What's Your Recommendation?
Changes in U.S. Interrogation Policy
Legally sanctioned interrogation techniques have drastically changed over the past decade. Following September 11, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, issued the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" that were not authorized in Army Field Manual 2-22-3 to be applied to "illegal combatants." The Army Field Manual determines the legally sanctioned use and limits of interrogation. Afterward, reports of abuse in federal detention facilities, including Guantanamo Bay Detention Center, secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prisons, and US facilities in Afghanistan (such as Abu Ghraib), began to surface.
On investigation of the report of torture at Abu Ghraib, the torture was found to relate to "(1) The military's training program, (2) authorization for torture and abuse, (3) systemic pressures, (4) bureaucratic protections, and (5) the strategic use of dehumanization" (Lankford, 2010, p. 21). On July 25, 2005, the Detainee Treatment Act was initiated by Senator John McCain, a former torture victim and prisoner of war (POW) in the Vietnam War. The intent of this act was to restrict government interrogators to the use of only the techniques sanctioned in the Army Field Manual.
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13491 on his second day of presidency, which restricted methods beyond the Army Field Manual as well as previously legal methods of interrogation found in the Army Field Manual. This order resulted in the discontinuation of abuse and torture of US detainees. It is necessary to know about these legal changes in order to learn about and stay within the boundaries of the field of interrogation.
Reference:
Lankford, A. (2010). Assessing the Obama standard for interrogations: An
analysis of Army Field Manual 2-22.3. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 33(1), 20–35.
Deception in Interrogations
In 2000, the Manchester Metropolitan Police found the Manchester Manual among a member of Al Qaeda's possessions. This document provided examples and techniques for Al Qaeda members to resist interrogation if one became detained. The discovery of this document is just one example of the ways that offenders may preplan and use deception to avoid legal charges and convictions in the interrogation process. While not all those who commit a crime engage in deception, using techniques to identify and verify truthfulness is an important aspect of interrogation (Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013).
Literature on the use of deception and truthfulness in interrogations supports that people who are guilty have more knowledge about the crime that they do not want interrogators to know about; so they withhold this data as a means to avoid criminal sanctions (Clemens et al., 2013). It is also common for a guilty person to intentionally provide false data while the non-guilty tend to focus on communicating more data than those being deceitful because the non-guilty have little to gain by withholding facts or details. While this may be the case for some suspects, Hartwig, Granhag, and Strömwall (2007) found that those who were non-truthful tended to tell a detailed story, told a consistent story, or lied about the data provided. Also, Strömwall and Willen (2011) found that deceivers with a criminal history engaged in strategies to deal with an interrogation by managing information they disclosed, avoiding providing information, keeping their stories simple, or reporting data that was close to the truth but was rich in detail.
The wide range of ways to engage in deception shows how difficult it is for interrogators to use specific rules or patterns to decipher truthfulness during an interrogation. Due to the inconsistencies in data, many interrogators will turn to their instincts to determine truthfulness of their suspects. As mentioned earlier, this may result in biased interrogation and false confessions. In your assigned readings, you will further explore factors to consider when identifying and managing deception as well as guidelines to deal with your own biases within this process. To increase the accuracy of your assessment, it is helpful to ask yourself whether this person fits a pattern of behavior that is consistent with deception. Are there other factors that could account for his or her behavior? Could ethnic, gender, or diversity factors explain the behavior? Are there individual factors, such as mental illness, developmental disabilities, or ideographic dimensions that might account for the behavior?
On the basis of the changes in interrogation policies and difficulties in identifying deception in interrogation, DeClue (2010) recommends the following: all interrogations should be video-recorded, agencies should not use "presumed guilty" techniques on suspects, and interviews should focus on finding the truth rather than coercing uncooperative suspects into a confession. These recommendations help forensic psychology professionals maintain the current ethical and legal standards.
References:
Clemens, F., Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2013). Counter-
interrogation strategies when anticipating questions on intentions.
Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 10(1),
125–138. doi:10.1002/jip.1387
DeClue, G. (2010). Three things that should be used to guide investigative
interviews by military and intelligence agencies. The Journal of
Psychiatry and Law, 38, 251–262.
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2007). Guilty and innocent
suspects' strategies during police interrogations. Psychology, Crime
and Law, 13(2), 213–227.
Strömwall, L. A., & Willen, R. M. (2011). Inside criminal minds: Offenders'
strategies when lying. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender
Profiling, 8(3), 271–281. doi:10.1002/jip.148
Changes in U.S. Interrogation Policy
Legally sanctioned interrogation techniques have drastically changed over the past decade. Following September 11, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, issued the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" that were not authorized in Army Field Manual 2-22-3 to be applied to "illegal combatants." The Army Field Manual determines the legally sanctioned use and limits of interrogation. Afterward, reports of abuse in federal detention facilities, including Guantanamo Bay Detention Center, secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prisons, and US facilities in Afghanistan (such as Abu Ghraib), began to surface.
On investigation of the report of torture at Abu Ghraib, the torture was found to relate to "(1) The military's training program, (2) authorization for torture and abuse, (3) systemic pressures, (4) bureaucratic protections, and (5) the strategic use of dehumanization" (Lankford, 2010, p. 21). On July 25, 2005, the Detainee Treatment Act was initiated by Senator John McCain, a former torture victim and prisoner of war (POW) in the Vietnam War. The intent of this act was to restrict government interrogators to the use of only the techniques sanctioned in the Army Field Manual.
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13491 on his second day of presidency, which restricted methods beyond the Army Field Manual as well as previously legal methods of interrogation found in the Army Field Manual. This order resulted in the discontinuation of abuse and torture of US detainees. It is necessary to know about these legal changes in order to learn about and stay within the boundaries of the field of interrogation.
Reference:
Lankford, A. (2010). Assessing the Obama standard for interrogations: An
analysis of Army Field Manual 2-22.3. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 33(1), 20–35.
Deception in Interrogations
In 2000, the Manchester Metropolitan Police found the Manchester Manual among a member of Al Qaeda's possessions. This document provided examples and techniques for Al Qaeda members to resist interrogation if one became detained. The discovery of this document is just one example of the ways that offenders may preplan and use deception to avoid legal charges and convictions in the interrogation process. While not all those who commit a crime engage in deception, using techniques to identify and verify truthfulness is an important aspect of interrogation (Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013).
Literature on the use of deception and truthfulness in interrogations supports that people who are guilty have more knowledge about the crime that they do not want interrogators to know about; so they withhold this data as a means to avoid criminal sanctions (Clemens et al., 2013). It is also common for a guilty person to intentionally provide false data while the nonguilty tend to focus on communicating more data than those being deceitful because the nonguilty have little to gain by withholding facts or details. While this may be the case for some suspects, Hartwig, Granhag, and Strömwall (2007) found that those who were nontruthful tended to tell a detailed story, told a consistent story, or lied about the data provided. Also, Strömwall and Willen (2011) found that deceivers with a criminal history engaged in strategies to deal with an interrogation by managing information they disclosed, avoiding providing information, keeping their stories simple, or reporting data that was close to the truth but was rich in detail.
The wide range of ways to engage in deception shows how difficult it is for interrogators to use specific rules or patterns to decipher truthfulness during an interrogation. Due to the inconsistencies in data, many interrogators will turn to their instincts to determine truthfulness of their suspects. As mentioned earlier, this may result in biased interrogation and false confessions. In your assigned readings, you will further explore factors to consider when identifying and managing deception as well as guidelines to deal with your own biases within this process. To increase the accuracy of your assessment, it is helpful to ask yourself whether this person fits a pattern of behavior that is consistent with deception. Are there other factors that could account for his or her behavior? Could ethnic, gender, or diversity factors explain the behavior? Are there individual factors, such as mental illness, developmental disabilities, or ideographic dimensions that might account for the behavior?
On the basis of the changes in interrogation policies and difficulties in identifying deception in interrogation, DeClue (2010) recommends the following: all interrogations should be video-recorded, agencies should not use "presumed guilty" techniques on suspects, and interviews should focus on finding the truth rather than coercing uncooperative suspects into a confession. These recommendations help forensic psychology professionals maintain the current ethical and legal standards.
References:
Clemens, F., Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2013). Counter-
interrogation strategies when anticipating questions on intentions.
Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 10(1),
125–138. doi:10.1002/jip.1387
DeClue, G. (2010). Three things that should be used to guide investigative
interviews by military and intelligence agencies. The Journal of
Psychiatry and Law, 38, 251–262.
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2007). Guilty and innocent
suspects' strategies during police interrogations. Psychology, Crime
and Law, 13(2), 213–227.
Strömwall, L. A., & Willen, R. M. (2011). Inside criminal minds: Offenders'
strategies when lying. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender
Profiling, 8(3), 271–281. doi:10.1002/jip.148
Conclusion
In this module, we examined the role of a forensic psychology professional in the interviewing and interrogating process. We took a scientific look at the research on detecting deception through verbal and nonverbal behaviors. The bulk of the research supports that it is not possible to detect deception through the careful observation of verbal or nonverbal behaviors. However, there are some authors in both law enforcement and psychology who suggest that it is possible to detect deception by "reading" people's behavior.
So how do we reconcile these contradictory findings? Part of the answer can lie in methodology. Some of the studies supporting positive results have been questioned in the literature on methodological grounds. But part of the answer may also be that some of the commentators have a vested interest in arguing that detection is possible. Many law enforcement personnel are trained in techniques purported to detect deception. The trainers and marketers of these techniques have a vested business interest.
The detection of deception is big business. The government has spent over one billion dollars on training to detect deception from nonverbal behaviors, with results no better than chance. Companies that sell the so-called voice stress analyzers claim that they can detect deception by changes in the voice. They market these instruments for use on the telephone or in person. One company even publishes its own "scientific journal" with studies touting the device's success. However, this is not a peer-reviewed journal and simply a marketing tool used by the company.
As forensic psychology professionals, we need to be able to critically evaluate the research literature and decide if conclusions are supported by evidence. But we also need to respect the differences in opinions. We need to approach the data with an open mind and be open to new findings. This approach does not mean that we accept anecdotal evidence as support for a conclusion. It is important for forensic mental health professionals to have a solid background in research methodology and statistical analysis. Also, professionals need to rely on the peer-reviewed literature and cannot accept information published in books or commercial websites at face value. As forensic psychology professionals, we are familiar with the Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. Part of the Daubert standard requires that the scientific evidence has been subjected to publication in a peer-reviewed journal. We need to hold the same standard to claim that individuals can detect deception by observing verbal or nonverbal behavior.
