Tutorial Needed

Research Article Prejudice From Thin Air The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes David DeSteno, 1Nilanjana Dasgupta, 2Monica Y. Bartlett, 1and Aida Cajdric 1 1 Northeastern University and 2University of Massachusetts–Amherst ABSTRACT— Two experiments provide initial evidence that spe- ciﬁc emotional states are capable of creating automatic prej- udice toward outgroups. Speciﬁcally, we propose that anger should inﬂuence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of its functional relevance to intergroup conﬂict and competition, whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state.

Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted, results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these ﬁndings for emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in par- ticular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.

Since the heyday of frustration-aggression and scapegoating theories of prejudice (e.g., Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), social psychologists have recognized that intergroup relations, and the stereotypes and prejudices that inevitably accompany them, are in- ﬂuenced by perceivers’ emotional states. As in the case of attitudes more generally, emotions have been found to inﬂuence when, and to what extent, people express positive or negative attitudes toward, and beliefs about, members of in- and outgroups (Bodenhausen, Muss- weiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001; Fiske, 1998; cf. Petty, DeSteno, & Rucker, 2001). For example, anger and happiness are known to en- hance heuristic processing of social information that, in turn, ex- acerbates stereotypic judgments of outgroups (Bodenhausen, Shep- pard, & Kramer, 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Sadness, however, has been shown to promote systematic processing of information that, in turn, decreases stereotypic judgments (Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997). These and similar ﬁndings have led to wide acceptance of the view that speciﬁc emotions can inﬂuence people’s beliefs about social groups.

It is important to note, however, that thus far, the growing corpus of research on emotion and intergroup cognition has focused exclusively on the effects of emotion on self-reported, or explicit, judgments of social groups (for a review, see Bodenhausen et al., 2001). Such judgments involve conscious deliberation and are, therefore, clearly under perceivers’ voluntary control. Indeed, if people suspect that incidental emotion may unduly inﬂuence an unrelated judgment, they often correct for the perceived bias (Lambert et al., 1997; cf. DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000). Moreover, happy individuals, who typically engage in heuristic processing, are able to process system- atically when instructed to do so (Queller, Mackie, & Stroessner, 1996) or when counterstereotypic information motivates them to do so (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996). Such control, however, is not available for all types of judgments, especially automatic ones (Banaji & Dasgupta, 1998; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In the domain of intergroup cognition, automatic attitudes stand as an unconscious analogue to self-reported or conscious attitudes; that is, they rep- resent evaluations of social groups whose initiation and modiﬁcation typically operate without volitional control (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Understanding the conditions that lead to the formation and exacerbation of automatic prejudice is im- portant not only because of its pervasiveness, but also because of accumulating evidence that automatic prejudice does not remain conﬁned to mental life—it diffuses into people’s behavior toward outgroup members (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). We believe that people’s emotional states at the time of intergroup judgment ought to inﬂuence their automatic evaluations of social groups by moderating or even creating intergroup biases outside of awareness. This hypothesis stems from a functional view of emotions as phenomena designed to increase adaptive responding to en- vironmentally signiﬁcant stimuli (Damasio, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 1999; LeDoux, 1996). 1From an adaptiveness standpoint, it seems The ﬁrst two authors contributed equally to this work. Address correspondence to David DeSteno, Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, e-mail: d.desteno@ neu.edu, or to Nilanjana Dasgupta, Department of Psychology, Tobin Hall, 135 Hicks Way, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, e-mail: [email protected]. 1The inﬂuence of emotion on cognition and behavior is theorized to produce adaptive responses that prepare organisms to meet environmental challenges.

However, the inﬂuence of emotions may also diffuse into new situations; that is, a preexisting or incidental emotion may inﬂuence interactions with a sub- sequent target (cf. Bodenhausen et al., 2001; Petty et al., 2001). Any biases that stem from the inﬂuence of incidental emotions on judgments of subsequent targets need not represent an adaptive response. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Volume 15—Number 5 319 Copyright r2004 American Psychological Society at UNIV TEXAS AT TYLER on August 22, 2016 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from reasonable to expect that speciﬁc emotions should facilitate people’s ability to evaluate social groups quickly and automatically, as well as slowly and carefully. We predict that to the extent that outgroups often signify sources of conﬂict, competition, or blockage of goals (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002), and to the extent that emotions help individuals meet environmental challenges by acti- vating goal-driven action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; LeDoux, 1996), emotions that prepare organisms to meet challenges related to conﬂict or competition (e.g., anger) should bias automatic intergroup evalua- tions in accord with these functional goals. EMOTION AND AUTOMATIC INTERGROUP ATTITUDES Although no evidence directly bears on this hypothesis, ﬁndings from three lines of research lend credence to the idea that emotion ought to shape automatic attitudes toward social groups. First, cognitive neu- roscience research has begun to identify subcortical structures in- volved in automatic evaluative appraisals of social groups (Phelps et al., 2000) and has found these structures to be reciprocally linked to both cortical and subcortical regions of the brain involved in the experience of emotion (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002).

Such reciprocal pathways suggest not only that automatic appraisals of particular stimuli can trigger emotion, but also that extant emotional states can inﬂuence subsequent appraisals. Given these linkages, it is possible that an emotional state renders individuals more vigilant against certain threats in the environment and that such vigilance modulates subsequent automatic evaluations of relevant social stim- uli. Because automatic evaluations facilitate rapid responses when strategic analysis is unavailable, it seems reasonable to expect that these responses may be an important medium through which emotions allow organisms to meet environmental challenges; for example, cer- tain emotion-driven automatic responses may act as the ﬁrst line of defense against threatening stimuli.Second, the functional view of emotion readily extends into the realm of intergroup relations. Recent work has begun to ﬁnd that appraisals of social groups evoke speciﬁc emotional states, goals, and action tendencies that facilitate the successful negotiation of group interactions (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Given this link between social groups and speciﬁc emotions, it is conceivable that the experience of such emotions, even when their source is incidental to intergroup relations, may inﬂuence people’s perceptions of in- and outgroups in accord with their functional signiﬁcance. Finally, for emotion-based moderation of automatic intergroup at- titudes to occur, such attitudes must show some degree of ﬂexibility.

Recent research has supported this view, providing evidence that automatic beliefs and attitudes toward groups are not as immutable as previously theorized, but rather are quite sensitive to external cues such as social context (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). Consequently, emotion, given its context-rel- evant signaling value, ought to act as an internal cue capable of moderating automatic intergroup attitudes. EXPERIMENT 1 We used a minimal-group procedure to provide an initial test of the hypothesis that speciﬁc emotions can bias automatic attitudes toward social groups. Minimal groups provided a clean assessment of the primary hypothesis because participants had no preexisting attitudes or emotional reactions toward them. Thus, any automatic preference for one group over another could be interpreted as a new attitude. 2To the extent that outgroups signify sources of conﬂict and competition, they may evoke feelings of anger and contempt (cf. Brewer & Brown, 1998; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002). We propose that just as anger can originate from current interactions with groups, so may incidental feelings of anger from an unrelated situation affect automatic ap- praisals of social groups in a subsequent situation because the emo- tion signals a hostile environment and prepares individuals to act accordingly. Speciﬁcally, we propose that incidental feelings of anger are likely to increase automatic bias against an outgroup because anger increases negativity toward the outgroup, decreases positivity, or both. According to a functionalist perspective, the emergence of outgroup bias should be speciﬁc to feelings of anger as opposed to other negative emotions that are typically less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness). To examine this hypothesis, we assigned participants to minimal groups, induced one of three emotional states (i.e., anger, sadness, neutrality), and then assessed participants’ au- tomatic attitudes toward these groups with an evaluative priming task.

Method Participants A community sample of 87 New York City residents (50 females, 37 males) participated in exchange for $10.

Manipulations and Measures Creation of Minimal Groups. To create minimal groups, we had par- ticipants complete a bogus personality test in which they estimated the frequency of various events (e.g., ‘‘How many people ride the New York subway every day?’’). After they completed the test, the computer ostensibly analyzed their responses and informed them that they were either an ‘‘overestimator’’ or an ‘‘underestimator.’’ In reality, each participant had been randomly assigned to one of these two groups. To ensure that participants remembered their group membership throughout the experiment, we instructed them to wear wristbands designating their group: red wristbands for underestimators and blue ones for overestimators. Participants were then shown pictures of 6 ingroup members and 6 outgroup members. 3The backdrops of these pictures were color-coded red for underestimators and blue for over- estimators. By matching participants’ wristbands to the color of the photographs, we sought to make group membership readily rec- ognizable by a visually salient characteristic.

Assessment of Automatic Intergroup Attitudes. An evaluative priming task was used to measure automatic intergroup attitudes (elements of this priming task were borrowed from Fazio et al., 1995, and Payne, 2001). In the ﬁrst block of 12 trials, participants categorized the pictures of in- and outgroup members that they had seen previously during the minimal-group assignment procedure as belonging to the 2There is debate about whether evaluative biases captured by response la- tency measures ought to be interpreted as personal attitudes or as cultural associations learned by exposure to particular stimulus pairings in the en- vironment (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). The evaluative biases captured in the present experiments cannot be attributed to cultural associations given that the target stimuli were experimentally created minimal groups.

3Individual pictures assigned to the overestimator and underestimator groups were counterbalanced. 320 Volume 15—Number 5 Prejudice From Thin Air at UNIV TEXAS AT TYLER on August 22, 2016 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from ingroup (‘‘us’’) or outgroup (‘‘them’’). These images were presented one at a time in a random order and later served as target stimuli. In the second block of 12 trials, participants learned to classify valenced words as good or bad; these later served as primes. The third block of 24 trials allowed participants to practice the standard evaluative priming procedure. In each priming trial, several stimuli were pre- sented in rapid succession in the following order: (a) an orienting stimulus ( n) for 500 ms, (b) a word prime for 200 ms, (c) a target picture for 200 ms, and (d) a gray mask that stayed on screen until participants pressed the appropriate key on a computer keyboard to indicate whether the target picture belonged to their ingroup (‘‘us’’) or outgroup (‘‘them’’). A 500-ms pause separated individual trials. Par- ticipants were instructed to attend to all stimuli presented on screen, but to categorize only the pictures. For each trial, the prime and target were selected randomly from a pool of 12 primes and 12 targets. Once practice was over, participants experienced the emotion induction (described in the next paragraph). They then completed two blocks of 45 data-collection trials each, received a second round of the emotion induction, and ﬁnally completed two more blocks of 45 data-collection trials (total of 180 critical trials).

Emotion Induction. The emotion-induction task was introduced as a study of people’s memories. Participants were asked to write in detail about an autobiographical event from the past that had made them very angry, very sad, or emotionally neutral (control condition). The duration of the initial writing task was 4 min. Participants were told that they would have an opportunity later to continue writing about their memory. In the second round of the induction procedure, par- ticipants were told to continue writing from where they had left off for another 2 min. 4 Emotion Manipulation Check. Emotional states were assessed using 5-point adjective rating scales known to tap sadness and anger (DeSteno et al., 2000). The anger subscale consisted of angry,an- noyed ,frustrated , andirritated (a 5 .90). The sadness subscale con- sisted of sad,gloomy , anddown (a 5 .91).

Procedure Participants arrived at the lab for what they thought was an experi- ment on people’s personalities. They ﬁrst completed the minimal- group assignment task, which they believed to be a measure designed to determine their personality type. Immediately following this ma- nipulation, participants completed the evaluative priming task, which served as a measure of their automatic attitudes toward the ingroup and outgroup. This task was introduced as a measure of ‘‘hand-eye coordination’’ that was allegedly necessary to serve as a baseline because of individual differences in people’s speed of responding to visually presented stimuli. As noted earlier, the emotion induction was embedded before the ﬁrst and again before the third data-collection blocks of this priming task. After the priming task, participants completed an emotion-manipulation check and were debriefed. All data were collected and instructions and stimuli presented via com- puter using MediaLab (Jarvis, 2002) and Inquisit (Draine, 2000). Results and Discussion Manipulation Check The emotion manipulations were successful in producing the expected 3 (emotion-induction condition) 2 (emotion rating) interaction, F(2, 85) 515.04, p< .001. That is, participants in the angry condition reported more anger ( M5 3.32) than sadness ( M5 2.57), t(30) 53.01, p < .01, d5 0.54; participants in the sad condition reported more sadness ( M5 3.28) than anger ( M5 2.36), t(24) 53.35, p< .01, d 5 0.67. Neutral participants reported low levels of both emotions ( M sadness 5 1.40, M anger 51.53).

Automatic Attitudes Toward Social Groups A 3 (emotion) 2 (prime) 2 (target) mixed analysis of variance revealed that the experience of speciﬁc emotional states differentially inﬂuenced automatic attitudes toward the target groups, as indicated by the three-way interaction, F(2, 85) 52.50, p5 .08 (see Fig. 1). 5A Prime Target interaction emerged among angry participants, in- dicating that, as predicted, the outgroup became a strongly valenced attitude object, F(1, 30) 54.95, p5 .03, d5 0.57. 6More speciﬁcally, angry participants were slower to associate positive attributes than negative attributes with the outgroup, t(30) 52.35, p5 .03, d5 0.42.

There was no difference in the speed with which they associated positive versus negative attributes with the ingroup ( t< 1), indicating a neutral evaluative stance toward this group. Moreover, as expected, no intergroup bias (i.e., Prime Target interaction) emerged for neutral or sad participants ( Fs < 1.3). These data suggest that anger exerted a functional inﬂuence on automatic attitudes and, in so doing, created automatic prejudice where none had previously existed.

However, before placing conﬁdence in this ﬁnding, we wanted to at- tempt a cross-method replication, especially given that the omnibus test of the three-way interaction did not reach the conventional level of statistical signiﬁcance. EXPERIMENT 2 In this experiment, we used a different measure to assess the effect of emotion on automatic attitudes—the Implicit Association Test (IAT).

We used the IAT for two reasons. First, it provided the opportunity to conduct a cross-method validation of the ﬁndings of Experiment 1.

Evaluative priming and the IAT share several commonalities: (a) Both tasks assume that if an attitude object evokes a particular evaluation, it will facilitate responses to stimuli that are evaluatively congruent versus neutral or incongruent, and (b) both tasks interpret response facilitation as a measure of the strength of association between the object and attribute (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; 4To avoid confounding the anger induction with the priming of information related to intergroup conﬂict, we screened participants’ responses for memories that were intergroup in nature. None of the memories involved intergroup themes; all were interpersonal. 5Analyses involving response latencies were conducted using log-trans- formed values to normalize the distributions. For easier interpretation, how- ever, we present descriptive statistical information using the millisecond metric.

6We were agnostic about whether increased intergroup bias would be driven by less positivity or greater negativity toward the outgroup. Previous work on automatic prejudice in particular, and automatic evaluations in general, has typically relied on the existence of signiﬁcant Prime Target interactions, as opposed to absolute comparisons of response latencies across different types of trials, to indicate the existence of an evaluative bias because such individual comparisons can be compromised by confounding factors that differentially inﬂuence responses to speciﬁc types of stimuli (see Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch, 1997). Volume 15—Number 5 321 D. DeSteno et al. at UNIV TEXAS AT TYLER on August 22, 2016 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).

However, there are procedural differences between these two tasks.

Thus, replicating Experiment 1 using the IAT would demonstrate the robustness of the predicted effect. Second, some data suggest that compared with priming techniques, the IAT may be more sensitive to individual and group differences and somewhat more reliable across time (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). We therefore expected that this task might be better able to capture the predicted pattern of emotion-induced moderation of intergroup bias.

Method Participants Eighty-one students (51 females, 30 males) participated in this ex- periment in partial fulﬁllment of requirements for a psychology course.

Procedure and Measures The procedure and measures used were identical to those of Experi- ment 1 with two exceptions: Automatic attitudes were assessed using an IAT instead of evaluative priming, and participants’ self-reported attitudes toward the ingroup and outgroup were also measured to ensure the success of the minimal-group manipulation.In the IAT task, participants ﬁrst completed three practice blocks during which they categorized four types of stimuli (pictures rep- resenting in- and outgroup members and positive and negative words) using two designated response keys. Speciﬁcally, participants classiﬁed (a) valenced words for 20 trials, (b) pictures of in- and outgroup members for another 20 trials, and then (c) all four types of stimuli simultaneously (20 trials). These practice tasks were coun- terbalanced such that half the participants learned to categorize ingroup and good stimuli using the same key and outgroup and bad stimuli using a different key. The remaining participants learned the opposite stimulus pairing. Participants then completed the ﬁrst round of emotion induction, which was followed by a data-collection block of the IAT that was identical to the last practice block, only longer (50 trials).

Next, additional practice was given so that participants could learn to categorize stimuli in the combination opposite to what they had learned before. During this practice, they ﬁrst classiﬁed pictures of in- versus outgroup members using response keys opposite to those they had used previously (20 trials). Next, they classiﬁed all four types of stimuli simultaneously such that, for example, those participants who had previously paired ingroup with good and outgroup with bad learned to associate ingroup with bad and outgroup with good (20 trials). Participants then completed another round of emotion induc- tion to reinstantiate their feeling state, followed by a second data- collection block of the IAT (50 trials). Next, participants reported their attitudes toward the groups using a ﬁve-item, 7-point semantic dif- ferential scale ( unintelligent-intelligent ,bad-good ,unpleasant-pleas- ant ,dishonest-honest ,awful-nice ); their responses were averaged into a single attitudinal index ( a5 .87). Participants’ emotional states were assessed at the end as in Experiment 1.

Results and Discussion Manipulation Checks The emotion manipulations were successful, as indicated by the Emotion Induction Emotion Rating interaction, F(2, 79) 513.14, p < .001. Participants in the sad condition reported more sadness ( M 5 3.63) than anger ( M5 2.98), t(25) 52.89, p< .01, d5 0.57; participants in the angry condition reported more anger ( M5 3.64) than sadness ( M5 3.21), t(27) 52.46, p5 .02, d5 0.46. Neutral Fig. 1. Reaction time in the evaluative priming task (Experiment 1) as a function of emotion, prime, and target. Error bars represent standard errors. 322 Volume 15—Number 5 Prejudice From Thin Air at UNIV TEXAS AT TYLER on August 22, 2016 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from participants reported low levels of both emotions (M sadness 51.57, M anger 5 2.05).

Analysis of participants’ self-reported attitudes veriﬁed the success of the group-assignment procedure. As in previous minimal-group research, participants reported more positive attitudes toward their ingroup ( M5 4.90) than their outgroup ( M5 4.46), F(1, 79) 511.21, p 5 .001, d5 0.75. 7 Automatic Attitudes Toward Social Groups Automatic attitudes were measured as the differential speed with which participants classiﬁed outgroup with good stimuli and ingroup with bad stimuli compared with the reverse combinations; larger difference scores correspond to stronger bias against the outgroup relative to the ingroup. Participants’ emotional states differentially biased their intergroup evaluations, F(1, 79) 54.03, p< .05, d5 0.54. 8As shown in Figure 2, only participants in the angry condition showed strong automatic prejudice against the outgroup and relative preference for the ingroup, t(27) 53.32, p< .01; those in the sad and neutral conditions showed no intergroup bias (both ts < 1). Further analyses revealed that the interaction effect was driven by slower responses to outgroup 1good/ingroup 1bad classiﬁcations for par- ticipants in the angry condition compared with those in the neutral and sad conditions, F(1, 79) 53.91, p5 .05. Response latencies for ingroup 1good/outgroup 1bad classiﬁcations did not differ signiﬁ- cantly across emotion conditions ( F< 1). Thus, as in Experiment 1, anger created automatic outgroup bias where none had previously existed. GENERAL DISCUSSION Using different measures of automatic attitudes, two experiments support our contention that incidental feelings of anger can create automatic prejudice against outgroups. Because this effect was not produced by a different negative emotion that is functionally less relevant to intergroup cognition (e.g., sadness), the results are in- consistent with a simple valence-based interpretation of emotional bias. We believe that anger, because of its basic association with in- tergroup competition and conﬂict, evoked a psychological readiness to evaluate outgroups negatively vis-a ` -vis ingroups, thus creating an automatic prejudice against the outgroup from thin air. To our knowledge, the present ﬁndings stand as the ﬁrst evidence that spe- ciﬁc emotions are capable of shaping people’s automatic evaluations toward social groups in accordance with their functional value. In everyday life, anger-induced psychological readiness is likely to prepare one to deal rapidly with possible aggression or resource competition. Although the exact mechanism underlying this exacer- bation of prejudice remains unknown at present, we speculate that it is likely to involve the activation of emotion-speciﬁc action tenden- cies and the accompanying cascade of physiological and psycholog- ical sequelae that result from the occurrence of speciﬁc emotional states (cf. Frijda, 1986; LeDoux, 1996). Given this functional view, it seems plausible that the ability of extant emotional states to bias automatic evaluation may not be limited to intergroup cognition, but may occur for many types of automatic appraisals. Emotions, in each case, might function to shunt automatic appraisals toward goal-spe- ciﬁc outcomes. It is important to note, however, that anger may not be the only negative emotion that can inﬂuence automatic attitudes toward known social groups. Although anger is a fundamental emotion associated with intergroup conﬂict, it is clear that negative feelings toward dif- ferent outgroups do indeed vary in emotional tone. Envy, fear, disgust, or some other negative emotion may be a salient component of an individual’s phenomenological experience with a speciﬁc outgroup, depending on that outgroup’s power, status, or other qualities in re- lation to the perceiver’s ingroup (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Thus, an important goal of future research is to determine if other discrete emotions associated with speciﬁc groups can alter automatic attitudes toward those groups even when these emotions are evoked by an unrelated source. At present, however, the current ﬁndings extend previous research on the interplay between emotion and intergroup relations into a new realm by providing evidence that emotions are capable of shaping automatic attitudes relevant to one of the central adaptive challenges in contemporary society—negotiating intergroup interactions.

Acknowledgments— This research was supported by National Sci- ence Foundation Grants BCS-0109105 and BCS-0109898. REFERENCES Abelson, R.P., & Prentice, D.A. (1997). Contrast tests of interaction hy- potheses. Psychological Methods ,2, 315–328. Fig. 2. Reaction time in the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2) as a function of emotion and stimulus pairing. Error bars represent standard errors.

7Emotional states did not moderate self-reported attitudes. Given that emotion was not induced a third time before assessment of these attitudes, we do not consider the effect of emotion on self-reported attitudes to be compar- able to the effects derived from the IAT. Even though some differences in emotion remained at the end of the experimental session, the magnitude of these differences no doubt dissipated over time.

8This Ftest represents a doubly centered interaction contrast specifying greater bias among angry participants compared with sad and neutral partic- ipants (cf. Abelson & Prentice, 1997). Volume 15—Number 5 323 D. DeSteno et al. at UNIV TEXAS AT TYLER on August 22, 2016 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from Banaji, M.R., & Dasgupta, N. (1998). The consciousness of social beliefs: Aprogram of research on stereotyping and prejudice. In V.Y. Yzerbyt, G.

Lories, & B. Dardenne (Eds.), Metacognition: Cognitive and social di- mensions (pp. 157–170). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Bargh, J.A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic attitude activation effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,62 , 893–912.

Bless, H., Schwarz, N., & Wieland, R. (1996). Mood and the impact of category membership and individuating information. European Journal of Social Psychology ,26 , 935–959.

Bodenhausen, G.V., Mussweiler, T., Gabriel, S., & Moreno, K.N. (2001). Af- fective inﬂuences on stereotyping and intergroup relations. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 319–343). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Bodenhausen, G.V., Sheppard, L.A., & Kramer, G.P. (1994). Negative affect and social judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness.

European Journal of Social Psychology ,24 , 445–462.

Bosson, J.K., Swann, W.B., & Pennebaker, J.W. (2000). Stalking the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant re- visited? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,79 , 631–643.

Brewer, M.B., & Brown, R.J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T.

Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 554–594).

Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ error. New York: Avon Books.

Dasgupta, N., & Greenwald, A.G. (2001). On the malleability of automatic attitudes: Combating automatic prejudice with images of admired and disliked individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,81 , 800–814.

Dasgupta, N., McGhee, D.E., Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R. (2000). Au- tomatic preference for White Americans: Eliminating the familiarity explanation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology ,36 , 316–328.

DeSteno, D., Petty, R.E., Wegener, D.T., & Rucker, D.D. (2000). Beyond va- lence in the perception of likelihood: The role of emotion-speciﬁcity.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,78 , 397–416.

Dollard, J., Doob, L., Miller, N.E., Mowrer, O.H., & Sears, R.R. (1939). Frustration and aggression . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dovidio, J.F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S.L. (2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice and interracial interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,82 , 62–68.

Draine, S. (2000). Inquisit 1.29 [Computer software]. Seattle, WA: Millisecond Software.

Duckworth, K.L., Bargh, J.A., Garcia, M., & Chaiken, S. (2002). The automatic evaluation of novel stimuli. Psychological Science,13 , 513–519.

Fazio, R.H., Jackson, J.R., Dunton, B.C., & Williams, C.J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona ﬁde pipeline? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,69 , 1013–1027.

Fazio, R.H., Sanbonmatsu, D.M., Powell, M.C., & Kardes, F.R. (1986). On the automatic activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,50 , 229–238.

Fazio, R.H., & Towles-Schwen, T. (1999). The MODE model of attitude- behavior processes. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories in social psychology (pp. 97–116). New York: Guilford Press.

Fiske, S.T. (1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology(pp. 357– 411). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Frijda, N.H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Glaser, J., & Banaji, M.R. (1999). When fair is foul and foul is fair: Reverse priming in automatic evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology ,77 , 669–687.

Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review,102 , 4–27.

Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E., & Schwartz, J.L.K. (1998). Measuring in- dividual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,74 , 1464–1480.

Jarvis, W.B.G. (2000). MediaLab 2000 [Computer software]. New York: Em- pirisoft.

Karpinski, A., & Hilton, J.L. (2001). Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,81 , 774–788.

Keltner, D., & Gross, J.J. (1999). Functional accounts of emotion. Cognition and Emotion ,13 , 467–480.

Klauer, K.C., Rossnagel, C., & Musch, J. (1997). List-context effects in eval- uative priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition ,23 , 246–255.

Lambert, A.J., Khan, S.R., Lickel, B.A., & Fricke, K. (1997). Mood and the correction of positive versus negative stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,72 , 1002–1016.

LeDoux, J.E. (1996). The emotional brain. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Mackie, D.M., & Smith, E.R. (2002). From prejudice to intergroup emotions:

Differentiated reactions to social groups . New York: Psychology Press.

McConnell, A.R., & Leibold, J.M. (2001). Relations among the Implicit As- sociation Test, discriminatory behavior, and explicit measures. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology ,37 , 435–442.

Neuberg, S.L., & Cottrell, C.A. (2002). Intergroup emotions: A biocultural approach. In D.M. Mackie & E.R. Smith (Eds.), From prejudice to in- tergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups (pp. 265–283).

New York: Psychology Press.

Ochsner, K.N., Bunge, S.A., Gross, J.J., & Gabrieli, J.D.E. (2002). Rethinking feelings: An fMRI study of the cognitive regulation of emotion. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience ,14 , 1215–1229.

Payne, B.K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,81 , 181–192.

Petty, R.E., DeSteno, D., & Rucker, D.D. (2001). The role of affect in attitude change. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 212–233). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Phelps, E.A., O’Connor, K.J., Cunningham, W.A., Funayama, E.S., Gatenby, J.C., Gore, J.C., & Banaji, M.R. (2000). Performance on indirect mea- sures of race evaluation predicts amygdala activation. Journal of Cog- nitive Neuroscience ,12 , 729–738.

Queller, S., Mackie, D.M., & Stroessner, S.J. (1996). Ameliorating some neg- ative effects of positive mood: Encouraging happy people to perceive intragroup variability. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology ,32 , 361–386.

Tiedens, L.Z., & Linton, S. (2001). Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: The effects of speciﬁc emotions on information processing.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,81 , 973–988.

Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C.M., & Park, B. (2001). Spontaneous prejudice in context: Variability in automatically activated attitudes. Journal of Per- sonality and Social Psychology ,81 , 815–827.

(R ECEIVED 11/13/02; R EVISION ACCEPTED 2/24/03) 324 Volume 15—Number 5 Prejudice From Thin Air at UNIV TEXAS AT TYLER on August 22, 2016 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from