philosophy of Descartes

TheRationalists andKant 443 maintain, forexample, thatyoucanunderstand anargument onlybystudying the debates fromwhich itgrew, andthecontemporary meaningofthe terms used toexpress it.Such writers paygreat attention tohistorical detail,andto the tracing ofinfluences. Others,bycontrast, layhold ofthe great deadphiloso- phers andshake themtolife, impiously interrogating themasthough theywere our contemporaries. Thesecond kindofcommentator willbemore useful to the student; butthefirst isnot tobe despised, andisbeginning tohave consid- erable influence onthe subject.

1.DESCARTES Descartes wasborn atLa Haye, nearTours, in 1596, attended ajesuitcollegein Anjou, tookadoctorate inlaw from theUniversity ofPoi tiers in 1616, andin 1618 embarked onamilitary career,travelling toHolland tojoin thearmy of Prince Maurice ofNassau. Hemade nomark asasoldier andin 1619, while campaigning inGermany, discovered hisvocation asathinker. Afterafew unsettled yearshereturned in 1628 toHolland, wherehelived fortwenty-one years, composing worksofcosmology, mathematics, physics,optics,meteoro- logy, andphilosophy, andbecoming celebrated asone ofthe greatest savantsof his day.

In 1649 hetravelled toSweden atthe invitation ofQueen Christina, whose exacting demands werepartly responsible forhisdeath inthe following year. (The adjective 'Cartesian' recordsthefact that Descartes's nameiscon- densed from'DesCartes") Descartes wroteinFrench andLatin. Theworks thatareofparticular impor- tance tothe student ofmodern philosophy are The Discourse onthe Method, pub- lished inFrench in 1637, the Meditations onFirst Philosophy, publishedinLatin in 1641, andthe Principles ojPhilosophy, publishedinLatin in 1644.

Although the Principles containsthemost comprehensive statementofthe Cartesian position, the Meditations isthe key text, notonly because ofits relentless andconcen- trated argument, butalso because itrepresents Descartes's attempttoshow the originality andimportance ofhis philosophical method.Severalsetsofobjec- tions tothis work werepublished inDescartes's lifetime,together withhis replies, andthese tooshould bestudied. Asfor the other works, theselections Contained inCottingham's edition(seetheBibliography) areadequate.

Descartes wasanaccomplished scientistandmathematician, wholaidthe foundations forNewtonian mechanics,andrevolutionized bothnumber theory and geometry. Itisworth bearing Descartes's scientificandmathematical achievements inmind, sincetheyexerted astrong influence overhisphilosophy.

Descartes believedthatmathematics isarealm of'eternal truth',revealed tothe intellect without reference toexperience. Healso believed thatscientific theo- ries aim inthe same direction, towardsabstractanduniversal principles. By 444 RogerScruton what method, however, canwejustify theseclaims tocertain knowledge, and to knowledge ofnecessary anduniversal truths?Thisquestion plungesusinto the heart ofDescartes's philosophy, andtohis ruling principle, whichhefor- mulated inthese words: 'Forright philosophizing ...the greatest caremust be take~ n~ttoadmit anything astrue which wecannot provetobe true' (Fifth Set of Objections andReplies).

. His quest foramethod, therefore, wasaquest forproof-and atthe same time foraphilosophy onwhich ourmany claims toknowledge couldbe founded.

1.1.

The Method ofDoubt De~cartes believedthathemust demolish allhis beliefs andopinions, andbegin ~ga~ fromthefoundations ifhe were tobe sure ofanything 'inthe sciences' (i.e. in~e recognized fieldsofinquiry) (Meditation 1,17).1 Tothis end hepro- posed hismethod ofdoubt: nottoaccept anything astrue ifhe could givearea- son for.thinking itmight befalse. Twoarguments persuadehimthathecan doubt VIrtually allhis normal beliefs:

The dreaming argument. Ibelieve thatIam sitting bythe fire with apiece of paper inmy hand. Why? Because mysenses tellme so.But could Inot be dreaming? Indreams mysenses present mewith information ofthe same kind as Ireceive whe?waking. Sohow doIknow that1am not dreaming now?

There arebeliefs thatarenot shaken bythis argument-beliefs aboutwhatis most general, suchaswe encounter inmathematics: 'whetherIam awake or asleep, twoandthree added together arefive, andasquare hasnomore than four. s~des. Its~ems im?OSsible thatsuch transparent truthsshould incurany suspicion ofberngfalse(Meditation 1,20).

2. The demon argument. Iimagine thatIwas made, notbyagood God,but b! a~evil demon ofthe utmost powerandcunning, whoemploys allhis ener- gies morder todeceive me.Thus thedemon produces inme the experiences that tellme that Iam sitting bythe fire-although thereisno fire, andnobody to be sitting there.Heproduces mymemories, images,andthoughts, even though nothing inthe world corresponds tothem. Heeven deceives me'in those matters whichseemtous supremely evident',suchasmathematics (Principles, 1.5. 6).

This argument isimmensely powerful,especiallyifit is true, asDescartes maintains, thatwecould bedeceived eveninthat which seemstous most evi- dent. Forthis casts doubt onDescartes's ownsolution tothe problem ofknow l- edge. (Seebelow, Section 1.7.) I Page references aretothe CEuvres deDescartes, i-xii,plussupplement, ed.Charles AdamandPaul Tannery (Paris,1897-1913). GoodEnglish editions willquote thepage numbering ofthis edition inthe margins ofthe translated text.

The Rationalists andKant 445 The two arguments havetheeffect oftransforming ourlocal doubts about this orthat into aglobal doubtabouteverything-and thisisthe result that Descartes requires.

1.2.

The Cogito So how isdoubt overcome? Theanswer iscontained inthe famous phrase 'Co ito,ergo sum', 'Ithink, therefore Iam'. 'Isaw ...that from themere fact thatI thought ofdoubting thetruth ofother things, itfollowed quiteevidently and certainly that1existed' (Discourse onthe Method, 32).

Descartes's wayof putting thepoint waslater amended: 'thisproposi~ion, .1am, Ie~t" isnecessar- ily true whenever itis put forward byme orconceived mmy mrnd .

The following observations shouldbenoted:

The original statement ofthe Cogito, asitis known, makesitlook likean inference. Thepremiss is'Ithink', andtheconclusion is'Iam': inwhich casewe need another premiss ifthe inference isto be valid, namely: 'Everything that thinks exists'. Butthat isprecisely whatDescartes hastoprove.

The statement inthe Meditations istherefore oftenpreferred: itis not that 1 infer myexistence fromthepremiss that1think. Itisrather that1cannot think that 1exist without itbeing truethat1exist. Thestatement thatIexist is'self- verifying' .

Hintikka describes thestatement thatIdo not exist as'existentially inconsis- tent'. Itisnot that itis necessarily false-Imightnothave existed. Rather,the statement cannotbecorrectly made,except incircumstances thatautomati- cally refute it.Itis the performance ofmaking thestatement thatdefeats it.And this applies alsowhen theperformance iscarried out'internally', when1merely think that1do not exist, without overtlystatingit.The attempt tothink one's own non-existence isnecessarily self-defeating.

Descartes says'Iam, Iexist, isnecessarily truewhenever itis put forward by me'. Butitis not, initself, necessarily true.Theproposition that1exist expresses acontingent truth,onethat might havebeen false.

The Cogito isinteresting formany reasons. Recentcommentators havebeen par- ticularly impressed bythe role ofthe word T(or the 'first-person case')inestab- lishing Descartes's desiredconclusion. Itseems thatmany sentences formulated in the first person areimmune toerror-or atleast tocertain kindsoferror. One is 'Iexist'; another is'Ithink'; another is'Iam inpain'. Arethese immune toerror for the same reason, orinthe same respect? Attimes Descartes seemstoanswer in the affirmative: 'Iask [my readers] toreflect ontheir ownmind, andallits attrib- utes. They willfind that they cannot beindoubt aboutthese, eventhough they suppose thateverything theyhave everacquired fromtheirsenses isfalse' (Objections andReplies, 162; seealso Principles, 1.8. 9 and 11.7-9).

- ..•..

--~-- 446 RogerScruton 1.3.

The Theory ofIdeas Descartes takestheCogito asproof ofseveral things:first,thatheexists, sec- ondly thatheexists asa'thinking thing',andthirdly thathehas acriterion whe~eb?, tor~cognize atrue belief Thisisthe criterion of'clear anddistinct per- ception. Thisphrase marksapoint ofgreat difficulty andcontroversy .

D ' m escartes sargument, andthestudent shouldapproach thematter withcare.

.All. mental activity, forDescartes, isaform ofthinking (cogitatio) (Meditation 2,28-9).

Thinking alwaysinvolves 'ideas',whichcomebefore the mind, andarethe immediate objectsofthought. Thuswhen Ithink ofahorse an ide~ ofahorse isbe~ore mymind; whenIdecide togo home, anidea ofgOin~ home isbefore mymmd; whenIsee agreen field,anidea ofagreen fieldis befor~ mymind. These ideasarethe 'matter', sotospeak, ofthinking, andare ?rga~ed bythe various activities ofthe mind (believing, desiring,doubting, lffiagmmg, etc.).

Descartes wasprobably thefirst philosopher touse theword 'idea'inthis way, although theusage caught on,and was made common byLocke and Berkeley.

2. J\ll the modes ofthinking thatweexperience withinourselves canbe brought undertwogeneral headings: perception, orthe operation ofthe intel- lect, andvolition, orthe operation ofthe will' (Principles, 1.32. 17).

Operations of the intellect includesenseperception andimagination, andinvolve thedirect confrontation withanidea, andtheattempt tounderstand it.When Igo on to affirm ordeny theidea, thenthisinvolves anact ofwill inaddition tothe per- ception.

Iperceive myideas more orless' clearly anddistinctly'. Alternatively; ideas themselves maybemore orless' clear anddistinct'. Whatismeant by'clear and distinct'? Descartes givesthefollowing definition: 'Icall aperception "clear" when itis present andaccessible tothe attentive mind...Icall aperception "dis- tinct" if,aswell asbeing clear,itis so sharply separated fromallother percep- tions thatitcontains withinitselfonlywhat isclear' (Principles, 1.45. 22).

That definition iscertainly neitherclearnordistinct. Immense controversy therefore surrounds thequestion whatDescartes meansbyclear anddistinct perception, or aclear anddistinct idea,andwhy heshould haveregarded clarityanddis- tinctness asmarks oftruth.

What heseems tohave inmind isthe idea ofa self-evident proposition.

Certain thingsthatcome before mymind simply cannot bedoubted-and in that sense bearanintrinsic markoftheir owntruth. TheCogito isone ofthem, and bystudying itwe come tosee that anyother proposition thatisperceived as clearly anddistinctly asthis one must alsobetrue. Itstruth isrevealed tothe 'natural light'ofreason.

The Rationalists andKant 447 S is tryin gto give anaccount ofapriori knowledge. Butitis avery Descarte atisfactory account. ..

uns artesalsorefers toadequate andinadequate ideas:anidea canbeclear 5 Desc .fthin.' . dis' twithout containing afull account ofthe essence 0 some g.i.e, ~d tlnbc.g'adequate' toits subject-matter. Thenotion ofan 'adequate' idea V/lthout em .' f Soi tion wastoplaya vitalpartinthe philosophy 0 Spinoza or concep talso introduced intophilosophy theconcept ofan innate idea, 6.

Desca: e~layanimportant roleinthe thought ofLeibniz. Sometimes he which wastho gh all ideas areinnate inus and that wederive noideas from writes asou .' . atall (See Comments onaCertatn Broadsheet, 358-9.) expenence .

Th htof the theory ofideas isrationalism. Knowledgecomesthrough e ups 0 ddi. .f fl .onour own ideas, andsoarriving ataclear an stinctperceptIOn 0 re ecttng ..he ' aliiht' f .

fthings Oureuide inthis exercise iste natur gt 0 reason, the essences 0.

b- .

hich Provide onlyobscure andconfused perceptions, canatbest the senses, w ..

show theworld asitseems, butaresilent concerning theworld asItis.

1.4.

The 'Real Distinction' Having established hisown existence, Descartesgoesontoexamine hisnature.

It is clear from theCogito thatIam athinking thing.Moreover, Icannot con- ceive myself exceptasthinking: anyconception ofmyself thatisa:-ailable tome is aconception ofmyself thinking. Henceitis of my essence tothink. Howev~r hard Itry, Ican find nothing elsethat belongs tomy ~ssence. Forexa~ple, It seems tome that Ihave abody which Ican move atwill; butIcan readily con- ceive ofthis body asnot existing, withoutsupposing myown non-existence.

Descartes thengoes ontoreflect uponthenature ofphysical things(bodies).

Consider thislump ofwax: ithas acertain shape,size,colour, perfume-qu~- ities which Ican perceive throughthesenses. Yetapproach itto the fire and It changes inall these respects, whileremaining thesame piece ofwax. Those sen- sory qualities donot therefore belongtothe essence ofthe piece ofwax. Indeed, no sensory experience enablesmetoperceive theessential natureofthe wax or of any other corporeal thing:onlybyreasoning willIobtain theclear anddis- tinct perception whichreveals theessence ofthe wax thatIhold before me.And this reasoning tellsmethat, while thewax may change inrespect ofits shape, size, colour, perfume, orany other sensory 'mode',itcannot ceasetobe extended inspace without ceasingtobe. Extension belongstoits essence; butI can find nothing elsethat belongs toits essence. Andthesame istrue ofall phys- ical (corporeal) things.

Those twoarguments occurinMeditation 2; in Meditation 6 Descartes adds the following observation: 'Iknow thateverything whichIclearly anddistinctly understand iscapable ofbeing created byGod soasto correspond exactlywith my understanding ofit.Hence thefact that I can clearly anddistinctly under- 448 RogerScruton stand onething apartfromanother isenough tomake mecertain thatthe two things aredistinct, sincetheyarecapable ofbeing separated, atleast byGod:

(See also Principles, 1.60. 28-9.) SinceIclearly anddistinctly perceivethat thought isof the essence ofmind, andextension ofthe essence ofbody, and nothing elseisof the essence ofeither, Iclearly anddistinctly perceivethatmind is essentially distinctfromthebody andtherefore inprinciple separable fromit.

There isa'real distinction' betweenmindandbody.

The details ofthe argument aresetout again inthe sixth setofDescartes's Replies toObjections, andmany arethe fallacies thathave been discerned, rightly or wrongly, inthis immensely subtlepieceofreasoning. Thefollowing points should benoted:

Mind, forDescartes, isathinking substance, inthe specific sensecommon to the rationalist philosophers: itis abearer ofproperties, whichdepends forits existence onno other thingbesides God (Principles, 1.51. 24).

The body isnot asubstance inthat sense, sinceitdepends foritsexistence on other things besides God.Nevertheless, Descarteswritesof'extended sub- stance', meaning matteringeneral, andalso ofcorporeal substances, meaning individual physicalthings.

3. Thought andextension are'principal attributes', throughwhichthesub- stances thatpossess themmaybecompletely oradequately conceived (Principles, 1.53. 25; see Section 2 below).

4. Given thetruth of (1), (2),and (3),there isaproblem asto how mind and body interact: reflection onthis problem wasoneofthe main motives behind Spinoza's philosophy.

1.5.

The Cartesian Theoryofthe Mind Descartes beginsfromthequestion 'Howcan I know, becertain of,the things that Iclaim toknow?' Immediately histhought isturned inwards, tothe con- tents ofhis Own mind andthecertainties whichattachtothem. Although the peculiarity ofthe Cogito liesinits self-verifying nature,therelurksbehind ita host ofother certainties. (See Principles, 1.

9 and 11.7.) Iam able toknow what Ithink, feel,experience, desire,withanauthority thatyoucould never match. Thefirst-person caseisnot merely aparadigm ofcertainty; itseems to show theessence ofthe mind-what itreally andessentially is-through the inner awareness of'ideas'.

Certainty aboutmyown mind goeshand-in-hand withuncertainty aboutthe external world.Mymind ismore immediately presenttome than anyphysical thing, andIcan have knowledge ofitwhile presupposing nothingaboutaphys- ical reality. Itseems asthough mysubjective viewpoint isaviewpoint on another realm-a realmthatisno part ofphysical reality,an'inner' realm, con- nected onlycontingently with'outer' things.

The Rationalists andKant . .d ith'Cartesian dualism'.Isitcoherent? Many ch· thepicture associate WI SU IS ..

phers denythatItIS.

philoso 449 1.6. God .Christian Butitwas notonly forthis reason thathe Descartes wasapIOUS. ofGod Without suchaproof, heargued, there sought toprove th~;~~~t:e scepticism:nothingwouldbecertain beyond a would beno way gIf B establishing theexistence ofasupre~ely handful oftruths aboutmyse~hYh othesis ofthe evil demon. Weobtam an good andwise Godwhedehstroy l~iS~ wetake itto be, when correctly using absolute guarantee tat tewor our God-gihir~end powdeprifts'h Meditations andelsewhere, Descartesgivestwoargu- In the T an f the existence ofGod:

ments or beiWhence camethisidea? Notfrom 1.

Ihave theidea ofamost perfect embg. uchreality (perfection) inthe . .rfect There must eas m .

me, since I.am 1m~e '.ed init'objectively' (i.e.inthe object thatItrepre- cause ofan Idea asIScon tam f mv i dea ofGod which isas great asGod.

sents). Hence theremustbeacau~e:m m~:andadds anew twist tothe theory This argument isvery strange an,cu 'ofscholastic terminology ('formal' . hid byDescartes suse .h of ideas. ItISnot epe ... dthe most difficult stepmte ' . ive') bhis disposition toregar , and objective ,nor !

dinararaph) asself-evident. (Descartess argument (sentence 4 m the prece g.p.g ) fhi ningisat Principles, 1.17.11.

best explanation 0 smea . Ihave anidea ofamost perfect 2 Aversion ofthe ontological argument. .all erfections be~g; Iclearly anddistinctly perceivHethatsuhic.h ~dbeea~~~~=::~st:nce, which alirv i rydegree encets1 and hence retym eve .f hthing Descartes addscanthis ' .t ist(0 noot er, , means thatGod sessence IS 0 exi .

be said.). .illhi hly controversial; mostphilosophers The ontological argumentISst g I think there issomething wrongwithit-but whatexacty? dill Since Godisno deceiver, itfollows thatmy~aculties~l;~:et~y ~~!~~~~e:w lead totruth rather thanerror. Godunderwntes my 1.7.

The Cartesian Circle . 11 onsidered tobe the greatest stumbling- We now encounter whatISge~era yc .IfI relyonmy cognitive pow- bl k i , hilosophical enterpnse. can , oc inDescartes sp .hdIotneed toassume Gods . htGod exists ten 0 n ers only onthe assumption ta h' d.not Descartes's argument . .d l't)Inot erwor s,IS eXistence mor ertoprove .

viciously circular? ..wncanbeexpressed inmany ways. Itwas The Cartesian circle,asIt.IS ~o b'~ctions tothe Meditations, andDescartes first diagnosed byArnauld, mhis 0~ 450 RogerScruton ~eplie~ toit(Second Objections andReplies, 125-6,140-6).

Ineffect theobjection IS sa~g th~following: eitherclearanddistinct perception isaguarantee of ~ruth, ~whi.ch casewecan know whatistrue without invoking God;orelse it IS not, ill which casewecannot proveGod's existence.

Matters aremade difficult byDescartes's admissionthatthedemon could deceive mee:en abo~t thosetruths thatseem mostcertain, including thetruths of mathematlcs. ForISnot mathematics arealm ofclear anddistinct ideas?

.O~e wayoutofthe circle issuggested byDescartes's ownreply (andalsoby Princtples, 1.13.9-10):

wecan doubt ourclear anddistinct ideas,butonly inret- rospect, whendoubt concerns thereliability ofmemory. Truthsthathave tobe proved byaseries ofsteps maybedoubted, inso far aswe rely onour memory ~o ~ssure.us thattheproof wascarried out.Butwhen aproof'is beforeourmind m ItS e.ntlrety, wecan besure o~it;we are granted an'intuition' ofits validity, ~d ~w~cannot doubt.TheIdea ofintuition wastoplay animportant part in Spinoza stheory ofknowledge .

. Ev~n so,the cn:cl~ points toapeculiar featureofDescartes's philosophy. His cntenon oftruth ISinternal. toideas. Locked withintherealm ofideas, henone ~e less supP?ses thathecan choose thetrue from thefalse among them.And hi~ test ofthis isthat there aresome thathecannot doubt.Hethen builds a bndge toGod, andcalls onGod toguarantee hisother claims toknowledge.

But why does Descartes's inabilitytodoubt thatpshow thatpis true?

1.8.

TheAbsolute Perspective O~e. way.of.loo~g atDescartes's philosophy issuggested byBernard Williams, mhis stimulatinp commentary. Descartes'sprofessedaimisto seek founda~ons forhis claims toknowledge. Andtheonly place inwhich these f~un~atlons couldbefound ishis own mind-among theideas which arebefore his mind when thinking. Hisvery method leadshimintothesubjective realm.

~ut. hissubjective pointofview isunreliable: itis that ofasensuous being,the maJonty ofwhose beliefsarisethrough sensoryexperience. Tojustify anyclaim to knowledge hemust risetoanother perspective, inwhich hecan confront t~gs ~sthey.are, andnotasthey seem. Thismeans acquiring an'absolute' viewpoint, whichdoesnotmerely reflecttheworld asitappears, butwhich sh?ws itas itis. Only reason canprovide thatviewpoint. Toput itanother way, things reallyareasthey seem toreason. Thatisthe hidden meaning ofthe doc- trine of'clear anddistinct' ideas.(Hence theargument aboutthewax-precur- sor ofso much laterphilosophy, fromLocke's discussion ofprimary and secondary qualities,toSaul Kripke andHilary Putnam on'natural kinds") But canwereach thisabsolute viewpoint, startingasDescartes does,from the narrow ~er~pective ofaself-conscious anddoubting individual? Maybewe could reachIt,ifwe could prove theexistence ofGod, whose perspective itis. The Rationalists andKant 451 The suspicion is,however, thatnoproof ofGod's existence isavailable fromour erspective. Anyproof mustcovertly assumethatwehave already obtained that ;bsolute conception' ofreality towhich weareinfact merely aspiring.

1.9.

Other Matters The following shouldbeborne inmind bythose whowish tomake aspecial study ofDescartes:

Descartes's theoryofthe will, andofthe distinction betweenentertaining an idea andassenting toit.(See Meditation 4,59-60; Principles, 1.33-5. 17-18.) 2. Descartes's theoryofsubstance, andofthe dependency offinite substances on God. (Seenext section.) 3. Descartes's theoryof'common notions',andhisattempt atan axiomati- zation ofhis system. (SeeAppendix tothe Second Replies, andnext section.) 2.

SPINOZA Benedict (Baruch) deSpinoza (1632-77) livedinHolland, wherehisfamily, who were Spanish Jews,hadcome asrefugees fromtheInquisition. Hewas brought up inthe Jewish faith,butwas anathematized andcast outfrom thesynagogue on account ofhis heretical views.Theseviewshadbeen acquired throughhis study ofDescartes, andthrough friendships withChristian andCartesian thinkers. Hisdefence offreedom ofconscience, inthe anonymously published Theologico-Political Treatise (1670), caused himtofall out with thesynod ofthe Calvinist Church,andhence withthecivil authorities. Asaresult ofthese trou- bles, Spinoza withheld hismasterpiece, theEthics, fromthepress, andlived in retirement, refusingtheoffer ofaprofessorship atHeidelberg, anddeveloping his philosophy throughcorrespondence withother scientific andphilosophical thinkers. Spinozahadwide-ranging interests,inpolitics, law,biblical scholar- ship, andpainting, aswell asmathematics andphysical science.Hecarried out experiments inoptics, andthegrinding oflenses forthese experiments may have exacerbated theconsumption whichbrought himtoan early death.

An earlier treatment ofsome ofthe themes ofthe Ethics iscontained inthe short andunfinished Treatiseonthe Emendation ofthe Intellect. Inaddition to those twoworks, Spinoza wrotetheTheologico-Political Treatisereferred to above, anunfinished PoliticalTreatise, andanexposition ofthe philosophical system ofDescartes (Descartes's PrinciplesofPhilosophy, publishedin 1663).

However, despiteSpinoza's enormous importance asapolitical philosopher, we shall beconcerned solelywithhismetaphysical theoriesandtheir ethical con- sequences.

2 2 Spinoza wroteinLatin; theavailable translations aredescribed inthe Bibliography.