Prof.Dan
Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory
Author(syf ' H L Q L R O / O R \ G - R Q H s
Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 2000yf S S 2
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097703
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Review of International Studies (2000yf & R S \ U L J K W " % U L W L V K , Q W H U Q D W L R Q D O 6 W X G L H V $ V V R F L D W L R n
Mediation, conflict resolution and critical
theory
DEINIOL LLOYD JONES
Abstract. Focusing primarily on questions of methodology, this article argues that mediation
in international affairs has yet to be properly analysed using the theoretical tools provided by
the post-positivist turn in international relations theory. Recognizing the familiar distinction
between power-political and facilitative approaches, the article makes the case for a third
approach based on the political theory of J?rgen Habermas. The debate between neorealist
forms of analysis and critical theory is well known. More contentious, however, is the
argument that facilitative forms of third party intervention, such as the Norwegian mediation
of the Oslo Accords, cannot operate without a more formal and abstract notion of the 'right' in politics. Facilitation's gently working of the lifeworld has much in common with the hermeneutic approach to social science. Like hermeneutics, therefore, facilitation may suffer
as it fails to root out relations of power and domination. Even 'interim stages' in conflict resolution need a sense of 'final status' to gather a sense of pace and direction. The Oslo
Accords, for example, demonstrate the need to create a strong vision of 'final status' during the interim stage. The article leaves the practical political questions to one side. However, a
'methodological space' for critical theory opens up once the defects of the tradition are
highlighted, a space which may be filled by distinct forms of mediation practice.
Introduction
In his Keywords, Raymond Williams notes that the term 'mediation' has 'long been a
relatively complex word in English' and that 'it has been made very much more
complex by its uses as a key term in several systems of thought.'1
The meaning of mediation is traditionally complex. Unfortunately, I wish to com
plicate things further by demonstrating how new thinking about international
relations could create an alternative and additional shade of meaning in the concept
of international mediation. This article intends to link new critical concepts to
the study of international mediation so that those connected with the study of
International Relations can think about the topic using ideas drawn from a broader
sociological and political perspective. My hope is that the critical meaning of
mediation, which I will introduce in this article, will become a 'keyword' in the new
post-positivist/realist International Relations vocabulary.
After a brief introduction indicating the importance of the study of international
mediation I proceed by outlining the two principal approaches to international
mediation which exist at the present time: the power-political and facilitative
approaches. I then illustrate key defects in these approaches before arguing that
critical theory offers an alternative and distinct paradigm.
1 Williams, R., Key Words: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana Press, 1988yf S .
647
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648 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
For two reasons, the bulk of the discussion will be directed at the facilitative
school of theory and practice.2 First, critical argument against realist and neorealist
international philosophy is well known. Second, and more importantly, attempts
have recently been made to use Habermas's 'Discourse Ethics' in support of the
broad thrust of the facilitative tradition.3 This marriage of traditions is partially
correct. However, there are crucial differences between critical theory and the
methodology and approach of the problem-solving workshop. This is true in both
theory and practice. The purpose of this article is to create some conceptual and
methodological space for the eventual emergence of a distinct and unique critical
approach.
Why study international mediation?
Mediation is a form of conflict resolution in international politics which stresses the
vital role of a third party in the process of creating peace and facilitating agreement
between erstwhile disputing actors. Mediation plays a prominent role in contem
porary international affairs. Whenever some historic or epoch-making international
events make the news headlines a mediator has often played a role in the shaping of
events. The prominence of this type of international politics, where a few individuals
make decisions which can affect the lives of millions, entails the need for serious
critical analysis and debate within International Relations theory. There are two
reasons why the critical study of international mediation is important.
First, there is a need to peer beyond what Noam Chomsky calls 'language in the
service of propaganda.4 As George Orwell wrote in his essay 'Politics and the
English Language':
[a]djectives like epoch-making, epic, historic, unforgettable, triumphant, age-old, inevitable,
inexorable, veritable, are all used to dignify the sordid processes of international politics.5
Typically, and unfortunately, these are all phrases used in connection with
mediated 'peace processes', 'new world orders' and the like. The problem is that
these phrases are ideological or honorific terms and they obscure more than they
illuminate. The media may parrot the phrase 'peace process' as if in a trance.
However, the meaning of such phrases is not obvious to International Relations
theory. As mediation theorist Vivienne Jabri notes, for example, the concept 'peace'
2 I shall take as being broadly representative of this school of thought the following works, the list is by no means exhaustive: J. Burton, Conflict and Communication, (New York, 1969yf - ( J H O D Q G , P S R W H Q t Superpowers, Potent Small States (Oslo, 1988yf 5 - ) L V K H U
7 K H 7 K L U G 3 D U W \ & R Q V X O W D Q W $ 0 H W K R d for the Study and Resolution of Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (1972yf S S ; M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating Success: Facilitative Problem-Solving Workshops in an Interconnected Context', Paradigms: the Kent Journal of International Relations, 9:2 (Winter 1995yf ; J. Rothman, From Confrontation to Cooperation, (London, 1992yf . 3 I refer, in particular, to brief references to the critical theory of J?rgen Habermas in the following works: M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating'; V. Jabri, Discourses on Violence (Manchester, 1995yf ; J. Rothman, From Confrontation to Cooperation (London, 1992yf . 4 N. Chomsky, Chronicles of Dissent: Interviews with David Barsiman (Stirling, 1992yf . 5 G. Orwell, 'Politics and the English Language', in The Penguin Essays of George Orwell (London, 1984yf S .
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Mediation, conflict resolution and critical theory 649
is as controversial as the concept of justice or any of the more routine and hotly
disputed political concepts.6
Despite mediation's relationship with what Orwell called the 'sordid processes of
international polities', serious commitments to maintaining international order are
going to have to rely, at least in part, on relatively informal mediation processes. This
is a second reason to study international mediation. In his recent diagnosis of the
modern world, Age of Extremes, Eric Hobsbawm reflects on the importance of
mediation for the global order by contrasting the system of international governance
which characterized the nineteenth century with the absence of international
governance and the chaos of the late twentieth century. He writes:
for the first time in two centuries, the world of the 1990s entirely lacked any international
system or structure. The very fact that, after 1989, dozens of new territorial states appeared
without any independent mechanism for determining their borders?without even third
parties accepted as sufficiently impartial to act as general mediators?speaks for itself.7
Mediation is important as it could form part of a working international order.
Power politics vs facilitation
It is not easy to recognize mediation with only a few definitive guidelines in mind.
One writer argues, for example, that:
mediation is the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and
neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties
in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute.8
However, a brief trail through the mediation literature would soon reveal that all
the key terms in this definition are open to question. International mediation is
conceived to be a complex phenomenon. Fortunately, for our theoretical and investi
gatory purposes, mediation is also an idea and practice which is held together by
certain family resemblances. These family resemblances are commonly recognized to
be divided into two main sub-groups.
A first approach emphasizes manipulation, forms of power, processes of bar
gaining, coercion, the ideas of quid pro quo, leverage and compromise. This is called
a 'bargaining' or 'power-political' approach to international mediation.9 This
tradition has the following terms in its vocabulary: mediation, power-politics,
leverage, sticks and carrots, states as actors, international structures, settlement
rather than resolution and it also has a sense that there are quantifiable issues and
outcomes in any international dispute. This tradition locates mediation within a neo
positivist social scientific framework that conceives the theory and practice of
6 V. Jabri, Discourses on Violence. 7 E. Hobsbawn, The Age of Extremes (London, 1994yf S . 8 C. Moore. The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for resolving Conflict (London, 1996yf S . 9 See C. Mitchell, 'Conflict Research', in A.J.R. Groom, and L. Light (eds.yf & R Q W H P S R U D U y International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994yf D Q G 0 + R I I P D Q , 'Third Party Mediation and Conflict Resolution', in J. Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds.yf ' L O H P P D V R f World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992yf .
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650 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
mediation as aiming at the manipulation of the social environment largely via state
centred executive and administrative power.
A second approach emphasizes the qualities of neutrality, consensus and
impartiality and is called third-party facilitation or consultation. This tradition
emphasizes a different set of characteristics: facilitation, communication, social
psychology, the symbolic constitution of the social world, the role of non-state and
individual interaction in the problem-solving workshop, the need for a genuine
resolution, and the qualitative nature of issues and outcomes. This approach empha
sizes how social-psychological perceptions, which are obstacles to more deep and
meaningful negotiations, can be broken down by a facilitator working within the
intimate setting of a small group of key decision-makers. Some facilitation theorists,
most prominently John Burton, even argue that this type of conflict resolution,
through the tool of the problem-solving workshop, can penetrate the fundamental
reality and causal power of human need.10
The two approaches rest, fundamentally, upon well-known sociological categoriz
ations of action. The power-political approach uses the idea of strategic action
effectively summarized by Stephen White. As White puts it, within the concept of
strategic rationality:
Action is conceptualized as the intentional, self-interested behaviour of individuals in an
objectivated world, that is, one in which objects and other individuals are related to in terms
of their possible manipulation. The rationality of action is correspondingly conceptualized as
the efficient linking of actions seen as the means to the attainment of individual goals.11
Broadly put, the facilitative approach works with a concept of action at odds with
strategic action?the idea of contextual rationality. Stephen White defines the idea
of contextual rationality. Situations defined by contextual rationality are situations:
in which the overriding motivation has an intrinsically intersubjective or social character in
that it expresses a recognizable orientation to the values of some community as they are
manifested in some basic moral, religious or social norms. It is in relation to this sort of
orientation that we are often willing to consider even an action endangering self-preservation
as possibly rational.12
It is useful to illustrate how the theory of third party intervention is linked to
more widely accepted and discussed concepts. We see how the topic of international
mediation could fit into the broad remit of political theory. And when we come to
criticize aspects of the theory and practice of mediation from the standpoint of
normative political theory, as we shall do in the following sections, the critique has
something on which to anchor itself.
Problems with power politics
Critical theory's squabbles with power politics and strategic rationality are well
known. Nevertheless, to hone our analytical skills and to understand the impact of
10 See, for example, J. Burton, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (London, 1990yf . 11 S. Wliite, The Recent Work of J?rgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity (Cambridge, 1988yf ,
p. 10.
12 Ibid., p. 15.
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Mediation, conflict resolution and critical theory 651
post-positivism on the theory of international mediation we will allow ourselves a
brief foray into the critical arguments against power-politics.
The power-political approach is found to neglect without sufficient justification
what, in Habermas' writing, is called the emancipatory-cognitive interest. Approaches
to International Relations which respect this interest ought to concentrate on
'reflexivity and the conceptualization of human consciousness' as International
Relations becomes a form of 'social criticism in support of practical political
activity'.13 Mediation theory needs to be aware of the following: that it is related to
practice; how it is related to practice; and how the relationships between theory and
practice can be understood and developed, especially from the normative point of
view.
In terms of political action, the power-political framework is found to neglect the
creative dimension of human agency in its analysis?the power, as Hannah Arendt
writes, to bring something new into the world.14 The international world is not
necessarily a fixed and static set of relationships which is incapable of being
moulded to fit human purposes. And if, as international actors, we have the power to
act then we need an understanding of international politics which specifies the goals and aims of action.
Fundamentally, the approach to international mediation based upon power
politics flounders on the problem of the fact/value distinction. Zartman and Touval,
for example, write of the 'empirical base' for their 'theoretical formulations' and of
case studies based on 'a context of power politics and cost-benefit calculations'.15 In
claiming this type of theoretical status, Zartman and Touval face problems endemic
to all realist or neorealist thinking.
Kenneth Waltz, the archetypal neorealist, is aware that 'the facts are myriad and
do not speak for themselves'. He argues that:
facts do not speak for themselves, because associations never contain or conclusively suggest
their own explanation [...]. The idea of 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge' loses its charm
and indeed its meaning, once one realizes that the possible objects of knowledge are infinite16.
Waltz's understanding of the significance of facts is not, however, as developed as
that articulated by most post-positivist theory.
First, Waltz judges the significance of 'normal science' using utilitarian standards
of prediction and control. He writes, 'the question, as ever with theories, is not
whether the isolation of a realm [of reality] is realistic, but whether it is useful. And
usefulness is judged by the explanatory and predictive power of the theory that may
be fashioned'.17 Critical theory sees a basic problem with this argument. The
13 M. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1995yf ,
p. 95. 14 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958yf $ U H Q G W Z U L W H V
W R D F W L Q L W V P R V W J H Q H U D O V H Q V H , means to take an initiative, to begin [...] to set something in motion [...] With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was created but not before'. (Ibid., p. 177yf . 15 Zartman and Touval, 'International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Polities', pp. 27^5. As Michael Nicholson writes, 'there are a host of papers in the Journal of Conflict Resolution [...] where formal models are analysed, or quantified relationships studied, and where the whole ethos is one of firm positivism': M. Nicholson, 'The Continued Significance of Positivism', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds.yf , Q W H U Q D W L R Q D O 7 K H R U \ 3 R V L W L Y L V P D Q G % H \ R Q G & D P E U L G J H \f, p. 128. 16 K. Waltz. 'Laws and Theories', in R. Keohane (ed.yf 1 H R 5 H D O L V P S .
17 Ibid., p. 36.
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652 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
criterion of 'usefulness', measured in terms of predictive and explanatory power,
ignores the critical-cognitive interest in freedom and emancipation. This can be used
to assess the validity and significance of a claim to understanding.
Second, Waltz's analysis does not emphasize the social and intersubjective
character of the judgments which determine the significance of theories. Casting
doubt on the method which emphasizes the inductive collection of facts Waltz asks
himself how theories are made: he answers, '[t]he best, but unhelpful answer is this:
creatively [...] The longest process of painful trial and error will not lead to the
construction of a theory unless at some point a brilliant intuition flashes'.18 Here the
creative and interpretive elements of theoretical understanding are explained in a
highly individualistic manner and acts of interpretation seem to be bolts from the
blue. The influence of the sediment of understanding laid down by previous
generations or by the prevailing cultural climate on the process of 'normal science' is
obscured in this analysis. Every act of interpretation becomes, implausibly, a
transcendence, an act of genius. Waltz's understanding would obscure the way in
which international politics is formed as an idea in the minds of social movements:
for example, nationalism or Marxism.
Third, where Waltz does recognize the importance of the prevailing cultural
values embedded in the understanding of a community he relies on the judgments of
experts. He writes that, 'some part of the scientific community has to decide whether
enough of an empirical warrant exists to give a theory credibility'.19 The problem
with this view in terms of international politics is twofold. First, judgments about
the latter ought to be part of the public domain. Thus whether an understanding is
significant or not does not depend solely on the judgment of the 'scientific
community'?whatever this might mean in the case of the theory of international
relations. Second, and to repeat a point, interpretations about international politics
are not generated only by the scientific community. More plausibly the 'scientific
community' in International Relations is influenced by a wider social and cultural
consciousness. The idea of a nation state, for example, was not formed in the minds
of professional theorists of International Relations.
The above debates are not just theoretical games. Mediation theory needs a good
dose of theoretical self-consciousness. Explicit value judgments can often mas
querade as the facts of a 'problem-solving' 'normal science' thus lending illegitimate
support to contentious political and moral commitments. In the case of Zartman
and Touval, for example, we can see that this danger is a real one.20 Zartman and
Touval write of American mediation in the politics of the Middle East. However, the
supposedly neutral or factual case study?'the US has 'mediated' between Israel and
the Palestinians and it 'mediated' in Lebanon in the 1980s?is a highly contestable
historical value judgment. There is considerable evidence that American policy is
deliberately skewed in particular directions in the politics of the Middle East and
that rather than being a mediator in these conflicts the US is a key player with
strong interests of its own.21 If this is the case, though, then are we talking about
genuine mediation? Note that the identification of supposed facts of international
political life can often serve value-laden and distinctly partisan political causes.
18 K. Waltz, 'Laws and Theories', in R. Keohane (ed.yf 1 H R 5 H D O L V P S . 19 K. Waltz, 'A Response to My Critics', in R. Keohane (ed.yf 1 H R 5 H D O L V P S . 20 S. Touval and W.I. Zartman, 'Power Polities'. 21 See, for example, N. Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle (Boston, 1983yf .
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Mediation, conflict resolution and critical theory 653
Waltz attempts to rebut the charge that neorealism could become an ideology. He
writes: '[h]ow can theory have these effects [...] A theory applies only so long as the
conditions it contemplates endure in their essentials. If the anarchy of international
politics were to give way to a world hierarchy, a theory of international politics
would become a theory about the past'.22 Waltz's rebuttal is flawed. If theory
becomes sufficiently rooted in society then it can become a pervasive ideology. The
belief in an earth-centred universe, for example, flourished for hundreds of years
despite the fact that the conditions which it contemplated contradicted it. Waltz
does not sufficiently recognize the potential power of ideology. Basically, Waltz
should say that a theory is supposed to apply 'so long as the conditions it con
templates ensure their essentials', not that it does. The lack of normative, critical
analysis in the strategic approach is problematic as normative analysis is always
necessary, especially given the power-political goals of 'dampening' or 'managing'
the physical or violent manifestations of conflict while placing the normative issues
on the 'backburner' ,23 'Dampening' or 'managing' the immediate manifestations of
a conflict in circumstances where violence is an instrumental attempt to rebalance
the scales of international justice, or where violence is an attempt to rebalance power
relations, could represent a grave injustice. It is an extreme example, but to broker a
truce between the French resistance and the Nazi occupation so that the Resistance
stopped resisting would hardly be an act in pursuit of conflict resolution or even an
act of neutrality?it would be more like broking a surrender. At the very most,
'dampening' could only be called a cease-fire. Of course, 'dampening' or 'managing'
a conflict may well be an appropriate activity for a mediator to undertake in certain
circumstances and under certain conditions. However, it takes normative and critical
analysis to determine the real meaning of an act of mediation.
Problems with facilitation theory
Facilitation theories' strength is the recognition of the normative dimension.
However, does facilitation theory have a critical-normative perspective? Recently,
theories of 'communicative action' articulated by J?rgen Habermas have been used
to support traditional facilitative opposition to the power-political approach to
international mediation.24 The details of these interesting developments need to be
worked out carefully. There are tensions between facilitation theory and an approach
to politics to be derived from the political theory of J?rgen Habermas.25 Facilitation theorists concede that facilitation cannot stand on its own. Hoffman writes that
facilitation is a 'contingent step which is potentially complementary to other third
22 K. Waltz, A Reply to My Critics', in R. Keohane (ed.yf 1 H R 5 H D O L V P S . 23 Touval and Zartman write that the aim of a mediation process is to 'manage' and 'dampen' them by removing its violence manifestations and by arranging trade-offs among its immediate causes and issues'. Touval and Zartman, 'Power Polities', p. 44. 24 M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating Success: Facilitative Problem-Solving Workshops in an Interconnected Context'; V. Jabri, Discourses on Violence; J. Rothman, From Confrontation to Cooperation. 25 In particular, I refer to Habermas's conceptualization of universal moral reasoning as described in J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, 1990yf .
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654 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
party initiatives'.26 If this is the case, then this article aims to circumscribe the limits
of facilitation theory. As facilitation theory struggles beyond empiricism and
hermeneutics, it's not clear that it has yet reached a true critical sophistication.
The facilitative approach to conflict has much in common with the approach to
social science rooted in the German interpretive tradition. Where meaning cannot be
separated from intersubjective interpretation and mutual recognition, politics
becomes something like, to use Gadamer's phrase, 'a fusion of horizons'.27 A
number of points are made: first, the infusion of knowledge by context, tradition
and history is not a barrier to understanding but is, on the contrary, a prerequisite to
it; second, understanding cannot escape the historical weight of tradition; third,
since individuals are constituted by history and tradition, the act of understanding is
also a process of self-development and formation; fourth, the act of understanding
moves history forward; fifth, the contingent character of knowledge and interpret
ation is recognized?here we see that the process of understanding is never fully
complete as it can always be revised in the light of new social experiences. Finally,
understanding is not construed solely as a method of approaching a social subject
but it is also construed as a way, or prerequisite, of being in the world.28
Hoffman echoes these views in his analysis of the basis of facilitation. Hoffman
writes of the facilitative view that, '[i]t takes as its starting point a recognition that
our identities are socially and historically constructed and that such identity-frames
are central to the causes and dynamics of conflicts'29. Here the interpretive process is
seen to be ongoing, constantly evolving and never finalized or closed. As Hoffman
puts it, in facilitation, '[s]uccess is no longer defined in terms of a set of unchanging
'objective' categories [...]'.30 Instead, facilitation is part of conflict resolution: the
general process of promoting social understanding which defines much of inter
national politics. Rothman also notes the influence of hermeneutics where, 'the
researcher reflexively places him- or herself right in the middle of the subject and,
acknowledging personal biases, even employing them, seeks to uncover how actors
interpret various events and meanings [...]'.31 The facilitator pursues the following
types of goals: 'fostering interactional conflict analysis', 'relationships', 'communi
cation', an 'educational role', 'an enhanced willingness to compromise' through
constructing 'meaningful relationships'.32 Rothman writes that the third party
facilitates the move from 'positional', through 'reflexive' to 'integrational' forms of
dialogue. Here positions are articulated, the reasons for holding them are uncovered
and based on these reasons attempts are made to create some form of social
integration. Rothman calls this a 'broader approach to peacemaking'. This approach
is 'partially descriptive of an emerging trend in the management of communally
based conflict [...] and fully prescriptive of a new emphasis that should be employed
in addition to conventional, adversarial-based approaches'.33
A general problem with a pure hermeneutics is that the recognition of con
textuality is insufficient to allow the formation of genuine understanding, as social
26 M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating', p. 5. 27 H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London, 1976yf S . 28 D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory (Cambridge, 1980yf S S A . 29 M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating', p. 9.
30 Ibid.
31 J. Rothman, From Confrontation, p. 71. 32 M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating'. 33 J. Rothman, From Confrontation, p. 64.
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Mediation, conflict resolution and critical theory 655
context can also be infused with relations of power, exclusion, domination and
control. These are relationships which have to be understood and practically over
come. Habermas describes 'the authority of tradition' in The Logic of the Social
Sciences'.
Authority and knowledge do not converge. Certainly, knowledge is rooted in actual tradition;
it remains bound to contingent conditions. But reflection does not wear itself out on the
facticity of traditional norms without leaving a trace. It is condemned to operate after the
fact; but, operating in retrospect, it unleashes retroactive power [...] Authority can be stripped
of that in it which was mere domination and dissolved into the less coercive force of insight and rational decision34.
Interestingly, from a more political perspective, yet echoing critical theory's dis
quiet about hermeneutics, Palestinian lawyer Jonathan Kuttab, describes the
facilitative model of conflict resolution as a 'false dialogue'.35 In the problem-solving
workshop there is, as Kuttab writes, the danger of assuming 'a false symmetry
between the oppressor and the oppressed; between the occupier and the occupied;
between the powerful and the weak'. Similarly, in an article on facilitation exercises,
Edward Said criticizes the idea that conflict results from a 'tragic mis
understanding'36. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, Said
would argue that the two sides understand each other all too well. The root of the
problems there do not stem from misunderstandings, but from fundamental political
disagreements which are coupled with radical imbalances of power.
Recognizing the defects of a pure hermeneutics, facilitation theory struggles to
move beyond a pure hermeneutics and attempts to adopt a more normative
perspective. In certain moments, for example, facilitation theory has proposed that
human nature, needs and purposes are somehow thwarted by the international
system and that the process of conflict resolution is merely, or mainly, one of
adjusting the surface superstructure of the system to ease to the surface of the
system what is, basically, an underlying harmony of human purposes and needs. We
might call this the volcano model of social change.37 The exact nature of this
philosophy is hard to capture, but it has much in common with the 'world society'
approach developed over the years by John Burton. As Halliday writes, Burton
'developed a theory of international relations based upon individual needs and the
system of issue-related linkages established by such needs'.38
Facilitation theorists acknowledge their debt to the Burtonian tradition. Rothman
writes, for example, that 'the roots of most if not all international conflict can be
34 J. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1988yf S . 35 J. Kuttab, 'The Pitfalls of Dialogue', Journal of Palestine Studies, XVIL2 (Winter 1988yf S S . 36 See 'The Limits to Cooperation', in E. Said, Peace and its Discontents (London, 1992yf . 37 While there are several different variants of this mode, in general it attributes episodes of collective violence to 'periodic eruptions of social-psychological tensions that boil up in human groups like lava under the earth's crust'. R. Aya, 'Theories of Revolution Reconsidered', Theory and Society, 8 (1979yf , p. 49. Basically, I reject this understanding of action for the reasons put forward by Salim Tamari. Tamari writes, with regard to the Palestinian intifada, that '[t]he word frustration obfuscates the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories. One, because it obscures the hierarchical form of control. Two, because it misconstrues the nature of the response, which is not a mindless eruption but a politically motivated act': S. Tamari, 'What the Uprising Means', Middle East Report, 153, 28 (May-June 1988yf . 38 F. Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Basingstoke, 1994yf 6 H H - % X U W R Q : R U O G 6 R F L H W y (Cambridge, 1972yf .
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656 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
traced to circumstances where these needs of individuals, who have banded together
in groups are threatened or frustrated'.39 Hoffman, at times, also deploys the
metaphorical strategies of the 'volcano' model?the tension between underlying
forces and surface structure. Describing the end of the Cold War he writes, for
example, that 'ethnic conflict' had been 'submerged beneath the contours of a
militarized bipolar system' and how violence has 'returned with a vengeance'.40 Here
facilitation becomes a technique designed to overcome a disequilibrium between
frustrated underlying demands and surface political structures. Hoffman writes of
'techniques', 'interconnected strategies', 'methods' and 'the manner in which they
are employed' .41
The role of the facilitator in this model is one akin to the role assigned to the
social critic in Habermas's earlier conceptions of critical theory. In an article,
'Systematically Distorted Communication', Habermas looked to psychoanalysis to
model the role of critical social theory.42 Here, insight and reflection are brought to
bear on hitherto repressed experiences as the patient (or societyyf D F K L H Y H V D Q H w
found autonomy and emancipation?an enlarged measure of rational control over
his or her actions. As Hoffman writes, 'violent conflict [is] an indication that the
assumptions underpinning the character, nature and structure of social relations are
in need of redefinition and rearticulation'.43 The facilitator in this situation plays a
similar role to the psychoanalyst or therapist. Like the psychoanalyst, as Kelman
writes, 'we do not propose (and certainly do not impose solutionsyf 5 D W K H U Z H W U \ W o
encourage a process whereby solutions will emerge out of the interaction between the
parties themselves'.44
There are problems with the 'volcano model' which stem from its concept of
'frustrated needs'. The conception of the underlying 'forces' ought to be normatively
redeemed and it isn't in the 'volcano model'. As 'needs theorists' Doyal and Gough
write:
one can have a drive to consume something, like lots of alcohol, which one does not need and
at the same time have a need for something, like exercise or to diet, which one is in no way
driven to seek [...]. To have an urge to act in a particular way must not be confused with an
empirical or normative justification for doing so45.
On this basis, Habermasian critical theory is hostile to the idea that human
nature, needs or drives can provide some kind of absolute fulcrum for critical
enquiry. As Stephen White remarks, '[...] Habermas usually does not refer simply to
'needs' but, rather, to 'need interpretations', a locution which expresses their cultural
variability'.46 If needs are understood as drives, the question of justification is
replaced by the technical question of how best to accommodate the drives within the
social structure. On this model, facilitation theory, in its attempt to move beyond a
39 J. Rothman, From Confrontation, p. 46. 40 M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating', p. 1. 41 Ibid., p. 2. 42 J. Habermas, 'Systematically Distorted Communication', Inquiry, 13 (1970yf . 43 M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating', p. 1. 44 H. C. Kelman, 'Applying a Human Needs Perspective to the Practice of Conflict Resolution: The Israeli-Palestine Case', in J. Burton, Human Needs, p. 285. The emphasis is mine. 45 L. Doyal and I. Gough, A Theory of Human Need (Basingstoke: 1991yf S . 46 S. WTiite, The Recent Work of J?rgen Habermas, p. 70.
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Mediation, conflict resolution and critical theory 657
pure hermeneutics, becomes just another form of social science orientated towards
prediction and control47.
The charges I level at facilitation theory at this stage in the argument are thus
twofold. First, the strong hermeneutic element of facilitation theory wrongly rests
on the idea that conflict is a function of a 'tragic misunderstanding'. Second, where
facilitation theory attempts to move beyond a pure hermeneutics to generate some
sort of critical order, the 'volcano model' of social change prevents adequate normative rationalization.
Some facilitative replies
I anticipate some objections from supporters of the facilitative approach. What's
interesting about some of these objections is the way they echo more postmodernist
or anti-enlightenment criticisms of Habermas's political theory. If nothing else, I
believe that the theory of international mediation is moving into the mainstream of
international political theory.
The first objection notes that facilitation theory does not always rely on the
Burtonian tradition to generate normativity. Both Hoffman and Rothman, for
example, allude to Habermasean and postmodernist political theory. These are
approaches less vulnerable to the problems surrounding the 'volcano model' as they
stress that all political or moral claims have to be normatively redeemed through discourse.48
The second defence of facilitation theory has much in common with
postmodernist criticisms of universalist political theories such as Habermasean
political theory.
Fundamentally, Habermas's normative understanding is Kantian in character. The mark of moral consciousness in 'discourse ethics'?Habermas boldest statement
of moral theory?is deontological (concerned with dutyyf F R J Q L W L Y L V W D L P L Q J W o
deliver moral knowledgeyf I R U P D O L W G R H V Q R W S U H V F U L E H V X E V W D Q W L Y H L Q M X Q F W L R Q V \f; and
universalist (the moral point of view is deemed to apply across time and spaceyf .
According to Habermas, 'discourse ethics' improves, in part, on the Kantian ethical
tradition. Rather than relying on abstract, monological standards of right, which are
applied by individuals in isolation from one another, 'discourse ethics' is rooted,
instead, in the structures of intersubjective, dialogical consciousness embedded in the modern lifeworld. 'Discourse ethics' thus reconnects Kantianism with real social
processes and is better placed, or so the argument goes, to overcome Hegel's seminal,
contextualist critique of Kantian abstraction.49
Commentators sympathetic to contextualist themes doubt whether Habermas has
completely succeeded in escaping the problems which face a more traditional
Kantian moral theory. As one writer argues:
47 J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Cambridge, 1986yf . 48 M. Hoffman, 'Defining and Evaluating'. J. Rothman, From Confrontation, 1992. In addition, Hoffman is well-known for his more general writing on critical theory. M. Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', Millennium, 16:2 (Summer 1987yf S S A . 49 J. Habermas, 'Discourse Ethics', in Moral Consciousness.
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658 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
Communicative ethics demands from its participants a willingness and ability to consider
normative questions from a universalist standpoint and to regard every being as an equal
regardless of the actual constellation of relations in real life.50
While situations of conflict are disruptions of everyday life, the authority of
tradition is already in question, thus Habermas cannot be accused of promoting the
attitude of critique for its own sake, critique as a way of life. (This, despite the fact
that Habermas argues, for example, that 'philosophy remains true to its tradition by
renouncing it'yf 1 H Y H U W K H O H V V W K H S U R E O H P I D F L Q J G L V F R X U V H H W K L F V V W H P V P R U H I U R m
the fact that, as Seyla Benhabib puts it, '[discourses arise when the intersubjectivity
of ethical life is endangered; but the very project of discursive argumentation
presupposes the ongoing validity of reconciled subjectivity'.51
The point would find an echo in facilitation theory. A willingness to engage in
conflict resolution based on 'discourse ethics' presupposes the kind of social and
political attitudes which remain to be fabricated in the process of conflict resolution.
Critical theory does not grasp that the problem of conflict lies at the deeper level.
Here a basic refusal to acknowledge the other exists. The problem is not just a
failure to agree over particular points of contention.
Facilitation theory has long argued that the 'demonization of the other' lies at the
root of conflict. And in this situation, arguing that communicative ethics is a
solution to a situation of conflict is rather like arguing that children who regularly
misbehave should be just told to respect authority.
Facilitation theory may take solace from these pertinent problems facing critical
theory more generally. Facilitation theory does not merely advocate communicative
ethics, but, instead, it attempts to work over time on deep-rooted attitudes and
practices which stand in the way of genuine dialogue. Facilitation theory is more in touch with the hermeneutic difficulties involved in conflict resolution. From this
perspective, the Norwegian facilitation of the Oslo Accords, for example, was not a
failure. Rather, it was a process which may not have been given time to work. To
condemn, in the abstract, the Oslo Accords for failing to respect the demands of
Palestinian nationalism, for example, is merely to fail to recognize the huge
difficulties which stand in the way of a meaningful peace process between Israel and
Palestine. There is a sense of political process in the hermeneutics of facilitation
theory and practice lacking in the more universalist Habermasean critical theory.
The need to retain critical normativity
I wish to conclude by suggesting a few remarks in favour of critical theory. Despite
the possible lack of a concept of 'process' in critical theory, there is still an approach
to international mediation which transcends both power politics and facilitation
theory, positivism and hermeneutics. For two reasons, critical theoretical approaches
to international mediation should not lose heart as they attempt to distinguish
themselves from their predecessors.
50 J. Mendelson, 'The Habermas-Gadamer Debate', New German Critique, 18 (1979yf S S " . 51 S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia (New York, 1986yf S .
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Mediation, conflict resolution and critical theory 659
First, it is important to remember that critical theory recognizes the need to
compromise and is sympathetic, for example, to ideas of 'interim periods' which are
divided from 'final status' solutions. The 'ideal speech situation', for example, to use
an old-formulation of Habermasean politics, is approximated in a process of moral
development. Thus critical theory is not totally removed from the concept of
'process'.
Second, the basic principles underlying particular compromises, and the division
of 'interim' from 'permanent status' solutions, need to retain a link with a normative
idea describing the nature of 'final status' and consensus could it be achieved. The
Oslo Accords, for example, have been criticized as the principles setting out the basic
framework of the facilitated peace process have been too weak to stop Israel from
exploiting the weakness of the Palestinians and the peace agreement during the
interim, compromise stage.52 Here, hermeneutic facilitation was not sufficiently
balanced by critical normativity. Agreement over final status was not sufficiently
strong to support the 'process' and, arguably, the latter has collapsed as a result. The
process model of facilitation theory, with its concepts of compromise, 'interim' and
'final status' has, therefore, to rely on an understanding supplied by a more abstract,
normative model if it is to translate the concept of 'process' into the concept of
'progress'. Though facilitation theory has a sense of 'process', it is critical theory
and practice which supplies the concept and sense, however vague and unspecified,
of 'final status'. And agreement over at least some aspect of 'final status' is necessary
to support the 'interim' status and solution.
Thus Jan Egeland and Geir Pederson, for example, who both played a part in the
Oslo facilitation exercise, stated their belief that Oslo would deliver what the
international community said was just?national rights for both Palestine and Israel.
This claim by Egeland and Pederson is not anything to do with the theory and
practice of facilitation as such. Rather, Egeland and Pederson articulated a claim
about ultimate normative foundations of their activities?that is, a belief that
'unrestrained communication', could it be achieved, would result in a bi-national
agreement.53
On top of this background reliance on the idea of 'unrestrained communication'
in facilitation theory, there is a more fundamental difference between facilitation and
critical theory. While facilitation theory's critical power seems limited to analysing
and promoting the microdynamics of the problem-solving workshop, critical theory
takes a more broad or historical view of an emancipatory political process. Funda
mentally, critical mediation theory wishes to know whether a peace process respects,
as Habermas puts it, the principle of universalization (Uyf + D E H U P D V Z U L W H V W K D W :
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulationyf 4
52 The final status negotiations between Israel and the PLO were supposed to reflect the provisions of UNSCR 242. However, it can be argued that UNSCR 242 is too weak to serve as an underlying set of principles guaranteeing the legitimacy of introducing an interim stage. Netanyahu, for example, has long made clear his belief that UNSCR 242 was respected with the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai under the Camp David Accords. See B. Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations (New York, 1993yf ,
p. 290. 53 Interviews with Jan Egeland and Geir Pederson August 1996. Egeland and Pederson were officials in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry at the time of Oslo. 54 J. Habermas, 'Discourse Ethics', in Moral Consciousness, p. 65.
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660 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
The crucial idea here is that normative validity depends on a general 'acceptance'
that a particular state of affairs is right. Habermas argues that he wishes to rule out
the 'monological' application of this principle.55 Knowledge of what the principle
entails must be generated discursively. However, it does not follow from the
argument against monologicality that the advent of a facilitative problem-solving
exercise is necessary to secure either (1yf W K H G H I D F W R J H Q H U D O D F F H S W D Q F H R I D Q Q R U m
or (2yf W K H R U H W L F D O N Q R Z O H G J H W K D W D S D U W L F X O D U Q R U P L V L Q I D F W D F F H S W H G D Q G W K H U H I R U e valid. Habermas claims that:
Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet {or could meetyf Z L W K W K H D S S U R Y D O R I D O l
affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.56
It is crucial to remember two things with regard to this idea. First, Habermas
leaves the nature of a 'practical discourse' largely unspecified and deliberately so.
Practical discourses may manifest themselves in different and as yet unspecified
ways. There is certainly no sense that practical discourse is equivalent to a facili
tation exercise and facilitation theory is presumptuous to claim the mantle of good
normative practice for itself alone. (Note, for example, that the PLO frequently
demanded an international conference chaired by the UN. This, for the PLO, was
the model of conflict resolution best suited to realizing its political-normative
ambitionsyf 7
A second point, and perhaps a more important one, is the fact that Habermas
states that a valid norm is one which could meet the approval of all those affected if
a practical discourse were actually to take place. This second condition, again, leaves
open the possibility that an actor could legitimately believe a norm to be valid even
though it had never actually been tested by that actor in a practical discourse, face
to face with other actors as it were. Of course, that actor would have to know that a
practical discourse, and we leave its nature unspecified, would validate the norm.
However, knowledge that a norm could meet with general approval in a practical
discourse may legitimately come from other sources?what Habermas calls, for
example, in another context, 'the web of human relationships' which make up the
intersubjective lifeworld.58 Again, there is no sense in which normative knowledge of
international relations generally, and international mediation more specifically, is
necessarily generated via the facilitative problem-solving workshop. In putting
forward this view, I am not suggesting that we can separate the cognitive question of
what norms are just from the organizational problem of creating democratic
procedures. This position would rightly be accused of falling into the problems
associated with the monological application of the Kantian will.59 I am merely
suggesting that critical theory operates at a higher level of abstraction than the
theory and practice of facilitation and with a broader account of emancipatory
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 See, for example, An Interview with Faisal Husseini' in The Journal of Palestine Studies, XX:4 (Summer 1991yf . 58 J. Habermas, 'Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power', in S. Lukes (ed.yf 3 R Z H U 1 H w
York, 1986yf . 59 As Stephen K. WHiite remarks, 'it is not difficult to see a nineteenth century American father forbidding his adolescent daughter from studying to be a doctor on the grounds that it is not proper for woman, given their 'nature', to enter professions. That father could, in good conscience, will his proscription as a universal law'. S. WTiite, The Recent Work of J?rgen Habermas, p. 82.
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Mediation, conflict resolution and critical theory 661
conflict resolution politics. For critical theory, the generation of a valid norm does
not depend on there having been, in particular, a facilitation process. The ways in
which a norm is validated are potentially much more numerous and diverse in
nature. As noted above, for example, the PLO had historically maintained that the
route to politically legititmate agreement with Israel lay through an international
conference under UN mediatory auspices. Such a model of conflict resolution would
be very different from the facilitative approach which created the Oslo Accords.
At this point the sceptic may rightly demand that I detail these supposed other
forms of normative political practice and that I connect these practices with the
work of third parties. Unfortunately, this task is beyond the scope of the present
article. In this article I intend merely to argue that there is a methodological space for
a distinctly critical approach and that power politics and facilitation theory is not
exhaustive of potential enquiry.
In any case, criticism has to be closely tied to the particular case. Habermas
writes, 'the validity claim of norms is grounded not in irrational volitional acts of
the contracting parties, but in the rationally motivated recognition of norms, which
may be questioned at any time'.60 These are the basic principles which would underly
an approach to international mediation based on critical theory. However, the
precise methods whereby a mediator can create 'the rationally motivated recognition
of norms' should be the subject of a 'pragmatic discourse' whose conclusions are (1yf
expressed in terms of 'conditional imperatives' and (2yf E H V W X Q F R Y H U H G Z L W K G H W D L O H d
reference to the contexts of particular situations.61 It is not the task of mediation
theory, as such, to answer such questions. (Though it may be true?theoretically?
that a general approach to the topic of international mediation must include
considerations which pertain to a 'pragmatic discourse'yf $ I X W X U H S U D J P D W L c
discourse would need to fill the methodological opportunity detailed in this article.
Conclusions
In this article, I have tried to show that there are differences between critical and
previous approaches to the theory and practice of mediation. The distinction
between critical and power political approaches is relatively uncontroversial. The
differences between critical and facilitative approaches are perhaps more
problematic.
Critical theory, with its strong universalist impulse, is vulnerable to the charge
that it lacks the sense of process which underlies the practice of facilitation. Here an
approach to international mediation based on the 'discourse ethics' of J?rgen
Habermas, for example, is rightly pushed to margins, if it exists at all. Against this
conclusion, however, facilitation's gentle working of the lifeworld is not the last
word.
First, to gather a sense of pace and direction, facilitation must rely on a
normative understanding that is derived from an idea of what would and should
occur if a more unconstrained communication were to take place. As Habermas has
60 J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 105. 61 J. Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (Cambridge, 1993yf S .
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662 Deiniol Lloyd Jones
long argued, there is, in every speech act, a tension between the factual and
counterfactual moments. Facilitation theory's concepts of process, compromise,
interim and final status all need to rely, for their theoretical and practical appli
cability, on a more ideal, normative point of view. As noted above, for example,
critics charge that the facilitated Oslo Accords have failed, at least in part, owing to
the uncertainties surrounding the agreed nature of 'final status' and the over
emphasis on the interim stage.
Second, critical theory has a more open-minded view as to the nature of norma
tively rational political processes in international politics. While these alternative
methods remained unspecified as yet, there is a prima facie case for believing that
normatively rational conflict resolution processes are not reducible to the facilitative
problem-solving discourse. The model of the international conference, though
unexplored in this article, seems different from both the power-political mediation and the facilitative exercise.
The article aims to prove, as a matter of methodology, that there is the possibility
of a unique and distinct critical approach to international mediation. What this
looks like in practice, remains to be seen. However, it is important to guard the truth
in matters of international relations. While we may not know exactly how critical
approaches work in practice, it is important to acknowledge that power politics and facilitation have their rivals. Whether these counter claims stem from the
abstractions of international theory or from discontents in the real world, I would
contend that the story of third party intervention in international politics is not over
yet.
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