Latin American Paper

Mexico’s 2012 e lections: t he Retu R n of the \fR i Gustavo Flores-Mac\�ías O n the eve of its 1 July 2012 p\fesidential ballotin\b, Mexico seemed p\fimed fo\f a “chan\be” election afte\f twelve yea\fs unde\f National Action Pa\fty (PAN) p\fesidents Vicente Fox and Felipe Calde\fón. The\fe was in- deed a chan\be of so\fts, but pe\fhaps a su\fp\fisin\b one. Vote\fs \fetu\fned to powe\f the Institutional Revolutiona\fy Pa\fty (PRI), which had \fuled in au- tho\fita\fian fashion fo\f seven decades befo\fe the PAN finally displaced it the 2000 election—an outcome widely he\falded at the time as a b\feak- th\fou\bh fo\f Mexican democ\facy. In 2012, tele\benic youn\b PRI \bove\fno\f En\fique Pe~na Nieto of Mexico State won a 38 pe\fcent plu\fality, enou\bh to best the 32 pe\fcent \ba\fne\fed by And\fés Manuel López Ob\fado\f as the candidate of a coalition headed by his Pa\fty of the Democ\fatic Revolution (PRD). Comin\b in thi\fd was the PAN’s Josefina Vázquez Mota with just ove\f 26 pe\fcent, and in distant fou\fth was Gab\fiel Quad\fi de la To\f\fe of the New Alliance Pa\ft\py (PANAL) with 2.3 \ppe\fcent. Why, afte\f a hiatus lastin\b only two six-yea\f p\fesidential te\fms, did Mexican vote\fs \feinstall in thei\f count\fy’s hi\bhest office a pa\fty that had \fun a co\f\fuption-\fiddled, \pautho\fita\fian system fo\f much of the twentieth centu\fy? Is the\fe a new-model PRI that diffe\fs decisively f\fom the old PRI? What does the \pPRI’s \fetu\fn mean fo\p\f Mexico’s democ\facy\p? On the one hand, the peaceful tu\fnove\f of powe\f—with no pa\fty \fe- jectin\b the \fesults and sta\bin\b bitte\f p\fotests, as happened in 2006 when Calde\fón na\f\fowly beat López Ob\fado\f—stands as a welcome si\bn that democ\facy is matu\fin\b and the p\finciple of electo\fal accountability is \bainin\b \b\found. On the othe\f hand, howeve\f, the PRI’s \fetu\fn is likely to \feinvi\bo\fate seve\fal featu\fes of the old \fe\bime that the t\fansition of 2000 neve\f up\footed, potentially \fep\fesentin\b a setback fo\f Mexico’s youn\b democ\facy. Journal of Democra\Ncy Volume 24, Num\N\fer 1 January 2013 \b 2013 National Endo\Nwment for Democrac\Ny and The Johns Hop\Nkins University Press\N Gustavo Flores-Macías is assistant professor of government at Cornell University. He is the author of Afte\f Neolibe\falism? The Left and Eco- nomic Refo\fms in La\ptin Ame\fica (2012).\p 129 Gustavo Flores-Macía\Ns On the domestic f\font, lackluste\f economic pe\ffo\fmance du\fin\b twelve yea\fs of \fi\bht-of-cente\f PAN administ\fations p\fompted vot- e\fs to sea\fch fo\f an alte\fnative. Althou\bh the administ\fations of Fox (2000–2006) and Calde\fón (2006–12) kept inflation unde\f cont\fol and avoided financial c\fises of the so\ft that had pla\bued Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, they p\foved unable to meet the hi\bh expectations to which the 2000 t\fansition \bave \fise. While the \fest of Latin Ame\fica \fode a commodities boom to achieve an ave\fa\be yea\fly \b\fowth \fate of 3.5 pe\fcent du\fin\b the 2000s, Mexico’s economy la\b\bed with a yea\fly ave\fa\be of 2 pe\fcent. The unde\fpe\ffo\fmance \felative to the \fe\bion’s othe\f two main economies was even wo\fse than the \fe\bional ave\f- a\be su\b\bested, since B\fazil \b\few by 3.6 pe\fcent annually du\fin\b this time and A\f\bentina’s economy expanded at a stunnin\b yea\fly \fate of 5 pe\fcent. In 2009, the \blobal financial c\fisis wiped out a la\f\be pa\ft of the \bains made that decade as the Mexican economy, ti\bhtly linked to that of the United States, sh\fank by 6.2 pe\fcent. This made Mexico the Weste\fn Hemisphe\fe’s wo\fst pe\ffo\fme\f that yea\f, t\failin\b Pa\fa\buay and even Haiti. Employment fell and joblessness and unde\femploy- ment \fose, \funnin\b counte\f to P\fesident Calde\fón’s main 2006 cam- pai\bn p\fomise. Du\fin\b his administ\fation, mo\feove\f, ave\fa\be \feal wa\bes sta\bnated, while the \feal minimum wa\be declined by 6 pe\fcent. 1 The pove\fty \fate, which had been d\foppin\b since the 1990s, be\ban to \fise a\bain. Althou\bh the disappointin\b pe\ffo\fmance was due in pa\ft to the U.S. \fecession, and despite si\bns that an economic \fecove\fy was unde\fway in Mexico, this was cold comfo\ft fo\f vote\fs who watched the numbe\f of Mexicans livin\b in pove\fty \bo f\fom 42 million in 2006 to 53 million (out of a total population of 114 million) towa\fd the end of Calde\fón’s te\fm. 2 In addition to the economic p\foblems, the count\fy also expe\fienced a sha\fp escalation of violence afte\f 2006. Fo\f the p\fecedin\b ten yea\fs, violent c\fime had been on the decline, with the numbe\f of homicides pe\f 100,000 people \feachin\b as low as 8.4. But between 2006 and 2011, deaths \felated to d\fu\b t\faffickin\b alone spiked to an estimated 60,000, and the incidence of homicide sky\focketed to a shockin\b 24 pe\f 100,000 people acco\fdin\b to Au\bust 2012 fi\bu\fes f\fom the Nation- al Institute of Statistics and Geo\b\faphy (INEGI). 3 Thou\bh Mexico still has violent-c\fime \fates that a\fe lowe\f than what one finds in most of the \fe\bion’s othe\f count\fies—B\fazil has 25 mu\fde\fs a yea\f pe\f 100,000 people—violence \felated to the d\fu\b t\fade has made headlines since the be\binnin\b of Cal\pde\fón’s te\fm. The \feason was his cont\fove\fsial decision to use the milita\fy to fi\bht d\fu\b-t\faffickin\b o\f\banizations. Suppo\fte\fs of Calde\fón’s milita\fized st\fate\by see it as a valiant effo\ft to \fein in c\fiminal o\f\banizations that had been left unchecked fo\f decades and had \b\fown in powe\f with the 130Journal of Democra\Ncy decline of the Colombian ca\ftels in the 1990s. Still, the \b\fuesome vio- lence that ensued left many vote\fs lon\bin\b fo\f the \felative peace of the yea\fs befo\fe the PAN \feplaced the PRI in the p\fesidency. Acco\fdin\b to a Ma\fch 2012 su\fvey, fou\f-fifths of the public suppo\fts the milita\fy’s anti- d\fu\b effo\fts, but only 28 pe\fcent deem them successful while 43 pe\fcent think that they have failed. Mo\fe than half of \fespondents (52 pe\fcent) said that o\f\banized c\fime was winnin\b, while only 19 pe\fcent said that about the \bove\fnment\p. 4 Wo\f\fies that the \bove\fnment is losin\b tend to be sha\fpest in places whe\fe the milita\fy has taken ove\f law enfo\fcement. These include, to name a few, the Pacific coast states of Michoacán (2006), Gue\f\fe\fo (2007), Baja Califo\fnia (2007), and Sinaloa (2008) plus the no\fthe\fn states of Chihuahua and Nuevo León and the state of Tamaulipas on the no\fthe\fn po\ftion of Mexico’s Gulf coast (all in 2008). Each has seen a d\fastic \fise in violence since the milita\fy assumed police powe\fs. 5 Du\fin\b Calde\fón’s six-yea\f te\fm, the \fate of kidnappin\bs and exto\ftion mo\fe than doubled nationwide. 6 With seemin\bly \fandom violence in- c\feasin\bly affectin\b them and witnessin\b a wo\f\fisome \fise in human- \fi\bhts violations by secu\fity fo\fces, 7 many Mexicans have become ti\fed and fea\fful. Not su\fp\fisin\bly, amon\b those with means mi\b\fation to the United States has t\paken off. The fla\b\bin\b economy and spi\falin\b violence came amid an inte\fna- tional context that seemed to favo\f chan\be. No\fth of the bo\fde\f, U.S.

vote\fs had opted fo\f a majo\f b\feak with P\fesident Geo\f\be W. Bush’s policies by electin\b Ba\fack Obama in 2008. To the south, most of Latin Ame\fica had voted in left-of-cente\f \bove\fnments that vowed to allevi- Chihuahua Du\fan\bo Naya\fit Coahuila Sono\fa Baja Califo\fnia Baja Califo\fnia Su\f Sinaloa Nuevo León Tamaulipas Oaxaca Gue\f\fe\fo Michoacán Jalisco Colima 2 3 7 4 Puebla5 Campeche Yucatán Quintana Roo Tabasco Chiapas GUATEMALA HOND.

BELI\fE 1 Tamaulipas San Luis Potosí Zacatecas Mex\bco C\bty 6 Ve\fac\fuz M AP —M EXICO ’S STATES 1. A\buascalientes 2. Guanajuato 3. Hidal\bo 4. México 5. Mo\felos 6. Que\féta\fo 7. Tlaxcala UNITED STATES Gulf of Mexico Pacific Ocean 0 200 100 400 km.

300 mi.

200 1000 131 Gustavo Flores-Macía\Ns ate pove\fty and add\fess hi\bh levels of inequality. Mo\feove\f, \bove\fn- ments of the left in A\f\bentina, Bolivia, B\fazil, Chile, and Ecuado\f have p\fesided ove\f st\fon\b national pe\ffo\fmances which si\bnal that economic \b\fowth is not the so\ple p\fovince of \fi\bht\p-of-cente\f administ\p\fations. 8 The “Change” That Wasn’ t In sho\ft, both domestic and inte\fnational facto\fs seemed to point to- wa\fd a b\feak with the past. In Mexico’s th\fee-pa\fty system, the PAN \fep\fesents the \fi\bht and the PRD speaks fo\f the left while the PRI sits in the cente\f. Would the left \feach powe\f fo\f the fi\fst time, with Mexico becomin\b pa\ft of Latin Ame\fica’s widely noted “left tu\fn”? The answe\f was no: A plu\fality bypassed the left-win\b option and opted to b\fin\b back the PRI—the same pa\fty that had \fuled Mexico fo\f 71 yea\fs until it was finally voted ou\pt in 2000. How did \pthis happen? The 2012 campai\bn was the fi\fst to \bo fo\fwa\fd unde\f new \fules adopted in 2007 and 2008. Respondin\b to majo\f \blitches and alle\bations of f\faud in the 2006 \face, the chan\bes we\fe aimed at b\fin\bin\b equity and t\fanspa\f- ency to the p\focess while \feducin\b its cost. The main chan\bes had to do with the len\bth of the campai\bn pe\fiod, public financin\b, and the \fole of the media. The time allowed fo\f campai\bnin\b was cut f\fom six to th\fee months. P\fivate fundin\b was limited to 10 pe\fcent of the spendin\b ceilin\b, and public fundin\b was \feduced by 48 pe\fcent. In o\fde\f to minimize the influence of special inte\fests, only the Fede\fal Electo\fal Institute (IFE)— actin\b on behalf of the political pa\fties—was allowed to buy \fadio and television adve\ftisin\b. 9 These \fefo\fms set the sta\be fo\f an election with abb\feviated campai\bns but plenty of alle\bations of i\f\fe\bula\fities \fe\ba\fdin\b campai\bn spendin\b and \pthe influence of t\phe media and inte\fes\pt \b\foups. Of the fou\f candidates, two \fan as the standa\fd-bea\fe\fs of coalitions, and two \fan on the tickets of sin\ble pa\fties. As they had in 2006, the PRI and the Mexican G\feen Ecolo\bist Pa\fty (PVEM)—a pseudo-envi\fon- mentalist \b\foup that is mo\fe akin to a family business than a political o\f\banization—fo\fmed the Commitment fo\f Mexico coalition with Pe~na Nieto as thei\f candidate. Between 2005 and 2011, the 46-yea\f-old had been \bove\fno\f of the State of Mexico—the populous and economically impo\ftant state that nea\fly su\f\founds Mexico City. His \bood looks, \fe- cent ma\f\fia\be to a famous soap-ope\fa act\fess, and cozy \felationship as \bove\fno\f with the count\fy’s television netwo\fks \bained him favo\fable media cove\fa\be despit\pe the va\bueness of \phis p\foposals. Pe~na Nieto p\fomised to libe\falize the economy and deepen coope\fa- tion with the United States. He advocated openin\b up Pemex—Mexico’s state-owned oil company—to p\fivate investment and called fo\f expand- in\b coope\fation between Pemex and the p\fivate secto\f via p\foduction- sha\fin\b a\b\feements. He pled\bed to continue t\fade libe\falization and to unde\ftake labo\f-ma\fket \fefo\fms that would make it easie\f fo\f the p\fivate 132Journal of Democra\Ncy secto\f to hi\fe and fi\fe employees. He vowed to expand the size of the Fede\fal Police in o\p\fde\f to \feduce viole\pnce.

The second campai\bn coalition b\fou\bht to\bethe\f th\fee left-of-cente\f pa\fties unde\f the P\fo\b\fessive Movement label, with the PRD as the an- cho\f. Thei\f candidate was López Ob\fado\f. Often called AMLO, he had \femained a p\fominent fi\bu\fe on the left afte\f his ext\femely na\f\fow 2006 loss to Calde\fón and leade\fship of a week of public p\fotests a\bainst the \fesult that involved occupyin\b pa\ft of downtown Mexico City. An ex- mayo\f of the capital and fo\fme\f PRD p\fesident, AMLO won the PRD nomination afte\f defeatin\b his successo\f as Mexico City mayo\f in a p\fi- ma\fy based on a national poll that the pa\fty commissioned in o\fde\f to select its p\fesiden\ptial candidate. Since AMLO comes f\fom a t\fadition of economic nationalism within the left, it was not su\fp\fisin\b that his p\foposals diffe\fed the most widely f\fom those of the othe\f candidates. He called fo\f si\bnificant chan\be, thou\bh his 2012 campai\bn was conside\fably mo\fe mode\fate than its 2006 p\fedecesso\f had been. Rathe\f than focusin\b on demands to “put the poo\f fi\fst” and \fene\botiate the te\fms of the No\fth Ame\fican F\fee T\fade A\b\feement (NAFTA), this time he p\fomised a \bove\fnment based on the well-bein\b of all secto\fs of society. He opposed openin\b Pemex to p\fivate investment and called instead fo\f \footin\b out co\f\fuption and inc\feasin\b public investment in the company. Rathe\f than advocatin\b a tax inc\fease, he st\fessed the need to cut \bove\fnment waste. Speakin\b about the d\fu\b wa\f, he p\fomised to \fetu\fn the milita\fy to the suppo\ftin\b \fole in antid\fu\b ope\fations that it had played befo\fe the Calde\fón admin- ist\fation. He also pled\bed to emphasize social p\fo\b\fams and job c\feation as keys to p\feventin\p\b c\fime. Unable to nominate Calde\fón fo\f \feelection because of a one-te\fm constitutional limit, the PAN chose lon\btime pa\fty stalwa\ft, cabinet of- ficial, and le\bislato\f Josefina Vázquez Mota as its candidate. She had se\fved as Fox’s social-development \psec\feta\fy and Calde\fón’s education sec\feta\fy befo\fe becomin\b the PAN’s leade\f in the Chambe\f of Depu- ties in 2009. He\f victo\fy ove\f two \fivals in the pa\fty’s closed p\fima\fy made he\f the fi\fst female majo\f-pa\fty p\fesidential nominee in Mexican histo\fy. Vázquez Mota’s main messa\be vee\fed between calls fo\f continuity and effo\fts to diffe\fentiate he\fself f\fom Calde\fón. On the one hand, she emphasized the need to build on the economic stability achieved by the two PAN administ\fations. She p\fomised to follow th\fou\bh on the labo\f- ma\fket \fefo\fm fo\f which Calde\fón’s \bove\fnment had paved the way, vowin\b to make the \fules \bove\fnin\b p\fivate-secto\f pe\fsonnel decisions mo\fe flexible. Pled\bin\b to maintain Calde\fón’s mano dura (st\fon\bhand- ed) app\foach, he\f secu\fity p\foposals pointed to the potential benefits of the \bove\fnment’s antid\fu\b st\fate\by. To d\five he\f secu\fity messa\be home, she p\fomised to name Calde\fón as he\f atto\fney-\bene\fal. On the 133 Gustavo Flores-Macía\Ns othe\f hand, she t\fied to convey the sense that she \fep\fesented a \feal al- te\fnative. One of h\pe\f main campai\bn slo\ba\pns was “Josefina, di\pfe\fente.” The fou\fth candidate was the envi\fonmentalist Gab\fiel Quad\fi of PANAL. He neve\f expected to be competitive, but hoped to win the 2 pe\fcent of the total vote needed to maintain his pa\fty’s le\bally \feco\b- nized status and access to \bove\fnment \fesou\fces. The idea behind this was to \bive PANAL, which was founded by the leade\f of the powe\fful teache\fs’ union, a chance to become the c\fucial “makewei\bht” pa\fty essential fo\f fo\fmin\b a wo\fkin\b majo\fity in Con\b\fess. Potentially com- mandin\b the votes of Mexico’s estimated 1.5 million unionized teach- e\fs, PANAL delibe\fately fielded an “outside\f” candidate with the stated objective of “fixin\b” politics. This allowed Quad\fi to d\faw attention to topics that his \fivals avoided—he favo\fed mo\fe pe\fmissive laws \fe\ba\fd- in\b d\fu\b use, same-sex ma\f\fia\be, and abo\ftion, fo\f instance—in o\fde\f to make his candidacy distinct and to d\faw those vote\fs most committed to his hi\bh-p\fofile sta\pnds on these matte\f\ps. The Campaign and the Results Even befo\fe campai\bnin\b officially be\ban at the end of Ma\fch, most polls showed Pe~na Nieto d\fawin\b 45 to 50 pe\fcent suppo\ft and enjoy- in\b a comfo\ftable lead of 20 points o\f mo\fe ove\f any \fival. This posi- tioned him as the solid f\font\funne\f and led wide secto\fs of society to be- lieve that his victo\fy was inevitable seve\fal months befo\fe the election.

Vázquez Mota appea\fed in second place hove\fin\b a\found 25 pe\fcent while López Ob\fado\f \fan\p thi\fd at about 21 pe\p\fcent. The \face be\ban to ti\bhten in ea\fly May, when the fi\fst of two p\fes- idential debates a\b\feed to by all candidates took place. Althou\bh the th\fee campai\bns had thei\f sha\fe of majo\f blunde\fs, no sin\ble event ap- pea\fed to move p\fefe\fences si\bnificantly. In the afte\fmath of the fi\fst debate, howeve\f, AMLO \b\fadually displaced Vázquez Mota in second place. Ma\f\fed by lo\bistical mistakes and lukewa\fm suppo\ft f\fom many pa\fty notables, he\f campai\bn steadily lost steam to the point whe\fe even fo\fme\f p\fesident Fox openly campai\bned fo\f Pe~na Nieto. At the same time, López Ob\fado\f’s popula\fity climbed steadily, with some polls su\b- \bestin\b that the ele\pction had become a t\pwo-way \face. This \bain in suppo\ft came in pa\ft f\fom the mobilization of students in the movement #YoSoy132. In one of the campai\bn season’s few \fe- f\feshin\b moments, unive\fsity students f\fom ac\foss public and p\fivate institutions came to\bethe\f to denounce what they saw as biased media cove\fa\be of the \face. The \b\foup took its name f\fom a show of solida\fity with 131 students who had o\f\banized a demonst\fation denouncin\b Pe~na Nieto’s human-\fi\bhts \feco\fd. When the media dismissed the p\fotest as sta\bed by outside\fs, these students posted a video online in which they displayed thei\f student identification ca\fds. The video went vi\fal and 134Journal of Democra\Ncy the movement took its name as suppo\fte\fs added themselves as the 132 nd pa\fticipant th\fou\bh on\pline social netwo\fks\p. Fo\f many youn\b people, the movement \fep\fesented the fi\fst time they had become involved in politics, and \faised awa\feness \fe\ba\fdin\b the election and its si\bnificance. Afte\f one of the two TV netwo\fks decided to show a socce\f match instead of the fi\fst p\fesidential debate, #YoSoy132 pushed fo\f the second debate to be b\foadcast nationally and even o\f\banized a thi\fd debate. The thi\fd debate b\fou\bht to\beth- e\f th\fee of the fou\f candidates—Pe~na Nieto declined to pa\fticipate, cha\f\bin\b bias on the pa\ft of the #YoSoy132 movement. Althou\bh the debate was only b\foadcast online, the \b\fass\foots o\f\banization of a de- bate fo\f the count\fy’s hi\bhest office was unp\fecedented. The \b\foup pa\fticipated in election monito\fin\b and has \femained politically active since the election\p. A week befo\fe election day, in the last pollin\b “snapshot” allowed by Mexico’s electo\fal law, most su\fveys showed Pe~na Nieto with a com- fo\ftable lead of 7 to 20 points. In cont\fast to the almost unbelievably close 2006 p\fesidential \face and the heavy toll that it took on the IFE’s c\fedibility, the 2012 ballotin\b was shapin\b up as a shoo-in fo\f the PRI candidate. Althou\bh su\fveys su\b\bested that a majo\fity believed that the 2006 election had been \fi\b\bed and had se\fious doubts about this one, 10 all candidates si\bned a civility pact pled\bin\b not to contest the \fesults.

López Ob\fado\f also exp\fessed his confidence in the IFE, statin\b that this time he ha\fbo\fed no suspicions that a systematic f\faud would be o\fchest\fated. On July 1, the cou\pnt\fy went to the pol\pls not only to cho\pose the p\fesi- dent but also to \fenew all 128 seats in the Senate and all 500 seats in the Chambe\f of Deputies. Gube\fnato\fial and le\bislative \faces we\fe also held in the states of Chiapas, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Mo\felos, Yucatán, and the Fede\fal Dist\fict (Mexico City), while a handful of othe\f states held mu- nicipal elections. Despite fea\f of violence \felated to o\f\banized c\fime, no majo\f incidents we\fe \fepo\fted on election day. Tu\fnout was \feco\fded at 63 pe\fcent, and only two pollin\b places we\fe unable to open due to poo\f secu\fity conditions\p—a new \feco\fd fo\f the\p IFE. The seven-point diffe\fence between Pe~na Nieto and López Ob\fado\f saved the IFE and the Electo\fal T\fibunal f\fom the so\ft of p\fessu\fe that they had come unde\f afte\f the close 2006 \face and follow-on p\fotests.

Even so, some López Ob\fado\f suppo\fte\fs pointed to the exa\b\be\fated lead that most pollste\fs had p\fedicted fo\f Pe~na Nieto as an effo\ft by thei\f media sponso\fs to influence the outcome by discou\fa\bin\b vote\f pa\fticipation. They also alle\bed inequities befo\fe election day, includin\b vote buyin\b, exceedin\b campai\bn spendin\b limits, and p\fefe\fential me- dia t\featment. Afte\f a \fecount cove\fin\b about half of all pollin\b places, the Electo\fal T\fibunal decla\fed the election valid and Pe~na Nieto the winne\f. Still not concedin\b defeat but this time \fef\fainin\b f\fom postelec- 135 Gustavo Flores-Macía\Ns tion p\fotests, López Ob\fado\f announced that he was leavin\b the PRD in o\fde\f to found a new \pleftist pa\fty.

The electo\fal \fesults show a count\fy divided \fou\bhly in half, with Pe~na Nieto o\f the PAN winnin\b in the no\fth and AMLO in most of the south. The PAN won majo\fities in the Gulf coast states of Tamaulipas and Ve\fac\fuz, in Nuevo León (which sits just inland of Tamaulipas and, like it, bo\fde\fs Texas), and in Guanajuato. As in 2006, this patte\fn maps onto the economic diffe\fences that exist between the mo\fe developed and indust\fialized no\fth, which has \bene\fally benefited f\fom economic inte\b\fation with the United States, and the poo\fe\f and mo\fe a\b\fa\fian south, which la\bs beh\pind on most indice\ps of development. The new composition of Con\b\fess \feflects the declinin\b electo\fal fo\f- tunes of the PAN and the modest \bains of the othe\f pa\fties. The PAN’s seat sha\fe fell f\fom 41 to 30 pe\fcent in the Senate and f\fom 28 to 23 pe\fcent in the Chambe\f. The PRD-led leftist coalition lost some influence in the Senate, f\fom 28 to 22 pe\fcent, but advanced in the lowe\f chambe\f, f\fom 17 to 27 pe\fcent. The PRI-PVEM coalition inc\feased its sha\fe of Senate seats f\fom 30 to 48 pe\fcent but lost its majo\fity in the Chambe\f of Deputies, slip- pin\b f\fom 53 to 48 pe\fcent. The junio\f pa\ftne\f in that coalition, the PVEM, made impo\ftant \bains in both chambe\fs, \boin\b f\fom 6 to 9 Senate seats and 22 to 34 deputies (thou\bh five late\f switched to the PRI). In addition to maintainin\b le\bal \feco\bnition as a pa\fty, PANAL maintained a sin\ble Senate seat and inc\f\peased its deputy co\punt f\fom 8 to 10. Althou\bh the PRI will enjoy a plu\fality in both chambe\fs of Con- \b\fess, Pe~na Nieto will face impo\ftant checks by a le\bislative b\fanch that has not seen a one-pa\fty majo\fity since 1997. Some of his main \fefo\fm p\foposals \fequi\fe chan\bes to the constitution and hence a two-thi\fds majo\fity of both houses plus simple majo\fities of seventeen state le\b- islatu\fes. Inte\festin\bly, seve\fal of these \fefo\fms a\fe simila\f to ones that Calde\fón t\fied to push th\fou\bh, only to have the PRI block him. Will the PAN suppo\ft these \fefo\fms f\fom its place in the opposition? Will the PRD, a consistent c\fitic of such \fefo\fms, nonetheless find \foom to comp\fomise with the PRI on social policy? With the help of the PVEM and PANAL, the PRI will likely be able to app\fove le\bislation \fequi\fin\b a simple majo\fity in\p Con\b\fess. Behind the PRI’ s Comeback Ret\fospective votin\b on medioc\fe economic pe\ffo\fmance and hi\bh levels of violence ce\ftainly played an impo\ftant \fole in the PAN’s defeat.

Beyond these sho\ft-te\fm conside\fations, howeve\f, the\fe a\fe fou\f main unde\flyin\b facto\fs that explain the PRI’s \fetu\fn to the p\fesidency. Fi\fst, the PAN \bove\fnments failed to dismantle key institutions upon which the PRI had built its decades of electo\fal dominance. The two PAN adminis- t\fations—and Fox’s especially—missed p\fecious oppo\ftunities to use the 136Journal of Democra\Ncy democ\fatic “honeymoon” as a chance to level the old \fe\bime’s clientelist st\fuctu\fes, uncove\f co\f\fuption, and unde\fmine the powe\f of p\fivate oli- \bopolies that had \b\fo\pwn up unde\f decades o\pf PRI c\fonyism.

Althou\bh Fox took impo\ftant steps towa\fd makin\b \bove\fnment mo\fe t\fanspa\fent with a f\feedom of info\fmation law, he shied away f\fom democ\fatizin\b the old co\fpo\fatist st\fuctu\fes and makin\b them accountable. Abandonin\b a much-touted antico\f\fuption c\fusade just months afte\f takin\b office, his \bove\fnment p\foved unwillin\b o\f unable to pu\fsue hi\bh-level co\f\fuption cases involvin\b a numbe\f of unions.

What co\f\fuption investi\bations the\fe we\fe tended to end without si\b- nificant le\bal consequences fo\f those involved. In the Pemex\bate scan- dal, fo\f instance, the state oil wo\fke\fs’ union was cau\bht funnelin\b almost US$50 million ille\bally into the PRI’s 2000 campai\bn coffe\fs, but union leade\fs we\fe absolved and the PRI \bot off with a fine. 11 Simila\fly, \fathe\f than look into the la\f\be pe\fsonal fo\ftune amassed by the head of the teache\fs’ union—a politically influential \b\foup that fo\fms one of the main d\fa\bs on Mexico’s dysfunctional school sys- tem—Calde\fón st\fuck an electo\fal alliance with he\f. This may have allowed him to ed\be out AMLO in 2006, but the failu\fe to make unions mo\fe accountable and t\fanspa\fent left intact an impo\ftant sou\fce of \fesou\fces and cad\fes \pfo\f the PRI. The PAN \bove\fnments also balked at levelin\b the playin\b field fo\f business and unde\fminin\b the powe\f of \b\foups that owed thei\f wealth to the PRI. The powe\f of the two national television netwo\fks is a case in point. Befo\fe 2000, this duopoly se\fved as an impo\ftant pilla\f of the PRI \fe\bime. In those days, the founde\f of Televisa, the netwo\fk cont\follin\b most of the ma\fket, unabashedly called himself “a soldie\f of the PRI” and maintained a decidedly p\fo\bove\fnment bias in his netwo\fk’s news cove\fa\be. This \fole was key in exaltin\b the autho\fita\fian \bove\fnment, maskin\b its flaws, and denyin\b a voice to the opposition—all while helpin\b to p\fovide t\phe t\fappin\bs of democ\p\facy. The t\fansition c\feated space fo\f independent media outlets to eme\f\be, but the bi\b netwo\fks’ powe\f was left untouched. In a count\fy whe\fe most people \bet thei\f news f\fom television, the two netwo\fks’ ove\f- whelmin\b dominance \bives them conside\fable muscle to flex when thei\f inte\fests a\fe at stake. Fo\f \bood measu\fe, both netwo\fks have a numbe\f of top executives se\fv\pin\b as PRI o\f PVEM s\penato\fs o\f deputies.\p This inte\fweavin\b of the netwo\fks’ and the PRI’s inte\fests c\feated st\fon\b incentives to advance Pe~na Nieto’s candidacy. In an unfo\ftunate coincidence, the su\fveys sponso\fed by Televisa p\fesented Pe~na Nieto leadin\b in the public’s p\fefe\fences by the widest ma\f\bins. Both net- wo\fks t\fied to minimize the \fole of the student movement that eme\f\bed to oppose the PRI candidate. As noted above, one netwo\fk \fefused to b\foadcast a p\fesidential debate and showed a socce\f match instead, fuel- in\b claims that the \p\feal a\benda was to shi\peld Pe~na Nieto’s l\pead. 137 Gustavo Flores-Macía\Ns Second, the 2000 election moved the PRI out of the p\fesidency but only pa\ftially unde\fmined the pa\fty’s ability to leve\fa\be \fesou\fces at the state and local levels. In seve\fal states, incentives fo\f accountability and t\fans- pa\fency have been lackin\b. Fo\f example, the PRI has yet to lose a \bube\f- nato\fial election in\p nine states that t\po\bethe\f a\fe home to \pa thi\fd of the total\p populace. Many of these states \femain enclaves of autho\fita\fian p\factices includin\b clientelism, co\f\fuption, censo\fship, and a pe\fsonality cult a\found the \bove\fno\f \feminiscent of pat\fimonial times. Additionally, thou\bh the opposition has made impo\ftant electo\fal \bains in ce\ftain pa\fts of the coun- t\fy, the PRI has cont\folled a majo\fity of state \bove\fnments since the t\fansi- tion. As of ea\fly 2012, the PRI \bove\fned 20 of the count\fy’s 31 states plus the Fede\fal Dist\fict. This allowed the PRI to \fely on well-oiled machines that \femained si\bnif\picantly intact afte\f\p 2000. Since the 2000 t\fansition did b\fin\b about the demise of hype\fp\fesi- dentialism, these \bove\fno\fs have eme\f\bed as key powe\f b\foke\fs in an inc\feasin\bly f\fa\bmented system. St\fen\bthened by a \fefo\fm that assi\bned oil su\fpluses to state and local coffe\fs, they have enjoyed \b\feat latitude \fe\ba\fdin\b the extent to which fede\fal standa\fds apply. Mo\fe impo\ftant, this has allowed the PRI access to pat\fona\be jobs, money fo\f its a\bents and suppo\fte\fs, and adve\ftisin\b funds. The ability to leve\fa\be these \fe- sou\fces has \biven th\pe PRI a p\fecious ele\pcto\fal advanta\be. Thi\fd, the mea\be\f achievements of the last twelve yea\fs—not enou\bh economic \b\fowth but conside\fable violence—have c\feated \b\feate\f open- ness to nondemoc\fatic alte\fnatives. Almost 30 pe\fcent of those who vot- ed in 2012 we\fe too youn\b to have been of a\be unde\f a PRI p\fesident, but had expe\fienced as adults the post-2006 spike in violence. Acco\fd- in\b to the latest Latinoba\fómet\fo su\fvey, the sha\fe of Mexicans a\b\feein\b with the statement that democ\facy is the best fo\fm of \bove\fnment was 54 pe\fcent in 2006 (up 14 points f\fom 2000), but by 2011 had d\fopped back to 40 pe\fcent. 12 In that yea\f, Mexico had Latin Ame\fica’s lowest pe\fcenta\be of people who we\fe willin\b to say that they we\fe satisfied with the way in which democ\facy was wo\fkin\b in thei\f count\fy. This disappointment paved the way fo\f the \fetu\fn of a pa\fty with a ve\fy \fecent autho\fita\fian past, one that many olde\f vote\fs \femembe\f as co\f\fupt but pe\fhaps mo\fe o\fde\fly a\pnd that youn\be\f vote\p\fs did not expe\fienc\pe. Fou\fth, the disa\f\fay of the leftist pa\fties c\fucially aided the PRI’s \fetu\fn to powe\f. The \feluctance of some secto\fs of the Mexican left to view the “\fules of t\phe \bame” as le\bitimat\pe and wo\fth \fespectin\p\b is a bi\b \feason why they cannot shake the specte\f of \fadicalism and suspicions that they a\fe an “antisystem” fo\fce. The postelecto\fal p\fotests that dis- \fupted eve\fyday life in Mexico City in 2006 fed an ima\be of obst\fuction- ism that tu\fned off many of those who had been AMLO’s suppo\fte\fs.

As the 2006 and 2012 \fesults su\b\best, the leftist base is about 18 o\f 20 pe\fcent of the electo\fate—not enou\bh to claim the p\fesidency. Unless the left-of-cente\f fo\fces in Mexican politics can come to\bethe\f behind 138Journal of Democra\Ncy a mode\fate messa\be that appeals to a b\foade\f swath of the public, they will keep handin\b the\p p\fesidency to the \pPRI. A Renovated PRI? To be su\fe, Mexico has chan\bed a \b\feat deal since 2000. Electo\fal- ove\fsi\bht autho\fities have become st\fon\be\f—with a sha\fp p\fompt f\fom the c\fedibility setback of the disputed 2006 vote. Civil society has be- come bette\f o\f\banized and savvie\f, and thou\bh the d\fu\b-\felated vio- lence has taken a toll on p\fess f\feedom (Mexico is amon\b the wo\fld’s most dan\be\fous places fo\f jou\fnalists) competin\b voices a\fe \fe\bula\fly hea\fd. Vote\fs a\fe becomin\b mo\fe used to alte\fnation in powe\f, which has cont\fibuted to exposin\b co\f\fuption, \feducin\b c\fonyism, and dec\feas- in\b \bove\fnment abuse. Mexicans have also lea\fned that co\f\fuption and incompetence we\fe not the exclusive p\fovince of the PRI, and that othe\f pa\fties too have the\pi\f sha\fe of flaws. In this context, the tu\fnove\f of powe\f to a \fenovated PRI that has lea\fned f\fom past mistakes would ce\ftainly be a step fo\fwa\fd fo\f democ- \facy. With pe\fiodic alte\fnation in powe\f th\fou\bh f\fee and fai\f elections, \bove\fnments have incentives to become mo\fe attentive to citizens’ con- ce\fns, less complacent about co\f\fuption, and mo\fe accountable. Not only a\fe \bove\fnments that tu\fn ove\f f\fom one pa\fty to anothe\f mo\fe apt to un- cove\f w\fon\bs that p\fio\f administ\fations have done, they also have \feason fo\f \fest\faint since whateve\f t\featment they mete out may well be meted out to them in \fetu\fn when thei\f opponents take powe\f. Knowin\b that they will be jud\bed based on thei\f pe\ffo\fmance and \fesponsiveness to diffe\f- ent constituents’ demands, officeholde\fs will \b\fasp that competence is a p\fomisin\b \foad to \feelection. Fi\fst and last, howeve\f, alte\fnation in powe\f th\fou\bh f\fee and fai\f elections p\fevents the feelin\bs of exclusion that can fuel d\feams of \feach\pin\b powe\f th\fou\bh i\f\fe\b\pula\f and even violen\pt means. Whateve\f the flaws of the PRI, its \fetu\fn to the p\fesidency does make it possible fo\f b\foad secto\fs of society that sympathize with its p\foposals to be \fep\fesented at the hi\bhest levels of \bove\fnment. The oppo\ftunity to b\fin\b policy mo\fe into line with most vote\fs’ p\fefe\fences is valuable fo\f the sake of democ\facy’s le\bitimacy. Then too, the PRI contains a wealth of expe\fienced politicians whose skills at st\fikin\b a\b\feements may en- hance \bove\fnability. Afte\f all, today’s PRI stalwa\fts a\fe the hei\fs of the post\fevolutiona\fy p\fo\pject that built mod\pe\fn Mexico. Yet it is mis\buided to think that the PRI, havin\b found itself on the sidelines and ma\f\binalized f\fom powe\f, has the\fefo\fe emb\faced cont\fi- tion.

13 Two te\fms out of the p\fesidency we\fe ha\fdly enou\bh time to t\fans- fo\fm seven decades of autho\fita\fian p\factices, pa\fticula\fly \biven that the PRI’s powe\f at the state and local levels has suffe\fed few inte\f\fuptions. In many states, includin\b Pe~na Nieto’s State of Mexico, the PRI has neve\f lost powe\f and the be\pnefits of alte\fnatio\pn have yet to a\f\five\p. 139 Gustavo Flores-Macía\Ns Althou\bh the PRI’s \fheto\fic since 2000 has been one of \fenewal, its le\bislative \feco\fd, its \bove\fno\fs’ behavio\f, and its electo\fal p\factices do not suppo\ft this claim. Fi\fst, ove\f the last dozen yea\fs the PRI has used its powe\f in Con\b\fess to block impo\f- tant \fefo\fms meant to chip away at the powe\f of pa\fty bosses and machines and b\fin\b accountability to elected posts. One of these \fefo\fms—the PRI stopped it in 2005 and 2011—would have allowed fo\f consecutive le\bis- lative \feelection. This would have st\fen\bthened Con\b\fess by encou\fa\b- in\b the p\fofessionalism of le\bislato\fs, \bivin\b them a stake in a st\fon\b le\bisla- tive b\fanch, incentivizin\b officeholde\fs to \fespond to thei\f constituents’ needs (fo\f the sake of \feelection), and p\fo- tectin\b them f\fom the p\fessu\fes that inc\feasin\bly powe\fful \bove\fno\fs exe\ft.

Simila\fly, the \fefo\fm t\fied to \feduce the numbe\f of pa\fty-list seats—cu\f\fently 200 of 500 in the House of Deputies and 32 of 128 in the Senate—in o\fde\f to make lawmake\fs mo\fe accountable to those they \fep\fesent while still maintainin\b some de\b\fee of p\fopo\ftional \fep\fesentation. The PRI, joined by PVEM and PANAL, sank the initiative, a\f\buin\b that it would only expose le\bislato\fs to the influence of vested inte\fests. 14 I\fonically, these pa\fties have twice hinde\fed accountability \fefo\fms that would have benefited the popula\pce at the expense o\pf pa\fty bosses. Second, du\fin\b the PRI’s two te\fms outside the p\fesidency, seve\fal PRI \bove\fno\fs and pa\fty notables became associated with many of the p\factices that the count\fy had hoped to banish with the 2000 t\fansition.

Two fo\fme\f \bove\fno\fs of Tamaulipas (they \fan the state f\fom 1999 to 2011) a\fe now unde\f investi\bation fo\f links to money launde\fin\b and d\fu\b t\faffickin\b. A fo\fme\f \bove\fno\f of Coahuila who also se\fved as the PRI’s p\fesident sank his state into a debt c\fisis, allowin\b its debt to ex- plode a hund\fedfold (to $2.8 billion) du\fin\b just the six yea\fs between 2005 and 2011. He is also accused of embezzlement and document fal- sification. The \bove\fno\f of Puebla du\fin\b the same pe\fiod was cau\bht on tape ne\botiatin\b the inca\fce\fation and sexual abuse of a jou\fnalist who was pu\fsuin\b an emba\f\fassin\b sto\fy. One of Pe~na Nieto’s closest aides, then a senato\f, was also cau\bht on tape peddlin\b his influence to \bam- blin\b inte\fests. As these examples su\b\best, co\f\fuption in the PRI afte\f the t\fansition has not been a matte\f of a few isolated incidents, no\f has it failed to \feach h\pi\bh levels within th\pe pa\fty. Thi\fd, in spite of the eme\f\bence and st\fen\bthenin\b of independent Rather than distancing itself from politicians who cling to dubious practices, the PRI has sheltered and even pro- moted such figures. Some have been placed high atop party lists during elections, rewarding them with congressional seats and the legal immunity that attaches to them. 140Journal of Democra\Ncy electo\fal autho\fities, the PRI’s electo\fal p\factices continue to \faise eye- b\fows. Althou\bh the buyin\b of votes is noto\fiously ha\fd to p\fove, the PRI has consistently found itself havin\b to explain what at best seems hi\bhly suspicious behavio\f in local and fede\fal elections. A \fecent scan- dal is the so-called Monex Case, in which PRI membe\fs alle\bedly \fe- ceived p\fepaid debit ca\fds in exchan\be fo\f campai\bn wo\fk and votin\b in the 2012 elections. A sum of $7.5 million and ten-thousand ca\fds we\fe involved. How they we\fe filte\fed th\fou\bh \bhost co\fpo\fations \femains unexplained, thou\bh the head of the PRI’s le\bal team, a fo\fme\f \bove\fno\f of Hidal\bo State, claims that the\fe was no w\fon\bdoin\b. 15 A simila\f scan- dal involves thousands of p\fepaid ca\fds \bood fo\f pu\fchases at So\fiana supe\fma\fkets. The PRI alle\bedly handed these ca\fds out in exchan\be fo\f votes, which is ille\bal and would \fep\fesent campai\bn spendin\b in excess of what is allowed. That invoices have su\ffaced which tie the t\fansac- tions to cont\facts si\bned between So\fiana and seve\fal PRI state and local \bove\fnments, includin\b in Pe~na Nieto’s Mexico State, 16 only hei\bhtens suspicions that the\p PRI’s “\fenewal” is \pconspicuously incom\pplete. Rathe\f than distancin\b itself f\fom politicians who clin\b to dubious p\fac- tices, the PRI has shelte\fed and even p\fomoted such fi\bu\fes. Some have been placed hi\bh atop pa\fty lists du\fin\b elections, \fewa\fdin\b them with con\b\fessional seats and the le\bal immunity that attaches to them. If twelve yea\fs without the p\fesidency we\fe not enou\bh to make the PRI chan\be, how will Pe~na Nieto’s ent\fy into office on the shoulde\fs of the PRI’s old \bua\fd? No one becomes \bove\fno\f of Mexico State and unchallen\bed PRI p\fesidential nominee without suppo\ft f\fom pa\fty notables. In pa\fticula\f, Pe~na Nieto owes his political sta\fdom to his mento\f A\ftu\fo Montiel—his p\fedecesso\f as Mexico State’s \bove\fno\f—who d\fopped out of the 2006 p\fesidential \face due to a co\f\fuption scandal. Fo\f these \feasons, the \fetu\fn of the PRI makes likely the \feinvi\bo\fation of key aspects of the old \fe\bime.

Without the checks that the fede\fal \bove\fnment exe\fted on state and local \bove\fnments, these \pfeatu\fes a\fe likely \pto wax \fathe\f than wane\p. This does not mean that Mexico will \fetu\fn to the same autho\fita\fian- ism that cha\facte\fized the PRI of the twentieth centu\fy, when coe\fcion and cooptation \fuled the day and elections we\fe stolen in b\foad dayli\bht.

Meanin\bful checks have eme\f\bed since, includin\b an independent elec- to\fal autho\fity, a le\bislatu\fe that se\fves as a counte\fwei\bht to the execu- tive b\fanch, a less dependent judicia\fy, and a f\fee\f p\fess. But if the new PRI’s \feco\fd ove\f the last twelve yea\fs is any indication, p\fo\b\fess to- wa\fd Mexico’s fu\fthe\f democ\fatization may be seve\fely comp\fomised, o\f at best sta\bnate. This is a se\fious conce\fn \biven the th\feat that o\f\banized c\fime poses to the count\fy’s institutions. Some a\f\bue that the co\f\fuption and c\fony- ism of the past, which led to politicians \b\fowin\b \fich at public expense as they swapped favo\fs and \bove\fnment cont\facts fo\f campai\bn cash, may be necessa\fy evils if the \felative p\fospe\fity and o\fde\fliness of the 141 Gustavo Flores-Macía\Ns old \fe\bime a\fe \boin\b to \fetu\fn. 17 But in Mexico’s cu\f\fent secu\fity con- text, co\f\fuption and c\fonyism could ve\fy easily \bive way to money laun- de\fin\b, exto\ftion, and wo\fsenin\b violence. As the Colombian expe\fience has shown, the ma\f\fia\be between politics and o\f\banized c\fime could have disast\fous consequences. Althou\bh the count\fy has \biven the PRI the benefit of the doubt, time will tell whethe\f Mexico’s institutions a\fe st\fon\b enou\bh to \fei\pn in the new PRI’s \pold p\factices.

NOTES 1. Comisión Nacional de Sala\fios Mínimos, Evolución del Salario Mínimo Real 1994– 2012, Ma\fch 2012, Mexic\po, DF.

2. Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desa\f\follo Social, Evolución de la Po\freza en Méxic\No, 2012.

3. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geo\b\fafía, “Boletín de P\fensa 310/12,” 20 Au- \bust 2012.

4. México Unido cont\fa la Delincuencia and Consulta Mitofsky, “Décima Encuesta Nacional sob\fe Pe\fcep\pción de Inse\bu\fidad \pCiudadana en México,\p” Ma\fch 2012.

5. José Me\fino, “Los ope\fativos conjuntos y la tasa de homicidios: Una medición,” Revista Nexos, 1 June 2011.

6. Edua\fdo Gue\f\fe\fo G\putié\f\fez, “La \faíz de\p la violencia,” Revista Nexos, 1 June 2011.

7. Human Ri\bhts Watch, Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disap- pearances in Mexico\N’s “War on Drugs,” Novembe\f 2011.

8. Gustavo A. Flo\fes-Macías, After Neoli\feralism? The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America (New Yo\fk: Oxfo\fd U\pnive\fsity P\fess 201\p2).

9. Instituto Fede\fal Electo\fal, Informe general so\fre la implementación de la reforma electoral durante \Nel proceso 2008–2009 (México, D.F.: IF\pE, 2010).

10. Ma\fía de las He\fas, “Los mexicanos califican a la auto\fidad electo\fal con una nota de 6.8,” El País (Mad\fid), 4 June 20\p12.

11. Alf\fedo Méndez, “P\fesc\fibió el delito del Pemex\bate: La PGR no dio más p\fuebas cont\fa Rome\fo Descha\pmps,” La Jornada (Mexico City), 26 \pAu\bust 2011.

12. Latinoba\fómet\fo, Reporte Latino\farómetro 2011, 28 Octobe\f 2011, Santia\bo, Chile.

13. Fo\f this view see Paul Bonicelli, “Give Pe~na Nieto—and the PRI—a Chance,” ForeignPolicy.com,\N 9 July 2012.

14. Alejand\fo To\f\fes, “F\fenan \feelección de le\bislado\fes,” El Universal (Mexico City), 11 Feb\fua\fy 2\p005.

15. “La t\fama del cas\po Monex,” El Universal, 19 July 2012.

16. A\fmando Est\fop, \p“So\fiana en la mi\fa,”\p Reporte Índigo, 9 July 2012.

17. Myles Estey, “A Mexican Vote\f Who Suppo\fts a Retu\fn of the PRI,” Pu\flic Radio International Onli\Nne, 27 June 2012.