reading analysis (graduate level)
in programs in whicb the U.S, is dominant. The United States could find itself isolated from major trends in space develop- ment and have to spend its own funds to obtain capabilities and data previously available through cooperative projects.
Most of all, the world is entering a new period of space activ- ity, in which socially and economically beneftcia! applications of space technology receive increased emphasis in parallel with the traditional priority given to science and exploration, it is not a time for the United States to withdraw from the opportunities and responsibilities that will accompany the space developtnents of the coming decades. And there is much in the U.S, record of international cooperation that has been quite successful; despite recent problems, the United States remains the partner of choice for most other countries.
Leading through cooperation should remain an important part of the U.S, approach to space (Logsdon, 1988).
The conservative, almost nostalgic, message of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U,S. Space Program with respect to international relationships in space stands in rather stark contrast to the optimistic conclusions of the last advisory committee that examined this topic in some depth, A 1987 report of a Task Force on International Relations in Space of the NASA Advisory Council concluded that International cooperation, a feature of the civil space program from its outset, has served the for- eign policy, scientific and space programmatic interests of the United States very well. It has given substance to U.S. leadership, l'he climate, character, and circumstances for cooperation have changed dramatically in recent years with the changing environment of international rela- tions in space. However, cooperation will be even more itnportant in the future although likely to change in character (NASA Advisory Council, 1987, p, 41), By giving scant attention to the role of international coop- eration (and international competition, by the way) in shap- ing the U.S. civilian space program of the next decade and beyond, the Comtnittee missed an important dimension of contemporary space policy. Given the pressures under which it was operating and the depth and scope of the problems internal to the U.S, program, the omission may be under- standable. But more needs to be said on these issues as the United States rebuilds a space program for the 21st century, • • • John M. Logsdon is director of both the Center for International Science and Technology Policy and the Space Poliey Institute of George Washington University's F.IIiott School of International Affairs where he is also professor of Political Science and International Affairs, He holds a B,S. in physics from Xavier University and a PhD from NYU in Political Science, References Advisory- Commiltee on the Future of the U,S, Space Program, December 1990, Report.
Washington: Government Printing Offiee -Joint Communique by NASA's Space Station Partners," June 3, 1991, signed by the heads of ttic European Space Agency, the National Space Devetopment Agency of Japan, and the Canadian Space Agency.
Log,sdon, John M,, t988. "leading through Cooperation," Issues in Science and Technology, vol, iV(Summer), pp, 43-47, NASA Advisory Council, Taslc Torce on International Relations in Space, October t2, 1987, International Space Policy for the 1990s and Beyond.
D,S, Advisory Committee on the Future of the U,S, Spaee Program, 1990, Report of tbe Advisory Committee on the future of the US.
Space Program.
Washington; Govemment Printing Office, NASA's Oi^ni2ational Structure: The Price of Decentralization by Arthur L.
Lemne W hen James Webb, the dynamo administrator and former president of ASPA, headed NASA in the 1960s, he worried that the space agency's field centers would "go into business for themselves" (Young, 1986, pp. 37-38). Led by sueh powerful personalities as Wernher von Braun and Robert Gilruth, the centers were major employers with thousands of civil service and on-site contractor personnel. They were home base for the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo astronauts and for cadres of superb tech- nical talent. The centers monitored contracts worth billions and worked closely with the giants of American industry and local area Gongressional delegations, Webb and his successors tried one reporting scheme after another in an attempt to get the centers to take direction from headquarters. At one point, Webb ignored span of cotitrol and had center directors report directly to his office, rather than to headquarter's progratn offices. Centers had regarded those offices as there to get them resources, but not to give them orders. Later, other NASA Administrators tried this tactic but nothing helped (Kloman, 1986), Today, Webb's fears have been realized, "Over the years NASA has evolved into a decentralized organization and the field centers have become more or less autonomous,'' declared a 1990 study written under a NASA contract (I-ewin and Narayanan, 1990, p. 132), According to one headquar- ters official, "Everywhere in NASA there is overlapping of responsibilities and redundancies. Each (of the ten NASA cen- ters) has a mass of sharp people who want to do eversthing" (Isbell, 1990). As the centers became stronger and more independent, capabilities at Headquarters weakened, espe- cially in such vital areas as systems concepts and analysis, cost estimating, and contract monitoring.
The structure of the civil space program both within NASA and at the Executive Branch level was of deep concern to the Augustine Gommittee. Its 1990 Report cited a clear need to strengthen NASA headquarters, to refocus the work of the NASA centers so that each becomes a center of excellence in specialized fields, to reduce overlap and the splitting of pro- jects, to establish firm headquarters direction over multicenter projects, and to balance in-house and contractor activity.
J'uhlic: Adniini.'itnicion Review * Mard^/April 1992, Vol, 52, \o, 2 The cc^mmittee also sought to strengthen the role of NASA in the structure for civil space in the Executive Branch. It reconunended that the 13 member National Space Council (see grey box on page 200), chaired by Vice President Quayle, create a smaller executive committee with the NASA Administrator as a member.
Keeping NASA intact and strong is a central theme of the Report. The committee forcefully rejected proposals to tum over human exploration of the moon and Mars (President Bush's Space Exploration Initiative) to a new agency pat- terned after the Department of Defense's Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (which runs the "Star Wars" program), or to move major NASA responsibilities for developing advanced launchers or practical applications of space tech- nology to other agencies or to a public authority or govem- ment corporation. Nor did the committee believe that a sepa- rate space science agency .should be created or that space .sci- ence should be transferred to the National Science Foundation (NSF) as some scientists have urged.
Likewise, proposals to lum the shuttle over to a private firm were deemed unwise since the shuttle had not reached the maturity of an operational system, and it was unlikely ever to do so.
Sweeping structural changes, the Report concluded, would cause serious disruption and would not be beneficial techno- logically: "...in spile of its imperfections, by the far the great- est body of space expertise in any single organization in the world resides in NASA..., NASA and only NASA realistically possesses the essential critical mass of knowledge and exper- tise upon which the nation's civil space program can be sus- tained," the Report declared. The task at hand, said the Committee, is "for NASA lo focus on maintaining the self- improvements that gird this responsibility" (p. 3)- These conclusions make sense. Often it lakes years for a new agency to develop a solid organizational base and to launch major new initiatives. New agencies do not necessari- ly perform better than existing agencies that have been revi- talized. The suggestion that space science be separated from NASA, advanced by several prominent space researchers, may seem attractive in theory, since a new agency or a transfer to the NSF could untie space science from the; delay-prone shut- tle and the space station, and from expensive "man-rated requirements" for scientific experiments, as well as the possi- bility of human activities disturbing astronomy observations or other delicate scientific activities. In addition, and perhaps most important, separation would eliminate the direct compe- tition for funds betvv'een science and large manned projects.
Many scientists were extremely upset when in June 1991, NASA agreed to cut the proposed FY 1992 space science bud- get by half a billion dollars in order lo help restore funding to the space station, which had been deleted from the NASA spending bill by the House Appropriations Subcommittee with jurisdiction over NASA's budget. (Subsequently, Congress restored some of this cut.) They saw in this aaion a repeat of the 1970s when overruns in the shuttle program led to cuts or delays in numerous space science missions which James Van Allen, the famed discoverer of the Radiation Belts that bear his name, called "the slaughter of the innocent" (Van .Mien, 1986, p. 37). NASA was accused by space scien- The Roots ofDeccntralizalioii Wliy NASA is sC' decentralized seems hard to understand since the agency won its reputation for management excel- lence during the 1960s with the centrally managed Apollo project for landing htjmans on tie Moon. But Apollo, a crash pfoject to beat the Russians, had strong .presidential, .congressional, and pubiic support and was itinded plentifully. Two of the field centers involved—Johnson and Kennedy—were new. Headquarters^was^ staffed largely by personnel, fresh from the field centers who maintained close ties with center staffs and had a tradition of going back to the Oeld often to work first hand, thus facilitating monitoring and control. Apollo, then, in structural terms was grafted on to NASA. From its very inception, ^^ASA was not a unified whole. NASA was formed in 1958 as a conglomerate of three distinct entities— the National AdviK:;.ry Committee for Aeronautics
Centrifugal tendencies were heightened in the post-Apollo years when the NASA budget was cut in half in real dollar rerms.
The field centers, concerned about dieir liitures, sought additional wo.rk to keep liieir talented staffs employed, and they learned how lo lobby for pieces of new projects. Congressional delegations and contraaors became allies. The result, in the words of the .i?epo?if, was that "significant competence built up across centers in a variety of fields,, .and diver- sification was even encouraged by headquarter's progratn rnanagers seeking competition between centers for new work" (p.
40).
Dudng the 1970 and 1980s, excessive decentralization led to competition among centers for new projects and to split- ting of responsibilities. Often, political and bureaucratic factors overrode technical considerations.in determining which center got what piece of major projects. As Riccardo Giacconi, director of the Space Telescope Science Institute at John Hopkins University, put it, "Program management responsibilities are split among NASA centers on the basis of a spoife system rather than effectiveness" (Giacconi, 1989, p. 97).
The Future of the U.S.
Space I'rogram 199 Role of the Space Council aiitl Olher Federal Agencies The:-stmeture of" tbe ci\€ space; program; outside "of NASA, "in :t|ie :Executive BTanch,. Is. topped by" the.NatioMl Space- ^lMfedl Vice Pi^sidentiQtiayle."'; :the;cGiuiica was established" :ifl "1989 ;ai6n^: tlie lines .of an eate versioa set; .the.cpunei"has:.^s:ii^en^rs.ije",S^ :;"• J^n^l^lit^KSiTi," -.GtjiimjferGei:,aril':fenfei^,;,-t|ie; -E)ifgcts)f::-of.C^fikje;;.^.&5#iiagejnei^ ^fld;:il^^wfet• pr^sident^l.
advisors^ fOi'-miiQmi isectidty' anci' sciend^,;"&e";CeiitraJ " eNASA"fe"^^ '' V ^ Ihe entiiie' US.:
..spa^ .program; both.civil and^military, and views them as closely inteireiated.
;PoHcy,-aiici;.3^%iinistr^tion. of .rpajPF el^ip^ts/of.jnllltary; space",- such" .ag tiie Strategic; Defense:.Initiative artdxeconnais^ce:
M •_•:
_•_•._.
• ".•;^:'-/ •••.".•,:• ." ;:
'."••••' "",'• ;p;ac| ifi:;sewt^:.p6licy:
areas, includm^^^^ ihe ;Pepa.tTOnt.gf Defense:(D(3D):aftd NASA to.worktog^^^ new heavy lift launcBer, promotiiig human; .ration of MarSi'and lesieaingpoHq'/fevdfable to the em^^ . '.
_ ; • ;In:;a(d^tion tO;die cotmcd,., severai.
"federal ^endes havecivil .space roles.: Tbese.iHdude.,tlie Bepartment'd' Gotianerce's :0X)0 N^t^oml; 06eaniC:and .^.tmospheflc Agency; (^IOAA), whit^ operates ;the" nation's weather satellites, and throu^ contract,.
hiidi .serising satellites.
QQC also prcanotes and re^afes U,S.
space cottmierce, except launches..
. . • -the • The" -ilie;;Dfepatt[nent;pf.trarisppitation.promotes and regulates the nation's commerdat. launch industry; the Department .of on nuclear space:
propulsion; .the Nadoiiai;Science Boundatior^:
sponsors akronomy projects; the !Agei^ and.
do&s researdi" on^threats to^the" earth's-Environment," induding the'.atmD- of :$tate, haiidies- iinteniatipnal agreemenis on space matters;: and thC:
VS-^ Trade • Rep^entative, is.
ir!i^ :.-...., ..,.,:,.,;.:"..' :.:.:-.
/ •-• ":",:.:,•,:."-:. ..•:;••-.•."• of De.fei5se.' is aiso• hea^iy;•.involi^ii- in' <:iyii'• spa(^;:ihr<>tigh;joint., acti^ties with NASA,'• such- "as• :sijuttle:
" •••• •• a "model" for other potentiai NASA FFRDCs. JPL has had an outstanding record in building and operating unmanned plan- etary missions. Whether this is a sound proposal depends upon the basic structural issue within NASA—the relationship of headquarters to the fieid centers—as discussed below.
The Importance of Structure While the Report recognizes the problems caused by over- lap and poor coordination among the centers, it is hesitant to make firm recommendations on changes in NASA's headquar- ters and field center structures.
"It is considered by the Committee that the internal organization of any institution should be the province of, and at the discretion of, those bearing ultimate responsibility for the performance of that institution" (p. 48). Hence, the Report makes only proposals for consideration by NASA management. These call for upgrading headquarter's capacities in systems concepts and analysis and cost estimating and for stronger headquarters direction of center projects.
Yet, by not insisting that NASA confront the structural issue head on, the committee decreases emphasis on a grave deficiency which has caused great damage to the civil space program and which, if not corrected, will imperil the mam- moth undertakings for the 1990s and beyond. This lack of emphasis also permits NASA to ignore or downplay the hard- to-tackle issue of headquarters-center relationships.
tists of ignoring the lead recommendation of the Augustine committee that science be the highest priority in the civil space program. (The Committee also favored building the station.) Space scientists, however, may still be better off by fight- ing for their cause within NASA. Even with the FY 1991 cut, space science will receive more than $2 billion, as well as launch and facilities support, a level which could not possibly be equaled in another place or a separate agency.
(The entire NSF FY 1992 budget request is $2.7 bQlion.) However, space scientists must insist that NASA work to insure that space science is funded at significant levels, historically 20 percent of the total NASA budget (which NASA leaders have pledged to do), and that NASA insure that space scientists have more authority over types of missions flown, the mix of small and large projects, launch vehicles, and schedules.
Space scientists must also step up their lobbying efforts, which showed good results in keeping alive such projects as Hubble and Galileo.
The only major structural change the committee recom- mended is that one or more of the NASA field centers be con- verted to Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), in the event that relief cannot be obtained from the civil service regulations which have stymied NASA's efforts to hire and retain top talent (see the article by Jay Shafritz in this symposium).
The Report cited the Jet Propulsion Laboratory QPl) which is operated by the Califomia Institute of Technology under contract to NASA as 200 I'liblic Administration Review • March/April 1992, Vol. 52, No.
2 The Price of Internal Fragmentation bubble Three of the nation's most prestigious space endeavors— the space shuttle, the spaee station, and ihe Hubble Space Telescope—bear witne.s.s to the scars of deeentralization.
The Shuttle According to the Rogers Commission whieh investigated the 1986 Challenger disaster, a "eontributing cau^e" of the accident w;is a NASA nanagcment stmcture whieli '"permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle man- agers." The commission pointed out ihat "The projeet man- agers for various elen^enls of the Shuttle program fell more accountable to their cenier management than to the Shultle program organization'' (Rogers Commission, 1986. p. 199)- The Space Station In this troubled program, the Marshall Spaee Flight Center, lluntsville, Alabama; the Johnson Space Center. Houston, Texas; the Goddard Spaee Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland; and the l.ewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, each heatled a major ""work package," Each center had a prime contractor working with it, and each [Mime had several subcontractors.
In one "w'ork package,"" 16 companies were in\oKed.
l^eviewing .serious management problems of the spaee sta- tion in late 19<^6, a committee of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAi'A) headed by the late General Samuel Phillips, former director of the Apollo projeet, found that strong centralized management was needed (Report of the NASA .Management Study Group, 1986). Rut the earlier effeets of deeentralized planning eould not be overcome easi- ly. The planned station included eveiy '"wish list" of every eenter. Fully 107 missions had been identified to be per- formed on the space station from 1991 to the year 2000, including a satellite ser\ieing eenter, an orbital transfer vehi- cle, a large dcployable reflector, an earth science project, materials processing laboratories, and a Vlars sample return mission (MeCurdy, 1988). To aeeommodate all of these mis- sions, the planners called for both a live-in modular core and unmanned platforms- These ambitious plans called for more flights than eould possibly be flown by the trouble-plagued shuttle, for thousands of hours of astronaut space walks for station assemi:)ly maJntenanee, and for far more electrieal power than eould be reasonably suj^plied.
The lack of central review is illustrated by the "rec|uire- ment" tiiat microwav';: ovens used to cocjk the astronauts' food would operate 24 hours a day. Such excesses have sinee bten eliminated and the station sealed baek, btit not until a new headquarters program office at Rcston, Virginia, was set u\) in 1987; special teams were empowered to take a hard look at station designs, and Congress ordered a down- sizing. The office in ResttMi, however, has suffered from iiiad- equate ci\'il .service staff, a lack of systems engineering capa- bility, and a suppon contractor who had great difficulty in coordinating the work of four powerful NASA centers. This experience showed that there mnst be a central program office to be effective, nut it also must be staffed with enough top pe(.i[)le with impressive technical and management skills.
The flaw in the primaiy mirror of the $1.6 billion Hubble Telescope, discovered after it was launched in the spring of 1990, was due to an inaccurate measurement made ten years before dunng eonstmction in the facilities of the Contractor, Perkin-Elmer. The measurement was never cross checked because of fiscal constraints whieh precluded most retesting and because the technical team at Perkin-Hlmer operated in a "closed-shop" whieh hindered communication beDveen NASA personnel and the contractor- But as Edc Lemer eoneluded after an intensive investigative reporting job for Aerospace America, these factors were compounded by an organizational problem. No one in cjr out of NASA had the personal responsibility (or the tele- scope mirrors that the principal investigators (Pis) had for the five instruments that made up the rest of liubble's complement. These Pis, based in universities outside NASA's administrative chain and armed with authorit)' that came from design- ing the instalments, acted as advocates, defend- ing the instruments against NASA eomer-etitting.
In contrast, the telescope mirrors were orphans (Lerner, 1991, p. 19), Within NASA, according to Lerner, responsibility for over- seeing tests on the mirror was never pinned down. There were twci university Pis for the overall mirror assembly (which included the pdmary and seeondaiy mirrors, the truss, and other components). Both thought that Marshall was tak- ing care of supervising testing of 4lie pdmary miiTor (Lemer, 1991, p. 2-i).
The environment in which the telescope project was man- aged in the late 1970s and early 1980s is reflected in com- ments by Noel Hinners who became director of Goddard in 1982.
Responsibility for Hubble was then split between Marshall (the lead eenter) and Goddard until severe manage- ment problems pulled project direction to heackjuarters in 19H5- Hinnets noted that relations among headquarters, Goddard, and Marshall were strained and that the roots of the ,strain went back to dividing program management between Goddard and Marshall, "1 ihink when Goddard didn't get the role (on the Space Telescope Program) it wanted, it said, we'll do the minimum—screw it" (Smith. 1989, p. 356), NASA and Policy Leadership NASA's internal fragmentation also hurts its ability to be a policy leader and to promote a ,strong civil space program.
NASA remains dominant in eivil spaee activity, with 97 per- cent of the civil space butlget.
('I'he Department of Commerce has 2 percent and other agencies share the last !
jicrcent.) The existence of" the Space Council and the increasing importance ot space commerce, international pro- grams, and the global environment—eoneerns of (jthcr l:xecutive IJranch agencies—poses a serious challenge to NASA\s liistorical leading policy role.
The 1958 Space Act created NASA as a eivilian agency due to concerns of President liisenhower and Compress that the The liiLuR; ol lilt' t.i,S Space t'rogram 201 new space program might be viewed as warlike. Over the years, the Department of Defense space activities have grown to twice the size of NASA's, and numerous proposals have been made to have DOD take over some of NASA's major responsibilities, particularly in advanced launcher develop- ment, which it currently .shares with the space agency, and in space operations. The combination of new civil space rivals, plus the prowess of the DOD's space programs, means that NASA must have strong leadership and loe a cohesive agency, if it is to exert major policy influence.
Contractor Operation of the Centers Converting the field centers to FFRDCs, in the event that NASA cannot get relief from civil service restrictions, would help to ease recruitment and retention problems. Such a move would also secure relief from inflexible procurement ailes and could aid in financing the rebuilding of the centers, many of whose facilities are run down.
Such changes should be approached with caution. JPL has been a successful FFRDC for NASA, but it is a unique institution. It was incorporated into NASA in 1958, shortly after the agency was formed, having been under contract to the Department of the Army. Therefore, it did not have to go through a painful conversion process. In addition, JPL had a long tradition as a leader in rocket research. Changing a civil service center to a university based-FFRDC would not guaran- tee thai a facility as capable as JPL would result. More impor- tant, would the additional legal and administrative layers cre- ated by contract operation make the new FFRDCs even less responsive to headquarters than is currently the case with the civil service centers? At various times, NASA had respon.sive- ness problems with JPL (Koppes, 1982; Keller, 1990). A fur- ther consideration is whether NASA headquarters would have sufficient capacity, both in technical and managedal staff, to adequately direct and monitor contractor operated centers.
Experience with the Department of Energy contractor operat- ed facilities indicates the problems which can result from poor central monitoring. In addition, would the ability of the converted centers to pay higher than civil service salaries drain key talent from the central agency, eroding government capability to plan and direct the civil spaee program, to insure the highest safety and quality standards, and to moni- tor industrial contractors?
Conclusion It is clear that to be an effective policy leader and program implementer, NASA must equip itself to provide firm direction of programs carded out at its field centers. Some leeway for the centers is desirable, for basic research and early develop- ment is nurtured in an atmosphere free of close supervision.
Care mu.st also be taken to permit center personnel to pro- pose new initiatives and to participate in key agency deci- sions.
But for major projects in the advanced development, implementation, and operations phases, strong central direc- tion is a must.
The Augustine Committee recognized this need but did not stress its importance relative to other concerns. It is wor- risome that NASA, while moving to strengthen headquarters capabilities, is doing so slowly. In line with a committee rec- ommendation, NASA has set up a headquarters office to pro- vide adviee to the spaee ageney's top officials. The new office of Systems Concepts and Analysis will rely on a small civil service staff to analyze sensitive issues requiring rapid response and for which expertise lies within NASA. Other issues requiring longer tenn in-depth analysis or extra precati- tions to ensure that perspectives presented to the administra- tor are unbiased may involve support from an existing FFRDC or another source. This move is all to the good, but was taken in May 1991, six months after the report WAS released.
Similarly, NASA is moving slowly on actions to give stronger direction to the centers. Top NASA officials have even said that the balance may have swung too much in the direction of headquarters!^ Such views and a leisurely pace of change are not compat- ible with the urgent need to bring the civil space program up to speed for decisive and capable management of large, com- plex programs.
To achieve a stronger central role, NASA leaders must be able to resist both internal and external opposition. The cen- ters and their congressional and contractor allies have resisted attempts by headquarters to centralize program management.
The Texas congressional delegation lodged a strong protest in 1986 when NASA ordered Johnson to relinquish the lead cen- ter role in the space station program, causing NASA nearly to loose the program altogether, and forcing the agency to sus- pend tlie move for 90 days (Lewin and Narayaman, pp. 119- 120).
Support for a stronger headquarters role by the President and the Spaee Council would help NASA leaders achieve the firmer direction needed to reach the ambitious goals for the civil space program in the 1990s and beyond.
• • • Note L RemartiS by J.R. Thompson, hearing before the Augustine Commiltee, September 13. 1990. Isbetl (1990, p. 7) quoted Administrator Tmty who warned that "A huge agency-wide disruption in rot&s and missions (of the centers) could be disruptive for years." James Rain, who will head the NASA office of Systems Concepts and Analysis, cautioned that the new office must evolve. "We need to gain acceptance from the NASA community." Douglas Istx^Il, "NASA Creates New Oftice to Advi.st- Truly, Thompson," Space News (}A-dy 20-26, 1991) p. 5.
References Appieby, Paul, 19'i5.
Big Democracy.
New York: Alfred A, Knopf.
Giacconi, R., 1989. "Science and Tc-chnology Policy: Space Science Strategies for the 1990s," in Radford Ryerly, Jr., ed. Space Policy Reconsidered. Boulder, CO: We,stview Press.
tstx-11, Douglas, 1990. "Major Shake-up of Agency's Field Centers Urged." 5pflC(7.V(ws (November 12-18).
Keller, Sam, 1990. Deputy Associate Administrator of NASA. Testimony before the Augustine Committee, September 13.
Kloman, Erasmus H., 1986. NASA: The Vit,ion and the Reality.
Washington, DC:
National Academy of Public Adminisiration.
202 Public Admitiislrjlion Review' • Mairh./April 1992, VoL 52, \o. 2 Koppes, Cla\ior\. 1982.
JPl.
and Ihe American Space Program:
A History of the Jet Propulsion !.ahoratcry.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lerner, Eric J,, 1991. "Whai Happened to Hubble," Aero.space America (February'), Lewin, Thomas _|. and V.K. Narayanan, 1990. Keeping the Dream Alive:
Managing Ihe Space Station Program, 1982-1986. Washington, DC; NASA, July. NASAConlracI NASW-424H, McCurdy, Moward E.,1988. "The DecLsion to Build lhc Space Station: Too Weak a Commitment?" SpticePo/icj (Novem!>cr), pp. 301-302.
Report of the U.S.
Presidential Commission to Investigate the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986. Wasfiington, D.C: USGPO.
Report of Ihe NASA Management Study Group, 1986. Phillips Report.
Washington, D.C: NASA Smith, Robert W., 1989. The Space Telescope:
A Study of NASA, Science^ Technology, und Politics.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, U,S, Advisory Committee on the Fulurc of the U.S. Space Progmm, 1990.
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S.
Space I'rogram.
Washington: Government Printing Office.
Van Allen, Jame.s A., 1986, "Space Science, Space Technology and the Space Station." Scientific American, vol. 254, no, 1 (January), !, John D., 1986, "James E. Webb and NASA," Tlje Bureaucrat, vol. IS, No, i (Fall).
ConcWing Observations The Augustine Report is now one year old, fn response to the public administration issues raised by the Report, NASA has made some internal changes: it created a systems con- cepts and analysis office, named associate administrators for human resources development and exploration, and separat- ed the management of the space shuttle from the space sta- tion by naming associate administrators for space flight oper- ations anci space systems development. Changes arc being made in some programs, particularly in space .sciences, to reduce overlap among centers. NASA also is transferring the bulk of its shuttle program management office from head- quarters to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida but is leav- ing largely unchanged the roles of the Johnson and Marshall centers in the Shuttle program, ft rejected creation of an independent cost-analysis group, as called for in the Report in favor of augmenting the staff of the NASA comptroller.
In line with the tone of the Augustine Report, NASA is considering cancelling some of its largest, multibillion dollar science satellites in favor of smaller, less costly spacecraft.
The space agency is also moving to improve its procure- ment management by creating a single financial information system that can track more accurately the agency's billions of dollars in contracts. This will replace individual systems at nine NASA centers and at headquarters.
As of this writing, significant action has not been taken on several central public administration issues. These include strengthening headquarters direction of the centers and pro- viding for independent cost analysis and cost estimates.
Additional refocusing of the roles and missions of the NASA field centers is advisable to reduce overlap and to ensure that each becomes a center of excellence in speciali:^ed fields.
Further, presidential leadership, viral to a revival of the civil space program, needs to be stronger. Congressional leadership, which also has been lacking, would provide greater impetus, f.eadersbip from both the executive and leg- islative branches is needed to help define specific intermedi- ate civil space objectives (as well as longterm goals) and to provide support for NASA's strengthening of headquarters vis- a-vis the centers. Both branches can also help by removing burdensome procurement and personnel restrictions and by authorizing multiyear funding of long-term missions and mul- tiyear procurement.
Tlie revolutionary' changes in the former Soviet Union are providing new opportunities for international co-operation, as the republics seek to reduce space program costs and raise cash from rental and even sale of their space facilities and hardware. NASA and the administration must be ready to broaden approaches to intemational co-operation.
The Augustine Report should be read carefully by the nalion'.s policy makers and by all citizens concerned with insuring that the United States is a leader in space activity for peaceful purposes and the benefit of all mankind.
The Future of the U,S, Space Program 203
