Latina America Question
Colburn and Cruz argue that Nicaragua presents an interesting case of a democracy mixed with personalism and populism. Write an essay explaining the connection between democratic institutions, personalism and populism in current Nicaragua. Please provide evidence to support your essay. Note: You have to read the article by Colburn and Cruz to answer this question.
Populism has focused on the ways in which charismatic leaders trade economic benefits for political support and their ability
to smother political institutions.1 But the Nicaraguan case suggests that
attention should also be given to the other end of the polity—namely,
the absence in the general population of a democratic culture that offers
needed support for political institutions. In Nicaragua, the scarcity of
informed, engaged, and exacting citizens—participants in politics—is
an important part of the explanation for the persistence of personalism
and populism. Daniel Ortega to office despite a constitutional ban
on consecutive terms—offers a example of the persistence of
personalism .
Notwithstanding its Sandinista revolution in the 1980s and subsequent
transition to democracy, Nicaragua continues its historical predilection
for being dominated politically by powerful individuals. Nicaragua is nominally a liberal democracy. Yet that label masks the degree to which the nation-state is dominated by powerful individuals.
In all political systems, there are (or have been) charismatic personalities. When these personalities become all-important and overshadow institutions, however, the polity is altered, inevitably becoming oligarchic. In Latin America, this phenomenon, long-recognized as a “fact of life,” is known as personalismo (personalism).Personalism is not a regime type but a form of political behavior that can seemingly infect—or even overwhelm—a wide range of regime types. Personalism is most commonly associated with authoritarian regimes; understandably, it seems most compatible with dictatorship. Indeed, Nicaragua offers the striking example of the Somoza dynasty: a father and his two sons who successively governed the country from the mid-1930s until their regime fell in 1979 to an insurrection by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) Personalism is thought to be largely incompatible with other kinds of regime types—above all, those two assumed to bracket authoritarianism on the political continuum, the revolutionary “socialist” state and liberal democracy. Nicaragua today, however, presents a case where personalism is pervasive, undermining the legitimacy (or “purity”) of the revolutionary aspirations of the Sandinistas, as well as corrupting the liberal ideals of the country’s incipient democracy and the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC), whose nomenclature would suggest a great affinity for democracy.
The case of Nicaragua—whose citizens in November 2011 returned former revolutionary leader and incumbent president Daniel Ortega to office despite a constitutional ban on consecutive terms— example of the persistence of personalism . The case of Nicaragua suggests that, at least in small, poor countries, personalism is likely to enhance “governability” by offering a certain degree of stability—someone, after all, assumes clear responsibility for meeting the elementary needs of public administration. There is governance. The confusion of countless institutions and myriad political transactions is swept aside. Residents know who governs—there is a face and a name (or a handful of faces and names). Those who are dominant are visible and thus can be held somewhat accountable.
Personalism easily leads to less rule-bound governance and thus creates distrust. Personalism contributes to populism,, and corruption. Personalism is oligarchic and profoundly antidemocratic—even when practiced, as in Nicaragua, within the framework of constitutional democracy.
Finally, and most worrisome, an exaggerated personalism can pave the way for a murky, but very real, “transition” to authoritarianism.
Personalist regimes may be more adept than their more institutionalized counterparts to prevent a collapse, or even at merely enacting stop-gap measures necessary to contain crises. Nicaragua did not collapse when oil prices rose because Ortega was able to secure relief quickly from Chávez.
Likewise, the short-term stability that personalist regimes can offer might boost the needed production of goods and services. The Nicaraguan case suggests—perhaps surprisingly—that there may be economic benefits to personalist political regimes. Yet it also suggests that economies are unlikely to reach their potential under personalist rule, which tends to be mercurial, unpredictable, self-serving, and even corrupt.
Personalist regimes may well contribute to narrow, focused discussions on how to resolve practical problems. But they impede broad-based discussions about national development. Thus personalism involves disturbing trade-offs.
Nicaragua still lacks a democratic culture, and that this
absence allows for the rise of strong-willed individuals.
For example: , Alemán won the 1996 presidential election with 51 percent of the vote. Daniel Ortega came in second with 38 percent. Pacts, Deals, and Uneasy Alliances What was a surprise to all was the intimate relationship that formed between Alemán and Ortega, whose control of the FSLN never faltered. In 1995, the two leaders induced their respective party members serving in Congress to modify the 1987 Constitution to enable them to distribute among their supporters government positions, including those in the judiciary. With this infamous “pact” (as it became known), Nicaragua was transformed from a winner-take-all presidential democracy, with a division of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, —a coalition of two political parties, firmly controlled by their leaders, colluding for their mutual benefit.
percent of the vote. In the 2006 election, the MRS vote share rose to 6 percent, even after its candidate Herty Lewites died of a heart attack and was replaced by Edmundo Jarquín. With the Liberal parties split, however, the MRS’s small vote share was not enough to keep FSLN leader Ortega from winning the presidency with only 38 percent of the vote. The election outcome can also be seen as a divide between two “traditional” candidates—and their parties—and two “modern” candidates. The 2006 results are revealing: The two traditional candidates, of the FSLN and the PLC, received a healthy majority of support from Nicaraguans (65 percent). These candidates received a strong majority of votes despite all the publicity surrounding their backroom dealings, their heavy-handed administration of their respective political parties, and allegations of corruption. The more “modern” candidates, of the ALN and MRS, received only 34 percent of the vote. Upon assuming the presidency, Ortega made a “deal” with Alemán, the details of which remain undisclosed. As a result, Alemán’s conviction was overturned, and he promptly resumed leadership of the PLC. In 2010, polls showed that the reformist liberal candidate, Eduardo Montealegre of the ALN, had slipped in popularity, with more Nicaraguans shifting their support back to Alemán and the PLC. Likewise, although Ortega and his followers had long expressed their determination to remove the constitutional impediment to Ortega running for reelection in 2011, his appeal did not diminish. Indeed, the FSLN, firmly controlled by Ortega, remained the most popular political party by far. Moreover, as Table 2 shows, FSLN supporters are decidedly more likely to vote, join the party, campaign, march, and protest than either the supporters of the Liberal Party or independents.
Nicaraguans seemingly do not punish either corruption or constitutional subterfuge. Indeed, no one seemed shocked when, in May 2010, Alemán registered as the PLC’s sole candidate for the 2011 presidential election. There was some protest when Ortega registered as the FSLN’s lone presidential candidate in March 2011 after a committee of the country’s Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional barrier to his reelection was “unconstitutional.” opinion polls showed Ortega as the candidate with the most public support. A March–April 2011 poll showed Ortega with the support of 48 percent of intended voters.17 An earlier poll, conducted between 27 November and 6 December 2010, asked, “If a president meets the needs of the population, should he be allowed to run for reelection?”18 The majority of respondents, 60 percent, replied that he should. These results show that everyday Nicaraguans are willing to tolerate personalism. Nicaragua’s populace consists more of clients than citizens. When asked how they perceive the country’s politics, poorer Nicaraguans routinely refer to individual politicians, often by their first names (“Daniel” or “Arnoldo”). Typical was the sentiment expressed by two poor, middle-aged women in El Crucero: “Daniel identifies with the poor. He has given chickens, pigs, and even cows to the poor. And he has given roofing material and other construction material to others. He helps people like us.
The media in Nicaragua perpetuate this personalist view of politics. Reporting often focuses on what prominent individuals say or do. It is rare to see or hear discussions about the rules, procedures, or institutions of democracy.
Nicaraguans’ toleration of corruption and constitutional subterfuge is difficult to explain, though it certainly stems in part from widespread poverty and low levels of education. Most Nicaraguans know little about the practice of democracy elsewhere in the world or the purpose of the institutional structures of established democracies. Moreover, Nicaraguans have been “worn down” by political conflict and hardship. The poverty of most Nicaraguans leaves them preoccupied with immediate concerns, and they ask politicians, “What can you do for me?” Both Alemán and Ortega have responded with a calculated populism: the exchange of visible goods and services for political support. Alemán likes to remind supporters that “the bell goes ding-dong” (in other words, “I will give you something, but in return you must support me”). Both Alemán and Ortega travel widely, including to the poorest communities. They both cultivate a sense that it is their munificence as leaders, not an impersonal bureaucracy, that is responsible for government assistance. Likewise, both leaders manage discretionary funds that are used to control their respective political parties, cultivate public opinion, and maintain and build public support. As presidents, both men managed to govern Nicaragua—poorly, perhaps, but they governed it nonetheless. The basic institutions of public administration are in place, and all postrevolutionary presidents have strived to “keep things going” and to mitigate crises. Although neither Alemán nor Ortega has been able to end poverty in Nicaragua, the people are still grateful to the two men for what they have achieved. Nicaraguans in any particular locale may feel that they are poor, and they are, but they appreciate every improvement or offer . Ortega is said in Nicaragua to practice a “responsible populism,” putting in place social programs designed to alleviate poverty and curry political favor, and backing them with real economic resources. Nicaragua’s small size (with a population of just 5.8 million) and its acute poverty make it possible to accomplish much—at least politically—with a relatively small budget. An October 2011 survey revealed that the most appreciated government program or service offered by Ortega’s administration was the “Roof Plan” (Plan Techo), with 37 percent of respondents mentioning it.26 This simple program distributes— for free—ten sheets of zinc per family to replace thatched roofs or roofs covered in plastic. Two-million sheets have been given out for a total cost of $30 million. Alemán had no comparable resources to back his reelection campaign. And while he did not appear to have been seriously hurt by his corruption conviction, he has suffered from his pacts with Ortega. Ortega’s detractors now view Alemán as compromised. Others see him simply as the loser in the competition with Ortega. Yet efforts to “remake” the liberal party via yet another splinter party, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), floundered. The PLI, MRS, and other breakaway factions formed a last-minute “unity” coalition before the 2011 election, and chose as116 Journal of Democracy their standard-bearer Fabio Gadea, a 79-year-old radio personality who lacked both broad appeal and resources. (Gadea has a son who is married to one of Alemán’s daughters.) As the campaign progressed, Ortega balked at the presence of international observers to monitor the election, saying that it was an affront to the country’s sovereignty. In the end, international observers were allowed entry but constrained. What they did see led to complaints: the European Union’s electoral mission, for example, called the vote tally “opaque and arbitrary.” While the voting itself was largely peaceful, there were scattered incidents of violence, most prominently in provincial cities, once Ortega’s victory was announced. Gadea refused to concede defeat, claiming that fraud nullified the legality of the election. The opposition to Ortega did not succeed in ousting him as head-of-state, but did manage to undermine his “democratic” legitimacy. In his first public speech after the Supreme Electoral Council confirmed his victory, Ortega was conciliatory, saying that he would not alter the direction of his government
or embark on dramatic changes. He sought to reassure the public, saying, “We are not going to do whatever we want, but instead what Nicaraguans want, and what they want is security, stability, peace, and reconciliation.”28 Finally, Ortega said he would not award all public-administration posts to FSLN members. He was clearly attempting to allay fears that his legislative majority—a first for a president in the postrevolutionary era—would embolden him. Still, thoughtful Nicaraguans of all political persuasions worry about the political strength of their president and the self-serving, capricious, and personalist nature of his governance. Nicaragua’s strongest political party, the FSLN, is totally under his control—so much so that the party’s headquarters are at Ortega’s residence. The “first minister” is Ortega’s wife, Rosario Murillo, known for her flamboyant outfits and oversized personality. Appointments in public administration, even in the judiciary, seem to be based largely on a promise of personal loyalty to Ortega.
The line between party and state is blurred, and so is the division between private and public.
Only 15 percent of government contracts go through an open bidding process. How the other 85 percent of government contracts are awarded remains shrouded in mystery. Nearly half the country’s television news stations, which receive significant sums of advertising revenue from the government, are now controlled by Ortega. His children run some of the family-controlled media outlets and other family “businesses” (whose ownership and range of activities are opaque). Ortega sometimes uses his considerable political and economic resources in heavy-handed, if deft, ways to intimidate opponents. The president is more an autocrat than either a democrat or a revolutionary. Nicaragua’s past of strongman dominance. The post revolutionary , like the period before the revolution, has reinforced a predilection in Nicaragua for personalist and populist rule. personalism in Nicaragua is a sobering reminder that the institutions and practices of democracy, when welded to the messy realities of individual countries, are compatible with many different outcomes.
