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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fnep20 Download by: [Brunel University London] Date: 21 April 2017, At: 03:06 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics ISSN: 1353-7113 (Print) 1557-2986 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnep20 Autonomy as a mechanism for conflict regulation?

The case of Crimea Susan Stewart To cite this article: Susan Stewart (2001) Autonomy as a mechanism for conflict regulation? The case of Crimea, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 7:4, 113-141, DOI: 10.1080/13537110108428647 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537110108428647 Published online: 24 Dec 2007.Submit your article to this journal Article views: 291View related articles Citing articles: 2 View citing articles Autonomy as a Mechanism for Conflict Regulation? The Case of Crimea SUSAN STEWART The literature on power-sharing and autonomy has often neglected the fact that when territorial autonomy is granted to an ethnic or linguistic group, problems can arise concerning the position of minorities (titular or otherwise) within the territory in question. This article attempts to illustrate the importance of taking this factor into account by analyzing the case of Crimea, where the success of a territorial autonomy arrangement based on the ethnic and linguistic predominance of Russians and Russsophones is being undermined in part by the inadequate consideration given to the minority Crimean Tatars in the region.

It has frequently been asserted that demands of compactly settled ethnic minorities for increased control over their own affairs can be met by granting a measure of territorial autonomy to the regions concerned.

However, this claim becomes less plausible when the territory of a local ethnic majority is also inhabited by other ethnic groups which constitute minorities in the autonomous region as well as in the country as a whole, especially when such groups possess a high degree of political mobilization.

This is the case in Crimea, an 'autonomous republic' within Ukraine where Russians comprise 62% of the population, with 26% largely russified Ukrainians and 10-12% Crimean Tatars. Building on a historical tradition of autonomy, Crimea received the status of autonomous republic in February 1991 within Soviet Ukraine. After Ukrainian independence in August of that same year Crimea retained its autonomy, although its status was the source of controversy for several years following. With the legal definition of this status cemented in the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution and the 1998 Crimean Constitution, it would appear that a compromise has been reached between the Ukrainian and Crimean capitals with which both can be relatively satisfied.

The establishment of Crimean autonomy within a unitary Ukrainian state was seen as a means of retaining the primarily ethnic Russian peninsula within Ukraine. The new (or restored) status presented a way of dealing with the historical, linguistic, social and ethnic distinctiveness of the Susan Stewart, Research Associate, Mannheim Center for European Social Research, Mannheim, Germany Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol.7, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.113-141 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON 114 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS peninsula without explicitly attributing a national or ethnic character to the autonomy. In adopting this mechanism, however, both the Ukrainian and the Crimean elites neglected the demands of the Crimean Tatars, a significant number of whom began to return in the late 1980s from over 40 years of exile in Central Asia. Their opinions on the status and character of the peninsula, forms of political representation and cultural development differed, at times radically, from those of established local elites. By choosing the mechanism of autonomy to mitigate the struggle between Kyiv and Simferopol, then, the Ukrainian and Russian-speaking power circles ran the risk of alienating the Crimean Tatars and thereby of sabotaging the chances of autonomy functioning as an effective conflict regulator.

This article will investigate two questions which arise out of the Crimean scenario: (1) To what extent do the political and cultural demands of Crimean Tatars and Russians/Russian-speakers stand in contradiction to one another? and (2) Can these competing demands be usefully addressed via the mechanism of territorial autonomy?

Conflict Theory Approaches to Autonomy In the theoretical literature on territorial autonomy there are two diametrically opposed positions: some analysts see autonomy as a means of conflict regulation, while others view it as the first step on the path toward secession and thus as a conflict stimulator. This dichotomy is qualified in the literature by indicating factors which can influence the results of granting autonomy to a particular territorial unit. These qualifications are mainly to be found in those works which see autonomy as a mechanism for conflict regulation, since those who hold the opposing view tend not to get involved in discussions of the potential advantages and disadvantages of autonomy, but rather to focus on other, in their view more promising, regulatory practices. Partially for this reason the discussion of the factors which affect the outcome of autonomy has not advanced very far, and mainly those examples have been presented which have seemed more or less successful.

In his concept of consociational democracy (later: power-sharing) Arend Lijphart suggests four mechanisms for mitigating the effects of pure majority rule. One of these is 'segmental autonomy, which entails minority rule:

rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority's exclusive concern'.1 John Burton also sees autonomy as a (possibly temporary) method of conflict regulation: 'Separation through local autonomy promotes a sense of security from which there can be cooperative transactions between communities, leading finally to a higher degree of functional cooperation, if not integration.2 Here the contrast to a possible AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 115 secession outcome is particularly extreme, with integration being the supposed aim of autonomy regulations.

Donald Horowitz has gone further in his attempt to define some conditions under which autonomy is likely to function as a conflict- regulating mechanism and those which foster the escalation of separatist sentiment and/or actions, culminating possibly in secession. He concludes that 'the most potent way to assure that federalism or regional autonomy will not become just a step to secession is to reinforce those specific interests that groups have in the undivided state'.3 He also suggests that ways to help prevent separatist sentiment from increasing along with growing autonomy include retention of ultimate power over the region by the central government, and making autonomy available to all regions, not just separatist ones.4 He further admits the lack of answers in the theoretical literature to questions such as: 'Under what circumstances is the creation of a separate state or region likely to forestall or encourage secession? What is the optimal form and scope such arrangements should take?'5 More recent work has attempted to answer some of these questions.

Some authors have pointed to possible negative consequences of introducing autonomy, although these criticisms have remained relatively general. Lake and Rothchild, for example, point out that, 'While regional autonomy and federalism have been used as safeguards, they have had, in some instances, unintended consequences that have actually increased conflict... Unless carefully crafted, decentralization schemes may worsen rather than improve inter-ethnic relations.'6 In a list of 16 conditions which can help ensure the success of an autonomy arrangement, Ruth Lapidoth points to the need to guarantee minority rights to minorities living within an ethnic group that has been granted autonomy.7 The following case study is in part an attempt to support this assertion and to offer a concrete scenario which illustrates its importance.

As can be seen from the above brief account, considerations of autonomy arrangements have to date taken into account primarily two actors: the centre and the minority group in the region concerned. The problem is that under certain circumstances it can be difficult, if not impossible, to define 'the area of the minority's exclusive concern', as Lijphart put it. This is certainly the case in Crimea, where the 'minority' in question is the Russian one, Russians currently making up approximately 62% of the peninsula's population compared with 22% of Ukraine's total population. As Crimea is the only region of Ukraine in which ethnic Russians constitute a majority, it would seem to be a perfect candidate for autonomy on an ethnic/linguistic basis. This is the more true since a large proportion of the 26% ethnic Ukrainians on the peninsula are significantly russified and thus identify themselves to a large extent with the majority Russian population.

116 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS However, most of the remaining 12% of the population consists of Crimean Tatars who have returned following their exile under Stalin in 1944.

The Tatars are politically well organized, being able to draw on traditions of protest developed under Soviet rule, and claim that they, in contrast to the ethnic Russians, are indigenous to the peninsula. Although it would seem that it is possible to point to a time when Crimean Tatars did not exist on the peninsula (prior to the arrival of the Mongol-Tatars in the thirteenth century), the difference between their traditions and those of the (in large part recently arrived) Russian population is significant. In short, the Crimean Tatars call into question the right of ethnic Russians and russified Ukrainians to determine developments on the peninsula, at times going so far as to claim this right exclusively for themselves. Thus conflicts of differing orders have evolved since Ukrainian independence, the conflict between the Crimean Tatars and the Russians/russified Ukrainians for influence on political and economic developments on the peninsula being a second-order struggle within the larger context of the conflict between the Crimean authorities and their counterparts in Kyiv. While the examination of one case cannot immediately lead to an expansion of conflict theory regarding autonomy, it can point to a missing link in theoretical approaches and stimulate further studies on the same question.

Since Ukrainian independence in 1991 a number of analyses of the Crimean situation have appeared,8 but no significant attempt has been made to place empirical developments on the peninsula in a theoretical framework involving the conflict literature or for that matter any other body of theory.9 Existing analyses have focused on the reasons for a low level of ethnic, political, or ideological conflict in Crimea and have suggested various explanations, primarily related to elite behaviour. The role of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean situation has been repeatedly addressed, and the problems that their return raises highlighted, but without placing the issue in a theoretical context.10 The History of Autonomy in Crimea The Crimea was annexed by Russia in 1783 under Catherine the Great." Prior to that time it was known for several centuries as the Crimean Khanate and was more or less controlled by the Crimean Tatars, a people who emerged from the intermixing of that group of Mongol-Tatar invaders who reached Crimea in the thirteenth century with various ethnic groups residing on the peninsula at the time. From about 1475 the Crimean Khanate came partially under the control of the Ottoman Empire, but retained a large degree of independence, primarily being required to provide warriors for the Ottomans' various battles. The growing influence of the Russian Empire in AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 117 the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which resulted in the annexation of the peninsula signalled the end of Crimean Tatar sovereignty. Large numbers of Crimean Tatars emigrated over the course of the next century, primarily to Turkey, and those who remained were to a large extent coopted into Russian politics and society.

At the end of the nineteenth century something of a Crimean Tatar revival occurred, but the Tatars were not numerous or strong enough to achieve their demands in the turmoil surrounding the Russian Revolution and ensuing Civil War. Although the Brest-Litovsk treaty of 1918 had awarded Crimea to Ukraine, the Bolsheviks established a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in October 1921 under the jurisdiction of the Russian SFSR. While the autonomous status of Crimea under the Soviet regime did not formally have any ethnic characteristics, the policy of 'nativization' carried out in many areas of the USSR in the 1920s resulted in the assignment of an over-proportional number of government posts to Crimean Tatars and the intensive development of their language and culture. As in other republics, the purges of the late 1920s and 1930s virtually eliminated the Crimean Tatar elite, and Crimean autonomy eventually lost all remnants of its ethnic character and became strictly territorial, which it had been in a legal sense all along.12 In spite of the territorial nature of Crimean autonomy, even its abolition in 1945 implied an ethnic component. The peninsula was downgraded to an oblast' of the RSFSR a year after the Crimean Tatars were deported, primarily to Central Asia, for their supposed treason to the Soviet cause during the Second World War. Any traces of Tatar history (such as monuments, place names) were carefully eliminated and the peninsula gained an increasingly Russian aspect. This development was complemented by the continued immigration of ethnic Russians to Crimea; while many had been on the peninsula for generations, a significant number are recent arrivals, having been attracted by opportunities in the military or tourism or having opted for retirement on the Black Sea. Thus according to the 1989 census the Crimean population consisted of 67% Russians, 26% Ukrainians and 7% others. However, since that date approximately 270,000 Crimean Tatars have returned to the peninsula from exile, having received permission to do so from the Soviet government in 1987 and an official invitation from the Ukrainian government following independence. It is believed that Crimean Tatars now make up 10-12% of the peninsula's inhabitants.13 However, their much larger historical presence and previous control of the peninsula have given them a sense of entitlement to greater influence over Crimean affairs than might be implied by their current population share.

118 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS Crimea 1991-95: Growing Separatism In February 1991, prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Crimea received the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This occurred in response to a referendum in January 1991 in which the overwhelming majority of Crimean inhabitants voted yes to the question: 'Are you in favour of the restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and as a participant of the union treaty?'14 The granting of this status by Kyiv was a sign of the liberalization of the Soviet political scene and one in a series of decrees improving the status of or creating a new status for particular territories throughout the USSR. However, the introduction of such a status was controversial on several levels. First of all, the Crimean Tatars perceived the granting of a territorial instead of an explicitly national (that is, ethnic) autonomy as a denial of their rights as a people indigenous to Crimea and a strengthening of the position of the ethnic Russian majority.

The fact that many of the other improvements in the status of Soviet territories were made on an ethnic basis and that Crimea's former autonomy had been perceived as recognizing Crimean Tatar status strengthened this belief.

Second, Crimea had never possessed an autonomous status as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Ukraine had no experience with autonomous regions, unlike many of the Soviet republics which had an explicitly or at least implicitly federal character.

The return to autonomy in 1991 has several symbolic aspects. First, it represented a return to the status the peninsula possessed in the early Soviet period. The loss of this status in 1945 was connected in the logic of the Soviet leaders to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, and the status itself was viewed retrospectively by the latter as an acknowledgement of their special role on the peninsula.15 Its restoration in 1991 was, however, lamented by the Tatars as failing to recognize their significance and to grant them corresponding rights.16 For other political forces in Crimea it could be seen as a reassuring return to familiar Soviet mechanisms in the turbulent period of perestroika, and of course as a boost in terms of the power wielded by Crimean elites. Second, the restored autonomous status distinguished Crimea from all other Ukrainian oblasts by giving it a special status which created a basis for treating Crimea as a separate subject in questions such as support for the new union treaty proposed by Gorbachev. In January 1991, 93% of Crimean residents voted in favour of an autonomous Crimea in union with other states, that is, for a looser Soviet Union which would give the peninsula the status of a union republic.17 Third, the granting of autonomy could be seen as an admission of the particular ethnic and linguistic character of Crimea and thus a sop to the Russians and Russian- AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 119 speakers there.18 Thus there was a potential conflict between the Russians/Russian-speakers and the Crimean Tatars inherent in the restoration of autonomy from the very beginning.

The next milestone in the story of Crimean autonomy came in April-May 1992, when arguments over the final version of a law on the status of Crimea caused an escalation of the political conflict which culminated in the decision of the Crimean parliament to adopt a declaration of Crimean independence and to schedule a referendum on this resolution for August 1992. These radical steps were countered by similar measures from the Ukrainian parliament, which declared the Crimean documents unconstitutional and demanded that the Crimean legislature revoke its decisions by 20 May. Kyiv's demands were indeed carried out, leading to a stalemate in the relationship between the capital and the peninsula in the following months. What made the Crimean political forces capitulate to Kyiv at this crucial juncture after their demonstrative protest? One author points to the 'liberalization of economic ties with Kiev and promises of financial support'.19 It is true that Crimea is dependent on Ukraine for a series of crucial supplies, including fuel and water. In an interview in 1993 Tatiana Shandra, the head of the Crimean Governmental Department of Economics and Market Relations, noted that Crimea was self-sufficient in only a few fields of production: televisions, sewing accessories, enamel dishes, household chemical products and hosiery.20 The economic situation is a key issue in relations between the Crimean and Ukrainian governments and deserves to be seen as one of a series of conflict-regulating factors in the Crimean case.21 Nonetheless it is inadequate to concentrate only on economic questions, as is increasingly done in analyses of contemporary Ukraine, since (1) Russia could serve as a potential replacement for Ukraine in terms of economic support for Crimea and (2) economic factors are intricately interwoven with political ones.22 This is particularly true in the case of defining the autonomous status of Crimea, since the peninsula's legal powers will determine the control Crimean elites have over natural and other resources, such as taxes. The eventual agreement on the 1998 Crimean Constitution reached between the Crimean and Ukrainian parliaments demonstrates concretely both the significance of economic issues and their relationship to political ones (see below).

While the Crimean political elite was battling Kyiv on the autonomy/ independence front, the Crimean Tatars were in conflict with the majority of Crimean politicians regarding the same question. The Tatars opposed the Crimean bid for independence and clearly supported Kyiv in the question of Crimean status. However, since they possessed no representation in the peninsular parliament during this early period (1992) and were increasingly involved in dealing with resettlement issues for the significant number of 120 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS Crimean Tatars returning to the peninsula, the Tatar leadership was unable to exert meaningful influence on the political developments regarding autonomy at that stage.

Between summer 1992 and autumn 1993 it appeared that Nikolai Bagrov, the speaker of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, was slowly moving to consolidate his position on the peninsula. As a former Communist apparatchik, Bagrov seemed to fit logically into the pattern of post-Soviet Crimea, which due to its population profile was overwhelmingly conservative and in large part nostalgic for the Soviet order.23 Nonetheless, Bagrov chose not to associate himself permanently with any one political party or organization, preferring to ally himself first with one, then another structure.24 This made him more than one enemy as he let first one group and then the next drop as their usefulness to him expired. Still, when Bagrov pushed through the institution of a Crimean presidency in September 1993 no one doubted that he intended the post to expand his own as well as the peninsula's powers, and it was largely assumed that he would triumph in the January 1994 elections. Kyiv was also counting on this scenario, since having concluded an uneasy alliance with the speaker it allowed the Crimean presidency to be established only in the hope of retaining a firm grip on the peninsula via Bagrov's support. This was one of the few cases where both Kyiv and Simferopol, the capital of Crimea could agree that increasing peninsular powers would benefit both sides.

Bagrov, forced into relative moderacy due to the need to cooperate with Kyiv and the insistent demands of the Crimean Tatars for representation on the peninsula, was pushed further and further to temper his position. This facilitated the consolidation of pro-Russia forces around Yurii Meshkov, a member of the Crimean parliament and founder of the Republican Movement (later Party) of Crimea (RMC).25 The RMC advocated Crimean independence and much closer cooperation with if not necessarily integration into the Russian Federation, although the latter was often assumed to be an unspoken part of its political program.

The extent of Bagrov's marginalization and of the success achieved in mobilizing the population in favour of the pro-Russia coalition did not become clear until Meshkov's surprise victory over Bagrov in the presidential elections held in January 1994.26 These elections, conceived as a means of consolidating Bagrov's power, indicated the dissatisfaction of the Crimean population with the current state of affairs and their willingness to be swayed by the inflated independence rhetoric of Meshkov. Kyiv, as well as the Crimean Tatars, became increasingly vehement supporters of Bagrov as the popularity of Meshkov became clearer and especially after the first round of the elections on 16 January 1994. This is one situation in which the autonomy debate failed to monopolize political discourse in AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 121 Crimea and other types of status, such as independence and joining the Russian Federation, were openly discussed not only by marginalized political groupings but also by major political forces. Furthermore, the radical tactics of Meshkov led to an escalation of rhetoric in the Ukrainian parliament, as some deputies went beyond limiting the content of Crimean autonomy by dissolving the Crimean parliament and abolishing the presidency to suggesting the liquidation of any autonomous status.27 The content of autonomy would probably not have regained its place on the political agenda had Meshkov been more adept at compromise and succeeded in maintaining his majority in the Crimean parliament, which he easily obtained during the elections of March 1994. By the summer of that same year, however, he had managed to alienate many of his own supporters by failing to act on his campaign agenda and by bringing in outsiders such as Russian citizen Evgenii Saburov as deputy prime minister instead of drawing from his own ranks. He further attempted to increase his own power by abolishing regional councils and replacing them with his appointed representatives. While Meshkov managed to change the tenor of the debate over the status of Crimea during his election campaign, after being elected president he became increasingly isolated and was even forced to seek assistance from Kyiv, support from Russia not being immediately forthcoming. Meshkov's discourse shift, therefore, did not last long enough to form a new pattern in Crimean politics, and after his political demise the wrangling over the content of autonomy began again, following an initial regrouping of forces on the peninsula.

Kyiv erred in its calculations even more severely than Bagrov. While the latter lost the election to Yurii Meshkov, the former was confronted with an institutionally more powerful peninsula with a hostile leader. If it had not been for Meshkov's hunger for power combined with political incompetence and inexperience, the conflict-regulating character of the autonomy status in its definition phase would not have been adequate to prevent Crimea from drifting toward Russia. As it was, the battle between Kyiv and Simferopol was for a time superseded by a struggle between the Crimean president and the parliament. While at first Kyiv could only sit by and watch, after a brief battle Meshkov, finding himself on the losing end, attempted to ally himself with the Ukrainian government in order to save his political skin. This despairing offer not only lost him any shred of credibility he had remaining, but was not taken up by the Ukrainian authorities, who saw their chance to gain a decisive victory in the power struggle with Simferopol. In March 1995 the Ukrainian parliament annulled the Crimean Constitution and abolished the peninsular presidency. After a long and complex debate on the status of the Crimean parliament, during which the OSCE intervened, the Crimean deputies retained their seats. Cowed into 122 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS temporary submission by threats from Kyiv on the loss of their mandates, the Crimean representatives elected a speaker agreeable to the Ukrainian government and pushed through a revised Crimean Constitution by November 1995.28 At this stage the Crimean Tatars had gained representation in the Crimean parliament (see below for details) and were thus able to participate in political developments more effectively than previously. While their last- minute support of Bagrov did not bring tangible results, the Tatars began to cooperate with a variety of factions in the parliament to increase their influence. Since they pursued a relatively consistent line on most policies and possessed an able politician in Refat Chubarov, who became deputy speaker, they gained rapidly in credibility and became a force to be reckoned with in peninsular politics. Despite Meshkov's eventual demise, however, the support for his campaign demonstrated the extent to which the Crimean population favoured closer ties with Russia, as well as other issues opposed by the Tatars. Meshkov further showed that it was possible to win a majority on the peninsula without any consideration of Crimean Tatar demands.

Crimea 1995-98: Cooperation with Kyiv Once Meshkov and his most fervent supporters were out of the way there was already a pattern of dialogue established to which political actors in both Kyiv and Simferopol could return. While Kyiv undoubtedly had gained the upper hand via the Meshkov interlude and was able to abolish the Crimean presidency and establish direct presidential control over the peninsula, it left the Crimean parliament and government intact as institutions. Since the Crimean presidency was a brand-new institution, and since the first experiment with it failed so miserably, there were few to protest its elimination, especially because the occupant of the abolished post had taken refuge in Moscow and his supporters had scattered. Politics in Crimea were as a rule oriented around the peninsular parliament and it was easy enough to fall back into that pattern. Although the Crimean Tatars had not been participants in the parliamentary dialogue before, they were able to become partners in it until 1998, at which time their guaranteed representation in parliament, which they owed to a temporary provision of the election law, was abolished.

Nonetheless, after Kyiv's demarche in March 1995 depriving the peninsula of its president and constitution, more power fell to the Crimean government, which under Anatolii Franchuk, an in-law of the Ukrainian President, was careful to follow Kyiv's line. However, this blatant support for the Ukrainian government, combined with Franchuk's flaunting of his power, was no more welcome on the peninsula than Meshkov's charades AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 123 had been. Franchuk managed, though, to retain the bulk of real power in Crimea throughout 1995, since his potential rivals had been weakened. In November 1995 he was successful in getting a majority of Crimean deputies, fearful of losing their seats to a Kyiv decree calling for new elections, to support a constitution amenable to the Ukrainian parliament, which nonetheless ratified it only in April 1996 and then only partially.29 Consistent Crimean Tatar support for Kyiv, as opposed to those peninsular forces seeking greater political autonomy or independence from the centre, was one factor which assisted Kyiv in the reestablishment of control over the peninsula.

The most important constitutional event of 1996 was, however, the passage of the Ukrainian Constitution by the parliament in Kyiv on 28 June.

This document contains important if paradoxical regulations regarding Crimea's status. First of all, Ukraine is defined as a unitary state, although the section on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea grants it broader powers than those possessed by the other Ukrainian regions. The peninsula is permitted a government, parliament and constitution. The Ukrainian president can prevent any Crimean executive or legislative act from entering into force, at least temporarily, until the Ukrainian Constitutional court has determined whether or not the relevant Crimean decree or legislation is in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution. The institution of the representative of the Ukrainian president in Crimea is retained, ensuring further presidential monitoring of and control over peninsular developments. This skeletal definition of the powers of the Crimean autonomy represents a compromise among the differing proposals which had been voiced or put on paper by political actors in Kyiv and Simferopol over the course of their five-year quarrel regarding the division of power between the centre and the privileged (compared to other Ukrainian regions) periphery. There was no mention of the Crimean Tatars in the section of the constitution dealing with the Crimea, nor in the remainder of the document, unless one includes a reference to indigenous peoples, which are, however, not defined here or elsewhere in current Ukrainian legislation.

The June 1996 Constitution was also a reflection of the then current relationship between Kyiv and Simferopol, in which the former still retained the upper hand. In the Crimean parliament, new power centres were building but were not yet capable of anything but negative action, resulting in the ousting of Franchuk and his eventual replacement under pressure from Kyiv by a relatively colourless figure, Arkadii Demidenko. The 'Blok Rossiia', a loose grouping of political parties and organizations which had supported Meshkov's presidential campaign, had long since split into various smaller units with differing ways of dealing with the crisis. Not surprisingly, a regrouping of political forces on the peninsula began which 124 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS resulted in the triumph of Communist forces under Leonid Grach, long a political fixture in Crimea. One of the first to fight for the restoration of the Communist Party after it was banned in 1991, he headed first a Communist Union, then Party of Crimea and was not fazed by the necessity to incorporate the party into larger Ukrainian structures once regional parties were banned by the 1996 Constitution. Due to his Communist positions and his lack of willingness to seek compromise with the Crimean Tatars, the latter found no common ground with Grach, and his ascent in the Crimean political hierarchy was not viewed favourably by the Tatar leadership.

How did Grach consolidate his position and what role did the definition of Crimean autonomy play in this process? Leonid Grach had the advantage that during his rise to power on the peninsula the rules of the game were already defined, at least by Kyiv, via the Ukrainian Constitution. A Crimean Constitution of which at least sections were in force also existed, but new pressure came from Kyiv to finally bring the basic law of Crimea into complete accordance with Ukrainian law. This opened the way for Grach to make his mark on the politics of the peninsula by demonstrating his ability to compromise with both Crimean political groupings and the executive and legislative branches in Kyiv. The result was a constitution which differed significantly from those of 1992 and 1995 and bore the distinct seal of Grach's attempts to consolidate his power in Crimea and raise his profile in Kyiv and Ukraine as a whole. Making no secret of his interest in participating in the Ukrainian presidential race in 2004, Grach engaged in a trade of symbolic goods for concrete ones. He scored so many points with the executive as well as right-of-centre representatives in Kyiv by formally upgrading Ukrainian to the only official language of the peninsula that many were willing to overlook the significant economic advantages Crimea gained via the 1998 Constitution, such as the right to dispose of all taxes gathered on its territory as it sees fit.30 The Crimean Tatars, however, protested vehemently against the 'Grach constitution' since it represented losses for them in the areas of language and status (see the section on cultural rights below). Nonetheless, as they had been deprived of their guaranteed representation in the peninsular parliament since March 1998, they were unable to mount significant opposition to the new document in the legislature and were forced to bow to the influence of Grach and his supporters. Since Grach is not likely to disappear from the political scene nearly as suddenly or completely as Yurii Meshkov, it would seem that conflict between the Crimean Tatars and the peninsular parliament is programmed for the near future. Especially without Crimean Tatar representation in the parliament, the second-order struggle of the Tatars will no doubt continue to remain subordinate to the first-order struggle of the Russian-speakers for autonomy vis-a-vis the centre.

AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 125 Grach was also able to profit from certain attempts at intervention by Kyiv which further harmed the image of the Ukrainian government in Crimea. First of all, prior to the local and national parliamentary elections in March 1998, President Kuchma decreed that elections in Crimea would be held according to the previous election law, which foresaw a pure majority principle. While the remainder of Ukraine voted according to the revised election law of 1997, which introduced significant proportional elements, the Crimean parliament was elected according to the superseded law. This move was calculated to harm the Communists by preventing a vote according to party lists. Second, in early 1998 Kuchma singlehandedly dismissed the head of the municipal administration in Yalta and installed a replacement of his own choosing, thereby violating the Ukrainian Constitution as well as the law on local self-government.31 Both these interventions strengthened the hand of Grach by allowing him to pose as the defender of Crimean interests against Kyiv, and provided him added leeway in negotiating the revised Crimean Constitution.

The clearest result of the negotiations between Kyiv and Simferopol in the period of Grach's consolidation of power on the peninsula is the significance of offering opportunities to Crimean leaders to advance in the Ukrainian political hierarchy. While this was not an option for Yurii Meshkov despite his desperate last-minute attempt to cooperate with Kyiy, it is a realistic perspective for Leonid Grach, particularly due to his increasing ties to the Communist Party of Ukraine following the prohibition of regional parties. This option has strengthened his determination both to improve the situation in Crimea and to tread carefully in his relations with Kyiv. However, this has not prevented him from repeatedly trying to oust Crimean Premier Sergei Kunitsyn, who has generally supported Kyiv's line against peninsular attempts to gain more autonomy. The seat of Crimean Tatar legislative efforts, meanwhile, has shifted to Kyiv, since two Crimean Tatar activists were elected to the national parliament in March 1998 (see section on political representation below), while no well-known Crimean Tatars gained seats in the peninsular legislature.

1999-2000: The Crimean Constitution Causes Conflict Crimean Tatar protests regarding the 1998 Constitution began prior to its passage and continued into 1999. The Mejlis, the executive organ of the Crimean Tatar parliament (Kurultai), organized a series of acts of civil disobedience in response to the constitution's failure to meet Crimean Tatar demands, particularly with respect to language and political representation, as well as socio-economic issues.32 In April 1999 Crimean Tatar protesters burned a copy of the Crimean Constitution along with a copy of Catherine 126 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS the Great's 1783 Manifesto annexing the Crimea to Russia. By juxtaposing these two documents the Tatars eloquently implied that the 1998 Constitution imposes a colonial status upon them similar to that under eighteenth-century Russian rule.33 A resolution of a protest meeting held by Crimean Tatars in Bakchisaray and addressed to the president, government, and parliament of Ukraine asked for, among other things, the restoration of national autonomy, effective, guaranteed political representation in legislative and executive branches, removal of obstacles to the establishment and development of national education for Crimean Tatars, and the return of religious buildings.34 The ire of the Crimean Tatars was further fuelled by the fact that part of the Mejlis headquarters was burned in January 1999 after unknown assailants tossed fire bombs through the window of Mustafa Dzemilev's office.35 The identity of the attackers was never established, but the Crimean Tatars surmised that they had government backing, since immediately prior to the fire both the telephone lines and the electricity in the building had been shut off.

In April 1999 a Council of Elders of the Crimean Tatar People (Soviet aksakalov) was created as an advisory body to the Crimean parliament.

While it claims not to be in competition with Mejlis, this is suspect, especially because plans are to establish local councils in areas of compact Crimean Tatar settlement to work with the Council of Elders, and this appears to be an attempt to subvert the system of local mejlises already in place.36 The membership of the council and the method of electing it both indicate that it is intended by Grach to be a puppet organ which gives the impression of consultation with the Crimean Tatars while allowing the parliament to circumvent real dialogue, especially with the Mejlis. Grach has made absolutely clear that he rejects any form of special treatment for the Crimean Tatars by emphasizing the multinational character of Crimea and the need to treat all equally. He went so far as to claim that autonomy for Crimea is justified precisely because of this multinationality:

Our Crimean essence and our measure of responsibility for the fate of Crimea is in our multinationality. And the spirit of the Crimea is the spirit of internationalism. In this lies the uniqueness and specificity of Crimea. That is why it has a special status. Crimea is that sacred land to which people living here of all nationalities can lay claim in equal measure.

Furthermore, Grach sees the creation of the Crimean autonomous region as a factor of interethnic reconciliation. He harshly criticizes the Mejlis as an illegal organization which has chosen a path of confrontation with the Crimean authorities and has isolated those Crimean Tatar activists who are willing to seek compromise. 'There will never be peace in our common home if some of its inhabitants claim their distinctiveness.'37 AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 127 Nonetheless, even Grach has been forced to address some of the problems raised by the Mejlis. In June 2000 the Presidium of the Crimean parliament passed a resolution entitled 'On immediate measures for the resolution of the problems of previously deported citizens', one clause of which referred to the possibility of introducing a proportional voting system on the peninsula. The Crimean Tatars welcomed this resolution cautiously, but warned that rhetoric without implementation mechanisms is inadequate.

Mejlis member Senaver Kadyrov suggested the creation of a working group involving members of the Crimean parliament and the Mejlis to come up with implementation proposals.38 Grach's position on political representation is not shared by Prime Minister Kunitsyn, who supports a quota for the Crimean Tatars, although he believes they should be elected by entire population of Crimea.39 However, he does not agree with the quota approach for governmental organs. The results of the opposition to such a quota in government can be seen in the figures reported by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), according to which 'only 1 per cent of Crimean Tatars are represented in Crimea's Government bodies; 0.1 per cent of them serve in the police force and security service'.40 This difference in positions between Grach and Kunitsyn is only one example of a deep-seated conflict between the two politicians, which reached a peak (one in a series of peaks) in the fight over the peninsular budget for the year 2000. This fight resulted from contradictions between Ukrainian and Crimean legislation, and severely qualified one of the major successes the Crimean authorities claimed to have achieved with the passage of the constitution. According to that document, the peninsular budget is supposed to be 'unidirectional' [odnokanal'nyi], meaning that funds flow from Simferopol to Kyiv but not in the opposite direction. In exchange for refusing all subsidies from the capital, the Crimea was to be allowed to keep all taxes collected on its territory. This provision, however, conflicted with existing Ukrainian law, under which value-added taxes were to go to Kyiv. Numerous attempts at resolving the conflict failed, and in March 2000 the Crimean parliament filed a petition with the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, asking it to declare unconstitutional those laws which prevent value-added tax revenues from remaining on the peninsula.41 As of July 2000 there was no response from the court. During the course of the efforts at resolution Kunitsyn and Grach took different lines. While Kunitsyn accepted a proposal to deliver the VAT revenues to Kyiv in exchange for subsidies from the centre in an equal amount, Grach rejected this suggestion out of hand, claiming a violation of the constitution.

Simultaneously Grach attempted to depose Kunitsyn while the latter worked to create a pro-government majority in the parliament, which proved, however, unstable in the extreme.

128 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS This conflict demonstrated the continued dependence of the peninsula on the political will of Kyiv, and particularly of President Kuchma, whose intervention was convincing enough to force Grach and Kunitsyn to lay aside their differences, at least temporarily, and deliver political results.

These were necessary in the case of the Ukrainian-wide referendum on four questions regarding the national parliament, which was held in April 2000.

The overwhelming support of the populace for all four questions was interpreted as backing for Kuchma in his struggle to subordinate the Ukrainian parliament to the president.

Meanwhile the sporadic protests of the Crimean Tatars prior to 18 May 2000 (the 56th anniversary of their deportation) took on a more continuous character after that date. The most obvious of these protest measures was the erection of a tent city in front of the Crimean parliament building, but others included blocking railways and roads and obstructing entrance to regional government buildings around the peninsula. These actions were stopped abruptly at the end of June following the signing by Kunitsyn of a government decree on providing for the socio-economic and ethno-cultural needs of the Crimean Tatar people. In addition, Anatolii Korniichuk, Kuchma's representative in Crimea, ordered the creation of a working group on electoral and land questions. It includes members of the Crimean government, parliament and the Mejlis.42 As in the past, it appears that the Crimean Tatars have been able to achieve significant changes in their situation only by means of civil disobedience. Despite gradually increasing Tatar participation in the executive branch and in local legislative bodies, it was only during the 1994-98 interlude of Crimean Tatar representation in the peninsular parliament that it became possible to conduct the second- order struggle of the Tatars for influence in Crimean affairs in established political structures at all levels.

Relevant Actors On the Crimean peninsula there are essentially two groups of relevant actors. These are the Crimean Tatars and the Russian-speakers.43 Due to lack of information about the grassroots level, the focus here will be on the political and cultural elites of these two groups. The Crimean Tatar elite is much more homogeneous than the Russian-speaking one, although a process of differentiation has occurred within it since the beginning of the return from exile in the late 1980s. An initial struggle between two organizations, the OKND (Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement) and the NDKT (National Movement of the Crimean Tatars) ended with the former as the clear winner. The establishment of two related institutions, the indirectly elected Kurultai (assembly) and its Mejlis AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 129 (presidium), set the stage for relatively unified activities by the Crimean Tatar elite. Groupings which have attempted to establish a niche for themselves (Milli Firka, Adalet, the OKND) have generally done so on the terms of a loose cooperation with the Mejlis and have not broken with it completely. A split occurred in December 1997, when almost half of the Mejlis resigned over unclear financial dealings, but this potential opposition group (Millet) has not yet been able to attract a significant number of backers. Thus the primary focus of this article will be on the Crimean Tatar Mejlis and its supporters.

Defining relevant actors among the Russian-speaking elite is more problematic. The term 'Russian-speaking' is used to emphasize the fact that not only ethnic Russians are involved, but also members of other nationalities (mainly Ukrainians) who identify primarily with the Russian language and culture. Key groups in this category can be determined via an analysis of political influence on the peninsula. Thus in the early years of Ukrainian independence Nikolai Bagrov and his supporters are relevant, with Yuri Meshkov and his cohorts serving as the opposition. During 1994-95 Meshkov, parliamentary speaker Sergei Tsekov and their short- lived Russia bloc come into play. After Meshkov's deposition in March 1995 there follows a period of unclear political relationships, after which Communist Party leader Leonid Grach comes to the fore, eventually in opposition to the head of government Sergei Kunitsyn. As can be seen from the foregoing, the political situation in Crimea is highly personalized, that is, one or two particular political figures are generally associated with each phase of the developments. Other, smaller or less significant parties or blocs will be taken into consideration when it is clear that they played a meaningful role at a particular point in time.

Discourse and Actions The three topics addressed in this section were chosen for the analysis because they illustrate well the spectrum of differences in viewpoint between the Russian-speaking elite and the Crimean Tatar leadership. This spectrum simultaneously includes diametrically opposed positions, a limited willingness to compromise, and relative indifference. This variety of options demonstrates the complexity involved in a consideration of the Crimean Tatar component when attempting to reach conclusions about the conflict-regulating nature of autonomy on the peninsula.

The Political Status of Crimea Regarding this parameter the russophone side underwent a series of transitions in the time period under consideration, whereas the Crimean 130 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS Tatar position remained quite consistent. Bagrov found himself forced to cooperate with Kyiv in order to remain in power and therefore was required to embrace the Kyiv line that the Crimea was part of Ukraine. However, it soon became clear that this position did not have the backing of the Crimean populace, which overwhelmingly supported Meshkov in the 1994 Crimean presidential elections. Meshkov's rapid failure demonstrated not only his personal incapacity to lead, but also that Moscow was unwilling to provide significant assistance to the Crimean leaders in their attempts at independence and/or integration with the Russian Federation. This fact among others must have been in Leonid Grach's mind as he commenced to follow a strategy in which cooperation with Kyiv played a key role. While the Communists differed from the Russia bloc in that they supported keeping Crimea within Ukraine, Grach spoke out forcefully in favour of a federal Ukraine and stronger links between Crimea and Russia. However, Grach was given an incentive to compromise with Kyiv on these and other issues due to the provision in the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution that banned regional political parties. This clause forced the Crimean Communists under Grach's leadership to unite with the Communist Party of Ukraine, thereby limiting their activities as an independent actor.

Thus on the level of key political actors there were swings back and forth regarding the status of the peninsula. On the institutional level there was more consistency, but also a certain initial contradiction. For example, the 1992 Crimean Constitution, which was passed by the Crimean parliament as a reaction to attempts by Kyiv to limit the peninsula's independence, granted statehood to the Crimea. Nonetheless Article 9 of the same constitution declared the Crimean Republic to be a part of the Ukrainian state. The references to Crimean statehood were eliminated from the version of the constitution which entered into force in September 1992. The revised 1995 version of the Crimean Constitution was never approved in its totality by Kyiv and therefore functioned only partially. The Crimean authorities lost some powers (such as the office of Crimean president) under the new constitution, although the status of the peninsula as an autonomous republic within Ukraine was not altered.44 The June 1996 Ukrainian Constitution cemented this status in Section 10, which defined the autonomous republic of Crimea as 'an inalienable fundamental part of Ukraine', although it limited Crimean powers in significant ways, thus altering somewhat the content of autonomy. The 1998 Crimean Constitution continued in the tradition of establishing the peninsula within Ukraine, while attempting to broaden peninsular authority, especially in economic matters.

The Crimean Tatars, on the other hand, were consistent in their support of Kyiv and their assertions that the Crimea should remain Ukrainian territory. However, the rhetoric of their statements and documents sometimes AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 131 seemed to belie this position. Both the statutes of the OKND (drawn up in 1989-90) and the Declaration on National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People (June 1991) called for 'the restoration of national statehood' and the establishment of a 'sovereign national state'.43 Andrew Wilson notes, however, a shift in their terminology when he compares the Declaration on National Sovereignty with the draft constitution drawn up by the Mejlis in December 1991, since in the latter there is no attempt to separate later (primarily ethnic Russian) settlers from others, although the 'indigenous peoples' are singled out as Crimean Tatars, Karaims and Krymchaks. This potentially indicates a broader definition of the group which would be involved in determining the content of Crimean sovereignty.46 The attitude toward the content of Crimean autonomy also emerges clearly from these documents. In the OKND statute a demand is made to restore Crimean autonomy within its 1921 borders, and the Declaration on National Sovereignty points out that this status at least temporarily included 'the necessary attributes of the national-territorial sovereignty of the Crimean Tatars'. This statement clearly shows that the Crimean autonomy of Soviet times is currently perceived as having an ethnic component. It is further stated that 'a Crimean ASSR restored not as a national-territorial formation is seen as an attempt at the legal establishment of the results of the Crimean Tatar deportation in 1944 and is not acknowledged by the Kurultai in such a form'.47 Nonetheless, none of these complaints diminished the level of Crimean Tatar loyalty to Ukraine, which has been one of the pillars of the Crimean Tatar position since the beginning of their mass return and especially following Ukrainian independence in December 1991.

This continuing loyalty was reiterated and emphasized by Refat Chubarov at an April 2000 Ukrainian parliamentary hearing on the problems of deported persons returning to Ukraine, where he contrasted the constancy of the Crimean Tatar position with the fluctuation in support from the Ukrainian government.48 A comparison of the attitudes of russophone and Crimean Tatar political elites in the last ten or so years would seem to indicate room for a certain optimism. While the Crimean Tatars have remained firmly in favour of a Crimea within Ukraine, Russian-speaking political forces appear to have come to share this position after a series of fluctuations. Nonetheless, positions on the character of the autonomy differ widely. Whereas the current peninsular authorities seem to have found a form of autonomy on which both they and Kyiv can agree, Crimean Tatar circles continue to insist on more ethnic (that is, Crimean Tatar) attributes for the peninsula. The discussion on political representation sheds some more light on this significant area of disagreement.

132 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS Political Representation Whereas in the question of the status of Crimea within Ukraine the russophone and Crimean Tatar positions seem to have become closer in the past decade, the issue of political representation demonstrates a different dynamic, one paralleling the developments concerning the character of Crimean autonomy. Initial widely differing positions gave way to a surprising compromise after a hard political struggle, but this fragile balance formally collapsed in 1998 (de facto even earlier) and shows no signs of reestablishing itself.

The Crimean Tatars suggested a variety of different representation mechanisms, the more radical of which ensured them a veto power over all legislation, the less radical a veto only in constitutional questions.

Possibilities included a two-chamber parliament in which the upper chamber would consist exclusively of representatives of the indigenous peoples (Crimean Tatars, Karaims, Krymchaks), and a one-chamber system with 33% Crimean Tatar representation. On the local level an 'Austro- Marxist system of national-personal autonomy' with overlapping mejlises and local councils was suggested.49 In all cases an ethnic system of voting was supported, whereby only Crimean Tatars would be allowed to vote for their representatives.

In the local arena the mejlises did not attain any official status and continue to work on a parallel but unrecognized level for the improvement of the Crimean Tatar situation, especially in the economic realm. However, many local mejlis members also participate in official local organs of government. On the republican level proposals came from the Russian- speaking community that were as radical as those of the Tatars, but pursued the opposite aim - a reduction in Crimean Tatar political representation.

One such plan, initiated by the (then) Communist Party of Crimea and the Republican Party of Crimea led by Yurii Meshkov, suggested the creation of 'a single multimandate Crimean constituency, with all candidates elected proportionately on party lists'.50 This would clearly have given larger parties the advantage and had as one goal a reduction in electoral opportunities for the Mejlis. An early proposal to grant the Crimean Tatars seven seats in the parliament was angrily dismissed by their leadership. Eventually Bagrov agreed to support 14 seats for Tatar representatives, but the majority of the Crimean legislature refused to back him. Thus it came about that the election law in the Crimea foresaw no guaranteed seats for the Crimean Tatars, which virtually ensured that they would not be represented in the 1994 parliament. Only a series of serious protests by the Crimean Tatars forced the legislators to rethink their position and pass an amendment to the law which assured the Crimean Tatars 14 representatives, if only for one four-year parliamentary term. During his tenure as peninsular president AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 133 Yurii Meshkov categorically refused to consider the possibility of continuing guaranteed Crimean Tatar representation in the Supreme Soviet.

Thus the original positions of the Russian-speakers and the Crimean Tatars regarding political representation were to a large degree diametrically opposed, making the eventual compromise particularly surprising. Certainly the support of Bagrov and the fact that the idea of Crimean Tatar representation had been under discussion for some time eased the final decision, but the critical impetus appears to have come from the acts of civil disobedience by a large number of Crimean Tatars. This appeared paradoxically to confirm the effectiveness of illegal protest as a tactic while simultaneously providing the Crimean Tatars with the legal opportunity to participate in governance of the peninsula. In the years which followed they built up their positions in the government and parliament and demonstrated a capacity to form temporary coalitions with other factions without relinquishing their tactics of occasional mass protest.

The fragility of the compromise became evident over the years leading up to the elections in 1998, when the election law amendment was abandoned. The Ukrainian parliament contributed to the improbability of a renewal by passing a constitution which stated that 'elections to the organs of state power and local administration are free and take place on the basis of general, equal and direct electoral rights by means of secret ballot' (Article 71). This could easily be interpreted to exclude the possibility of specific representation by a particular ethnic group. In the section on the autonomous republic of Crimea there was no mention of a political or any other role for the Crimean Tatars. Kuchma further hurt the Crimean Tatars' chances of gaining representation in the peninsular legislature by declaring that the new Ukrainian election law, which introduced an element of proportional representation into the electoral system, would not be valid in Crimea, which would instead retain the previous majoritarian system. As stated above, this was widely believed to be a means of lowering the Communist representation in the Crimean parliament and raising that of smaller parties favourable to Kuchma. A side effect of this decision, however, was to reduce the Crimean Tatars' already minimal chances of representation to virtually zero, since while the Crimean Tatars' percentage in some districts exceeded that of their total among the Crimean population, they failed to constitute a majority in any district.

With these signals coming from Kyiv and the popularity of the Crimean Communists under Grach on the upswing, it could hardly be expected that the Crimean Tatar quota in the parliament would voluntarily be extended.

The positive results of the Crimean Tatar participation in the legislature, seen by outsiders as a reason for continuing the quota system, could be interpreted by the Communists as a threat to their parliamentary dominance.

134 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS Only one Crimean Tatar was elected to the 1998 republican parliament, and he was neither affiliated with the Mejlis nor considered by its members to be a representative of Crimean Tatar interests. As a result the centre of Crimean Tatar political representation shifted to Kyiv, because two prominent Mejlis members were elected to the Ukrainian parliament.

Mustafa Dzemilev, an eminently respected dissident and long the figurehead of the Crimean Tatar movement, was elected as a member of the Rukh list.51 Refat Chubarov, previously a deputy speaker in the Crimean parliament known for his political skills, was elected by a plurality in his district with just under 30% of the vote.52 Thus Crimean Tatar and russophone ideas on representation in Crimean political bodies differ in the extreme. A brief period of difficult compromise in 1994 was followed by a continual decline in relations which has resulted in the loss of Crimean Tatar representation in the peninsular parliament and a shift of focus to the Ukrainian capital. This trend was confirmed by the establishment in spring 1999 of a Crimean Tatar Advisory Council to the Ukrainian President, which so far duplicates the membership of the Mejlis, although its members are appointed by the president rather than chosen by the Crimean Tatars themselves. However, this is not an adequate strategy in the long term in view of Kyiv's hesitancy in complying with Crimean Tatar demands and the necessity to achieve a workable arrangement with republican authorities, who in many spheres have a more significant impact on developments among the Crimean Tatar population than politicians in the capital.

Cultural Rights Without political influence it is clearly difficult for the Crimean Tatars to achieve much in the cultural realm, which often must take a back seat to sheer survival in current Crimean economic conditions. Nonetheless, there are some mitigating factors. First, the cultural sphere is a good example of Crimean Tatar success in working with international organizations. Second, the fact that Russian-speakers are as a rule more concerned about the encroachment of Ukrainian in the realms of education and culture than of the expansion of the Crimean Tatar language facilitates the development of Crimean Tatar schools and cultural institutions. Nonetheless, Crimean Tatar cultural achievements are less the result of a fundamental consensus on cultural developments between Russian-speaking and Crimean Tatar elites than of the persistence of certain Crimean Tatar actors and the partially removed nature of culture from the political sphere.

Actions of a more or less symbolic nature play an important role in the 'gradual reconstruction of consciousness' of the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group.53 These include celebrations of national holidays and ethnic festivals as AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 135 well as returning historic names to places of special significance for Crimean Tatars. There are several Crimean Tatar publications, the best known of which is Avdet, a newspaper which is officially independent but which de facto functioned as the organ of the Mejlis, at least until the split in that organization occurred in December 1997 (see above). Most of the Crimean Tatar press (including Avdet) is published partially or exclusively in Russian.

An exception is the newspaper Jan"y diun'ia [New World}, published exclusively in Crimean Tatar. This publication, however, has had significant difficulties in receiving allotted funds from Crimean government organs and was recently deprived of the possibility to appear.54 With primarily Dutch and Ukrainian support a Crimean Tatar library named after Ismail Gasprinski was reopened after a major renovation in 1999.55 Mosques and cultural centres have been built in many towns with a significant Crimean Tatar population, often with governmental or private assistance from Turkey. The spectrum of Crimean Tatar cultural developments indicates that this area is not as problematic as the issues of political representation and the nature of Crimean autonomy have shown themselves to be.

One important aspect of culture concerns language. From comments surrounding the passage of the Crimean Constitution in the autumn and winter of 1998, and from the text of the document itself, it is clear that designating Ukrainian the state language is at the present time primarily a symbolic act, and that Russian still enjoys priority on the peninsula. Since on the language front Ukrainian is seen as a usurper and enemy of Russian, there is perhaps more space for the unhindered (if also largely unassisted) development of Crimean Tatar than of Ukrainian. This is confirmed by the fact that there are already a number of schools on the peninsula in which Crimean Tatar is taught, whereas there is only one Ukrainian school, meaning that only 0.5% of schoolchildren in Crimea have classes conducted in Ukrainian.56 (Certainly there is also relatively little demand for instruction in Ukrainian given the largely russified nature of the majority of the ethnic Ukrainian population. Nonetheless the difficulties surrounding the establishment of a Ukrainian school indicate that other factors are also involved.) On the other hand, the status of 'state language' granted to Crimean Tatar (along with Russian and Ukrainian) by the 1992 Crimean Constitution was not renewed in the 1998 version. This status, among other things, was seen as evidence of the willingness of Crimean authorities to respond to Crimean Tatar demands. The then US Ambassador to Ukraine William Miller, speaking on 14 March 1995, claimed the following: 'The fact that Crimea has three official languages - Ukrainian, Russian, and Tatar - is emblematic of the commitment by all concerned to resolve their differences in a civilized fashion and to encourage effective political representation.'57 He presents the conflict as one between Kyiv and 136 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS Simferopol and not as one between the Crimean Tatars and the peninsular powers, since 'The leaders of the legislative and the executive branches, for example, have accepted the Tatars' desire to develop their own governing institution for local ethnic matters, the Mejlis, in accordance with the traditions and aspirations of their community.' In view of the still unresolved status of the Mejlis, which aspires to official recognition as the representative body of the Crimean Tatar community, Miller's assessment appears overly optimistic. With regard to language questions, continuing protests over the loss of status that the Crimean Tatar language suffered in 1998 indicate that this issue still represents a bone of contention between the Crimean Tatar leadership and Crimean authorities.

Empirical and Theoretical Implications of the Crimean Case The results of the above analysis are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand there is some evidence of basic agreement between the Crimean Tatar and Russian-speaking elites (on the status of Crimea within Ukraine) and of their ability to compromise (on the issue of political representation). On the other hand there are diametrically opposed views on the character of Crimean autonomy, and the spectrum of opinions on the appropriate political representation for the Crimean Tatars is so wide that the temporary compromise reached in 1994 collapsed. In the cultural realm less of a controversy is present due to the fact that the russophone elites perceive the Ukrainian language and culture to be a greater threat to their traditional environment than Crimean Tatar efforts in the cultural sphere.

At first glance, therefore, while there do not appear to be ideal preconditions for a simple application of autonomy to mitigate the problematic relationship between a Ukrainian Kyiv and a Russian Crimea, the scenario does not seem hopeless. The agreement of both the Russian- speaking and Crimean Tatar sides on the status of Crimea as an autonomous republic within Ukraine is an important condition for further progress.

However, this agreement also changes to some extent the rules of the game.

While russophone elites which called this status into question were in power in Crimea (particularly during the Meshkov period), Kyiv had a greater incentive to cooperate with the Crimean Tatars since they represented a counterweight to separatist threats emanating from the Crimean power circles. With the passage of the 1996 Ukrainian and especially the 1998 Crimean Constitution the Russian-speaking Crimean elites are located firmly in the Ukrainian camp, which lessens the need for the Ukrainian government to rely on (and support) the Crimean Tatars. However, since this support was always meagre and slow, it is unlikely that significant changes in the relationship between Kyiv and the Tatars will occur. This is AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 137 particularly true because the presence of two Crimean Tatar representatives in the Ukrainian parliament gives them heightened influence in the capital.

This shift in allegiances does mean, however, that the peninsular Crimean Tatars may be obliged to work more directly with local and republican authorities in the Crimea itself, a process that has been difficult in the past due to holdovers of Soviet bureaucratic practices and negative attitudes towards the Crimean Tatars, who are frequently viewed as invaders, traitors and/or Muslim fundamentalists. On the one hand, Crimean Tatars are represented in many organs of local government,58 and the relationship in some regions appears to be a relatively tolerant one.59 However, the collapse of the compromise on political representation on the republican level and the loss of state status for the Crimean Tatar language with the passage of the 1998 Crimean Constitution indicate that the current peninsular russophone elites are not particularly inclined to take Crimean Tatar demands seriously.

Thus it would seem that the agreement reached between Kyiv and Simferopol on the status of Crimea and the character of its autonomy, while cementing the relationship between the two capitals and their respective elites, has relegated the Crimean Tatars to a marginal role in peninsular politics. The Crimean parliament passed a budget for the year 2000 which foresees 10 million hryvni (to date approximately $2.2 million) for the resettlement of those returning from deportation (primarily Crimean Tatars).60 If these funds are provided promptly and used for the designated aim, this will be a significant advance over previous actions of both the Ukrainian and Crimean bureaucracies. However, this approach also indicates a mechanism by which the Crimean Tatars will be the recipients of assistance without having influence over the political decisions involved in its granting. This may be sufficient to pacify the large majority of Crimean Tatars, who are primarily concerned about their material survival and less about politics. Nonetheless, the traditions of organization and protest which survived the Crimean Tatars' exile and which have been adapted to the new conditions of life in Crimea are unlikely to fade away in the near future. There is a significant Crimean Tatar elite which demands not only funding from a bureaucracy from the relevant authorities, but also influence in the mechanisms of government, both on the peninsula and in the Ukrainian capital. Thus the application of autonomous status as a means of conflict regulation, while appearing to have been relatively successful in the Crimean case, has simultaneously jeopardized the situation by marginalizing a relevant group with significant mobilization potential.

Should this finding be borne out in other cases, a qualification of the existing theory on the conflict-regulating functions of autonomy would seem to be in order. The diametrical opposition in the theory referred to in 138 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS the introductory theoretical section needs to be modified and give way to a more nuanced version which could take the form of a spectrum on which cases would be placed according to their amenability to conflict regulation via autonomy arrangements. The appropriateness of such arrangements would hinge on certain conditions. While the case study detailed above cannot yield an exhaustive list of such conditions, it does point to several relevant ones. First of all, if we limit our consideration to cases involving ethnic aspects, then if there is no significant ethnic minority in the (potentially) autonomous region, the problems facing the autonomy and the centre in drawing up and implementing an autonomy agreement are likely to be fewer than in the Crimean case. However, cases in which an autonomous region is populated almost exclusively by a particular minority are in practice few and far between. Second, if there are other minorities but these are not politically mobilized or do not have interests which differ significantly from those of the dominant minority (that is, the majority in the autonomous territory), then the chances for an autonomous arrangement which does not result in interethnic tension are also relatively good. The Crimean case indicates that the presence of significant politically mobilized ethnic minorities with interests differing from those of the majority in the autonomy is probable in areas which have undergone major population migrations, particularly forced ones. This facilitates the creation of groups with differing claims regarding the status of the territory and their respective degree of influence over developments within it.

Nonetheless, this should not necessarily imply that autonomous arrangements cannot work if such conditions are present. In theory, autonomy can be a solution to quarrels between the centre and a given region because it provides the region with special competence to resolve issues unfamiliar to the centre, since they are likely to exist only in that one territory and to constitute at least a partial reason for the granting of autonomous status.

On the other hand, the centre sometimes needs to arbitrate among interests in an autonomous territory to prevent a dominant minority from controlling the situation to the detriment of other groups. However, the centre is also unlikely to be an unbiased party in the conflict, as is reinforced by the Crimean case. Rather, it may expect certain behaviour from a beleaguered minority group in return for its support vis-a-vis the dominant minority in the region, thus leading to a more intense standoff between the two groups in the autonomous area. Thus there is a delicate balancing act to be performed when creating and implementing autonomy arrangements, in which the relationships among the centre, the regional authorities and the ethnic groups involved must be carefully considered.

AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 139 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Volodymyr Kulyk for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, as well as an anonymous reviewer for useful remarks.

NOTES 1. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), p.41.

2.

John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention (Houndmills and London: St. Martin's Press, 1990, reprinted 1993), p.140.

3.

Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.628.

4.

Ibid., p.624.

5.

Ibid., p.602.

6. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', in Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1997), p.119.

7. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), pp.199-201.

8. For a sampling of this literature see for example Jane I. Dawson, 'Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.30, No.4 (1997), pp.427-44; Gwendolyn Sasse, 'Die Krim: Regionale Autonomie in der Ukraine', Bericht des BIOst (Bundesinstitut fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien) 31/1998; Oleg Strekal, 'The Crimean Conflict and Its Implications for Ukraine's National Security', project paper of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-IP 2864 (September 1994); Maria Drohobycky (ed.), Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges and Prospects (Lanham and London:

Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).

9. An exception to this is the unpublished manuscript by Gwendolyn Sasse presented at the ASN (Association for the Study of Nationalities) Convention in New York, April 1999, 'State-Building in Divided Societies: Crimean Regional Autonomy as a Means of Conflict- Prevention'.

10.

John Packer comes closest to doing this in his analysis of OSCE activity in Crimea, in which he points to the problem of 'the rights of minorities within minorities' (p.316) and mentions the possibility of combining the current territorial autonomy arrangement in Crimea with 'a regime of functional autonomies' (p.315) for the Crimean Tatars. His article, however, deals only briefly with the Crimean Tatar situation. John Packer, 'Autonomy Within the OSCE:

The Case of Crimea', in Markku Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp.295-316.

11.

See Alan W. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

12.

This does not exclude the possibility (indeed likelihood) that the Crimea was granted ASSR status due to the high proportion and historical presence of Crimean Tatars there.

Nonetheless an examination of the decree establishing the Crimean ASSR reveals that no guaranteed Crimean Tatar political or other representation existed. See M.N. Guboglo and S.M. Chervonnaia, Krymsko-tatarskoe national'noe dvizhenie: Tom II, Dokumenty, Materialy, Khronika (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1992), pp.37-39.

13.

As of April 2000 a Ukrainian parliamentary document listed a figure of 270,000 returned Crimean Tatars. 'Rekomendatsii uchasnykiv parlaments'kykh slukhan' 'Problemy zakonodavchoho vrehuliuvannia ta realizatsii derzhavnoi polityky shchodo zabezpechennia prav kryms'kotatars'kogo narodu ta national'nykh menshyn, iaki buly deportovani i dobrovil'no povertaiut'sia v Ukrainu', appendix to Postanova Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy N 1660-III (20 April 2000).

14.

S.A. Usov, 'K voprosu o statuse Respubliki Krym: istoriia i sovremennye problemy', in Paul Goble/Gennadii Bordiugov (eds.), Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v Rossii i SNG (Moscow:

Its 'AIRO-XX', 1994).

140 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS 15.

Fisher, pp.167-8 and Part One, paragraph 23 of the Parallel Report Prepared by the Foundation for Research and Support of the Indigenous Peoples of Crimea about the situation in Crimea (Ukraine) undertaken in accordance with the article 25th of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of Council of Europe.

www.riga.lv/minlres (1999).

16.

See, for example, 'Deklaratsiia o national'nom suverenitete krymskotatarskogo naroda', 28 June 1991, in Guboglo/Chervonnaia, pp.110-11.

17.

Drohobycky (ed.), p.xxvi.

18.

According to the 1989 Ukrainian census, the population of Crimea is 67% ethnic Russian, but 83% of the inhabitants gave Russian as their native language. See Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine, Ukraina u tsyfrakh u 1992 rotsi (Kyiv: Tekhnika, 1993), p.25.

19.

Strekal, p.11.

20.

'Gor'koe nasledstvo, ili pochemu Krym ne mozhet sam sebia prokormit", Rabochaia gazeta, 22 July 1993.

21.

See Sasse, 1998.

22.

For an excellent treatment of the interaction between politics and economics in the Ukrainian case see Andreas Wittkovsky, Fünf Jahre ohne Plan: die Ukraine 1991-1996 (Hamburg:

LIT-Verlag, 1998).

23.

The Crimean population includes a large proportion of elderly Russians recently arrived in Crimea for retirement after working in responsible positions in the Communist hierarchy as well as workers in elite and (formerly) lucrative tourist resorts and military and industrial personnel involved in the Black Sea Fleet infrastructure and related areas.

24.

Andrew Wilson, 'Crimea's Political Cauldron', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, No.45 (12 November 1993), pp.1-8.

25.

Ibid.

26.

Andrew Wilson, 'The Elections in Crimea', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, No.25 (24 June 1994), pp.7-19.

27.

Svetlana Dorosh, 'Ukrainskii parlament schitaet, chto ispol'zoval poslednii miagkii argument pered likvidatsiei krymskoi avtonomii', UNIAN-Politika, No.46 (77), (1994), p.1.

28.

For a useful discussion of the Crimean situation in 1994-95 see the brief articles by various authors in UNIAN-Politika (obzory, kommentarii, prognozy), No.43 (74) - No.8 (143), (1994-95).

29.

Dawson; Sasse, 1998.

30.

Even though the status of Ukrainian as the 'state language' of Ukraine was acknowledged in the 1998 Crimean Constitution, the spheres remaining open to Russian were defined so broadly that it actually retained a status equal to that of Ukrainian on the peninsula.

31.

'Krymskii 'poligon': idet repetitsiia gosudarstvennogo perevorota?', Den' (3 February 1998).

32.

Nikolai Semena, 'Krym: Poligon 'izbiratel'noi' revoliutsii?', Zerkalo nedeli (27 March 1999). This and all further articles cited in Zerkalo nedeli can be found in the newspaper's archive under http://www.mirror.kiev.ua.

33.

Nikolai Semena, 'Protiv kolonial'nogo rezhima. V Ukraine?', Zerkalo nedeli (10 April 1999).

34.

MINELRES (Minority Electronic Resources, www.riga.lv/minelres/archive), 9 May 1999.

35.

Nikolai Semena, 'V Simferopole podozhgli zdanie medzhlisa', Zerkalo nedeli (16 January 1999).

36.

Nikolai Semena, 'Godovshchina, kak predmet dlia ssory', Zerkalo nedeli (24 April 1999).

37.

Leonid Grach, 'Natsional'nye problemy internatsional'nogo Kryma', Zerkalo nedeli (27 May 2000).

38.

Vladimir Pritula, 'Krymskie tatary ne veriat Grachu', Zerkalo nedeli (10 June 2000).

39.

Nikolai Semena, 'Sergei Kunitsyn: "Strategicheskikh oshibok ne dopushcheno...'", Zerkalo nedeli (22 May 1999).

40.

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Doc. 8655, 'Repatriation and integration of the Tatars of Crimea' (18 February 2000), http://stars.coe.fr., p.7.

41.

Nikolai Semena, 'Krym ne soglasen s biudzhetom 2000...', Zerkalo nedeli (18 March 2000).

42.

Vladimir Pritula, 'Troe v krymskoi lodke, ne schitaia tekh, kto na beregu', Zerkalo nedeli (1 July 2000).

AUTONOMY AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT REGULATION 141 43.

Most Crimean Tatars speak Russian better than the Crimean Tatar language, although they overwhelmingly indicate the latter as their native tongue. Nonetheless for purposes of analysis they will be treated separately from the category 'Russian-speakers'.

44.

See Sasse, 1998, pp.9-10.

45.

Edward A. Allworth, 'The Elusive Homeland', in Edward A. Allworth (ed.), The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), pp.259-60, 353.

46.

Andrew Wilson, 'Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming', in Allworth (ed.), pp.281-322.

47.

'Deklaratsiia o natsional'nom suverenitete krymskotatarskogo naroda', in Guboglo and Chervonnaia, pp.109-11.

48.

Recording of the hearing, 'Problemy zakonodavchoho vrehuliuvannia ta realizatsii derzhavnoi polityky shchodo zabezpechennia prav kryms'kotatars'kogo narodu ta national'nykh menshyn, iaki buly deportovani i dobrovil'no povertaiut'sia v Ukrainu' (in the author's possession) provided by Volodymyr Kulyk.

49.

Wilson, 1998, p.290.

50.

Wilson, 1994, p.13.

51.

The Crimean Tatars began to cooperate with the Ukrainian national movement Rukh even prior to Ukrainian independence.

52.

See the website of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in Ukraine at http://www.ifes.ipri.kiev.ua/Elections98/Deputies/index.phtml.

53.

Svetlana Chervonnaia, Problemy vozvrashcheniia i integratsii krymskikh tatar v Krymu:

1990-e gody (Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1997), p.64. This monograph is an excellent treatment of the Crimean Tatar return and contains, inter alia, useful information on cultural and religious developments.

54.

Vladimir Pritula, 'Konets sveta dlia 'Novogo sveta'?', Zerkalo nedeli (8 April 2000).

55.

See Forced Migration Projects Special Report (January 1999), http://www.soros.org/ fmp2/html/FMP-Jan99.pdf.

56.

Nikolai Semena, 'Rozhdenie v...iskusstvennykh mukakh', Zerkalo nedeli (7 August 1999).

57.

Drohobycky (ed.), p.xii.

58.

Svetlana Chervonnaia, 'Krymskotatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie (1994-1996)' (Moscow:

Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1997), p.11.

59.

For example, the Sudak region. See A.R. Viatkin and E.S. Kul'pin, Krymskie tatary:

problemy repatriatsii (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniia RAN, 1997).

60.

Nikolai Semena, 'Ekonomicheskaia gordost' avtonomii', Zerkalo nedeli (24 July 1999). The budget must be approved by Kyiv in order to enter into force.