ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS

Chapter 8 - External Threats and Countermeasures Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction, 5th Edition by  Philip P. Purpura Butterworth-Heinemann © 2008 Citation Countermeasures Countermeasures for external (and internal) threats can be conceptualized around the five "Ds": Deter : The mere presence of physical security can dissuade offenders from committing criminal acts. The impact of physical security can be enhanced through an aura of security . An aura is a distinctive atmosphere surrounding something. Supportive management and security personnel should work to produce a professional security image. They should remain mum on such topics as the number and types of intrusion detection sensors on the premises and security system weaknesses. Security patrols should be unpredictable and never routine.

Signs help to project an aura of security by stating, for example, PREMISES PROTECTED BY HIGH-TECH REDUNDANT SECURITY. Such signs can be placed along a perimeter and near openings to buildings. The aura of security strives to produce a strong psychological deterrent so offenders will consider the success of a crime to be unlikely. It is important to note that no guarantees come with deterrence. (Criminal justice policies are in serious trouble because deterrence is faulty; criminals continue to commit crimes even while facing long sentences.) In the security realm, deterrence must be backed up with the following four "Ds." Detect : Offenders should be detected and their location pinpointed as soon as they step onto the premises or commit a violation on the premises. This can be accomplished through observation, closed-circuit television (CCTV), intrusion sensors, duress alarms, weapons screenings, protective dogs, and hotlines.

Delay : Security is often measured by the time it takes to get through it. Redundant security refers to two or more similar security methods (e.g., two fences; two types of intrusion sensors). Layered security refers to multiple security methods that follow one another and are dissimilar (e.g., perimeter fence, strong doors, a safe). Both redundant and layered security creates a time delay. Thus, the offender may become frustrated and decide to depart, or the delay may provide time for a response force to arrive to make an apprehension.

Deny : Strong physical security, often called target hardening , can deny access. A steel door and a safe are examples. Frequent bank deposits of cash and other valuables extend the opportunity to deny the offender success.

Destroy : When you believe your life or another will be taken, you are legally permitted to use deadly force. An asset (e.g., proprietary information) may require destruction before it falls into the wrong hands. Which "D" do you view as most important? Which "D" do you view as least important? Explain your answers. Construction and Environmental Security Design When a new facility is being planned, the need for a coordinated effort by architects, fire protection and safety engineers, loss prevention practitioners, and local police and fire officials cannot be overstated. Further, money is saved when security and safety are planned before actual construction rather than accomplished by modifying the building later.

Years ago, when buildings were designed, loss prevention features were an even smaller part of the planning process than today. Before air conditioning came into widespread use, numerous windows were required for proper ventilation, providing thieves with many entry points. Today's buildings also present problems. For example, ceilings are constructed of suspended ceiling tiles with spaces above the tiles that enable access by simply pushing up the tiles. Once above the tiles, a person can crawl to other rooms on the same floor. Roof access from neighboring buildings is a common problem for both old and new buildings. Many of these weak points are corrected by adequate hardware such as locks on roof doors and by intrusion sensors.

Architects are playing an increasing role in designing crime prevention into building plans. Environmental security design includes natural and electronic surveillance of walkways and parking lots, windows and landscaping that enhance visibility, improved lighting, and other architectural designs that promote crime prevention. Additionally, dense shrubbery can be cut to reduce hiding places, and grid streets can be turned into cul-de-sacs by using barricades to reduce ease of escape.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Oscar Newman (1972) , an architect, conducted innovative research into the relationship between architectural design and crime prevention that developed into the concept of defensible space . He focused on the built environment, studied more than 100 housing projects, and identified design elements that inhibit crime. For instance, Newman favored the creation of surveillance opportunities, called natural surveillance , through both windows for residents and clear lines of sight; this increases the potential to report crimes. Another strategy, known as natural territorial reinforcement , provides clear boundaries between public and private areas through such features as landscaping, signs, and fences. These boundaries send a message to potential intruders to avoid entering the area, and the strategy enables easier identification of intruders. He also recognized that the neighborhood surrounding the residential setting influences safety. An essential part of defensible space is to create designs that increase residents’ use of public places while reducing fear of crime; this is hoped to have a snowballing effect. Oscar Newman found that physical design features of public housing affect both the rates of victimization of residents and their perception of security.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is multidisciplinary and goes beyond the concept of defensible space. It includes psychological and sociological issues of deterring offender behavior and influencing resident behavior in preventing crime. CPTED is applicable not only to public housing but also to businesses, industries, public buildings, transportation systems, and schools, among others. In the past, the U.S. Department of Justice has funded CPTED programs in several cities.

An illustration of how CPTED is applied can be seen with the design of Marriott hotels ( Murphy, 2000 : 84 –88). To make offenders as visible as possible, traffic is directed toward the front of hotels. Lobbies are designed so that people walking to guest rooms or elevators must pass the front desk. On the outside, hedges are emphasized to produce a psychological barrier that is more appealing than a fence. Pathways are well lit and guide guests away from isolated areas. Parking lots are characterized by lighting, clear lines of sight, and access control. Walls of the garage are painted white to enhance lighting. On the inside of hotels, the swimming pool, exercise room, and vending and laundry areas have glass doors and walls to permit maximum witness potential. One application of CCTV is to aim cameras at persons standing at the lobby desk and install the monitor in plain view. Since people can see themselves, robberies have declined. CPTED enhances traditional security methods such as patrolling officers and emergency call boxes.

Research from the United Kingdom has extended the reach of CPTED. The UK Design Against Crime (DAC) Program seeks a wide group of design professionals to develop creative and often subtle design solutions to combat crime and fear of crime. The DAC is a holistic, human-centered approach that facilitates crime prevention without inconveniencing people or creating a fortress environment. Examples include the following: a fence with a top rail that is angled to discourage young people from sitting on the fence and "hanging out"; the playing of classical music to prevent youth from congregating in certain areas; and the "antitheft handbag" that has a short strap, a carefully located zipper, thick leather, and an alarm (Davey et al., 2005 : 39–51). Since the physical environment can influence behavior, offenders may decide whether to commit a crime at a location after they determine the following ( Taylor and Harrell, 1996 : 1–32): 1. How easy will it be to enter? 2. How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear? 3. What are the chances of being seen? 4. If seen, will the people in the area do something about it? 5. Is there a quick, direct route from the location? CPTED is enhanced through the "Broken Windows" theory of James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982) . This theory suggests that deteriorated buildings that remain in disrepair and disorderly behavior attract offenders and crime while increasing fear among residents. If someone breaks a window and it is not repaired, more windows may be broken, and a continuation of dilapidated conditions may signal that residents do not care. Minor problems, such as vandalism, graffiti, and public intoxication, may grow into larger problems that attract offenders and destroy neighborhoods. However, residents can increase safety and security when they take pride in the conditions of their neighborhood.

Another theory related to CPTED is situational crime prevention (SCP). "This approach encompasses many CPTED principles; however, it focuses on managerial and user behavior factors that affect opportunities for criminal behavior in a specific setting for a specific crime, whereas CPTED focuses on changing the physical design aspects of environments to deter criminal activity" ( U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 : 2–19). Lab (2004 : 177) writes: "Instead of attempting to make sweeping changes in an entire community or neighborhood, situational prevention is aimed at specific problems, places, people, or times. The situational approach assumes that a greater degree of problem identification and planning will take place prior to program implementation and that the impact will be more focused and, perhaps, identifiable." Lab (2004 : 177) traces SCP to the crime prevention work of the British Home Office ( Clark, 1983 ) in the late 1970s. The goal was to successfully address different crime problems.

Lab (2004 : 178–179) sees the theoretical basis for SCP from the following perspectives: Rational choice theory : Individuals make calculated decisions about crime based on many inputs, including the potential payoff, the risks, and needs.

Routine activities theory : Day-to-day activities of people result in the convergence of motivated offenders with victims. Examples: Multiple-income households leave more homes unoccupied and subject to burglary. Increased mobility in society brings victims and offenders together more so than in the past.

Lifestyle perspectives : This approach focuses on the activity of the victim as a contributing factor in criminal acts and victimization. Individual lifestyle and behavioral choices can lead to victimization. For example, an individual who frequents bars where fights occur often increases the risk of assault. Perimeter Security Perimeter means outer boundary, and it is often the property line and the first line of defense against unauthorized access (see Figure 8-1 ). Building access points such as doors and windows also are considered part of perimeter defenses at many locations. Typical perimeter security begins with a fence and gate and may include multiple security methods (e.g., card access, locks, sensors, lighting, CCTV, and patrols) to increase protection (see Figure 8-2 ). Technology can extend security surveillance beyond the perimeter, as illustrated with radar that is applied by a facility near a waterway (see Figure 8-3 ). Courtesy: Wackenhut Corporation. Photo by Ed Burns. Figure 8-1: Perimeter security Figure 8-2: Multiple security methods increase protection Courtesy : Honeywell Security. Figure 8-3: Radar extends security surveillance beyond the perimeter at a facility near a waterway The following variables assist in the design of perimeter security: 1. Whatever perimeter security methods are planned, they should interrelate with the total loss prevention program and business objectives. 2. Perimeter security needs to be cost effective. When plans are presented, management is sure to ask: "What type of return will we have on our investment?" 3. Although the least number of entrances strengthens perimeter security, the plan must not interfere with normal business and emergency events. 4. Perimeter security has a psychological impact on potential intruders. It signals a warning to outsiders that steps have been taken to block intrusions. Offenders actually "shop" for vulnerable locations. 5. Even though a property line may be well protected, the possibility of unauthorized entry cannot be totally eliminated. For example, a fence can be breached by going over, under, or through it. 6. Penetration of a perimeter is possible from within. Merchandise may be thrown over a fence or out of a window. Various things are subject to smuggling by persons walking or using a vehicle while exiting through a perimeter. 7. The perimeter of a building, especially in urban areas, often is the building's walls. An offender may enter through a wall (or roof) from an adjoining building. 8. To permit an unobstructed view, both sides of a perimeter should be kept clear of vehicles, equipment, and vegetation. This allows for what is known as clear zones . 9. Consider integrating perimeter intrusion sensors with landscape sprinkler systems.

Trespassers, protesters, and other intruders will be discouraged, and, when wet, they are easier to find and identify. 10. Perimeter security methods are exposed to a hostile outdoor environment not found indoors.

Adequate clothing and shelter are necessary for security personnel. The selection of proper security systems prevents false alarms from animals, vehicle vibrations, and adverse weather. 11. Perimeter security should be inspected and tested periodically. International Perspective: Physical Security Proves Its Value Forty hooded demonstrators seemed to have appeared out of nowhere at the front gate of a breeding farm in the English countryside, where a pharmaceutical giant breeds animals for government- mandated testing of new medicines. A video recording of the incident showed protesters rocking the perimeter fence and harassing employees. What follows here is a description of how this business responded to its protection needs ( Gips, 1999 : 42–50). For simplicity's sake, we will refer to this actual company as "PC" for pharmaceutical company. One threat facing the PC was the 50 or so incidents from animal activists in one year. Consequently, protection against sabotage, terrorism, and infiltration by animal rights activists became top priorities.

Measures included physical security and access control, internal theft countermeasures, information safeguards, and bomb threat response. Protection was afforded not only to 2,000 scientists, support personnel, intellectual property, and physical assets, but also to the company image.

The PC favors a layered approach to physical security, which begins with strong perimeter protection.

At the breeding farm, a seven-foot-high fence bounds the site and security officers monitor the farm from a gatehouse that doubles as a control room for intrusion and fire detection and CCTV. Because no police are nearby, a PC facility 12 miles away provides backup. The PC's response to protestors is low-key in part because in England simple trespass is a civil, not a criminal, matter. Protestors, even if verbally abusive, can be arrested only if they are violent; then police will make the arrests. Protestors generally want media attention, so they usually surrender to security when found on the premises.

They know they will not be arrested, and no civil action will be initiated.

At another PC facility, security integration is shown through CCTV cameras, mounted every 75 yards along the perimeter, which work with video motion detection and infrared sensors. Although continuous recording occurs, when motion is detected, the action appears on a monitor for evaluation in the control room. This facility requires vehicles to pass through a raising-arm barrier. Pedestrians must register at a gatehouse, and employees use their Wiegand access control cards as they pass through a full-height antipassback turnstile. Doors are alarmed, and windows are treated with antibandit glazing to delay an offender.

To reduce internal theft from employees and contractors, personnel are reminded of their responsibility to secure valuables, vulnerable areas have restricted access, doors are kept locked, and a crime prevention day is held. Information is protected through an awareness course, security bulletins, secure fax and videoconferencing facilities, a high priority on IT security, technical surveillance sweeps, and tours under close controls.

The animal activist threat is handled through counterintelligence (i.e., a database of information), vetting (i.e., examination of all personnel to prevent infiltration or the planting of devices to collect information), and public relations (i.e., outreach to explain the importance of research with animals).

To deal with bomb threats, PC facilities are too large for a dedicated team to conduct a search, so each employee is responsible for checking for anything unusual in his or her work area. Also, all incoming mail passes through an X-ray scanner. One lesson from all this protection is that losses can be much more expensive than security. Barriers Post and Kingsbury (1977 : 502–503) state, "the physical security process utilizes a number of barrier systems, all of which serve specific needs. These systems include natural, structural, human, animals, and energy barriers." Natural barriers are rivers, hills, cliffs, mountains, foliage, and other features difficult to overcome. Fences, walls, doors, and the architectural arrangement of buildings are structural barriers. Human barriers include security officers who scrutinize people, vehicles, and things entering and leaving a facility. The typical animal barrier is a dog. Energy barriers include protective lighting and intrusion detection systems.

The most common type of barrier is a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire. A search of the Web shows many industry standards for fences from ASTM, UL, ISO, and other groups from the United States and overseas. For example, ASTM F 567 focuses on materials specifications, design requirements, and installation of chain-link fencing.

One advantage of chain-link fencing is that it allows observation from both sides: a private security officer looking out and a public police officer looking in. Foliage and decorative plastic woven through the fence can reduce visibility and aid offenders. Opposition to chain-link fencing sometimes develops because management wants to avoid an institutional-looking environment. Hedges are an alternative. It is advisable that the chain-link fence be made of at least 9-gauge or heavier wire with 2 × 2 diamond- shaped mesh. It should be at least 7 feet high. Its posts should be set in concrete and spaced no more than 10 feet apart. The bottom should be within 2 inches of hard ground; if the ground is soft, the fence can become more secure if extended a few inches below the ground. Recommended at the top is a top guard— supporting arms about 1 or 2 feet long containing three or four strands of taut barbed wire 6 inches apart and facing outward at 45 degrees.

Barbed wire fences are less effective and used less frequently than chain-link fences. Each strand of barbed wire is constructed of two 12-gauge wires twisted and barbed every 4 inches. For adequate protection, vertical support posts are placed 6 feet apart, and the parallel strands of barbed wire are from 2 to 6 inches apart. A good height is 8 feet.

Concertina fences consist of coils of steel razor wire clipped together to form cylinders weighing about 55 pounds. Each cylinder is stretched to form a coil-type barrier 3 feet high and 50 feet long. The ends of each 50-foot coil need to be clipped to the next coil to obviate movement. Stakes also stabilize these fences.

This fence was developed by the military to act as a quickly constructed barrier. When one coil is placed on another, they create a 6-foot-high barrier. One coil placed on two as a base provides a pyramid-like barrier that is difficult to penetrate. Concertina fences are especially helpful for quick, temporary repairs to damaged fences.

Razor ribbon and coiled barbed tape are increasing in popularity. They are similar to concertina fencing in many ways. Every few inches along the coil are sharp spikes, looking something like a small-sharpened bow tie.

Gates are necessary for traffic through fences. The fewer gates, the better because, like windows and doors, they are weak points along a perimeter. Gates usually are secured with a chain and padlock.

Uniformed officers stationed at each gate and fence opening increase security while enabling the observation of people and vehicles.

Vehicle barriers control traffic and stop vehicles from penetrating a perimeter. The problems of vehicle bombs and drive-by shootings have resulted in greater use of vehicle barriers. These barriers are assigned government-certified ratings based on the level of protection; however, rating systems vary among government agencies. One agency, for example, tests barriers against 15,000-pound trucks traveling up to 50 miles per hour, while another agency tests 10,000-pound trucks traveling the same speed. Passive vehicle barriers are fixed and include decorative bollards, large concrete planters, granite fountains, specially engineered and anchored park benches, hardened fencing, fence cabling, and trees. An alternative to bollards is a plinth wall —a continuous low wall of reinforced concrete with a buried foundation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 : 2–33). Moore (2006) notes alternatives to bollards, including tiger traps (i.e., a path of paving stones over a trench of low-density concrete that will collapse under a heavy weight) and NOGOs (i.e., large, heavy bronze blocks). Active vehicle barriers are used at entrances and include gates, barrier arms, and pop-up type systems that are set underground and, when activated, spring up to block a vehicle ( True, 1996 : 49–53). As we know, no security method is foolproof, and careful security planning is vital, including ADA requirements. In 1997, to protest government policy, the environmental group Greenpeace penetrated government security in Washington, D.C., and dumped four tons of coal outside the Capitol building. The driver of the truck drove the wrong way up a one-way drive leading to the building!

Walls are costly and a substitute for fences when management is against the use of a wire fence. Attractive walls can be designed to produce security equal to fences while blending into surrounding architecture.

Walls are made from a variety of materials: bricks, concrete blocks, stones, or cement. Depending on design, the top of walls 6 or 7 feet high may contain barbed wire, spikes, or broken glass set in cement.

Offenders often avoid injury by throwing a blanket or jacket over the top of the wall (or fence) before scaling it. Many jurisdictions prohibit ominous features at the top of barriers. Check local ordinances. An advantage of a wall is that outsiders are hindered from observing inside. However, observation by public police during patrols also is hindered; this can benefit an intruder.

Hedges or shrubbery are useful as barriers. Thorny shrubs have a deterrent value. These include holly, barberry, and multiflora rose bushes, all of which require a lot of watering. The privet hedge grows almost anywhere and requires minimal care. A combination of hedge and fence is useful. Hedges should be less than 3 feet high and placed on the inside to avoid injury to those passing by and to create an added obstacle for someone attempting to scale the fence. Any plants that are large and placed too close to buildings and other locations provide a climbing tool, cover for thieves, and a hiding place for stolen goods.

Municipal codes restrict the heights of fences, walls, and hedges to maintain an attractive environment devoid of threatening-looking barriers. Certain kinds of barriers may be prohibited to ensure conformity.

Planning should encompass research of local standards.

The following list can help a security manager eliminate weak points along a perimeter or barrier. 1. Utility poles, trees, boxes, pallets, forklifts, tools, and other objects outside a building can be used to scale a barrier. 2. Ladders left outside are an offender's delight. Stationary ladders are made less accessible via a steel cage with a locked door. 3. A common wall is shared by two separate entities. Thieves may lease and occupy or just enter the adjoining building or room and then hammer through the common wall. 4. A roof is easy to penetrate. A few tools, such as a drill and saw, enable offenders to cut through the roof. Because lighting, fences, sensors, and patrols rarely involve the roof, this weakness is attractive to thieves. A rope ladder often is employed to descend from the roof, or a forklift might be used to lift items to the roof. Vehicle keys should be hidden and other precautions taken. 5. Roof hatches, skylights, basement windows, air-conditioning and other vent and duct systems, crawl spaces between floors and under buildings, fire escapes, and utility covers may need a combination of locks, sensors, steel bars, heavy mesh, fences, and inspections.

A widely favored standard is that any opening greater than 96 square inches requires increased protection. Protecting Buildings against Terrorism To help justify security and loss prevention expenditures, executives should refer to the Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks against Buildings (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 : iii), here referred to as FEMA 426. This publication notes that building designs can serve to mitigate multiple hazards. For example, hurricane window design, especially against flying debris, and seismic standards for nonstructural building components apply also to bomb explosions. Next, Purpura (2007) describes protection methods from FEMA 426.

FEMA 426 refers to site-level considerations for security that include land use controls, landscape architecture, site planning, and other strategies to mitigate risks of terrorism and other hazards. Land use controls , including zoning and land development regulations, can affect security because they define urban configurations that can decrease or increase risks from crime and terrorism. For instance, managing stormwater on-site can add security through water retention facilities that serve as a vehicle barrier and blast setback. This reduces the need for off-site pipes and manholes that can be used for access or to conceal weapons. FEMA 426 offers several building design suggestions to increase security (see Figure 8-4 ). Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2003) . Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks against Buildings , FEMA 426 (December). Washington, D.C.: FEMA. Figure 8-4: Summary of site mitigation measures A target-rich environment is created when people, property, and operations are concentrated in a dense area. There are advantages and disadvantages to a dense cluster. An advantage is the possibility to maximize stand-off (i.e., protection when a blast occurs) from the perimeter. Additional security benefits are a reduction in the number of access and surveillance points and a shorter perimeter to protect. A dense cluster of buildings can possibly save energy costs through, for instance, heat transfer from heat-producing areas to heat-consuming areas. In addition, external lighting would not be dispersed over a large area, requiring more lights and energy. In contrast, dispersed buildings, people, and operations spread the risk.

However, dispersal can increase the complexity of security (e.g., more access points), and it may require more resources (e.g., security officers, CCTV, lighting perimeter protection).

FEMA 426 recommends that designers consolidate buildings that are functionally compatible and have similar threat levels. For instance, mailrooms, shipping and receiving docks, and visitor screening areas, where people and materials are often closely monitored prior to access, should be isolated and separated from concentrations of people, operations, and key assets.

The design of open space with protection in mind offers several benefits: the ease with which to monitor and detect intruders, vehicles, and weapons; stand-off value from a blast; pervious open space that permits stormwater to percolate back into the ground, reducing the need for pipes, manholes, and other covert access points and weapon concealment sites; and wetland or vegetated area to improve aesthetic value while hindering vehicle intrusion.

Here are other suggestions for buildings from FEMA 426: Provide redundant utility systems to continue life safety, security, and rescue functions in case of an emergency. Since hardened glazing may cause windows not to blow out in a blast, a system for smoke removal is essential.

When possible, elevate fresh-air intakes to reduce the potential of hazardous materials entering a building from ground level. The intakes should be sloped down and have screens in case a device is thrown toward the opening.

Manipulation of the HVAC system could minimize the spread of a hazardous agent. Filtration systems are another option, although expensive. Mitigation for Explosive Blasts Stand-off distance is the distance between an asset and a threat. FEMA 426 views distance as the most effective and desirable strategy against a blast because other methods may vary in effectiveness, be more costly, and result in unintended consequences. A blast wall can become a part of the fragmentation if a bomb is detonated close to it. Urban environments create challenges when designing stand-off distance because land is often expensive. There is no ideal stand-off distance; numerous variables take part in planning, such as the type of threat or explosive, construction characteristics and target hardening, and desired level of protection.

Blast and antiramming walls provide an expensive option for protecting buildings, especially in urban areas where stand-off distance may be unavailable. Revel (2003 : 40) writes that a test of a blast wall conducted by the U.S. Government's Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) showed the effectiveness of this security method. The blast wall sustained an explosion more powerful than the one that destroyed the Murrah Federal Building (Oklahoma City bombing) and the effects on the test building behind the blast wall were reduced by about 90%. The blast wall was constructed by first inserting in the ground 18-foot blast posts, with 9 feet extending above the ground. Then steel-jacketed concrete and rebar-filled panels were lowered between the posts in an interlocking pattern. When the explosion occurred, the posts twisted and deflected the blast above and back from the panels, directing the force up and beyond the lower structural steel of the building and around the ends of the wall. The blast wall is also capable of absorbing large vehicle impact at high speeds.

Although several building design features can mitigate explosive blasts, many factors enter into the design of buildings, including cost, purpose, occupancy, and location. A high-risk building should incorporate more mitigation features than a low-risk building. Significant changes to existing buildings may be too expensive; therefore, lower cost changes must be sought. Bollards and strong gates are less expensive than making major structural changes to a building. In addition, trees, vegetative groupings, and earth berms offer some degree of blast shielding. Examples of mitigation features from FEMA 426 are as follows: Avoid "U" or "L" shaped building designs that trap the shock waves of a blast. Circular buildings reduce a shock wave better than a rectangular building because of the angle of incidence of the shock wave.

Avoid exposed structural elements (e.g., columns) on the exterior of a facility.

Install as much glazing (i.e., windows) as possible away from the street side.

Stagger doors located across from one another in interior hallways to limit the force of a blast through the building.

High-security rooms should be blast- and fragment-resistant.

Provide pitched roofs to permit deflection of launched explosives. Keep out zones help to maintain a specific distance between vehicles or people and a building. This is accomplished by installing perimeter security (e.g., fences), access controls, bollards, and other security methods. If terrorists plan to attack a specific building, they will likely use surveillance to study security features, look for vulnerabilities, and try to penetrate access controls and defenses through creative means.

Glazing Annealed glass , also called plate glass , is commonly used in buildings. It has low strength, and upon failure, it fractures into razor sharp pieces. Fully thermally tempered glass (TTG) is four to five times stronger than annealed glass, and upon failure, it will fracture into small cube-shaped fragments. Building codes generally require TTG anywhere the public can touch (e.g., entrance doors). Wire-reinforced glass is made of annealed glass with an embedded layer of wire mesh. It is applied as a fire-resistant and forced entry barrier. All three types of glass present a dangerous hazard from a blast ( U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 ). Traditionally, window protection focused on hindering forced entry. Today, we are seeing increasing designs that mitigate the hazardous effects of flying glass from a variety of risks, besides explosion.

Experts report that 75% of all damage and injury from bomb blasts results from flying and falling glass.

Vendors sell shatter-resistant film , also called fragment retention film (FRF), that is applied to the glass surface to reduce this problem. Conversely, a report on the 1993 World Trade Center attack claimed that the destroyed windows permitted deadly gases to escape from the building, enabling occupants to survive.

A balanced design (i.e., type of glass, glass frame, and frame to building) means that all the window components have compatible capacities and fail at the same pressure levels. The U.S. General Services Administration publishes glazing protection levels based on how far glass fragments would enter a space and cause injuries. It is important to note that the highest level of protection for glazing may not mitigate the effects from a large explosion ( U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 ). Blast curtains are window draperies made of special fabrics designed to stop glass window shards that are caused by explosions and other hazards. Various designs serve to catch broken glass and let the gas and air pressure dissipate through the fabric mesh. The fibers of these curtains can be several times as strong as steel wire. The U.S. General Services Administration establishes criteria for these products ( Owen, 2003 : 143–144). Glass can be designed to block penetration of bullets, defeat attempted forced entry, remain intact following an explosion, and protect against electronic eavesdropping. The Web shows many standards for glazing from the American Architectural Manufacturers Association (AAMA), ANSI, UL, ASTM, Consumer Product Safety Commission, ISO, and overseas groups. Security glazing should be evaluated on comparative testing to an established national consensus standard such as ASTM F1233, Standard Test Method for Security Glazing Materials and Systems. Important issues for glazing include product life cycle, durability, installation, maintenance, and framing ( Saflex, Inc., 2005 ). Underwriters Laboratories classifies bullet-resistant windows into eight protection levels, with levels 1 to 3 rated against handguns and 4 to 8 rated against rifles. Level 4 or higher windows usually are applied by government agencies and the military. Protective windows are made of either glass or plastic or mixtures of each.

Laminated glass absorbs a bullet as it passes through various glass layers. The advantage of glass is in its maintenance: it is easy to clean and less likely to scratch than plastic. It is less expensive per square foot than plastic but heavier, which requires more workers and stronger frames. Glass has a tendency to spall (i.e., chip) when hit by a bullet. UL752-listed glass holds up to three shots, and then it begins to shatter from subsequent shots.

Two types of plastic used in windows are acrylic and polycarbonate. Both vary in thickness and are lighter and more easily scratched than glass. Acrylic windows are clear and monolithic, whereas glass and polycarbonate windows are laminates consisting of layers of material bonded one on top of another. Acrylic will deflect bullets and hold together under sustained hits. Some spalling may occur. Polycarbonate windows are stronger than acrylics against high-powered weapons. Local codes may require glazing to pop out in an emergency.

In addition to protective windows, wall armor is important because employees often duck below a window during a shooting. These steel or fiberglass plates also are rated.

Burglar-resistant windows are rated (UL 972, Burglary Resisting Glazing Material); available in acrylic and polycarbonate materials; and protect against hammers, flame, "smash and grab," and other attacks.

Combined bullet- and burglar-resistant windows are available. Although window protection is an expense that may be difficult to justify, insurers offer discounts on insurance premiums for such installations.

Electronic security glazing , containing metalized fabrics, can prevent electromagnetic signals inside a location from being intercepted from outside, while also protecting a facility from external electromagnetic radiation interference from outside sources. Standards for this type of glazing are from the National Security Agency, NSA 65–8.

Window Protection Covering windows with grating or security screens is an additional step to impede entrance by an intruder or items being thrown out by a dishonest employee. Window grating consists of metal bars constructed across windows. These bars run horizontally and vertically to produce an effective form of protection.

Although these bars are not aesthetically pleasing, they can be purchased with attractive ornamental designs. Security screens are composed of steel or stainless steel wire (mesh) welded to a frame. Screens have some distinct advantages over window grating. Employees can pass pilfered items through window bars more easily than through a screen. Security screens look like ordinary screens, but they are much heavier in construction and can stop rocks and other objects.

When planning window protection, one must consider the need for emergency escape and ventilation . To ensure safety, certain windows can be targeted for the dismantling of window protection during business hours.

Window Locks Businesses and institutions often contain windows that do not open. For windows that do open, a latch or lock on the inside provides some protection. The double-hung window , often applied at residences, is explained here as a foundation for window protection. It consists of top and bottom windows that are raised and lowered for user convenience. When the top window is pushed up and the bottom window pushed down, a sash lock containing a curved turn knob locks both parts of the whole window in place (see Figure 8-5 ). By inserting a knife under the sash lock where both window sections meet, an offender can jimmy the latch out of its catch. If an offender breaks the glass, the sash lock can be unlocked by reaching inside.

With such simple techniques known to offenders, more complicated defenses are necessary. Nails can be used to facilitate a quick escape while maintaining good window security: one drills a downward-sloping hole into the right and left sides of the window frame where the top and bottom window halves overlap and inserts nails that are thinner and longer than the holes. This enables the nails to be quickly removed during an emergency escape. If a burglar attacks the window, he or she cannot find or remove the nails (see Figure 8-5 ). Another method is to attach a window lock requiring a key (see Figure 8-5 ). These locks are capable of securing a window in a closed or slightly opened position. This can be done with the nail (and several holes) as well. The key should be hidden near the window in case of emergency. Figure 8-5: Double-hung window (view from inside) Electronic Protection for Windows Four categories of electronic protection for windows are foil, vibration, glass-breakage, and contact-switch sensors. Window foil , which has lost much of its popularity, consists of lead foil tape less than 1-inch wide and paper thin that is applied directly on the glass near the edges of a window. In the nonalarm state, electricity passes through the foil to form a closed circuit. When the foil is broken, an alarm is sounded.

Window foil is inexpensive and easy to maintain. One disadvantage is that a burglar may cut the glass without disturbing the foil. Vibration sensors respond to vibration or shock. They are attached directly on the glass or window frame. These sensors are noted for their low false alarm rate and are applicable to fences, walls, and valuable artwork, among other things. Glass-breakage sensors react to glass breaking. A sensor the size of a large coin is placed directly on the glass and can detect glass breakage several feet away. Some types operate via a tuning fork, which is tuned to the frequency produced by glass breaking. Others employ a microphone and electric amplifier. Contact switches activate an alarm when opening the window interrupts the contact. In Figure 8-6 , this sensor protects a door and roof opening. Figure 8-6: Switch sensors have electrical contacts that make or break an electrical circuit in response to a physical movement Additional ideas for window protection follow: 1. A strong window frame fastened to a building prevents prying and removal of the entire window. 2. First floor windows are especially vulnerable to penetration and require increased protection. 3. Consider tinting windows to hinder observation by offenders. 4. Windows (and other openings) that are no longer used can be bricked. 5. Expensive items left near windows invite trouble. 6. Cleaning windows and windowsills periodically increases the chances of obtaining clear fingerprints in the event of a crime. Doors Many standards apply to doors, from the AAMA, ANSI, ASTM, BHMA, National Association of Architectural Metal Manufacturers (NAAMM), NFPA, Steel Door Institute (SDI), UL, and ISO. In addition, other countries have standards.

Doors having fire ratings must meet certain frame and hardware requirements. Decisions on the type of lock and whether electronic access will be applied also affect hardware. Decisions on doors are especially crucial because of their daily use and the potential for satisfying or enraging users and management (Schumacher, 2000 : 40). Businesses and institutions generally use aluminum doors. Composed of an aluminum frame, most of the door is covered by glass. Without adequate protection, the glass is vulnerable, and prying the weak aluminum is not difficult. The all-metal door improves protection at the expense of attractiveness.

Hollow-core doors render complex locks useless because an offender can punch right through the door. Thin wood panels or glass on the door are additional weak points. More expensive, solid-core doors are stronger; they are made of solid wood (over an inch thick) without the use of weak fillers. To reinforce hollow-core or solid-core doors, one can attach 16-gauge steel sheets, via one-way screws.

Whenever possible, door hinges should be placed on the inside. Door hinges that face outside enable easy entry. By using a screwdriver and hammer, one can raise the pins out of the hinges to enable the door to be lifted away. To protect the hinge pins, it is a good idea to weld them so they cannot be removed in this manner. Another form of protection is to remove two screws on opposite sides of the hinge, insert a pin or screw on the jamb side of the hinge so that it protrudes about half an inch, and then drill a hole in the opposite hole to fit the pin when the door is closed. With this method on both top and bottom hinges, even if the hinge pins are removed, the door will not fall off the hinges (see Figure 8-7 ). Figure 8-7: Pin to prevent removal of door Contact switches applied to doors offer electronic protection. Greater protection is provided when contact switches are recessed in the edges of the door and frame. Other kinds of electronic sensors applied at doors include vibration sensors, pressure mats, and various types of motion detectors aimed in the area of the door.

More hints for door security follow: 1. A wide-angle door viewer within a solid door permits a look at the exterior prior to opening a door. 2. Doors (and windows) are afforded extra protection at night by chain closures. These frequently are seen covering storefronts in malls and in high-crime neighborhoods. 3. To block "hide-in" burglars (those who hide in a building until after closing) from easy exit, require that openings such as doors and windows have a key-operated lock on the inside as well as on the outside. 4. Almost all fire departments are equipped with power saws that cut through door locks and bolts in case of fire. Many firefighters can gain easy access to local buildings because building owners have provided keys that are located in fire trucks. Although this creates a security hazard, losses can be reduced in case of fire. 5. All doors need protection, including garage, sliding, overhead, chain-operated, and electric doors. Intruding Neighbors The Finch Brothers Supermarket Company maintained a busy warehouse stocked with hundreds of different items for local Finch supermarkets. The company leased the large warehouse to accommodate the increasing number of supermarkets. After 18 months at this location, managers were stumped as to why shrinkage was over 4%. Several precautions were taken to avert losses:

perimeter security consisted of intrusion sensors, lighting, and a security officer. A perpetual inventory was maintained.

Eventually, Finch's loss prevention manager's job was on the line, so he began a secret, painstaking, and continuous surveillance of the warehouse at night. After an agonizing week went by, he made an astonishing discovery. A printing company building next door was only 7 feet away from the warehouse, and printing company employees on the late shift were able to slide a 12 ′ × 16² × 2² board from a third-story window to a window of the same height at the warehouse. Within 30 minutes, the group of thieves hauled and threw many burlap sacks of items from one building to another. With camera equipment, the manager recorded the crime. Police were later notified and arrests made.

The thieves confessed that, when they worked the 11 P.M. to 8 A.M. shift, they stole merchandise from the warehouse. They stated that a maintenance man, who visited the warehouse each day, left the window open so the board could be slipped in. They added that dim lighting and the fact that intrusion sensors existed only on the first floor were factors that aided their crimes. Intrusion Detection Systems Standards for intrusion detection systems are from UL, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and ISO, plus other groups in the United States and overseas. UL, for example, "lists" installation companies that are authorized to issue UL Certificates on each installation. This means that the installer conforms to maintenance and testing as required by UL, which conducts unannounced inspections.

Table 8-1 describes intrusion detection systems; these systems have gone through several generations, leading to improved performance. Not in the table is magnetic field , which consists of a series of buried wire loops or coils. Metal objects moving over the sensor induce a current and signal an alarm. Research shows that the vulnerability to defeat (VD) for magnetic field and infrared photo beam is high. Microwave, electric field, fence disturbance, seismic sensor cable, taut wire, and video motion systems all have a medium VD. The VD for ported coaxial cable systems is low. Visible sensors are relatively easy to defeat but cost effective for low-security applications. Multiple sensors, and especially covert sensors, provide a higher level of protection ( Clifton and Vitch, 1997 : 57–61; Reddick, 2005 : 36–42; Shelton, 2006 : 80–82). Table 8-1: Types of Intrusion Alarm Systems [*] Open table as spreadsheet System Graphic Idea Concept Advantages Disadvantages System Graphic Idea Concept Advantages Disadvantages Motion detection Fence- mounted sensor Detection depends on movement of fence Ease of installation; early detection on interior fence; relatively inexpensive; requires little space; follows terrain easily Frequent false alarms (weather and birds); conduit breakage; dependent on quality, rigidity of fence, and type of installation Seismic sensor cable (buried) Detection depends on ground movement (intruder walking over buried movement sensors, or other seismic disturbances) Good for any site shape, uneven terrain; early warning; good in warm climate with little rain False alarms from ground vibrations (vehicles, thunderstorms, heavy snow); not recommended for heavy snow regions; difficult installation and maintenance Balanced capacitance Detection depends on touching of cable, interfering with balance of cable Few false alarms; good for selected areas of fence, rooftops, curves, corners, any terrain Not to be used independently; for selected areas only Taut wire Detection depends on deflecting, stretching, or releasing the tension of wire that triggers alarming mechanism Good for any terrain or shape; can be used as interior fence; extremely low false alarm rates adjustments Relatively expensive; possible false alarms from snow, ice, birds, etc.; temperature changes require Energy field Microwave sensor Based on line of sight; detection depends on intrusion into volumetric area above ground between transmitter and receiver Does not require a great deal of maintenance Not good on hilly or heavily contoured terrain; costly installation; potential false alarms caused by weather (snow, ice, wind, and rain); vegetation must be removed System Graphic Idea Concept Advantages Disadvantages Energy Field Infrared photo beam sensor Based on line of sight; detection depends on intrusion into beam(s) stacked vertically above ground Good for short distances, building walls, and sally ports Distances between transmitter and receiver must be short, requiring more intervals; potential false alarms by animals and weather conditions (fog, dust, snow); voltage surges Ported coaxial cable Detection depends on interruption of field in terms of mass, velocity, and length of time Adaptable to most terrains False alarms caused by heavy rain (pooling of water), high winds, tree roots; relatively expensive installation and maintenance Video motion detection Detection depends on change in video-monitor signal Good for enhancing another system; good for covering weak spots Lighting is a problem Electric field sensor Detection depends on penetration of volumetric field created by field wires and sensor wires Good on hilly or heavily contoured terrain; can be freestanding or fence- mounted Requires more maintenance; sensor wires must be replaced every 3 years; vegetation must be controlled [*]Sources : Information from New York State Department of Corrections, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Federal Bureau of Prisons. Reproduced from U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Stopping Escapes: Perimeter Security (U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1987), p. 6.

Fiber optics is a growing choice for intrusion detection and transmission. Fiber optics refers to the transportation of data by way of guided light waves in an optical fiber. This differs from the conventional transmission of electrical energy in copper wires. Fiber optic applications include video, voice, and data communications. Fiber optic data transmission is more secure and less subject to interference than older methods.

Fiber optic perimeter protection can take the form of a fiber optic net installed on a fence. When an intruder applies stress on the cable, an infrared light source pulsing through the system notes the stress or break and activates an alarm. Optical fibers can be attached to or inserted within numerous items to signal an alarm, including razor ribbon, security grills, windows, and doors, and it can protect valuable assets such as computers. Garcia (2006 : 83–84) views intrusion sensor performance based on three characteristics: probability of detection of the threat, nuisance alarm rate, and vulnerability to defeat. The probability of detection depends on several factors including the desired threat to be detected (e.g., walking, tunneling), sensor design, installation, sensitivity adjustment, weather, and maintenance/testing. According to Garcia, a nuisance alarm rate results from a sensor interacting with the environment, and a sensor cannot distinguish between a threat and another event (e.g., vibration from a train). A false alarm rate results from the equipment itself, and it is caused by inadequate design, failure, or poor maintenance. Vulnerability to defeat varies among systems. Bypass means the adversary circumvented the intrusion detection system. Spoofing means the adversary traveled through the detection zone without triggering an alarm; depending on the sensor, one strategy is by moving very slowly. Garcia emphasizes the importance of proper installation and testing of intrusion detection systems.

No one technology is perfect; many protection programs rely on dual technology to strengthen intrusion detection. In the process of selecting a system, it is wise to remember that manufacturers’ claims often are based on perfect weather. Security decision makers must clearly understand the advantages and disadvantages of each type of system under a variety of conditions.

Applications Intrusion detection systems can be classified according to the kind of protection provided. There are three basic kinds of protection: point, area, and perimeter. Point protection (see Figure 8-8 ) signals an alarm when an intrusion is made at a special location. It is also referred to as spot or object protection . Files, safes, vaults, jewelry counters, and artwork are targets for point protection. Capacitance and vibration systems provide point protection and are installed directly on the object. These systems often are used as a backup after an offender has succeeded in gaining access. Area protection (see Figure 8-9 ) detects an intruder in a selected area such as a main aisle in a building or at a strategic passageway. Microwave and infrared systems are applicable to area protection. Perimeter protection (see Figure 8-10 ) focuses on the outer boundary of the premises. If doors and windows are part of the perimeter, then contact switches, vibration detectors, and other devices are applicable. Figure 8-8: Point protection Figure 8-9: Area protection Figure 8-10: Perimeter protection Control Unit As described in Chapter 7 , intrusion detection systems contain three major components: once a sensor detects an intruder, a control unit receives this information and activates an annunciator (e.g., noise or light) to summon security or police. Figure 8-11 shows a control unit with user instructions. Figure 8-11: Alarm control unit with user instructions Alarm Signaling Systems Alarm signaling systems transmit data from a protected area to an annunciation system. Local ordinances and codes may restrict certain systems, designate to whom the alarm may be transmitted, limit the length of time the alarm is permitted to sound, and fine the user of the system for excessive false alarms. In addition, police agencies vary on policies pertaining to their response to alarms.

Local alarm systems notify, by sound or lights, people in the hearing or seeing range of the signal. This includes the intruder, who may flee. Typically, a siren or bell is activated outside a building. Often, local alarms produce no response—in urban areas responsible action may not be taken, and in rural areas nobody may hear the alarm. These alarms are less expensive than other signaling systems but are easily defeated. If a local alarm is used during a robbery, people may be harmed. Research from the UK ( Coupe and Kaur, 2005 : 53–72) points to the benefits of delayed-audible alarms during a burglary that are triggered as the offender enters the premises but sound a few minutes later so CCTV cameras have an opportunity to record the offender and police still have time to respond prior to the offender's escaping if they are notified promptly. Combining these strategies with an immediate silent alarm to a central station increases the opportunity for an arrest.

A central station alarm system receives intrusion or fire signals or both at a computer console located and monitored a distance away from the protected location. When an alarm signal is received, central station personnel contact police, firefighters, or other responders. Central station services employ sales, installation, service, monitoring, and response personnel. Proprietary monitoring systems are similar to central station systems, except that the former does the monitoring and the system is operated by the proprietary organization. Resources for central station design are available from UL, NFPA, and the Security Industry Association ( Patterson, 2000 : 80). Technology drives advances in central station capabilities. They include remote video monitoring, global positioning system (GPS), and off-site video storage. Remote video monitoring enables a central station operator to view what triggered an alarm to verify the need for a human response. GPS permits real-time tracking (e.g., location, direction, and speed) and archiving of moving assets and people. Off-site video storage, especially at a UL-listed central station, affords increased protection and backup for video recordings. It also helps to prevent the problem of offenders taking recording equipment with them as they leave the crime scene and, thus, destroy evidence ( Evans, 2005 : 44–46). Various data transmission systems are utilized to signal an alarm. Here, the earlier technology is covered first before the modern technology.

Automatic telephone dialer systems are of two kinds: tape dialer and digital dialer. Tape dialer systems seldom are used today. They deliver a prerecorded or coded message to an interested party (e.g., central station, police department) after that party answers the telephone. Digital dialers do not use a recorded tape message; coded electronic pulses are transmitted, and an electronic terminal decodes the message onto a panel or teletype.

With direct connect systems the intrusion device is connected by wire directly to an alarm receiver located on the premises, at a police station, or some other location. Local ordinances may not permit direct reporting to police stations. A variation of this method is the "buddy" alarm system, in which the alarm signal is transmitted via direct wire to a neighbor, who calls the police. These systems usually are silent alarms.

Radio frequency (RF) and microwave data transmission systems often are applied where telephone lines are not available or where hardwire lines are not practical. The components include transmitter, receiver, and repeaters to extend range, battery backup, and solar power.

Fiber optic data transmission systems, as discussed earlier, transport data by way of light waves within a thin glass fiber. These cables are either underground or above ground. The components include transmitter, receiver, repeaters, battery backup, and solar power. Fiber optic systems are more secure than direct wire.

Signals should be backed up by multiple technologies. Options for off-site transmission of activity include satellite, local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), cellular, and the Internet. Cellular is especially useful for backup, since it is more likely to remain in operation in certain disasters. It can also be used as a primary transmission method ( Zwirn, 2003 : 74–83). Among the advances in alarm monitoring is remote programming . Using this method, a central station can perform a variety of functions without ever visiting the site. Capabilities include arming and disarming systems, unlocking doors, performing diagnostics and corrections, and, with access systems, adding or deleting cards.

Alarm systems also may be multiplexed or integrated. Multiplexing is a method of transmitting multiple information signals over a single communications channel. This single communications channel reduces line requirements by allowing signal transmission from many protected facilities. Two other advantages are that information that is more detailed can be transmitted, such as telling which detector is in an alarm state, and transmission line security is enhanced with encoding. Integrated systems , as covered in Chapter 7 , combine multiple systems (e.g., alarm monitoring, access controls, and CCTV).

CCTV CCTV allows one person to view several locations. This is a distinct advantage when protecting the boundaries of a facility, because it reduces personnel costs.

Television programs and movies sometimes portray an intruder penetrating a perimeter barrier by breaking through when a CCTV camera had momentarily rotated to another location. Usually, the camera just misses the intruder by returning to the entry point right after the intruder gains access. Such a possibility can be averted via overlapping camera coverage. If cameras are capable of viewing other cameras, personnel can check on viewing obstructions, sabotage, vandalism, or other problems. In addition, covert CCTV surveillance should also be considered for outdoor applications in conjunction with overt CCTV surveillance.

Tamper-proof housings will impede those interested in disabling cameras. Different models are resistant to bullets, explosion, dust, and severe weather. Housings are manufactured with heaters, defrosters, windshield wipers, washers, and sun shields. Low-light-level cameras provide the means to view outside when very little light is available. When no visible light is available, an infrared illuminator creates light, invisible to the naked eye, but visible to infrared-sensitive cameras. Another option is thermal imaging cameras , which sense heat from an intruder and are especially helpful to spot them in darkness, fog, smoke, and foliage ( Pierce, 2006 : 24–28). An essential aspect of CCTV is proper monitoring. To reduce fatigue and ensure good-quality viewing, it is a good idea to rotate personnel every two hours if possible, limit TV monitors to fewer than 10, arrange the monitors in a curved configuration in front of the viewer, control the lighting over the console to avoid glare on the monitor screens or tilt the monitors if necessary, place the monitors in an order that permits easy recognition of camera locations, provide a swivel chair that hampers the opportunity for sleeping, and assign tasks to the viewer (e.g., communications, logging). The previous chapter covers technology that has enhanced monitoring and CCTV systems.

Lighting From a business perspective, lighting can be justified because it improves sales by making a business and merchandise more attractive, promotes safety and prevents lawsuits, improves employee morale and productivity, and enhances the value of real estate. From a security perspective, two major purposes of lighting are to create a psychological deterrent to intrusion and to enable detection . Good lighting is considered such an effective crime control method that the law, in many locales, requires buildings to maintain adequate lighting.

A major study on the effect of lighting on the incidence of crime was conducted in England by Painter and Farrington (1999) . Three residential areas were selected. One was the experimental area that contained improved lighting. The second was labeled the adjacent area. And the third served as the control area.

Lighting in the adjacent and control areas remained unchanged. The research included the question of whether improved lighting might result in a reduction of crime in the adjacent area. The research results showed a marked reduction in a variety of crimes in the experimental area, whereas crime in the adjacent and control areas remained the same.

One way to analyze lighting deficiencies is to go to the building at night and study the possible methods of entry and areas where inadequate lighting will aid an offender. Before the visit, one should contact local police as a precaution against mistaken identity and to recruit their assistance in spotting weak points in lighting.

Three sources for information on lighting are the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA), the National Lighting Bureau , and the International Association of Lighting Management Companies. The IESNA provides information on recommended lighting levels for a variety of locations. Negligence Caused by Lighting Deficiency Entities have an obligation to create a safe environment through lighting. In addition to moral and societal obligations, legal responsibilities are illustrated in the Illinois case of Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc . In this case, a police officer's widow won a wrongful death suit because a storeowner had disconnected his backdoor light even though the location had been burglarized several times and the owner was aware that local police checked the business during the evenings. A burglar hidden in a dark area shot the officer. The court found the storeowner guilty of negligence through this failure to provide adequate lighting ( U.S. Department of Justice, 1976 : 183). What lighting level will aid an intruder? Most people believe that under conditions of darkness a criminal can safely commit a crime. However, this view may be faulty, in that one generally cannot work in the dark.

Three possible levels of light are bright light, darkness , and dim light . Bright light affords an offender plenty of light to work but enables easy observation by others; it will deter crime. Without light—in darkness—a burglar finds that he or she cannot see to jimmy a door lock, release a latch, or perform whatever work is necessary to gain access. However, dim light provides just enough light to break and enter while hindering observation by authorities. Support for this view was shown in a study of crimes during full-moon phases, when dim light was produced. This study examined the records of 972 police shifts at three police agencies, for a two-year period, to compare nine different crimes during full-moon and non-full-moon phases. Only one crime, breaking and entering, was greater during full-moon phases ( Purpura, 1979 : 350 –353). Although much case law supports lighting as an indicator of efforts to provide a safe environment, security specialists are questioning conventional wisdom about lighting ( Berube, 1994 : 29–33). Because so much nighttime lighting goes unused, should it be reduced or turned off? Does an offender look more suspicious under a light or in the dark with a flashlight? Should greater use be made of motion-activated lighting? How would these approaches affect safety and cost-effectiveness? These questions are ripe for research. What are your views on nighttime lighting? Should certain locations turn it off? Illumination Lumens (of light output) per watt (of power input) are a measure of lamp efficiency. Initial lumens-per-watt data are based on the light output of lamps when new; however, light output declines with use.

Illuminance is the intensity of light falling on a surface, measured in foot-candles (English units) or lux (metric units). The foot-candle (FC) is a measure of how bright the light is when it reaches 1 foot from the source. One lux equals 0.0929 FC. For measures of illuminance, values not labeled as vertical are generally assumed to be horizontal FC (or lux). The light provided by direct sunlight on a clear day is about 10,000 FC; an overcast day would yield about 100 FC; and a full moon, about 0.01 FC. A sample of outdoor lighting illuminances recommended by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (2003) are as follows: guarded facilities, including entrances and gatehouse inspection, 10 FC (100 lux); parking facilities, garages, and covered parking spaces, 6 FC (60 lux) on pavement and 5 FC (50 lux) for stairs, elevators, and ramps; and for fast-food restaurant parking, general parking at schools and hotels/motels, and common areas of multifamily residences and dormitories, 3 FC (30 lux).

Care should be exercised when studying illuminance. Horizontal illuminance may not aid in the visibility of vertical objects such as signs and keyholes. FC vary depending on the distance from the lamp and the angle. If you hold a light meter horizontally, it often gives a different reading than if you hold it vertically. Are the FC initial or maintained? Maintenance and bulb replacement ensure high-quality lighting ( National Lighting Bureau , n.d.: 1–36; Smith, 1996 : 1–4). Lamps The following lamps are applied outdoors ( National Fire Protection Association, 2005 : 12–13; National Lighting Bureau , n.d.: 1–36; Smith, 1996 : 1–4): Incandescent lamps are commonly found at residences. Electrical current passes through a tungsten wire enclosed in a glass tube. The wire becomes white-hot and produces light.

These lamps produce 17 to 22 lumens per watt, are the least efficient and most expensive to operate, and have a short lifetime of from 500 to 4,000 hours.

Halogen and quartz halogen lamps are incandescent bulbs filled with halogen gas (like sealed-beam auto headlights) and provide about 25% better efficiency and life than ordinary incandescent bulbs.

Fluorescent lamps pass electricity through a gas enclosed in a glass tube to produce light, producing 67 to 100 lumens per watt. They create twice the light and less than half the heat of an incandescent bulb of equal wattage and cost 5 to 10 times as much. Fluorescent lamps do not provide high levels of light output. The lifetime is 9,000 to 17,000 hours. They are not used extensively outdoors, except for signage.

Mercury vapor lamps also pass electricity through a gas. The yield is 31 to 63 lumens per watt, and the life is over 24,000 hours with good efficiency compared to incandescent lamps.

Because of their long life, these lamps are often used in street lighting.

Metal halide lamps are also of the gaseous type. The yield is 80 to 115 lumens per watt, and the efficiency is about 50% higher than mercury vapor lamps, but the lamp life is about 6,000 hours. They often are used at sports stadiums because they imitate daylight conditions, and colors appear natural. Consequently, these lamps complement CCTV systems, but they are the most expensive light to install and maintain.

High-pressure sodium lamps are gaseous, yield about 80 to 140 lumens per watt, have a life of about 24,000 hours, and are energy efficient. These lamps are often applied on streets, parking lots, and building exteriors. They cut through fog and are designed to allow the eyes to see more detail at greater distances. Low-pressure sodium lamps are gaseous, produce 150 lumens per watt, have a life of about 15,000 hours, and are even more efficient than high-pressure sodium. These lamps are expensive to maintain. Each type of lamp has a different color rendition , which is the way a lamp's output affects human perceptions of color. Incandescent, fluorescent, and certain types of metal halide lamps provide excellent color rendition. Mercury vapor lamps provide good color rendition but are heavy on the blue. High-pressure sodium lamps, which are used extensively outdoors, provide poor color rendition, making things look yellow. Low-pressure sodium lamps make color unrecognizable and produce a yellow-gray color on objects. People find sodium vapor lamps, sometimes called anticrime lights , to be harsh because they produce a strange yellow haze. Claims are made that this lighting conflicts with aesthetic values and that it affects sleeping habits. In many instances, when people park their vehicles in a parking lot during the day and return to find their vehicle at night, they are often unable to locate it because of poor color rendition from sodium lamps; some report their vehicles as being stolen. Another problem is the inability of witnesses to describe offenders accurately.

Mercury vapor, metal halide, and high-pressure sodium take several minutes to produce full light output. If they are turned off, even more time is required to reach full output because they first have to cool down.

This may not be acceptable for certain security applications. Incandescent, halogen, and quartz halogen have the advantage of instant light once electricity is turned on. Manufacturers can provide information on a host of lamp characteristics including the "strike" and "restrike" time.

Lighting Equipment Fresnel lights have a wide flat beam that is directed outward to protect a perimeter, glaring in the faces of those approaching. A floodlight "floods" an area with a beam of light, resulting in considerable glare.

Floodlights are stationary, although the light beams can be aimed to select positions. The following strategies reinforce good lighting: 1. Locate perimeter lighting to allow illumination of both sides of the barrier. 2. Direct lights down and away from a facility to create glare for an intruder. Make sure the directed lighting does not hinder observation by patrolling officers. 3. Do not leave dark spaces between lighted areas for offenders to move within. Design lighting to permit overlapping illumination. 4. Protect the lighting system: locate lighting inside the barrier, install protective covers over lamps, mount lamps on high poles, bury power lines, and protect switch boxes. 5. Photoelectric cells will enable lights to go on and off automatically in response to natural light.

Manual operation is helpful as a backup. 6. Consider motion-activated lighting for external and internal areas. 7. If lighting is required in the vicinity of navigable waters, contact the U.S. Coast Guard. 8. Try not to disturb neighbors by using intense lighting. 9. Maintain a supply of portable, emergency lights and auxiliary power in the event of a power failure. 10. Good interior lighting also deters offenders. 11. If necessary, join other business owners to petition local government to install improved street lighting. Parking Lot and Vehicle Controls In the preceding chapter, considerable attention was focused on access controls. Here, parking lot and vehicle controls are discussed as integral components of access controls. A well-designed parking lot is a chief prerequisite to construction. Space usually is limited, and the layout of parking spaces and traffic lanes demands care. Employee access control to a building is easier when a parking lot is on one side of a building rather than surrounding the building. Vehicles should be parked away from shipping and receiving docks, garbage dumpsters, and other crime-prone locations.

Executives and other employees should have permanent parking stickers, whereas visitors, delivery people, and service groups should be given a temporary pass to be displayed on the windshield. Stickers and passes allow uniformed officers to locate unauthorized vehicles.

Parking lots are more secure when these specific strategies are applied: CPTED, access controls, signs, security patrols, training, lighting, CCTV, and panic buttons and emergency phones. Crimes often occur in parking lots, and these events can harm employee morale and result in lawsuits, unless employees (and customers) are protected. Hospitals, for example, supply an escort for nurses who walk to their vehicles after late shifts. Employee education about personal safety, locking vehicles, and additional precautions prevent losses.

Certain types of equipment can aid a parking lot security/safety program. Cushman patrol vehicles, capable of traveling through narrow passageways, increase patrol mobility. Bicycles are another option. A guard house or security booth (unfortunately called guard shack at times) is useful as a command post in parking lots.

Various technologies can be applied to controlling vehicles at access points. One example is automatic license plate recognition systems that apply image-processing technology that reads a vehicle's license plate and uses infrared light to illuminate a plate in the dark. A high-speed camera is used to photograph a plate, and then the recorded information is compared to a database. Besides access controls, the applications include fleet management, locating stolen vehicles, and border security ( National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, 2006 : 1). The threat of terrorism has influenced the design of parking lots and vehicle controls. Different types of parking lots present various security issues. Surface lots keep vehicles away from buildings, consume large amounts of land, and may add to storm water runoff volume. On-street parking provides no setback.

A garage may require blast resistance. If the garage is under a building, a serious vulnerability exists, since an underground bomb blast can be devastating.

A designer can propose minimizing vehicle velocity because, for example, a bollard that can stop a 15,000- pound truck moving at 35 MPH may not be able to stop the same truck moving at 55 MPH (FEMA 426).

The road itself can become a security measure by avoiding a straight path to a building . A straight road enables a vehicle to gather speed to ram a barrier, penetrate a building, and then detonate a bomb.

Approaches should be parallel to the building and contain high curbs, trees, or berms to prevent vehicles from leaving the road. Curving roads with tight corners offer another strategy.

Traffic calming strategies are subtler and communicate appropriate speed. Examples are speed humps and raised crosswalks. A speed hump is not as rough as a speed bump. The latter is often used in parking lots. All these strategies reduce speed and liability while increasing safety. Drawbacks are that the response time of first responders increases, and snow removal may become difficult.

Security Officers Officers normally are assigned to stationary (fixed) posts or to patrol. A stationary post is at a door or gate where people, vehicles, and objects are observed and inspected. Stationary posts also involve directing traffic or duty at a command post where communications, CCTV, and alarms are monitored. Foot or vehicle patrols conducted throughout the premises and along perimeters identify irregularities while deterring offenders. Examples of unusual or harmful conditions that should be reported are damaged security devices, holes in perimeter fences or other evidence of intrusion, hidden merchandise, unattended vehicles parked inappropriately, keys left in vehicles, employees sleeping in vehicles or using drugs, blocked fire exits, cigarette butts in no-smoking areas, accumulations of trash, and odors from fuels or other combustibles. In contrast to public police officers, private security officers act in primarily a preventive role and observe and report . Before security officers are employed, far-sighted planning ensures optimum effectiveness of this service.

What are the unique characteristics of the site? How many people and what assets require protection?

How many hours per day is the facility open? How many employees? How many visitors and vehicles are admitted daily? What are the particular vulnerabilities? How will security officers interact with other loss prevention measures?

Security officers are expensive. Wages, insurance, uniforms, equipment, and training add up to a hefty sum per officer per year. If each officer costs $30,000 per year for a proprietary force and 5 officers are required for the premises at all times, to maintain all shifts seven days per week requires approximately 20 officers. The cost would be about $600,000 per year. To reduce costs, many companies switch to contract security services and/or consider technological solutions.

Several specific steps can be taken to improve the effectiveness of officers. Three of the most critical are careful applicant screening, sound training , and proper supervision . Management should ensure that officers know what is expected of them. Policies, procedures, and day-to-day duties are communicated via verbal orders, memos, and training programs. Policies should ensure that supervisors check on officers every hour. Irregular, unpredictable patrols hinder offenders. Rotating officers reduces fatigue while familiarizing them with a variety of duties. Providing inspection lists for adverse conditions will keep them mentally alert. The formal list should be returned with a daily report. Courtesy and a sharp appearance command respect from employees and visitors.

Monitoring Officers Historically, watch clocks have been used to monitor officer patrols along preplanned routes. The officer on patrol carried this older technology, consisting of a timepiece that contained a paper tape or disc divided into time segments. A watch clock was operated by an officer via keys mounted in walls at specific locations along a patrol route. These keys were often within metal boxes and chained to walls. When inserted into the watch clock, the key made an impression in the form of a number on the tape or disc.

Supervisors could examine this to see whether the officer visited each key location and completed the scheduled route. Keys were located at vulnerable locations (e.g., entry points, flammable storage areas).

Good supervision prevented officers from disconnecting all the keys at the beginning of the shift, bringing them to one location for use in the watch clock (and, thus, avoiding an hourly tour), and returning the keys at the end of the shift.

Automatic monitoring systems are another way to monitor patrols and keep records. Key stations are visited according to a preplanned time schedule and route. If an officer does not visit a key station within a specific time period, a central monitoring station receives a transmitted signal, and if contact cannot be made, personnel are dispatched.

Bar-code or touch button technology provides other avenues for monitoring patrols. A security officer carries a wand that makes contact with a bar code or touch button to record data that is later downloaded into a computer. Bar codes or buttons are affixed at vulnerable locations for a swipe by the wand to record the visit by the officer, who can also swipe bar codes or buttons that represent various conditions (e.g., fire extinguisher needs recharging). Supervision of these systems ensures that officers are patrolling properly and conditions are being reported ( Arnheim, 1999 : 48–58). To improve the efficiency of a security officer, the officer can use a wireless tablet PC (see Figure 8-12 ), which enables the officer to leave a monitoring post and take the workstation with him or her. If, for example, an officer must leave a control center to investigate an incident, the officer can bring the tablet PC and continue to watch CCTV, monitor alarms, and open doors for employee access. Courtesy: Hirsch Electronics, Santa Ana, CA. Figure 8-12: The tablet PC is a mobile workstation enabling a security officer to leave a post and do many things mobile that are done from a desktop PC, such as view CCTV, monitor alarms, and open doors Lower burglary and fire insurance premiums are possible through the use of monitored patrols. Insurance personnel may subject records to inspection.

Contraband Detection Contraband is an item that is illegal to possess or prohibited from being brought into a specific area. Examples are weapons, illegal drugs, and explosives. Security officers play a crucial role in spotting contraband at businesses, schools, airports, courthouses, and many other locations. They use special devices to locate contraband, and these devices are as good as the personnel behind them . Here is an overview of these devices ( "Scanning for Trouble," 2000 : 1–3): Metal detectors transmit a magnetic field that is disturbed by a metallic object, which sets off a light or audio signal. Two types of metal detectors are handheld and walk-through. False alarms are a common problem.

X-ray scanners use pulsed energy to penetrate objects that are shown on a color monitor. Drugs, plastic explosives, and firearms with plastic parts are difficult to identify with this method of detection.

Dual-energy systems use X-rays at different energy levels to classify objects as organic, inorganic, or mixed. Colors are assigned to each classification to help spot contraband. When color and shape are observed, these systems are good at detecting explosives, since most are organic.

Computed tomography scanners are like CAT scanners used in hospitals. An X-ray source is spun around an object taking slice pictures that show on a computer. Although this device is expensive, detection of items is good. Armed versus Unarmed Officers The question of whether to arm officers is controversial. Probably the best way to answer this question is to study the nature of the particular officer's assignment. If violence is likely, then officers should be armed. Officers assigned to locations where violent crimes are unlikely do not need firearms, which, if worn by officers, could be offensive. The trend is toward unarmed officers because of liability issues.

If weapons are issued to officers, proper selection of officers and training are of the utmost importance.

Instructions on the use of force and firearms safety, as well as practice on the firing range every four months, will reduce the chances of accidents, mistakes, and costly lawsuits.

Communications and the Control Center As emergency personnel know, the ability to communicate over distance is indispensable. Every officer should be equipped with a portable two-way radio; this communication aid permits officers to summon assistance and notify superiors about hazards and impending disasters. Usually, officers on assignment communicate with a control center that is the hub of the loss prevention program. FEMA 426 ( U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2003 : 3–45) recommends redundant communications. The control center is the appropriate site for a console containing alarm indicators, CCTV monitors, door controls, the public address system, and an assortment of other components for communication and loss prevention (see Figure 8-13 ). Courtesy: Diebold, Inc. Figure 8-13: Security officer at console managing access control, CCTV, alarm monitoring, and video imaging Because of the convergence of IT and physical security, the traditional security control center may be within a network operations center. Some organizations may choose to outsource a portion of operations.

Since these operations are critical, they must be secure both electronically and physically ( Milne, 2005 ). Because personnel will seek guidance from a control center in the event of an emergency, that center must be secure and operational at all times. A trend today is automated response systems programmed into the control center because so many decisions and actions are required for each type of emergency ( Patterson, 2000 : 76–81). The control center is under increased protection against forced entry, tampering, or disasters when it contains a locked door, is located in a basement or underground, and is constructed of fire-resistant materials. An automatic, remotely operated lock, released by the console operator after identifying the caller, also enhances security. Bullet-resistant glass is wise for high-crime locations. FEMA 426 ( U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 : 3–47) recommends a backup control center, possibly at an off-site location. Whoever designs the control center should be well versed in ergonomics, which deals with the efficient and safe partnership between people and machines. Protective Dogs Classified as an animal barrier, a dog can strengthen security at a protected site. An alarm dog patrols inside a fenced area or building and barks at the approach of a stranger, but does not attempt to attack.

These dogs retreat when threatened but continue to bark. Such barking may become so alarming to an intruder that he or she will flee. A guard or attack dog is similar to an alarm dog, with an added feature of attacking an intruder. To minimize the possibility of a lawsuit, a business should selectively apply and adequately fence in these dogs, and should post warning signs. An experienced person on call at all times is needed to respond to emergencies. Another type of attack dog is the sentry dog . This dog is kept on a leash and responds to commands while patrolling with a uniformed officer. The advantages are numerous.

These animals protect officers. Their keen senses of hearing and smell are tremendous assets when trying to locate a hidden offender (or explosives or drugs). Dogs can discern the slightest perspiration from people under stress, enabling the dogs to sense individuals who are afraid of them. An ingredient in stress perspiration irritates dogs, which makes frightened persons more susceptible to attack. When an "attack" command is given, a German shepherd has enough strength in its jaws to break a person's arm.

In addition to the possibility of a lawsuit if a dog attacks someone, there are other disadvantages to the use of dogs. If proprietary dogs are part of the protective team, personnel and kennel facilities are needed to care for the dogs. These costs and others include the purchase of dogs and their training, medical care, and food. Using a contract service would probably be more feasible. Another disadvantage is the possibility that dogs may be poisoned, anesthetized, or killed. An offender also may befriend a dog. Dogs should be taught to accept food only from the handler. Neighbors near the protected premises often find dogs noisy or may perceive them as offensive for other reasons.

Since the 9/11 attacks, interest in canines has increased. At the same time, there is a need for consistent standards for training, quality assurance, kenneling, selection of handlers, and presentation of evidence.

Definitions also present a problem. For example, there is no consistent definition as to what constitutes an explosive detection canine. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has developed the National Odor Recognition Testing initiative, which could be a standard to which dogs could be certified.

Research is being conducted on the possible use of chemical warfare agent detector dogs and GPS technology in conjunction with remote commands for searches, surveillance, and tracking of persons (Harowitz, 2006 : 36–38). Which strategies do you view as affording the best protection against unauthorized entry? Support your answer.

International Perspective: UN Efforts at Global Crime Prevention In 1951, the United Nations established the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of Experts to advise the UN on crime matters. In 1971, the group's name changed to the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control.

Several strategies are employed by the UN to prevent crime and improve justice. The UN fosters UN norms in national legislation, conducts research, and provides technical expertise to countries. Every five years since 1955, the UN has held a congress on crime issues, where successful policies and strategies are shared ( United Nations, 1993 : 1–19). In light of the crime problem, the UN asked its member states to prepare an inventory of crime prevention measures so the information can be published and shared worldwide. The inventory focuses on four sections: Crime prevention through social measures: This approach tackles the root causes of crime and works to improve the family, schools, activities for youth, employment, and health.

Situational crime prevention: These measures involve the management, design, or manipulation of the environment to reduce opportunities for criminal behavior and increase the risk for the offender. Specific strategies include hardening the target through security surveys, building and design codes, publicity and awareness campaigns, and insurance incentives to install physical security. Additional measures are marking property, natural surveillance (i.e., designing the inside and outside of buildings so people can more easily observe others), Neighborhood Watch, and citizen patrols.

Community crime prevention: This approach recognizes that physical security should be part of a broader, community-based response to crime. Community policing and multiagency cooperation are also a part of this approach.

Planning, implementation, and evaluation of crime prevention: The first step in this approach is an analysis of crime and victimization. Compiling and analyzing the location and nature of offenses and many other characteristics of a crime enhance crime prevention planning and implementation. Evaluation assesses whether preventive measures were successful ( United Nations, 1990 ). In essence, crime is a global problem, and many of the crime prevention methods applied in the United States are applied overseas. The UN is asking member nations to compile and share their ideas on how best to reduce crime.

When the 10th congress on crime prevention was held ( United Nations, 2000 ), there was much concern about transnational organized crime and the need for increased global cooperation among nations. There was also continued emphasis on the preceding four categories. However, ethical concerns focused on situational crime prevention because it is seen as a more repressive approach and more harmful to society than other methods of crime prevention. This criticism included the development of a "fortress society," the erosion of civil liberties through CCTV, and inconvenient security checks. Conversely, these arguments met counterclaims, such as the success of CPTED and situational crime prevention in reducing crime, and the public's acceptance of increased security.

Search the Web Use your favorite search engine to see what vendors have to offer and prices for the following: fences, window protection or glazing, door protection, exterior intrusion detection systems, security lighting, and protective dogs.

Check out the following sites on the Web: American Institute of Architects, Security Resource Center: www.aia.org/security American National Standards Institute: www.ansi.org American Society for Testing and Materials: www.astm.org American Society of Landscape Architects: www.asla.org Builders Hardware Manufacturers Association: www.buildershardware.com/ Illuminating Engineering Society of North America: www.iesna.org International Association of Lighting Management Companies: www.nalmco.org International CPTED Association: www.cpted.net International Organization for Standardization: www.iso.org National Crime Prevention Council: www.ncpc.org National Fire Protection Association: www.nfpa.org National Lighting Bureau : www.nlb.org Security Industry Association: www.siaonline.org Technical Support Working Group: www.tswg.gov Underwriters Laboratory (UL): www.ul.com United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network: www.uncjin.org U.S. General Services Administration: www.gsa.gov Use of content on this site is subject to the restrictions set forth in the Terms of Use . Page Layout and Design ©2017 Skillsoft Ireland Limited - All rights reserved, individual content is owned by respective copyright holder.

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