionmakers. 531 F. 3d, at 1089. We granted certiorari , 555 U. S. ___ (2009) , and now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. II The Fourth Amendment “righ t of the people to be secure in their persons . . . a gainst unreasonable searches and seizures” generally requires a law enforcement officer to have probable cause f or conducti ng a search. “Probab le cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstance s within [an officer’s] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustwo rthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warran t a man of reas onable caut ion in the b elief that’ an offense has been or is being committed,” Brine gar v. United S tates, 338 U. S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925)), and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the 4 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of the Court place to be searched. In T. L. O. , we recognized that the school setting “re - quires som e modificati on of the level of suspi cion of i llici t activity needed to justi fy a search, ” 469 U. S., at 340, an d held that for searches by school officials “a ca reful balanc - ing of governmental and private interests s uggests tha t the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that s tops short of probable cause,” id. , at 341. We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrat or’s search of a student, id. , at 342, 345, and have held that a school search “will be permi ssible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intru - sive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,” id. , at 342. A number of our cases on probable cause have an im - plicit bearing on the reliable k nowledge ele ment of rea - sonable sus picion, as we have attempted to flesh out th e knowledge component by look ing to the degree to which known facts imply prohibited conduct, see, e.g. , Adams v. William s, 4 07 U. S. 14 3, 148 (1972); id. , at 160, n. 9 (Mar - shall, J., dissenting), the specificity of the information received, see, e.g. , Spin elli v. Unit ed Stat es, 39 3 U. S. 410, 416–417 (1 969), and the reliabilit y of its sou rce, see, e.g. , Aguilar v. Texas , 378 U. S. 108, 1 14 (1964). At the end of the day, h owever, we have realized that t hese factors cannot rigi dly control, Illinois v. Gates , 462 U. S. 213, 2 30 (1983), and we have come back to saying th at the stan - dards are “ fluid concepts that ta ke their substantive con - tent from t he particul ar contex ts” in which they are being assessed. Ornel as v. United S tates, 517 U. S. 690, 69 6 (1996). Perhaps the best that can be sa id generally about the required knowledge component of probable ca use for a la w enforcement officer’s e vidence search is tha t it raise a “fai r 5 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court probability,” Ga tes , 46 2 U. S., at 238, or a “substantial chance,” id. , at 244, n. 13, of discovering evidence of cri mi - nal activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of findin g evidence of wrongdoing. III A In this case, the school’s policies strictly prohibit the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on schoo l grounds, including “ ‘[a ]ny prescription or over -the-counter drug, e xcept those for which permission to use in school has been granted purs uant to Board policy.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 128a. 1 A week before Savana was searched, another student, Jordan Romero (no relation of t he school’s administrative assistant), told the principal and Assistant Principal Wilson that “certain students were bringing drugs and we apons on campus,” and that he had been sick after takin g some pills that “he got from a classmate.” App. 8a. On th e m orning of October 8, the same boy handed Wilson a white pill that he said Marissa Glines had given him. He told Wi lson that students were —————— 1When the object of a school search is the enforcement of a school rule, a va lid s earch a ssumes, of cours e, the rule’s legit imacy. But the legitimacy of the rule usually goes without saying as it does here. The Court s aid pla inly in New Jer sey v. T. L. O ., 469 U. S. 325, 34 2, n . 9 (198 5), th at st an dar ds of c onduct for sch ools ar e for school admin istra- tor s to deter mine without sec ond-gue ssing by cou rts la cking t he experi - en ce to appr eciate wh at ma y be n eeded. Ex cept in paten tly ar bitr ary instan ces, Fou rth Amen dme nt an aly sis takes th e r ule a s a g iven, as it obviously should do in this case. Ther e is n o need here either to explain the imperative of keeping drugs out of schools, or to e xplain the reasons for the school’s rule banning all dr ug s, no matter how benig n, without adv ance per miss ion . Teac hers ar e n ot ph armac ologists train ed to identify pills a nd powders, a nd an e ffective drug ban has to be enforce - able fa st. Th e plen ary ban makes sen se, an d th ere is no basi s to c laim that the searc h was unreaso nable owin g to some defect or shortcoming of the rule it was ai med at enforcing. 6 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of the Court planning to take the pills at lunch. Wilson lear ned from Peggy Schwa llier, the sc hool nurse, that the pill was Ibu profen 400 mg, available only by prescription . Wilson then called Marissa out of class. Outside th e classroom , Marissa’s teacher handed Wilson the day planner, found within Marissa’s reach, containin g various contraband ite ms. Wilson escorted Marissa back to his office. In the pre sence of H elen Rom ero, Wils on requested Marissa to turn out her pocket s and open her wall et. Marissa produced a blue pill, several white ones, and a razor blade. Wilson a sked where the blue pil l came from, and Marissa answered, “ ‘I guess it slipped i n when she gave me the IBU 400s. ’” Id. , at 1 3a. Wh en Wilson asked whom she meant, Marissa replied, “ ‘Savan a Redding.’ ” Ibid. Wilson then enquired about the day pl anner and its contents; Marissa denied knowing anythin g about them. Wilson did not ask Marissa any followup questions to determine whether th ere was an y likelihood that Sava na presently had pills: nei ther as king when Marissa received the pills from Savana nor where Savana might be hiding them. Schwallier did not im mediately recognize the blue pill, but information provided through a poison cont rol hotline 2 indicated that the pil l was a 20 0-mg dose of an anti - inflammatory dru g, ge nerically called naproxen, available over the counter. At Wilson’s dir ection, Marissa was then subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by Ro - mero and Schwallier, as Savana was later on. The search revealed no additional pills.

—————— 2Pois on cont rol cent ers acro ss the count ry m aint ain 24 -hour help hotlines to pr ovide “immed iate ac cess to poison ex posur e manag ement instructions a nd informatio n on pote ntial poisons.” Am erican Associa - tion of Pois on Control Centers , online at http://www .aapcc.org /dnn / About/ta bid/7 4/Default.aspx (all Inter net mater ials a s visited June 19, 200 9, an d av ailable in Cler k of Cou rt’s c ase file). 7 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court It was at this juncture that Wils on called S avana into his office and showed her the day planner. Their conve r- sation esta blished th at Savana and Marissa were on friendly terms: while s he denied k nowledge of the contra - band, Sava na admitted that the day planner was hers and that she ha d lent it to Marissa. Wilson had other repo rts of their friendship from staff members, who had identified Savana and Marissa as part of an unusually rowdy group at the school’s op eni ng dance in August, during which alcohol and cigarettes were fo und in the girls’ bathroom. Wilson had reason to connect the girls with this contra - band, for Wilson knew tha t Jordan Romero had told the principal that before th e dance, he had been at a party at Savana’s h ouse where alcohol was served. Marissa’s statement that the pills came from Savana was thus suffi - ciently pla usible to warrant sus picion that Savana was involved in pill distribution. This suspicion of Wilson’s was eno ugh to jus tify a search of Savana’s backpack and outer clothing. 3 If a student is reasonably suspected of giving out contraband pills, she is reasonably suspected of carryi ng them on her person and in the carryall that has become an item of student uniform in most places today. If Wilson’s reasonable suspicion of pill distribution were not under stood to support searche s of outer clothes and backpa ck, i t would not justify an y search worth making. And the look into Sa va na’s bag, in her presence and in the relative p rivacy of Wilson’s office, was not excessively in trusive, any more than Romero’s subsequent search of her outer clothing. —————— 3There is no q uestion here t hat just ificati on for the school officials’ search wa s req uired in a ccorda nce wit h the T. L. O. standard of reason - able su spic ion , for it is c ommon grou nd that Sav ana had a r eason ab le expect ation of priva cy cove ring t he pe rsonal things she c hose to carry i n her bac kpac k, c f. 469 U. S., at 33 9, an d t hat Wil son ’s decision to look thr ough it was a “sear ch” within the meaning of the Four th Amend - ment. 8 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of the Court B Here it is t hat the parties part company, with Savana’s claim that extending the search a t W ilson’s b ehest to the point of making her pu ll out her u nderwear was constitu - tionally unreasonable. The exact label for t his final st ep in the intrusion is not important, t hough strip search is a fair way to speak of it . Romero and Sch wallier directed Savana to remove her clothes down to her underwear, and then “pull out” her bra and the ela stic band on her under - pants. Id ., at 23a. Although Romero and Schwallier stated that they did not see anything when Savana fol - lowed their instructions, App. to Pet. for Cert. 135a, we would not define strip search and its Fourth Amendment consequenc es in a wa y that wou ld guarantee litigation about who was looking and how m uch was seen. The ver y fact of Savana’s pulling her un derwear away from he r body in the presence of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily exp osed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societa l expectations of personal privac y s upport the treatment o f such a sear ch as categorically distinct, requiring distinc t elements of justification on the part of school authoritie s for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings. Savana’s s ubjective expectation of privacy against such a search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating. The reasonabl eness of her expectation (required by the Fourth Amendment stan - dard) is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adol es cent vulner - ability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure. See Brief for National Association of Social Work ers et al. as Amici Curiae 6–14; Hyman & Perone, The Other Side of School Viol ence: Educator Po licies and Practices that may Contribute to Student Misbehavior, 36 J. Sch ool Psychol - ogy 7, 13 (1998) (strip search can “result in serious em o- tional damage”). The common reaction of these adoles - 9 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court cents simply registers the obvious ly different meaning of a search exposing the b ody from the experien ce of nak ed- ness or n ear undress in other school circumstance s. Changing for gym is getting re ady for play; exposing for a search is r esponding to an accu sation reserved for sus - pected wro ngdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that a nu mber of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and ha ve banned them no matter what the facts may be, see, e.g. , New York City Dep t. of Edu cati on, Reg. No . A–432, p. 2 (2005), online at http://docs .nycenet.edu/ docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-21/A-432.pdf (“Under no circumstan ces shall a strip-search of a student be conducted”) . The indignity of the se arch does not, of course , outlaw it, but it does implicate the rule of reasonablen ess as state d in T. L. O. , that “the search as actually co nducted [b e] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 469 U. S., at 341 (internal quotation marks o mitted). The scope will be permissible, that is, when it is “not excessively intrusive i n light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id. , at 342. Here, the c ontent of the suspicion failed to match th e degree of intrusion. Wilson knew b eforehand that the pill s were prescr iption-strength i buprofen and over-the-counter naproxen, common pain relievers equivalent to two Advi l, or one Alev e.4 He must have been aware of the nature and limited threat of the s pecific drugs he was searching for, and while just about anything ca n be taken in quantities that will do real harm, Wils on had no rea son to suspect —————— 4An Advil tabl et, caplet, or g el capl et, conta ins 20 0 mg of ib uprofen. See Physician s’ Desk Refer ence fo r Non pres cript ion Dru gs, Diet ary Supplements, and Herbs 674 (28th ed. 20 06). An Alev e caplet c ontains 200 mg naproxen an d 20 mg sodiu m. See id. , at 675. 10 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of the Court that large a mounts of the drugs we re being passed around, or that individual students were r eceiving gr eat number s of pills. Nor could Wilson h ave suspected that Savana was hiding common painkillers in her underwear. Petitioners suggest, as a tru th u niversally acknowledged, that “stu - dents . . . h id[e] contraband in or under their clothing,” Reply Brief for Petitioners 8, and cite a smattering of cases of stu dents with contraband in their un derwear, id ., at 8–9. But when the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a search down to the body of an adolesc ent requires some justification in s uspected facts, general backgroun d possibiliti es fall short; a reasonabl e search that extensive calls for suspicion that it w ill pay off. But nondangerous school cont raband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no evidence in the record of any genera l practice among Safford Middle School stu - dents of hiding that s ort of thing in underwear; neither Jordan nor Marissa suggested to Wilson that Savana wa s doing that, and the preceding search of Marissa that Wilson ordered yielde d nothing. Wilson ne ver even de - termined when Marissa had received the pills from Sa - vana; if it had been a few days b efore, that would weigh heavily against any reasonable conclusion that Sava na presently had the pills on her person, much less in h er underwear. In sum, wh at was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana wa s any indication of da nger to the students from the power of the drugs or th eir quantity, and any reason to sup pose that Savana was carrying pills in her unde rwear. We think that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable. In so holdi ng, we mean to cast no ill ref lection on the assistant principal, for the record raises no doubt that his motive throughout was to eliminate drugs fro m his school and protect students from what Jordan Romero had gon e 11 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court through. Parents are known to overreact to protect thei r children from danger, and a school off icial w ith respons i- bility for safety may te nd to do the same. The difference is that the Fo urth Amendment plac es limits on the offici al, even with the high degree of deference that courts must pay to the educator’s professi onal j udgment. We do mean, though, to make it clear that the T. L. O . concern to limit a sch ool s earch to reasonable scope re - quires the support of reasonable s uspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpa cks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intru - sive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. IV A school off icial searching a studen t is “entitled to quali - fied immun ity where clearly established law does not sho w that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.” Pe arson v. Callahan , 555 U. S. __, __ (2009 ) (slip op., a t 18). To b e established clearly, however, ther e is no need that “the very action in question [have] previ ously been held unlaw - ful.” Wilso n v. Layne , 526 U. S. 603, 615 (1999). The unconstitutionality of outrageous conduct obviously will b e unconstitutional, this being the r eason, a s J udge Posner has said, that “[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.” K. H. v. Morgan , 914 F. 2d 8 46, 851 (CA7 1990). But even as to action less than an outrage, “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law . . . in novel factual circumstances.” Ho pe v. Pe lze r, 536 U. S. 730, 741 (2002). T. L. O. dir ected school officials t o limit the intrusive - ness of a search, “in light of the age and sex of the studen t and the nature of the infraction,” 469 U. S., at 342, and as 12 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of the Court we have just said at some length, the intrusiveness of the strip search here cannot be s een as justifia bly related to the circums tances. Bu t we realiz e that the lower courts have reach ed diverge nt conclusions regardi ng how the T. L. O. sta ndard appli es to such searches. A number of judges h ave read T. L. O. as th e en banc minority of the Ninth Circuit did here. The Sixth Circu it upheld a st rip search of a high school student for a drug, without any suspicion that drugs were hidden next to h er body. Willi ams v. Elli ngton , 936 F. 2d 881, 882–883, 887 (1991). An d other cou rts considering qualified immunity for strip searches have read T. L. O. as “a series of ab - stractions, on the on e hand, and a declaration of seemin g deference to the judgments of school off icials, on the other,” Jenkins v. Tall adega Ci ty Bd. of Ed. , 115 F. 3d 821, 828 (CA11 1997) (en banc), which made it impossible “ to establish clearly the contours of a Fourth Amendment right . . . [in] the wide variety of possible sc hool settings different from those in volved in T. L. O. ” itself. Ibid. S ee also Thomas v. Roberts , 323 F. 3d 950 (CA11 2003) (grant - ing qualified immunity to a te acher and police officer who conducted a group strip search of a fifth grade class when looking for a missing $ 26). We think these differe nces of opi nion from o ur own are substantial enough to require immunity f or the sch ool officials in this case. We would not suggest that entitl e- ment to qu alified imm unity is the guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts, and the fact tha t a single ju dge, or eve n a group of judges, disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically render the law unclear if we have been clear. That said, however, the cas es viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see the m are numer - ous enough , with well -reasoned majority a nd dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law. We conclude that qualified 13 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court immunity is warrante d. V The strip s earch of Savana Redding was unreasonable and a viola tion of the Fourth Am endment, but petitioners Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier are neve rtheless pro - tected from liability through qualified im munity. Our conclusions here do not resolv e, however, the question of the liability of petitioner Saffo rd U nified School District #1 under Monell v. Ne w York City Dept. of Soci al Serv s., 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978), a claim th e Ninth Ci rcuit did n ot address. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded for consideration of the Monell claim. It is so orde red. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S CHOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR IL REDDING ON WRIT OF CERTIORA RI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [Ju ne 25, 2009] JUSTICE STEVEN S, wit h whom J USTICE GIN SBURG joins, concurring i n part and dissenting in part. In New Je rsey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985), the Court estab lished a two-step inquiry for dete rmining th e reasonableness of a s chool offi cial’s decision to search a student. First, the Court explained, the search must be “‘justified at its inception’ ” by the presence of “reasonabl e grounds for suspecting that the s earch will turn up evi - dence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of t he school.” Id. , at 342. Second, th e search must be “permissible in its scope,” which is achieved “when the measures adopted are reasonab ly related to t he objectives of the sea rch and not exce ssiv ely intrusiv e in light of the age and s ex of the stu dent and th e natur e of th e infrac tion .” Ibid . (em phasis added). Nothing th e Court d ecides today alters this basic framework. It simply applies T. L. O. to decla re unconsti - tutional a s trip search of a 13- year -old honors student that was based on a groundless suspi cion that s he might b e hiding medicine in her underwear. This is, in essence, a case in which clearly e stablished law meets cl early outra - geous conduct. I ha ve long believed that “‘[i]t does not require a constitutional scho lar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitu - tional rights of some magnitud e.’ ” Id. , at 382, n. 25 2 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of S TEVENS , J. (S TEVENS , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Do e v. Renfro w, 631 F. 2d 91, 92–93 (CA7 1980)). The strip s earch of Sa vana Reddi ng in this case was both more intrusive and less justified than the search of the student’s purse in T. L. O. Theref ore, while I join Parts I – III of the Court’s opinion, I disa gree with its decision to extend qua lified immu nity to the school official who au - thorized this unconstitutional sear ch. The Court reaches a contrary conclusion ab ou t qualified immunity based on the fact that various Courts of Appeals have adopted seeming ly divergent views about T. L. O. ’s application to strip sea rches. Ante , at 12. Bu t the clarit y of a well-es tablished right should not depend on whether jurists have misread our precedents. And while our cases have previ ously noted the “d ivergence of views” among courts in deciding wh ether to extend qualified immunity, e.g. , Pea rso n v. Callah an, (2009) 555 U. S., ___, ___ (sli p op., at 20) (noting the unsettled constitutionality of the so - called “consent-once-removed” doc trine); Wil son v. Layne , 526 U. S. 603, 618 (19 99) (considering conflicting views on the constitutionality of law en forcement’s pr actice of al - lowing the media to enter a private home to observe and film attempted arrests), we have r elied on that considera - tion only to spare officials from having “ ‘to predict th e future cour se of constitutional law,’ ” Id., at 617 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette , 434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978); empha - sis added). In this c ase, by contrast, we chart no new constitutional path. We mere ly decide whether the dec i- sion to strip search Savana Redding, on th ese facts, w as prohibited under T. L. O. Our conclusion leaves t he boundaries of the law undisturbed.* —————— *In fact, in T. L. O. we cit ed wit h approva l a Nint h Circuit ca se, Bil - brey v. Brown , 738 F. 2d 1 462 (19 84), w hich held th at a s trip se arch per formed under similar circumstanc es v iolated the Constitut ion. New Jer sey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325, 33 2, n . 2 (198 5); id. , at 341, an d n . 6 (adopting Bilbrey ’s reasonab le suspicion st andard). 3 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. The Court of Appeals properly rejected the school offi - cial’s qualified immunity defense, and I would affirm th at court’s jud gment in its entirety. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of GINSBURG, J. SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S CHOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR IL REDDING ON WRIT OF CERTIORA RI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [Ju ne 25, 2009] JUSTICE GIN SBUR G, concurring in part and di ssenting in part. I agree with the Court that Assistant Principal Wils on’s subjection of 13-year-old Savana Redding to a humiliating stripdown s earch violated the Fourth Amendm ent. But I also agree with J USTI CE STEVE NS, ante , at 1–2, that our opinion in New J ers ey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985), “clearly established” the law governing this case. Fellow student Marissa Glines, ca ught with pills in her pocket, accused Redding of supplying them. App. 13a. Asked where the blue pill among several white pills in Glines’s pock et came from, Glines answered: “I guess it slipped in when she gave me the IBU 400s.” Ibid . Asked next “who is she ?”, Glines responded: “Sava na Redding.” Ibid. As the Court observes, ante , at 6, 10 , no follow up questions w ere asked. Wilson did not test Glines’s accusa - tion for veracity by as king Glines when did Redding gi ve her the pills, where, for what purpose. Any reasonable search for the pills would have e nded when inspection of Redding’s backpa ck a nd jacket pock ets yielded nothin g. Wilson had no cause to suspect, based on prior experience at the school or clues in this case, that Redding had hid - den pills—containing the equival ent of two Advils or on e Aleve—in her underwear or body. To mak e matters worse, Wilson did not release Redding, to return to class 2 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of GINSBURG, J. or to go home, after the search. Instead, he made her sit on a chair outside his office for over two hours. At no point did he attempt to call he r parent. Abuse of authority of that order should not be shielded by official immunity. In contrast to T. L. O. , where a teacher discovered a student smoking in th e lavatory, and wher e the search was confined to the student’s purs e, the search of Redding involved her body and rested on the bare accusation of another student whose reliability the Assistant Principal had no reason to trust. The Court’s opinion in T. L. O . plainly stated the controlling Fourth Amendment law: A search ordered by a school officia l, even if “justified at its inception,” crosses the constitutional boundary if i t be - comes “excessively intrusive in lig ht of the age and sex of the student and the na ture of the infraction.” 469 U. S., a t 342 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, “the nature of the [supposed] infraction,” the slim basis for suspecting Savana Re dding, and her “age and sex,” ibid. , establish beyond doubt that Assistant Principal Wilson’s or der cannot be reconciled with this Court’s opinion in T. L. O. Wilson’s treatment of Redding was abusive an d it was not reasonable for him to believe th at the law permitted it. I join J USTICE STE VEN S in dissentin g from the Court’s acceptance of Wilson’s qu alified imm u- nity plea, and would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judg - ment in all respects. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S CHOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR IL REDDING ON WRIT OF CERTIORA RI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [Ju ne 25, 2009] JUSTICE THOMAS , concurring in the judgment in par t and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court that the judgment a gainst th e school officials with respect to qualified immunity should be reversed. See ante , at 11–13. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that the search of Savana Redding did not violate the Fourth Ame ndment. The majorit y imposes a vague and amorphous standard on school a d- ministrators. It also g rants judge s sweeping authority to second-guess the measures that these officials take to maintain di scipline in their school s and ensure the hea lth and safety of the students in their charge . This deep intrusion into the administration of public schools exe m- plifies why the Court should ret urn to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis under which “the judiciary wa s reluctant to interfere in the ro utine business of school administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to m aintain order.” Morse v. Frederick , 551 U. S. 3 93, 414 (2007) (T HOMAS , J., concu rring). Bu t even under the prevailing Fourth Amendment test estab - lished by New Jer sey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985), all petitioners, including the school district, ar e entitled t o judgment a s a matter of law in their favor. 2 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. I “Although the underlying comm and of the Fourth Amendment is always that search es and seiz ures be rea - sonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes p lace.” Id. , at 337. Th us, althoug h public school students retain Fourth Amendment righ ts under this Court’s precedent, see id. , at 33 3–337, those rights “a re different . . . than elsewhere; the ‘reasonable - ness’ inquiry cannot di sregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility f or children,” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U. S. 646, 656 (1995); see also T. L. O. , 469 U. S., at 339 (ide ntifying “th e substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline i n the classroom and on school grounds”). For nearly 25 years this Court has understood that “[m]aintaining order in the class room has n ever been easy, but in more recent years, school disorder has often taken parti cularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social pr oblems.” Ibid. In scho ols, “[e]vents calling for discipline a re frequent occurrence s and some - times require immediate, effective action.” Goss v. Lopez , 419 U. S. 5 65, 580 (1975); see als o T. L. O., 469 U. S., a t 340 (explaining that schools have a “legitimate need to maintain a n environment in which learning can ta ke place”). For this reason, school offic ials retain br oad authority to protect students a nd preserv e “order a nd a prop er educatio nal environme nt” under the Fourth Amendmen t. Id., at 339 . This authority requires that sch ool off icia ls b e able to eng age in the “clos e super vision of schoolchildr en, as well as . . . enf orc[e] rules aga inst conduct that wou ld be perfectly permissible if underta ken by an adult.” Ibid. Seeking to reconcile the Fourth Amendment with th is uniqu e pub lic school setting, the Court in T. L. O. held that a school search is “reason able” if it is “ ‘justified at its incepti on’ ” and “‘reas onably re lat ed in scop e to th e cir - 3 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. cumstances which justified the interferenc e in the first place.’ ” Id. , at 341–34 2 (quoting Terry v. Oh io, 392 U. S. 1, 20 ( 1968 )). The s earch under r eview easily meets th is standard. A A “search of a student by a teacher or other s chool offi - cial will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are rea - sonable grounds for su specting that the sear ch will turn up evidence that the student has violated o r is violati ng either the law or the rules of the school.” T. L. O., su pra , at 341–342 (footnote omitted). As the majority rightl y concedes, this search was justified at its inception because there were reasonable ground s to suspect that Reddin g possessed medication that violated school rules. See ante , at 7. A find ing of reasonable suspicion “does n ot deal with hard certai nties, but with probabilities.” United States v. Cortez , 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981); see also T. L. O. , supr a, at 346 (“[T]he requirement of rea sonable sus picion is not a requirement of absolute certainty” ). To satisfy this stan - dard, more than a mere “hunch” of wrongdoin g is required, but “considerably” less suspicion is needed th an would be required to “satisf[y] a preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu , 534 U. S. 266, 274 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in evalu ating whether there i s a reason - able “particularized and objecti ve” basis for conducting a search based on suspected wrongdoing, government offi - cials must consider the “totality of t he circumst ances.” Id. , at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted). School officials have a spe cialized un derstanding of the sch ool environ - ment, the h abits of the students, and the concerns of the community, which enables them to “ ‘formul at[e] certai n common-sense conclusions ab out human behavior.’ ” United Sta tes v. Sokol ow, 490 U. S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting Cortez , sup ra, at 418). And like police off icers, school 4 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. officials are “entitled to make an assessment of the situ a- tion in l ight of [this] s pecialized training and familiarity with the customs of the [school]. ” See Arviz u, supra, at 276. Here, petitioners had reasonable grounds to suspect that Reddi ng was in possession of prescription and non - prescription drugs in vi olation of the school’s prohibition of the “non-medical use, possession , or sale of a drug” o n school prop erty or at school event s. 531 F. 3d 1071, 107 6 (CA9 2008) (en banc); see also id. , at 1107 (Hawkins, J ., dissenting) (explainin g that the school policy defined “drugs ” to include “ ‘[a]ny prescription or over -the-counter drug, e xcept those for which permission to use in school has been granted’ ”). As an initial matter, school officials were aware that a few years earlier, a student had becom e “seriously i ll” and “spent several days in in tensive care” after ingesting prescr iption medication obtained from a classmate. App. 10a. Fourth Am endment searches do n ot occur in a vacuum; ra ther, context must inform the judi - cial inquiry. See Cor tez, sup ra, a t 417–418. In this in - stance, the suspicion of drug possession arose at a middle school that had “a history of problems with students using and distributing prohibited and illegal su bstances on campus.” App. 7a, 10a. The school’s substance-abuse problems had not abated by the 200 3–2004 school year, which is wh en the chal - lenged search of Redding took place. School officials ha d found alcohol and cigarettes in the girls’ bathroom during the first school dance of the year and noticed that a gro up of students including Redding and Marissa Glines smel led of alcohol. Ibid. Several weeks later, another student, Jordan Romero, reported that Re dding had hosted a party before the dance where she serve d whisk ey, vodk a, and tequila. Id. , at 8a, 11a. Romero had provided this report to school officials as a result of a meeting his mother scheduled with the officials after Romero “bec[a]me vio - 5 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. lent” and “sick to his stomach” one night and admitted that “he had taken some pills th at he had got[ten] from a classmate.” Id., at 7a–8a, 10a–11a. At that meeting, Romero admitted tha t “cer tain students were bringin g drugs and weapons on campus.” Id., at 8a, 11 a. One week later, Romero handed the assistant principal a white pill that he said he had received from Glines. Id. , at 11a. He reported “that a group of students [were] planning on taking the pills at lunch.” Ibid. School officials justifiably t ook quick action in light o f the lunchtime deadline. The assistant principal took the pill to the school nurs e who iden tified it as prescription - strength 40 0-mg Ibuprofen. Id., at 12a. A subsequen t search of Glines and her belongings produced a razor blade, a Naproxen 200-mg pill, and several Ibuprofen 400 - mg pills. Id ., at 13a. When asked, Glines claimed that she had received the pi lls from Re dding. Ibid. A search of Redding’s planner, which Glines h ad borrowed, then un - covered “several knive s, severa l lighters, a ci garette, an d a permanent marker.” Id ., at 12a, 14a, 22a. Thus, as the majority ac knowledges , ante , at 7, the totalit y of relevant circumstances justified a search of Redding for pills. 1 B The remaining question is whether the search was reasonable in scope. Under T. L . O. , “a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the sea rch and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the —————— 1To be sure, Redding denied knowle dge of the pills and th e materi als in her plan ner. App. 14a. Bu t h er den ial alon e does not n egate th e reasonable su spicion held by school offi cials. See New J ersey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325, 34 5 (19 85) (f indin g sear ch reason ab le ev en though “T. L. O. had been accus ed of smoking, and had denied t he accusation in the strongest possi ble ter ms when sh e stated th at sh e di d not smoke at all”). 6 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. student an d the natu re of the infraction.” 469 U. S., at 342. The majority concludes that the school off icials’ search of R edding’s un derwear was not “ ‘re asonably re - lated in sc ope to the circumsta nces which justified t he interference in the first place,’ ” see ante , at 8–11, notwith - standing th e officials’ reasonable suspicion that Reddin g “was involved in pill di stribution,” ante, at 7. Accordin g t o the majority, to be rea sonable, this school search required a showing of “danger to the students from the power of the drugs or th eir quantity” or a “reason to suppose that [Red - ding] was c arrying pill s in her underwear.” Ante , at 10 . Each of these addition al requirem ents is an unjustifiable departure from bedrock Fourth Amendment law in t he school setti ng, where this Co urt has heretofore read the Fourth Am endment to grant considerable leeway to scho ol officials. Because the school officials searched in a loca - tion where the pills could have been hidden, the sear ch was reasonable in scop e under T. L. O. 1 The majority finds that “subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privac y support . . . treat[ing]” this type of search, which it lab els a “strip search,” as “cate gorica lly di stinct, requiring distinct ele - ments of justification on the part of school a uthorities for going beyond a search of clothing and belong ings.” Ante , at 8. 2 Thus, in the majority’s vie w, althoug h the school officials ha d reasonable suspicion to believe that Reddin g —————— 2Like t he dis sent below, “ I would res erve t he t erm ‘strip s earch’ for a sear ch th at r equ ired its su bject to fu lly disrobe in view of officials.” 531 F. 3d 107 1, 1 091, n . 1 (CA9 200 8) (opi nion of Hawkins, J.). The distinc - tion between a s trip se arch an d th e se arch at i ssu e in this c ase may be slight, but it i s a di stinction that the law has drawn. See, e.g., San din v. Conne r, 515 U. S. 47 2, 4 75 (1 995) (“Th e offic er su bjec ted Con ner to a str ip sear ch, c omplete with inspec tion of the r ectal ar ea”); Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U. S. 520, 558 , an d n. 39 ( 1979) (desc ribing visual in spec - tion of body cavities as “ part of a str ip sear ch”). Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) 7 Opinion of T HO MAS, J. had the pills on her person, see ante , at 7, they needed some greater level of particu larized suspicion to condu ct this “strip s earch.” Th ere is no support for th is contortion of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has generally held that the reason ableness of a search’s scope depends only on whether it is limited t o the area that is capable of concealing the object of th e search. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton , 52 6 U. S. 295 , 307 (1999) (Police off icers “may inspect passengers’ be - longings found in the car tha t a re capable of concealing the object o f the search ”); Florida v. Jimeno , 5 00 U. S. 24 8, 251 (1991) (“The scope of a search is generally defined b y its expressed object”); United S tates v. Johns , 469 U. S. 478, 487 (1985) (search reasonab le because “there is no plausible argument tha t the object of the sear ch could no t have been concealed i n the pack ages”); United Sta tes v. Ross , 456 U. S. 798, 8 20 (1982) (“ A lawful search . . . gen - erally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found”). 3 In keeping with this longstanding rule, the “nature o f the infracti on” referenced in T. L. O. delineates the proper scope of a search of students in a way that is identical to that permit ted for searches outside the school— i.e. , the search must be limite d to the areas where the object of that infraction could b e concealed . See Ho rton v. Califor - nia , 496 U. S. 128, 141 (1990) (“Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where rifles might be” (inter - nal quotation marks omitted)); Ross , su pra , a t 82 4 (“[P]robable cause to be lieve that u ndocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless —————— 3The Court ha s adopt ed a different standa rd for s earch es involving an “intr usio[n] into the human body .” Schm erb er v. California , 384 U. S. 757, 770 (1966). Th e sear ch here does n ot implic ate th e Cou rt’s cases governing bodily intrusions, ho wever , because it did not involve a “phys ical intrus ion, penetra ting b enea th the s kin,” Sk inner v. Railwa y Lab or Executi ves’ Assn ., 489 U. S. 602, 616 (1989). 8 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. search of a suitcase”). A search of a student therefore is permissible in scope under T. L. O. so long as it is objec - tively reasonable to believe that the area sea rched could conceal the contraban d. The di ssenting opinion below correctly c aptured th is Fourth Amendment standar d, noting that “if a studen t brought a baseball ba t on campu s in violation of school policy, a search of that s tudent’s shirt pocket woul d be patently unjustified.” 531 F. 3d, at 110 4 (opinion of Hawk ins, J.). The analysis of whether the scope of the search here was permissible under that standard is straightforward. Indeed, the majority does not dispute that “general back - ground possibilities” establis h that students conceal “con - traband in their underwear.” Ante, at 10. It acknowledges that school officials had reasonable suspicion to look in Redding’s b ackpa ck an d outer clothing because if “Wilson’ s reasonable suspicion of pill distri bution were not unde r- stood to su pport searches of outer clothes an d back pack , it would not justify any search worth making. ” An te, at 7. The majority neverthe less concludes that pr oceeding any further with the search was unreasonable. See ante , at 8– 10; see also ante , at 1 (G INSBURG , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Any rea sonable s earch for the pills would have end ed when i nspection of Redding’s backpa ck a nd jacket pockets yielded nothing”). But ther e is no support for this conclusion. The reasonable suspicion that Redding possessed the pills for distribution purposes did not dis sipate simp ly because the search of her back - pack turne d up nothi ng. It was eminently reasonable to conclude that the backpack was empty becau se Redding was secreting the pills in a place s he thought no one woul d look . See Ross , supra , at 820 (“ Contraband goods rarely are strewn” about in plain view; “by their very nature such goods must be withheld from public view”). Redding wo uld not hav e been the first person to conceal pills in her undergarments. See Hicks, Man Gets 17-Ye ar 9 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. Drug Sente nce, [Corbin, KY] Tim es-Tribune, Oct. 7, 200 8, p. 1 (Dru g courier “tol d officials she had the [Ox ycontin ] pills concea led in h er crotch”); Conley, Whiteh aven: Traffic Stop Yields Hydrocodone Pills, [Memphis] Commercial Appeal, Au g. 3, 2007, p. B3 (“An additional 40 hydro - codone pill s were fou nd in her pants”); Ca ywood, Police Vehicle Chase Leads to Dru g A rrests, [Worcester] Tele - gram & Ga zette, June 7, 2008, p. A7 (25-yea r-old “alleg - edly had a cigar tube stuffed with pills tucked into the waistband of his pants”); Hubartt, 23-Year-Old Charge d With Dealing Ecs tasy, The [Fort Wayne] Journal Gazette, Aug. 8, 200 7, p. C2 (“[W]hile he was being pu t into a squ ad car, his pan ts fell down and a plas tic bag containing pink and orange pills fell on the ground”); Sebasti an Residents Arrested in Drug Stin g, Vero Beach Press Journal, Sept. 16, 2006, p. B2 (Arrestee “told them he ha d more pills ‘down my pants’ ”). No r will she b e the last a fter today’s decision, which annou nces the s afest place to secrete contraband in school. 2 The majority compound s its error by reading t he “natur e of the infraction” aspect of the T. L. O. test a s a license to limit searc hes based on a judge’s assessment of a particu - lar school policy. According to the majority, the scope of the search was impermissible be cause the school offici al “must have been aware of the natu re and limited threat of the specific drugs he was search ing for” an d because he “had no rea son to suspect that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or that individual students were receiving great numbers of pills.” An te, at 9–10. Thus, in order to locate a ra tionale for finding a Fourth Amendment violation in this case, the majority retreat s from its ob servation that the school’s firm n o-drug policy “makes sense, and th ere is no basis to claim that the search was unreasona ble owin g to some defect or short - 10 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. coming of the rule it was aimed at enforcing.” Ante , at 5 , n. 1.

Even accep ting the majority’s as surances that it is not attacking the rule’s reasonablen ess, it certainly is attack - ing the rule’s importan ce. This ap proach dire ctly conflict s with T. L. O. in which the Court was “unwilling to adopt a standard u nder which the legality of a s earch is dependen t upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of school rules .” 469 U. S. , at 342, n. 9. Indeed, the Court i n T. L. O. exp ressly rejected the proposition that the major - ity seeming ly endorses —that “some rules regarding stu - dent conduct are by nature too ‘trivial’ to justify a search based upon reasonable suspicion.” Ibid.; se e a lso id., at 343, n. 9 (“ The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct p resumably reflects a judgment on the part of school off icials that su ch cond uct is destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Absent an y suggestion that the rul e violates some substantive consti - tutional guarantee, the courts should as a g eneral matter, defer to that judgment ”). The majority’s decision in this regard also departs from another basic principle of the Fourth Amendment: tha t law enforcement officials can enfor ce with the same vigor all rules and regulations irrespective of th e perceived importance of any of those rul es. “In a long line of case s, we have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancin g of private and public interests is not in doub t. The arrest is const itutionally reasonable. ” Virginia v. Moore , 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (s lip op., at 6 ). The Fourth Amendment rule for searches is the same: Police offic ers are entitled to search rega rdless of the perceived triviality of the underlying law. As we ha ve explained, requiring p olice to make “sensitive, case-by - case determinations of government need,” Atwater v. La go Vista , 532 U. S. 318, 347 (2001), for a parti cular prohibi - 11 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. tion before conducting a sea rch would “place police in an almost impossibl e spot,” id. , at 350. The majority has placed school officials in this “impossi - ble spot” by questioning whether possession of Ibuprofen and Napro xen causes a severe enough threat to warran t investigation. Had the suspected infraction involved a street drug, the majority implies that it would have ap - proved the scope of the search. Se e ante , at 9 (relying on the “limited threat of t he specific drugs he was searching for”); ante, at 10 (relying on the limited “ power of the drugs” in volved). In effect, then, th e majority has replaced a school rule that draws no distinction among drugs with a new one that does. As a result, a full search of a student’s person for prohibited drugs will be permitted only if the Court a gre es that the drug in q uestion was sufficiently dangerous. Such a test is unworkable and unsound. School offic ials cannot be expected to halt s earches based on the possibility that a court might later fi nd that the particular infraction at issue is not severe enough to war - rant an intrusive investigation. 4 —————— 4 JUS TICE GINSBURG su ggests t hat r equ iring Reddin g to “s it on a c hair outside [the a ssi stant principal’s] o ffice for ove r two ho urs” and failing to c all her par ents befor e conduc ting the sear ch constitutes an “[ a]bus e of author ity ” that “should not be shielde d by offic ial i mmunity .” See ante , at 1–2. Bu t th e sc hool was u nder n o constitu tion al oblig ation to call Redding’s pa rent s befor e conduct ing the s earch: “ [R]ea sona bleness under the Fo urth Amendment does not require employing the least int rusive m eans , because the logic of s uch ela borate les s-res trict ive - alter nativ e ar gumen ts c ould r aise in superable barriers to the exercise of virt ua lly a ll s earch-a nd-s eizure powers .” Board of Ed. of Indepe nd - ent School D ist. No. 92 of Po ttawatomie Cty. v. Earls , 536 U. S. 8 22, 8 37 (200 2) (in ternal qu otat ion mar ks an d br ackets omit ted). For th e same reason, the Constitution did not r equir e school officials to ask “followu p qu estion s” aft er th ey h ad alr eady dev eloped r eason able su spic ion th at Redding posse ssed drugs. See ante , at 6, 10 (m ajor ity opinion ); ante , at 1 (opinion of G INSBURG, J.). In an y ev en t, t he su ggestion that r equ iring Redding to s it in a cha ir for t wo hou rs amounted to a depriva tion of her constitutional rights, or that sc hool officials are required to engage in 12 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. A rule pro mulgated b y a school board repr esents the judgment of school off icials that the rule is needed to maintain “school orde r” and “a proper educational envi - ronment.” T. L. O. , 4 69 U. S., at 343, n. 9. Teachers, administrators, and the local school board are called upon both to “p rotect the . . . safety of s tudents an d school per - sonnel” and “maintain an environment conducive to learn - ing.” Id. , at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring i n judgment). They are task ed with “watch[ing] over a large number o f students” who “are inclined to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct an d to imitate the misb ehavior of a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with quickly.” Id. , a t 352. In such an environment, something as simple as a “water pistol or peash ooter can wreak [havoc] until it is taken away.” Ibid . The danger posed by unchecked di s- tribution and consumption of prescription pills by students certainly needs no elab oration. Judges are not qualified to second-guess the best man - ner for maintaining quiet and order in the school envi - ronment. Such institutional judgments, like those con - cerning the selection of the be st methods for “restrain[ing students] from assaulting one anot her, abusin g drugs an d alcohol, and committing other cr imes,” id., at 342, n. 9, “involve a host of policy choices that must be made by locally elec ted representatives, r ather than by federa l judges inte rpreting th e basic cha rter of Gov ernment for the entire c ountry.” Collins v. Ha rker Heigh ts, 503 U. S. 115, 129 (1992); cf. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewin g, 4 74 U. S. 214, 226 (1985) (observing that federal courts are n ot “suited to evaluat[ing] the substance of the multitude of academic decisions” or disciplinary decisions “that are —————— det ailed int erroga tions b efore cond uct ing s earches fo r dru gs, only reinforces the conclusion that the Ju dicia ry is ill-e quip ped to second - guess th e dail y dec ision s made by public adminis trator s. Cf. Beard v. Banks , 548 U. S. 521, 53 6–5 37 (2 006) (T HOMAS , J ., con curring in judg men t). 13 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions”). It is a mistake for judges to assume the responsibility for deciding which school rules are impor - tant enough to allow for inva sive searches an d which rules are not. 3 Even if this Court were authorized to second-guess the importance of school r ules, the C ourt’s assessment of the importance of this distr ict’s policy is flawed. It is a crime to possess or use pres cription-strength Ibuprofen without a prescripti on. See Ariz. Rev. Sta t. Ann. §13–3406(A)(1) (West Supp. 2008) (“A person s hall not knowingly . . . [p]ossess or use a prescription-only drug unless the perso n obtains the prescription-only drug pursuant to a valid prescription of a presc riber who is licensed pursuant to [state law]” ).5 By proh ibiting unauthorized prescription drugs on s chool grounds—and conducting a search t o ensure students abide by that pro hibition—the school rule here was consistent with a routine provision of the state criminal code. It hardly seems unreasonab le for school officials to enforce a rule that , in effect, proscr ibes conduct that amounts to a crime.

—————— 5Arizona’s law is not idio syncratic; ma ny S tates ha ve s epa rately crimina lized the una uthoriz ed pos session of prescriptio n drugs. See, e.g ., M o. Rev . Sta t. §577. 628(1) ( Supp. 200 8) (“No pe rson less th an tw en ty-on e years of ag e sh all posses s upon the real prope rty comprising a public or private elementary or sec ondary sc hool or school bu s pre - script ion m edica tion wit hout a va lid pres cript ion for s uch m edica tion” ); Okla. Sta t., Tit. 59, §3 53.2 4(2) (Su pp. 20 08) (“It shall be unlawfu l for any pers on, fi rm or corpo ration t o . . . [s ]ell , offer fo r s ale, b arter or give away an y unused qu an tity of dr ugs obtain ed by pr esc ription , ex cept . . . as provided by the State Board of Ph armac y”); Utah Code An n. §5 8– 17b –5 01(1 2) (Lex is 200 7) (“ ‘Unla wful con duct’ incl udes : us ing a pre - scription drug . . . for hims elf that was no t lawfully pre scribed for him by a pr actition er”); see also Ala. Code § 34–23 –7 ( 200 2); Del. Code An n., Tit. 16, §475 4A(a)(4) (Su pp. 200 8); Fl a. St at. §499.0 05( 14) (200 7); N. H. Rev . Stat. An n. §318:42(I) (S upp. 2008). 14 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. Moreover, s chool distri cts have valid reasons for punish - ing the un authorized possession of prescription drugs o n school property as severely as the possessi on of street drugs; “[t]e enage abus e of ov er-th e-counter and prescrip - tion drugs poses an in creasingly alarming national crisis.” Get Teens Off Drugs, The Education Digest 75 (Dec. 2006). As one study noted, “m ore young people ages 12–17 abuse prescription drugs than any ill icit drug except mari - juana—more than coca ine, heroin, and metha mphetamine combined.” Executive Office of the Presid ent, Office of National Drug Control Policy ( ONDC P), P rescription f or Danger 1 (Jan. 2008) (hereinafter Prescription for Da n- ger). And a ccording to a 2005 survey of teens, “nearly one in five (19 percent or 4.5 million) admit abu sing prescrip - tion drugs in their lif etime.” Columbia University, The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CAS A), “Y ou’ve Got Drugs!” V: Pr escription Drug Pusher s on the Internet 2 (July 2008); see also Dept. of Health an d Human Services, National Institut e on Drug Abuse, High School and Youth Tre nds 2 (Dec. 2008) (“In 2008, 15. 4 percent of 12th-graders reported using a prescription dru g nonmedically within th e past year”). School administrators can reasona bly conclude that this high rate of drug abuse is being fueled, at leas t in part, b y the increasing presence of prescription drugs on scho ol campuses. See, e.g., Gibson, Grand Fork s Schools See Ris e In Prescription Drug Abuse, Grand Forks Herald, Nov. 16, 2008, p. 1 (explaining that “prescription drug abuse is growing int o a larger problem” as students “bring them to school and sell them or just give them to their friends”). In a 2008 survey, “44 percent of teens sa[id] dru gs are used, k ept or sold on t he grounds of their schools.” CASA, National Survey of American Attitudes on Substance Abuse XIII: Teens and Parents 19 (Aug. 2008) (hereinafter National Survey). The risk s posed by the abuse of these drugs a re every bit as serious as the dange rs of using a 15 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. typical stre et drug. Teenagers are nevertheless apt to “believe the myth th at these drugs provide a medicall y safe high.” ONDCP, Teens and Prescripti on Drugs: An Analysis of Recen t Trends on the Emerging Drug Th reat 3 (Feb. 2007) (here - inafter Teens and Pre scription Drugs). Bu t since 1999, there has “been a dramatic increase in the number of poisonings and even deaths assoc iated with the abuse of prescription dru gs.” P rescription for Dan ger 4; see also Dept. of He alth and Human Servi ces, The NSDUH Report: Trends in Nonmedical Use of Prescription Pain Relievers:

2002 to 200 7, p. 1 (Feb. 5, 2009) (“[ A]pproxima tely 324,000 emergency department visits in 2 006 involved the non - medical use of pain relievers”); CA SA, Un der the Counter: The Diversi on and Abu se of Controlled Prescription Dru gs in the U. S., p. 25 (July 2005) (“In 2002, a buse of con - trolled prescription drugs was i mplicated in at least 23 percent of drug-related emergency department admissions and 20.4 percent of all sing le drug-related emergency department deaths”). At least some of these injuries and deaths are likely due to the fact that “[m ]ost controlled prescription drug abusers are poly- substance a busers,” id. , at 3, a habit that is e specially likely to res ult in deadly drug combinations. Furthermore, even if a child is not immediately harmed by the abuse of prescription dru gs, research suggests th at prescription drugs have become “gatewa y drugs to oth er substances of abuse.” Id. , at 4 ; Healy, Skipping the Street, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15, 2008, p. F1 (“Boomers made marijuana their ‘gateway’ . . . but a you nger generation finds prescription drugs an easier scor e”); see a lso National Survey 17 (noting that teens report “tha t pre scription d rugs are e asier to buy than beer”). Admitte dly, the Ib uprofen an d Na proxe n at iss ue in thi s case are no t the prescriptio n pa inkille rs at the forefront of the prescription-drug- abuse proble m. See Pre scription for 16 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. Da nge r 3 (“Pain relie ve rs li ke Vi co din an d OxyCon tin a re the prescriptio n drugs most co mmonl y ab us ed by teens”). Bu t t hey a re not wi tho ut thei r o wn da nge rs. As no nste r- oidal a nti-in flamm ato ry drugs ( NSAI Ds), they pose a ris k of dea th fro m overdose . The Pil l Boo k 821 , 827 (H. Sil verman, ed., 13 th e d. 200 8) (obse rvin g tha t Ibuprof en and Naproxen are NSAI Ds and “[p]e ople have died from NSAI D over - doses”). Moreover, the side-effec ts caused by the use o f NSAI Ds can be magnified if they are taken in combination with other drugs. See, e.g., Reacti ons Weekly, p. 18 (Issu e no. 1235, Jan. 17, 2009) (“A 1 7-year-old girl developed allergic interstitial nephriti s and renal failu re while re - ceiving escitalopram a nd ibuprofen”); id. , at 26 (Issue no. 1232, Dec. 13, 2008) (“ A 16-month-old boy developed iron deficiency anaemia a nd hypoalbuminaemia during treat - ment with naproxen”); id. , at 15 (Issue no. 1 220, Sept. 2 0, 2008) (18-year-old “was diagnosed with pill-i nduced oes o- phageal perforation” after ta king ibuprofen “and wa s admitted to the [intensive care unit]”); id. , at 20 (Issue n o. 1170, Sept. 22, 2007) (“A 12-year-old boy developed ana - phylaxis following ingestion of ibu profen”). If a studen t with a previously un known intolerance to Ibuprofen or Naproxen were to ta ke either drug and be - come ill, the public outrage would likely be directed to - ward the school for failing to take steps to prevent the unmonitore d use of the drug. In light of the risk s in - volved, a school’s decision to establish and enf orce a school prohibition on the poss ession of a ny unauthorized drug is thus a reasonable judgment. 6 —————— 6Schools h ave a sig nific an t i nter est in protecting a ll stu dents from pres cription drug a buse; yo ung fema le s tudents are no exception. See Teens and Pr escription Drugs 2 (“Pr esc ription drugs are the most common ly abu sed dr ug amo ng 12–1 3-y ear-olds”). In fac t, amon g 12- to 17-y ear-olds, f emales ar e “ more likely th an boy s to have abu sed pr e- scription drug s” and ha ve “higher ra tes o f dependence or abuse invol v- ing prescription drugs.” Id. , at 5. Thus , ra ther tha n undermining the 17 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. * * * In determining wheth er the search’s scope was reason - able under the Fourth Amendment, it is therefore irrele - vant whether officials suspe cted Redding of possessing prescription -strength I buprofe n, nonprescripti on-strength Naproxen, or some ha rder str eet drug. Safford prohibite d its possession on school prop erty. Reasonable suspicion that Reddi ng was in possession of drugs in violation of these polici es, therefor e, justified a search extending to any area where small pills could be concealed. The sear ch did not violate the Fourth Amendment. II By declarin g the search unreason able in this case, the majority has “ ‘surren der[ed] control of the American public school system to public school studen ts’ ” by invali - dating school policies t hat treat all drugs equally and b y second-guessing swift disciplinary decisions made by school offici als. See Morse , 551 U. S., at 421 (T HOMAS , J., concurring) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. , 393 U. S. 503, 526 (1 969) (Black, J., dissenting)). The Court’s inte rference in these matters of great concern to teachers, parents, and s tudents illu s- trates why the most constitutionally sound approach t o the question of applyi ng the Fourth Amendment in local public schools would in fact be the complete restoration of the common-law doctri ne of in loco paren tis . “[I]n the early years of public schooling,” courts applie d the doctrine of in loco paren tis to transfer to teachers the authority of a parent to “ ‘command obedien ce, to control stubbornness, to qu icken diligen ce, and to reform ba d habits.’ ” Morse , supra, at 413–4 14 (T HOMA S, J., concur - —————— releva nt gove rnm ental int eres t here, R edding’s age a nd s ex, if a ny - thing, increased the need f or a sea rch to pr event the reasonab ly sus - pected use of p rescription drugs.

18 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. ring) (quoting State v. Pe nde rg rass, 19 N. C. 365, 365–366 (1837)). So empowered, school teachers and administrators had almost complete discreti on to establish and enfor ce the rules they believed were ne cessary to maintain control over their classrooms. See 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 205 (1873) (“So the power allowed by law to the parent over the person of the c hild may be delegated to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the pur pose of education”); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of En gland 441 (1765) (“He may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmast er of his chi ld; who is then in loco paren tis , an d has such a portion of t he parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint a nd co rrection, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed”). 7 T he perils of judicial policymaking inh erent in applying Fourth Amendment protections to public schools cou nsel in favo r of a return to the understanding that existed in this Na - tion’s first public schools, which gave teache rs discretion to craft the rules needed to carry out th e disciplinar y responsibilities delegated to them by parents. If the common-law view that par ents delegate to teach - ers their authority to discipline and maintain order we re to be applied in this case, the search of R edding wou ld stand. There can be n o doubt that a parent would have had the au thority to c onduct the search at i ssue in this case. Pare nts have “i mmunity fr om the stri ctures of th e Fourth Am endment” when it comes to sear ches of a child —————— 7The o ne aspect of school discipline with respec t to which the judic i- ary at times b ecame inv olved was the “imposition of ex cessiv e phy sical punis hment.” Morse , 551 U. S., at 416 (T HOM AS, J., conc urrin g). Some early cou rts found co rpora l punis hment proper “a s long a s the tea cher did not ac t wi th leg al ma lice or cause permanent injury;” while other courts inter vened only if the punishment was “c lear ly excessiv e.” Ibi d. (emphasi s del eted and inte rnal quot atio n marks omit ted) (collecting dec ision s). 19 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. or that child’s belongings. T. L. O. , 469 U. S., at 337; see also id. , at 336 (A parent’s authority is “not s ubject to the limits of th e Fourth Amendment”); Griffin v. Wis consin , 483 U. S. 868, 876 (1987) (“[P]are ntal custodial authority” does not require “judicial approval for [a] search of a minor child’s room”). As ackno wledged by this Court, this principle is bas ed on the “societal understanding of superior and inferior” with respec t to the “pa rent and ch ild” relationship. Geor - gia v. Ra ndolph, 547 U. S. 103, 114 (2006). In light of th is relationship, the Court has indicated that a parent c an authorize a third-part y search of a child by consenting to such a search, even if the child denies his consent. See ibid.; see also 4 W. La Fave, Search and Seizure §8.3(d), p. 160 (4th ed. 2004) (“[A] father, as the head of the house - hold with the responsibilit y and the authority for the discipline, training and control of his children, has a supe - rior interest in the fa mily residence to that of his minor son, so that the father’s consent to search would be effec - tive notwithstanding the son’s contemporaneous on-the - scene obje ction” (internal quo tation marks omitted )). Certainly, a search by the parent himself is no different, regardless of whether or not a ch ild would prefer to be left alone. See id., §8.4(b), at 202 (“[E]ven [if] a minor child . . . may thi nk of a roo m as ‘his,’ the overall dominance will be in his pa rents” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Restoring t he common-law doctri ne of in loco paren tis would not, however, leave public schools entirely free to impose any rule they choose. “If parents do not like the rules impos ed by those schools, they can seek redress in school boar ds or legislatures; they can send their children to private schools or home sch ool t hem; or the y can simply move.” See Morse , 551 U. S., at 419 (T HOMA S, J., concur - ring). Indeed, parents and local government officials have proved themselves quite cap able of challenging overly harsh school rules or the enforcement of sensible rules i n 20 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. insensibl e ways. For example, on e com munity questioned a school policy that resulted in “an 11-year-old [being] arrested, hand - cuffed, and taken to jai l for bringing a plastic butter knife to school.” Downey, Zero Toleran ce Doesn’t Always Add Up, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Apr. 6, 2009, p. A11. In another, “[ a]t least on e school board member was outraged” when 14 elementa ry-school students were suspended for “imitati ng d rug a ctivity” afte r they com - bined Kool- Aid and sugar in plastic bags. Grant, Pupils Trading Sweet Mix Get Sour Shot of Discipline, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 18, 2006, p. B1. Individuals within yet another sch ool district protested a “ ‘zero-tolerance’ policy toward weapons” that had become “so rigid that it force[d ] schools to expel any student wh o belongs to a military organization, a drum-and-bugle corps or any other legiti - mate extra curricular group and is simply transporti ng what amounts to harmless props.” Richardson, School Gun Case Sparks Cries For “Common Sense,” Washington Times, Feb. 13, 2009, p. A1. 8 These local efforts to change controversial school policies through de mocratic p rocesses hav e proven successful in —————— 8See also, e.g. , Smy do, Allde rdic e Par ents D ecry Su spen sion s, Pit ts- bu rgh Post-Gazette, Apr . 16, 2009, p. B1 (Par en ts “bel iev e a on e-day suspen sion for a fir st-time h allw ay infraction is an overreaction”); O’Brien & Bu ckha m, Girl’s Smooch on School Bu s Leads to Su spen sion , Bu ffalo News, Jan . 6, 2008, p. B1 (Par en ts of 6-y ear-old say th e “sc hool officials overreacted” when they puni shed their daughter for “kissing a second-gra de boy”); S tewa rt, Ca mera Ph one Cont rove rsy: Da d S ays School Ov err eacted, Hou ston Ch ronicle, Dec . 12, 2007 , p. B5 (“Th e father of a 13-year-old . . . said the school di strict o verstepped it s bounds when i t suspended his da ughter for taking a cell phone photo of another chee rleader getting out of th e sho wer during a s leepover in his home”); Dumenig o & M uell er, “Cops and Robber s” Su spension Cr iti- cized at Sayreville School, The [New Jersey] Star-Ledger, Apr. 6, 200 0, p. 15 (“ ‘I think it’s ridiculous,’ said the mo ther of one of the [kindergar - ten] b oys. ‘Th ey’re lit tle b oys pla ying with each othe r. . . . w hen did a fin ger bec ome a weapon ?”). 21 Cite as: 55 7 U . S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MAS, J. many cases. See, e.g., Postal, Schools’ Zero Tolerance Could Lose Some Punch, Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 24, 200 9, p. B3 (“Sta te lawmake rs want schools to dial back s tri ct zero-tolerance policies so students do not end up in juve - nile detention for some ‘goofy thin g’ ”); Richar dson, Toler - ance Waning for Zero-tolerance Rules, Washin gton Times, Apr. 21, 20 09, p. A3 (“[A] few states have moved to relax their laws. Utah now allows stu dents to bring asthma inhalers to school without violating the zero-tolerance policy on drugs”); see also Nussb aum, Becoming Fed Up With Zero Tolerance, New York Times, Sep t. 3, 2000 , Section 14, p. 1 (discus sing a report that found that “wide - spread use of zero-tole rance discipline polici es was creat - ing as many problems as it was solving and that there were many cases around the country in wh ich students were harshly disciplined for infractions where there was no harm intended or done”). In the end, the task of impleme nting and amending public school policies is beyond this Court’s function. Parents, teachers, school admi nis trators, local politicia ns, and state officials are all better suited th an judges to determine the appropri ate limits on searches conducted b y school officials. Preservation of order, discipline, and safety in public school s is simply not the do main of the Constitution. And, co mmon sense is not a ju dicial monop - oly or a Constitutional imperative. III “[T]he nationwide dru g epidemic makes the war a gainst drugs a pressing concern in every school.” Board of Ed. of Independen t School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls , 536 U. S. 822, 834 (2002). And yet the Court h as limited the authority of school offic ials to conduct searche s for the dru gs that the officials believe pose a serious safety risk to their students. By doing so, the majority has con - firmed that a return to the doctri ne of in loco paren tis is 22 SAFFORD UNIFIED S CHOOL DIS T. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of THOMAS , J. required to keep the judiciary f rom essentially seizing control of p ublic school s. Only then will teach ers again b e able to “ ‘govern the[ir] pupils, qui ck en the sl othful, spur the indolent, restrain the impetuous, and control the stubborn’ ” by making “ ‘rules, gi v[ing] com mands, and punish[ing] disobedience’ ” with out interference from judges. Se e Morse , su pra , at 414. By decidi ng that it i s better equipped to decide what behavior shou ld be permit - ted in schools, the Court has undercut stud ent safety and undermined the authority of school admin istrators and local officia ls. Even more troubling, it has done so in a case in whi ch the un derlying res ponse by school adminis - trators was reasonable and justified. I cann ot join this regrettable decision. I, therefore, respectfully dissent fro m the Court’s determination that this search violated th e Fourth Am endment.