Response Paper for 4 international affairs articles
Strong State and Strong Civil Society in Contemporary South Korea: Challenges to Democratic Governance Author(syf Jennifer S. Oh Reviewed work(syf :
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5 2 8 J E N N I F E R S . O H Strong State and Strong Civil Society in Contemporary South Korea Challenges to Democratic Governance A B S T R A C T This article examines the impact of Korean civil society on politics since democratization. Weak mediating institutions prevent the systematic inclusion of societal actors in the policymaking process, pitting an increasingly strengthened civil society against the state. Consequently, Korean state-society relations continue to remain contentious, posing challenges to democratic governance.
KEYWORDS : Korea, civil society, interest groups, political parties, U.S. beef imports Korean civil \fociety ha\f \bade remarkable progress in the past two decades.
One only needs to look at the recent public outcry against U.S. beef imports to observe the robustness of Korean civil society. In the summer of 2008, more than 1,800 civic groups participated in a series of candlelight vigils protesting prospective imports of U.S. beef. At their peak, the vigils gathered about one million people from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, with even more people engaging in various online discussion forums. 1 And collectively, a coalition of progressive political parties, civic groups, and online discussion groups called the “People’s Action for Countermeasures against Mad Cow Disease” pressured the government into renegotiating the issue of beef im- ports with the U.S. government. The popular protest over U.S. beef reflects 1. Sung-tae Hong, “Chotbul Jiphwaewa Minjujuui” [The candlelight assemblies and democracy], Kyungjaewa Sahoi [Economy and Society] 80 (Winter 2008), p. 35; and Yong Cheol Kim and June Woo Kim, “South Korean Democracy in the Digital Age: The Candlelight Protests and the Internet,” Korea Observer 40:1 (Spring 2009), pp. 63 –66. Jennifer S. Oh is a full-time lecturer in the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. She wishes to thank Hwang Jung-min and an anonymous reviewer for their help in preparing this article. The work was supported by the Ewha Global Top 5 Grant 2011 of Ewha Womans University. Email: . This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 2 9 an increasingly active civil society that has emerged since democratization in 1987.
Korea’s robust civil society is generally perceived as a driving force for democ - ratization and democratic consolidation. In the late 1980s, it played a critical role in bringing down the authoritarian regime and introducing democratic elections. 2 More recently, Korean civil society has attempted to enhance the voice of the people, and thereby deepen democracy, by engaging in various political activities aimed at reforming existing policies and political practices. Examples of such activities include promotion of fair elections, minority shareholder rights, healthcare reform, labor rights, and environmental protection. 3 Given the widespread recognition of civil society’s role in shaping Korea’s post-democratization political experience, there is a need to accurately assess the extent to which civil society has influenced Korean politics over this time. What exactly has changed because civil society is stronger? Contrary to prevailing views, this paper argues that a stronger civil society has not funda- mentally altered the nature of state-society relations in Korea. One defining feature of current Korean society is the absence of established institutions linking a strong state and a strong civil society. Despite democratization and the strengthening of civil society, political parties and interest groups have been inadequate channels through which ordinary citizens participate in and shape politics. Instead, rich forms of associational life in Korean society have perpetuated the prevalence of mass mobilization 4 against government policies. As a result, Korean state-society relations continue to be marked by contention, popular protest, and the absence of systematic inclusion of societal actors in the policymaking process. The broader implication of such an argument is that the emergence of a robust civil society does not necessarily guarantee improved linkages between 2. Charles K. Armstrong, ed., Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State (New York:
Routledge, 2007); and Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 3. Thomas Kalinowski, “State-Civil Society Synergy and Cooptation: The Case of the Minor- ity Shareholder Movement in Korea,” Korea Observer 39:3 (Autumn 2008), pp. 339–67; Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, pp. 117–29; Timothy Lim, “Racing from the Bottom in South Korea? The Nexus between Civil Society and Transnational Migrants,” Asian Survey 43:3 (May/June 2003), pp. 323–42; and Joseph Wong, “Adapting to Democracy: Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Taiwan and South Korea,” Studies in Comparative International Development 40:3 (Fall 2005), pp. 88–111. 4. Mass mobilization refers to public gatherings of ordinary people, such as street demonstrations and candlelight vigils, for the purpose of confronting authority figures or opponents. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 3 0 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 the state and society. Weak linkages, in turn, imply that the ability of civil society to shape politics is much more limited than one would expect. Apart from mass mobilization and voting, there are few means through which civil society or ordinary citizens can systematically participate in politics to shape policies. As a result, in Korea civil society facilitates placing controversial and sensitive issues on the public agenda but lacks the capacity to monitor and influence the process of drafting, revising, and implementing specific policies. Ultimately, if one believes that mediating institutions are critical in the functioning of representative democracies, Korea’s condition of strong state, strong civil society, and weak political parties and interest groups does not bode well for effective democratic governance in the future. The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section one examines the core features of Korean civil society since democratization, in particular the lack of strong interest groups and the persistence of mass mobilization and protests.
Section two explores the implications of Korean civil society for Korean politics and then proceeds to discuss state-society relations in current-day Korea.
Because mediating institutions between state and society are weak, the rich associational life in Korea has not led to visible improvements in the political empowerment of ordinary citizens. Section three illustrates the limitations of Korean civil society through an assessment of the 2008 U.S. beef imports issue. Section four discusses future prospects for civil society under incumbent President Lee Myung-bak’s administration. Section five concludes.
C I V I L S O C I E T Y I N P O S T- D E M O C R A T I Z A T I O N K O R E A Two distinguishing features characterize Korean civil society today. First, de- spite the dramatic increase in the number of civic groups, interest groups have failed to gain a strong hold on society. As analyzed below, civic groups mainly focus on instituting macro-structural changes in Korean society and politics; they are facing an organizational crisis. Second, large-scale mass mobilization and protests continue to be popular modes of voicing political interests and demands. From a societal perspective, these two features reflect the current lack of systematic interaction between the state and society in Korea.
Vibrant Associational Life, Weak Interest Groups The past 10 years saw a remarkable rise in the number of civic groups. In Korea, “non-profit civic group” is the “most inclusive term that refers to This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 3 1 all organizations that are neither governmental nor for-profit.” 5 Officially registered non-profit civic groups alone increased from 2,193 in June 2000 to 10,362 by March 2012. 6 These figures account for a small percentage of existing non-profit civic groups because most do not register with the central or local governments. While there are no official data on the total number of non-profit civic groups in Korea, one study estimates that less than 20% of them register and puts the total number at 60,000 or more. 7 The dramatic rise in the number of civic groups has generally been viewed as a powerful source of political influence for Korean citizens. Civic groups in Korea are often strong advocates of political and social reform. Hundreds, even thousands, of civic groups participated in the massive candlelight vigils that occurred throughout the 2000s, including the Misun- Hyosun vigil in 2002 commemorating the deaths of two middle school students, the anti-impeachment vigil in 2004 protesting impeachment measures against President Roh Moo-hyun, and the 2008 anti-U.S. beef imports candlelight vigil. An interesting feature of the civic groups participating in these candlelight vigils is that they come from an extremely diverse background. Religious groups, labor groups, environmental groups, entertainment industry groups, pharmacist groups, and farm groups all take part. A strong desire for political and social reform seems to be a common link among the large number of civic groups that have emerged since democratization. In particular, citizen’s movement organizations are reflective of the type of civic groups that have gained visibility in Korean politics and society since democratization. The two best-known organizations are the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), founded in 1989 and 1994, respectively. Citizens’ movement organizations focus on broad economic, political, and social reforms aimed at redressing unjust practices from the past and enhancing the voices and livelihoods of ordinary citizens. Such groups exhibit the following three traits. First, they 5. Inchoon Kim and Changsoon Hwang, “Defining the Nonprofit Sector: South Korea,” Work- ing Papers of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, no. 41 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 2002), p. 5. 6. Author correspondence with Ministry of Public Administration and Security [Republic of Ko - rea], Local Administration Bureau, Civil Society Cooperation Division, July 7, 2010, via the ministry’s Q&A portal website. Data since 2005 are available at , accessed May 5, 2012. Because of revisions in the “law of supporting non-profit civic groups,” figures prior to 2000 are not comparable to figures after 2000. 7. Kim and Hwang, “Defining the Nonprofit Sector: South Korea,” p. 6. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 3 2 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 generally take on a watchdog function, serving as a powerful oppositional force to the government. Second, they are often perceived as representing the interests of the people. Third, citizen’s movement organizations can be traced to the democratization movement, reflecting the struggle between state and society. 8 Although the number of civic groups has been on the rise, survey results on individual membership in various types of civic groups offer a different story. According to the World Values Survey results on South Korea, the percentage of respondents who acknowledged membership (active and inactive) in voluntary associations decreased between 1996 and 2005 (see Table 1). 9 When comparing the state of active membership, only the category 8. Kim Dong-Chan, “Growth and Crisis of the Korean Citizens’ Movement,” Korea Journal (Summer 2006), p. 104. 9. The World Values Survey investigates political and sociocultural changes in 97 societies, covering nearly 90% of the world’s population. The survey is conducted by the World Values Survey Association, a non-profit based in Stockholm. Social scientists from all over the world conduct surveys using local funding. Survey results are available at World Values Survey, Online Data Analysis. table 1. Membership in Voluntary Associations, South Korea (% out of Total Respondents) 198219962005 Art/music/educational org. Active member2.37.2 7.4 Inactive member 2.0 29.7 15.3 Total (active/inactive) 4.336.9 22.7 Environmental org. Active member2.36.2 1.6 Inactive member 0.718.8 5.9 Total 3.0 25 7.5 Church/religious org. Active member10.615.517.5 Inactive member 13.831.326.1 Total 24.446.843.6 Charitable/humanitarian org. Active member2.86.2 1.4 Inactive member 1.626.1 7.7 Total 4.432.3 9.1 Sports/recreation org. Active membern/a14.5 13.8 Inactive member n/a35.2 20.9 Total n/a49.7 34.7 Professional org. Active member2.26.1 1.6 Inactive member 4.77.6 7.0 Total 6.913.7 8.6 \fource: World Values Survey, Online Data Analysis, 1982, 1996, 2005, , accessed April 13, 2010. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 3 3 of church/ religious organization showed a marginal increase between 1996 and 2005. Inactive membership also declined in all six categories of voluntary associations. This decreasing trend in voluntary association membership is a striking departure from the membership trend between 1982 and 1996, when substantial increases probably reflected Korea’s democratization in 1987. Low membership in civic groups among the general population is even reflected in citizens’ movement organizations. Historically, their membership primarily consisted of intellectual elites with strong ties to the political opposition movement during Korea’s authoritarian regime. As a result, the general population did not actively participate in citizens’ movement organizations, a trend that continues until now. Participation of the broader population is weak despite the groups’ claim to represent the interests of ordinary citizens. 10 While one should not extrapolate too much from three surveys, these results point to the possibility that the increase in the number of civic groups has not been accompanied by widespread participation by the population. Another notable observation is the steep membership fall in environmental, charity/humanitarian, and professional organizations in 2005. Individual mem - bership in professional organizations only accounted for 13.7% (1996) and 8.6% (2005) of the respondents (see Table 1). Likewise, the percentage of respondents acknowledging membership in environmental or charity organizations declined between 1996 and 2005. Membership in environmental organizations fell from 25% (1996) to 7.5% (2005), and membership in charity organizations fell from 32.3% (1996) to 9.1% (2005). When looking only at active members in 2005, the total falls below 2% for all three types of organizations. In contrast, in all three survey periods a large percentage of respondents claimed membership in religious, sports/recreation, and art/music/educational organizations. For example, 24.4% (1982), 46.8% (1996), and 43.6% (2005) of the respondents identified themselves as active or inactive members in church or religious organizations. Additional surveys conducted by the Social Statistics Planning Division of Statistics Korea, the government’s central organization for statistics under the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, exhibit results similar to the World Value Surveys. People over 15 years of age were asked whether they had participated in community group activities in the past year (see Table 2). The percentage 10. Ibid., pp. 103–04. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 3 4 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 who answered positively increased from 23.1% in 1999 to 44.8% in 2003 but declined afterward to 39.8% in 2009. Among the participants, an overwhelm - ing majority participated in social groups such as alumni associations and fraternities. Participation in religious organizations ranked second, followed by hobby and leisure groups. Yet, the percentage of respondents who were engaged in professional groups (e.g., labor unions, pharmacist associations, lawyer associations) and issue-focused groups (e.g., citizens’ movement organizations, housewives’ clubs, the YMCA, and environmental groups) were only 1% and 6.2%, respectively, in 2009. These survey results illustrate that with the exception of a few well- known citizens’ movement organizations, Korean civil society activities are mainly concentrated in fostering ties and interaction among people. The fact that participation in religious, leisure, and recreational groups dominates associational life shows that ordinary people are regularly interacting with one another in their communities. However, participation in groups that could potentially impact policies, such as professional or issue-focused groups— what we conventionally view as interest groups—is still fairly low. Korea’s vibrant associational life has not necessarily created groups that can systemati - cally engage with the government to promote specific causes. Let’s take a look at labor unions, a classic example of a working-class interest group. Union membership in Korea has been consistently low throughout the post-democratization period, falling from 19.8% in 1989 to 10.1% in 2009. 11 Low unionization rates have persisted despite the presence 11. Korea International Labor Federation, Current Research and Statistics, July 1, 2010, , accessed September 29, 2011. table 2 . Social Group Participation Rate, South Korea (% out of Participant) Participant a Social Religious Hobby/Leisure Issue-focused ProfessionalOther 1999 23.1 54.119.0 15.7 7.51.62.1 2003 44.8 68.613.4 11.2 4.21.11.5 2006 38.8 64.0 15.0 12.2 5.51.32.0 2009 39.8 58.419.7 12.3 6.21.0 2.4 \f o u rc e: Korean Statistical Information Service, Bogun, Sahoe, Bokji [Health, society, and welfare], Sahoe [Society], Sahoe Chosa [Investigation of society], 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, , accessed March 7, 2011.
a Percent out of total respondents. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 3 5 of two encompassing labor organizations, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU).
Korean labor unions do not actively participate in deciding national labor policies despite several government attempts to create a tripartite labor policy committee with both labor and business representatives. 12 In Korea, the emergence of a vibrant civil society contributed to the growth of civic groups. The country has also witnessed the emergence of civic groups such as citizens’ movement organizations that focus largely on political and social reform. Yet, much of the growth in civil society and civic groups has been concentrated on religion, hobbies, recreation, or social activities (via alumni associations). Because interest groups play a rather weak role, civil society continues to interact with the state through popular protests and mass mobilization. Popular Protest and Mass Mobilization Popular protest remains a dominant feature of Korean politics, a heritage from pre-democratic regimes. In a 2009 study of popular protest, Sunhyuk Kim notes that the level of popular protest remained consistently high from 1988 to 2007. 13 On average, Korea recorded 372 protests annually, exhibiting a polarizing trend toward either small (less than 200 participants) or massive protests (over 2,000). Kim also notes that the proportion of street demon- strations out of total protests has increased noticeably since 2002, averaging 75.2% during President Roh Moo-hyun’s government (2003–07). Within the 20 years under study, protests have mainly targeted the state and political society 14 while becoming more violent and disruptive.
Mobilization is a fairly common form of political engagement in Korea.
The annual aggregate number of mobilizations by citizens (that is, all forms of public gathering including protests) ranged from 34,100 in 2002 to 28,600 12. Ideological differences between the two encompassing labor organizations, the FKTU and KCTU, and internal divisions between the radical and moderate members of the KCTU have undermined labor cohesion at the national level. More important, given Korea’s history of hostile state-labor relations, labor unions are reluctant to work within the existing political system. See Jae- jin Yang, “Korean Social Concertation at the Crossroads: Consolidation or Deterioration?” Asian Survey 50:3 (May/June 2010), pp. 449–73. 13. Sunhyuk Kim, “Civic Engagement and Democracy in South Korea,” Korea Observer 40:1 (Spring 2009), pp. 13–16. 14. In Kim’s study, the state includes central and local governments, the president, and the National Assembly. Political society refers to political parties. Ibid., p. 14. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 3 6 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 in 2009. 15 The number of instances when the police mobilized in response to a large gathering increased between 2001 and 2009 from 11,750 to 14,384, respectively, then dropped to 7,762 in 2011. 16 During the candlelight vigils that occurred throughout the 2000s, hundreds of thousands, even a million pro- testors gathered to protest government action and policies. The candlelight vigils were a powerful demonstration of public opposition and dissatisfaction with government decisions and policies. Clearly, there exists tension between mass mobilization and protest as the main venues for citizen engagement in Korea, and a certain stagna - tion in the means of approaching the state. While civil society has gained increasing visibility since democratization thanks to a liberalized political environment, the methods by which people participate in politics have not changed significantly. Importantly, mass mobilizations are increas - ingly occurring in a context of a politically informed population. Studies of candlelight vigils show that participants actively share information over the Internet and are knowledgeable about the issue in contention. 17 Election turnout continues to be substantial—the 2007 presidential polls had a 63% participation rate—but is still declining over time. Even the 2010 local assembly elections had a majority turnout rate of 54.4%. 18 In short, contemporary Korean civil society consists of highly mobilized and politically informed citizens. S T R O N G S T A T E , S T R O N G C I V I L S O C I E T Y Korean civil society’s relationship with the state continues to be conflictual and contentious. The key question is the following: why have high levels of 15. Republic of Korea, National Police Agency, “Byunyabyul Jiphuishiwui Gaechae Hyunhwang” [Mobilization and protest by sector division],
do?idx=95523>, accessed May 5, 2012. 16. Idem, “Bulbup, Gwagyuk, Pokryuk Shiwui Hyunghwang” [Illegal, excessive, violent protest], , accessed May 5, 2012. 17. Kim and Kim, “South Korean Democracy in the Digital Age,” pp. 53–83; and Hyeon-Woo Lee, “Political Implications of the Candlelight Protests in South Korea,” Korea Observer 40:3 (Au- tumn 2009), pp. 495–526. 18. Republic of Korea, National Election Commission, “Jae17dae Daetongryung sungeo Toopyo - ryul Boonsuk” [Analysis of the 17th presidential election turnout rate] (2008),
go.kr/nec_new2009/nec_html/info_election/election02.jsp?bcSeq=58>; and National Election Com - mission, “Jae5hui Jungukdongshijibang sungeo Toopyoyul Boonsuk” [Analysis of the 5th Local As- sembly election turnout rate] (2008), , accessed February 11, 2011. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 3 7 popular political awareness, political liberalization, and vibrant associational life in Korea not propelled systematic and institutionalized interactions between the state and society? Weak interest group politics and under- institutionalized political parties explain the lack of linkage between these two sectors. Although civil society has increased its voice and visibility, ultimately, the absence of adequate mediating institutions raises concerns for democratic governance.
Continuity in Korean State-Society Relations: Past and Present Korean civil society has a long history of contentious relations with the state, dating back to Japanese colonial rule in the first half of the 1900s. While colonized, elements of Korean civil society were increasingly mobilized in anti-Japanese struggles. The colonial state, for its part, was only weakly linked to its alienated civil society, preferring to rely on coercion. 19 State repression of civil society, and dissident efforts to oppose the state via movements, continued in post-Independence Korea. The population was subjected to harsh state surveillance and control under the three authoritarian regimes of Presidents Rhee Syng-man (1948–60), Park Chung-hee (1963–79), and Chun Doo-hwan (1980–87). Yet, state repression was not sufficient to stifle growing anti-government sentiments among students, intellectuals, laborers, teachers, and, more broadly, citizens. Eventually an aroused and mobilized civil society took to the streets and forced Chun out of office, kindling democratization in 1987. 20 Throughout Korea’s authoritarian regimes, violent street demonstra- tions and dissident movements characterized civil society’s interaction with the state. Current-day Korean civil society’s relationship with its democratic state bears a striking resemblance to that of the past. Hagen Koo notes, “Though short in history and relatively under-developed in institutional features, civil society in South Korea has always contained both elements of strong resistance to state power and violent eruptions.” 21 Not only is the state-society relationship contentious, but the main mode of interaction still occurs outside the existing political structure. The persistence and frequency of popular 19. Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). 20. Bruce Cumings, “Civil Society,” in Armstrong, ed., Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State. 21. Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” p. 232. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 3 8 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 protest and mass mobilization discussed above should be understood within this context. Even after democratization, the majority of popular protests have targeted the state and political society. Protests targeting the central or local governments take up an increasing share proportionally. 22 As demon- strated in the candlelight vigils that marked Korean society in the 2000s, civic groups also serve an important function to constrain government decisions and policies. Korean civil society continues to view the state as a main object of political and social reform. Weak Mediating Institutions in Korea: Interest Groups and Parties The origin of contentious state-society relations lies in Korea’s histori - cal experiences under Japanese colonialism. Yet, historical legacies alone cannot explain the perpetuation of this dynamic. The absence of mediating institutions such as interest groups and political parties explains why societal dissatisfaction against state action spills out onto the streets. Mediating institutions reduce conflict by opening up possibilities for real societal influence over policy outcomes. In other words, if existing institutions provided channels through which diverse societal interests could press their demands on the state, then state and society would learn to interact more systematically. Conflict would remain, as in most countries, but it would be less likely to pit state interest against societal interests. Interest groups and political parties are both common forms of mediating institutions. Interest groups’ ability to deliver votes and financial resources, as well as their organizational capacity to implement government policies, makes them attractive partners for politicians and state actors. Interest groups are generally more successful than the masses in sustaining regular relations with politicians and state actors, thus allowing these groups to gain systematic access to the policymaking process. And such access has given interest groups greater leverage over policy outcomes at the expense of the unorganized.
Political parties serve a similar function of aggregating and reflecting societal interests at the political level. The presence of stable political parties with well- defined policy platforms spread across a wide political spectrum increases the likelihood that state-society interaction would occur through political parties. Mediating institutions such as interest groups and political parties are critical in transforming the nature of the state-society relationship. Over time, those operating in even highly contentious state-society relationships 22. Kim, “Civic Engagement and Democracy in South Korea,” p. 14. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 3 9 can learn how to interact within a more established system, given the presence of effective and stable mediating institutions. By opening up stable channels to influence policy outcomes, mediating institutions reduce the legitimacy and attractiveness of popular protests and demonstrations. It is important to note that mediating institutions do not guarantee the representation of all, or even the majority, of interests in society. Small groups often exercise greater policy influence than mass organization: organized farm interests in developed countries are one good example. Nonetheless, mediating institu- tions guarantee a source of stable and predictable interaction between state and society.
In Korea, the rise of civil society was not accompanied by the establishment of mediating institutions. As illustrated earlier, the powerful actors in current Korean civil society are groups and movements aiming at broader political and social reform, not interest groups focusing on single issues. Interest group activities are also hampered by negative perceptions from other civic groups. 23 Interest groups are often viewed as pursuing selfish interests at the expense of the broader societal good. A useful example is the controversial medical reform in 2000, which separated prescription of medical drugs from their sale. 24 Throughout the drafting of the reform bill, citizen’s movement organi- zations such as the CCEJ often came into conflict with interest groups such as the Korean Medical Association (KMA). The CCEJ supported the reform, whereas the KMA sought to block it, fearing a loss of revenue generated from selling medicine. 25 More important, Korean politicians and state actors are not prepared to interact with interest groups, which undermines the groups’ potential (and perhaps sole) channel of systematic influence. To word it differently, weak institutionalization of the policymaking process and political parties limits interest groups’ influence. Since democratization in 1987, Korean interest groups increasingly influence policy through the National Assembly, via 23. Junghee Lee, Iik Jipdan Jungchi: Galdeung gwa Tonghap ui Yukdongsung [Interest group politics: Dynamism between conflict and unity] (Kyungido, Korea: Ingan Sarang, 2010), p. 178. 24. Prior to 2000, Korea’s pharmaceutical system encouraged misuse and overuse of drugs by allowing physicians and hospitals to sell medicine directly to their patients. Revenue from medicine sales constituted a large proportion of hospitals’ and physicians’ income. In order to curb drug consumption, the Korean government reformed the system to separate the prescription and selling of prescription drugs. Now, doctors can only prescribe, and pharmacies can only sell drugs. See Randall S. Jones, “Health-Care Reform in Korea,” OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- tion and Development] Economics Department Working Papers, no. 797 (Paris: OECD, 2010), p. 13. 25. “Civic Groups Take over Policy on Medical Reform,” JoongAng Daily, October 28, 2002. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 4 0 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 public hearings and debates, petitions, policy support, and financial contri- butions to individual assembly persons. Yet, severe divisions and an inability to compromise among National Assembly members drown out the voice of interest groups. Without adequate mechanisms to counter this reality, interest groups’ influence over policymaking is limited. 26 Korean interest groups’ interaction with political parties is even more limited. Much of it centers around public hearings and discussions, rather than active negotiation and lobbying. The most dynamic engagement occurs during elections, when interest groups recommend candidates to political parties, which make an effort to heed the groups’ demands. However, the relationship does not last beyond elections: political parties view interest groups as merely a useful tool for vote mobilization. To a large extent, weak interest group relations with political parties can be explained by weak party capacity. Effective interest group politics is contingent on the capacity of political parties to serve as a channel between state and society. Political parties should respond to interest group pressure by channeling their demands to the state and also carry state demands back to interest groups. Yet, Korean political parties fulfill neither of these functions.
Due to frequent mergers, splits, and changes of party names, Korean political parties remain under-institutionalized despite two decades of democracy. The average longevity of Korean parties is only five years. 27 They also lack strong ideological or policy orientations. As a result, voters face very narrow policy choices and approach parties with apathy. 28 An important structural condition that has contributed to weak party institutionalization in Korea is the presence of deep regional rivalries in society. Although the historical origins of regionalism are debated among scholars, most agree that conflict between Honam (the southwest region) and Youngnam (the southeast) was augmented in the 1970s under Park Chung- hee. 29 Since then, regional identity has been the single largest factor shaping 26. Lee, Iik Jipdan Jungchi. Discussions in this article on interest groups’ interaction with the National Assembly and political parties are derived from case studies in this book. 27. Yoonkyung Lee, “Democracies without Parties? Political Parties and Social Movements for Democratic Representation in Korea,” Korea Observer 40:1 (Spring 2009), p. 37. 28. Kim, “Civic Engagement and Democracy in South Korea,” pp. 19–20.
29. Chul-hyun Park, Hanguk Sahoe ui Galdung gwa Gujo [Current conflicts in Korean society] (Seoul: Korea Institute of Criminal Justice Policy, 2005), pp. 69–74; Eui Hang Shin, “Correlates of the 2002 Presidential Election in South Korea: Regionalism, the Generation Gap, Anti-Amer- icanism, and the North Korea Factor,” East Asia 21:2 (Summer 2004), pp. 25–26; Bae-Gyoon This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 4 1 voting behavior and electoral outcomes in both presidential and legislative elections. 30 Candidates from Honam and Youngnam attract an overwhelming percentage of votes from their respective regions. Accordingly, political parties in Korea tend to form (and disappear) around individual candidates who rely on their regional hometowns for political support, further undermining the development of institutionalized political parties built around policy agendas. Strong regional voting patterns will persist in the foreseeable future. A quick glance at the two most recent presidential elections illustrates this point. In 2002, candidate Roh Moo-hyun received over 90% of the Honam vote, whereas Lee Hoi-chang received over 68% of the Youngnam vote. 31 The clear regional divide during the election is all the more interesting given the popularity of Roh Moo-hyun’s progressive policy stance among the younger generation—irrespective of regional identity. The regional voting pattern emerged again in the 2007 presidential election, where candidate Lee Myung-bak attracted over 70% of the vote in Kyungbuk (northern Young- nam) and 56% in Kyungnam (southern Youngnam), while Chung Dong- yong took 80% of the Honam vote. 32 By shaping voting behavior and party politics, regionalism has a profound influence on South Korean civil society. First of all, as long as regional identity remains a dominant factor shaping electoral outcomes, political parties will continue to remain weak and under-institutionalized. Second, parties lack a strong incentive to establish close ties with interest groups because party politics revolves around regional identities, not issues. This in turn implies that Korean interest groups, which are weak to begin with, face greater difficulties in establishing sustained systematic relations with political parties.
More significantly, such strong horizontal cleavages across Korean society along regional lines create further divisions within civil society. Perhaps one Park, “ Territorialized Party Politics and the Politics of Local Economic Development: State-led In- dustrialization and Political Regionalism in South Korea,” Political Geography 22 (2003), pp. 811–39.
30. So Young Lee, “Regionalism as a Source of Ambivalence in Korea,” Korea Observer 40:4 (Winter 2009), pp. 671–99; Yusaku Horiuchi and Seungjoo Lee, “The Presidency, Regionalism, and Distributive Politics in South Korea,” Comparative Political Studies 41:6 (June 2008), p. 867; Hong Nak Kim, “The 2000 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey 40:6 (November/ December 2000), pp. 894–913. 31. Shin, “Correlates of the 2002 Presidential Election in South Korea,” p. 25.
32. Jun-young Choi, “Jae 17dae Daetongryung Sunguwa Jiyukgunyul” [The 17th presidential election and regionalism], 21 Saegi Jungchihak Huibo [21st Century Political Science Review] 18:3 (December 2008), pp. 55–56, 61–62. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 4 2 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 reason for the lack of strong interest group politics at the national level is their difficulty in bridging the regional divide.
In short, two common forms of mediating institutions, interest groups and political parties, are underdeveloped and under-institutionalized in Korea.
Even organized societal interests lack access to the policymaking process through state actors and political parties. Consequently, both unorganized and organized societal interests have little option but to resort to popular protests and mass mobilization to voice their demands and influence policy outcomes. Deliberate efforts to institutionalize the political party system and policymaking process might create added incentives for organized societal interests to work through the system.
Challenges to Democratic Governance The Korean case provides several insights useful to both civil society and democracy literature. When discussing the merits of civil societies in de - mocracies, one prevailing notion is that civil society strengthens democratic governance by creating democratic citizens. Individuals learn how to behave as democratic citizens—that is, to express their interests and make demands on the government—as they interact in various civic groups. 33 Korean civil society has had over two decades of promoting liberal democratic values such as political reform and liberalization. And as discussed previously, Korean civil society has grown visibly in size and numbers during this time. It is no surprise that many prominent scholars have identified Korean civil society as a driving force of Korean democracy. Yet, the current form of Korean civil society poses potential challenges to democratic governance in the long run. In a seminal article, Berman argues that, in Germany, the existence of a rich associational life in the context of weak, fragmented political parties was a core factor behind the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazi Party. 34 While it would be a far stretch to compare present-day Korea to the Weimar Republic, one observation still holds true: a strong and vibrant civil society in the absence of mediating institutions can potentially destabilize and undermine existing democratic institutions. For example, when political parties offer very limited 33. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993). 34. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics 49:3 (1997), pp. 401–29. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 4 3 choices to citizens—as in the case of Korea—dissatisfied citizens tend to look to other means to express their interests, further weakening the parties. Weak political parties in turn undermine the formation of interest groups because interest groups lack stable political counterparts to address their interests. More important, continued popular protests and mass mobilization in Korea potentially limit the political empowerment of Korean citizens.
Protests and mobilization clearly provide a space for wider participa - tion and an opportunity for citizens to express their political voice. Yet, as demonstrated below in regard to the U.S. beef import protest, mass mobilization and protests suffer from a lack of leadership and unifying ideology. The only tie binding the large number of civic groups and individual citizens is their opposition to government policies; they are not bound by concrete ideas on how to remedy the policies. Inevitably, internal divisions over goals tend to undermine the longevity and impact of these protest movements. Additionally, civic groups and individual citizens do not have access to the formal policymaking process. Without formal or informal inclusion in that process, Korean civil society has few means to shape or monitor policy formation or implementation as they affect people’s daily lives. By focusing on weak interest groups and political parties, the argument presented in the paper naturally raises the question of whether interest group politics or party politics is preferable to mass politics (i.e., mass mobilizations). In many advanced industrial democracies, political parties and interest groups are biased in favor of a narrow group of interests in society. Korean civil society exhibits the opposite trait, with large numbers of individuals gathering to express so-called public opinion on specific government decisions. While both organized and unorganized forms of interaction between state and society are less than ideal, civil societies that encourage systematic interaction between organized societal interests and the political community offer greater possibilities to empower ordinary citizens. Systematic and regular inclusion of societal interests in the poli - cymaking process through interest groups and/or political parties is the starting point to greater participation of civil society. On the other hand, when citizens face the state on the streets, both sides have few means to effectively communicate and cooperate on policy measures. Without insti - tutionalized collaboration between state and society, effective democratic governance may founder in the long run. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 4 4 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 PR O T E S T O V E R U . S . B E E F IM P O R T S I N 2 0 0 8 : T H E LI M I T A T I O N S O F C I V I L SO C I E T Y On May 2, 2008, 10,000 citizens gathered outside Cheonggye Plaza in Seoul to hold their first candlelight vigil against the Korean government’s decision to resume importing U.S. beef. 35 For the next three months, more than 2,000 street rallies were held to protest against U.S. beef imports. Hundreds, sometimes thousands, of citizens—including women and teenagers— participated in the candlelight vigils, with the national turnout for a single day reaching as high as one million in June. The protest over U.S. beef imports was one of the largest, if not the largest, public gatherings over government policy in recent years. Internet forums and discussions played a critical role in informing and mobilizing citizens and accounted for the large turnout during the vigils. The U.S.
beef import protest was noteworthy in that non-traditional protesters such as middle school and high school students played an active role. 36 All of these phenomena, in addition to the Korean government’s quick response to the public outcry, seemed to illustrate the strengthened political voice of contemporary Korean civil society. Yet, a closer look at the process and nature of the U.S. beef imports protest and the new beef agreement reveals inherent and fundamental weaknesses of Korean civil society. First, apart from condemning the resumption of U.S. beef imports, no unified policy position emerged from the protest. In fact, the demands of protesters broadened to include opposition to a whole span of government policies such as proposals to privatize public enterprises (e.g., water companies) and construct a cross-Korea canal. Both proposals ultimately failed due to strong public opposition. Protestors also criticized the government’s educational policies, arguing that proposals to create more private high schools, strengthen English courses, and liberalize college entrance exams would only encourage extracurricular lessons and widen the gap between rich and poor students. 37 The protest against U.S. beef imports had quickly turned into an anti-government protest. As a result, while the candlelight vigils and street rallies powerfully demonstrated public dissatisfaction with the govern- ment, what the public in fact wanted became increasingly unclear over time. 35. The Korean government banned the importation of U.S. beef in December 2003 after a case of mad cow disease in the U.S. 36. Kim and Kim, “South Korean Democracy in the Digital Age,” pp. 53–83.
37. “Beef Protests Turn Ugly,” Chosun Ilbo, May 26, 2008. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 4 5 The lack of central leadership among civic groups and their involvement with diverse, sometimes conflicting objectives explain the absence of a clear policy goal during the U.S. beef protests. Kim and Kim characterize the candlelight vigils and street rallies as being led by “loosely connected horizon - tal networks, not by hierarchical civic organizations.” 38 No single civic group or group of individuals led the protest. Rather, the vigils and street rallies were spawned by calls spread via Internet discussion forums. The involvement of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers’ Union, the KCTU, and citizen’s movement organizations such as PSPD also contributed to the broadening of protest demands to include non-beef issues. Given these groups’ anti- government stance, it is no surprise that the U.S. beef protest quickly turned into anti-government demonstrations. The beef protests also attracted civic groups of diverse backgrounds—religious, consumer, and professional— further undermining the protesters’ unity. Second, the government’s response was equally one-sided. There were no attempts to engage in systematic communication or negotiation with groups in civil society. As a result, the position of the protesters became more extreme. The People’s Action for Countermeasures against Mad Cow Disease called for the resignation of the entire administration unless the government renegotiated the terms of the beef accord with the U.S. govern- ment. 39 In response to the outcry, President Lee Myung-bak delivered a public apology for not being sensitive to the people’s concern over food safety and vowed to take measures to halt imports of unsafe U.S. beef. 40 Lee reached an agreement with the U.S. not to import beef from cattle over 30 months old. The new beef agreement consisted of a voluntary Quality System Assess- ment Program imposed by U.S. beef exporters, in which only beef less than 30 months old would be slaughtered and processed for export to Korea. The U.S. Department of Agriculture would then verify and issue a certificate of sanitation. The agreement also banned the importation of cranial bone, brain, eyes, and spinal cord even from younger cattle. 41 Such measures, however, did little to appease the protesters. Labor activists threatened to block transporta - tion of U.S. beef from warehouses, and women’s organizations threatened to boycott all U.S. beef. 42 38. Kim and Kim, “South Korean Democracy in the Digital Age,” p. 60.
39. “What Is the Future for the Candlelight Vigils?” Chosun Ilbo, June 12, 2008.
40. “Lee Says Sorry for U.S. Beef Furor,” ibid., May 22, 2008.
41. “Korea, U.S. Agree New Beef Trade Terms,” ibid., June 23, 2008.
42. Sang-hun Choe, “South Korea Lifts Ban on U.S. Beef,” New York Times, June 26, 2008. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 4 6 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 The protest over U.S. beef imports illustrates the dangers of having weak mediating institutions in the context of a vibrant civil society. Civil society took no part in shaping the terms of the new beef agreement, and the protesters failed to offer a concrete policy stance against which to assess the government’s measures. The government failed to engage with civil society when drafting its response to the protesters. More precisely, the government was unable to engage with any specific group given the lack of an identifi- able movement leader, the diversity of civic groups involved, and the lack of any institutionalized means to interact with society. As Kim and Kim note, political parties also failed to mediate between the public and the government, thereby intensifying the protests. 43 Ultimately, the final outcome reflected no real negotiation between state and society. Given the lack of consensus between the government and the public, it is no surprise that the enactment of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement on March 15, 2012, and the subsequent imports of U.S. beef both continue to meet opposition from Korean society. 44 So what did Korean civil society achieve during the protest over U.S. beef imports? Foremost, it succeeded in raising food safety concerns. Protesters also forced the government to recognize that U.S. beef imports would have to resume under stricter sanitary conditions. And lastly, civil society demonstrated that citizens could mobilize in a public show of defiance against government policies. But that is precisely the limitation of Korean civil society. Despite the large gathering and show of public opposition, the public took no part in actually shaping the new beef agreement with the U.S. More important, the new beef agreement relied heavily on the voluntary cooperation of U.S. beef exporters to restrict the export of cattle over 30 months old, much to the dissatisfaction of the Korean protesters. Even after such a dramatic confrontation with the government, civil society has not attained improved access to the policymaking process. F U T U R E P R O S P E C T S : C I V I L S O C I E T Y U N D E R L E E M Y U N G - B A K Observers of Korean politics note that civil society’s relationship with the state took a turn for the worse under President Lee Myung-bak. State- society relations had seemed to improve during the two previous progressive 43. Kim and Kim, “South Korean Democracy in the Digital Age,” p. 75.
44. Jung-yoon Choi, “South Koreans Still Angry over U.S. Free-Trade Pact,” Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2012. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 4 7 administrations of President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–08). These two presidents actively sought the support of civil society in order to overcome the conservative opposition and even encouraged civic participation in the government and in various regulatory activities. 45 In particular, Roh was keenly interested in creating a “participatory government” and made efforts to regularly interact with citizens’ movement organizations such as the PSPD. However, the return of a conservative administration under Lee signified a reversion to past state-society relations. The protest over U.S. beef imports was a litmus test for Lee’s relations with civil society. The general assessment is that Lee ignored strong public disapproval of the U.S. beef import deal. A poll conducted in May 2008 indicated that 85% of Koreans opposed U.S. beef imports. Instead of seeking consensus among the public, Lee pushed forward with the U.S.
beef import deal. The president’s bulldozer-like leadership style generated serious repercussions, as Korean civil society erupted in protest over both the beef imports and Lee’s policies. 46 And as noted in the previous section, Lee’s belated apology was not sufficient to quell the public’s anger. Jang Jip Choi, a prominent Korean political scientist, argues that civil society is weakening under the Lee Myung-bak administration because of the resurgence of conservative forces in society, notably within the mass media and big business. 47 Others point to the strengthening of regulations against public mobilization in response to the numerous candlelight vigils in the summer of 2008 as evidence of a state that is hostile to civil society. 48 Even after the 2008 protest over U.S.
beef imports, civil society has continued its struggle with Lee’s administration.
In May and June 2009, following the death of Roh while under investigation for embezzlement, university professors, religious groups, and university students issued declarations criticizing the government for its lack of communication with the people and heavy-handed approach to civil society. The declaration raised concerns over the retreat of democracy in South Korea, specifically, the arrest 45. Yeonho Lee and Taeyoung Park, “Civil Participation in the Making of a New Regulatory State in Korea: 1998–2008,” Korea Observer 40:3 (Autumn 2009), pp. 461–93. 46. Lee, “Political Implications of the Candlelight Protests in South Korea,” pp. 496–97; and SungDeuk Hahm and Yong Hwan Choi, “Early Assessment of the Lee Myung-bak Presidency:
Leadership Style and Qualities,” Korea Observer 40:4 (Winter 2009), pp. 624–25. 47. Jang Jip Choi, “The Democratic State Engulfing Civil Society: The Ironies of Korean De- mocracy,” Korean Studies 34:1 (January 2010), pp. 7–8. 48. Seung-Soo Ha, “Shimin Chamyuh eh daehan Gyujaejangchirosuh ui Bup ui Munjaejum” [“Law” as a means of restriction on civic engagement and its legal issues], Shimin Sahoe wa NGO [Civil Society and NGOs] 6:2 (2008), p. 8. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5 4 8 • A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3 of civilians who participated in the candlelight vigils of 2008 and proposals for laws to restrict public gatherings. 49 The same month, the government prosecuted unionized teachers for violating the Civil Servants Law by filing a complaint against the government. 50 Lee’s administration also took strong means to control civil society during the 2010 Group of Twenty (G20) summit held in Seoul. Breaking with conventional practice, officials blocked civil society groups from access to the media center during the summit. The government also denied entry to international activists as potential threats to the summit. 51 While it is true that the current conservative administration has diverged from the previous progressive administrations’ conciliatory approach to civil society, the fundamental nature of state-society relations in Korea has remained relatively consistent over time. Even under the previous progressive administrations, civil society’s engagement in politics was only possible because the government allowed it. In other words, in the absence of stronger mediating institutions, earlier progressive governments opened up political space to deliberately interact with civic groups. Of course, such measures are temporary and must be followed by institutional changes in order to ensure continued and regular public access to the policymaking process. President Lee simply closed the political space without difficulty because existing mediating institutions such as interest groups and political parties had not fundamentally changed in the past decade. Without stronger mediating institutions, the extent to which Korean civil society participates in politics is largely contingent on the character of each administration. Korea’s highly mobilized and politicized civil society will continue to interact with the state through extra-institutional means, but such embedded practice becomes more difficult to change over time.
Regardless of whether the president is progressive or conservative, there is a need to systematically include societal actors in the policymaking process to strengthen communications between state and society and bring about a less contentious state-society relationship. Otherwise, Korean democracy is 49. “Civil Society Turns against President Lee for Defaming Democracy,” The Hankyoreh [One People] (Seoul), June 8, 2009,
html>, accessed September 10, 2011. 50. Shin-who Kang, “Probe of Teacher Starts,” Korea Times, June 29, 2009, , accessed September 10, 2011. 51. Bong-kyu Kim and Yoon-Nayoung Kim, “Kyungchalehgen Gija Wanjang, Shimin Danchaeehn Media Jupgun Tongjae” [Police disguised as reporters, civil society denied access to media center], Pressian (Seoul), November 11, 2010,
asp?article_num=30101111202350§i\lon=02>, accessed September 10, 2011. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O H / C A N D L E L I G H T A N D T E N S I O N I N S O U T H K O R E A • 5 4 9 vulnerable to the presence of a large, discontented population that cannot accept the decisions of a democratically elected government. C O N C L U S I O N Korean civil society has undergone rapid changes in recent years. The num- ber of civic groups has exploded, and the groups are increasingly assuming a watchdog function to counter government policies and actions. Citizens have turned out in large numbers to participate in various candlelight vigils.
Compared to the past, Korean civil society has gained in size and strength.
Ironically, such changes have not been accompanied with changes in state- society relations. Contentious state-society relations continue to mark Korean politics, pitting a strengthened civil society against Korea’s strong state. Korean civil society continues to work outside the existing political system while failing to gain systematic access to policymaking. As a result, the strengthening of civil society has not spurred substantial increases in the political empowerment of ordinary citizens.
Korea needs to strengthen its weak mediating institutions—specifically its interest groups and political parties—in order to improve state-society relations. In the absence of systematic ties to the political community through mediating institutions, it is very difficult for actors in Korean civil society to exercise real influence over policies. The protest over U.S. beef imports clearly demonstrated that turning out in large numbers did not necessarily guarantee increased policy leverage. If the Korean government and society continue to engage outside the system in one-sided communication, a strong civil society poses a potential danger to existing democratic institutions. The nature of contemporary Korean civil society illustrates that not all forms of civil society lead to the political empowerment of ordinary citizens. The public played a critical role in democratization but failed to institutionalize its newly gained power. Deliberate efforts to establish mediating institutions must accompany the rise of civil society in order to ensure its long-term political influence. Ultimately, the presence of strong mediating institutions will also increase the possibility of cooperative relations between civil society and the state, providing the grounds for effective democratic governance. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:08:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
