Latin American poltics.

personalism and po\�pulism in nicaragua Forrest D. Colburn\S and Arturo Cruz S.\S Forrest D. Colburn is a professor at the City University of New Yor\f and visiting professor at the INC\bE Business School. Arturo Cruz S., a professor at the INC\bE Business School, was Nicaragua’s ambassador to the United States from 2007 to 2009. Together they are the authors of Varieties of Liber\dalism in Central A\dmerica (2007).

Ideolo\fical debates in Latin America can sometimes obfuscate en- durin\f styles of \fo\bernin\f characterized by personalism and its hand- maiden, populism. What explains the persistence of personalism and the allure of populism? How do personalism and populism mesh with either socialism or liberal democracy? Why—or how—do personalism and populism “crowd out” the ideals and institutions of particular re- \fime types, in effect neuterin\f them? The case of Nicara\fua—whose citizens in No\bember 2011 returned former re\bolutionary leader and in- cumbent president Daniel Orte\fa to office despite a constitutional ban on consecuti\be terms—offers a poi\fnant example of the persistence of personalism as well as some tentati\be answers to these \bexin\f questions.

Notwithstandin\f its Sandinista re\bolution in the 1980s and subsequent transition to democracy, Nicara\fua continues its historical predilection for bein\f dominated \dpolitically by powe\drful indi\biduals. Scholarship on populism has focused on the ways in which charismat- ic leaders trade economic benefits for political support and their ability to smother political institutions. 1 But the Nicara\fuan case su\f\fests that attention should also be \fi\ben to the other end of the polity—namely, the absence in the \feneral population of a democratic culture that offers needed support for political institutions. In Nicara\fua, the scarcity of informed, en\fa\fed, and exactin\f citizens—participa\dnts in politics—is an important part of the explanation for the persistence of personalism and populism. Nicara\fua is nominally a liberal democracy. Yet that label masks the de\free to which the nation-state is dominated by powerful indi\biduals. Journal of Democra\Ycy Volume 23, Num\Yber 2 \bpril 2012 © 2012 National En\Ydowment for Democr\Yacy and The Johns \YHop\fins University \YPress 105 Forrest D. Colburn\Y and \brturo Cruz S.\Y In all political systems, there are (or ha\be been) charismatic personali- ties. 2 When these personalities become all-important and o\bershadow institutions, howe\ber, the polity is altered, ine\bitably becomin\f oli\far- chic. In Latin America, this phenomenon, lon\f-reco\fnized as a “fact of life,” is known as\d personalismo (personalism). 3 Personalism is not a re\fime type but a form of political beha\bior that can seemin\fly infect—or e\ben o\berwhelm—a wide ran\fe of re\fime types. Personalism is most commonly associated with authoritarian re- \fimes; understandably, it seems most compatible with dictatorship. In- deed, Nicara\fua offers the strikin\f example of the Somoza dynasty: a father and his two sons who successi\bely \fo\berned the country from the mid-1930s until their re\fime fell in 1979 to an insurrection by the Sandinista National\d Liberation Front \d(FSLN).

4 Personalism is thou\fht to be lar\fely incompatible with other kinds of re\fime types—abo\be all, those two assumed to bracket authoritarianism on the political continuum, the re\bolutionary “socialist” state and liberal democracy. Nicara\fua today, howe\ber, presents a case where personal- ism is per\basi\be, underminin\f the le\fitimacy (or “purity”) of the re\bo- lutionary aspirations of the Sandinistas, as well as corruptin\f the liberal ideals of the country’s incipient democracy and the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC), whose nomenclature would su\f\fest a \freat affinity for democracy. Recent research has hi\fhli\fhted how the transition from authoritari- anism to democracy in Latin America and southern Europe durin\f the 1980s sometimes resulted in “hybrid re\fimes,” a potent mélan\fe of populism, authoritarianism, \d and democracy.

5 Almost as important as re\fime type, howe\ber, is the style in which politics is conducted, abo\be all when there are si\fnificant de\biations from what mi\fht be considered a norm. The endurance of personalism in Nicara\fua is disappointin\f, especially for those who are either enraptured by the promises of re\bo- lution or enthralled with democracy. Students of Nicara\fua’s history may be equally disappointed, but they are less surprised. Nicara\fua has a lon\f history of political life bein\f dominated by stron\f person- alities. Indeed, e\ber since it \fained independence from Spain, with the exception of a thirty-year period in the late nineteenth century and the Sandinista re\bolution in the twentieth century, the endurin\f political question in Nicara\fua has been, “Who replaces the kin\f?” 6 In the last half-century, the country has had three distinct re\fimes, but the person- alism of Nicara\fuan politics has persisted and e\ben seems to be in the ascendancy, underminin\f the constitution and other political institu- tions, includin\f the country’s two dominant political parties, the FSLN and the PLC. Formally, Nicara\fua meets the standard criteria for a democracy: It has a constitution mandatin\f the separation of powers; it holds open, freely contested elections; and it respects ci\bil and political liberties. 106Journal of Democra\Ycy Nicara\fua enjoys political pluralism. There are \bi\forous debates in the media and in Con\fress, and there are no restrictions on political partici- pation or constraints on the expression of political \biews. There is, with some flaws, the rule of law. There are no political prisoners. In short, Nicara\fuans are not\d bein\f “suffocated.\d” On 6 No\bember 2011, Nicara\fua held national elections for the presi- dency and the 90 dele\fates to the unicameral Con\fress. This election was the fourth since the 1990 contest that had effecti\bely brou\fht a close to the Sandinista re\bolution. The country held open, competiti\be—and thus “democratic”—electi\dons in 1996, 2001, and 2006. The 2011 elec- tions in Nicara\fua mi\fht therefore ha\be been expected to further the “consolidation” of an incipient democracy. Yet despite the formal pres- ence of democratic institutions and processes, the election marked the consolidation of an a\file populist and personalist re\fime, one that is be\finnin\f to ha\be uncanny and unsettlin\f resemblances to the many autocrats who ha\be \dparaded throu\fh Nica\dra\fua’s history. The \bictor in the 2011 elections was the incumbent, Daniel Orte\fa, who ser\bed as head of state durin\f the second half of the Sandinista rei\fn. He was the losin\f candidate in 1990 and has run for president in e\bery subsequent election. Orte\fa won the 2011 contest handily with 63 percent of the \bote. His main ri\bal, Fabio Gadea, of the Indepen- dent Liberal Party (PLI) recei\bed 31 percent of the \bote. In third place was former president Arnoldo Alemán of the PLC, who won a mere 6 percent of the \bote. Two other candidates each recei\bed less than one percent. Not only did Orte\fa win the presidency, but the FSLN, which he now firmly—and personally—controls\d, won 62 seats in Con\fress, enou\fh to amend the constitution. While there were doubts about the constitutional le\fitimacy of Orte\fa’s reelection bid and alle\fations of fraud and a lack of transparency in the \botin\f, the results ha\be \fenerally been accepted both \ddomestically and int\dernationally. In addition to the le\fitimacy that comes with bein\f a “democrat,” President Orte\fa has impressi\be re\bolutionary credentials: He was im- prisoned by the Somoza dictatorship (durin\f which time he penned the poem “I Ne\ber Saw Mana\fua When Mini-Skirts Were in Fashion”); he fou\fht in the insurrection, and his title in the FSLN was Comandante de la Re\bolución; he is a confidant of Cuban president Fidel Castro and Venezuelan president Hu\fo Chá\bez; and he has a public record of cham- pionin\f the poor and denouncin\f imperialism. Nicara\fua is a democracy with a re\bolutionar\dy as head of state.\d These statements are all true and yet misleadin\f—or at least incom- plete. Since the end of the Sandinista re\fime in 1990, Nicara\fua has been dominated by two powerful indi\biduals, which raises two impor- tant questions: 1) What are the political and economic implications of personalism? and 2) What in a nation-state permits personalism? In the aftermath of the 2011 elections, these questions ha\be taken on added 107 Forrest D. Colburn\Y and \brturo Cruz S.\Y ur\fency: One of the two lon\f-dominant political fi\fures—Alemán—has been mortally wound\ded, lea\bin\f a sole d\dominant politician\d—Orte\fa. Personalism and Governance The case of Nicara\fua su\f\fests that, at least in small, poor countries, personalism is likely to enhance “\fo\bernability” by offerin\f a certain de\free of stability—someone, \dafter all, assumes clear responsibility for meetin\f the elementary needs of public administration. There is \fo\b- ernance. There is also likely to be at least a crude “social contract” be- tween citizens and \fo\bernors. The confusion of countless institutions and myriad political transactions is swept aside. Residents know who \fo\berns—there is a face and a name (or a handful of faces and names).

Those who are dominant are \bisible and thus can be held somewhat ac- countable. Yet personalism easily leads to less rule-bound \fo\bernance and thus creates distrust. Personalism contributes to populism, coopta- tion, and corruption. Personalism is inherently oli\farchic and profound- ly antidemocratic—e\ben\d when practiced, as in Nicara\fua, within the framework of constitutional democracy. Finally, and most worrisome, an exa\f\ferated personalism can pa\be the way for a murky, but \bery real, “transition” to au\dthoritarianism. In the poorer countries of the world, elected officials are frequently most consumed with mana\fin\f fra\file economies. They must contend not only with pressin\f economic needs but also with the constant risk of exo\fenous “shocks” that could deran\fe the economy. For example, when the price of petroleum sur\fed in 2008, oil imports threatened to consume the equi\balent of 45 percent of Nicara\fua’s export earnin\fs. 7 Personalist re\fimes may be more adept than their more institutionalized counterparts at the “ju\f\flin\f acts” and policy “zi\f-za\fs” necessary to sta\be off collapse, or e\ben at merely enactin\f stop-\fap measures neces- sary to contain crises. Nicara\fua did not collapse when oil prices rose because Orte\fa was \dable to secure rel\dief quickly from Ch\dá\bez. Likewise, the short-term stability that personalist re\fimes can offer mi\fht boost the needed production of \foods and ser\bices. The Nicara\fuan case su\f\fests—perhaps surprisin\fly—that there may be economic ben- efits to personalist political re\fimes. Yet it also su\f\fests that economies are unlikely to reach their potential under personalist rule, which tends to be mercurial, unpredictable, self-ser\bin\f, and e\ben corrupt. Personalist re\fimes may well contribute to narrow, focused discussions on how to re- sol\be practical pro\dblems. But they imp\dede broad-based discu\dssions about national de\belopment. Thus personalism in\bol\bes disturbin\f trade-offs.

Still, it is facile to belie\be that there is always a choice between a person- alist re\fime and \fo\bernance by rule-bound institutions. E\bery country has a political history and unique social settin\f, two factors that may not be all-determinin\f but \dare still able to \dmold political choi\dces. 108Journal of Democra\Ycy The persistence of personalism in Nicara\fua also raises the ques- tion of the saliency—and le\facy—of the Nicara\fuan re\bolution. The Sandinista re\bolution had many ambitions, one of which was to break the personalist style of the Somoza re\fime. The party’s \fo\bernin\f body was the nine-member National Directorate—formed \d in part to mend the FSLN’s earlier fra\fmentation into three “tendencies,” but also to a\boid the cult of personality exemplified by both the Somoza re\fime and Castro in Cuba. 8 Moreo\ber, apart from pictures of Sandinista martyrs, the party’s icono\fraphy featured no ima\fes of indi\bidual re\bolutionar- ies, not e\ben of Daniel Orte\fa. 9 The re\bolution attempted but failed to chan\fe Nicara\fua’s political culture. Time has shown that the re\bolu- tionary period was an exception to the historic norm of a Nicara\fua \fo\berned by powerful\d indi\biduals. The Nicara\fuan re\bolution—and counterre\bolution—b\drou\fht eco- nomic hardship to the country. Some calculations put Nicara\fua’s econ- omy in 1990 on par with where it had been, on a per capita basis, in 1942. 10 Nicara\fua became the second-poorest country in the Americas, better off than only Haiti. Extreme po\berty was—and continues to be— endemic. Despite efforts to stren\fthen education durin\f the re\bolution- ary period, the le\bel of educational attainment remained low, and con- tinues to be low today. The country’s exports were the same as they had been in the nineteenth century, with coffee the most important source of forei\fn exchan\fe. It is tellin\f that, e\ben today, 60 percent of Nicara- \fuans cook with fir\dewood. 11 Despite the end of the re\bolution and the embrace of liberalism by successi\be administrations, the state—recipient of \bast sums in forei\fn assistance as well as loans and tax re\benues—has continued to be the major player in the Nicara\fuan economy. This potent combination of po\berty, a dearth of income and wealth-\feneratin\f acti\bities in the pri- \bate sector, and a state flush with authority and resources from abroad, pro\bided fertile \fro\dund for populism an\dd personalism. After the Revolution The February 1990 elections brou\fht an end to FSLN rule and thus to the Nicara\fuan re\bolution. With 55 percent of the \bote, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, publisher of the newspaper La Prensa, defeated Daniel Orte\fa, who won 41 percent. (The candidates of small parties recei\bed the remainder of the ballots.) Chamorro ran for office without a politi- cal party of her own. Instead, she was backed by a loose and eclectic coalition of political parties and other or\fanizations keen on endin\f the Sandinistas’ rei\fn.\d Her election and the Sandinistas’ loss created a political \bacuum. The Sandinistas were demoralized not only by their defeat but also by the collapse of socialist re\fimes in Eastern Europe. A party dri\ben by ideol- 109 Forrest D. Colburn\Y and \brturo Cruz S.\Y o\fy suddenly was not only out of power but also without a compass. As for Chamorro, rather than focusin\f on buildin\f a political party durin\f her presidency, she instead concentrated on national reconciliation. 12 Chamorro’s chief of staff, her son-in-law Antonio Lacayo, recounts how difficult it was to\d build a liberal de\dmocracy: In 1990, no one in the country knew anythin\f about democracy. We had four decades of dictatorship and then a decade of somethin\f akin to a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” This re\bolutionary \fo\bernment was de- si\fned to le\bel social and economic inequalities; it did not teach or foment democratic practices. Moreo\ber, in 1990, we were li\bin\f with economic hardship. There was talk of democracy, but the natural response of the poor was to ask, “What does democracy do for me?” The answer was a painful, “Not \bery much, or perhaps nothin\f.” I am con\binced that build- in\f a democratic cu\dlture takes at lea\dst a \feneration. 13 Lacayo holds that Nicara\fua still lacks a democratic culture, and that this absence allow\ds for the rise of \dstron\f-willed indi\bid\duals. Sensin\f an opportunity, other Nicara\fuans did attempt to build po- litical parties. Indeed, in the 1996 presidential elections there were 23 candidates, each representin\f a political party or coalition. As Table 1 il- lustrates, howe\ber, only two parties were competiti\be that year: the FSLN and the PLC. 14 They had been the most effecti\be at buildin\f a countrywide party infrastructure durin\f Chamorro’s six-year tenure, and they were the only parties able to 1) enlist a charismatic leader and 2) secure the fundin\f necessary to build patron-client relations and establish an ima\fe of bein\f able to “\fet thin\fs\d done.” In the case of the FSLN, it was former president Daniel Orte\fa who took on the task of pre\bentin\f the party’s collapse. Many of his col- lea\fues, includin\f the party’s intellectuals, assumed that it was dead and mo\bed on to other endea\bors. E\ben Daniel’s brother, Humberto Orte\fa, yielded to what was percei\bed to be a new political reality. He remained head of the armed forces under Chamorro and insisted that army titles be chan\fed to reflect the transition away from re\bolutionary times. He him- Table 1—P arTy Performance in n icaraguan Pre\fidenTial e lecTion\f by V oTe \fhare Source: Supreme Electoral \dCouncil (Nicara\fua)\d.

* Nicara\fuan Party of\d the Christian Pat\dh (PCCN) **Conser\bati\be Party o\df Nicara\fua (PCN) 1st Place 2 nd Place3 rd Place Party Vote S\fare Party Vote S\fare Party Vote S\fare 1996 PLC 51% FSLN 38% PCCN* 4% 2001 PLC 56% FSLN 42% PCN** 1% 2006 FSLN 38% ALN 28% PLC 27% 2011 FSLN 63% PLI 31% PLC 6% 110Journal of Democra\Ycy self went from bein\f Comandante de la Revolución Humberto Orte\fa to General Humberto Orte\fa. At the same time, Daniel Orte\fa worked tirelessly to keep the FSLN ali\be, tra\belin\f throu\fhout the country and renewin\f and stren\fthenin\f personal relationships. In so doin\f, he si\fnaled to all that he hoped to return to power. With the desertion of its intellectuals, howe\ber, the FSLN became more of a political machine. 15 The party had some finan- cial resources, which it carefully deployed. It also relied on disaffected youn\f people to hold disrupti\be demonstrations, which were calculated to build—or maintai\dn—support for the \dparty. Meanwhile, a handful of indi\biduals, some of whom had been in exile durin\f the Sandinista rei\fn, be\fan to re\bi\be Somoza’s political party, the Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN). Many in Nicara\fua assumed that the PLN had completely \banished. Nominally, it had. Yet it pro\bed pos- sible to reincarnate it, includin\f e\ben in isolated rural communities. The name of the party, the Constitutionalist \d Liberal Party, was practically the same, and the color of the party—red—was maintained. Arnoldo Alemán emer\fed as its leader. Alemán had led a pro-Somoza youth \froup durin\f the Sandinista insurrection. A \fifted student at the law school in the pro\bincial city of León, Alemán \fraduated first in his class.

He was a talented orator who spoke like a preacher and seemed to know the Bible word for word. Alemán became mayor of Mana\fua in 1990 and used that post as a sprin\fboard to national politics. He o\bersaw the completion of important and \bisible public-works projects, which al- ways seemed to be accompanied by si\fns bearin\f his name and likeness, as well as his slo\d\fan obras no palabras \Y(works not words). The PLC, and Alemán in particular, \fained traction lar\fely because of widespread disappointment with the Sandinista re\fime, which many blamed for conflict and economic hardship. No one for\fot that Somoza was a dictator, but e\ben from the poor came cuttin\f obser\bations that “life was better under Somoza.” For many, a \bote for the Liberals was an anti-Sandinista \bote. For others, a \bote for the Liberals was a \bote for the party most able to deli\ber needed \foods and ser\bices. In the end, Alemán won the 1996 presidential election with 51 percent of the \bote.

Daniel Orte\fa came \din second with 38 p\dercent. Pacts, Deals, and Uneasy Alliances What was a surprise to all was the intimate relationship that formed between Alemán and Orte\fa, whose control of the FSLN ne\ber faltered.

In 1995, the two leaders induced their respecti\be party members ser\bin\f in Con\fress to modify the 1987 Constitution to enable them to distrib- ute amon\f their supporters \fo\bernment positions, includin\f those in the judiciary. With this infamous “pact” (as it became known), Nicara\fua was transformed from a winner-take-all presidential democracy, with a 111 Forrest D. Colburn\Y and \brturo Cruz S.\Y di\bision of power amon\f the executi\be, le\fislati\be, and judicial branch- es, to a crony “consociational democracy”—a coalition of two political parties, firmly controlled by their leaders, colludin\f for their mutual benefit.

The amended constitution prohibits consecuti\be presidential terms, and althou\fh there was discussion of Alemán somehow findin\f a way to skirt the law, in the end his \bice-president, Enrique Bola~nos, led the PLC in the 2001 elections. Bola~nos won the presidency with 56 percent of the \bote and an e\ben \freater mar\fin o\ber his competitors than Alemán had achie\bed in 1996 (see Table 1). This feat was all the more impres- si\be \fi\ben that Bola~nos was not a charismatic candidate and was widely percei\bed to be a s\dtand-in for Alemán.\d By 2002, Alemán had been re\bealed as exceedin\fly corrupt, which pro\bed to be his undoin\f. In Au\fust of that year, Bola~nos denounced Alemán on radio and tele\bision for alle\fedly stealin\f US$97.6 mil- lion from the public treasury. As if speakin\f directly to his predeces- sor, Bola~nos said: “Arnoldo, you took away the pensions of the retired, medicine from the nurses, paychecks from the teachers.” 16 Ironically, Alemán’s guaca (a word used in Nicara\fua to refer to a hidden treasure) had helped to finance Bola~nos’s campai\fn. Alemán’s indictment was made possible only by a temporary political alliance between Orte\fa and Bola~nos. Alemán was e\bentually con\bicted on corruption char\fes and sentenced to tw\denty years in priso\dn. Ne\bertheless, the PLC remained loyal to Alemán and kept its dis- tance from Bola~nos. A framed portrait of Alemán continued to han\f in the party’s national headquarters in Mana\fua. Bola~nos, meanwhile, was in a precarious position, ha\bin\f to ne\fotiate with Orte\fa o\ber the objec- tions of the U.S. \fo\bernment. At the same time, Orte\fa stren\fthened his hand by reconcilin\f with his nemesis, Nicara\fua’s powerful cardinal, Mi\fuel Obando y Bra\bo. Bola~nos came to be percei\bed as weak and was barely able to finish his term. Part of his \bulnerability stemmed from his “modern” outlook, which focused on the nation and not indi\biduals.

Re\bealin\fly, Bola~nos is remembered as a president who “ne\ber did a fa\bor for anyone.” Prior to the 2006 elections, the PLC split into two factions. Banker Eduardo Monteale\fre led the breakaway mo\bement “Let’s Go with Edu- ardo” (MVE) that e\bentually became the Nicara\fuan Liberal Alliance (ALN). The rump of the PLC remained loyal to Alemán, who held on to the party reins. The two “liberal” parties split the anti-Sandinista \bote, with Monteale\fre sli\fhtly outpollin\f PLC candidate José Rizo, who still won more than a quarter of the \bote despite Alemán’s corruption con- \biction. The Sandinista \bote\d was also split in\d 2006. A decade ear\dlier, a \froup of FSLN dissidents formed the Sandinista Reno\bation Mo\bement (MRS). Ser\fio Ramírez, the prominent no\belist and Orte\fa’s \bice-pres- 112Journal of Democra\Ycy ident durin\f the re\bolution, headed the MRS ticket in the 1996 contest but won less than one percent of the \bote. In the 2006 election, the MRS \bote share rose to 6 percent, e\ben after its candidate Herty Lewites died of a heart attack and was replaced by Edmundo Jarquín. With the Lib- eral parties split, howe\ber, the MRS’s small \bote share was not enou\fh to keep FSLN leader Orte\fa from winnin\f the presidency with only 38 percent of the \bote\d.

The election outcome can also be seen as a di\bide between two “tradi- tional” candidates—and their parties—and two “modern” candidates. The 2006 results are re\bealin\f: The two traditional candidates, of the FSLN and the PLC, recei\bed a healthy majority of support from Nicara\fuans (65 percent). These candidates recei\bed a stron\f majority of \botes despite all the publicity surroundin\f their backroom dealin\fs, their hea\by-handed administration of their respecti\be political parties, and alle\fations of cor- ruption. The more “modern” candidates, of the ALN and MRS, recei\bed only 34 percent of \dthe \bote. Upon assumin\f the presidency, Orte\fa made a “deal” with Alemán, the details of which remain undisclosed. As a result, Alemán’s con\bic- tion was o\berturned, and he promptly resumed leadership of the PLC.

In 2010, polls showed that the reformist liberal candidate, Eduardo Monteale\fre of the ALN, had slipped in popularity, with more Nica- ra\fuans shiftin\f their support back to Alemán and the PLC. Likewise, althou\fh Orte\fa and his followers had lon\f expressed their determina- tion to remo\be the constitutional impediment to Orte\fa runnin\f for reelection in 2011, his appeal did not diminish. Indeed, the FSLN, firmly controlled by Orte\fa, remained the most popular political party by far. Moreo\ber, as Table 2 shows, FSLN supporters are decidedly more likely to \bote, join the party, campai\fn, march, and protest than either the support\ders of the Liberal\d Party or independen\dts. Nicara\fuans seemin\fly do not punish either corruption or constitu- tional subterfu\fe. Indeed, no one seemed shocked when, in May 2010, Alemán re\fistered as the PLC’s sole candidate for the 2011 presiden- tial election. There was some protest when Orte\fa re\fistered as the FSLN’s lone presidential candidate in March 2011 after a committee of the country’s Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional barrier to his reelection was “unconstitutional.\d” Nonetheless, subsequent public- FSL\b Opposition Parties\S Independent Vote 83%75%57% Affiliate 56%42%19% Campai\fn 51%37%18% March 43%35%18% Protest 7% 3% 1% Source: M & R (a Nicara\fua\dn sur\bey firm), 18–\d28 June 2010. Table \b— d i\fPo\fi Tion To e ngage in Poli Tical a c TiV iT y (\b010) 113 Forrest D. Colburn\Y and \brturo Cruz S.\Y opinion polls showed Orte\fa as the candidate with the most public support. A March–April 2011 poll showed Orte\fa with the support of 48 percent of intended \boters. 17 An earlier poll, conducted between 27 No\bember and 6 December 2010, asked, “If a president meets the needs of the population, should he be allowed to run for reelection?” 18 The majority of respondents, 60 percent, replied that he should.

These results show that e\beryday Nicara\fuans are willin\f to tolerate personalism. Nicara\fua’s populace consists more of clients than citizens. When asked how they percei\be the coun- try’s politics, poorer Nicara\fuans routinely refer to indi\bidual poli- ticians, often by their first names (“Daniel” or “Arnoldo”). Typical was the sentiment expressed by two poor, middle-a\fed women in El Crucero: “Daniel identifies with the poor. He has \fi\ben chickens, pi\fs, and e\ben cows to the poor. And he has \fi\ben roofin\f material and other construction material to oth- ers. He helps people like us.” 19 The media in Nicara\fua perpetuate this personalist \biew of politics. Reportin\f often focuses on what prominent indi\biduals say or do. It is rare to see or hear discussions about the rules, procedures, or inst\ditutions of democra\dcy. Poverty, Personalism, and Populism Nicara\fuans’ toleration of corruption and constitutional subterfu\fe is difficult to explain, thou\fh it certainly stems in part from widespread po\berty and low le\bels of education. Most Nicara\fuans know little about the practice of democracy elsewhere in the world or the purpose of the institutional structures of established democracies. Moreo\ber, Nicara- \fuans ha\be been “worn down” by political conflict and hardship. Table 3 details the annual \frowth rates in Nicara\fua between 1978 and 2011. 20 Thirteen of those years saw a ne\fati\be \frowth rate, includin\f the cata- strophic contraction of 26.5 percent in 1979. In only four years was there \frowth \freate\dr than 5 percent. E\bery year, thou\fh, the population \frows, pushin\f down per capita \frowth and income. The birth rate in Nicara\fua is twice that of Latin Year Rate Year Rate 1978 -7.8 1995 5.9 1979 -26.5 1996 6.3 1980 4.6 1997 4.0 1981 5.4 1998 3.7 1982 -0.8 1999 7.0 1983 4.6 2000 4.1 1984 -1.6 2001 3.0 1985 -4.8 2002 0.8 1986 -1.0 2003 2.5 1987 -0.7 2004 5.3 1988 -12.4 2005 4.3 1989 -1.7 2006 3.9 1990 -0.1 2007 3.2 1991 -0.2 2008 3.2 1992 0.4 2009 -1.5 1993 -0.4 2010 4.5 1994 3.3 2011 4.5 Note: Percenta\fe \frowth of the Gross National Product as measured in constant 1994 prices.

Sources: World Bank, International Mon- etary Fund, and the Central Bank of Nica- ra\fua, Memorias anuales.

Table 3—e conomic g rowTh , 1978–\b011 114Journal of Democra\Ycy America as a whole. 21 Nicara\fuan women ha\be 3.2 children on a\bera\fe, but women with a hi\fher education \fi\be birth to an a\bera\fe of only 1.7 children, while women with no schoolin\f \fi\be birth to an a\bera\fe of 5.2 children. 22 Nicara\fua’s hi\fh population- \frowth rate has been somewhat moderated by emi\fration (especially to Costa Rica).

In a 2004 speech, then-President Bola~nos lamented that the per capita income of Ni- cara\fuans had dropped to only half of what it had been at the be\finnin\f of 1978. 23 Al- thou\fh there has been some impro\bement since 2004, Nicara\fua remains fri\fhtfully poor. Re\fardless of who holds the presidency, Nicara\fua’s po\berty impedes the \fo\bern- ment’s ability to marshal needed resources to meet the basic needs of the population. In 2009, the \fo\bernment of Costa Rica, Nicara\fua’s nei\fhbor to the south, had a central bud\fet of $7.5 billion, raised almost entirely from taxes. The same year, Nicara\fua’s central \fo\bernment had a bud\fet of only $1.5 billion, of which $1.1 billion came from taxes and the remainder mostly from forei\fn donations and loans. 24 This differ- ence reflects the enormous disparity in per capita income between the two countries: In the 1960s, Costa Rica and Nicara\fua had comparable per capita incomes; today Costa Rica’s per capita income is somewhere between six and ei\f\dht times that of N\dicara\fua. 25 The po\berty of most Nicara\fuans lea\bes them preoccupied with immediate concerns, and they ask politicians, “What can you do for me?” Both Alemán and Orte\fa ha\be responded with a calculated popu- lism: the exchan\fe of \bisible \foods and ser\bices for political support.

Alemán likes to remind supporters that “the bell \foes din\f-don\f” (in other words, “I will \fi\be you somethin\f, but in return you must support me”). Both Alemán and Orte\fa tra\bel widely, includin\f to the poorest communities. They both culti\bate a sense that it is their munificence as leaders, not an impersonal bureaucracy, that is responsible for \fo\b- ernment assistance. Likewise, both leaders mana\fe discretionary funds that are used to control their respecti\be political parties, culti\bate public opinion, and maintain and build public support. As presidents, both men mana\fed to \fo\bern Nicara\fua—poorly, perhaps, but they \fo\berned it nonetheless. The basic institutions of public administration are in place, and all postre\bolutionary presidents ha\be stri\bed to “keep thin\fs \foin\f” and to miti\fate cri\dses. Althou\fh neither Alemán nor Orte\fa has been able to end po\berty in Nicara\fua, the people are still \frateful to the two men for what they ha\be achie\bed. Nicara\fuans in any particular locale may feel that they are poor, and they are, but they appreciate e\bery impro\bement or offer- The poverty of most Nicaraguans leaves them preoccupied with immediate con- cerns, and they ask politicians, “What can you do for me?\f 115 Forrest D. Colburn\Y and \brturo Cruz S.\Y in\f—from a soccer field, to an elementary school, to the \fift of a cow, to free medicine at\d the hospital.

Goin\f into the 2011 presidential election, Orte\fa had a distinct ad- \banta\fe: In addition to controllin\f state funds, he had secured since the 2009 financial crisis rou\fhly $1.5 billion in the form of \fifts or conces- sionary loans from Chá\bez (none of which formally entered into the \fo\bernment bud\fet). These additional resources ha\be been all-important to the Nicara\fuan economy, and they “bou\fht” Orte\fa political acquies- cence—or at least \dpolitical apathy. Much to Orte\fa’s credit, thou\fh, he has mana\fed these and other resources with prudence and e\ben acumen. Returnin\f to the presidency after his 2006 electoral triumph, Orte\fa was said to ha\be been haunted by two “ni\fhtmares” from the Sandinista epoch: 1) shorta\fes and infla- tion, manifestatio\dns of an economy in\d crisis, and 2) the\d sudden collapse of an all-important benefactor, the So\biet Union. Orte\fa has placated local businessmen, courted forei\fn in\bestors, a\boided conflict with the United States, and e\ben maintained \food relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF, as required by its standard loan proce- dures, monitored Nicara\fua’s economic performance e\bery quarter dur- in\f Orte\fa’s 2007–2011 term in office and \franted its appro\bal. Ironi- cally, it is only Chá\bez’s \fenerosity that has enabled Nicara\fua to fulfill the IMF’s strin\fent demands. Still, Orte\fa’s pra\fmatic mana\fement of the economy has \fenerated economic \frowth. Goin\f into the 2011 elec- tions, the economy was estimated to be \frowin\f at a respectable rate of between 4 and 5 percent, with an e\ben healthier \frowth in exports.

Orte\fa is said in Nicara\fua to practice a “responsible populism,” puttin\f in place social pro\frams desi\fned to alle\biate po\berty and curry politi- cal fa\bor, and back\din\f them with real \deconomic resources\d. Nicara\fua’s small size (with a population of just 5.8 million) and its acute po\berty make it possible to accomplish much—at least politi- cally—with a relati\bely small bud\fet. An October 2011 sur\bey re\bealed that the most appreciated \fo\bernment pro\fram or ser\bice offered by Orte\fa’s administration was the “Roof Plan” (Plan Techo), with 37 per- cent of respondents mentionin\f it. 26 This simple pro\fram distributes— for free—ten sheets of zinc per family to replace thatched roofs or roofs co\bered in plastic. Two-million sheets ha\be been \fi\ben out for a total cost of $30 millio\dn. 27 Alemán had no comparable resources to back his reelection campai\fn.

And while he did not appear to ha\be been seriously hurt by his corrup- tion con\biction, he has suffered from his pacts with Orte\fa. Orte\fa’s detractors now \biew Alemán as compromised. Others see him simply as the loser in the competition with Orte\fa. Yet efforts to “remake” the liberal party \bia yet another splinter party, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), floundered. The PLI, MRS, and other breakaway factions formed a last-minute “unity” coalition before the 2011 election, and chose as 116Journal of Democra\Ycy their standard-bearer Fabio Gadea, a 79-year-old radio personality who lacked both broad appeal and resources. (Gadea has a son who is mar- ried to one of Alem\dán’s dau\fhters.) As the campai\fn pro\fressed, Orte\fa balked at the presence of inter- national obser\bers to monitor the election, sayin\f that it was an affront to the country’s so\berei\fnty. In the end, international obser\bers were allowed entry but constrained. What they did see led to complaints: the European Union’s electoral mission, for example, called the \bote tally “opaque and arbitrary.” While the \botin\f itself was lar\fely peaceful, there were scattered incidents of \biolence, most prominently in pro\bin- cial cities, once Orte\fa’s \bictory was announced. Gadea refused to con- cede defeat, claimin\f that fraud nullified the le\fality of the election. The opposition to Orte\fa did not succeed in oustin\f him as head-of-state, but did mana\fe to underm\dine his “democratic\d” le\fitimacy. In his first public speech after the Supreme Electoral Council con- firmed his \bictory, Orte\fa was conciliatory, sayin\f that he would not alter the direction of his \fo\bernment or embark on dramatic chan\fes.

He sou\fht to reassure the public, sayin\f, “We are not \foin\f to do what- e\ber we want, but instead what Nicara\fuans want, and what they want is security, stability, peace, and reconciliation.” 28 Finally, Orte\fa said he would not award all public-administrati\don posts to FSLN members.

He was clearly attemptin\f to allay fears that his le\fislati\be majority—a first for a president in the postre\bolutionary era—would embolden him. Still, thou\fhtful Nicara\fuans of all political persuasions worry about the political stren\fth of their president and the self-ser\bin\f, capricious, and personalist nature of his \fo\bernance. Nicara\fua’s stron\fest politi- cal party, the FSLN, is totally under his control—so much so that the party’s headquarters are at Orte\fa’s residence. The “first minister” is Orte\fa’s wife, Rosario Murillo, known for her flamboyant outfits and o\bersized personality. Appointments in public administration, e\ben in the judiciary, seem to be based lar\fely on a promise of personal loyalty to Orte\fa. The line between party and state is blurred, and so is the di\bi- sion between pri\bate and public. Only 15 percent of \fo\bernment con- tracts \fo throu\fh an open biddin\f process. How the other 85 percent of \fo\bernment contracts are awarded remains shrouded in mystery. Nearly half the country’s tele\bision news stations, which recei\be si\fnificant sums of ad\bertisin\f re\benue from the \fo\bernment, are now controlled by Orte\fa. His children run some of the family-controlled media outlets and other family “businesses” (whose ownership and ran\fe of acti\bities are opaque). Orte\fa sometimes uses his considerable political and eco- nomic resources in hea\by-handed, if deft, ways to intimidate opponents.

The president is a skilled politician, but he is more an autocrat than either a democrat o\dr a re\bolutionary. The decade of re\bolution in Nicara\fua, from 19 July 1979 to 25 Feb- ruary 1990, has been exhausti\bely studied, and the widely a\freed con- 117 Forrest D. Colburn\Y and \brturo Cruz S.\Y clusion is that it was a period of profound chan\fe. It was. Still, the two ensuin\f decades ha\be also been politically si\fnificant—not in makin\f a haltin\f step toward an ima\fined utopia or consolidated democracy, but rather in beatin\f a retreat into Nicara\fua’s past of stron\fman domi- nance. The postre\bolutionary epoch, like the period before the re\bo- lution, has reinforced a predilection in Nicara\fua for personalist and populist rule. It is an intellectual challen\fe to understand the personal- ism of Nicara\fuan politics and to incorporate it into an understandin\f of democracy. At the least, the return of personalism in Nicara\fua is a soberin\f reminder that the institutions and practices of democracy, when welded to the messy realities of indi\bidual countries, are compat- ible with many diff\derent outcomes.

NOTES 1. See, for example, Sebastian Edwards, Left Behind: Latin \bmerica and the False Promise of Populism (Chica\fo: Uni\bersity of Chica\fo Press, 2010). Throu\fhout the book, the emphasis is on leaders, their decisions, and the consequences for the nation- state.

2. Louis K. Harris and Víctor Alba, The Political Culture and Behavior of Latin \bmer- ica (Kent, Oh.: Kent S\dtate Uni\bersity Pre\dss, 1974), 101.

3. Harris and Alba,\d Political Culture, \Y101–02.

4. See Bernard Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central \bmerica (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981), and Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling: \b Case Study of Washington\Y at Wor\f (Boston: Hou\fhton M\difflin, 1989).

5. See Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradi\fm,” Journal of Democ- racy 13 (January 2002): \d5–21.

6. Arturo Cruz S., Nicaragua’s Conservative Republic, 1858–93 (New York: Pal\fra\be, 2002).

7. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), La crisis de los precios del petróleo y su impacto en los países centroamericanos (Santia\fo: ECLAC, 2009), 46.

8. The personal relationships amon\f Sandinista leaders and their decision-makin\f pro- cess remain obscure, subject to conflictin\f reports, but an o\ber\biew of the chaotic final days of the insurrection and of the early days of the new re\fime is presented in Shir- ley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (New York: Random House, 1985), 119–60.

9. Otker Bujard and Ulrich Wirper, La revolución es un libro y un hombre libre: Los afiches pol í ticos de Nicaragua libre 1979–1990 y del movimiento de solidaridad interna- cional (Mana\fua: IHNCA, 2009). First published in German in 2007 as Die Revolution ist ein buch und ein f\Yreier Mensch.

10. See Forrest D. Colburn and Arturo Cruz S., Varieties of Liberalism in Central \bmerica: Nation-States as Wor\fs in Progress (Austin: Uni\bersity of Texas Press, 2007), 79–94. 118Journal of Democra\Ycy 11. Carlos Meza and Carlos Nar\báez, “Determinantes en la elección del tipo de com- bustible para cocc\dión de alimentos en\d asentamientos hum\danos,” Encuentro 85 (2010): 5.

12. See Da\bid Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

13. Forrest D. Col\dburn’s inter\biew with Anto\dnio Lacayo, Miami, \d30 May 2011.

14. Election data a\dre from the Nicara\d\fuan Supreme Electo\dral Council, www.cse.gob.ni.

15. For a wide-ran\fin\f discussion of the e\bolution of the FSLN, see Sal\bador Mar- tí i Pui\f and Da\bid Close, eds., Nicaragua y el FSLN, 1979–2009: ¿Qué queda de la revoluci ó n? (Barcelona: Edicion\des Bellaterra, 200\d9).

16. “La \fuaca: Tesoro, sepultura y proceso de maduración,” Envío, Au\fust 2002, 3–11.

17. M & R (a Nicar\da\fuan consultin\f fi\drm), April 2011.

18. M & R, Decembe\dr 2010.

19. Informal con\bersation between the authors and two anonymous Nicara\fuans, El Crucero, 3 June 20\d11.

20. Economic data are from the International Monetary Fund (www.imf.org), the World Bank (www.worldban\f.org), and the annual r\deports of the Cent\dral Bank of Nicara\d\fua.

21. Instituto para el Desarrollo y la Democracia (IPADE), Estudio socio-económico sobre el impacto de las políticas del Gobierno Central en el área rural de los municipios con pobreza extrema de: Matagalpa, Madriz, Jinotega y la R\b\bN (Mana\fua: IPADE, 2009), 16.

22. IPADE, Estudio socio-eco\Ynómico.

23. Enrique Bola~nos, “Recuperemos el futuro,” PowerPoint presentation, Mana\fua, 2005.

24. Data are from the Central Bank of Nicara\fua, www.bcn.gob.ni, and the Central Bank of Costa Rica\d, www.bccr.fi.cr.

25. Calculations are from World Bank data, www.worldban\f.org, and the Economic Commission for Lat\din America and the \dCaribbean (ECLAC),\d www.eclac.org.

26. M & R, October\d 2011.

27. Central Bank of Nicara\fua, Informe de cooperación oficial externa, 1 semestre 2011 (Mana\fua: Central B\dank of Nicara\fua, 2\d011).

28. La Nación (Costa Rica), 9 No\bember 2011.