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Social and Personality Psychology Compass10/1 (2016): 11–25, 10.1111/spc3.12229

Exploring the Toolkit of Emotion: What Do Sadness and

Anger Do for Us?

Heather C. Lench*

, Thomas P. Tibbett and Shane W. Bench

Texas A&M University

Abstract

What do negative emotions do for people? We present a framework that def ines the function of emotions

as the degree to which discrete emotions result in better outcomes in particular types of situations. Focus-

ing on sadness and anger, we review evidence related to the situations that elicit these emotions; the cog-

nitive, physiological, and behavioral changes associated with the emotions; and the extent to which these

changes result in demonstrably better outcomes in the type of situation that elicits the emotion. Sadness is

elicited by perceived goal loss without possibility of restoration given current abilities and is associated

with deliberative reasoning, reduced physiological activity, and behavioral expression. There is prelimi-

nary evidence suggesting that sadness can permit coping with loss, and that expression of sadness can re-

cruit others to assist in goal attainment. Anger is elicited by perceived goal loss that can be prevented if an

obstacle is overcome and is associated with heuristic reasoning, increased physiological activity, and be-

havioral expression. There is evidence that expression of anger prompts others to remove themselves as

obstacles, and preliminary evidence that anger can promote overcoming obstacles and goal attainment.

Like precision tools, specif ic emotions are best utilized to resolve particular problems.

People often assume that being in a constant state of happiness would be ideal for human func-

tioning. In fact, the majority of people consider being happy to be of paramount importance in

their lives (Diener, 2000). Yet research f indings have revealed that happiness is not the panacea it

might appear, and that instead a mixture of positive and negative emotions is related to positive

outcomes (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004). In the present review, we address the question of

what negative emotions do for people. We utilize a class of emotion theories–functional ac-

counts–to integrate f indings related to the consequences of emotions. Broadly speaking, func-

tional accounts of emotion posit that emotions are functional in the sense that they do

something useful for people. We present a framework that def ines the function of emotions

as the degree to which the changes associated with discrete emotions result in better outcomes

in particular types of situations. To use an analogy, emotions do not function as sledgehammers that

can deal with any problem, but rather as a Swiss army knife with a multitude of tools that are

best utilized to resolve particular problems.

Functional Accounts of Emotion

The term“emotion”is used in a variety of ways in the research literature and in colloquial

speech. Although debate continues, there is an emerging consensus that a primary distinguishing

feature of emotions is that they are reactions to events (Eich, Kihlstrom, Bower, Forgas, &

Niedenthal, 2000; Kaplan, Levine, Safer, & Lench, 2015; Lench, Bench, Darbor, & Moore,

2015; Verduyn, Van Mechelen, & Tuerlinckx, 2011). Emotions are directed toward or“about”

a specif ic event, such as the sadness experienced after a defeat or the anger felt over an insult.

This can be contrasted with moods, which have less identif iable specif ic causes and are more

Kaplan et al., 2015). The present review focuses on the emotions sadness and anger, as illustra-

tions of how existing accounts can be integrated to identify the functions of emotion within

particular situations. Anger and sadness were selected because they are included on almost all lists

of emotions that are universally experienced and have a biological basis (e.g., lists of“basic emo-

tions,”and cross-species comparative analyses; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2011).

They also are both negative in valence and therefore can illustrate the differences between

emotions of the same valence that can be predicted from functional accounts. Further, both

emotions are frequently regarded as states that should be managed or regulated (Erber & Erber,

2000; Taylor, 1991). This perception likely arises in part because extreme or chronic sadness and

anger are symptoms of psychiatric disorders, and in part because they are aversive experiences, so

much so that people will pay money to avoid experiencing them (Lau, White, & Schnall, 2013;

Tibbett & Lench, 2015).

Functional accounts posit emotions are powerful organizing forces of cognition, physiology,

and behavior that do something for people, in that they function to resolve particular types of

problems. There are multiple functional accounts that vary in their particulars (Arnold, 1960;

Averill, 1983; Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1987; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter,

Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005; Pinker, 1997). Rather than reviewing support for a particular

functional account, the present review focuses on evidence related to the core assumption

among all of these accounts–that emotions serve a function. There are three key questions

that must be addressed in order to identify the potential functions of any emotion: (1) What

are the situations that elicit that emotion? (2) What cognitive, physiological, and behavioral

changes are associated with that emotion? And (3) to what extent do these changes result in

demonstrably better outcomes in the type of situation that elicits the emotion? The challenge

of a functional account, then, is to determine the extent to which a given emotion resolves the

type of situation that elicited the emotion. In other words, to identify what a particular emo-

tional“tool”can do. Figure 1 presents an overview of this approach applied to evidence related

to sadness and anger.

Figure 1Framework for identifying the functions of speciﬁcemotions.

12 Functions of Emotion

Some functional accounts focus on the objective situations that result in different emotions, such

as images of snakes that trigger a fear response (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Although there do

appear to be stimuli that elicit particular emotional responses, the vast majority of studies have

revealed individual variability in how people respond to objective situations. In one study, in-

vestigators videotaped travelers reporting lost luggage at the airport (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997).

The emotions that the travelers expressed to this identical objective situation varied quite a

bit, with some people expressing anger and others expressing anxiety. Yet this variability in re-

sponse was accounted for by differences in how peopleperceivedthe situation. Across individuals

and cultures, people’s perceptions of situations are stronger and more accurate predictors of their

emotional response than the objective situation (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013;

Scherer & Meuleman, 2013; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007; Stein & Hernandez, 2007).

So what perceptions of situations matter? This is a matter of some debate among researchers,

and the inferences that can be drawn from the existing empirical literature are often mixed.

Conceptualized broadly, emotions result from the perceived discrepancy between the desired

and current status of goals and values (Arnold, 1960; Carver, 2004; Frijda, 1986; Lench, Flores,

& Bench, 2011; Levenson, 2014; Levine, 1996). Negative emotions result when there is a mis-

match between what people want and what they have at the moment. Indeed, many theorists

regard negative emotions as signals that direct attention to relevant stimuli when there are goals

that are in danger of failing (Carver, 2004; Cole et al., 2004). The specif ic negative emotion ex-

perienced results from the specif ic type of mismatch that is perceived (Arnold, 1960; Campos,

Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994). In a study of people’s daily emotional lives, almost 70%

of specif ic emotional experiences could be predicted from the perceived goal-relevant events

that preceded them (Oatley & Duncan, 1994).

Sadness

Sadness is conceptualized as resulting from the perception that a goal has been lost, without the

possibility of restoration given one’s current abilities (Carver, 2004; Frijda, 1986, 1987; Gross &

Levenson, 1995; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lench et al., 2011; Levine, 1996; Levine

& Pizarro, 2004; Oatley & Jenkens, 1996). Some theories focus specif ically on the social situa-

tions of relationship loss that predict the emotion of sadness (see Keltner & Kring, 1998, for

a review), but sadness has been consistently documented in nonsocial situations involving fail-

ure. Images and f ilms depicting relationship losses (e.g., death, illness) effectively elicit sadness,

as do imaginative tasks, texts, recall, and real life experiences that involve the experience of goal

failure (Lench et al., 2011). In one example, the experience of sadness was effectively manipu-

lated by failure to attain an incentive during a game (Carver, 2004 & Scheier, 2001). Similarly,

young children predict that a protagonist will experience sadness in situations involving irrevoca-

ble goal loss (Levine, 1995) and adults report sadness after loss (Oatley & Duncan, 1994). Concep-

tualizing sadness as the result of perceived goal failure beyond one’s ability to repair is also

consistent with f indings from studies of the specif ic evaluations (appraisals) of situations that pre-

dict emotions. Appraisals that a situation is beyond one’s control (i.e., high situational control, low

personal control) reliably predict the experience of sadness across a number of objective situations

involving goal failure (Keltner et al., 1993; Siemer et al., 2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Anger

Anger is also conceptualized as resulting from the perception that a goal has been lost, but, unlike

sadness, goal attainment is possible with the removal of an obstacle (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler,

Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001; Carver, 2004; Carver &Harmon-Jones, 2009; Frijda, 1986; Gross

Functions of Emotion 13

Pizarro, 2004; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). As with sadness, some theories focus

specif ically on social situations that elicit anger, which are often characterized by the perception

of injustice committed by another person (Keltner et al., 1993). Consistent with these accounts,

anger is effectively elicited by emotion elicitations involving f ilms and pictures that portray social

injustice (Lench et al., 2011), and appraisals thatsomeone else is to blame for a negative situation

predict the experience of anger (Siemer et al., 2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

However, a social context involving injustice does not appear to be a necessary condition for

anger to occur. Anger is also experienced in nonsocial situations involving obstacles to goals

(Averill, 1983; Oatley & Duncan, 1994) and effectively elicited by imaginative tasks, texts, recall

tasks, and real life experiences that involve obstacles (Lench et al., 2011). For instance, travelers

were video recorded reporting their lost luggage at an airport and then asked questions about

their perception of the situation, with the result that the perception that goals were obstructed

predicted greater anger expression and behavior in the travelers (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). In

studies with infants, anger is frequently elicited by taking away or blocking an attractive toy

or video (Buss & Goldsmith, 1998; Stifter & Braungart, 1995). Similarly, young children predict

that a protagonist will experience anger in situations involving goal loss when the protagonist

can take action to reinstate the goal (Levine, 1995). Anger as the result of perceived obstacles

to goal attainment is also consistent with f indings from appraisal studies. Appraisals of individual

control and certainty predict the experience of anger (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Smith &

Ellsworth, 1985), suggesting that anger is elicited in situations characterized by the possibility of

goal attainment with additional effort. Together, the available evidence suggests that anger is

elicited in situations that involve obstacles to goals, and that other people can be the obstacle.

What Changes are Associated with Emotions?

Once an emotion is elicited by the perception ofa problematic situation, what changes occur?

Emotions have been conceptualized as coordinated responses across cognitive, physiological, and

behavioral systems to changes in the environment (Ekman, 1992; Levenson, 2014; Mauss et al.,

2005; Pinker, 1997; Scherer, 1984). In other words,negative emotions are responses to the percep-

tion of problematic situations, described above, that represent a mismatch between what people

want and what they have. According to this perspective, emotions represent coordinated changes

that draw attention to information relevant to the problem and prepare for action to resolve the

problem (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). It is important to note that the changes associated with an

emotion are not considered to be deterministic butrather probabilistic, such that individual re-

sponses can be affected by a number of moderators (Buck, 2010; Frijda, 1987; Izard, 2007; Lelieveld,

van Dijk, van Beest, & van Kleef, 2013; Levenson, 2011; Panksepp, 2007; Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013).

For example, people do not ref lexively attack every time that they become angry. Rather, the

proposition is that anger is associated with an increased likelihood of aggressive behavior, with indi-

vidual responses moderated by experience and the situation. This perspective is also consistent with

the reasoning based on evolutionary theory that underlies many functional accounts, in that the

expression of any evolved feature (the genotype) isaltered by individual specif ic experiences (the

phenotype; Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000; Gould & Lewontin, 1979).

Across emotions, there is evidence supporting the proposition that emotions represent coordi-

nated changes across systems, although sometimes those relationships are small in size (Lench et al.,

2011). Computer algorithms can reliably predict the emotions that people report based on input

from behavioral and physiological changes (Bailenson et al., 2008; Kragel & LaBar, 2013). These

f indings suggest that discrete emotions are associated with unique changesacross systems and that

changes tend to co-occur. There is also evidence that emotions represent coordinated responses

14 Functions of Emotion

© 2016 John Wiley & Sons LtdSocial and Personality Psychology Compass10/1 (2016): 11–25, 10.1111/spc3.12229 across systems in the sense that changes correlate during emotional episodes (Bonanno & Keltner,

2004; Hsieh et al., 2011; Levenson, 2014; Lewis, 2011; Mauss et al., 2005), although correlations

may vary across the life span and in differentcontexts (Izard & Abe, 2004; Izard, Hembree, &

Huebner, 1987; Mauss et al., 2005; Shiller, Izard, & Hembree, 1986). Additionally, discriminant

neural pathways have been demonstrated for specif ic emotions, consistent with the idea that emo-

tions represent coordinated responses (Kassam,Markey, Cherkassky, Loewenstein, & Just, 2013).

Sadness

The changes across systems that are associated with sadness have frequently been characterized as

“deactivation”or the absence of behavior (Averill, 1968; Cunningham, 1988; Frijda, 1986).

This deactivation after a sadness-eliciting goal loss (i.e., a failure) is thought to promote a focus

on understanding the causes of goal failure and to reduce goal pursuit and distraction in an en-

vironment that is not conducive to success (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Cunningham, 1988).

In a recent meta-analysis that examined the effects of emotions across systems, sadness was asso-

ciated with moderate changes (g= 0.41) across all outcomes compared to neutral conditions, in

a manner consistent with this deactivation account (Lench et al., 2011). Sadness also differed

from other emotion conditions on measures across systems with small effect sizes compared

to other negative emotions and large effect sizes compared to happiness.

Cognitively, sadness has been demonstrated to change the way that information is processed,

prompting a relatively deliberative, analytic reasoning style that is thought to promote an under-

standing of the causes of past failures and to prevent future goal failures (Ambady & Gray, 2002;

Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Forgas, 1998; Markman & Weary, 1996). The downstream con-

sequences of this more analytic reasoning style include more accurate memories (Bless, Schwarz,

& Wieland, 1996; Forgas, Laham, & Vargas, 2005; Park & Banaji, 2000), and less biased judg-

ments (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Forgas, 1998). In addition to more deliberative processing,

sadness also directs attention specif ically to the outcomes and causes of goal failures. In one study

demonstrating this focus, participants who were made sad and then read a narrative about a

failure were more likely to recall information about the event outcomes than happy or angry

participants (Levine & Burgess, 1997; Levine & Pizarro, 2004). Sadness is also related to more

pessimistic thinking, in the form of greater estimates of the likelihood of losses and negative

outcomes (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000).

Sadness associated with loss generally results in reduced physiological activity (Ekman,

Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Kreibig, 2010; Levenson, 2011, 2014), and the prof ile associated

with sadness is distinct from other emotional states (Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio,

2006). This decreased physiological arousal is thought to promote reduced psychomotor activ-

ity, permitting sad people to concentrate on the source of their failure without becoming dis-

tracted (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Forgas, 1998). In one study, sadness was elicited by

having participants pose facial expressions consistent with sadness, resulting in a deactivation

in muscle activity (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). A review of studies that elicited emo-

tion to examine physiological consequences found that sadness without crying was associated

with decreased heart rate, electrodermal activity, heart rate variability, f inger pulse amplitude,

and f inger temperature, as well as increased respiratory activity (Kreibig, 2010). Although sad-

ness is generally associated with decreased physiological activation, sadness that is elicited when

there is the possibility of avoiding loss and accompanied by crying behavior is typically associated

with increased physiological activity (Kreibig, 2010), suggesting a different physiological pattern

when loss might be avoidable with help from others.

Behaviorally, emotions can be expressed through facial expressions, posture, and vocaliza-

tions, and any of these expressions can be consistently identif ied by others as ref lecting a

Functions of Emotion 15

2003; Tracy & Robins, 2004). The majority of research on behavioral expression has focused on

facial expressions, with a particular focus on the subsets of muscle movements associated with

different emotions. The characteristic facial expression of sadness includes a frown, eyebrows

lifted in the center of the forehead, and relaxed eyes (Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). Com-

puter modeling has revealed that the pattern of facial muscle contractions associated with sadness

is distinct from patterns for other emotions, which makes facial expression particularly effective

for communicating emotion to others (Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005).

Anger

The consequences of anger for responses across systems have been characterized as a“readiness for

action,”which is thought to facilitate the ability to respond quickly to attain goals or remove obsta-

cles to goals (Frijda, 1986; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001; Kreibig, 2010; Lench et al., 2011).

This activation during the blockage of a goal is believed to encourage focus on achieving the goal

and decrease the pursuit of alternative goals untilthe current goal has been achieved, or is lost with-

out opportunity to recover (Levine & Pizarro, 2004). In a recent meta-analysis that examined the

effects of emotions across systems, angerwas associated with moderate changes (g=0.51) across

all outcomes compared to neutral conditions, in a manner consistent with this activation account

(Lench et al., 2011). Anger also differed from other emotion conditions on measures across systems

with small to moderate effect sizes compared to other negative emotions (in some cases the number

of available comparisons was small, however), and large effect sizes compared to happiness.

Cognitively, anger impacts information processing by encouraging a relatively heuristic rea-

soning style, resulting in more biased and more optimistic judgments (Bodenhausen et al., 2011;

DeSteno et al., 2000; Lench & Levine, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). In addition to

more heuristic processing, anger appears to direct attention to goals and the actions of others

(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Levine & Burgess, 1997; Levine & Pizarro, 2004)

and reduces self-focused attention (Green & Sedikides, 1999). Additionally, anger results in

greater estimation of the likelihood of negative outcomes as a result of obstacles to goals (e.g., late

due to traff ic; DeSteno et al., 2000), suggesting greater attention to goal-relevant information.

Physiologically, anger due to a blocked goal resultsin increased physiological activity (Kreibig,

2010; Levenson, 2014; Levenson et al., 1990), andthe prof ile associated with anger is distinct

from other emotional states (Rainville et al., 2006). This increase in physiological activity is pro-

posed to prepare people to takeaction to recover a blocked goal (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman,

2001; Lench et al., 2011; Pinker 1997). Consistent with this proposal, anger has been found to

be strongly related to the cardiovascular system (Levenson, 1992; Miller, Patrick, & Levenston,

2002) and to possess a unique physiological prof ile (Miller et al., 2002). A review of studies that

examined the impact of elicited emotion on physiological outcomes found that anger was asso-

ciated with increased heart rate, systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, total peripheral

resistance, electrodermal activity, skin conductance level, and respiratory activity (Kreibig, 2010).

Behaviorally, the intensity of anger, as well as factors such as trait anger-proneness and gender,

moderate the expression of anger (e.g., verbal, physical aggression, facial expression;

Deffenbacher, Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 1996).As with sadness, the majority of research on be-

haviors associated with anger has focused on facial expression and found that anger is associated

with lowered brows, glaring eyes, and tightened lips(Ekmanetal.,2002).Thefacialexpression

of anger has been found to be identif iable in seven-month old infants and to become more pro-

nounced with increased intensity (Stenberg, Campos, & Emde, 1983). A meta-analysis of studies

examining the recognition of emotion expressions suggested that both the verbal and facial

expressions of anger can be recognized across cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).

16 Functions of Emotion

The thread tying functional theoriestogetheristhatemotionsserveapurpose,namely,thatemo-

tions represent coordinated responses that help to resolve particular problems (Ekman, 1992; Lazarus,

1991; Lench et al., 2011; Levenson, 2014; Mauss et al., 2005; Pinker, 1997; Scherer, 1984).

Theoretically, the problem that specif ic emotions serve to resolve should match the situation

that elicited that emotion. Therefore, this resolution can be demonstrated in studies that reveal

that the cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioral changes associated with an emotion result in

better outcomes in situations characterized by the perceived mismatch between goals and the

environment that elicits the emotional response. Although many studies demonstrate that

emotions change responses in ways thatappearfunctional, as reviewed above, studies have infre-

quently assessed whether those responsesarefunctional (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). So, what is

the evidence that emotions do something for us, in that they help resolve challenges to goals?

Sadness

Given that the changes associated with sadness result from situations involving goal loss that is

beyond one’s ability to address, the critical question for functional accounts is the extent to

which changes associated with sadness result in better outcomes in situations involving goal loss

beyond one’s ability to address.

Interpersonal effects.Better outcomes could result because ofinterpersonaleffects of emotion, in which

changes associated with sadness alter the behaviors of others in ways that promote better outcomes

related to goal loss. Because interpersonal effects are by def initionthe result of social exchanges,

behavioral expression of emotion is particularly likely to be relevant to interpersonal outcomes

(Fridlund, 1991). However, the degree to which expression of emotion results in better outcomes

is necessarily dependent on the perception of the other person and their relationship to the expresser.

Evidence suggests that the facial or verbal expression of sadness can elicit help from others, at

least under some conditions. In situations that involve goal loss beyond one’s ability to address,

recruiting help from others to attain goals results in better outcomes. Indeed, evidence suggests

that crying, a behavior typically associated with sadness, can be an effective signal to caregivers to

provide help to infants (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972). In investigations with adults, participants were

more likely to make concessions to an opponent who displayed a digital facial expression of

sadness (Dehghani, Carnevale, & Gratch, 2014). However, participants only made concessions

when sadness was displayed over an object of moral signif icance, suggesting that the expression

of sadness elicits helping behavior primarily when there is a rationale for requesting concessions.

There is also evidence that verbally conveying that one is experiencing disappointment (similar

to sadness, although there is an element of blame to expressing disappointment that is likely

absent in sadness) can increase support from others. In one investigation, participants were

paired with an ingroup or outgroup member (actually a computer program) and bargained over

the distribution of chips with differing payoff structures (Lelieveld et al., 2013). In some condi-

tions, the opponent indicated disappointment with an offer made by the participant, and

consequently, the participants viewed the opponent as weaker and offered more chips, but only

when the opponent was described as a member of their group. This suggests that people were

more inclined to support someone in their group who had expressed a sad emotional response.

Thus there is evidence that signaling one is experiencing sadness during social exchanges, either

verbally or by sending a facial expression, can change others’behavior in ways that promote

one’s goals. However, the impact of expressing sadness on goal protection outcomes is

unknown when sadness is expressed in other ways or in other contexts that do not involve

direct negotiation.

Functions of Emotion 17

© 2016 John Wiley & Sons LtdSocial and Personality Psychology Compass10/1 (2016): 11–25, 10.1111/spc3.12229 Intrapersonal effects.Better outcomes could also result because of intrapersonal effects of emotion,

in which the changes associated with sadness promote better outcomes in situations involving

goal loss beyond one’s ability to resolve. In one study, Wrosch and Miller (2009) found that

the experience of depressive symptoms (including sad mood) predicted increased goal

disengagement capacity over time, and that this disengagement capacity predicted reduced

depressive symptoms. This study provides tentative support for the notion that sadness can result

in better outcomes in situations involving goal loss and/or failure, although it was unclear in this

investigation if goal disengagement was necessary. The only other evidence supportive of this

possibility are f indings that sadness promotes ways of thinking that seem likely to support goal

protection, although that link has not been assessed. For example, sad people meet conversa-

tional norms during speech more than happy people (Koch, Forgas, & Matovic, 2013), sad

people are better able to detect deception than happy people (Forgas, 2013), and sad people

are less optimistic about their futures than happy people (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).

The vast majority of predictions regarding the intrapersonal consequences of sadness that can

be derived from a functional account, including that sadness should promote learning from past

mistakes and blocking goal disruptions, remain to be tested.

Anger

Given that the changes associated with anger result from situations involving obstacles to goals

that are still attainable, functional accounts would predict that anger should result in better

outcomes in situations involving obstacles to goals.

Interpersonal effects.If anger promotes overcoming obstaclesto goals, then expression of anger should

elicit responses in others that make goal accomplishment more likely, potentially through removing

themselves as obstacles or supporting one’s position. As with sadness, these interpersonal effects are

necessarily dependent on the perception of the other person and their relationship to the person ex-

pressing anger. Expressing anger has been described as a signal to others that one is serious and might

lose control or take aggressive action (Pinker,1997), and people experiencing anger versus other

emotions are more likely to act aggressivelytoward others after an insult (Harmon-Jones &

Sigelman, 2001; Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor, 1999). People seem to be intui-

tively aware of this connection, as supervisors report strategically using the expression of anger to

resolve issues with employees (Lindebaum & Fielden, 2011). In one investigation, participants were

paired with another player (actually a computer program) who stated in writing that they were an-

gry or happy about an offer made by the participant during a negotiation (or wrote nothing; Van

Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Participants facing an angry opponent were more likely to

concede to the demands of the opponent, suggestingthatverballyexpressingangercanresultin

people capitulating to one’s desires. Similarly, participants indicated that they would be more likely

to comply with the demands of an angry person who left a message for them (Tamir & Ford, 2012).

There is evidence, however, that capitulation to the desires of a person who expresses anger in a ne-

gotiation is dependent on a number of moderators.In one investigation, participants conceded more to

an angry person, but only if they wanted to maintain acontinued relationship with the person (Sinaceur

& Tiedens, 2006). Similarly, participants conceded more to an angry person if that person had relatively

high power, in the sense that their satisfaction would have an impact on the participant (Van Kleef, De

Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). The expression of anger can also result in rejection during nego-

tiations that involve multiple parties who form coalitions to promote better negotiating power (Van

Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). Together, these f indings suggest that the expression of anger

can result in better outcomes in negotiations with others, but that it is only effective to the extent that

the expresser has the ability to carry through on theimplied threat associated with anger expression.

18 Functions of Emotion

ipants who viewed faces posing the different components of an anger expression (i.e., browridge

lower, brow lower, cheekbones higher, nose wider, mouth raised, lips thinner, chin raised) at-

tributed signif icantly greater strength to the person than when the person had a neutral expres-

sion (Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014; see also Hess, Helfrecth, Hagen, Sell, & Hewlett, 2010).

Thus, expressing anger might convey strength to others, making it more likely that they would

remove themselves as obstacles to one’s goals. There is evidence, however, that only expressing

anger facially is insuff icient to motivate others to capitulate. Participants engaged in a negotia-

tion with a confederate (a professional actor) who was instructed to display fake anger (only

modifying facial expression, but not internal experience or tone) or intense anger (modifying

experience; C té, Hideg, & van Kleef, 2013). Participants were more likely to give into the de-

mands of an opponent expressing anger, but not if that anger was only expressed facially, and

this difference was the result of a decreased sense of trust when the opponent appeared to be

faking anger.

There is some evidence that expressing anger increases others’support for one’s position. In

one investigation, participants watched a video of a politician expressing anger or sadness

(Tiedens, 2001). Those who viewed the angry versus sad politician had more positive attitudes

toward the politician, indicated that they were more likely to vote for the politician, and viewed

the politician as a better leader. Similarly, people report that they experience anger most often in

their close relationships and that one consequence of expressing anger within those relationships

is that the target gained respect for the angry person (Averill, 1983).

Thus there is evidence that expressing anger verbally or facially can change others’behavior

in ways that promote overcoming obstacles to goals, although the impact of expressing anger in

other ways is unknown and the impact on achieving better outcomes outside of a negotiation

context, which is inherently contentious, is unclear.

Intrapersonal effects.Intrapersonally, anger should be characterized by responses across systems that

enable overcoming obstacles and goal attainment. In one study, participants who had been in-

duced to be angry kicked with more force on a physical task than happy or neutral

participants, which might be effective in removing obstacles to goalsin physical encounters

(Woodman et al., 2009). Similarly, Darwin (1872) suggested that the baring of teeth common

during angry expressions might ready the expresser to bite if necessary, which might help people

overcome obstacles in physical f ights. Frijda (1986) argued that the lowered brow and frown that

are common in angry expressions ref lect expressions that promote focused visual attention and

might help angry people focus on a particular problem or target. As with sadness, however, the

evidence that anger and responses that characterize anger actually result inovercomingobstacles

and goal attainment is meager. There is correlational evidence that people experiencing anger

persist longer on diff icult tasks and consequentlyare more successful on cognitive tasks that re-

quire persistence (Lench & Levine, 2008; Mikulincer, 1988). However, because of the nature

of correlational research designs, it is also possible that persisting longer elicits greater anger. In

one investigation, participants were induced to feel emotions and then played a game that in-

volved confrontation (shooting enemies) or a non-confrontational game (Tamir, Mitchell, &

Gross, 2008). Angry participants performed better during the confrontational game than the

other game, and better than participants induced to feel excitement or in a neutral condition.

If the enemies in the game can be conceptualized as obstacles, then these f indings would support

the notion that anger facilitates overcoming obstacles. Again, the vast majority of predictions that

can be derived from a functional account remain to be tested, including that anger should

promote better outcomes related to focused attention on goal pursuits and concerns, reduced

moral restrictions, and greater physical responsiveness.

Functions of Emotion 19

Propositions that emotions are functional is often interpreted within a broader evolutionary

account, with the assumption made that emotions resulted from natural selection because they

provided a benef it in terms of survival or reproduction (Ekman, 1992; Lench, Bench, & Flores,

2013; Lench et al., 2011; Mauss et al., 2005; Pinker, 1997). However, evidence that emotions

are functional, in the sense that they result in better outcomes in particular situations, is only one

piece of evidence that is necessary to claim that emotions are adaptations from natural selection

(Lench et al., 2015). Emotions can also be functional and result in better outcomes because

people have learned that expressing or experiencing specif ic emotions is useful in particular

situations (Averill, 1983; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 2013). Arguments that emotions

are adaptations in an evolutionary sense must draw on multiple lines of evidence, and function-

ality is only one piece of supporting evidence (see Lench et al., 2015, for a review of

this evidence). From an evolutionary perspective, however, evidence of functionality is

considered particularly important for evaluating if a feature is an adaptation. Such evidence is

equivalent to a“performance check,”to evaluate the likelihood that a feature conveyed a

benef it that could have been selected for through evolutionary processes.

The purpose of this review was to illustrate how a functional account of emotions can be

implemented to organize predictions related to the causes and consequences of emotion, and

to examine the evidence that two negative emotions–sadness and anger–are functional.

Evidence suggests that sadness results in situations that involve goal loss beyond one’s ability

to resolve and that sadness is associated with cognitive, physiological, and behavioral changes.

Limited evidence further demonstrates that the changes associated with sadness can result in

better outcomes in situations involving goal loss, either by recruiting others to assist or by

promoting changes conducive to resolving goal loss such as disengagement. Available evidence

reveals that anger results in situations that involve potential goal loss than can be resolved by

overcoming obstacles to goals, and that anger is associated with cognitive, physiological, and

behavioral changes. Evidence further suggests that the changes associated with anger can result

in better outcomes in situations involving obstacles, either by intimidating or impressing others,

or by promoting changes conducive to overcoming obstacles such as physical force. Obviously

more work is needed that examines whether changes associated with these emotions actually

result in better outcomes in particular situations. In other words, research has def ined the scope

of the tools, but it is not yet clear if or when the emotional tools of sadness and anger are actually

effective in resolving problems.

Acknowledgement

The f irst author was supported during preparation of this article by the National Science Foun-

dation (award #1451297).

Short Biographies

Heather Lench is an associate professor at Texas A&M University. She conducts research on the

impact of emotions on thoughts and behavior. She received an APA New Investigator Award

for work on affective reactions and optimism. She teaches graduate seminars in Affective Sci-

ence and an undergraduate statistics course. She earned her BA from Florida State University

and PhD from the University of California, Irvine.

Tom Tibbett is a graduate student at Texas A&M University. His research interests include

decision-making, the function of emotion, and ostracism. He earned his BA at the College of

20 Functions of Emotion

pleted a graduate-level certif ication in Applied Statistics in conjunction with his degree.

Shane W. Bench is a post-doctoral research associate at Texas A&M University. His research

interests include the functions of emotions and social cognition, with specif ic areas of interest

including boredom as a functional emotion, predictions of the future, perceptions of the self

and others, and altruistic behavior. He has taught undergraduate courses in social psychology,

prosocial behavior, and introductory psychology. He earned his BS from Weber State

University and PhD from Texas A&M University.

Note

Correspondence: Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4235, USA. Email:

[email protected]

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