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The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
ISSN: 1351-8046 (Print) 1556-3006 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fslv20
‘The War We Want; The War That We Get ’:
Ukraine ’s Military Reform and the Conflict in the
East
Deborah Sanders
To cite this article: Deborah Sanders (2017) ‘The War We Want; The War That We Get ’: Ukraine ’s
Military Reform and the Conflict in the East, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30:1, 30-49,
DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2017.1271652
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1271652
Published online: 23 Jan 2017.Submit your article to this journal Article views: 145View related articles View Crossmark data ‘The War We Want; The War That We Get ’: Ukraine ’s
Military Reform and the Conflict in the East
Deborah Sanders
King ’s College London and Joint Services Command and Staff College
ABSTRACTThis article examines the military change that has taken place in Ukraine since the conflict in the east began in 2014 and
argues that the Ukrainian military that is emerging from this process is very different from that envisaged by earlier govern-ments. The realities of the conflict on Ukraine from 2014
onwards have necessitated a move away from the transforma- tional model of military reform adopted from 2006 to 2014.
Instead, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have been forced to adapt their structure, means, and methods according to acomplex blend of the resuscitation of older features and the
embrace of new solutions. This process notably has included the adoption of mass, crowdfunding, and the raising of volun-
teer battalions. These changes provide the foundation for what is likely to continue to be a painful process of far-reachingmilitary reform.
Introduction
From 2006 to 2014, Ukraine ’sarmed forces (UAF) were engaged in a process
of military reform. This process was influenced heavily by the so-called
transformation paradigm: a model of war articulated by the United States
that identified future military effectiveness with such concepts as agility,
concentration, digitization, and information. When these reforms were tested
in the Donbas conflict in the east of Ukraine from 2014 onwards, it was
evident that the Ukrainian military was incapable of leveraging this model of
warfare. In response to the actual challenges of the conflict in the east, a
further process of change has been underway. The Ukrainian military that is
emerging from this process is very different from that envisaged in 2006.
Indeed, in some respects, the lessons from the fighting in the east of Ukraine
have shaped a return to pre-modern ways and means of waging warfare in
the 21st century.
The Ukrainian experience is interesting for two particular reasons. First, it
says something important about the problems of military reform. The
Ukrainian experience demonstrates the difficulties of importing military
CONTACT Dr. Deborah Sanders [email protected] Joint Services Command & Staff College, Faringdon Road, Shrivenham, Swindon, SN6 8LA, UK.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES2017, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 30 –49 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1271652
© 2017 Taylor & Francis
ideas from one context into another and in trying to engage in military
reform when fighting is still ongoing. Second, the Ukrainian example also
demonstrates the potential weaknesses embodied in the transformation
model, a model that has influenced many other militaries as well. The
British soldier Lord Kitchener is said to have declared, ‘We make war as
we must, not as we would like ’.1Kitchener ’s observation is an important
corrective to the notion that the war that we want to fight necessarily is the
war that we will actually have to fight. Rapid, decisive, high-technology
conflicts marked by small forces and low casualties may be how the West
would like future warfare to be characterized, but Ukraine ’s experience in the
east suggests that this might not be the reality.
In making these arguments, this article is divided into four parts. First, the
analysis considers the transformation paradigm, its features and
assumptions. Second, it examines the Ukrainian military ’s attempts from
2006 to import the transformation model into its armed forces and to imitate
key features of it. This involves examining both the idea of military reform
and its various constituent elements, as well as assessing the nature of the
Ukrainian reform program. It then examines how the Ukrainian military has
been shaped by operations in the east since 2014 before then assessing its
future prospects. Ultimately, this article argues that the challenges posed by
the conflict in the east have required a reform process marked in many ways
by a return to such traditional military verities as the importance of mass and
the development of volunteer forces funded by oligarchs and civil society.
The transformation paradigm
Transformation has been defined, rather elliptically, by the US Department
of Defense
as a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and coopera-
tion through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations
that exploit our nation ’s advantages and protect against our asymmetrical vulner-
abilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability
in the world. 2
In practical terms, what this translated into was a doctrine designed to
leverage such emerging technology as digitization, precision-guided munitions,
and new sensor and command and control infrastructures through innovative
new concepts and force structures. The aim was to move away from the large,
ponderous military systems of the Cold War. Instead, mass would be replaced by
forces that were more agile, mobile, flexible, lethal, and versatile. Technology, in
1D. R. Woodward, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson , Praeger, Westport, CT/London, UK, 1998, pp. 14, 17. 2O. Kronvall, ‘Transformation: The Key to Victory? ’in K. E. Haug and O. J. Maao, Conceptualising Modern War , Hurst and Company, London, UK, 2011, p. 260.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 31
the form of advanced information systems and precision firepower, would allow
forces to be smaller, and more capable, enhancing their effectiveness through
intense networking. 3Forces would be modularized with the focus on the
brigade, rather than the division, as the key combat element. 4Doctrinally,
transformation embraced the concept of ‘effects ’— rather than focus simply
on destruction, transformed militaries would focus instead on the proper coor-
dination of violent ( ‘kinetic ’) and non-violent ( ‘non-kinetic ’) activity designed to
influence an adversary ’s military, political, economic, social, informational, and
infrastructure ‘systems ’. Jointery, that is, co-ordination between different ser-
vices, was also regarded as central to the new approach, promoting synergistic
effects among land, sea, and air forces. 5This process of ‘de-massification ’,of
creating smaller forces but making them more capable, appeared vindicated in
2003 when mass, industrial-age Iraqi forces were crushed wholesale by the
United States ’information-age, post-industrial military.
Transformation emerged from a number of factors: the end of the Cold War,
assessments of the causes of the colossal coalition victory in the 1990 –91 Gulf
War, and political and institutional support for a concept that promised radically
improved effectiveness with smaller forces. 6Though it was a US concept,
transformation was extremely influential. For many other armed forces, the
innovative nature of US doctrinal thinking, its quality and quantity, combined
with the size of the US armed forces and their record of combat experience,
made them a ‘paradigm army ’: an army perceived to reflect the most efficacious
model of warfare and therefore an organization worth emulating. 7
Transformation has remained controversial, not least because of the difficulties
experienced by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. There, the difficulties in
translating success in the early war-fighting stages into success in longer-term
‘peace winning ’raised questions about the utility of transformations focus on
reducing mass in military forces. 8Still, transformation had a wide impact on global
militaries, becoming the premier warfigh ting model. The themes central to trans-
formation influenced the military reform processes of many key military actors,
including Russia and China. 9As the strategist Colin Gray notes: ‘Thedemiseof
3G. Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and T. Franks, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2005, pp. xiii –xiv and 11. 4S. E. Johnson, J. E. Peters, K. E. Kitchens, A. Martin, J. R. Fischbach, ‘A Review of the Army ’s Modular Force Structure ’, RAND, 2012, pp. 18 –21. 5G. Fontenot et al., pp. xiv and 17 –19. 6T. Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation ’,International Affairs , 84(4) (2008), p. 778; K. L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America ’s Military Revolution , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 106. 7C. C. Demchak, ‘Creating the Enemy, Global Diffusion of the Information Technology-Based Military Model ’,inE.O. Goldman and L. C. Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas , Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2003, pp. 307 –347. 8C. Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, chapter 8. 9See, for example, R. Cliff, China ’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015; K. Giles, ‘A New Phase in Russian Military Transformation ’,The Journal of Slavic Military Studies , 27(1) (2014), pp. 147 –162.
32 D. SANDERS
mass, sheer quantity, in favor of quality, is today the orthodox understanding of the
future of regular warfare in the technically more advanced countries ’.10
Ukraine ’s military transformation
Prior to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the emergence of conflict in the east
of Ukraine, the Ukrainian military had been engaged in a program of military
reform from 2006 –2014 that was marked by attempts to imitate elements of the
transformation model. After the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian government ’s
new mission was to build ‘anewtypeofarmy ’that would be ‘flexible, highly mobile
(not only in respect of tactics, but also strategy) and able to react to any
emergencies. ’11 Ultimately this meant the creation of a ‘high-quality, multifunc-
tional, mobile, professionally tr ained, well armed and fully equipped ’military in
Ukraine. 12 This vision was reiterated by the former Defense Minister, Anatoliy
Grytsenko, who stated that the Ukrainian military must ‘have a high level of
training and professionalism, along with the skills and experience of all the
ArmedServicesactingjointly,aswellasmulti-functionality,mobilityand
interoperability. ’13Grytsenko also pledged to equip Ukrainian forces with ‘modern
weapons platforms and equipment required to operate effectively particularly for
overseas deployments where state of the art communication are necessary to
ensure the integrity of command and contr ol and provide real interoperability
with partner countries. ’14
As part of this process of military transformation, Ukraine developed an
ambitious plan that would run from 2006 to 2011 and in which the Ukrainian
military would be radically downsized, res tructured, and shaped into an effective
professional force. Ukraine would begin by reducing its military personnel from
200,000 to 143,000 personnel by 2010. 15 Ukraine would also end conscription in
2010 and move toward a fully professional standing force by 2011. Ukraine would
also re-structure its armed forces into three functional divisions to facilitate
‘mobility, interoperability and functionality ’16: the Joint Rapid Reaction forces
(JRRF), the Main Defense Force, and Strat egic Reserves. The JRRF, which was to
be responsible for peacekeeping operations, would be the most powerful part of
Ukraine ’s fighting forces, and its prioritization in terms of funding and equipment
reflected the Ukrainian government ’s emphasis on developing interoperable,
deployable peacekeeping forces to enhance international and regional security.
10C. S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future War , Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2006. 11‘Ukraine ’s Strategic Defense Bulletin Until 2015: Brief Review with Comments ’, Razumkov Center, National Security and Defense, No. 8, 2004, p. 8.12The White Book 2006, Defense Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2007, p. 4.13Ibid., p. 514White Book 2005, p. 6.15‘Ukrainian Defense Minister Says 10bn Dollars Needed to Create Professional Army ’, Interfax-Ukraine News Agency, Kiev.16The White Book 2006, p. 18.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 33
Under these plans, the JRRF would be staffed by 29,000 personnel or about
30 percent of the total combat strength of the military. 17 The JRRF would have
two components: the Immediate Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces. The
Immediate Reaction Forces will be made up of 8,000 personnel, and the Rapid
Reaction Forces, which would have compr ised 23,000 personnel, would augment
these troops. Signifying the need to be rapidly deployable, the JRRF would be held
at an operational readiness of 30 days.
In a positive sign that the Ukrainian government was committed to implement-
ing these far-reaching and ambitious military reforms, the Ukrainian parliament
approved a significant increase in the defense budget for 2006 from 1.36 percent of
GDP to 1.74 percent. This signified recognition of the need to increase defense
funding if Ukraine was to engage in radical military transformation over the next
five years. 18 The Director of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry ’sfinancedepartment,
Ivan Marko, stated that this budgetary i ncrease for 2006 would allow the govern-
ment to move from sustaining the military to developing the military. 19 However,
the military failed to receive all of this funding, and with inflation running at
9 percent, this amount proved simply insufficient. As a result, many of the
proposed training programs had to be cancelled that year. 20 Ultimately, defense
spending during this early period of reform remained low despite recognition by
the government of the high costs of building a modern military. 21 Ukraine was hit
badly by the economic financial crisis in 2008 and from then its defense spending
failed to match its more modest transformational ambitions. Ukraine ’sGDP
shrank by more than 14 percent in 2008, and industrial production fell by half
from the previous year. The Ukrainian currency also suffered in response to the
country ’s declining economic prospects and financial difficulties. In response to
the economic crisis, the Ukrainian government was forced to agree a USD
16.4 billion package with the IMF to reviv e the banking sectors and ensure that
it could continue to service its large external debts. In light of these difficulties,
Ukraine ’s defense budget in 2009 dipped to an all-time low of 0.79 percent of GDP.
Highlighting the consequences of this, the Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff,
Colonel General Ivan Svida, went as far as to claim that ‘with the defense budget for
2010 … the Ukrainian Armed Forces will not be able to fulfil their constitution
duty to protect the state ’.22 Over the next few years, Ukraine ’s defense budget
remained at less than 1 percent of GDP. The year-after-year underfunding of the
UAF mean that by 2012 the government admitted that 90 percent of Ukraine ’s
17The White Book 2005, p. 35.18‘Ukraine Should Spend 2 Per Cent of GDP on Defence — Minister ’, Text of report by Interfax-Ukraine News Agency, Kiev, in Russian, 23 February 2006 as reported in BBC Online Monitoring 23 February 2006.19‘Ukraine Defense Ministry Reveals Budget Figures ’, UT1, Kiev, in Ukrainian 17 February 2006 as reported in BBC Online Monitoring, 17 February 2006.20The White Book 2006, p. 22.21‘Ukraine Needs Over 8bn Dollars to Launch Professional Army ’, Interfax-Ukraine News Agency, Kiev, 29 November 2007, in BBC Monitoring Online.22‘State of the Armed Forces in Ukraine Hinders NATO Bid — Russian Paper ’, Kalingrad newspaper Strazh Baltiki , 26 January 2010, in BBC Monitoring Online.
34 D. SANDERS
weapons were outdated and needed replacing. In addition, as Ukraine had failed to
radically downsize the UAF, 83 percent of its defense budget was spent on
maintaining rather than developing its military power.
Political instability and infighting in Ukraine during this period also had a
negative impact on military transformation. Military reform became hostage to
political infighting, coalition building, and constitutional wrangling among the
major political parties and actors in Ukraine. In March 2006, Ukraine held
parliamentary elections that, due to constitutional changes, would also decide
the appointment of the next Prime Minister and cabinet. After the Orange
Revolution, a constitutional package of reform was adopted wherein Ukraine
would move toward a parliamentary as opposed to a presidential system of
government. The new Prime Minister, who would form a cabinet to run the
government, would no longer be appointed by the President but instead be
drawn from the political party that won the most seats in the Ukrainian parlia-
ment, the Rada. In the parliamentary election, Viktor Yanukovych ’s party, the
Party of the Regions, Yushchenko ’s discredited rival in the October 2004 pre-
sidential elections, formed an Anti-Crisis Coalition with the Socialist Party and
the Communist Party and with a majority in the Rada eventually became Prime
Minister. 23 President Yushchenko dissolved parliament in April 2007 when it
proved impossible to work with Prime Minister Yanukovych, and parliamentary
elections took place in September. 24 Yulia Tymoshenko was eventually
appointed Prime Minister at the end of 2007 after her party and the pro-
presidential Our Ukraine — People ’s Self Defense Union gained a small majority
in the Rada. 25 However, major disagreements remained between the political
parties over fundamental issues such as the division of powers between the
president and legislative branches of government. The amendments to the 1996
Ukrainian Constitution did not satisfactorily resolve the issue of where power
lay in the Ukrainian political system, and the effect was political stalemate,
infighting, and a lack of effective government from 2007 to 2010. 26
As a result of this political instability, Ukraine made very little progress
during this first stage of military transformation in building a paradigm
military. In 2010, the newly elected President, Viktor Yanukovych, intro-
duced a revised military reform package that would run from 2011 to 2015,
again with the aim of building a small, but effective, professional military. 27
23For details of the parties and a breakdown of the election results, see S. Woehrel, ‘Ukraine: Current Issues and US Policy ’,CRS Report for Congress , Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 7 June 2006. 24For details of the results, see T. Kuzio, ‘Trends and Opinion Polls Reveal Shifting Voter Preferences in Ukraine ’, Jamestown , 4(171). 25For details, see T. Kuzio, ‘Presidential Party Is Weakest Link in Orange Coalition ’,Jamestown , 4(206), 6 November 2007.26‘Ukraine Must Choose Between Presidential and Parliament Form of Government, PM Tymoshenko Says ’, Ukrinform , 11 March 2008, as posted on the Ukrainian Government Portal, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/ publish/printable_article?art?id=117556944 . 27‘Ukrainian Defense Minster Views Army Problems, Plans, Ties With Russia, NATO ’,Krasnay Zvevda , 25 August 2010, in BBC Monitoring Online.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 35
As part of this more pragmatic approach to military imitation, Ukraine
would aim to reduce the number of service personnel in the UAF to
100,000 to free up resources, increase combat effectiveness, upgrade weapons,
and purchase new platforms. 28 However, by 2014 it had become increasingly
evident that the Ukrainian military actually had been trying to adopt a model
of warfare that was beyond the capability of the Ukrainian state actually to
implement and fund. The year-after-year shortfall in defense spending and
the context in which the Ukrainian army found itself, in which Ukraine was
faced with the emergence of Russian-backed, -led, and -supported separatists
in the east, has meant that while the Ukrainian government still supports the
idea of building a professional force, in the short term it has adopted a
composite approach that is both forward and backward looking. Military
change can take a number of forms, from innovation — the introduction of
new techniques or ideas; resuscitation — the repair of existing institutions
that have fallen into decay; adaptation — the contextualization of imported
values/ideas; to imitation — importing and recreation of values and ideas. 29
The Ukrainian government has adopted a policy of resuscitation where it has
attempted to repair previous structures and return to pre-modern ways and
means of waging warfare in the 21st century. It has also, however, adopted
some new and innovative ways of funding and supplying the UAF.
The Donbas conflict: Initial failure
In April 2014 the Ukrainian Government announced the start of the Anti-
Terrorist Operations (ATO) in response to the seizure of government build-
ings by separatists in the east of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk. By May
the separatists had occupied a significant portion of the Donbas. As the
Ukrainian government ’s counter-offensive looked to be gaining momentum
in June, Russian volunteer military forces crossed the border to support the
separatists, and Russia also began to arm the separatists with heavy weapons,
such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and advanced anti-
aircraft systems. 30 Over the next few months, in light of increased Russian
support, there was a growing asymmetry between the combat effectiveness of
the separatists in the east and the ill-prepared and increasingly outnumbered
Ukrainian forces. In the initial stages of the ATO, the Ukrainian army
struggled to deploy adequate numbers of properly trained and equipped
28‘Ukrainian Armed Forces Strategy Envisages Personnel Cuts, Equipment and Modernisation ’, Ukr.net. 7 December 2010.29For a discussion of the difference between military reform that is based on imitation, resuscitation, adaptation,and innovation, see C. Tuck. ‘All Innovation Leads to Hellfire: Military Reform and the Ottoman Empire in the 18th Century ’,Journal of Strategic Studies , 31(3) (2008); also see C. Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare , Routledge, London, 2014.30‘Preserving Ukraine ’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do ’, Atlantic Council , February 2015
36 D. SANDERS
forces. The political and financial neglect of the UAF meant that Kyiv could
only field 6,000 combat-ready troops in early 2014 out of a potential force of
130,000 personnel. 31 In July, Ukraine launched a fresh offensive to retake
towns held by the rebels and to reach government troops besieged for more
than a month at the city ’s airport in Donetsk. During this initiative, the newly
elected Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, drew attention to the grow-
ing threat when he claimed that Russia was moving from covert to more
overt support of the separatists after a Ukrainian An-26 transport plane was
shot down near the border. 32 A statement on the president ’s Web site said
that the aircraft was flying at an altitude high enough to evade any of the
weapons the separatist were known to have and was therefore mostly likely
attacked from inside Russia, thereby demonstrating the use of Russian forces
and capabilities to directly support the separatists. 33
The initial challenges facing Ukraine ’s armed forces in light of the growing
conflict in the east forced on them another reform process. This process was,
however, very different from that of 2006 –2014. First, it was shaped by the
nature of the conflict itself. In a speech in August 2014, Poroshenko claimed
that ‘a new Ukrainian army has been born in heavy and exhausting
fighting ’.34 Second, it drew on growth in Ukraine ’s civil society and built
on aspects of civilian technology, especially in terms of the Internet, and
modern means of utilizing it. Third, rather than military imitation, this
process featured important elements of resuscitation — of recreating older
approaches that, in the context of actual combat in the Donbas, seemed
better suited than continued attempts to replicate aspects of the transforma-
tion model. The key aspects of this process of reform included: the reintro-
duction of mass; organic ‘bottom-up ’innovation; and the utilization of what
were, in effect, pre-modern methods of mobilization.
The reintroduction of mass
In an attempt to address the challenges facing the Ukrainian military in the
east, the acting President, Olexander Turchynov, reinstated military con-
scription in May 2014 just months after it was scrapped by the previous
President, Viktor Yanukovych. 35 The return to conscription and the
announcement in February 2016 of the launch of the seventh wave of
mobilization to the UAF signaled a decisive move away from the develop-
ment of a small professional standing force and the previous policy of
31A. Osborn and A. Macdonald, ‘Ukraine Appeals to West as Crimea Turns to Russia, ’11 March 2014, Reuters, http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSBREA1Q1E820140311 . 32‘Ukraine Military Plane Shot Down as Fighting Rages ’,BBC Europe , 14 July 2014; A. Kramer, ‘Separatists Down Military Transport Jet, Killing 49 in Eastern Ukraine ’,The New York Times , 14 June 2014. 33‘Ukrainian President Blames Russian Troops After Transport Plane Shot Down ’,The Guardian , 14 July 2014. 34‘Ukraine Conflict: Poroshenko Boosts Military Spending ’,BBC News Europe , 24 August 2014. 35‘Ukraine Reinstates Conscription as Crisis Deepens ’,BBC News , 2 May 2014.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 37
military transformation. As a result of the nature of the conflict in the east,
Ukraine has dramatically increased the size of the UAF to 250,000 personnel,
successfully fielding 53,000 soldiers by June 2015 in the ATO operational
area in the east. 36 The adoption of conscription is ultimately an inevitable by-
product of the type of high-intensity asymmetrical conflict the UAF fought in
the east in 2014. In an interview in 2016, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense
stated that a ‘contract army would never be able to win ’the war in the east
and that it would be irresponsible for Ukraine to return too quickly to a
professional army. 37
The battle of Ilovaisk in August 2014, where a force of mostly volunteer
Ukrainian battalions supported by the UAF failed to hold a strategic railway
junction in Donetsk, highlights not only the brutal nature of this war but also
just how problematic Ukraine ’s previous model of military reform actually
was given the type of conflict the UAF were fighting. 38 Ultimately this battle
demonstrated the importance of mass, reserves, and the need for a large
stockpile of military hardware. Ukrainian forces made three unsuccessful
attempts to take Ilovaisk before its forces were cut off and then massacred
as they tried to withdraw. On 5 August the Kryvbas Battalion, supported by
the 51st Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian army, was given orders to take
the city and over the next few days conducted four unsuccessful attacks. The
next assault, undertaken by the Donbas, Shakhtarsk, and Azov Battalions on
10 August, was also unsuccessful and was followed by an assault on
17 August. In these attacks Ukrainian forces faced heavy and sustained
fighting. One unit reported that direct ‘contact with enemy forces took
place daily, with fire fights lasting up to seven hours ’with the number of
mortal rounds fired at them reaching 300 a day. 39 The importance of mass
became clear as the two sides fought each other to a stalemate, with
Ukrainian forces to the west of the train line that bisects Ilovaisk and the
rebels entrenched to the east. A campaign launched on social media demand-
ing that the government provide immediate relief for the Ukrainian forces
pinned down in Ilovaisk highlights the lack of reserves and also the growing
role played by Ukraine ’s civil society in the conflict. 40
The balance of forces continued to worsen for Ukraine. On 24 August the
Ukrainian Army General Staff Chief Viktor Muzhenko was informed that
Russian forces had invaded Donetsk, significantly augmenting the separatists ’
numbers and capabilities. Russian forces then began hitting Ukrainian posi-
tions in the south east of Ilovaisk. As a result of the Russian invasion, the
36‘Stepan Poltorak: Actual Armed Forces of Ukraine Differ From Last Year Army ’, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site, 8 June 2015.37‘Interview With Minister of Defense ’, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site, 4 January 2016. 38‘Photo Exhibit Captures Horrors of Russian Military Victory in Ilovaisk ’,Kyiv Post , 14 August 2014. 39‘Massacre of Ilovaisk Led to Massive Ukrainian Defeat ’,Kyiv Post , 21 August 2015, p. 11. 40L. Kim, ‘The Battle of Ilovaisk: Details of a Massacre Inside Rebel-Held Eastern Ukraine ’,Newsweek , 4 November 2014.
38 D. SANDERS
Ukrainian military were increasingly outnumbered, making victory impossi-
ble. Ukraine ’s chief military prosecutor, Anatoliy Matios, stated that as a
result of Russian reinforcements, ‘the balance of Ukraine ’s forces to the total
number of illegal armed groups and the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation was 1 to 18 in manpower; 1 to 11 in tanks; 1 to 16 in armored
vehicles; 1 to 15 in artillery; and 1 to 16 in mortars ’.41
Reinforcing the importance of mass was the significant attrition taken by
Ukrainian forces. Mikhail Barabanov has argued that an important lesson
from this conflict in the east was that manpower, materiel, and reserves were
used up rapidly by both sides and that the conflict ‘exposed the high vulner-
ability of military equipment to modern weapons ’even in a ‘not so big war ’.42
Illustrating the high materiel costs of the battle in Ilovaisk, President
Poroshenko claimed that 65 percent of Ukraine ’s military hardware was
destroyed during the fighting. Estimates suggest that Ukraine lost 220 tanks
and more than 480 armored vehicles through August due to combat, break-
down, or capture by the separatists. 43 Barabanov goes on to point out that
contrary to current thinking, compact modern armies with moderate reserves
are ultimately insufficient even for what might be termed small wars like
those currently being fought in the east of Ukraine. The high attrition rates in
the battle of Ilovaisk where 366 Ukrainian servicemen were killed, 429 were
wounded, 128 taken prisoner, and 158 are still missing suggest that building a
small professional army might not be sufficient to address future military
challenges. 44
By 2015 it had become increasingly clear that the war in the east was not
the rapid and mobile warfare that the UAF had been conceptually and
structurally preparing for, at least in theory, since 2006. Instead, the UAF
faced a highly attritional, and by mid 2015, an increasingly static and
unremitting conflict. In January 2015, Ukrainian troops lost control of
Donetsk airport after having defended it for nearly nine months. Dozens of
Ukrainian soldiers were killed or captured in fierce fighting. This was
followed a month later by intense fighting to control the strategically impor-
tant railroad junction in Debaltseve where Ukrainian soldiers withdrew after
taking and imposing heavy casualties on the Russian-backed forces.
Estimates suggest that Ukraine lost up to 260 soldiers with Russian losses
at 868. 45 Again, like in August 2014 in Ilovaisk, Ukraine ’s combat power was
undermined in Debaltseve by the lack of a strategic reserve. In an annex to
the White Book 2015, the Ukrainian MoD outlines how, during this conflict
in Debaltseve, the Ukrainian forces were tied down and prevented from
41Massacre of Ilovaisk Led to Massive Ukrainian Defeat ’,Kyiv Post , 21 August 2015, p. 11. 42M. Barabanov, ‘Testing a “New Look ”,Russia in Global Affairs , 18 December 2014. 43D. Lynch, ‘Ukraine Is Fighting a 21st Century War With Cold War Arms ’,International Business Times , 2 June 2015. 44‘Massacre of Ilovaisk Led to Massive Ukrainian Defeat ’,Kyiv Post , 21 August 2015. 45A. J. Motyl, ‘A Stalemate Ukraine Can Win ’,Foreign Policy , 4 March 2015.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 39
regrouping and that moving Ukrainian forces from one area to another
would have led to a weakening of the flanks. 46
As a result of both Russia and Ukraine ’s failure to implement the Minsk II
agreement signed in February 2015, the conflict has also become increasingly
static with tens of thousands of troops facing each other along a 500 km line of
separation. 47 Although there were signs that the shelling had become less
intense in late 2015, Ukrainian forces face continual attacks by separatist
forces, landmines, and sporadic fire fights. 48 On 27 December 2015,
Ukrainian positions were attacked at least 66 times in eastern Ukraine. 49
Over a 24-hour period in February 2016, the UAF Headquarters reported
that the enemy had conducted 22 precision attacks using mortars, grenade
launchers, and small arms on ATO forces. 50 In a clear sign of the brutality of
this conflict, figures published in a UN report in December 2015 suggest that
the death toll had reached more than 9,000, and more than 20,000 people had
been injured. While official government figures suggest that the number of
Ukrainian soldiers killed as of November 2015 was 1,842 with 8,519 wounded,
estimates suggest that the total number killed could be closer to 2,400. 51
The nature of this static and unrelenting conflict in the east has also,
perhaps unsurprisingly, also affected the morale of the UAF. As of
October 2015, the number of non-combat-related losses in the Ukrainian
army since the beginning of the conflict was estimated by the government to
be 600: This included suicides, accidents, murders, and security breaches.
The stressful operational environment in which service personnel face long
periods of boredom and repetition followed by ferocious attacks that they
have, at times, been unable to respond to has also increased such social
problems as alcoholism. 52
‘Bottom-up ’innovation
A second key way in which the UAF have been forced to move away from a
strategy of transformation has been in the funding — or more accurately
described as the ‘crowdfunding ’— of the military. In 2014 after the Russian
annexation of Crimea and the eruption of conflict in the east, the Ukrainian
defense ministry issued an appeal to the Ukrainian people to help fund the
impoverished armed forces. 53 Highlighting the extent of the problem facing
46‘White Book 2015, The Armed Forces of Ukraine ’, Ministry of Defense, Kyiv, 2016, p. 89. 47‘Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine ’, Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing No.79, International Crisis Group , 5 February 2016, p. 16. 48O. Grytsenko, ‘Ukrainian Soldiers Settle in for Another Winter at War Front ’,Kyiv Post , 4 December 2015. 49‘Russian Separatist Forces Attack Ukrainian Soldiers, Killing One and Wounding Three ’,Kyiv Post , 27 December 2015.50‘Ukraine Sees Over 50 Military Attacks on Its Positions in Last Day ’,Kyiv Post , 19 February 2016. 51‘At Least 2,400 Soldiers Killed in Russia ’s War Against Ukraine ’,Kyiv Post , 10 December 2015. 52O. Grytsenko, ‘Boozing Takes Soldiers ’Lives in War Zone ’,Kyiv Post , 7 December 2015, http://www.kyivpost.com/ article/content/kyiv-post-plus/boozing-takes-soldiers-lives-in-war-zone-403692.html
40 D. SANDERS
the government, the Deputy Defense Minister, Petro Mehed, stated that ‘our
army has been systematically destroyed and disarmed ’.54 As a result of this
appeal by the government and the civic awakening after the Maidan protests,
Ukrainian civil society has emerged as a key player in financing and supply-
ing the UAF. 55 The Ukrainian government raised USD 11.7 million to help
rebuild the UAF. 56 Highlighting the vital role played by volunteers and
charities in funding the UAF, Oleya Verbytska claims that at the start of
the conflict ‘the state was not ready for what was happening, and for almost
a year everything rested on the shoulders of the volunteers ’.57 In essence,
Ukraine ’s military are ‘supported by an army of civilian volunteers, who in
turn are supported by hundreds of thousands of diaspora Ukrainians, who
contribute large sums of money ’.58 Indicating the breadth of civil society ’s
engagement with the supply and financing of the UAF, money and supplies
have been reaching the military via Facebook groups, Web sites, text mes-
sages, and volunteer organizations. Online groups such as the Wings of
Phoenix, whose mission is to ‘equip, uniform, protect and improve the
Ukrainian Army as soon as possible ’have delivered thousands of helmets,
bulletproof vests, hundreds of radio sets, and sights to the Ukrainian military
units on the front line. 59 The People ’s Project, led in part by Dmitry
Tymchuk, the director of ‘Information Resistance ’at the Center of Military
and Political Research in Kyiv, has also successfully raised USD 36,000 to
build a squadron of border surveillance drones for the UAF. 60 Official figures
suggest that civil society provided the UAF with the equivalent of almost
4 percent of the Ukrainian defense budget in donations, logistic support, and
humanitarian assistance in 2015. 61
Pre-modern mobilization
There have also been profound changes in the structure of the UAF due to
the conflict in the east, which marks more of a process of resuscitation than
any attempt to imitate the world ’s leading militaries in the 21st century. The
process by which Ukraine ’s fighting force were regenerated could hardly be
54K. Lally, ‘Ukraine, Short on Military Budget, Starts Fundraising Drive ’,The Washington Post , 19 April 2014. 55K. Pishchikova and O. Ogryzko, ‘Civic Awakening: The Impact of Euromaidan on Ukraine ’s Politics and Society ’, FRIDE, Working Paper, No.124, July 2014; R. Biermann, A. Hartel, A. Kaiser, J. Zajaczkowski, ‘Ukrainian Civil Society After the Maidan: Potentials and Challenges of the Way to Sustainable Democratization and Europeanization ’, Report to the Conference organized by the Political Science Department of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, 12 December 2014.56V. Shevchenko, ‘Crowdfunding in Ukraine ’s DIY War ’,BBC News Europe , 29 July 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-europe-28459772 . 57K. Honcharov, ‘Creating a New Ukrainian Army ’,UNIAN , 16 November 2015. 58A. J. Motyl, ‘Ukraine Doesn ’t Have a Warlord Problem ’,Foreign Policy , 26 March 2016. 59http://wings-phoenix.org.ua/en . 60S. Gallagher, ‘Ukrainians Turn to Crowdfunding for Border Surveillance Drones ’,Law & Disorder , 30 June 2014. 61‘White Book 2015, The Armed Forces of Ukraine ’, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2016, p. 60.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 41
further from the transformation ideal. Instead, this process was more neo-
medieval in character, in which some of the most effective forces were raised,
equipped, and paid on behalf of the state by local notables — in particular,
oligarchs. In April 2014 the Ukrainian government launched the anti-
terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine and, due to the inability of the UAF
to mobilize sufficient forces, almost 50 volunteer battalions were set up,
comprising almost 10,000 fighters. 62 Throughout 2014 and into 2015, these
volunteer battalions played a vital role in containing the separatists. Lightly
armed, under-equipped, and with little training, the rapidly and often hap-
hazardly formed volunteer battalions became powerful forces in the struggle
against the Russian-backed separatists. Volunteer battalions performed a
range of tasks from police functions to combat operations. They come
from a variety of ethnic, professional, and political backgrounds and were
funded by local authorities, civil society, and oligarchs. 63 For instance, the
Azov Battalion, named after the Sea of Azov, is largely Russian speaking and
composed of volunteers from eastern and central Ukrainian regions with
several foreign fighters also making up its numbers. 64 The Azov Battalion is
funded by the governor of Donetsk region, the oligarch Serhiy Taruta.
Although the Azov Battalion operated officially under the control of the
Ukrainian interior ministry, its finances were murky, private donors pro-
vided weapons, and the far-right ideology of many of its members was
described as ‘alarming ’.65 Despite these challenges, the Azov Battalion,
regarded as the most effective of the volunteer forces, played a decisive role
in the campaign, and President Poroshenko referred to one of the volunteers
lost in combat as a hero. 66 In August 2014 the Azov Battalion mounted a
bold attack on rebel-held Marinko, establishing a bridgehead for the attack
on Donetsk, widening the Ukrainian front, and tightening the circle around
the Russian-backed separatists. 67 The Azov Battalion was also instrumental
in launching a major counter-offensive east and north east of Mariupol in
February 2015, pushing back the thin Russian line of defense some 2 –5km
east of the city and retaking important towns like Pavlopil, Shyronkyne, and
Kominternove. 68 In spite of the decisive role played by volunteers, this form
of pre-modern mobilization has created operational problems. The battle of
62C. Dunnett, ‘Ukraine ’s“Battalions ”Army, Explained ’,Hromadske International , 14 September 2014, https:// medium.com/@Hromadske/ukraines-shadow-army-b04d7a683493#.a5dro017t; B. Judson, What the Ukrainian Military Really Need ’,POLITICO , 27 August 2014. 63M. Klein, ‘Ukraine ’s Volunteer Battalions — Advantages and Challenges ’,RUFS Briefing No. 27, April 2015. 64C. Dunnett, ‘Ukraine ’s“Battalions ”Army, Explained ’. 65T. Parfitt, ‘Ukraine Crisis: The Neo-Nazi Brigade Fighting Pro-Russian Separatists, ’The Telegraph , 11 August 2014; S. Walker, ‘Azov Fighters Are Ukraine ’s Greatest Weapon and May Be Its Greatest Threat ’,The Guardian , 10 September 2014.66T. Parfitt, ‘Ukraine Crisis ’. 67T. Parfitt, ‘Ukraine Crisis ’. 68‘A Glimmer of Hope — The Azov Counteroffensive ’,Conflict Report Web log post, 10 February 2015, http:// conflictreport.info/2015/02/10/the-azov-counteroffensive-ukraine-fights-back/
42 D. SANDERS
Ilovaisk, for instance, revealed the challenges of effective communication and
coordination between the volunteer Battalions and the UAF. Officials in the
Ukrainian Defense Ministry told the Ukrainian parliament that the defeat at
Ilovaisk was due to the ‘independence of the volunteer battalions and lack of
coordination between them and the military ’.69
Despite volunteer battalions being ranked the second-most-trusted institu-
tions in Ukraine in an opinion poll in December 2014, they have also been
seen as a growing threat to the Ukrainian state and society. 70 In particular,
concerns have been raised about the creation of independent armies, the
increasing politicization of the Battalions, and allegations of human rights
abuses. A number of high-profile incidents have called into question the
Ukrainian state ’s‘monopoly on legitimate violence ’.71 Igor Kolomoisky, the
governor of Dnipropetrovsk, was forced to resign in March 2015 after
allegedly sending in a group of armed men to raid the Kyiv offices of the
state-owned oil company UkrTransNafta after one of his allies had been
sacked as chairman of the company. 72 Independent military forces directly
threatening the government ’s monopoly on the use of force was seen again a
few months later in July 2015, when the far-right paramilitary group Pravy
Sektor (Right Sector), who played a crucial role in the war effort, openly
criticized the Ukrainian government and, after an armed standoff with
government forces in Mukachevo, demanded the resignation of the country ’s
interior minister and threatened to send fighters to Kyiv. 73 There have also
been allegations of an increasing militarization of Ukrainian politics with
links between volunteer units, such as Sich, and nationalist parties such as
Svoboda, the latter using the former for political ends. During a protest at the
end of August 2015 in Kyiv over proposed constitutional amendments that
would have granted greater autonomy to the separatist regions in the east,
three National Guardsmen were killed by Ihor Humenyuk, a member of the
Sich Volunteer Battalion with links to the Svoboda party. 74 Although the
Svoboda party no longer has representation in the Ukrainian parliament, a
number of political groups and key individuals within the government retain
links to volunteer forces. 75
Allegations of human rights abuses have also been made against some of
the battalions. In September 2014 Amnesty International accused the Aydar
69A. Luhn, ‘Anatomy of a Bloodbath ’,Foreign Policy , 6 September 2014. 70M. Klein, ‘Ukraine ’s Volunteer Battalions ’. 71H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Trans. and eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology , Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, pp. 77 –128. 72E. Piper and S. Karazy, ‘Special Report: Ukraine Struggles to Control Maverick Battalions ’,Reuters , 29 July 2015; ‘A Ukrainian Oligarch Casts Doubts on Unity in Kiev ’,STRATFOR , 25 March 2015. 73R. Oliphant, ‘Far-Right Group Pravy Sektor Challenges Ukraine Government After Shootout ’,The Telegraph , 12 July 2015.74O. Sukhov, ‘Killed in Line of Duty, Defending Parliament ’,Kyiv Post , 4 September 2015. 75‘As Anger Mounts, What Comes Next? ’,Kyiv Post , 4 September 2015, p. 10.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 43
battalion of ‘widespread abuses including abduction, unlawful detention, ill
treatment, theft, extortion and possible executions during the conflict in
Donetsk and Lugansk ’.76 In light of these allegations, the Aydar battalion
was disbanded in January 2015, and in a show of force, they staged a protest
outside the Defense Ministry. 77 In December 2015, the Kyiv-based Civil
Rights Organization co-authored a report into Russian war crimes in
Ukraine and also found that Ukrainian forces, including fighters from the
Aydar and Tornado volunteer battalions, had also been accused of kidnap-
ping people. 78 In spite of attempts by the Ukrainian government to bring all
volunteer forces under central control by integrating them into the UAF, the
National Guard, or Interior Ministry, problems with the demobilization of
well-trained battle-hardy and highly motivated veterans continues to be a
problem. An improvised blockade of Crimea set up by Tatar activists in
September 2015 received support and reinforcements from Pravy Sektor and
Azov battalion veterans recently released from military duty. 79 On
20 November 2015, two pylons carrying electricity to Crimea from mainland
Ukraine were damaged in a series of explosions most likely by veterans from
these battalions. 80 In addition, there have been complaints about human
rights violations by members of the Right Sector taking part in the blockade
of Crimea. 81
Future developments and challenges
Despite these ongoing concerns about the future of the battalions and
demobilized veterans, the changes in the structure, means, and methods
used by the UAF over the last two years could represent an opportunity to
build a more effective program of military reform. The mass mobilization of
forces, the involvement of civil society, as well as the use of volunteer
battalions on the front line has in many ways created the impetus for change,
even if it is too early to determine how durable these will be in the long term.
The crowdfunding and public support of volunteer battalions, for instance,
has promoted and encouraged the development of a more modern procure-
ment system in the Ministry of Defense, although problems clearly remain. 82
The creation of a single efficient logistics and supply system for Ukraine ’s
76Amnesty International Briefing, 8 September 2014, AI Index: EUR 50/040/2014, https://www.amnesty.at/de/view/ files/download/showDownload/?tool=12&feld=download&sprach_connect=16777‘Tires on Fire: Nationalist Battalion Fighter Protest “Disbanding ”in Kiev, RT,https://www.rt.com/news/228623- aidar-kiev-protest-ministry/78‘Activists Aim to Hold Russia Accountable for War Crimes ’,Kyiv Post , 25 December 2015. 79B. Jarabik, ‘The Crimean Blackout: Electrifying Maidan ’,Carnegie.RU . Commentary, 25 November 2015. 80G. Gressel, ‘The Domestic Logic of Ukraine ’s Crimean “Blockade ”’, European Council of Foreign Relations, 3 December 2015.81H. Coynash, ‘Armed Right Sector & Azov Fighters Are Discrediting Crimea Blockade ’, Op-Ed, Kyiv Post , 7 October 2015.82K. Honcharov, ‘Creating New Ukrainian Army ’, UNIAN, 16 November 2015.
44 D. SANDERS
military, both in peacetime and war, is stated as a key priority in Ukraine ’s
Military Doctrine. 83 The Defense Minister, Stepan Poltorak, outlined how the
National Defense Procurement Plan for 2015 has dramatically increased the
number of military contracts and provided for the procurement of 400,000
rockets and ammunition for the ATO as well as significantly increased the
supply of clothing, shoes, and other items for the UAF. 84 The Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense has also introduced an open e-bidding system to increase
the effectiveness of procurement and to address allegations of corruption. 85
In January 2016, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense used this e-bidding
system for the first time to secure a contractor to supply food to the UAF,
allegedly saving the government more than UAH 1 million or about 34 per-
cent of the previous costs. 86 Despite these very small steps in improving
logistics, the system of supplying the UAF remains problematic. In
December 2015, the Defense Minister called for the investigation of financial
irregularities in the supply of the UAF. Estimates by the Defense Ministry
suggest that as much as UAH 7.8 billion (USD 312 million) has
disappeared. 87
In addition, although there has been some progress in developing the
social protection of military personnel, a vital element in constructing a
professional military, there is still a long way to go. In a bid to attract
more contract (professional) soldiers, there has been a significant increase
in pay. Stepan Poltarak, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, in announcing
the increase, claimed that in spite of the ‘adverse economic conditions, for
the first time, the wage of a contract serviceman will be more than an average
wage ’. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, more than doubling
the wages of all military ranks will allow the UAF to attract ‘experienced
professionals and patriots to the army ’.88 To address the housing shortage for
service personnel, the Ukrainian government has also developed a
‘Programme of Housing Provision for AFU Servicemen 2016 –2021 ’that
aims to develop a detailed plan for the construction, reconstruction, and
modernization of housing for veterans during this period. 89 Nonetheless, big
problems remain in the government ’s provision of housing for service per-
sonnel. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense admitted that it had failed to
83‘Military Doctrine of Ukraine ’, President of Ukraine official Web site, Documents No.555/2015, Section V point 47, http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443 . 84‘Reborn of the Ukrainian Army ’, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site, 4 December 2015, http://www. mil.gov.ua/en/speeches/2015/12/04/reborn-of-the-ukrainian-army/85‘Stepan Poltorak: Our Task Is to Create Conditions for Good Food Supply to Our Soldiers ’, 30 January 2016, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site.86‘First E-Procurement Saves Over UAH 1 Million ’, 20 January 2016, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site. 87Y. Butusov, ‘Military Strategy of Ukraine, Dzerkalo, Censor.net, 31 December 2015, http://en.censor.net.ua/ resonance/367277/military_strategy_of_ukraine88‘Minister of Defense of Ukraine: Next Year Servicemen Will Receive Wage of UAH 7,000 at Least ’, 20 January 2016, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site.89‘Reform of Housing Provision for AFU Servicemen and Management of AFU Military Assets ’, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, May 2015, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 45
meet the guaranteed right by law of military personnel and their families to
receive permanent housing in 2015. The queue for service personnel for
permanent housing was estimated as 27 years by the Ukrainian Ministry of
Defense, and with only 1 percent of veterans ’families receiving permanent
housing, the prospects of creating the necessary enabling conditions to build
a professional force do not look good. In a further attempt to improve the
social protection of service personnel, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has
also introduced new standards for medical support to troops with more than
6,000 service personnel receiving medical, psychological, and social
rehabilitation. 90 Ukraine ’s Military Doctrine also highlights the importance
of modernizing the military health-care system and integrating this more
effectively with the civilian health-care system. 91 Despite these commitments
and improvements over the last year, the UAF still receive a large number of
their medical supplies from international and domestic donors. 92
One of the additional positive effects of the conflict has been the realiza-
tion of the importance of developing Special Forces and Ukraine ’s need to
engage in fundamental reform of the Spetsnaz, to increase their operational
effectiveness. Ultimately the revival of Ukraine ’s Special Forces is recognized
by the government as integral to the development of a modern military.
Ukraine ’s new military doctrine states that bringing its Special Operations
Forces up to NATO standards is a key priority of defense reform. 93 During
the conflict the effectiveness of the Spetsnaz had been hampered by the lack
of a dedicated command structure, which meant that they were treated as ad
hoc infantry units and supplementary forces for front-line defense and rarely
used for specialist operations such as deep reconnaissance missions into
separatist-held territory. 94 The Spetsnaz also suffered from a lack of specialist
training and investment in specialist equipment. In 2013 the last Spetsnaz
training facility was closed down, and reports suggest that they lack basic
equipments such as night vision goggles, effective transport, body armor, and
sidearms. The lack of an appropriate command model and the lack of
investment in these forces have been recognized by the Ukrainian
Government. The NATO-Ukraine National Program for 2015 makes explicit
reference to the importance of strengthening its special forces and developing
a separate command structure. 95 In a sign that progress was being made, the
90‘We Were Able to Significantly Increase the Combat Capability of the Army ’, 23 January 2016, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site.91‘Military Doctrine of Ukraine, Section V, number 47.92‘US Gives Ukraine USD 23 mln in Medical Equipment and Military Communications ’,Ukraine Today , 17 January 2016; ‘UK to Send 3,500 First Aid Kits to Ukrainian Armed Forces ’, BBC News, 19 January 2016. 93Military Doctrine of Ukraine, section V number 47, ‘Formation of National Defense Capabilities Will Be Implemented Through ’. 94T. Gibbons-Neff, ‘Inside the Ukrainian Special Forces Fight Against Separatists —and Their Own Government ’,The Washington Post , 12 November 2015. 95‘Under Ukraine-NATO Programme ’,Kyiv Post , 27 April 2015.
46 D. SANDERS
Untied States recently set up a six-month special operations training program
in Khmelnytskyi. 96
Despite the small positive signs that Ukraine is building elements of a modern
military, a number of important challenges remain. Perhaps the biggest challenges
will be in funding such a large conscript-based military and equipping it with
modern capabilities and assets. Although Ukraine ’s defense budget in 2014
represented an increase of 24.9 percent over the previous year and accounted
for 1.78 percent of the GDP, the net increase over 2013 was reduced significantly
because of the high rate of inflation. 97 In addition, official figures show that more
than 80 percent of Ukraine ’s defense budget in 2014 was spent on the maintenance
of the UAF, with the training budget reduced from 2013 from 7.8 percent of the
defense budget to 3.4 percent of the budget in 2014. As a result of the reduction in
the percentage of the defense budget spent on training, there was also no increase
in the level of combat effectiveness of the UAF in 2014. 98 In 2015 Ukraine
increased its defense budget by almost 100 percent to USD 3.2 billion in an
attempt to build a well-trained and well-equipped armed force. Recognizing the
importance of investing in the development of new military equipment and
armaments, the percentage of the defense budget spent in these areas in 2015
was four times bigger than the budget in 2014. 99 In 2016 Ukraine further increased
its defense budget by about UAH 7.6 billion (USD 304 million). 100 Although this
budget marks a significant increase over p revious years, the costs of sustaining, in
the interim, such a large military to meet the threat in the east means that Ukraine
is unlikely to be able to effectively fund the building of a efficient and effective
military in the medium to longer term.
Despite the government ’s commitment to building a professional force, it
will struggle to achieve this goal even with a substantial increase in the
defense budget, as it is still fighting a financially costly war in the east. In a
speech to the UN summit in New York in September 2015, the Ukrainian
President, Petro Poroshenko, spelled out the high economic costs of the
conflict, which had contributed significantly to a slump in the Ukrainian
economy. Poroshenko claimed that the conflict in the east was costing
Ukraine USD 5 million a day. He also went on to point that due to the
loss of its eastern territories, Ukraine had also lost about a fifth of its
economic potential. 101 Production within the Donbas region has plummeted
by 70 percent, and estimates suggest this has cost Ukraine 7 percent of its
96‘US Begins Special Forces Training for Ukrainian Troops ’,Ukraine Today , 21 November 2015; ‘Statement and Releases ’, Kyiv, Ukraine — Embassy of the US, 20 January 2016. 97‘White Book 2014, The Armed Forces of Ukraine ’, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2015. 98Ibid., p. 13.99‘In 2015 UAH 7 Bln 105 Mln to Be Spent for Armament and Military Equipment ’, 19 January 2015, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine official Web site.100‘Defense Ministry Budget for 2016 to Amount for $2.22 Billion ’, 12 January 2016, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site.101‘Poroshenko Says Conflict Costing Ukraine $5 Million a Day ’, RFE/RL, 28 September 2015.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 47
GDP. Estimates also suggest that Russia ’s annexation of the Crimea has also
led to the loss of up to 4 percent of Ukraine ’s GDP. 102 In addition, the flow of
refugees from the region either to Russia or to other parts of Ukraine not
only represents an important loss of manpower but also puts additional
strain on the Ukrainian economy. 103 These losses call into question the
ability of the Ukrainian government to continue waging this campaign and
engage in far-reaching and what will be extremely costly military transforma-
tion. Despite the recent restructuring of Ukraine ’s debts and some tentative
positive signs that Ukraine ’s economic slump had slowed, Ukraine ’s econ-
omy ‘remains in dire straits ’.104
Conclusion
The Ukrainian government remains committed, at least in the long term, to
developing a professional military. 105 The Deputy Defense Minister, Ivan
Rusnak, stated that the main goal of military reform in Ukraine is to create ‘a
highly mobile, professional, well-equipped ’military. 106 However, the Donbas
conflict has cruelly exposed the limitations in Ukraine ’s attempts to imitate the
transformation paradigm and raises important questions as to whether or not
this is actually the best model for Ukraine in the future. Political and economic
conditions inside Ukraine from 2006 to 2014 made it impossible to implement
military reform in a sustained or coherent way. Indeed, during this period,
Ukraine ’s armed forces became less, not more, potent. The weaknesses of this
reform process were brutally exposed in the earliest stages of the Donbas conflict
when Ukraine could deploy only very limited forces. From 2015 onwards, the
Ukrainian military has become more effective. This effectiveness, however, has
been the result of embracing a return t o mass and positional warfare. At the
same time, while there have been very innovative developments in terms of the
use of the Internet and the engagement of civil society, this has been the result of
a bottom-up process prompted by the perceived inadequacy of the government ’s
ability to run the war. Indeed, aspects of the Ukrainian war effort have been
almost medieval in character, in terms of the raising of armed units on behalf of
the state by local notables.
The example provided by Ukraine ’s war in the Donbas region raises two
issues of more general relevance. First, is it wise for so many nations to try to
imitate the approach to war adopted by the United States? As the Ukrainian
102A. Aslund, ‘Russia ’s War on Ukraine ’s Economy ’,World Affairs , 9 July 2015. 103Pierre Vimont, ‘Ukraine ’s Indispensable Economic Reforms ’, Carnegie Europe, April 26 2016. 104E. Moore, R. Olearchyk, and N. Buckley, ‘Ukraine: Costs of Conflict ’,The Financial Times , 2 September 2015; D. Krasnolutska, ‘Ukraine Economy Slump Slows as Government Sees Turning Point ’,Bloomberg Business , 14 August 2015.105‘President: We Must Use All the Resources and Reserves for the Formation of the Contract Army ’, 11 February 2016, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web site.106‘We Were Able to Significantly Increase the Combat Capabilities of the Army ’, Ivan Stupak, 23 January 2016.
48 D. SANDERS
example demonstrates, local political, military, economic, and social contexts
can constrain decisively the ability of a state to realize the ambitious precepts
of the transformation paradigm. Reflecting on the weaknesses of the Egyptian
army in the years prior to the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, the Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat mused that: ‘We will simply have to use our talents
and our planning to compensate ’.107 It might well be that some states would
be better focused on more modest military reform programs that better
reflect the particular conditions that they face. Second, can we presume
that, just because we would like to fight in a particular way that the condi-
tions of a particular conflict will allow us to do so? The attritional character
of the Donbas conflict poses serious questions about the resilience of many
European armies. If the wars that we must fight in the future are not the
short wars of maneuver that we want, then will ‘de-massified ’militaries be
large enough to cope?
Notes on contributor
Dr. Deborah Sanders is Reader in Defence and Security Studies in the Defence Studies
Department, King ’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College,
Shrivenham, UK.
107A. Bregman, Israel ’s Wars, 1947 –93, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2009, p. 72.
JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 49
