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Bloody Christmas and the Irony of Police Professionalism: The Los Angeles Police Department, Mexican Americans, and Police Reform in the 1950s Author(syf Edward J. Escobar Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 72, No. 2 (May 2003yf S S 9 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/phr.2003.72.2.171 .

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. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to PacificHistorical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bloody Christmas and the Irony of Police Professionalism: The Los Angeles Police Department, Mexican Americans, and Police Reform in the 1950s EDW ARD J . ESCOBAR The author is a member of the departments of Chicana and Chicano Studies and histor y at Arizona State University. On December 25, 1951, approximately Ž fty Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) ofŽ cers brutally beat seven young men in their custody, including Ž ve Mexican Amer i- cans. The ensuing controversy became known as Bloody Chr istmas. Mexican Amer i- can activists demanded investigations into allegations of police brutality and L APD accountability to c ivilian control. The L APD’ s new chief, William Parker, however, had just launched a reform campaign based on the police professionalism model, which stressed police autonomy, particularly about inter nal discipline. Parker and his allies in city government sti ed external investigations into depar tment matters, viliŽ ed L APD cr itics, and even ignored perjur y by ofŽ cers. They thus helped create an organizational culture that valued L APD independence above the rule of law and led to the L APD’ s estrangement from Mexican Amer ican and other minor ity communities. E arly on the morning of December 25, 1951, ofÞ cers of the Los Angeles Police Department (L APD) severely beat seven young men, Þ ve of whom were of Mexican descent. All the beatings took place after ofÞ cers had the victims in custody. Much of the violence occurred at the central city jail where over 100 had gathered for a Christmas party. Responding to false rumors that a fellow ofÞ cer had lost an eye in a brawl with the young men, drunken policemen fought with each other and slipped on the victimsÕ blood to beat, batter, knee, and kick the prisoners. One of the victims later testiÞ ed that ofÞ cers kicked him so hard on the temple that the whole side 171 PaciÞ c Historical Review, V ol. 72, No. 2, pages 171Ð 199. ISSN 0030-8684 © 2003 by the PaciÞ c Coast Branch, American Historical Association. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223. This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 172 1. Los Angeles Times (hereafter Times ), March 11, 1952; Los Angeles Herald Express (hereafter Herald Express ), March 20, 1952; Hollywood Citizen- Ne ws (hereafter Citizen- Ne ws ), March 20, 1952; Times , March 21, 1952; Herald Express , March 25, 1952; Chr istian Science Monitor , April 24, 1952; Times , May 14, 1952; Herald Express , Oct. 6, 1952; Los Ange- les Mir ror (hereafter Mir ror ), Oct. 15, 1952; Los Angeles Daily Ne ws (hereafter Daily News ), July 1, 1952; see also Daryl F . Gates and Dianne K. Shah, Chief: My Life in the LAPD (New York, 1992), 35 Ð 36, and Joseph Gerald Woods, Ò The Progressives and the Police: Urban Reform and the Professionalization of the Los Angeles PoliceÓ (Ph.D. dissertation, Uni- versity of California, Los Angeles, 1973), 437Ð 439, for interesting but incomplete and somewhat inaccurate descriptions of Bloody Christmas. Most of the newspaper citations in this article are available in the form of newspaper clippings in the Los Angeles City Archives located at the Los Angeles City Records Center, Los Angeles, California. I have used standard newspaper citations in the notes to assist scholars who may not have easy access to this collection. of his head became temporarily paralyzed. Others suffered punc- tured bladders and kidneys. 1 All survived, but disclosure of the beat- ings created a controversy over the issues of police brutality and accountability to civilian control that captivated Los Angeles for al- most a year. The Christmas morning beatings and the discord that followed became known in the oral traditions of both the Los An- geles Mexican American community and the L APD as Ò Bloody ChristmasÓ and were dramatized in the 1998 motion picture L.A. ConŽ dential . The Bloody Christmas controversy resulted from a conß uence of forces that were at work in Los Angeles at mid-century. As a result of the appointment of William H. Parker as chief of police, the L APD had just embarked on a reform campaign based on the police pro- fessionalism model that stressed police autonomy in internal disci- plinary matters. At the same time, a newly insurgent Mexican Amer- ican civil rights movement had made ending police misconduct and holding the L APD more publicly accountable among its highest pri- orities. Mexican American community leaders therefore moved to force a thorough and impartial investigation into the Christmas morning beatings. Those efforts proved at least partially successful. The county grand jury investigated the beatings and brought indict- ments against eight ofÞ cers. Human relations groups, which munic- ipalities had developed in the previous decade to deal with inter- ethnic conß ict, held public hearings and issued reports calling for civilian control over L APD discipline. Local newspapers took up the issue of police brutality, and, for a time, the negative publicity seem- ingly threatened both the administration of recently appointed Chief Parker and the as-yet untested autonomy of the L APD. This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 173 2. At its simplest, the theory of the rule of law states that in a democratic society the law is an end in itself. No one, whether the President of the country or a police ofÞ cer, is above the law. More speciÞ cally, ofÞ cers cannot break one law in attempting to enforce another. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Tr ial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic So- ciety (Berkeley, 1975), 17Ð 21. ParkerÕ s job and the L APDÕ s independence were, however, safe. Los Angeles government leaders, including the mayor, the district attorney, the overwhelming majority of the city council, and even members of the judiciary, valued a strong, independent, and profes- sional police department that maintained order and stability above one that strictly adhered to the rule of law. 2 Non-governmental elites, such as members of the business community and segments of the press, concurred. What seems to have happened is that a broad consensus developed among these community leaders, and ulti- mately among a large segment of white Angelinos, that an aggres- sive, forceful, and independent L APD was vital to maintaining the city free of crime and ensuring its future economic well-being. That consensus developed largely out of the departmentÕ s public rela- tions campaign, which touted the L APDÕ s crucial role in keeping the city crime-free, which portrayed the department as the protector of the white middle and working classes from the growing minority populations, and which sought to vilify the departmentÕ s critics. Los Angeles elites thus supported ParkerÕ s efforts to limit the damage from Bloody Christmas. Those efforts fell into three cate- gories. First, Parker and his allies thwarted some investigations and limited the scope of others. Second, they failed to uphold the rule of law by ignoring obvious cases of perjury and obstruction of justice by ofÞ cers involved in the beatings. Finally, in keeping with Cold War sensibilities, local leaders tried to discredit the L APDÕ s critics by questioning their motivations and by arguing that charges of police brutality damaged police morale. The Bloody Christmas beatings and the L APDÕ s defensive pos- ture are certainly not unique in the departmentÕ s history. Beginning with early twentieth-century police attacks on Mexican immigrants, through efforts to destroy Mexican American labor unions in the 1930s, the Zoot Suit riots of World W ar II, the attempts to suppress the Chicano movement of the 1960s, and culminating with the most recent Rampart scandal, the L APD has a lengthy history of harass- ment, physical abuse, and civil rights violations against Mexican Americans and other minority individuals. Not only has the depart- This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 174 3. For early twentieth-century examples of L APD misconduct, see Edward J. Esco- bar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity: Mexican Amer icans and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1900 – 1945 (Berkeley, 1999), 34 Ð 36, 172 Ð 185; for conß ict between the L APD and Chicanos in the 1960s, see Edward J. Escobar, Ò The Dialectics of Repression: The Los Angeles Police Department and the Chicano Movement, 1968 Ð 1971,Ó Jour nal of Amer ican Histor y , 79 (1993), 1483 Ð 1514; for the most recent Rampart scandal, see the Los Angeles Times beginning Sept. 15, 1999; Los Angeles Police Department, Ò Board Of In- quiry Into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident Public Report,Ó 2000; Independent Re- view Panel, Ò A Report to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners Concerning the Operations, Policies, and Procedures of the Los Angeles Police Department in the Wake of the Rampart Scandal,Ó Los Angeles Police Department, 2000. As the 1965 Watts rebel- lion and the Rodney King beating demonstrate, African Americans have also been fre- quent victims of L APD misconduct; for Watts, see Robert M. Fogelson, ed., The Los Ange- les Riots (New York, 1969), which contains the McCone Commission Report and critiques of it; see also Robert Conot, Rivers of Blood, Y ears of Darkness: The Unforgettable Classic Account of the W atts Riot (New York, 1967); Þ nally, Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, Ò Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police DepartmentÓ (Los Angeles, 1991) provides late twentieth-century examples of L APD treatment of African Americans and Latinos as well as details on the King beating. ment engaged in such activities, it has managed to pass through most of the resultant controversies seemingly unscathed. 3 Within this context, the Christmas morning beatings and the subsequent cover-up would seem just another case of police brutality against Mexican Americans. Bloody Christmas, however, has signiÞ cance beyond a physical attack, no matter how vicious, on a group of young men. It proved to be a watershed event. Bloody Christmas coincided with the emer- gence of the modern, Ò professionalÓ L APD and, in fact, helped in- stitutionalize the police professionalism model in Los Angeles by developing a system by which the department insulated itself from external control. In subsequent years, the department would gain the reputation as not only the most professional and independent, but as simply the best police department in the nation. The L APDÕ s inß uence thus spread eastward to affect big city police departments throughout the country. Locally, Bloody Christmas solidiÞ ed ParkerÕ s hold not only on the department but also on the city as a whole. It brought into sharp relief the logical consequences of the L APDÕ s belief that Mexican American youth were a criminal element within the community, initiating a Þ fty-year period in which the departmentÕ s identity emerged as the protector of the white middle and working classes from the cityÕ s minority communities. At the same time, Mexican AmericansÕ vigorous response to Bloody Christmas demonstrated This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 175 4. For a thorough discussion of the L APDÕ s history, see Woods, Ò The Progressives and the Police.Ó 5. Ibid ., 360 Ð 364, 397Ð 416; see also Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 155 Ð 156. that communityÕ s growing political power and sophistication. The way that the L APD and Parker in particular successfully responded set the pattern for how the department would deal with public crit- icism in the decades to come. Finally and ironically, Bloody Christ- mas helped establish an organizational culture that prized the de- partmentÕ s independence above all other values, including the rule of law , thus legitimizing patterns of behavior that ran counter to as- pects of the professional model itself as well as to fundamental prin- ciples of law enforcement in a democratic society. * * * In the dozen years before 1951, the L APD went through a tu- multuous period in which it was literally re-formed. During the Þ rst third of the twentieth century, the department had been exceed- ingly corrupt. Large numbers of ofÞ cers received bribes from liquor, gambling, and prostitution interests, which in turn were al- lowed to conduct their business freely. Brutality against citizens, un- lawful arrests, the Ò third degree,Ó and other forms of misconduct ran rampant throughout the department. Civic leaders condoned this state of affairs because the department also served as a tool of local business interests in suppressing organized labor. 4 By the 1950s, however, the L APD had become the model for the modern, reformed, Ò professionalÓ police force. The process be- gan in 1938, when voters recalled Mayor Frank Shaw on the issue of police corruption. During the 1940s reform of the department con- tinued with a purge of corrupt ofÞ cers, the establishment of high standards for entrance into the force, a rigorous training program, better pay for ofÞ cers, and more modern equipment and adminis- trative procedures. The reform forces gained full control of the department at mid-century when Police Chief C. B. Horrall retired because of yet another scandal. A retired Marine general, William Worton, temporarily replaced him, but since only a career police ofÞ cer could become the permanent chief, W orton Õ s term was short. Thus, on August 9, 1950, William Parker, one of the architects of po- lice professionalism, became chief and began the wholesale profes- sionalization of the department. 5 This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 176 6. The discussion on police professionalism comes largely from Escobar, Race, Po- lice, and the Making of a Political Identity , 157Ð 162; see also Robert M. Fogelson Big City Po- lice (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 142 Ð 143, 145; for twentieth-century municipal reform in the West, see Amy Bridges, Morning Glor ies: Municipal Reform in the Southwest (Princeton, N.J., 1997).

7. Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 157Ð 162; Fogelson, Big City Police , 59, 99 Ð 100, 104 Ð 105, 144 Ð 145, 158 Ð 160, 175 Ð 176, 184, 223 Ð 224, 225, 282 Ð 287. While middle-class municipal elites had led the police reform movements of the Progressive Era, Parker and the other leaders of the police professionalism movement emerged from within the ranks of law enforcement agencies. Their main goal was to use pro- fessionalism to raise the status of policing, arguing that ofÞ cers de- served the same respect, admiration, and control over their profes- sion as doctors, lawyers, and teachers. 6 Two fundamental tenets of police professionalism Ñ police autonomy and a war-on-crime ori- entation Ñ had profound consequences for Bloody Christmas, the policeÕ s broader relationship with the cityÕ s minority communities, and ultimately for policing in the late twentieth century . Police professionals stressed that law enforcement should be carried out impartially, free from the control of politicians who had traditionally used police departments for patronage and to protect their political friends, even when those friends engaged in illegal ac- tivities. Reformers instead argued for total police independence from political control. Like doctors and lawyers, only police should set standards for entrance into the profession, proper conduct, pro- motion, and what actions necessitated disciplinary action. More- over, only with complete autonomy from political inß uence, espe- cially in the areas of promotions and police discipline, could police administrators ensure that ofÞ cers would enforce the law equally for all citizens. Thus, the police professionals conceded to elected ofÞ - cials only the power to pass laws. The police kept for themselves the power to determine how laws would be enforced, both for the pub- lic and for themselves. 7 In Los Angeles, the statutory premise upon which police au- tonomy stood was Section 202 of the city charter. As amended in 1934 by a margin of just 175 votes out of 190,000, Section 202 stated that ofÞ cers had a vested right to their jobs and could not be re- moved or seriously disciplined without due process. Due process in this case meant that sole authority regarding internal departmental discipline for serious infractions belonged to a board of review com- This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 177 8. Woods, Ò The Progressives and the Police,Ó 337Ð 338; Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 163 Ð 164. 9. Fogelson, Big City Police , 220 Ð 221, 231Ð 232; see also Steve Herbert, Policing Space: T er r itor iality and the Los Angeles Police Depar tment (Minneapolis, 1997), 59 Ð 60. posed of fellow ofÞ cers. The board of review determined whether an infraction of department policy had occurred, whether a speciÞ c ofÞ cer was guilty of such an infraction, and whether the infraction warranted serious punishment. The chief of police could review the trial boardÕ s decision and even lower the punishment, but he could not raise the boardÕ s disciplinary recommendation. No one outside the L APD had any authority over department discipline. 8 Because various sectors of the community believed the police could not po- lice themselves, Section 202 would become a focus of controversy once Bloody Christmas became public. In addition to the principle of police autonomy, professional- ism also brought a war-on-crime orientation that resulted in a degradation of the relationship between the police and the com- munity. Spurred by the public relations success of the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation Õ s (FBI) war on criminals such as John Dillinger, a new direction arose among urban police departments in which police changed from being a responsive force that reacted primar- ily to citizensÕ complaints to a preventive force that aggressively con- fronted the Ò criminal elementsÓ in society. Under the aegis of the war on crime, ofÞ cers aggressively patrolled neighborhoods that ar- rest statistics identiÞ ed as Ò high-crime areasÓ to demonstrate that vi- olation of the law brought certain and severe punishment. More- over, since many Americans violated some sort of law (liquor or trafÞ c laws, for example), the emphasis on crime Þ ghting created an Ò us against themÓ mentality and provided further evidence that the population at large disregarded the law. The police thus became alienated from the society they were supposed to serve. 9 While the war-on-crime mentality may have made Los Angeles police ofÞ cers feel like a class apart, it also put them in direct, often violent, conß ict with the cityÕ s minority communities. That conß ict resulted from the L APDÕ s belief that Mexican American youth were inclined toward criminality. In 1942 and 1943 a hysteria swept over Los Angeles emanating from the belief that a Mexican American crime wave was engulÞ ng the city. Evidence suggests that no such crime wave existed, but a broad spectrum of observers nonetheless This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 178 10. Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 186 Ð 202, 207Ð 227. 11. See William H. Parker, Ò Crime and Belief Ó and Ò Invasion from Within,Ó in O. W. Wilson, ed., Parker on Police (SpringÞ eld, Ill., 1957), 11Ð 17, 49 Ð 65. 12. Probably the most spectacular incident was the Salcido case, in which an L APD ofÞ cer stood trial for killing a Mexican American teenager. See Times , April 13, 1948, and other Los Angeles dailies for coverage of this case; for the L APDÕ s need to mend fences with nonelite whites, see Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 165 Ð 166, and Woods, Ò The Progressives and the Police,Ó 436. concluded that the zoot suit fad among Mexican American juveniles signaled their inherent delinquency. While ultimately most analysts agreed that such delinquency resulted from poverty and discrimi- nation, law enforcement ofÞ cials at the time argued that Mexican American criminality sprang from biological factors and that people of Mexican descent were genetically inclined toward violent crime. 10 In the years after World War II, the L APD ofÞ cially adopted so- ciological explanations for Mexican American crime but extended the linkage between race and criminality to African Americans and institutionalized it in the training and deployment of ofÞ cers. 11 The adoption of the war-on-crime orientation and the labeling of racial groups as the criminal element in society resulted in chronic conß ict between the L APD and the minority communities. OfÞ cers who believed that Mexican Americans were criminally inclined were more likely to be on the lookout for crime among them, to Þ nd it, and to make arrests. Similarly, ofÞ cers who believed that Mexican Americans were naturally violent were more likely to use force in what they regarded as dangerous situations. This last factor fused with Mexican AmericansÕ growing vigilance regarding police prac- tices to provoke a series of spectacular controversies between the Mexican American community and the L APD in the late 1940s. At the same time, the conß ict with the cityÕ s Mexican American and Af- rican American communities established the L APD as the protector of the white middle and working classes against minority crime, a role that helped the department create a constituency among groups that it had alienated by its union-busting past. 12 The war-on-crime metaphor also increased police ofÞ cersÕ sensitivity to criticism and especially to perceived attacks on their authority. After all, in a theater of war, which was how the police saw the streets of urban America, there could be only two sides, and po- lice came to believe that their critics favored lawlessness and disor- der. OfÞ cers thus responded defensively to charges of brutality and This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 179 13. Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 162; Fogelson, Big City Police , 99 Ð 100, 104 Ð 105, 112 Ð 116, 158 Ð 160, 236 Ð 242. 14. Woods, Ò The Progressives and the Police,Ó 410 Ð 412, 417Ð 425; see also Wilson, ed., Parker on Police , vii Ð xi. misconduct. This defensiveness, which historian Robert Fogelson has labeled Ò occupational paranoia,Ó merged with the professional- ism principle of autonomy to make ofÞ cers not only unsympathetic but practically invulnerable to citizensÕ complaints. The profession- alism model and its war-on-crime orientation thus strained the re- lationship between law enforcement and society in general. Because of the presumed linkage between race and criminality, however, they had their most deleterious impact on minority communities. 13 William Parker, the new chief of police of the L APD in the 1950s, was a product of this police professionalism tradition. Before becoming chief, he had developed and commanded the L APDÕ s Þ rst Bureau of Internal Affairs, whose function was to investigate charges of ofÞ cer misconduct. Under Parker and his successors, in- ternal affairs largely succeeded in weeding out ofÞ cers who took bribes or engaged in other forms of corruption that embarrassed the department. ParkerÕ s success at running the internal affairs divi- sion was crucial to the future of police professionalism since that unitÕ s efÞ cient functioning was vital to the concept of self-discipline and, ultimately , the philosophy of police independence. Moreover, Los Angeles had in Parker the quintessence of the professional po- lice ofÞ cer. He was intelligent, honest (Ò incorruptibleÓ was the word often used to describe him), innovative, strong, and loyal to his de- partment and to his men rather than to any politician. He was also a Catholic, a social conservative, a strident anticommunist, a Re- publican, and a believer in strict law-and-order policing. In short, he was the perfect Cold War police chief. 14 Equally important, Parker had the political skills and muscle to make police professionalism a fact. He became chief in August 1950 with the reputation both as a strict moralist and disciplinarian and as one of the leading theoreticians in the police professionalism movement. Immediately upon taking ofÞ ce, he set about reenergiz- ing and reorganizing the department. He informed the force that the old days of protecting vice and shaking down citizens for bribes were gone for good. Henceforth, internal affairs would seek out cor- rupt ofÞ cers and remove them from the department. Parker also This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 180 15. Woods, Ò The Progressives and the Police,Ó 417Ð 436; Daily Ne ws , April 9, 1952. For the L APDÕ s prestigious reputation, see the series of articles in the Chicago Sun Times extolling the department as one of the best police departments in the nation. Chicago Sun Times , March 11, 13 Ð 14, 1952; Wilson, ed., Parker on Police , vii Ð xi; Herbert, Policing Space , 59 Ð 60. In time, the Los Angeles Fire and Police Protective League would become a cru- cial component supporting the professional agenda, but in the early 1950s it had not yet attained its current political inß uence; see Fogelson, Big City Police , 192 Ð 218. streamlined the bureaucracy and gained additional appropriations for the department Ñ including increased ofÞ cer salaries Ñ while at the same time diminishing the inß uence of the mayor, the city coun- cil, and even the civilian police commission in the running of the department. He successfully asserted the major tenet of police pro- fessionalism: that elected ofÞ cials and the police commission had no authority over internal departmental discipline. Overall, he proved incredibly successful in these pursuits, turning the L APD into the very model of a professional urban police force and making himself at once the countryÕ s most renowned big city police chief and the most powerful man in Los Angeles until his death in 1966. 15 It is the supremacy of the police professionalism model in Los Angeles that brings special signiÞ cance to the Christmas morning beatings and the subsequent investigations. For Bloody Christmas occurred not in spite of police professionalism, but because of it. Several aspects of police reform ideology contributed to Bloody Christmas and the ensuing cover-up. First, the war-on-crime men- tality gave ofÞ cers a no-holds-barred attitude toward those they con- sidered lawbreakers. The linkage between race and criminality turned Mexican Americans into the criminal element and predis- posed ofÞ cers to engage in jailhouse justice against the victims. Fur- thermore, the public perception that Mexican American youth were criminally inclined gave ofÞ cers a sense that their deeds would go unpunished. The professional model also developed among ofÞ cers an ex- cessive sense of occupational identity and fraternalism. Thus, even normally honest ofÞ cers placed vengeance for and loyalty to their fellow ofÞ cers and to the department above the rights of people in their custody. The centralization of authority in the chief of police made him so powerful that he could successfully defeat any attempt, even by the police commission, to challenge established disciplinary procedures. Most importantly , the primacy of police autonomy meant that all other considerations could be ignored in its defense. This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 181 16. Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 264 Ð 284; for earlier in- stances of Mexican American protest against police misconduct, see ibid ., 34 Ð 36, 66 Ð 68, 132 Ð 154. The departmentÕ s independence, especially in the area of discipline, meant that outside agencies were virtually powerless to pursue thor- ough investigations. In the end, even the power of the courts was mitigated by the intransigence of individual police ofÞ cers who per- jured themselves rather than incriminate fellow ofÞ cers. Conse- quently, despite the involvement of at least 100 police ofÞ cers in Bloody Christmas, not one was disciplined until after the grand jury investigation was completed. Furthermore, the grand jury investiga- tion resulted in only eight indictments; in the eight trials that fol- lowed, there were but Þ ve convictions. One of the few forces to question the basic direction of the L APD was the emerging Mexican American civil rights movement. From the mid-1940s through the 1950s Mexican Americans domi- nated the civil rights agenda in Los Angeles. As recently as the early 1940s Mexican Americans had had practically no impact on local government. The crisis of the W orld W ar II-era zoot suit hysteria and the political aggressiveness of returning Mexican American veter- ans, however, brought about a new political consciousness that re- sulted in Mexican Americans gaining Þ rst inß uence and later a voice in city government. During the 1940s crisis, groups such as the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee brought national attention to anti-Mexican discrimination in Southern California. City ofÞ cials, looking for ways to restore Los AngelesÕ s stained reputation, turned to Mexican American-led groups, such as the Coordinating Council for Latin American Youth, to gain a better understanding of the Mexican American community and to deal with the zoot suit phe- nomenon. Having asked for Mexican AmericansÕ help, civic leaders had to grant them at least a modicum of inß uence. Mexican Amer- ican leaders took full advantage of the situation to gain social service programs for their community and reforms within the L APD. 16 After the war, returning Mexican American GIs asserted their newly found political muscle. First, they formed political groups, such as the Community Service Organization (CSO) that embarked on voter registration campaigns and addressed issues of community concern, including police misconduct. In 1949 the CSO helped elect Edward R. Roybal as the Þ rst Mexican American city council- This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 182 17. Ibid ., 285 Ð 290; Congressman Edward R. Roybal, interviewed by author, Jan. 5, 1988, in authorÕ s possession. See also Katherine Underwood, Ò Pioneering Minority Rep- resentation: Edward Roybal and the Los Angeles City Council, 1949 Ð 1962,Ó PaciŽ c Histor- ical Re vie w , 66 (1997), 399 Ð 425. 18. Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 259 Ð 260; Daily Ne ws , April 14, 1948; California State Assembly, Ò Resolution,Ó March 20, 1950, box 35300, Chief of Police (hereafter COP), General Files, Los Angeles City Records Center (hereafter CRC), Los Angeles. See also Underwood, Ò Pioneering Minority Representation.Ó man since the 1880s. Roybal had witnessed the zoot suit hysteria Þ rst- hand and made ending police abuse of Mexican Americans a major theme of his campaign. During his years on the city council, he paid special attention to issues related to the L APD, especially to the de- partmentÕ s relations with the Mexican American community. Roy- bal, for example, supported the appointment of Parker as chief of police in 1950 because he believed that Parker would bring needed reform to the L APD. Roybal also backed increased appropriations for many of the professionalization initiatives that Parker proposed. At the same time, Roybal focused on projects that improved relations between the department and the community and was quick to criti- cize the department over issues of police misconduct. 17 The emergence of Mexican American political power thus al- tered relations between that community and the L APD. One reason for the changed environment was that some mainstream white groups took up a protective stance toward the recently discovered exploited status of the Mexican American population. Beginning in the mid-1940s, the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Re- lations, created in response to the Zoot Suit riots and the Sleepy La- goon case, kept a watchful eye on police treatment of Mexican Americans to forestall any recurrence of the zoot suit hysteria. Left- ist groups, such as the Civil Rights Congress, were quick to decry in- stances of police brutality. Newspapers such as the Los Angeles Daily News publicized obvious cases of police misconduct. Most impor- tant, however, were the efforts of Mexican Americans themselves. Individuals, such as attorney Richard Iba– ez, helped raise awareness in police shooting cases. Mexican American-led organizations, such as the CSO and the more radical Asociació n Nacional Mexicana Amer- icana , called for investigations of the L APDÕ s treatment of the Mex- ican American community . Overall, Mexican Americans declared that they would no longer allow police abuse of their community to go unchallenged. 18 This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 183 19. Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity , 260 Ð 264. 20. For worsening relations, see the letter of the Mexican American candidate for the state assembly reprinted in the California Eagle , July 22, 1948; on William Worton Õ s ef- forts and the Committee of 21, see Roybal to Worton, Jan. 17, 1950, Worton to Roybal, Feb. 16, 1950, and especially Worton to David C. Wigglesworth, March 23, 1950, box 35300, COP, General Files, CRC; Armando Morales, Ando Sangrando [I Am Bleeding]: A Study of Mexican Amer ican Police Con ict (La Puente, Calif., 1972), 21Ð 22. Not only did the Mexican American community express its wishes, the L APD listened. In the immediate aftermath of the Zoot Suit riots, the department embarked upon a program to improve re- lations with the Mexican American community. For the Þ rst time in the departmentÕ s history, the chief of police proclaimed that ofÞ cers should not engage in discriminatory treatment of racial groups. The L APD initiated community relations programs and even Spanish- language training in the police academy. The department also es- tablished the Deputy Auxiliary Police, a program in which police ofÞ cers did youth work in the Mexican American community . 19 Despite these efforts, relations actually worsened in the imme- diate post-World W ar II years as instances of police misconduct con- tinued and the community became ever quicker and sharper in its response. During his brief tenure, however, Police Chief Worton made real efforts to improve interactions between police and Mexi- can Americans. He opened dialogues with community leaders. He made special efforts to quell public fears created by sensationalized newspaper accounts of Mexican American crime. He helped estab- lish the Committee of 21, a joint police-community group in the Mexican American barrio of East Los Angeles that sought to discuss and resolve differences between the two groups. Community lead- ers, and in particular Councilman Roybal, hoped that the new Ò pro- fessionalÓ chief of police, William Parker, would improve relations even more. They ended up being sorely disappointed by his re- sponse to Bloody Christmas. 20 * * * The catalyst for the Christmas morning beatings was a brawl outside the Showboat Bar on Riverside Drive just northeast of down- town. Two ofÞ cers, Julius Trojanowski and Nelson Brownson, re- sponded to a call that minors were illegally drinking at the bar. When the ofÞ cers arrived, they found Danny and Elias Rodela, Jack and William Wilson, Raymond Marquez, Manuel Hernandez, and This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 184 21. For early reports of the incident, see Daily Ne ws , Dec. 25, 1951; Times , Dec. 26, 1951; Mir ror , Dec. 25, 1951; Los Angeles Examiner (hereafter Examiner ), Dec. 26, 1951; Na- tional V oice , Jan. 3, 1952. 22. The Los Angeles metropolitan newspapers gave almost daily coverage to Bloody Christmas, beginning with the trial of the victims on March 6, 1952, until the grand jury issued its indictments on April 23, 1952. See, in particular, the Daily News , March 20, 1952; Herald Express , March 20, 1952; Times , March 21, 1952; Chr istian Science Monitor , April 24, 1952; and the Mir ror , July 2, 1952. 23. Daily Ne ws , March 20, Sept. 16, 1952; Times , March 21, 1952; Citizen- Ne ws , May 12, 1952; Mir ror , May 13, 1952; Herald Express , July 16, 1952. Eddie Nora sitting at the bar, drinking beer. Although the young men provided identiÞ cation proving they were over the legal drink- ing age, the ofÞ cers demanded that the seven leave the bar. When they refused, the ofÞ cers physically removed them, which precipi- tated the Þ ght between the ofÞ cers and the seven youths. No arrests occurred at the bar; however, several hours later police ofÞ cers went to the homes of the seven, arrested them, and took them to the cen- tral city jail. 21 When the youths arrived at the jail, they found themselves in the midst of the departmentÕ s Christmas Eve party . In violation of department policy, about 100 ofÞ cers were drinking liquor donated by local merchants. A false rumor had spread that OfÞ cer Tro- janowski had lost an eye in the Þ ght on Riverside Drive. 22 The effects of the liquor, the desire to avenge a brother ofÞ cer, and the knowl- edge that the prisoners were relatively powerless Mexican Ameri- cans produced an atmosphere conducive to brutality. The Bloody Christmas beatings were indeed brutal. Danny Rodela suffered a punctured kidney and a broken cheekbone. A physician testiÞ ed that Rodela had been Ò near deathÓ and would have died had he not received repeated blood transfusions. Eddie Nora sustained a punctured bladder from repeatedly being kneed in the groin, and he still suffered from the effects of the beatings months later. All the rest suffered similar injuries. Despite the obvi- ous brutality, the fact that as many as Þ fty ofÞ cers had participated in the beatings, and that over 100 ofÞ cers witnessed or had direct knowledge of them, department ofÞ cials managed to keep the case from the public eye for over two months. 23 By late February 1952, however, Mexican AmericansÕ increased aggressiveness brought the issue of police brutality to public atten- tion. The incident that raised conß ict between Mexican Americans and police to a new height was a violent confrontation between An- This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 185 24. Daily Ne ws , Feb. 25, 27Ð March 11, 1952. After February 27, the other metropol- itan newspapers also began to carry the case. 25. Daily News , Feb. 25 Ð March 11, 1952; Times , Feb. 26 Ð March 11, 1952; Herald Ex- press , Feb. 25 Ð March 11, 1952; Examiner , Feb. 26 Ð March 11, 1952. thony R’ os, chairman of the Community Service Organization, and two L APD ofÞ cers. According to court testimony, R’ os and a friend, Alfred Ulloa, saw two apparently drunken men beating a third man in the parking lot of a cafŽ on First and Soto Streets in East Los An- geles. R’ os and Ulloa protested, not knowing that the two assailants were plainclothes vice ofÞ cers. When the two ofÞ cers, F . J . N‡ jera and G. W. Kellenberger, identiÞ ed themselves, R’ os and Ulloa de- manded to know their badge numbers, whereupon the ofÞ cers drew their guns, threatened to kill R’ os and Ulloa, and arrested the two for interfering with an ofÞ cer. According to both men, at the jail N‡ - jera and Kellenberger stripped them of their clothes and beat them. Ò I guess this will teach you to keep your nose out of other peopleÕ s business,Ó R’ os quoted N‡ jera as saying. R’ os and Ulloa Þ led an ofÞ cial complaint, and fellow CSO member Councilman Roybal asked for a meeting with Parker. Nothing came of the complaints until R’ os and Ulloa went on trial. 24 The trial of R’ os and Ulloa, which began on February 27, 1952, sparked public interest in the issue of police misconduct. Here, af- ter all, was a case where the head of the cityÕ s most important civil rights organization was going on trial for allegedly trying to stop an instance of wanton police brutality. Moreover, events immediately preceding the trial date brought the issue even wider public atten- tion. On February 25 newspapers reported that OfÞ cer N‡ jera had stabbed a young Mexican American in an altercation at an East Los Angeles movie theater. The next day a Mexican American physician, Dr. Arthur Serra, claimed that a Los Angeles motorcycle ofÞ cer shot at him while he was rushing to see a patient. Finally, on the day the trial began, Councilman Roybal charged before the city council that he had Þ fty Ò provableÓ complaints of brutality by police against Mexican Americans and called for an immediate investigation of the department. Parker responded that RoybalÕ s charges were Ò un- warrantedÓ and that such accusations were Ò wreckingÓ the police department Ñ a rhetorical device that Parker would use repeatedly in the months to come. 25 The charges of police brutality thus became newsworthy , and the R’ os trial received daily coverage in the local press. Newspapers This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 186 26. Herald Express , March 1, 3, 1952. F. J. N‡ jeraÕ s reputation seemed to be well de- served. For an example of another confrontation with a Mexican American, see John Gar- c’ a, afÞ davit, Feb. 15, 1952, Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, supplementary Þ les (henceforth P.C. supplementary Þ les), CRC. 27. Mir ror , March 6, 1952. 28. Daily Ne ws , March 6, 1952. 29. Ibid ., March 11, 1952. In the same story, the Daily Ne ws noted that the jury fore- man stated that the jury was unanimously in favor of acquittal almost from the beginning of deliberations. 30. Califor nia Eagle , March 6, 1952. 31. Daily Ne ws , March 4, 1952. made much of the defense attorneyÕ s charges that OfÞ cer N‡ jera was a Ò brutal sadistÓ and that he bragged that he was Ò Ô the toughest cop on the East Side.Õ Ó 26 One witness corroborated R’ osÕ s and Ul- loaÕ s story that the two ofÞ cers threatened to kill them when they asked for identiÞ cation. 27 The owner of the cafŽ where the alterca- tion took place testiÞ ed that N‡ jera had been drunk and had tried to intimidate her. 28 With little deliberation, the jury found R’ os and Ulloa innocent of charges against them, a verdict that one newspa- per called a vindication. 29 The R’ os verdict legitimized the charges of police brutality against minority groups and provoked a broader discussion regard- ing the extent of police brutality. The African American-owned Cali- fornia Eagle , for example, published an informational piece entitled Ò Police Brutality; What T o DoÓ that told readers how to make com- plaints to the police department. 30 More provocatively, the Los An- geles Daily News published an editorial that called for amending Sec- tion 202 of the city charter to put L APD discipline in the hands of the civilian police commission and the mayor. Ò When any function of government, national or local, gets out of civilian control,Ó the Daily News concluded, Ò it becomes totalitarian.Ó Anything other than civilian control of police Ò makes them a Gestapo.Ó 31 Thus, for Parker and other proponents of police autonomy, the stakes were high when Bloody Christmas came to public attention in the midst of the R’ os trial. As in the R’ os case, the L APD had not dis- closed allegations about the beatings until the beginning of the trial of six of the seven youths who had been charged with battery and disturbing the peace. As might be expected, prosecution and de- fense witnesses gave differing accounts of the altercation at the Showboat Bar. The two police ofÞ cers claimed that they were at- tacked when they Ò peaceablyÓ asked Jack Wilson to leave the bar. This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 187 32. Ibid ., March 7, 1952; Examiner , March 8, 1952. 33. Daily Ne ws , March 6, 1952; see also Examiner , March 7, 1952, and Mir ror , March 7, 1952. 34. Times , March 8, 1952. 35. Daily Ne ws , March 13, 1952; Times , March 13, 1952; Mir ror , March 13, 1952; Ex- aminer , March 13, 1952; Herald Express , March 13, 1952; Citizen- Ne ws , March 13, 25, 1952. 36. Times , March 13, 1952; Mir ror , March 13, 1952; Examiner , March 13, 1952. The defendants, in turn, claimed that the Þ ght began when OfÞ cer Trojanowski began hitting Wilson on the head with a blackjack. 32 But the presiding judge, Joseph L. Call, did not restrict testi- mony to the Þ ght at the Showboat; he also allowed argument and testimony about how ofÞ cers beat the defendants after police had them under arrest. In his opening remarks, defense attorney James Warner told the jury that police beat Þ ve of the defendants on three separate occasions after the initial arrests. The defendants them- selves gave vivid testimony of the beatings. Danny Rodela recounted how ofÞ cers broke down the door of his house and repeatedly beat him over the head with a blackjack as they dragged him out to the waiting police car. 33 Jack Wilson testiÞ ed about how two ofÞ cers held him by the arms while OfÞ cer Trojanowski hit him in the stomach and on the face. 34 In his summation, defense attorney W arner ar- gued that L APD ofÞ cers had acted as Ò dictatorsÓ and that the de- fendants had a right to defend themselves. The jury did not agree and on March 12 found the defendants guilty of two counts of bat- tery and one of disturbing the peace. 35 Judge Call, however, was deeply angered by the apparent bru- tal and bloody beating that L APD ofÞ cers had inß icted on the de- fendants. After the jury delivered its verdict, he issued a stinging re- buke of police practices and called for an independent investigation into the Christmas morning beatings. Ò The record in this case,Ó Call stated, Ò is permeated with testimony of vicious beatings and brutal- ity perpetrated without cause or provocation long after these defen- dants were taken into custody.Ó He called the brutality by law en- forcement ofÞ cers Ò intolerable and reprehensibleÓ and stated unequivocally that the police ofÞ cers involved were Ò guilty of assault, battery and assault with a deadly weapon Ñ a felony.Ó Call concluded by requesting a grand jury investigation of the Christmas morning beatings and for indictments for those involved. Police Chief Parker and District Attorney Ernest Roll could only acquiesce. 36 Bloody Christmas created a Þ restorm of criticism against the This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 188 37. Walter C. Peterson to Police Commission, March 14, 1952, P.C. supplementary Þ les, CRC.

38. Amelia Aguayo to Los Angeles Police Commission, March 13, 1952; Pauline Ep- stien, et al ., to Fletcher Bowron, et al ., petition, March 13, 1952, P.C. supplementary Þ les, CRC; Boyle Heights Post No. 1556, resolution, March 13, 1952, in ibid . 39. Daily Ne ws , March 12, 1952. 40. Herald Express , March 14, 1952; Times , March 14, 1952; Citizen- News , April 30, 1952; Daily News , March 13, May 26, 1952; Examiner , May 27, 1952; Mir ror , May 27, 1952. L APD. Individuals and groups of various political persuasions con- demned the beatings and called for reform of the department. The tenor of the different groupsÕ statements ranged from those that simply denounced the L APD to those that made speciÞ c policy rec- ommendations. The city council, for example, observed Ò that the people are rightfully disturbed over evidence . . . [of ] Police brutal- ity.Ó 37 More pointedly, a group of 300 residents of East Los Angeles signed a petition protesting the L APDÕ s belief that just because people Ò are Negro or Mexican[,] they are criminals.Ó The petition also Ò demand[ed] a halt to the random arrest and the beating of members of our community.Ó For its part, the primarily Mexican American Boyle Heights Post of the V eterans of Foreign Wars, noting that the L APD had taken Ò no clear cut disciplinary action Ó regarding the many complaints of police brutality, called for an immediate in- vestigation and demanded that the brutality Ò cease at once.Ó 38 Concerns over the departmentÕ s inaction and calls for an in- vestigation were among the most prominent aspects of the criticism of the L APD. Even before Judge CallÕ s denunciation, the Los Ange- les County Democratic Central Committee sent a resolution to the state attorney general denouncing Ò the indifference of city ofÞ cials . . . toward brutal police methods against citizens and minority groups.Ó Such indifference, the Democrats stated, protected, sanc- tioned, and encouraged police brutality. They called on the attorney general to launch an investigation into Ò the person and the ofÞ ce of the Chief of Police William H. Parker, the Police commission and other responsible ofÞ cialsÓ and demanded that Ò ofÞ cials respon- sible for allowing police brutality to continue be brought to justice, be punished and dismissed or forever barred from public ofÞ ce.Ó 39 While some may have seen this as a partisan attack, the announce- ment that the FBI was Ò probing L.A. police brutalityÓ fed specula- tion that Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron, a fellow Republican, was displeased with Parker and would seek his resignation. 40 This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 189 41. Leroy Parra to Board of Police Commissioners, March 17, 1952, P.C. supple- mentary Þ les, CRC. 42. The Daily News was the only major Los Angeles newspaper to call for amending Section 202. See, in particular, Daily News , March 24, April 29, May 11, 14, 1952. 43. Public Relations Committee of the Los Angeles County Conference on Com- munity Relations (L ACCCR), Ò Report to the Los Angeles Police Commission,Ó March 17, 1952, P.C. supplementary Þ les, CRC. The L ACCCRÕ s other recommendations included having the department 1) issue a Ò statement of policy [regarding] the treatment of per- sons in custodyÓ and make Ò periodic checks to insure conformanceÓ ; 2) establish a hu- man relations detail; 3) establish Police-Citizen Committees in minority divisions; 4) pro- vide in-service training on minority relations; and 5) administer Ò social attitude testsÓ for current personnel and recruits. As offended as Parker may have been by these personal attacks, he was undoubtedly equally concerned over calls to amend Section 202 of the city charter, which guaranteed the L APDÕ s independence on personnel issues. The Independent Progressive Party character- ized Section 202 as a Ò most vicious and undemocratic law that tends to create the attitude among police ofÞ cers that they are Ô Law unto themselves.Õ Ó It called for the creation of an independent and elected civilian review commission to investigate and adjudicate any complaints of police brutality and misconduct. 41 A major metropol- itan newspaper, the Los Angeles Daily News , called for amending Sec- tion 202 to give the chief of police ultimate authority over discipline within the department. 42 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Los Angeles County Conference on Community Relations (L AC- CCR) charged that the L APDÕ s Internal Affairs Division (IAD) failed Ò effectively to check and discipline abuses of police power.Ó The L ACCCR speciÞ cally asserted that investigating ofÞ cers could arbi- trarily dismiss any complaint, that complainants were not allowed the presence of attorney, and that Ò too frequentlyÓ the IADÕ s Ò inter- rogations are conducted in an antagonistic manner or are based on the assumption that the complainant is a malcontent or trouble- maker and the ofÞ cer is above suspicion.Ó The L ACCCR thus called for the police commission to investigate the IAD and make recom- mendations that would Ò insure greater respect for the law and the law enforcement agency among the public.Ó 43 The calls for ParkerÕ s ouster and reform of the IAD threatened L APD autonomy and the larger professionalization movement. In response, L APD supporters and Parker in particular went on the of- fensive by impugning the integrity of their accusers and claiming that such criticism seriously damaged law enforcement efforts in Los Angeles. Mayor Bowron began the counterattack on March 17 at a This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 190 44. San Fernando V alle y Times , March 17, 1952. 45. Ibid .; Citizen- News , March 27, 1952; Rancho Park Star , March 27, 1952; The Com- panion , April 1952; Greater W est Hollywood Tr ibune , May 1, 1952. 46. Westwood Hill P ress , March 27, 1952. 47. Daily Ne ws , April 9, 5, May 22, 1952; Herald Express , April 22, 1952. special meeting of the police commission called to investigate com- plaints of police brutality in minority communities. While stating that he would not tolerate police brutality, the mayor nevertheless claimed that most allegations of police brutality came from com- munists who were seeking to destroy all agencies of lawful authority in America. 44 Conservative neighborhood newspapers often re- peated this allegation. 45 Two weeks later Parker picked up the same theme but added a new twist. In a speech before a West Los Angeles civic group, the chief declared that Ò fast money boysÓ were behind the accusations of police brutality in order to get him Þ red. The chief declared that if he were removed, underworld inß uences would reenter Los An- geles and reestablish their illegal activities. He defended his ofÞ cersÕ use of force, saying that, in a violent society, Ò sometimes the police have to use violence to protect the public.Ó Articulating what later became a recurrent theme, he charged that Ò all that stood between the public and anarchy were the police.Ó 46 In addition to impugning the motives of their critics, police ofÞ cials sought to hinder the various investigations into Bloody Christmas. Parker, for example, prevented the civilian police com- mission, which had statutory authority over the L APD, from investi- gating allegations of police brutality. Although it had no authority to impose punishment, at its special March 17 meeting the com- mission voted to have its hearing examiners investigate Bloody Christmas and all other complaints of police brutality. Parker, on the advice of City Attorney Ray Cheeseboro, however, informed the commission that, under the city charter, hearing examiners could not investigate matters of police conduct. With no other investiga- tive staff, the commission was unable to investigate the department over which it theoretically had authority. 47 L APD ofÞ cials and their allies also managed to limit the grand juryÕ s investigation. The district attorney provided the grand jury only with evidence related to the Christmas morning beatings them- selves and the poor supervision that allowed them to occur. The jury thus did not address the crucial question of the efÞ cacy of the This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 191 48. Examiner , March 21, 1952. 49. Times , April 11, 1952; Mir ror , April 11, 1952; Citizen- News , April 11, 1952. 50. Herald Express , March 18, 1952; Times , April 23, 1952. 51. William H. Parker to Grand Jury, June 16, 1952, box 35306, COP, General Files, CRC.

L APDÕ s disciplinary system or the broader issue of police brutality. In addition, the department managed to confuse and undermine even this limited investigation. Parker, for example, provided the grand jury a 204-page internal report on Bloody Christmas that re- vealed that several ofÞ cers actually witnessed the Christmas morn- ing beatings. The report nevertheless concluded that Ò none of the prisoners was physically abused in the manner alleged.Ó 48 Moreover, several ofÞ cers seemingly perjured themselves in their grand jury testimony. For the Þ rst two weeks of hearings, the grand jury listened to vivid and detailed testimony from the victims about the exact na- ture of the beatings. In contrast, ofÞ cers who were accustomed to giving precise testimony in criminal trials were vague, evasive, and often even contradictory before the grand jury. OfÞ cers, for ex- ample, admitted seeing the victims being beaten but could not rec- ognize any of the ofÞ cers taking part. Furthermore, some ofÞ cers who had previously given detailed information, including names, to the internal affairs investigators could remember little or nothing of the nightÕ s events when under oath. Los Angeles newspapers re- ported that the grand jury considered issuing perjury indictments against police ofÞ cers. 49 The stonewalling of the investigations succeeded in limiting the damage to the L APD. Despite early speculation that as many as Þ fty ofÞ cers might face indictment, the grand jury ultimately indicted only eight Ñ all for assault. 50 In addition, Parker initiated disciplinary proceedings against more than forty ofÞ cers for their activities on the night of the Christmas Eve beatings. The punish- ments, however, were minor, consisting of temporary suspensions without pay. 51 On April 29, a week after issuing the indictments, the grand jury released its Þ nal report on Bloody Christmas. While the local media made much of the criticism leveled at Parker, the report itself focused primarily on management issues related to the night of the beatings. The report faulted the department for Ò a general lack of proper supervision and controlÓ on the part of lieutenants and sergeants, the fact that there were Ò no clear cut or well deÞ ned zones of responsibilityÓ in the jails, and that training had been in- This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 192 52. Los Angeles County Grand Jury, Ò Interim Report Re: Police Brutality,Ó April 29, 1952, box 29, Edward R. Roybal Papers, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; for newspaper coverage of the report, see Herald Express , April 29, 1952; Daily Ne ws , April 29, 1952; Times , April 30, 1952. 53. Daily Ne ws , July 31, Aug. 1, 1952. adequate, Ò particularly [in] the matter of handling prisoners and the general public.Ó The report made no mention of the larger is- sues of L APD brutality against Mexican Americans or how the de- partment handled internal discipline. Nevertheless, the grand jury did feel compelled to remind the L APD that it functioned Ò for the beneÞ t of the public and not as a fraternal organization for the beneÞ t of fellow ofÞ cers.Ó It also suggested that ofÞ cers seek to un- derstand Ò the meaning of an oath taken before the Grand Jury, as some of them who testiÞ ed before this body are quite evidently un- aware of the same.Ó 52 The trials of the eight indicted ofÞ cers, which took place be- tween July and November 1952, provided few new revelations. Ulti- mately, Þ ve of the eight were convicted; only one received a sen- tence of more than a year in prison. Nevertheless, the extent to which high-ranking ofÞ cials, from judges to Chief Parker, ignored the apparent perjury and subornation of perjury by police ofÞ cers reveals the lengths to which government ofÞ cials would go to pro- tect the L APD. Throughout the criminal trials, police ofÞ cers either lost their memory or changed their testimony from what they had said earlier to either the grand jury or internal affairs. The Þ rst ofÞ cer to come to trial was Charles Heinzelman. During the trial, Heinzelman admitted telling one version of the events on Christmas morning to the internal affairs investigators and then changing his story during his trial. After his conviction, he stated at his probation hearing that he had been Ò inß uencedÓ by a fellow ofÞ cer not to tell the truth before the grand jury. Although this became public knowl- edge and was a clear indication of subornation of perjury, neither Police Chief Parker nor District Attorney Roll was willing to damage the departmentÕ s prestige by pursuing the matter. 53 Similarly, policemen who themselves were not accused of any criminal activity were nevertheless loath to give damaging testimony against brother ofÞ cers. Repeatedly they described the blows that resulted in punctured kidneys and other serious injuries with eu- phemisms such as Ò jostled,Ó Ò touched,Ó Ò pushed,Ó and Ò shoved.Ó Some even repudiated their earlier testimony before the grand jury. This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 193 54. Daily News , July 8, 1952; Citizen- Ne ws , July 8, 1952; Times , Aug. 7, 1952; Mir ror , Aug. 7, 8, 1952; Examiner , Aug. 7, 1952. 55. Daily News , March 24, April 29, May 11, 14, 1952; Mir ror , Sept. 18, March 20, July 2, 1952; Times , Oct. 9, 1952. The changing testimony of OfÞ cer John P . Epperson offers an illus- tration. Before the grand jury, Epperson stated that he saw Lt. Harry Fremont, the highest-ranking ofÞ cer indicted, Ò handling the boy [Eddie Nora] roughly . . . .There were possibly one or possibly two . . . blows,Ó Epperson testiÞ ed, Ò struck in the mid-section of Eddie Nora by Lieutenant Fremont.Ó (Nora suffered a ruptured bladder because of the beating.) During FremontÕ s trial, however, Epperson stated that he no longer believed that he had seen Lieutenant Fre- mont strike Nora. Epperson explained that before the grand jury he Ò testiÞ ed more freely than [he] normally would have doneÓ because police ofÞ cials assured him that they would handle the matter in- ternally and that Lieutenant Fremont would not face criminal charges. Ò Now ,Ó he concluded, Ò I believe I was mistaken about it be- ing Fremont who struck a prisoner in my presence.Ó 54 That police and elected ofÞ cials were covering up the facts of Bloody Christmas did not escape the notice of the Los Angeles news- papers. The Daily News repeatedly stated that the apparent perjury proved the injudiciousness of police self-discipline and called for the repeal of Section 202. The Mirror editorialized that a cover-up had existed since the beginning of the departmental investigation and had continued through the criminal trials. Columnist Florabel Muir wondered mischievously if ofÞ cersÕ bad memories would one day result in criminals going free. Even the conservative Los Angeles Times commented wryly that, while Ò some policemen can remember everything they see or hear; others can Õ t remember much.Ó Report- ing on the trial of OfÞ cer Roy Lantz, the Times noted, Ò Only one of the obviously reluctant [police] witnesses was able to recall with any clarity what he had previously reported witnessing in the jail.Ó 55 De- spite such damning commentary, it would seem that the courts, like the district attorney and the internal affairs division, were more in- terested in preserving the L APDÕ s autonomy than in taking action against this apparent obstruction of justice. One reason that the courts failed to take action against the ap- parent instances of perjury, and that the press referred to it only obliquely, was the L APDÕ s campaign to gain public support. Part of the campaign included ParkerÕ s meeting, sometimes privately, with This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 194 56. Daily Ne ws , March 28, 1952; see also the Community News , April 4, 1952. At the time of Bloody Christmas, the L APD had only the most rudimentary public relations op- eration. Parker, however, understood that his professionalism program needed strong public support and spent much of his time in subsequent years making public appear- ances. T oday, of course, the L APD has a highly sophisticated public relations apparatus. For the departmentÕ s public relations program in the early 1950s, see Worton to Bowron, Jan. 6, 1950, and Worton to Police Commission, March 1, 1950, box 35306, COP, General Files, CRC. For ParkerÕ s public relations initiatives, see Gates and Shah, Chief , 27Ð 38; for ParkerÕ s ideas on public relations, see William H. Parker, Ò The Police Administrator and Public RelationsÓ in Wilson, ed., Parker on Police , 135 Ð 144. 57. Mir ror , April 2, 1952. inß uential community leaders to plead the departmentÕ s case. In late March, for example, Parker met with a select group of newspa- per editors and other members of the white political establishment to try to temper coverage of Bloody Christmas. 56 The overall theme of the campaign was that Los Angeles needed the L APD to protect the city from criminal elements and maintain the cityÕ s reputation. In public pronouncements, Parker argued that criticism of the po- lice hindered ofÞ cersÕ ability to Þ ght crime, thus leaving law-abiding citizens defenseless against the depredations of gangsters and crim- inals who sought to overrun the city. On the day before the grand jury was to hand down its indictments, for example, Parker told a tel- evision audience that Ò antisocial elements are having a heydayÓ as a result of all the publicity regarding police brutality. He complained that the department was Ò harassed by the press,Ó placing it in a Ò de- fensive position from which the whole community is suffering.Ó 57 Other high-ranking police ofÞ cials agreed, alleging that crime was rising and arrests were falling because police ofÞ cersÕ morale was Ò shotÓ from all the negative publicity. The Los Angeles Mirror dis- closed that a consensus of L APD division commanders reported Ò a general letdown in activity because of public criticism of police.Ó The commanders argued that ofÞ cers hesitated to make arrests because they feared accusations of police brutality. These high- ranking police ofÞ cials seemed to take aim at the groups they blamed for raising the issue in the Þ rst place. The V alley Division commander, for exampled, complained that Ò those groups who provoke incidents now take an insolent attitude. They do all that they can to try an ofÞ cerÕ s patience.Ó Parker spoke to the conse- quences of the current state of affairs when, according to the Mirror , Ò he termed the drop in police morale a dangerous situation for the community.Ó Ò It tends,Ó he added, Ò to incite hoodlum elements to a This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 195 58. Ibid ., April 30, 1952. 59. Parker to Police Commission, April 1, 1952, box 35306, COP, General Files, CRC. 60. William H. Parker, Ò Invasion from Within,Ó 49 Ð 65; for the long-term effect of the concept, see Gates and Shah, Chief . The newspaper published by the Los Angeles Po- lice Protective League (which had evolved from the earlier Los Angeles Fire and Police Protective League) is called The Thin Blue Line . sense of power.Ó 58 By implication, critics of the L APD became allies of hoodlums and enemies to law-abiding citizens. In a further attempt to inß uence public opinion, Parker inau- gurated a new metaphor for explaining the mission of the L APD. In early April Parker informed the police commission that he was start- ing a weekly television program that would Ò disseminat[e] accurate information to the public concerning police affairs.Ó Parker named his program The Thin Blue Line and stated that Ò current attempts to undermine public conÞ dence in the Police Department demand some counteraction if the interest of the community is to be served.Ó The speciÞ c purpose of the program was Ò to instill greater conÞ - dence in the police service.Ó 59 The idea of Ò the thin blue lineÓ would become the L APDÕ s central organizing metaphor for decades to come. Its essence was ParkerÕ s statement in the early days of the Bloody Christmas controversy that only the police protected civi- lized society from anarchy. Parker saw society as two competing forces. On one side stood law-abiding, white, middle-class Ameri- cans who longed for security and supported, and even appreciated, the need for strong law enforcement institutions. In opposition were the forces of chaos and iniquity. Here Parker saw not only or- ganized crime but also racial minority groups, dissidents, especially communists, and anyone who supported these groups, which for Parker meant anyone who criticized the police. The role of the po- lice, in short, was to protect civilization from these forces of bar- barism and anarchy. 60 In the long run, the concept of the thin blue line helped cre- ate a vast constituency for the L APD among people who feared that the rapidly changing nature of American society threatened their personal safety. It was a particularly salient idea within a Cold War mentality that already divided the world into two opposing camps. For white Angelinos (about 80 percent of the population) already inured to the linkage between race and criminality, the idea that they must support the L APD, which after all was the only entity that This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 196 61. Parker to Donald Norman, Sept. 26, 1952, box 35306, COP, General Files, CRC. 62. See, for example, Citizen- News , March 15, 18, 27, 1952. 63. American Legion Hollywood Post No. 43, Resolution, April 16, 1952, box 35306, COP, General Files, CRC. 64. Herald Express , May 27, 1952; Times , May 28, 29, 1952; Citizen- Ne ws , May 29, 1952; Examiner , May 29, 1952. 65. Los Angeles newspapers covered the Servando Canales killing on a daily basis between September 14 and September 25. 66. See, in particular, Examiner , Sept. 19, 1952, and Times , Sept. 19, 1952. 67. Mir ror , Sept. 15, 1952. protected them from the growing brown and black populations, must have been particularly persuasive. In the speciÞ c scandal sur- rounding Bloody Christmas, it helped the department gather sup- port to Þ ght off efforts to overhaul its disciplinary policy . ParkerÕ s program stayed on the air only through September 1952. 61 Never- theless, friendly editorials from conservative newspapers and state- ments of support from individuals and organizations echoed L APD rhetoric. 62 The Hollywood Post of the American Legion, for ex- ample, passed a resolution supporting the department in part be- cause Ò there are those whose background, training, habits and in- clinations are such they constantly ß aunt [ sic ] . . . laws and, on occasion, attack law enforcement ofÞ cers.Ó 63 The strategy seemed to work. The obstructionist legal tactics and the public relations campaign joined with the convictions of Þ ve of the eight indicted ofÞ cers to dissipate widespread demands for reform of the L APD. As early as May 1952, both the mayor and the police commission reafÞ rmed their conÞ dence in Chief Parker, laying to rest any rumors that he would be removed. 64 As the trials proceeded, public ofÞ cials, the general public, and even critics of the police seemed to lose interest in the issue of police brutality. Nothing shows this better than the reaction to the September 13, 1952, killing of Servando Canales by L APD vice ofÞ cer Donald Mac- Gregor at the same bar where the Bloody Christmas incident had begun the previous December. 65 While the departmentÕ s version of events changed several times, the ofÞ cial story was that MacGregor drew his gun when a group of men physically threatened him while he questioned a patron about his age. When the men Ò jostledÓ him, the gun went off, fatally striking Canales in the chest. 66 Parker, who personally took charge of the investigation, called the killing Ò a tragic, regrettable accident.Ó 67 Local newspapers, however, referred to Ò trigger-happyÓ police and accused Parker and Mayor Bowron of This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 197 68. On trigger-happy police, see the editorial in the Examiner , Sept. 16, 1952, and Daily Ne ws , Sept. 19, 1952; on allegations of cover-up, see the editorial in Mir ror , Sept. 18, 1952. 69. Times , Sept. 17, 24, 1952; Mir ror , Sept. 17, 25, 1952; Herald Express , Sept. 17, 1952; Times , Sept. 18, 1952; Examiner , Sept. 18, 1952. 70. Herald Express , Dec. 5, 1952. a cover-up. 68 Moreover, other eyewitnesses stated that no one was near MacGregor when he Þ red, and two told investigators that he referred to Bloody Christmas just before he shot Canales. Neverthe- less, a specially picked coronerÕ s jury found that CanalesÕ s death was an Ò excusable homicide Ñ performed in the line of duty.Ó The next day the county grand jury dropped its investigation into the killing and thereafter the press ended its coverage of the matter as well. 69 The whole process took less than two weeks. Everyone seemed to agree that the Canales killing would not become another Bloody Christmas. With the Canales investigation out of the way and the Þ nal Bloody Christmas trial concluded, Parker began reinterpreting the whole episode for his men and the city. For Parker and the L APD, Bloody Christmas was not about the rights of people in custody, po- lice misconduct, or the departmentÕ s disciplinary procedures; it was about the forces of anarchy trying to destroy lawful authority. On December 5, two days after the last ofÞ cer was convicted and sen- tenced, Parker proclaimed that, while Ò criminals have been made into heroes in the eyes of the hoodlum element, . . . innocent [po- lice ofÞ cers] had their names dragged through the mire.Ó He re- minded his men to be especially careful during the coming holidays, as subversive elements in Los Angeles Ò will work actively to incite holiday incidents calculated to discredit the department and rekin- dle old Þ res of public criticism.Ó 70 He thus simultaneously reminded the public that criticism of the police was anti-American. In the Þ nal analysis, Bloody Christmas helped establish the or- ganizational culture that would dominate the L APD for the next half-century. By beating back the departmentÕ s critics, Parker en- sured the dominance of police professionalism: For decades to come, no one would seriously threaten the departmentÕ s prized independence. For that reason, from the 1950s through the 1980s, the L APD had the reputation as the least corrupt, best paid, best trained, best equipped, and best run police department in the na- tion. Such a reputation helped make the L APD the most powerful This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PaciŽ c Historical Review 198 71. For an example of how ofÞ cials protected law enforcement in the 1960s, see Es- cobar, Ò Dialectics of Repression,Ó 1501Ð 1504. institution in the city as well as the envy of other big city police de- partments. The way the L APD beat back its critics in Bloody Christ- mas also established a precedent for how it would deal with future criticism. Henceforth, police ofÞ cials would work hand in hand with other government ofÞ cials to limit the scope of investigations, de- monize critics, and, if all else failed, engage the Ò blue code of si- lenceÓ to make it all but impossible for a citizen to prosecute a com- plaint against an ofÞ cer successfully for excessive use of force or other forms of anti-citizen police misconduct. 71 What made all this possible was the departmentÕ s adoption of the thin blue line as its controlling metaphor. As the self-proclaimed guardians of civiliza- tion, the L APD had the right, indeed the responsibility, to attack its critics, who, of course, could only be the forces of barbarism. The irony of all this is that the departmentÕ s prized indepen- dence became an end in itself, eclipsing other more fundamental and even professional values, such as compliance with the rule of law, telling the truth while under oath, and enforcing the law equally for all citizens. Thus, while the internal affairs division continued to rid the department of ofÞ cers who stole or took bribes, it ignored apparent cases of excessive use of force and perjury, especially when the victims were Mexican Americans or African Americans who, af- ter all, were the criminal element. What resulted was a culture within the L APD that prized highly aggressive, even illegal, tactics in minority communities; that protected ofÞ cers who stepped over the legal limit; and that lashed back at anyone who criticized or other- wise tried to constrain the department. The logical outcomes of such a culture were the Rodney King beating and the Rampart scan- dal in which L APD ofÞ cers committed perjury, planted evidence, and even shot people, all in the name of ridding the community of Latino youth gangs. It is not surprising, therefore, that frustrations over L APD mis- conduct grew and became solidiÞ ed in minority communities. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the increas- ingly self-conscious Mexican American and African American com- munities grew ever more frustrated with police misconduct. Many came to see the department as a hostile occupying force and began organizing politically around the issue of police misconduct. Grow- This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mexican Americans and the L A Police 199 ing resentment and anger directed at law enforcement led to the spontaneous eruptions of violence in Watts in 1965, East Los Ange- les in 1970 Ð 1971, and Los Angeles in 1992. In the 1990s the twin controversies of the King beating and the Rampart scandal have kept the L APD in an almost constant state of upheaval. Police pro- fessionalism may have triumphed in Bloody Christmas, but the irony is that it simultaneously legitimized new forms of corruption that violated the rule of law Ñ the fundamental principle of policing in a democratic society Ñ and led to the departmentÕ s estrangement from large segments of the community it served. The L APD is still paying the price. This content downloaded from 204.17.179.87 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:40:05 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions