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Effective Emergency Management 131 Collaboration is a necessary foundation for dealing with both natural and technological hazards and disasters and the consequences of terrorism. Th is analysis describes the structure of the American emergency management system, the charts development of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and identiﬁ es conﬂ icts arising from the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the attempt to impose a command and control system on a very collaborative organizational culture in a very collaborative sociopolitical and legal context. Th e importance of collaboration is stressed, and recommen- dations are oﬀ ered on how to improve the amount and value of collaborative activities. New leadership strategies are recommended that derive their power from eﬀ ective strategies and the transformational power of a compel- ling vision, rather than from hierarchy, rank, or standard operating procedures. H urricane Katrina revealed a national emer- gency management system in disarray, one that was incapable of responding eﬀ ectively to the immediate needs of communities along the Gulf Coast and unprepared to coordinate the massive relief eﬀ ort required to support recovery. Criticism focused on the lack of leadership at all levels of gov- ernment and the inability of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Depart- ment of Homeland Security (DHS) to mount a disaster response and coordinate the relief. Unfortu- nately, critics have tended to view the emergency management eﬀ ort as synonymous with emergency response. Emergency management is a broader set of functions that go beyond search and rescue, emer- gency medical services, temporary shelter and feed- ing, and restoring lifelines. Emergency management also includes (1) hazard mitigation to prevent or lessen the impact of disaster, such as building levees or moving people out of ﬂ oodplains; (2) disaster preparedness, such as emergency planning and train- ing; (3) disaster response activities, such as conduct- ing search and rescue activities; and (4) disaster recovery, usually meaning the restoration of lifelines and basic services. A lack of understanding of emergency management is likely one reason why oﬃ cials have suggested that the nation’s response to catastrophic disasters needs a stronger command and control system that might be best handled by the military. Th is article explores whether command and control systems are appropri- ate in dealing with catastrophic disasters in which authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed, re- sources are scattered, and collaborative processes are essential. Collaborative processes or some combina- tion of command and control and collaboration might be more appropriate. It also begins to address how FEMA and the DHS should structure the nation’s capabilities to deal with catastrophes of all sorts, natural and unnatural.

Th e ﬁ eld and profession of emergency management have been evolving into a more collaborative enter- prise since the 1940s and 1950s. Th is transformation has gradually moved beyond the classic top-down bureaucratic model to become a more dynamic and ﬂ exible network model that facilitates multiorganiza- tional, intergovernmental, and intersectoral coopera- tion. Yet in the aftermath of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, there have been strong pressures to return to command and control approaches, which are incon- sistent with the shared responsibility and authority that characterizes the national emergency manage- ment system and interfere with the collaboration that is necessary to address natural and man-made hazards and manage disaster operations. Why is collaboration so important in emergency management, and why are command and control approaches so problematic? The Evolution of Emergency Management By the 1990s, professional emergency managers had largely overcome images of the authoritarian air raid wardens and civil defense directors to develop a lead- ership model emphasizing open communication and broad collaboration. Th e transition from the civil defense focus of the Cold War to the all-hazards focus of the 1990s involved a fundamental cultural change, as well as a mission adjustment. Relationships with William L . Waugh Jr.

Gregory Streib Georgia State University Collaboration and Leadership for Eﬀ ective Emergency Management William L. Waugh Jr. is a professor of public administration, urban studies, and political science in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University.

E-mail : [email protected] . Gregory Streib is a professor and chair of the Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University.

E-mail : [email protected] . Articles on Collaborative Public Management 132 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue the public changed. Relationships with other govern- mental and nongovernmental organizations changed.

Th e successful emergency manager came to be deﬁ ned as one who could interact eﬀ ectively with other gov- ernment oﬃ cials and with the broader disaster relief community ( Drabek 1987 ). Hundreds of organiza- tions have some role in dealing with hazards or disas- ters, and many are not linked closely with federal, state, or local emergency management agencies. Mak- ing and maintaining the necessary linkages is a monu- mental challenge, and it is a necessary task when dealing with catastrophic or potentially catastrophic disasters. In other words, the capacity to collaborate eﬀ ectively with the nation’s disaster networks is essen- tial. Frequent interaction, including participation in planning and training exercises, builds that capacity.

Emergency management is also being better inte- grated into mainstream government operations in more states and communities, though it is still a pe- ripheral function in some. Some communities either lack the resources to invest in hazard management and disaster response capabilities or simply do not see the need to do so. However, when there is identiﬁ able and signiﬁ cant risk to life and property, oﬃ cials may face political and legal liability for failing to take action.

Th e 9/11 Commission’s recognition of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 standard and the emergency management community’s ac- knowledgment of the Emergency Management Ac- creditation Program (EMAP) standards have made it diﬃ cult for public oﬃ cials to ignore the need to invest in programs to address hazards ( Bea 2004 ). Th ese standards have also made it easier to hold public of- ﬁ cials accountable when they do not address known risks and prepare for disasters reasonably. It is much more diﬃ cult to claim ignorance of risks when the standards identify potential hazards and provide assessment procedures.

Th e profession of emergency management has also changed since 9/11 and the catastrophic hurricanes of 2004 and 2005. Th e task environment has become even more complex with the increased involvement of law enforcement and national security agencies and the addition of terrorist threats. Although there are many similarities between disasters caused by so-called weapons of mass destruction and those caused by natural hazards, unnatural hazards present some spe- cial problems for emergency responders. Recent cata- strophic disasters have also changed the way natural disasters are viewed. For example, long-term disaster recovery has become a much more central concern, and pre-disaster recovery planning has become a focus in emergency planning. Th ere is more pressure to link disaster recovery to economic development and to deal with the long-term social and economic problems exacerbated by disasters. Th e broadened mission of emergency management requires a much diﬀ erent skill set than what was once expected of civil defense oﬃ cials and has been expected of homeland security oﬃ cials.

At the local level, collaboration has always been a necessary skill because of the reliance on voluntarism and community involvement. Volunteer ﬁ re brigades were organized to protect colonial communities more than two centuries ago, and most American commu- nities still rely on volunteer ﬁ re departments. Th e American Red Cross and the Salvation Army are still the principal sources of assistance to disaster victims.

Volunteers provide essential surge capacity and links to community resources.

Clearly, hierarchical bureaucracy can still be found in the mosaic that is contemporary emergency manage- ment. In response to the growing number of major natural disasters that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, the National Governors Association asked President Jimmy Carter to consolidate the hundred- plus federal programs that had some responsibility for dealing with disasters. When FEMA was created in 1979, the new agency was given responsibility for programs ranging from the Emergency Alert System to the U.S. Fire Academy to the National Flood Insur- ance Program. During this time, FEMA experienced serious integration problems as diverse organizational cultures were mingled and national security programs were given priority. Th e DHS has experienced similar problems since its creation in 2003. For FEMA, the failure to respond eﬀ ectively to Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki led Congress to consider disman- tling the agency in 1992. However, James Lee Witt reinvented the agency, and it proved remarkably ca- pable during the Northridge earthquake in 1994 and the 9/11 disasters. Problems became evident again, however, during the response to the 2004 Florida hurricanes, and they became a national scandal fol- lowing the poor response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005. Th e question now is how to repair the nation’s capability to deal with disaster. In some measure, the question has become “FEMA in or FEMA out” — should FEMA remain within DHS, or should it be an independent agency that reports di- rectly to the president, as it was before the DHS was created? Is it even possible to restore FEMA’s capabili- ties to deal with natural and technological disasters?

Th e collaborative approach that guided FEMA’s pro- grams in the 1990s may be lost. The Essential Roles of Networks Modern emergency management presents a paradox.

On one hand, emergency response requires meticu- lous organization and planning, but on the other hand, it is spontaneous. Emergency managers have to innovate, adapt, and improvise because plans, regard- less of how well done, seldom ﬁ t circumstances.

Blending these conﬂ icting needs is no easy task. Effective Emergency Management 133 Government hierarchies play a central role, of course, but emergency response also necessarily draws on a wide range of community economic, social-psychological, and political resources. Th e mobilization of organiza- tional and individual volunteers also serves a social- psychological purpose in that it brings communities together and gives them a sense of eﬃ cacy.

Sociologists have described a process of convergence in which those wishing to help converge on disaster areas ( Fritz and Mathewson 1956 ). In fact, the state of California’s manual for anticipating and organizing volunteers is titled Th ey Will Come (2001). Emergency response diﬀ ers from many other aspects of modern life that are dominated by rigid organizational structures. Th e involvement of nongovernmental actors builds the capacity of communities to deal with future disasters. Th e disaster experience can speed recovery and make communities more resilient when disaster strikes again. Commu- nity capacities to respond to and recover from disasters are not enhanced when oﬃ cials preempt or exclude commu- nity involvement ( Comfort 1999 ).

In California and (increasingly) in states with a high frequency of disaster, emergency management has become a cottage industry. Professional groups and consultants address almost every aspect of natural and technological hazards and disasters. Private companies are also involved, providing an extensive range of services from retroﬁ tting buildings so that they are less vulnerable to earthquakes to providing psychological counseling. Th e lines between governmental and nongovernmental activities are blurring as services are contracted out and governments encourage prepared- ness eﬀ orts. Itinerant emergency managers move from community to community, developing emergency operations and mitigation plans, coordinating disaster operations, and facilitating collaboration among com- munities and state agencies. To be sure, emergency management is not unlike other government oﬃ ces and agencies today in terms of the contracting out of central functions, but a key diﬀ erence is that service demand escalates tremendously when a major disaster strikes. Communities become vulnerable when their internal capacity is permitted to atrophy and outside resources are unavailable. Hurricane Katrina tested the limits of governmental and nongovernmental capacities.

Emergency management capacity is built from the ground up. Neighborhood and community pro- grams have to stand on their own because assistance may not arrive for hours or days. Major incidents are addressed by mutual assistance arrangements among community police, ﬁ re, and emergency medical service providers. Prevention is generally a local responsibility as well. Local governments have prin- cipal responsibility for adopting and enforcing building codes, building standards, and land-use regulations to mitigate water, wind, seismic, land- slide, and other hazards. Local emergency managers are increasingly collaborating with building code, urban planning, and other oﬃ cials who can help reduce risks. What we now call the new governance process forms the core of our national emergency response. Consensual processes are the rule. State and federal agencies play important roles by provid- ing public education, alert and warning systems, and evacuation plans, but the tools needed to manage hazards and reduce risks are most often in the hands of local oﬃ cials.

Disaster operations, particularly large operations, frequently in- volve a great many organizational and individual participants. For example, the response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 involved hundreds of public, nonproﬁ t, and private organiza- tions, as well as spontaneous volunteers. Th e bombing was a federal crime involving a federal facility that resulted in the deaths of federal oﬃ cers, and legal jurisdiction clearly resided with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies. However, the search and rescue operation was managed by the Oklahoma City Fire Department, and the outer secu- rity perimeter was managed by Oklahoma City and Oklahoma State law enforcement oﬃ cers. Th e rescue operation included federalized Urban Search and Rescue teams from local agencies across the nation.

Fireﬁ ghters from more than 75 Oklahoma communi- ties and more than 35 departments from Texas, Kansas, Arkansas, and other states participated. In all, FEMA deployed more than 1,000 of its own employ- ees and hundreds from other federal agencies. Th e American Red Cross provided food and shelter for emergency personnel and support for victims and their families. Private ﬁ rms ranging from building supply companies to funeral homes to restaurants supported the responders. Th e scale of the operation required resources from all levels of government and a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations.

Th e response to the World Trade Center attack in 2001 was much larger and much more complex than the response to the Oklahoma City bombing. Th e operation involved hundreds of organizations and many thousands of volunteers. Restaurants, catering ﬁ rms, and disaster relief organizations fed emergency response and law enforcement personnel for weeks.

Th e American Red Cross coordinated the recruitment Th e involvement of nongovern- mental actors builds the capac- ity of communities to deal with future disasters. Th e disaster ex- perience can speed recovery and make communities more resil- ient when disaster strikes again. 134 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue and deployment of tens of thousands of volunteers around Ground Zero. Private ﬁ rms provided material support ranging from equipment for search and rescue operations to clean socks and underwear for emer- gency responders, not to mention big-screen televi- sions, lounge chairs, and massage therapists for rest areas. Representatives from the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Pet Rescue, and other animal welfare organizations located and res- cued pets left in apartments by owners who had evac- uated. Relief organizations cleaned apartments and businesses covered with dust and debris from the collapsed towers ( Lowe and Fothergill 2003; Sutton 2003 ), and volunteer counselors provided psychologi- cal counseling for emergency responders, law enforce- ment personnel, and victims for months afterward ( Seeley 2005 ). Ad hoc relief organizations created in the neighborhoods surrounding the World Trade Center site continue to operate today. In fact, approxi- mately 350 new charities were created after the 9/11 attacks. Similarly, almost 400 new charities were cre- ated after the Hurricane Katrina disaster ( Strom 2006 ).

Th e large number of nongovernmental organizations involved in disaster operations has encouraged the creation of umbrella organizations such as National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster and Inter- Action, a consortium of U.S.-based international humanitarian and development organizations, as well as activities such as the Disaster News Network, which is funded by the American Baptist Churches USA, Episcopal Relief and Development, the Mennonite Disaster Service, Presbyterian Disaster Assistance, the United Methodist Committee on Relief, and other faith-based groups (see www.

disasternews.net/sponsors/ ). As early as 1992, Monte Sahlin of Adventist Community Services noted the development of networks of nongovernmental actors.

In a speech to the National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster, Sahlin judged the Hurricane Andrew disaster to be a watershed marking a shift toward network organizations. He described the shift in these terms: Increasingly our constituencies all gray together into a mass of individuals who want to respond to disasters. And we don’t know anymore whether they are part of the Adventist constitu- ency or the Mennonite constituency or the Red Cross constituency or the Methodist constitu- ency and they don’t care. Th ey are just indi- viduals who want to do something and make a diﬀ erence because people are suﬀ ering. Th ey tend to operate on the basis of the personal and want to participate on a personal level. Th ey do not trust large organizations and they don’t want to be put into some bureaucratic system.

( Sahlin 1992 ) Sahlin’s comments underscore the complexities of developing an eﬀ ective emergency response when organizational cultures vary so greatly. As he notes, imposing a hierarchy can have a stiﬂ ing eﬀ ect. In fact, conﬂ icts between the organizational cultures of groups such as those described by Sahlin and those of hierar- chical governmental organizations, particularly law enforcement and the military, are legend in disaster relief organizations. Cultural interoperability prob- lems are major impediments to the eﬀ ective coordina- tion of disaster relief operations (Waugh 2003, 2004).

Eﬀ ective collaboration requires both cultural sensitiv- ity and a common language. Nonetheless, conﬂ icts are inevitable, and some organizations simply may be unable or unwilling to work with others.

Collaborative networks are a fundamental component of any emergency response. It is a mistake to assume that a response can be completely scripted or that the types of resources that are available can be fully cata- logued. It is also a mistake to assume that any indi- vidual or organization can manage all the relief and recovery eﬀ orts during a catastrophic disaster. The Collaborative Role of Emergency Managers At the professional level, the critical tasks leading up to, during, and following a disaster involve coordinat- ing multiorganizational, intergovernmental, and inter- sectoral response and recovery operations. In the early 1970s, because of coordination problems during large California wildﬁ res, the incident command system was created to integrate and coordinate ﬁ re operations involving multiple departments. Unity of command tempered by management by objectives was the solu- tion for mounting large-scale, disciplined ﬁ re re- sponses, and incident command became the mantra of ﬁ re services. When events get larger and involve more participants, a uniﬁ ed command is created.

Uniﬁ ed command usually means more sharing of information and coordination of eﬀ ort, but participa- tion in decision making is limited in large emergency response operations. Th ere are practical limits to participation, particularly when quick decisions are needed, but there are also limits imposed by culture and convention. Noncollegial professions typically do not ﬁ nd open communication and participation comfortable. Public health professionals, for example, generally expect open discussion of issues before decisions (Waugh 2002b).

By the 1980s, it was recognized that the eﬀ ectiveness of emergency management programs rested primarily on the interpersonal skills of emergency managers rather than on their technical skills ( Drabek 1987 ).

Th e emergency manager became a coordinator and facilitator of emergency operations by ﬁ rst and second responders largely by maintaining a central emergency operations center, ensuring communications between Effective Emergency Management 135 and among responders, and providing essential links to policy makers. Th e coordinative role became crucial in large intergovernmental, intersectoral, and multior- ganizational operations ( Waugh 1993 ). In large juris- dictions, the emergency management director, working as an agent of the chief executive or chief administrative oﬃ cer, might also provide strategic direction when necessary. Distinctions were made between the coordinative role of the emergency man- ager and the operational roles of ﬁ rst responders. In small jurisdictions, however, the roles were often intertwined with ﬁ re chiefs, police chiefs, or their subordinates acting as emergency managers as well as responders. Whether the incident command system has utility at the emergency operations center level (as opposed to the ﬁ eld operations level) is an issue that needs to be examined.

By the mid-1990s, the paradigm shift noted by Sahlin was also being reﬂ ected in the new FEMA of James Lee Witt. Th e focus shifted from disaster response to mitigation. Th e agency’s mantra became “one dollar spent on mitigation saves two (or several) dollars in recovery.” Th e federal role changed from being the proverbial cavalry, rushing in to save people, to being a supporter of individual and community eﬀ orts to reduce risks and prepare for and respond to disasters.

Th e cavalry approach is impractical in a large nation or state because it simply takes too long for the cavalry to mobilize and ride to the rescue. Proactive activities, such as pre-positioning material near expected disaster areas, were adopted to support state and local eﬀ orts and to prevent the kinds of delays that occurred dur- ing responses to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Th e lessons of Hugo and Andrew also gave impetus for a speedier federal response to aid the most vulnerable populations — notably the poor, elderly, and ill, who do not have the resources to fend for themselves for even a few days. Th e creation of the National Pharmaceutical Stock- pile (now the National Stock- pile), with medical supplies dispersed across the nation, was a part of this response. Th ese changes also required partnerships with state and local agencies to facilitate communication and coordination and to expand the capacities of ﬁ rst and second re- sponders, particularly at the local level. Increased partnerships with nongovernmental organizations and private ﬁ rms (such as Home Depot) were part of the new FEMA in the Clinton administration.

A 2002 study of FEMA’s involvement in promoting safe construction methods to reduce vulnerabilities to ﬂ ood, ﬁ re, wind, and other hazards found the agency taking a multifaceted approach. It was using its regu-latory power and economic incentives through the National Flood Insurance Program to reduce ﬂ ood losses and employing the Project Impact (Disaster- Resistant Communities) program to address a variety of hazards. It was also funding workshops through the Blue Sky Foundation to help create a market for safe construction methods and to encourage the building industry to adopt such methods. Funding was given to the Institute for Business and Home Safety’s “forti- ﬁ ed home” program, university agricultural extension “model home” programs, and other local, state, and federal programs to educate the public and builders about construction methods that can reduce vulner- abilities to wind, ﬁ re, and water hazards. Th e eﬀ orts included direct regulation, ﬁ nancial and regulatory incentive programs, direct funding, collaboration with other agencies, and informal, often personal encour- agement for the champions of safe construction meth- ods. In some cases, the same agency personnel were working formally and informally with very diﬀ erent kinds of networks to promote the adoption of safe construction methods (Waugh 2002a). Developing an Effective Leadership Strategy Leadership problems were cited speciﬁ cally by the House Select Committee that investigated the poor response to Hurricane Katrina. Th e committee found “failures at all levels of government that signiﬁ cantly undermined and detracted from the heroic eﬀ orts of ﬁ rst responders, private individuals and organizations, faith-based groups, and others” (U.S. House 2006, 1).

Th e committee went on to say in its ﬁ nal report, We r e ﬂ ect on the 9/11 Commission’s ﬁ nding that “the most important failure was one of imagination.” Th e Select Committee believes that Katrina was primarily a fail- ure of initiative. But there is, of course, a nexus between the two. Both imagination and initiative — in other words, leadership — require good information. And a coordinated process for shar- ing it. And a willingness to use information — however imperfect or incomplete — to fuel action. (1) Likewise, in his testimony before the Senate Commit- tee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aﬀ airs in June 2006, Donald Kettl concluded that leadership was the critical and missing element in the poor Katrina response. He argued that the committee should focus on improving FEMA and the DHS leadership rather than on organizational reform.

How, then, should leaders lead in times of disaster?

Th e ﬁ ndings of the 9/11 Commission and the House Th e lessons of Hugo and Andrew also gave impetus for a speedier federal response to aid the most vulnerable popula- tions — notably the poor, elderly, and ill, who do not have the re- sources to fend for themselves for even a few days. 136 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue Select Committee that oﬃ cials lacked imagination and initiative, respectively, certainly focus on the inability of leaders to be proactive. Th e House Select Committee report also points out that oﬃ cials failed to adapt existing plans to circumstances as the storm approached New Orleans and especially when the levees failed (2006, 4). Ultimately, oﬃ cials had to respond on an ad hoc basis because plans were not implemented, were not implemented in time, or were found to be ineﬀ ective.

Leadership needs vary, and comprehensive emergency management presents a diﬀ erent set of challenges than emergency response. Th e task environment is very diﬀ erent after the storm has passed or the ground stops shaking or the terrorists have ﬂ ed. Nonetheless, hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery are not just closely linked — they are intertwined. A ﬂ exible leadership approach is necessary. In fact, Charles Wise (2006) suggests that although command and control struc- tures are important, the DHS also needs to have more ﬂ exible and more nimble processes to ensure that it can adjust to changing circumstances. Network man- agement is the missing capability in the DHS organi- zation, in other words. Wise concludes that more adaptive management — that is, processes that encour- age the sharing of information and more collabora- tion — would foster organizational learning and facilitate adaptation and improvisation.

Th ere is evidence that inappropriate leadership strategies were a factor in the poor response to Hurricane Katrina.

Th e House Select Committee report faulted the com- mand and control system because it interfered with the disaster response. Th e implication was that a better command and control system rather than a decentral- ized system would have worked better. However, a large part of the problem with the command and control system was the lack of situational awareness — that is, poor communication among oﬃ cials in the disaster area and decision makers in Baton Rouge, Jackson, and Washington. Th e leadership strategy required for crises may well be counterintuitive. Information often ﬂ ows from the bottom in a traditional hierarchy, to the extent that it ﬂ ows at all. Such a situation may be better han- dled by a style that is aﬃ liative, open, and democratic.

An authoritarian response would certainly be faster and more consistent, but it would require insight and vision that may not be available to those with actual authority and media access. As noted previously, ﬂ exibility needs to be a key requirement for leaders in catastrophic disas- ters and hierarchical decision processes are neither ﬂ ex- ible nor speedy in rapidly changing circumstances ( Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 31 ). Collaboration and Katrina Following the 9/11 attacks, the nation focused on the threat of terrorism rather than on more familiar and probable natural and technological disasters (Waugh 2006). Th e all-hazards Federal Response Plan that served to coordinate the federal response to the 9/11 attacks was replaced by a more terrorism-centric National Response Plan. Th e federal government is assumed to be the lead government for major dis - asters of all sorts, even though the primary legal and political responsibility for dealing with most disasters normally resides with state and local oﬃ cials. Sorting out responsibilities was one of the major problems in the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (U.S.

House 2006).

Homeland security – style emergency management has become more response oriented, less collaborative, and more centralized. Centralized decision processes caused delays in approving and dispatching disaster assistance and greatly complicated communication between and federal oﬃ cials on the ground in New Orleans, Mississippi, and Alabama and their bosses in Washington. Th e infamous e-mail exchange between FEMA director Michael Brown and Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA oﬃ cial who rode out the storm in New Orleans and reported conditions in the Superdome, is indicative of the disconnect between federal decision makers and emergency management personnel in the disaster area ( Lipton 2005 ). After action reports and studies have noted serious communication problems between and among local, state, and federal oﬃ cials, not to mention serious problems communicating with and among emergency responders (U.S. House 2006; Waugh 2006).

A major criticism of homeland security oﬃ cials has been their failure to collaborate extensively with non- governmental disaster organizations, as FEMA did in the 1990s. Although FEMA experienced some prob- lems coordinating with charities following the 9/11 attacks, the problems were largely resolved within a few weeks (GAO 2002). Th e House Select Committee report on the Katrina response cites serious coordina- tion problems among FEMA, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the state of Louisiana (2006, 3). Th e report also cites problems coordinating search and rescue operations among the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Guard, the regular military, and others (4).

Th e lack of coordination of military and state and local emergency management eﬀ orts was attributed to the fact that the Northern Command was not connected to state emergency management structures prior to the disaster. As a result, there was a lack of understanding and trust (4). Th ese problems were not new when Katrina made landfall. Intergovernmental and interor- ganizational coordination problems have been noted in several TOPOFF (Top Oﬃ cials) exercises (DHS 2005; Inglesby, Grossman, and O’Toole 2001).

Part of the common wisdom of emergency management is that communication and collaboration are facilitated Effective Emergency Management 137 by personal familiarity, not just institutional contact.

Th e development of strong working relationships with state and local counterparts was a central component of FEMA’s regional programs during the 1990s, and those relationships have since deteriorated. Building regional oﬃ ces and roles has been suggested to DHS (Heyman and Carafano 2004; Meese, Carafano, and Weitz 2005), but recent reorganizations have centralized rather than decentralized decision processes.

Terrorist-spawned catastrophes require considerable collaboration in order to utilize the nation’s capacity to deal with disaster ( Waugh and Sylves 2002 ). Eﬀ ec- tive utilization of nongovernmental resources is a problem following terrorist attacks because the agencies that are supposed to take the lead role are often unfamiliar with the networks that respond to large natural disasters and unused to communicating openly and collaborating closely with nongovernmen- tal actors (Waugh 2003). Th is is one of the concerns with proposals for a larger military role in the nation’s emergency management system. Greater capacity for command and control is not synonymous with greater capacity for collaboration. Th e poor response to Katrina demonstrated a lack of collaboration and, as the House Select Committee has pointed out, the Defense Department does not have continuous working rela- tionships with state and local emergency management oﬃ ces. Nor does it have a role in hazard mitigation (except for the work of the Corps of Engineers), disaster preparedness, and disaster recovery.

Collaboration is an expectation in emergency manage- ment. Th e NFPA 1600, the international standard for emergency management programs, and the EMAP standard, which was adapted from the NFPA 1600 for public emergency management programs, deﬁ ne programs as “a jurisdiction-wide system that provides for management and coordination of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activi- ties for all hazards. Th e system encompasses all organi- zations, agencies, departments, entities, and individuals responsible for emergency management and homeland security” (EMAP Standard 3.3.3).

Th e standard goes on to require an advisory commit- tee to ensure input by program stakeholders (Standard 4.3.1) and to “ensure that the program is developed and maintained in collaboration with program stake- holders, both from policy and operational levels” (Standard 4.3.2). Organizations are not accredited, but programs are.

An analysis of the baseline assessments, conducted as part of FEMA’s National Emergency Management Baseline Capabil- ity Assurance Program to help programs improve their capa-bilities, found that about one-half of the states evalu- ated had committees of stakeholders or similar mechanisms to ensure meaningful involvement in program policy and operational decision making ( Lucas 2005 ). Accreditation is contingent on develop- ing mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration, even when it requires a change in state law or local ordinance to permit participation by nongovernmen- tal organizations.

Th e focus on collaboration and cooperation is also evident in FEMA’s training programs. FEMA encour- ages communities to send their elected and appointed oﬃ cials, along with their emergency managers, to the National Emergency Training Center for four-and-a- half-day Integrated Emergency Management courses that use simulations and classroom instruction to develop collaborative skills, as well as an understand- ing of technical issues such as recovery and mitigation following hurricanes (FEMA 2004). Some jurisdic- tions send dozens of oﬃ cials, including elected leaders, to ensure that they develop the skills to handle com- plex emergencies. Th e point is that the interpersonal contact — the working relationships — are critical.

Intellectually, the emergency management profession has moved beyond a focus on emergency response to a focus on all hazards and comprehensive emergency management. Indeed, to receive the highest credential in the ﬁ eld, the Certiﬁ ed Emergency Manager desig- nation, emergency managers have to have education, training, and experience in all four functions (mitiga- tion, preparedness, response, and recovery). It is not enough to be an experienced ﬁ reﬁ ghter or an emer- gency medical technician or a military logistician. A working knowledge of the four functions and an un- derstanding of the social, political, and legal contexts of emergency management are required. Th ese devel- opments certainly illustrate the value placed on leaders able to understand the big picture, but these actors are seldom the ones designing the major organizational infrastructure that governs national action. Th ey must also manage the “rowers,” who may not have a clear conception of the diﬀ erent roles in the system. Conclusions Disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and re- covery are the end products of complex political and administrative interactions, and the results cannot be easily controlled or anticipated.

Analyzing the best way to ap- proach these tasks is valuable, as improved performance in emer- gency management depends to a great extent on the ability of pub- lic oﬃ cials to fully comprehend the complexities of the policy networks operating in the areas in which they work and to think Disaster mitigation, prepared- ness, response, and recovery are the end products of complex political and administrative in- teractions, and the results can- not be easily controlled or anticipated. 138 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue strategically about how to use or alter them. Th ey also need subject-matter knowledge of diverse topics — such as land-use regulation, zoning, and building codes — in order to properly understand and explain community vulnerabilities.

Understanding the implications of disaster response decisions on a community’s ability to recover quickly is also essential. It is not just a case of “putting the white on the red,” as ﬁ reﬁ ghters describe putting out ﬁ res. Th e need for a broad perspective and eﬀ ective leadership skills is not radically diﬀ erent from other public administration activities, but the hazards faced are often far more dire and consequential. Sorting out these complex issues is more than any single person can do, and this is certainly one reason emergency managers were quick to understand and embrace collaborative activities. Collaboration is the way pro- fessional emergency managers get the job done. Th at said, disasters and fear of disasters also generate a strong desire for hierarchy — somebody to take charge, or possibly someone to be held accountable. Such thinking is inconsistent with the tenets of the ﬁ eld and displays blindness to what collaborative action has accomplished. Th ere are pressures in emergency man- agement that help drive collaboration, but there is also pressure for the kind of security promised by a com- manding leader.

Emergency management theory and practice has certainly been inﬂ uenced by the revolution that is changing all aspects of public administration here and abroad. Th e National Performance Review called for delegating authority, replacing rules and regulations with incentives, developing budgets based on results, exposing government operations to competition, searching for market rather than administrative solu- tions, and, whenever possible, measuring the success of government in terms of customer satisfaction ( Gore 1993, 7 ). FEMA has been transformed by the National Performance Review, the Government Performance and Results Act, and the New Public Management. In the 1980s, FEMA oﬃ cials measured outputs — for example, the number of training pro- grams and the amount (in dollars) of assistance deliv- ered. In the 1990s, saving lives and reducing property losses, as well as customer satisfaction, were the results that FEMA pursued. Th e achievement of those results necessitated partnerships and broader collaboration because FEMA had neither the authority nor the resources to achieve the desired results on its own (see Waugh 1999). Little has changed since the 1990s.

FEMA, as well as the DHS, lack the authority and the resources to protect life and property without collaboration.

Better understanding of the nature of collaboration can also produce beneﬁ ts. It is easy to confuse respon- siveness with collaboration, for example. Th is kind of confusion could also help to fuel the desire for greater hierarchical control. Disasters will inevitably produce calls for responsiveness, but an eﬀ ective response is unlikely to happen without collaboration. Vigoda (2002) helped to clarify this issue when he argued that New Public Management notions of responsiveness have also been accompanied by “a lower willingness to share, participate, elaborate, and partner with citi- zens.” Responders can be blinded by their own good intentions.

Likewise, public oﬃ cials need to know that network management and intergovernmental management may not be related activities ( Agranoﬀ and McGuire 2003 ). Despite arguments about the disarticulated state, the basic legal and normative structure remains intact. Th is makes collaboration much more challeng- ing in emergency management than in other public arenas. Th e federal government is always the elephant in the room, possibly facilitating or inhibiting the actions of others. And, we saw during the Katrina response, it can be frustrating for federal oﬃ cials when they lack the authority to deal with the catastro- phe they see developing. Th ough they could have supplanted state authority and taken over the re- sponse, the political repercussions would have been severe. Th e temptation is to change the rules rather than to collaborate closely. By the same token, it can be frustrating for state oﬃ cials when federal oﬃ cials want to assume control over state resources, such as the National Guard.

Th e response to natural disasters is, in large measure, an ad hoc aﬀ air involving organized nongovernmental actors, governmental actors, and emergent groups that often become well organized and long lived. No one can ever have complete control; it is not possible to fully command attention or to compel compliance.

Nongovernmental organizations will respond with or without government approval. Volunteers will arrive with or without an invitation. First responders will self-deploy. Th is type of convergence behavior is inevi- table. Better integration of nongovernmental organi- zations into federal, state, and local disaster relief operations is the best approach, as recommended by the White House’s review of the Katrina response ( Townsend 2006 ), but this will not be easy to achieve.

An enhanced military role in disaster response is likely to occur, but unless the Defense Department develops long-term and close working relationships with state and local emergency management oﬃ ces, a broader role is not realistic. Some (perhaps many) nongovern- mental organizations would choose not to work with military units as well.

Although integration might facilitate the co-optation of nongovernmental organizations ( O’Toole and Meier 2004 ), it is likely that some diﬀ erences cannot be smoothed over. Goal conﬂ icts are common, as is Effective Emergency Management 139 distrust. Th e controversy over rebuilding neighbor- hoods in New Orleans’s Ninth Ward is a good illustra- tion. Nongovernmental organizations and volunteers are helping to rebuild homes as city and state oﬃ cials consider redevelopment plans, including plans not to rebuild in some areas, and as federal oﬃ cials deter- mine what restrictions should be in place to prevent future ﬂ ooding. Governors, mayors, sheriﬀ s, and other public oﬃ cials, including presidents and mem- bers of Congress, have heavy political stakes in the management of hazards and disasters. Th eir goals frequently conﬂ ict, and ﬁ nding common ground is challenging.

As Donald Kettl (2006) noted in his congressional testimony, leadership has been a serious problem for FEMA and the DHS. Th e skills and experience that should be required for new appointees has been a subject of debate following recent resignations. Th e type of leadership credibility discussed by Gabris (2004) is certainly needed. Th e choice should derive from vision and strategic thinking rather than from a predisposition to hierarchy or management control.

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