philosophy

R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y M ed it a tion s O n F ir st P hilos op hy René Descartes 1641 I nternet Encyclop edia o f P hi losophy, 1996. Thi s fi le is of the 1911 editio n of The Philosophical Works of Descarte s (Ca mbr idge Un ivers ity Press), translated by E lizabet h S. Haldane. P refat or y N ote T o T he M ed it at ion s. The fir st editio n o f the Meditat ions wa s publ ished in Latin by Mic hael So ly o f Paris “a t the Si gn of the P hoenix ” in 1641 cum P rivilegio et Approbation e Doctorum. The R oyal “priv ilege” wa s indeed give n, but th e “approb ation” seem s to h ave been of a mo st in defi nite ki nd. The reason of t he book bei ng publi shed in France and n ot in Holla nd, w here Descartes w as liv ing in a char ming coun try ho use at Endegeest near Leid en, w as appa rently hi s fear that the Du tch m in is ter s m ight in so me wa y lay h old of it. Hi s friend, Per e Mersenne, took charge of it s publ ication in Paris and wr ote to hi m about any di fficu lties tha t occurr ed in the course of its progr ess thro ugh the press. The second editio n w as ho wev er publ ished at A m sterda m in 1642 by Loui s Elze vir, and thi s edition wa s acc ompan ied by the n ow co mp leted “ Objections and Repl ies.” 1 The editio n fro m which the present tra nslation i s m ade i s th e s econd jus t me nti oned, and is that adopted by M M. A da m and T an ner y as the m ore cor rect, f or reason s th at they s tate in detail in the prefac e to the ir editio n. The wo rk wa s tran slated int o French by the Duc de Luynes in 164 2 a nd Descartes con sidered the tra nslation so ex celle nt that he h ad it publ ished so me yea rs later. C lersel ier, to com plete ma tters, had the “ Obje ction s” al so p ublis hed in French w ith th e “Rep lies,” and thi s, l ike t he other, was su bje ct to Descartes’ revis ion 1 P ub lishe d s eparately. and corr ection. This revis ion renders th e French edit ion specially va luable. Wh ere it see ms desirable a n alternati ve reading from th e French is g ive n in square brackets. —El izabeth S . Haldane TO THE MOS T WISE AND ILL USTRIOUS THE DEAN AND DOCT ORS OF THE SACRED FACUL TY OF T HEOLO GY IN PARI S. The m otive w hic h in duces me to present to you thi s T reatise is so ex celle nt, and, w hen you become acquai nted w ith its design, I a m conv inced th at you w ill also h ave so e xcelle nt a m otive for tak ing it un der your protection, tha t I feel tha t I canno t do better, in orde r to render it in so me sort acce ptable to you, tha n in a fe w wo rds to st ate w ha t I ha ve set my self to do. I ha ve al ways cons idered t ha t t he two q uest ions respecting God and th e S ou l we re the c hief of th ose th at oug ht to be dem onstrated by ph ilosoph ical rather th an theological argu ment. For al tho ugh it is qui te eno ugh for u s fai thfu l one s to accept by me ans of fai th the fact th at th e hu man sou l does no t perish w ith th e body , and that God e xi sts, it certainly does no t seem possible ever to persuade inf idel s of any religion, in deed, we ma y alm ost s ay, of a ny m ora l vir tue, un less, to begin w ith, w e prove th ese two fact s by me ans of th e n at ural reason. An d ina sm uc h as o ften in thi s li fe greate r re wards are of fere d for v ice th an for vir tue, fe w people w ou ld prefe r th e rig ht to th e u se ful, we re th ey restrai ned neither by th e f ear o f God n or th e ex pectation of anot her li fe; a nd alt houg h it is absolu tely true tha t we must believe that there is a God, because we are so ta ugh t in th e Holy S criptures, and, o n th e other h and, that we must believe t he Holy Script ures because t hey com e from God (the reason of th is is , tha t, f ait h being a g if t o f God, He w ho give s the grace to cause us to belie ve other things can like wise give it to cause u s to belie ve tha t He ex ists), we nevert heless could no t place thi s argum ent before in fidel s, w ho m igh t accuse u s of reasoning in a circle. An d, in truth, I have n oticed that you, along w ith all th e theologia ns, did no t on ly af fir m that th e ex iste nce of God ma y be proved by the n at ural reason, bu t also tha t it m ay be in ferred fro m th e Holy S criptures, tha t kn owl edge about Hi m is much clear er t han that w hic h we have of ma ny cre ated th ings, and, as a m atter o f fact, is s o easy to acquire, tha t th ose 1- 1 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y w ho ha ve it no t are cu lpable in the ir ignorance. Thi s indeed appe ars from the W isdo m of So lom on, chapter x iii ., w he re it is said “ How be it they are not to be exc used; for if their understanding wa s so great that they could di scern the wo rld and the creatures, why did they not ra ther find out the Lo rd thereof?” and in R oma ns, c hapter i., it is s aid th at th ey are “ w ithout excuse ”; and agai n in the sa me place, by th ese wo rds “ that w hich may be known of God is manife st in them ,” it seem s as thro ugh w e we re sh own th at all th at w hic h can be kn own of God ma y be ma de ma nif es t by m ea ns w hich are n ot derived from anyw here but from oursel ves, and from the s imp le cons ideration of th e na ture of o ur m ind s. Hence I tho ugh t it not beside m y purpose to in qu ire h ow thi s is so, and h ow God ma y be mo re easily and certainly kn ow n th an the th ings o f the wo rld. An d as rega rds th e s ou l, al tho ugh m any ha ve cons idered that it is no t easy to kn ow its n at ure, and s om e h ave eve n dar ed to say th at hu man reason s ha ve con vinced u s th at it w oul d perish w ith the bod y, and tha t fai th alo ne could believe the con trary, nevert heless, ina smu ch as th e Later an Co unc il he ld u nder Leo X (in the eigh th ses sion) condem ns the se te net s, and as Leo express ly ord ains C hr istia n ph ilosophers to ref ute the ir argum ents and to em ploy al l the ir pow ers in ma kin g kno wn the trut h, I ha ve v en tured i n thi s treati se to un dertake t he sa me tas k. More than tha t, I am a ware th at th e pri ncipal reason w hich cau ses ma ny imp ious persons n ot to desire to believe th at there is a God, and th at th e h uma n sou l is dis tinc t from the bod y, is that they decla re tha t hi therto no o ne ha s been able to dem onstrate th ese two facts ; and alt houg h I am n ot o f th eir opin ion b ut, o n th e contrary , ho ld tha t the greate r part of the reasons whic h have been brought forward concerni ng th ese tw o ques tions by s o ma ny great m en are, w he n th ey are righ tly un derstood, equal to so ma ny de mo nstration s, and that it is al m os t i mp ossible to in ve nt n ew ones, it is yet in m y opi nion the case that no thing mo re us eful can be accomp lished in p hi losophy than once for all to seek w ith care for the best of th ese reasons, and to se t the m forth in so clear a nd ex act a m an ner, tha t it w ill h encefort h be e viden t to every body th at th ey are veritable de mo nstratio ns. An d, fi na lly, in as muc h as it wa s desired tha t I sh ou ld un dertake th is ta sk by ma ny w ho w ere aware tha t I had cul tivated a certain Met hod for the resolu tion of difficu ltie s o f e ver y ki nd in th e Scie nces—a m ethod whic h it is tr ue is no t nove l, s in ce there is not hing mo re ancie nt th an the tru th, bu t of w hich they we re a ware th at I h ad m ad e us e s ucces sful ly e nough in ot her m atter s of dif ficulty—I h ave tho ught tha t it w as my duty also to ma ke trial of it in the present ma tter. Now al l tha t I could acc ompl ish in th e ma tter is contai ned in thi s T re atise. Not tha t I ha ve here draw n together all the di fferent reasons w hic h m igh t be brought f orw ard to serve as proofs of th is s ubject: for th at n ever seem ed to be n ecessary e xcepti ng w hen there w as n o one si ng le pro of th at w as certain. But I h ave treated the f irs t a nd pri ncipal ones in s uc h a m an ner tha t I can ven ture to bring the m f orw ard as very ev ident and very certain dem onstrat ions. An d more t han that, I w ill say th at th ese pro ofs are s uc h th at I do no t th ink tha t there is any w ay open to the h uma n m ind by w hich it can ever su cceed in discoveri ng better. For t he imp ortance of the su bject, a nd th e glor y of God to w hich al l t hi s relates, constrain me to speak here some what mo re freely of myself tha n is my habi t. Nevert heless, w ha tever certain ty a nd e vidence I f in d in my reasons, I canno t persuade my self th at al l the w or ld is capable o f un derstandi ng th em . S till, ju st as in Geo metry th ere are ma ny dem onstrat ions tha t h ave been le ft to us by Arc hime des, by Apo llonius, by Pappus, and ot hers, w hich are acc epted by e ver yone as perfe ctly certain and evident (bec ause th ey clearly con tain n oth ing w hic h, cons idered by it sel f, is n ot v ery easy to un derstand, and a s all thro ugh th at w hich fol low s h as an e xact connect ion w ith, a nd dependence o n th at w hich pre cedes), ne vertheles s, because they are so me what le ngt hy, and de ma nd a m ind w hol ly devoted tot heir cons ideration, they are o nly take n in and u nderstood by a v er y limi ted nu mber of persons. Si milar ly, al tho ugh I judge that those of w hic h I here m ak e u se are equal to, or eve n surpas s in certainty and e vidence, th e dem onstratio ns of Geom etry, I yet apprehend that th ey can not be adequately understood by ma ny, both because th ey are also a lit tle le ngt hy a nd dependent the one on th e ot her, and principally bec ause th ey de ma nd a m in d w hol ly free of pre judices, a nd one w hic h can be easi ly detached from the affa irs o f the se nse s. A nd , tr ut h to say, there are not so m an y in th e wo rld who are f it ted for me taphysical speculation s as th ere are for tho se of Geom etry. A nd mo re tha n th at; there is st ill th is dif ference, th at in Geom etry, s in ce each one is persuaded tha t n ot hing m ust be advanced of w hich there is no t a certain de mo nstration, tho se w ho are not entirely adepts mo re frequen tly err in appr oving w hat is fa lse, in ord er to give th e imp ress ion tha t they u ndersta nd it, tha n in refu ting the tr ue. But the case is dif ferent in phi losophy w here e ver yone believe s th at al l is pro blemat ical, and few gi ve the mse lves to the search af ter tr ut h; and t he greate r nu mber, in their desire to acquire a reputatio n for boldness of 1- 2 2 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y th oug ht, arr ogantly combat th e m os t i m portan t of tru ths 2 .

That is w hy , w ha tever force th ere ma y be in my reasonin gs, seei ng th ey belong to p hilo sophy, I can not hope tha t th ey w ill ha ve m uch effect o n the m in ds o f me n, un less you ex tend to th em your prote ction. But the es tim ation in w hich your Co mpany is u ni ver sally he ld is so great, and th e na me of S ORBONNE car ries w ith it so m uc h a ut hority, th at, ne xt to th e Sacred Co uncils, ne ver ha s su ch deference been paid to the judgm ent of a ny Bod y, no t only in w hat concerns th e fai th, bu t also in w ha t regar ds hu man philo sophy as w ell: e ver yone in deed believes th at it is n ot pos sible to di scover el sew here m ore perspica city and so lidi ty, or mo re int egrity a nd wis do m in pronounc ing judgm ent. For this reason I ha ve no doubt tha t if you deign to ta ke the trouble in th e f irs t place of cor recti ng thi s w or k (for being consc ious n ot on ly of my in fir mity, b ut also of my ignorance, I sh ou ld no t dare to sta te th at it w as free from err ors) , a nd the n, af ter adding to it the se th ings that are lac king to it, com pleting those whic h are i m perfect, a nd yourselve s ta ki ng the trouble to gi ve a mo re a mp le e xpla natio n of tho se th ings whic h have n eed of it, or at lea st ma kin g m e a ware of the defects so that I m ay apply my self to rem edy the m; 3 w he n thi s is done a nd w hen fin ally th e reasonin gs by w hic h I prove tha t there is a God, a nd th at th e hu man sou l dif fers from th e body , sh all be carrie d to tha t point of perspicui ty to w hich I a m sure th ey can be car ried in orde r th at they ma y be e steem ed as perfe ctly ex act de mo nstration s, if you deign to au thorize your appro bation and to render publ ic te stim ony to th eir tr ut h and certainty, I do no t doubt, I say, tha t hence forward al l the erro rs and fal se opi nions w hic h ha ve e ver ex isted rega rding th ese tw o ques tions w ill s oon be effaced fro m the m ind s of m en. For t he tru th itse lf w ill easily cause all m en of m ind and learnin g to s ub scribe to your judgm ent; a nd your au thority w ill cau se th e athe ists, w ho are u su ally m ore ar rog ant tha n learned or judiciou s, to rid the mse lves of their sp irit of contradiction or lead th em pos sibly th em sel ves to defend th e reasoni ngs w hich they fi nd being received a s dem onstrat ions by all persons of cons ideration, les t th ey appea r not to un derstand the m. An d, fi nal ly, all others w ill easi ly yield to su ch a ma ss of ev idence, a nd there w ill be n one w ho dares to doubt the ex iste nce of God and th e real a nd true dis tinct ion betw een the h uma n sou l a nd th e bod y. It is f or you no w in your si ng ular w isdo m to judge of th e im porta nce of the es tablis hme nt of s uc h beliefs [you w ho see the 2 Th e French version is followed here. 3 Th e French version is followed here. disorders produced by the doubt of th em ] 4 . But it wo uld n ot become me to s ay mo re in cons ideration o f th e cause o f God a nd religion to th ose w ho h ave al ways been the m os t w or thy s upports of th e Ca tho lic Ch urc h. P refac e t o t he R ead er . I ha ve already s li gh tly touc hed o n the se tw o q uest ions of God and the hu man so ul in the Di scourse o n the Met hod of righ tly conduct ing the Rea son and seek ing tru th in the S ciences, publ ished in French in th e ye ar 1637. Not th at I had th e des ign of treating these w ith any th oroughne ss, b ut on ly s o to speak in pas sing, a nd in orde r to ascertain by the judgm ent of the rea ders h ow I s ho uld treat th em later o n. For th ese que stio ns ha ve al ways appe ared to me to be of su ch imp ortance th at I judged it su itable to speak of th em mo re th an o nce; and th e road w hic h I fol low in the e xp lanatio n of the m is s o lit tle trodd en, a nd so far rem oved from the ordinar y path, tha t I did n ot judge it to be ex pedient to se t it fort h at le ngt h in French a nd in a Di scourse w hic h m igh t be rea d by e ver yone, in case the feebler m ind s s ho uld believe tha t it w as perm itted to th em to attem pt to fol low t he sa me path. But, h av ing in thi s D iscourse on Method begged all those who h ave fou nd in my w riting s so mew ha t deservi ng of cens ure to do me the favo ur o f acquai nting me w ith the grou nds of it, no thing w or thy of rem ark has been objecte d to in th em beyond two m atter s: to these tw o I w ish h ere to reply in a fe w wo rds before u ndertak ing th eir mo re detailed discussio n. The f irs t obje ction is tha t it does no t fol low fro m the fact that the hu man min d reflectin g on it self does not per ceive it self to be other th an a th ing that th inks , tha t its na ture or it s esse nce con sists only i n it s being a thi ng that thi nk s, in the se nse that thi s w ord only ex clude s al l other th ings which m igh t also be supposed to pertain to th e n at ure of the s ou l. T o th is obj ection I repl y tha t it wa s n ot my inte ntion in that place to ex clude the se in accor dance w ith the orde r th at loo ks to th e tr ut h of the ma tter (as to w hic h I wa s no t the n dealing), b ut on ly in accor dance w ith th e orde r of m y th oug ht [perce ption]; th us my me aning w as that so far as I wa s a ware, I kn ew n oth ing clearl y a s belong ing to my es sence, ex cepting that I w as a thi ng that thi nk s, or a th ing th at ha s in it self the 4 Wh en it is tho ught desirable to insert additi onal r eadings from the French version this will be indicated by the use of square bra ckets. 1- 3 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y facu lty o f th inking . But I sh all sh ow h ereafter ho w from the fact tha t I kn ow no ot her thi ng w hic h pertain s to m y es sence, it fol low s tha t th ere is no other thi ng w hich really does belong to it. The s econd objection is th at it does n ot fo llo w from th e fact tha t I ha ve in m ys elf th e idea o f s om ethi ng mo re perfect th an I am , that thi s idea is mo re perfect th an I, a nd m uch les s tha t w ha t is repr esented by th is idea ex ists. But I repl y tha t in thi s ter m idea there is h ere so me thing equi vocal, for it ma y eit her be take n ma terially, as an act of my un dersta nding, and in th is sen se it can not be said th at it is m ore perfect th an I; or it m ay be ta ken ob jectively, as the thi ng w hic h is rep resented by thi s act, w hich , al tho ugh we do no t su ppose it to ex ist ou tside of my u ndersta nding, ma y, no ne th e les s, be mo re perfect t han I , because of it s es sence. An d in f ollo wing o ut th is T re atise I sh all sh ow mo re fu lly ho w, from th e s ole f act tha t I have in m ys elf the idea of a th ing mo re perfe ct than my self, it f ollo ws that th is th ing tru ly ex ists. In addition to the se two ob jections I ha ve al so seen tw o fa irly leng thy wo rks on this subject, w hich , h ow ever, did not so m uc h i mp ugn my reasonin gs as my concl usion s, and thi s by argum ents draw n from th e ordinar y athe istic so urces. But, because s uc h argum ents can not ma ke any im pres sion o n the m in ds of th ose w ho really u nders tand m y reasoning s, and a s th e judgm ents o f ma ny are so feeble a nd irrational th at they v ery o ften allo w the mse lves to be persuaded by th e opin ions w hic h they h ave firs t for med, h owe ver fal se and far re mo ved fro m reason they ma y be, rat her th an by a true and s olid b ut s ub sequen tly rec eived refutat ion of these opi nions, I do n ot desire to reply here to th eir criticis ms in case of bei ng fir st of al l obliged to s tate the m. I sh all on ly say in general tha t all tha t is said by th e athe ist again st the ex iste nce o f God, al ways depends eit her o n the fact tha t w e a scribe to God affect ions w hich are hu man , or tha t w e at tribute so m uc h stre ngth and w isdo m to o ur m ind s tha t w e e ven ha ve the presu mption to desire to deter mine a nd u nders tand th at w hich God can and oug ht to do. In th is wa y all th at th ey al lege w ill cause us n o di fficu lty, provided o nly we rem ember tha t w e m ust con sider our m in ds as th ings w hich are fi ni te and li m ited, a nd God as a B eing w ho is incom prehensible a nd in fini te. No w tha t I have once for al l recognized a nd ackno wledged the opin ions of m en, I at o nce begin to treat of God and th e H uma n so ul, and at the sa me ti m e to treat of the w hol e of th e F irst Ph ilosophy, w ithou t ho wev er e xpecti ng a ny praise fro m th e vu lgar and w itho ut the hope that m y book w ill h ave ma ny reade rs. On the contrary , I s ho uld ne ver advi se a nyone to read it ex cepting those w ho desire to m ed ita te seriou sly w ith me , and w ho can detach the ir m in ds fro m affa irs of sen se, and deli ver th ems elve s ent irely from every sort of pre judice. I kn ow too we ll that s uc h me n e xi st in a v ery s ma ll n umb er. But for th ose w ho, w ith ou t caring to co mprehe nd the ord er and connect ions of my reasoni ngs, form their critici sms on detached portions arbitr arily selected, as is the c us tom w ith m an y, the se, I s ay, w ill not obtai n m uch profit fro m reading th is Treatise. An d alt houg h they perhaps in several parts fi nd occasion o f cavi lling, they can for all their pai ns m ake n o obj ection which is urgen t or deservi ng of repl y. An d in as much as I ma ke n o pro mise to others to sat isfy the m at once, a nd as I do n ot presum e so much o n my ow n pow ers as to believe my self capa ble of foreseeing all tha t can cau se dif ficulty to a nyone, I sh all f irs t of all set forth in th ese Meditatio ns the very con siderations by w hic h I persuade m ys elf th at I ha ve rea ched a certain and e viden t kn owl edge of the tru th, in orde r to s ee if , by th e sa me reasons w hic h persuaded me , I can also persuade ot hers. An d, af ter tha t, I sh all reply to t he obje ction s w hic h have been m ade to me by persons of gen ius and learnin g to w hom I h ave se nt m y Medi tation s for e xa mination, before su bmi ttin g the m to th e press. For they ha ve ma de so ma ny obje ction s and these s o dif ferent, th at I v en ture to pro mise that it w ill be di fficul t for anyone to bring to m in d criticis ms of a ny con sequence w hic h ha ve no t been alrea dy to uched upo n. Thi s is why I beg tho se w ho read the se Meditatio ns to for m n o judgm ent upo n th em u nl es s they ha ve give n th em sel ves th e trouble to read all the obj ections a s we ll as the replies w hic h I ha ve mad e to t hem. 5 S yn opsis of the S ix F ollow in g M ed it at ion s. In the firs t Medi tation I set forth the reasons for w hich w e ma y, generally speak ing, doubt about all th ings a nd especially about ma terial th ings, at leas t s o lo ng as we have n o ot her fo undat ions for th e scie nces th an tho se w hic h w e have hi therto pos sessed. But al tho ugh th e u ti lity of a Do ubt w hic h is s o general does n ot at fir st appea r, it is at the sa me ti m e very great, i na smu ch as it delivers us fro m every k in d of pre judice, and se ts out for us a v er y s imp le wa y by w hic h the m in d ma y detach 5 Between the Praefati o ad Lectorem and the Synopsis , the Paris Editio n (1st Editi on) interpo lates an Index which is not found in the Am sterda m Editio n (2n d Editi on). Since De scartes did not r epro duce it, he was doub tless not its author. Mersenne pro bably composed it himself, adjusti ng it to the pagin g of the first Editi on. (Note in Adam and Tannery’s Edition.) 1- 4 4 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y it sel f fro m the s en ses ; and f in ally it ma kes it im po ssible for us e ver to doubt tho se thi ng s w hic h we have o nce discovered to be true. In the second Meditatio n, m in d, w hich ma kin g us e o f the liberty w hic h pertains to it, take s for granted tha t al l th ose thi ng s of w ho se ex iste nce it has the leas t doubt, are n on -exi sten t, recognizes that it is ho wev er absolu tely i mp ossible tha t it does n ot it sel f ex ist. This poi nt is li ke wi se of th e greatest mo ment , in as muc h as by th is m ea ns a dis tinctio n is eas ily dra wn bet ween the th ings w hic h pertain to m ind — th at is to say to the in tel lectual n at ure—and th ose w hich pertain to bod y. But because it m ay be th at so me ex pect fro m m e in th is place a sta tem ent of the reason s es tablis hing the im m or tali ty of the sou l, I feel th at I sh ou ld here ma ke k no wn to the m th at h av ing ai me d at w riting no thing in al l thi s Tr eatise o f w hich I do n ot posse ss very ex act dem onstrat ions, I a m obliged to fol low a si m ilar orde r to that m ade u se of by the geom eters, w hich is to begin by p utt ing for ward as prem ises all tho se th ings upo n w hic h the proposition tha t w e seek depends, before com ing to a ny concl usion regar ding it. Now the firs t a nd principal m atter w hic h is requisi te for thoroug hly un dersta nding th e i m mor tal ity of th e sou l is to f orm the clear est poss ible conception of it, and one w hich w ill be ent irely dis tinct from all th e conceptions w hic h we m ay h ave o f bod y; a nd in thi s Meditatio n thi s has been done. I n addition to th is it is requisi te th at w e ma y be a ss ured th at al l the thi ng s w hic h w e concei ve clearl y and di stinct ly are tr ue in the v er y w ay in w hic h we thi nk the m; and th is could n ot be proved previo usly to the Fourth Mediation. Furt her w e m ust h ave a di stinct conception of cor por eal na ture, w hic h is gi ven partly in thi s Second, and partly in the Fif th and S ixt h Medi tation s. A nd fi na lly we sh ou ld concl ude from all th is, that tho se th ings w hic h w e conceive clearl y a nd di stinc tly a s being diverse su bstances, a s w e regar d m in d a nd body to be, are really su bstances es sen tially dis tinct o ne from the ot her; and th is is th e conclu sion of th e S ixt h Medi tation. This is fu rther conf irmed in thi s sa me Meditat ion by the fact that we canno t conceive of bod y ex cepting in so far as it is div isible, w hil e the m ind canno t be conceived of ex cepting as i ndivisib le. For we are n ot able to conceive of the h alf o f a m ind as we can do o f the s ma lles t of all bodies; so tha t we s ee th at no t on ly are th eir nat ures di fferent b ut even in so me respects con trary to one anot her. I h ave n ot ho we ver dealt fu rther w ith th is m atter in th is treatise, both bec ause w hat I h ave said is s uf ficie nt to sh ow clearly eno ugh th at th e ex tinc tion of the m ind does no t fol low fro m the cor ruption of the bod y, a nd also to give m en th e h ope of anot her li fe after death, as also because th e prem ises from which the im mor tal ity of th e sou l ma y be deduced depend on an elucidatio n of a complete sys tem of Physics. This wo uld me an to establi sh in the fir st place th at all su bstances generally—that is to say all th ings w hic h canno t e xi st w ithou t bei ng created by God—are in the ir na ture incorruptible, and th at they can ne ver cease to ex ist un less God, in denying to the m hi s concurrence, reduce the m to n oug ht; a nd secondly that bod y, regar ded generally, is a su bstance, w hich is th e reason w hy it also can not peris h, bu t th at the h um an body , inas much a s it dif fers fro m ot her bodies, is com posed only of a certain con figuration o f me mbers and of other si m ilar accidents, w hil e the hu man m in d is no t s imi larly co mposed of any accidents, bu t is a pure su bstance. For al tho ugh all the accidents of m ind be cha nged, alt houg h, for in stance, it th ink certain thi ng s, w ill others, perceive ot hers, etc., despite al l th is it does n ot e merge fro m th ese changes a nother m in d: the hu man body on th e other h and become s a dif ferent thi ng from the so le fact that the fi gure or for m of any of it s portion s is fo un d to be c hanged. Fro m thi s it fo llow s tha t the hu man body ma y in deed easily enoug h peris h, bu t th e m in d [or so ul of ma n (I ma ke no di stinc tion betw een th em) ] is ow ing to its na ture i m mor tal. In the th ird Meditatio n it see ms to m e tha t I ha ve ex plai ned at su ffic ien t le ngt h th e principal argu ment of w hic h I ma ke us e in ord er to prove the existence of God. But no ne the les s, because I did not w is h i n th at place to ma ke u se of a ny com parison s derived from corp oreal th ings, so as to w ith draw as m uc h as I cou ld the m ind s o f reade rs from th e se nse s, th ere ma y perhaps ha ve rem ained m any obscuritie s w hic h, ho wev er, w ill , I h ope, be ent irely rem oved by th e Repl ies w hich I h ave ma de to the Objections w hic h have been set before m e. A mo ngs t others th ere is, for ex am ple, thi s o ne, “Ho w the idea in us of a being su prem ely perfect posses ses so m uc h obje ctive reality [th at is to s ay participates by repr esentat ion in so m any degre es of bei ng and perfection] t hat it necessarily pro ceeds fro m a cause w hich is absolu tely perfect.

” This is il lu strated in th ese R eplies by the com parison of a very perfect ma chine, the idea of w hich is fo und in the m in d of so me wo rkman . For as th e obje ctive contri vance o f thi s idea m ust h ave so me cause, i.e. eit her the scie nce of the wo rkman or that of so me other from w ho m h e ha s received t he idea, it is si m ilar ly i mp ossible tha t th e idea o f God whic h is i n u s sh ould not ha ve God him se lf as it s cau se. In the fourt h Meditatio n it is s ho wn th at al l th ese thi ng s w hich we very clearly a nd dis tinct ly perceive are tr ue, and at the sa me time it is ex plai ned in w ha t the nat ure o f err or or fa lsity con sists. Thi s m ust o f 1- 5 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y neces sity be k no wn bot h for th e conf irmation of th e pre ceding tru ths and for th e better co mprehe nsion o f th ose that fol low . (But it m ust me anwhile be rem arked that I do no t in any w ay there treat o f si n- -th at is to s ay, of the err or w hic h is com mitt ed in th e p ursu it of good and ev il, bu t o nly of th at w hich arises in the deciding betw een the tr ue and th e false. An d I do not in tend to speak of ma tters pertaini ng to the Fait h or the cond uct o f life, bu t only of those w hic h concern specu lative tru ths, and w hic h m ay be kno wn by th e sole aid of th e ligh t of na ture.) I n the f if th Meditatio n cor poreal n ature generally is ex plai ned, and in addition to th is th e e xi stence of God is de mo nstrated by a ne w proof in w hic h there m ay poss ibly be certain di fficu ltie s al so, b ut th e s olu tion of the se w ill be see n in the R eplie s to the Objections. An d fur ther I sh ow in w ha t se nse it is tr ue to say that the certainty of geom etrical dem onstrat ions i s i tse lf dependent on the k nowledge of God. Fina lly in th e S ixt h I dis tinguish th e action of th e u nders tandin g 6 from tha t of the im ag ina tion ; 7 the ma rks by w hic h thi s di stinc tion is ma de are described . I here sh ow that the m ind of ma n is really di stinc t from the body , and at the sa me ti m e tha t the two are so closely joined together t hat they form , so to speak, a s in gle thing. A ll t he err ors whic h pro ceed fro m the sen ses are the n sur veye d, w hil e th e me ans of avoidi ng th em are de mo nstrated, a nd f in ally al l the reasons from w hic h we m ay deduce th e ex iste nce of m aterial thi ng s are se t fort h. Not tha t I judge th em to be very u se ful in establi shing tha t w hic h they prove, to w it, t hat th ere is in tru th a wo rld, that me n posses s bodies, and ot her s uc h thi ng s w hic h ne ver have been doubted by anyone of se nse ; bu t because in cons idering these closely we com e to see that they are n eit her so stro ng nor s o e viden t a s tho se argu ments w hich lead u s to the kn owl edge of our m in d a nd of God; so tha t the se la st m ust be the mo st certain a nd mo st ev ident facts w hic h can fa ll w ithin the cogni zance of the h um an m ind . A nd th is is the w hol e ma tter tha t I have tried to prove in th ese Meditatio ns, for w hich reason I here om it to speak o f m any other ques tions w hic h I dealt inc identally in t his di scussion. 6 intellectio.

7 imagi natio. MEDITATIONS ON THE FI RST PHILOSOPHY IN WH ICH TH E EX ISTE NCE OF GOD AND THE DI STI NCTION BETW EEN M IND AND BODY ARE DEMONST RATED. 8 M ed it at ion I. O f t h e t h in gs w hic h m ay be b rou ght w ith in th e s ph ere of th e dou btfu l. I t is n ow so me ye ars si nce I detected ho w ma ny w ere th e fal se beliefs th at I had fro m my earliest youth adm itted as tr ue, and ho w doubtf ul w as everything I h ad s in ce cons tructed o n thi s bas is; a nd fro m th at ti m e I wa s conv inced tha t I m ust once for all seriou sly un dertake to rid m ys elf o f all the opinio ns w hic h I had for merly acce pted, a nd com mence to bu ild ane w from the fo un dation, if I w ant ed to e stabli sh any fir m and per mane nt s truc ture in the scie nces. But as th is en terp rise appe ared to be a v ery great one, I w aited un til I h ad attai ned a n age s o ma ture th at I could no t h ope th at at any later date I s ho uld be better fi tted to e xec ute m y design. This reason caused me to delay so lo ng th at I sh ou ld feel tha t I wa s doing w ro ng w ere I to occup y in deliber ation the ti m e tha t yet re ma ins to me for action. To- day, th en, si nce very opportunely for the plan I h ave in vi ew I ha ve delivered m y m ind from ever y car e [and am happily agitated by no pass ions] and si nce I ha ve procure d for m ys elf an ass ured lei sure in a peac eable retirem ent, I sh all at las t serio usly and freely addr ess m ys elf to the general upheaval of all my former opin ions. No w for thi s obj ect it is n ot necessary tha t I sh ou ld sh ow tha t al l of th ese are fa lse—I s ha ll perhaps ne ver arrive at th is end. But in as much as reason alread y persuades m e that I o ugh t no les s car efu lly to w ithhold my as sen t from m atter s w hic h are no t e nt irel y certain a nd in dubi table tha n fro m tho se w hic h appea r to m e m ani festly to be fa lse, if I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, thi s w ill s uf fice to jus tify m y re jecting th e w ho le. A nd for th at e nd it w ill no t be requi site th at I sh ou ld e xa mi ne each in particular, w hich wo uld be a n endles s un dertaki ng; for o wi ng to the fact tha t the destr uction of the foun dation s 8 I n plac e of this long title a t the head of the page the first Editi on had im mediately a fter the Sy nopsis, and on the s am e page 7, simply “First Meditatio n.” (Ad am’s Editi on.) 1- 6 6 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y of n ecessi ty bring s w ith it the dow nfall of th e rest of the edifice, I s ha ll on ly in the fir st place attack th ose principles upo n w hic h al l my form er opin ions rested. Al l tha t u p to the present ti m e I have accepte d as mo st tr ue a nd certain I have learned eit her from th e s en ses or thro ugh the sen ses; bu t it is so metime s proved to me tha t the se s en ses are deceptive, a nd it is w iser no t to tr us t en tirely to anyt hing by w hic h we h ave once been deceived.

But it ma y be th at alt houg h th e sen ses so metime s deceive u s concerning thi ng s w hic h are hardly perc eptible, or very far a way, th ere are yet ma ny others to be me t w ith as to w hich w e canno t reasonabl y ha ve a ny doubt, al tho ugh w e reco gnize the m by the ir me ans. For ex amp le, th ere is the f act th at I a m h ere, seated by the fire, attired in a dressin g gow n, hav ing t hi s pap er in my ha nds and other si m ilar matter s. An d ho w could I deny that the se ha nds and th is body are m in e, we re it no t perhaps tha t I com pare m ys elf to certain persons, devoid of se nse, w ho se cer ebella are so troubled and clouded by th e vio lent v apours of black bile, that they cons tantly ass ure u s tha t they th ink th ey are ki ng s w he n they are really q ui te poor, or that they are clothed in purple w hen th ey are really w itho ut covering, or w ho im ag ine tha t th ey ha ve an earthen ware head or are n ot hing bu t p ump kins or are m ad e o f g lass. But they are m ad, and I sh ou ld no t be a ny the le ss in sa ne we re I to fol low exam ples so ex travagant. At th e sa me ti m e I m ust re me mber that I a m a ma n, and th at conseque ntly I am in the h abit of sleeping, and in my drea ms rep resenti ng to m ys elf th e s am e thi ng s or so me tim es even les s pro bable th ings, than do tho se w ho are ins ane in th eir w aki ng mo men ts . Ho w ofte n has it happened to me tha t in the n ig ht I drea mt that I fou nd my self in thi s particular place, that I w as dressed a nd seated n ear the fire, w hil st in reality I w as lyi ng u ndressed in bed! A t thi s mo men t it does indeed s eem to m e tha t it is w ith ey es aw ake that I a m looki ng at th is pape r; th at th is head w hich I m ov e is n ot asleep, th at it is deliber ately a nd of se t p urpose tha t I ex tend m y h and and per ceive it; w ha t h appens in sleep does n ot app ear so clear nor so di stinct as does all th is. But in thi nk ing o ver th is I rem ind my self that o n m any occasions I h ave in sleep been deceived by si m ilar il lu sio ns, a nd in dw elling careful ly o n th is reflectio n I see so mani festly tha t th ere are no certain in dication s by w hich we ma y clearly di sting uish w ake fulnes s from s leep t hat I a m los t in a ston ishme nt. An d my a ston ishme nt is suc h th at it i s al mos t capa ble of persuading me that I no w drea m. No w le t u s ass ume tha t w e are a sleep and tha t all the se particulars, e.g.

t hat we open our eyes, shake our head, e xt end our h and s, and so on, are but fal se delu sions; and le t us reflect tha t poss ibly n eit her o ur hand s nor o ur w ho le bod y are su ch as they appe ar to us to be. A t th e s am e ti m e we m ust at leas t confe ss tha t t he t hi ng s w hich are represented to u s in sleep are like pain ted repr esentatio ns w hic h can o nly h ave been form ed as th e cou nterparts of so methi ng real and true, and tha t in thi s wa y those ge neral th ings at leas t, i.e. eyes, a head, h and s, and a w hol e bod y, are not im ag inary thi ng s, bu t thi ng s really e xi sten t. For, as a ma tter of f act, painters, e ven w hen they s tu dy w ith the greatest s ki ll to rep resent siren s and satyrs by f orm s th e m os t strange a nd ex traordinar y, canno t gi ve th em n at ures w hic h are en tirely ne w, bu t me rely ma ke a certain m ed ley of th e m em ber s of dif ferent ani mals; or if their i ma ginat ion is ex travagant e nough to inv ent so me thing so no vel th at no thing si m ilar h as e ver before been seen, a nd th at the n their w or k rep resents a th ing purely f ict itio us a nd absolu tely fal se, it is certain al l th e sa me tha t th e colours of w hic h thi s is co mpo sed are neces sarily real.

A nd for th e sa me reason, alt houg h th ese general th ings, to w it, [a bod y], ey es, a h ead, hand s, and s uc h li ke, ma y be ima ginar y, we are bound at th e sa me time to confe ss tha t th ere are at leas t so me other obj ects yet mo re si m ple and m ore u ni ver sal, w hich are real a nd true ; and of the se ju st in the sa me wa y as w ith certain real colours, al l the se i ma ges of th ings w hic h d we ll in our thou ghts, w he ther true and real or fal se and fanta stic, are formed. T o su ch a class of thi ng s pertains corp oreal nat ure in general, and it s ex tens ion, the fi gure of e xt ended th ings , the ir qua ntity or m ag nitude and nu mber, as also th e place in w hic h th ey are, the time w hic h me asures t heir duration, and so on. That is poss ibly w hy our reasoning is no t u nju st w he n we concl ude from th is tha t Physics, As tronom y, Medici ne a nd al l ot her sc iences w hic h ha ve as the ir end th e cons ideration of co mpo site thi ng s, are very dubio us and un certain ; b ut th at Ar ithme tic, Geo metry and other scie nces o f tha t k in d w hic h only treat o f thi ng s th at are v ery si m ple and very ge neral, w itho ut tak ing great trouble to a scertain w het her th ey are actual ly e xi sten t or not, contai n so me me asure of certainty and an elem ent of the ind ubitable. For w het her I a m awa ke or as leep, two a nd three toget her al ways for m fi ve, and th e s quare can never have m ore th an four s ides, a nd it does n ot s eem poss ible tha t tr ut hs so clear a nd appa rent can be suspected of any f als ity [or uncertai nty]. Nevertheles s I ha ve long had fi xed in my m ind th e belie f tha t a n all -pow erful God ex isted by w hom I h ave been created su ch as I am . But ho w do I k no w that He ha s no t brought it to pas s th at there is no 1- 7 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y earth, no h eave n, no e xt ended bod y, no m ag nitude, no place, a nd tha t ne vertheles s [I pos sess th e perc eptions o f all the se th ings and tha t] they seem to me to e xi st ju st ex actly as I n ow see the m? An d, besides, as I so me tim es ima gine th at ot hers deceive the mse lves in the thi ng s w hich th ey th ink they k no w bes t, ho w do I kn ow that I a m not deceived ever y ti m e th at I add t w o and t hree, or cou nt the si des of a s quare, or judge of th ings yet s imp ler, if anyt hing si m pler can be im ag ined? But pos sibly God ha s not desired th at I sh ou ld be th us deceived, f or He is sa id to be su prem ely good. If, ho we ver, it is con trary to Hi s goodness to ha ve ma de m e su ch tha t I cons tantly deceive my self, it wo uld also appea r to be contrary to H is goodness to perm it m e to be so metime s deceived, and nevert heless I canno t doubt t hat He does permit t hi s. There m ay indeed be those w ho woul d prefe r to deny the ex iste nce of a God so po werf ul, rather than believe tha t all other th ings are un certain. But le t us no t oppose th em for the present, a nd grant th at all th at is here sa id of a God is a fable; n evert heless in w hat ev er w ay they su ppose th at I h ave arrived at the sta te of bei ng that I h ave reached— w he ther they at tribute it to fate or to accid ent, or ma ke ou t t ha t i t is by a cont inual success ion of anteced ents, or by s om e ot her me thod —since to err and deceive onesel f is a defect, it is clear th at th e greater w ill be the pro bability of my being so i m perfect as to deceive m ys elf ever, as is the Au thor to w ho m they as sig n m y origin the les s po werf ul. To the se reasons I ha ve certainly not hing to repl y, bu t at the end I feel cons trained to confe ss tha t th ere is n ot hing in all tha t I form erly believed to be true, of w hic h I canno t in s om e m ea su re doubt, and tha t no t m ere ly thro ugh wa nt of th oug ht or throug h lev ity, bu t for reasons w hic h are very pow erful and ma turely cons idere d; so th at he nceforth I oug ht n ot the les s careful ly to refrain fro m giv ing cred ence to the se opin ions th an to that w hic h is m an ifes tly fa lse, if I desire to arrive at any certainty [in t he sc iences]. But it is no t s uf ficie nt to ha ve m ad e the se re mark s, we m ust al so be car efu l to k eep the m in m in d. For th ese a ncient and co mmo nly h eld opin ions st ill revert frequen tly to my m in d, long and fa mi liar cu sto m ha ving give n th em th e right to occupy my m in d again st m y inc lina tion and rendere d th em al m os t ma sters of m y belief; nor w ill I e ver lo se the habi t of deferring to the m or of placi ng my conf idence in the m, so lo ng as I cons ider the m a s they really are, i.e. opin ions in s om e m ea su re doubtf ul, as I h ave jus t sh own , and at t he sa me tim e hig hly proba ble, s o th at th ere is m uch mo re reason to believe in tha n to deny the m. That is w hy I cons ider th at I s hal l n ot be acting am iss, if, ta ki ng of se t purpose a contrar y belief, I allo w m ys elf to be deceived, and f or a certain time pretend that all the se opinio ns are ent irely f al se and ima ginary, u nt il at las t, ha ving thu s balanced m y for mer prejudices w ith m y lat ter [ so that th ey canno t divert m y opi nion s m ore to one s ide tha n to th e other], m y judgm ent w ill no lo nger be dom inated by bad us age or tu rned aw ay from the rig ht kn owl edge of the tru th. For I am ass ured tha t there can be ne ither peril nor erro r in th is course, and tha t I canno t at present yield too m uc h to di stru st, si nce I am no t con sidering th e q uest ion of action, bu t only of kn owl edge. I sh all the n su ppose, no t tha t God w ho is su prem ely good a nd the fou ntain of tru th, bu t so me evi l geni us n ot les s pow erful than dec eitful, ha s e mp loye d h is w hol e e nergies in deceivin g me ; I s ha ll con sider that th e hea ven s, th e earth, colours, fi gures, so un d, and all other ex ternal th ings are no ugh t b ut the ill us ions and dream s of w hich thi s geni us h as avai led hi msel f in orde r to lay traps for my credulity; I sh all con sider my self as h av ing n o h and s, n o ey es, no f les h, no blood, n or any se nse s, yet fa lsely believi ng m ys elf to pos sess all the se th ings ; I s ha ll re ma in obsti nately attached to thi s idea, and if by th is me ans it is n ot in my pow er to arrive at th e k no wledge of any tru th, I ma y at leas t do w ha t is in m y pow er [i.e. s us pend m y judgm ent], and w ith f ir m purpose avoid giv ing cred ence to a ny fa lse thi ng, or being im po sed u pon by thi s arch deceiver, h owe ver pow erful and dece ptive h e m ay be. But thi s tas k is a laborious one, a nd ins en sib ly a certain las situde leads m e in to the course of my ordinar y li fe. A nd ju st as a captive who i n sleep enjoys an i ma ginary liberty, w hen he begin s to s us pect tha t h is liberty is b ut a dre am, fears to a wa ken, and conspires w ith the se agree able ill us ion s th at the deception ma y be prolonged , so in se ns ibly of my o w n accor d I fal l back in to m y for mer opi nions, a nd I dread a wa kening from th is sl umb er, les t th e laborious w ake fulnes s w hich wo uld fol low the tranqu illity of thi s rep ose s ho uld h ave to be s pent not in daylight, b ut in th e ex ces sive darknes s of the dif ficult ies w hich ha ve jus t been disc ussed. M ed it at ion II O f t h e N ature of th e H um an M in d; an d that it i s m ore e as ily kn ow n t h an th e B ody . The Meditat ion o f yesterd ay fi lled m y m ind w ith so m any doubt s th at it is n o lo nger in my pow er to forget the m. An d yet I do n ot see in w ha t m ann er I can resol ve the m; a nd, ju st as if I h ad all of a su dden fal len in to very deep wa ter, I am so disconcerted t ha t I can nei ther make 1- 8 8 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y certain o f s ett ing m y f eet o n the botto m, nor can I s w im and so su pport my self o n the su rface. I sh all n evert heless m ake an effort and fol low ane w the sa me path as that on w hich I yesterda y entered, i.e. I s ha ll pro ceed by se tti ng aside al l tha t in w hic h the leas t doubt cou ld be su pposed to e xi st, jus t as if I had di scovered th at it wa s absolu tely false; and I sh all e ver fol low in thi s road u nt il I h ave me t w ith so me thing w hic h is certain, or at least, if I can do n ot hing el se, un til I h ave learned for certain th at there i s n oth ing in the w orld tha t is certain. Arch imede s, in ord er that h e m igh t draw th e terrestrial g lobe o ut of it s place, a nd transport it else where, dem anded o nly th at one point s ho uld be fi xed and i mmoveable; i n the sa me wa y I sh all have th e right to conceive hi gh hopes if I am happy eno ugh to disco ver o ne thi ng o nly w hic h is certain and ind ubitable. I su ppose, the n, th at al l the thi ng s tha t I see are fal se; I persuade my self tha t n oth ing ha s e ver e xi sted o f all tha t m y fal lacious me mory rep resents to me . I con sider th at I pos sess no s en ses ; I ima gine th at bod y, fig ure, e xt en sio n, m ov eme nt and place are b ut the f ict ion s of my m ind . W hat, th en, can be es teem ed as tr ue? Perhaps n ot hing at all, un less t ha t there is no thing i n the wo rld that is certain. But h ow can I kn ow there is no t s om ethi ng dif ferent fro m those th ings th at I ha ve ju st con sidered, o f w hic h o ne can not have the sl igh test doubt? Is there no t so me God, or so me ot her being by w ha tever na me w e call it , w ho pu ts the se reflection s into my m in d? That is no t n ecessary , for is it not pos sible tha t I am capable of pro duci ng the m m ys elf? I m ys elf, a m I n ot at least s o me thing? But I ha ve already den ied that I had sen ses and body . Yet I h es itate, f or w hat fol low s from th at? A m I so dependent o n bod y and se nse s tha t I cannot ex ist w ith ou t th ese? But I wa s persuaded tha t there w as no thing in al l th e w or ld, tha t there wa s no heave n, n o earth, th at th ere we re n o m ind s, nor a ny bodies: wa s I not then li ke wi se persuade d th at I did n ot ex ist? Not at al l; of a s urety I m ys elf did ex ist si nce I persuade d my self of so me thing [or m ere ly because I tho ugh t of so me thing]. But there is so me deceiver or other, v ery pow erful a nd very cun ning, w ho ever em ploys h is inge nuity in deceivi ng m e. Then w ithou t doubt I ex ist also if he deceives m e, and let hi m deceive m e as m uch as he w ill, he can ne ver cau se me to be nothing so long as I t hi nk th at I a m s om ethi ng . S o th at af ter h av ing reflected we ll and careful ly ex ami ned all th ings, we m ust com e to the definite concl usion tha t t hi s proposition : I am , I e xi st, is necessarily true each time th at I pronou nce it, or th at I m en tally conceive it.

But I do not yet kn ow clearl y e nough w ha t I a m, I w ho am certain th at I am ; and he nce I m ust be careful to see that I do no t imp ruden tly take s o me other obje ct in place of m ys elf, a nd thu s tha t I do no t go astray in respect of th is k no wledge that I h old to be the mo st certain and mo st ev ident of all th at I ha ve for merly learned. That is w hy I s ha ll no w cons ider ane w w hat I believed my self to be before I em barked upo n the se la st reflection s; a nd of my for mer opin ions I sh all w ithdra w all th at m ight even in a s ma ll degr ee be inv alidated by the reasons w hic h I ha ve jus t brough t for ward, in orde r th at there ma y be n ot hing at all lef t beyond what is absolu tely certain and in dubitable. W hat the n did I for merly believe my self to be? U ndoubtedly I believed m ys elf to be a ma n. But w ha t is a ma n? Sh all I say a reasonable an ima l? C ertain ly no t; for the n I sh ou ld ha ve to inq uire w ha t a n an ima l is, and w ha t is reasonable; a nd thu s fro m a si ng le ques tion I sh ou ld in se ns ibly fa ll int o an in fini tude of ot hers mo re dif ficult; a nd I s ho uld n ot w is h to w as te the lit tle time a nd leis ure rem aini ng to me in trying to un ravel su btleties like these. But I sh all rather s top here to cons ider the th oug hts w hich of the ms elve s spri ng up in my m ind , and w hic h w ere n ot in sp ired by a nythi ng be yond my ow n na ture alone whe n I applied myself to the cons ideration of my being. In th e fir st place, the n, I cons idere d my self as h av ing a face, h and s, arm s, and all th at sys tem of me mbers com posed o n bones and fl es h as seen in a corpse w hich I des ignated by the n am e o f body . I n addition to th is I cons idered tha t I wa s no uris hed, that I w alked, tha t I fel t, a nd th at I th oug ht, and I refer red all these action s to the soul: but I did not s top to cons ider w ha t the so ul wa s, or if I did stop, I ima gined th at it w as so me thing ex tre me ly rar e and su btle li ke a w in d, a f la me , or a n ether, w hic h w as spread thro ugho ut m y grosser parts. A s to bod y I had no ma nner of doubt about it s na ture, b ut th oug ht I h ad a very clear kn owl edge of it; a nd if I had desired to e xp lain it acco rding to th e no tion s th at I had th en for med of i t, I sh ou ld h ave describe d it thu s: B y th e bod y I un derstand al l th at w hich can be def ined by a certain fi gure: so me thing which can be conf ined in a certain place, a nd whic h can fil l a give n s pace in s uc h a w ay tha t every other bod y w ill be e xc luded from it ; w hich can be perceived eit her by to uch, or by si gh t, or by heari ng, or by ta ste, or by s me ll: w hic h can be mo ved in m any wa ys n ot, in tru th, by itse lf, bu t by so me thing w hic h is foreign to it, by w hich it is to uched [and from whic h it receives impre ssions ]: for to have the po wer of sel f- mo veme nt, a s also o f feel ing or of thi nk ing, I did n ot con sider to appe rtain to the nat ure o f bod y: on the con trary, I w as rather a ston ished to fi nd th at facu lties si milar to the m e xi sted in so me bodies. But w hat am I, no w th at I su ppose tha t there is a certain geni us 1- 9 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y w hic h is e xt rem ely po wer ful, a nd, if I ma y say so, ma licio us, w ho em ploys al l hi s po wers in deceivi ng me ? Ca n I a ff irm tha t I posses s the least of al l th ose thi ng s w hich I h ave ju st said pertain to the nat ure of bod y? I pau se to con sider, I revol ve all the se th ings in my m in d, and I fi nd no ne of w hic h I can s ay tha t it pertains to me . It wo uld be tedious to stop to e nu merate the m. Let us pass to th e attribu tes of sou l and see if there is a ny o ne w hich is in me ? Wha t of n ut rition or wa lki ng [ th e fir st m ent ioned]? But if it is so tha t I ha ve no bod y it is al so true that I can ne ither w alk nor take no uris hme nt. An other attribu te is se nsa tion. But one can not feel w ith ou t body , and besides I h ave tho ugh t I per ceived m any thi ng s d uring sleep tha t I reco gnized in my w aki ng mo men ts as n ot h av ing been ex perienced at all. Wha t of th inking ? I fi nd here that thou ght is a n attribu te th at belongs to me ; it alone cannot be separated from me . I am , I ex ist, tha t is certain. But ho w of ten? Ju st w hen I th ink; for it m ight poss ibly be t he case i f I ceased e ntirely to th ink, tha t I sh ou ld lik ew ise cease al together to e xi st. I do no t n ow adm it anyt hing w hich is no t necessarily true : to speak accuratel y I am no t mo re t han a th ing which th inks , tha t i s to say a m in d or a so ul, or an un derstandi ng, or a reason, w hic h are ter ms w ho se s ign ificance wa s form erly un kno wn to me . I a m, ho wev er, a real th ing and reall y ex ist; bu t w hat t hi ng ? I have ans wered: a thi ng w hich thi nk s. A nd wha t m ore ? I s ha ll e xercise m y ima ginat ion [ in orde r to s ee if I a m not so me thing mo re]. I a m not a collectio n of me mbers w hich we call the h uma n body: I a m n ot a s ub tle air dis tributed throug h the se me mbers, I a m not a w ind , a f ire, a v apour, a breath, nor anyth ing at all w hic h I can ima gine or concei ve; because I ha ve a ss ume d tha t al l the se we re not hing. Wi tho ut cha ngin g tha t s uppos ition I fi nd th at I o nly leave m ys elf certain of the fact that I a m so me what . But perhaps it is true th at th ese sa me th ings w hich I s upposed we re no n-ex isten t because th ey are un know n to m e, are really no t di fferent fro m th e sel f w hich I kn ow. I am no t s ure about thi s, I s ha ll no t disp ute about it no w; I can on ly g ive judgm ent o n thi ng s th at are k no wn to m e. I kn ow tha t I ex ist, and I in qu ire w ha t I am , I w ho m I kn ow to ex ist. But it is v ery certain th at th e k no wledge of my ex iste nce ta ken in its precise si gn ificance does no t dep end o n thi ng s w ho se ex iste nce is no t yet k no wn to m e; conseque ntly it does not depend on tho se w hic h I can fe ign in i ma ginat ion. A nd indeed the v ery ter m feign in im ag inat ion 9 proves to me my err or, for I really do thi s if I ima ge my self a s o me thing, si nce to i ma gine is n ot hing else th an to conte mplate th e fig ure or ima ge of a 9 Or “form an im age” (effingo). cor por eal thi ng. But I alread y kn ow for certain tha t I am , a nd th at it ma y be tha t all th ese ima ges, and, speak ing generally, al l th ings that relate to the na ture o f body are n ot hing bu t drea ms [and chi meras]. For th is reason I s ee clearl y th at I ha ve as li ttle reason to say, “I sh all st im ulate my im ag ina tion in order to kn ow m ore dis tinctly w ha t I am ,” th an if I we re to say, “ I a m now awa ke, and I per ceive s o me what that is real and tr ue: but because I do not yet perc eive it dis tinct ly e noug h, I sh all go to sleep of e xpres s purpose, so th at m y dream s m ay rep resent th e perc eption w ith greatest tru th and e vidence.” A nd , th us , I k no w for certain th at n ot hing of all tha t I can un dersta nd by m ea ns of m y i ma ginat ion belongs to th is kn owl edge w hich I h ave of my self, and th at it is n ecessar y to rec all the m ind from th is mo de of th oug ht w ith th e ut mos t di ligence in orde r that it ma y be able to k no w its ow n na ture w ith perfe ct di stinct ness. But w hat then am I? A thing w hich th inks . Wh at is a thi ng w hic h th inks ? It is a thi ng w hich doubt s, u nders tands, [concei ves], aff irm s, denies, w ill s, refu ses, w hic h al so im ag ine s and feels. C ertain ly it is n o s m all ma tter if al l th ese thi ng s pertain to my na ture. But w hy sh ou ld they no t so pertain ? A m I no t th at bei ng w ho no w doubts nearly everything, w ho ne vertheles s u ndersta nds certain th ings, w ho affirm s tha t o ne o nly is true, w ho den ies al l th e others, w ho desires to k no w m ore, is a verse fro m being deceived, w ho im ag ine s ma ny th ings, so me tim es indeed despite hi s w ill, a nd w ho perc eives ma ny lik ew ise, as by the inter vent ion of th e bodily organs? Is there no thing in al l th is w hich is as tr ue as it is certain th at I e xi st, eve n th oug h I sh ou ld al way s sl eep and tho ugh h e w ho ha s gi ven me bei ng em ployed al l hi s inge nuity in deceivin g m e? Is there li ke wi se any one of th ese attribu tes w hic h can be di sting uished from my th oug ht, or w hic h m igh t be said to be separate d fro m my self? For it is so e vident of itse lf tha t it is I w ho doubt s, w ho u ndersta nds, and w ho des ires, that th ere is n o reason here to add anyth ing to e xplai n it. An d I h ave certainly the po wer of ima gini ng lik ewi se; f or al tho ugh it ma y h appen (as I form erly s upposed) th at n one o f th e th ings w hich I im ag ine are true, ne verthele ss th is po wer of im ag ining does no t cease to be really in us e, a nd it form s part of my thou ght. Fi nal ly, I a m the sa me w ho feels, th at is to s ay, w ho per ceives certain thi ng s, as by the organs o f s en se, si nce in tru th I s ee li gh t, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it w ill be sa id t hat th ese phe nom ena are fa lse a nd tha t I am dream ing. Let it be so; st ill it is at lea st q uite certain tha t it see ms to m e th at I see ligh t, th at I h ear no ise and tha t I feel heat. That cannot be fa lse; pro perly speaki ng it is 1- 10 10 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y w ha t is in me called f eelin g; 10 and us ed in thi s precise se nse th at is no other thi ng t ha n th inking . From th is ti m e I begi n to k no w w ha t I am w ith a li ttle m ore clearness a nd dis tinc tion th an before; bu t ne verthele ss it st ill see ms to me , and I canno t prevent m ys elf fro m th inking , th at corpo real th ings, w ho se ima ges are framed by thought, w hic h are tested by t he se nses, are m uc h m ore dis tinct ly k no wn tha n th at obscure part of me w hic h does no t com e u nder th e ima ginat ion. Al thou gh really it is very stra nge to say that I k no w a nd un derstand m ore di stinc tly the se th ings w ho se ex iste nce s eem s to me d ubious, w hic h are un kno wn to m e, and w hic h do no t belong to me , tha n others of th e tru th of w hich I a m conv inced, w hic h are kn ow n to me and w hic h pertain to m y real n at ure, in a w ord, th an my self. But I see clearl y ho w the case st and s: my m in d love s to wa nder, a nd cannot yet su ffer it sel f to be retained w ithin the ju st li m its of tr ut h. Very good, le t u s once mo re gi ve it the freest rein, so tha t, w he n after wards w e sei ze the pro per occasion for p ull ing up, it m ay the mo re easily be regulated and controlled. Let u s begin by con sidering the co mmon est ma tters, tho se w hic h we believe to be the mo st dis tinc tly com prehended, to w it, the bodies w hic h we touch a nd see; n ot in deed bodies in ge neral, for the se ge neral ideas are us ua lly a li ttle mo re conf used, but le t u s cons ider one bod y in particular.

Let u s ta ke, for ex amp le, thi s piece of wa x: it h as been take n quite freshly fro m t he hiv e, and i t has no t yet lo st the s weetnes s of th e ho ney w hic h it con tain s; it still retai ns some what of the odour of the flo wers from w hic h it h as been cul led; it s colour, it s fig ure, its si ze are appa rent; it is h ard, cold, easi ly h andled, and if you str ike it w ith th e fi nger, it w ill emi t a s ou nd. Fi nal ly all the th ings w hic h are requis ite to cause us dis tinct ly to recognize a bod y, are me t w ith in it. But not ice th at w hile I speak a nd app roach th e fire w hat rem ained o f th e tas te is ex haled, th e s m ell evapor ates, th e colour alters, the fi gure is destroy ed, th e s iz e i ncreases, i t become s liq uid, i t heat s, scarc ely can one handle i t, and w hen one s tri kes it, n o so und is em itted. Does th e sa me w ax rem ain after thi s c hange? We m ust confe ss that it rem ains ; no ne w oul d judge other wise. Wha t the n did I kn ow so dis tinct ly in thi s piece of wa x? I t cou ld certainly be no thing o f al l tha t the se nse s brought to my no tice, si nce all th ese th ings w hich fa ll un der tas te, s me ll, si gh t, touc h, and hearing, are found to be changed, a nd yet the sa me wa x re ma ins. Perhaps it wa s w ha t I no w th ink, v iz . that th is w ax w as no t that s we etnes s of ho ney, nor th at agree able scen t of flo wers, n or tha t 10 Sentire. particular w hit en ess, nor that f igure, n or th at so und, bu t si m ply a body w hic h a li ttle w hile before appe ared to m e as perc eptible un der the se form s, and w hic h is n ow perce ptible un der ot hers. But w hat , precisely, is it that I im ag ine w he n I for m su ch conceptions ? Let us at tent ively cons ider th is, and, abstracting from all tha t does no t belong to the w ax, let u s see w hat rem ains. Certai nly no thing rem ains ex cepting a certain ex tended thi ng w hic h is flex ible and m ov able. But w ha t is the me aning of fle xible and mo vable? I s it n ot th at I ima gine th at th is piece o f w ax being rou nd is capable o f becom ing sq uare and of passi ng fro m a square to a triangu lar figure? No, certainly it is no t tha t, sin ce I i m ag ine it ad mi ts of a n inf initude of si m ilar cha nges, a nd I n evert heless do n ot kn ow ho w to co mpas s the inf initude by m y im ag ina tion, and conseque ntly thi s conception w hich I h ave of th e w ax is no t brough t about by th e facu lty of ima ginat ion. W hat n ow is th is ex ten sion? Is it no t also u nk now n? For it bec omes greate r w he n th e wa x is m elted, greate r w hen it is boiled, and greate r s ti ll when th e h eat increases; and I sh ou ld n ot conceive [clearly] accor ding to tr ut h wha t wa x is, if I did not th ink t hat eve n th is piece t ha t we are con sidering is capable of receivin g mo re variat ions in e xt en sio n tha n I ha ve ever ima gined. We m ust the n grant that I cou ld not even un derstand throug h the im ag ina tion w hat t hi s piece o f w ax is, and tha t it is my m ind 11 alone w hic h per ceives it. I say th is piece o f wa x in particu lar, for as to w ax in general it is yet cleare r. But w ha t is thi s piece of wa x w hic h can not be un derstood ex cepting by th e [u ndersta nding or] m in d? I t is certainly the sa me that I s ee, to uch, i ma gine, and f in ally it is the sa me w hic h I ha ve al ways believed it to be from the begin ning. But w ha t m ust particularly be observed is tha t its per ception is ne ither an act o f v is io n, nor of to uch, nor of ima ginatio n, and has n ever been su ch al tho ugh it ma y ha ve appea red form erly to be so, bu t o nly a n in tuitio n 1 2 of the m ind , w hic h m ay be im perfect and conf used as it wa s form erly, or clear a nd dis tinct as it is at present, acco rding as my at tent ion is mo re or le ss directed to the elem ents w hic h are found in i t, and of w hic h i t is com posed. Yet in th e me antim e I a m greatly as toni shed w hen I cons ider [t he great feeblenes s of m ind ] and it s proneness to fal l [in sen sibly] int o err or; for alt houg h w itho ut g iv ing ex pressio n to m y th oug ht I cons ider all th is in my o wn m ind , wo rds of ten imp ede me and I am al m os t deceived by th e term s of ordinary la nguage. For w e say th at w e see th e sa me wa x, if it is present, and no t tha t w e s imp ly judge that it is the 11 entendement F., mens L . 12 inspectio. 1- 11 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y sa me fro m it s h av ing th e sa me colour and fig ure. Fro m th is I s ho uld conclude that I k ne w the w ax by m ea ns of v is ion and n ot s imp ly by th e in tuition of the m ind ; un less by chance I rem ember th at, w hen look ing from a w ind ow and saying I see me n w ho pass in th e street, I really do no t see th em, b ut inf er tha t w ha t I see is me n, ju st as I say tha t I see wa x. An d yet w hat do I s ee from the w in do w but ha ts a nd coats w hic h ma y cover a uto matic ma chines ? Yet I judge the se to be m en . A nd si m ilarly so lely by th e facu lty of judgm ent w hich rests in m y m ind , I com prehend tha t whic h I believed I sa w w ith m y ey es. A ma n w ho ma kes it h is ai m to raise h is k no wledge above the com mon s ho uld be as ha med to derive the occasion for doubti ng from th e form s of speech inv ented by the v ul gar; I prefer to pas s o n and cons ider w he ther I had a mo re e vident and perfect conception o f w ha t th e w ax wa s w hen I fir st perc eived it, and w hen I believed I kn ew it by me ans of the e xt ernal sen ses or at least by the co mmo n s en se 1 3 as it is called, that is to say by the ima ginati ve fac ulty, or w he ther m y present conception is clearer no w tha t I have m os t carefully e xa mined w ha t it is , and in w ha t w ay it can be k no wn. It w oul d certain ly be abs urd to doubt as to th is. For w ha t w as th ere in th is f irst per ception w hic h wa s dis tinct? Wh at w as there w hich m ight not as w ell h ave been perceived by a ny o f t he anima ls? But when I di sting uish the wax from its ex ternal form s, a nd w he n, ju st as if I h ad take n fro m it its v es tm ents, I con sider it qu ite na ked, it is certain th at al tho ugh so me erro r m ay s ti ll be f ou nd in my judgm ent, I can nevert heless not per ceive i t th us w itho ut a h uma n m ind . But fin ally w ha t s ha ll I say of t hi s m ind , th at is, of m ys elf, for up to th is poin t I do not ad mi t in m ys elf anyth ing b ut m ind ? Wh at th en, I w ho see m to per ceive th is piece of wa x so di stinct ly, do I n ot k no w my self, no t only with m uch m ore tr uth and certainty, b ut also w ith m uch mo re dis tinc tness a nd clearness ? For if I judge tha t the w ax is or e xi sts from the fact that I s ee it , it certainly fo llow s m uch mo re clearl y tha t I am or tha t I ex ist m ys elf from the fact th at I see it. For it m ay be th at w ha t I see is n ot really w ax, it m ay al so be tha t I do n ot pos sess ey es w ith w hich to see anyth ing; bu t i t can not be th at when I see, or (for I n o longer ta ke accoun t of the di stinct ion) w hen I th ink I see, tha t I my self w ho thi nk a m n oug ht. So if I judge th at th e w ax ex ists fro m th e fact th at I touc h it, the s a me th ing w ill follo w, to w it, that I a m; and if I judge tha t my ima ginat ion, or som e ot her cause, w ha tever it is , persuades me th at th e w ax ex ists, I s ha ll st ill conclude the sa me. An d 13 sensus com munis. w ha t I ha ve here rem arked o f wa x m ay be applied to al l other thi ng s w hic h are ex ter nal to m e [a nd w hich are m et with o ut side of m e]. An d fu rther, if the [ not ion or] perce ption of wa x ha s see med to m e clearer and m ore di stinc t, not on ly after th e si gh t or the touc h, bu t also a fter ma ny ot her cause s have rendere d it q uite ma nif es t to me , w ith h ow m uc h mo re [ev idence] and di stinc tness m ust it be said that I n ow k no w my self, s in ce all the reasons w hich con tribute to the kn owl edge of w ax, or any other bod y w ha tever, are yet better proofs of the n at ure o f my m ind ! A nd there are so ma ny other th ings in the m in d itsel f w hich ma y contribu te to th e el ucidation of its na ture, tha t th ose w hich dep end on bod y suc h as th ese jus t me ntioned, h ardly me rit being take n in to account.

But fin ally here I a m, h av ing in se ns ibly reverted to the poi nt I desired, for, s in ce it is no w m an ifes t to m e tha t eve n bodies are not pro perl y speak ing kno wn by th e s en ses or by t he facu lty of ima ginat ion, bu t by th e u nders tandin g o nly, and si nce they are n ot kn ow n fro m th e fact that th ey are seen or touc hed, b ut only because t hey are u nders tood, I s ee clearl y th at there is no thing w hic h is easier for me to k no w than my m ind . But because it is dif ficult to rid onesel f so promp tly of an opin ion to w hic h one w as accus tomed for so long, it w ill be we ll th at I sh ou ld h al t a li ttle at th is poin t, s o tha t by th e le ngt h of my med ita tion I ma y mo re deeply imp rint o n m y me mory th is ne w k no wledge. M ed it at ion III. Of God: that He exis ts .

I sh all no w close my eyes, I sh all s top m y ears, I s ha ll call aw ay al l m y sen ses, I s ha ll e fface e ven fro m my tho ugh ts all the i ma ges o f corp oreal th ings, or at leas t (for tha t is h ardly pos sible) I s ha ll es teem th em as va in and fa lse; and th us h oldin g con verse o nly w ith my self and cons idering my o w n n at ure, I sh all try lit tle by li ttle to reach a better kn owl edge of and a m ore fa miliar acquain tanceship with m ys elf. I am a th ing that th inks , tha t is to say, t hat doubts, affir ms , denie s, tha t kno ws a fe w thi ng s, tha t is ignorant of ma ny [t hat love s, tha t hate s], tha t w ills , th at desires, that al so im ag ine s and perceives; for as I re mar ked befor e, alt houg h th e t hi ng s w hic h I perc eive a nd i m ag ine are perhaps n ot hing at all apart fro m m e and in th em sel ves, I a m n evert heless as sured that th ese m ode s of tho ught tha t I call perc eptions and ima ginat ion s, in as muc h on ly as they are mo des of tho ugh t, certainly reside [and are me t w ith ] i n m e. A nd in the li ttle tha t I ha ve jus t sa id, I thi nk I h ave s u m med up all 1- 12 12 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y th at I really k no w, or at leas t al l tha t hi therto I wa s a ware th at I kn ew. I n ord er to try to e xt end my kno wledge fur ther, I s ha ll no w look around mo re carefully and see w het her I can not s ti ll discover in m ys elf so me other thi ng s w hic h I ha ve not h it herto perceived. I a m certain tha t I am a th ing w hich thi nk s; bu t do I n ot the n like wise kn ow w ha t is requi site to render me certain of a tru th? C ertain ly in th is f irs t kn owl edge th ere is no thing th at a ss ures me of it s tr ut h, e xcepti ng the clear a nd dis tinc t per ception of that w hic h I sta te, w hich wo uld no t in deed su ffice to ass ure me th at w hat I say is tr ue, if it cou ld e ver h appen tha t a th ing w hic h I conceived so clearly and dis tinctly cou ld be fa lse; and acco rdingly it see ms to m e that alread y I can es tablis h as a ge neral r ule th at all th ings w hic h I per ceive 1 4 very clearly and very di stinc tly are true.

A t th e sa me ti m e I h ave before received and ad mi tted ma ny th ings to be very certain and m an ifes t, w hic h yet I after wards recognized as being d ubiou s. W hat the n w ere these th ings ? The y we re t he earth, s ky, stars and all other obj ects w hic h I app rehended by me ans of the sen ses. But w hat did I clearly [a nd di stinct ly] perceive in th em? Not hing m ore th an tha t the ideas or tho ughts of the se th ings w ere presented to m y m ind . A nd not e ven n ow do I deny that the se ideas are me t w ith in me. But there w as yet a nother thi ng w hich I a ff irm ed, a nd w hic h, ow ing to th e habi t w hic h I had for med of belie ving it , I tho ugh t I perc eived very clearl y, alt houg h in tru th I did not per ceive it at all, to w it, that there we re ob jects ou tside of me from w hich these ideas pro ceede d, a nd to w hic h they w ere e nt irely s im ilar. An d it wa s in thi s th at I erre d, or, if per chance m y judg ment wa s corr ect, thi s w as no t d ue to any k no wledge arisi ng from m y per ception. But w hen I took a nythi ng very s imp le and easy in the sp here o f arith metic or geo metry int o cons ideration, e.g. th at tw o and three together m ade f iv e, a nd other th ings of the sort, w ere n ot th ese present to m y m ind so clearl y as to enable me to a ff irm tha t they w ere true? Certai nly if I judged tha t si nce s uc h ma tters cou ld be doubted, th is wo uld n ot ha ve been so for a ny other reason tha n th at it cam e in to my m ind that perhaps a God m ight ha ve endo wed m e w ith su ch a na ture th at I ma y ha ve been deceived e ven concerning thi ng s w hic h seem ed to me mo st m ani fest. But every t ime that th is pre conceived opin ion of th e sovereign pow er of a God present s itse lf to my tho ught, I am cons trained to confe ss th at it is easy to Hi m, if He w is h es it, to cause me to err, e ven in ma tters in w hich I belie ve my self to h ave th e bes t 14 Percip io, F. no us concevons. ev idence. A nd , on the other ha nd, al ways w he n I direct m y attent ion to th ings w hic h I believe m ys elf to perceive v ery clearly, I am so persuaded of th eir tr ut h th at I le t m ys elf bre ak out into w ord s su ch as th ese: Let w ho w ill dec eive me , He can n ever cau se m e to be no thing w hil e I thi nk th at I a m, or s o me day cau se it to be true to say t hat I h ave ne ver been, it being true no w to s ay th at I a m, or tha t tw o and three ma ke mo re or les s tha n fi ve, or any su ch thing in whic h I see a ma nifest contradiction.

A nd , certainly, s in ce I h ave n o reason to belie ve tha t th ere is a God w ho is a deceiver, and as I ha ve n ot yet sat isfied my self th at there is a God at al l, th e reason for doubt w hich depends on th is opin ion alone is very sl ig ht, and so to speak me taphysical. But in ord er to be able altoget her to re mo ve it , I m ust i nqu ire w het her there is a God as soo n as the occasion presents itself; and if I fi nd tha t th ere i s a God, I m ust also in qu ire w he ther He ma y be a deceiver; for w itho ut a kn owl edge of these two tr ut hs I do not see th at I can ever be certain of anyth ing. A nd in order t ha t I ma y ha ve an oppo rtunity of inqu iring in to thi s in an orderl y wa y [w itho ut in terrupting the ord er of m ed ita tion w hic h I ha ve prop osed to m ys elf, and w hich is li ttle by lit tle to pass fro m the no tion s w hic h I fi nd fir st of al l in m y m ind to tho se w hich I s ha ll later on di scover in it ] it is requis ite th at I s ho uld h ere div ide my tho ugh ts in to certain k in ds, and th at I s ho uld con sider in w hic h of the se ki nd s th ere is, prop erly s peakin g, tr ut h or er ror to be fou nd. O f my th oug hts so me are, so to speak, ima ges of th e thi ng s, and to the se alo ne is th e ti tle “i dea” prop erly applied; ex am ples are m y tho ugh t of a m an or of a ch im era, of h eaven, of an a ngel, or [eve n] of God. But other thou ghts posses s ot her form s as we ll. For exa mp le in w ill in g, fearing, app rovi ng, denying, tho ugh I al ways perc eive so me thing as th e s ubject of th e actio n of my m ind , 1 5 yet by th is action I al ways add so methi ng else to the idea 16 w hic h I have of that th ing; and of the tho ugh ts of thi s ki nd so me are called volitions or af fection s, and others judgm ents. No w a s to w hat concerns ideas, if w e con sider the m on ly in th em sel ves a nd do n ot relate the m to a nythi ng else be yond th em sel ves, th ey canno t prop erly speaki ng be fal se; f or w het her I im ag ine a goat or a c hi mera, it is no t les s true tha t I ima gine the o ne th at th e other. We m ust n ot fear li ke wi se tha t fal sity can enter in to w ill and i nto affect ions, for alt houg h I ma y desire evi l thi ng s, or e ven thi ng s tha t ne ver ex isted, 15 Th e French version is followed here as being more explicit. In it “action de mon esprit” replace s “mea cogitatio.” 16 I n the L atin version “similitu dinem.” 1- 13 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y it is n ot th e le ss tr ue tha t I desire the m. Thu s th ere re ma ins no m ore th an the judgm ents w hich we ma ke, in w hic h I m ust ta ke the greatest car e no t to deceive m ys elf. But th e principal erro r a nd the com mone st w hic h w e m ay me et w ith in th em , con sists in m y judgi ng th at the ideas w hic h are in me are s imi lar or confor mable to th e thi ng s w hic h are ou tside m e; for w ithou t doubt if I con sidere d the ideas o nly a s certain mo des o f m y tho ugh ts, w itho ut trying to relate the m to anyt hing be yond, they could scarcel y give me material for err or. But a mo ng th ese ideas, so me app ear to me to be in na te, s om e adven titiou s, a nd ot hers to be for med [or inv ented] by my self; for, as I ha ve the pow er o f u nders tandin g w hat is called a th ing, or a tru th, or a th oug ht, it app ears to m e th at I h old thi s po wer from no other s ource th an my o w n n at ure. But if I no w hear so me so und, if I see the su n, or feel heat, I ha ve hi therto judged that these se nsa tion s pro ceeded from certain th ings th at e xi st out side of m e; and f in ally it appe ars to me th at sire ns, h ippogr yphs, and th e li ke, are for med out of m y ow n min d. But again I ma y pos sibly persuade m ys elf tha t all the se ideas are of the na ture of those w hic h I term advent itious, or else th at th ey are all in na te, or all fi cti tio us: for I ha ve n ot yet clearl y discovered their true origin.

An d my principal tas k in th is place is to con sider, in respect to th ose ideas w hich appea r to m e to proc eed fro m certain obj ects tha t are ou tside m e, w hat are the reasons w hich cau se me to th ink the m si m ilar to the se obje cts. It see ms indeed in th e fir st place tha t I am ta ugh t th is les son by nat ure; a nd, secondly, I ex perience in my self that these ideas do n ot depend o n m y w ill nor th erefor e o n my self—for th ey ofte n present the ms elve s to m y m in d in sp ite of my w ill . J us t no w, for in stance, w het her I w ill or w het her I do n ot w ill , I f eel h eat, a nd thu s I persuade m ys elf th at th is feeli ng, or at leas t th is idea of heat, is pro duced in m e by so me thing w hic h is di fferent fro m me , i.e. by the heat of th e fire n ear w hic h I si t. A nd no thing see ms to me m ore obvio us th an to judge th at th is obj ect imp rints it s li kene ss rat her tha n anyth ing el se upon me . Now I m ust discover w he ther th ese pro ofs are s uf ficie ntly s trong and con vinci ng. W hen I s ay th at I a m so in structed by na ture, I m ere ly me an a certain s ponta neous in cli nat ion w hich imp els me to belie ve in th is connect ion, and n ot a n at ural ligh t w hic h ma kes m e recognize tha t it i s tr ue. But the se tw o th ings are very different ; for I canno t doubt tha t w hic h the n atural lig ht causes me to belie ve to be tr ue, as, for ex amp le, it h as s hown m e th at I am from the fact tha t I doubt, or other facts of t he sa me ki nd. An d I pos sess n o other fac ulty w hereby to di sting uish tru th from fa lse hood, w hic h can teach m e th at w hat this ligh t s ho ws me to be true is not really tr ue, and no other facu lty tha t is equal ly tru stw ort hy. But as far a s [appar ently] na tural im pu lses are concerned, I h ave frequen tly re marked, w he n I h ad to ma ke active c hoice bet wee n vir tue and vice, tha t they of ten eno ugh led me to the part tha t wa s wo rse; and th is is w hy I do no t s ee any reason for fo llow ing th em in w ha t rega rds tru th a nd erro r. An d as to th e ot her reason, w hich is th at th ese ideas m ust proc eed from objects ou tside m e, s in ce they do n ot depend o n m y w ill , I do no t fi nd it any th e m ore con vinci ng. For jus t as the se im pu lses of w hic h I ha ve s poken are fou nd in me , n ot withs tand ing th at th ey do not al ways concur w ith m y w ill, so perhaps there is in me so me facu lty fi tted to pro duce the se ideas w ithou t th e as sistance of a ny e xt ernal thi ng s, eve n th oug h it is not yet k no wn by me ; ju st as, appa rently, they h ave h it herto al ways been fou nd in me during s leep w ithou t the aid o f a ny ex ternal obj ects. An d fi na lly, th oug h th ey did pro ceed from obje cts dif ferent from my self, it is no t a neces sary conseq uence tha t th ey s ho uld rese mble th ese. O n the con trary, I ha ve no ticed tha t in m any cases th ere wa s a great dif ference betw een the obje ct and it s idea. I fi nd, for e xa mple, t wo com pletely di verse ideas of th e s un in m y m ind ; th e one derives its origin from th e sen ses, and sh ou ld be placed in the catego ry of adven titiou s ideas; acc ording to th is idea the s un seems to be ex trem ely s ma ll; b ut th e other is derived from astrono mical reasoning s, i.e. is elici ted from certain no tio ns th at are inn ate in me , or el se it is form ed by m e in so me other ma nner ; in accor dance with it the s un appea rs to be several time s greate r th an th e earth. These two ideas can not, indeed, both resem ble th e sa me su n, a nd reason ma kes m e belie ve th at th e one w hic h see ms to h ave originated directly fro m the su n itsel f, is the one w hic h is m os t di ssimi lar to it. Al l thi s cau ses me to believe tha t u nt il th e present time it has n ot been by a judgm ent tha t w as certain [or premedi tated], bu t o nly by a sort of blind imp ulse th at I believed th at thi ng s e xi sted ou tside of, a nd dif ferent from me, whic h, by th e org ans of m y s en ses, or by so me other me thod w ha tever it m ight be, con veye d th ese ideas or ima ges to me [and i mprinted on me t he ir si mili tu des ]. But there is yet anot her me thod of in qu iring w het her any o f th e obj ects of w hich I h ave ideas withi n m e e xi st ou tside of me . If ideas are on ly take n a s certain mo des of tho ugh t, I reco gnize am ongst the m no dif ference or inequal ity, and all appe ar to pro ceed from me in the sa me ma nner ; bu t w hen w e con sider the m as im age s, one repr esenti ng o ne 1- 14 14 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y th ing a nd the other anot her, it is clear tha t th ey are very dif ferent o ne from the ot her. There is no doubt th at tho se w hic h repr esent to me su bstances are so methi ng mo re, and con tain so to speak m ore obje ctive reality w ithi n the m [th at is to s ay, by rep resentation participate in a hi gher degre e of being or perfe ction] tha n th ose tha t si m ply rep resent mo des or accidents ; and tha t idea agai n by w hic h I un derstand a su prem e God, eternal, inf inite, [i m mutab le], o m nisc ien t, om nipo tent, and Creator o f al l th ings w hich are o ut side of H im sel f, ha s certainly mo re obje ctive reality in it sel f than th ose ideas by w hich fi ni te su bstances are represented. No w it is ma nif es t by the n at ural lig ht th at there m ust at leas t be as m uc h reality in th e e ff icient a nd total cau se as in its e ffect. For, pra y, w he nce can the ef fect derive it s reality, if not from it s cause? An d in w ha t w ay can th is cau se com municate thi s reality to it, u nl es s it posses sed it in it self ? An d from this it f ollo ws, not o nly th at so me thing canno t proce ed fro m no thing, b ut li ke wi se th at w ha t is mo re perfect— th at is to say, which ha s mo re reality withi n i tse lf—cannot proc eed from th e les s perfect. An d thi s is n ot o nly e viden tly tr ue of tho se effect s w hic h posse ss actual or form al reality, bu t also of th e ideas i n whic h we cons ider m ere ly w hat is ter med obj ective reality. T o take an e xa mple, th e sto ne w hich h as no t yet e xi sted n ot only cannot no w com mence to be u nl es s it h as been pro duced by so me thing w hich posses ses w ithi n it sel f, ei ther f orm ally or e mi nen tly, al l tha t enters in to th e co mpo sition of t he stone [i.e. it must posses s t he sa me th ings or ot her m ore excel lent th ings th an th ose w hich e xi st in th e stone] and heat can on ly be pro duced i n a su bject i n w hich it did not previous ly ex ist by a cau se that is of an ord er [degree or ki nd ] at lea st as perfect a s h eat, a nd so in al l other cases. But fur ther, the idea of heat, or of a st one, can not e xi st in me unless it ha s been placed w ithi n m e by s om e cau se w hich pos sesse s w ithin it at leas t as m uc h reality as tha t w hic h I conceive to e xi st in th e heat or th e sto ne. For al tho ugh this cau se does not trans mit anyt hing of it s act ual or form al reality to m y idea, w e m ust no t for th at reason i ma gine that it is neces sarily a les s real cause; w e m ust re me mber tha t [s in ce e ver y idea is a wo rk o f th e m ind ] it s nat ure is su ch th at it dem ands of it sel f no other for ma l reality tha n that w hic h it borr ows from m y th oug ht, o f w hic h it is only a mo de [ i.e. a m ann er or wa y of th inking ]. But in ord er tha t an idea s ho uld con tain so me o ne certain obj ective reality rather th an a nother, it m ust w ithou t doubt derive it from so me cause i n whic h th ere is at least as m uc h for ma l reality as this idea con tain s o f obj ective reality. For if we ima gine that so me thing is fou nd in an idea w hich is no t f ou nd in the cau se, it must the n ha ve been derived fro m noug ht; b ut h owe ver imp erfect ma y be th is mode of being by w hich a thi ng is obje ctively [or by rep resentatio n] in th e un derstandi ng by its idea, w e can not certainly say tha t thi s mo de of being is not hing, nor con sequen tly, th at th e idea derives its origi n from no thing. Nor m ust I ima gine tha t, s in ce th e reality that I con sider in th ese ideas is o nly obj ective, it is not es sen tial th at th is reality sh ou ld be form ally in th e cau ses of my ideas, b ut tha t it is s uf ficie nt tha t it sh ou ld be fo un d obj ectively. For jus t as thi s mo de o f obj ective e xi ste nce pertains to ideas by th eir pro per n ature, so does the m ode of for ma l ex iste nce pertain to th e cause s of tho se ideas (th is is at lea st tr ue of the fir st and principal) by t he na ture pecul iar to t he m. An d al tho ugh i t ma y be th e case tha t one idea g ive s birt h to another idea, tha t can not cont inue to be s o indef initely; for in th e end w e m ust reach an idea w ho se cause sh all be so to speak an archetyp e, in w hich the w ho le reality [or perfe ction] w hich is so to speak obj ectively [or by rep resentatio n] in th ese ideas is con tained for ma lly [and reall y]. Thus th e ligh t of na ture cau ses me to kn ow clearl y th at th e ideas in me are li ke [p ictures or] im ages w hic h can, in tru th, easily fall sh ort of the perfection of the obje cts fro m which they ha ve been derived, bu t w hich can never contain anything greate r or m ore perfect. An d th e longer and th e m ore careful ly tha t I in ve stigate th ese ma tters, the m ore clearl y and di stinct ly do I recognize their tru th. But w ha t am I to conclude fro m it all in th e end? It is th is, th at if the obj ective reality of any o ne of my ideas is of su ch a nat ure as clearl y to ma ke m e rec ogni ze tha t it is not in me ei ther form ally or em inen tly, a nd th at con sequen tly I can not m ys elf be the cause of it, it fol low s of neces sity that I a m not alone in the world, but th at there i s a nother being w hic h ex ists, or w hich is th e cause of th is idea. O n th e ot her ha nd, h ad no su ch an idea ex isted in me , I s ho uld ha ve had n o su ffic ient argu ment to conv ince me of the ex iste nce of a ny bei ng beyond m ys elf; for I ha ve ma de very careful inv estigatio n ever ywh ere and u p to the present ti m e ha ve been able to find no other ground. But o f m y ideas, bey ond th at w hic h rep resents m e to my self, as to w hic h there can here be n o di fficu lty, th ere is a nother w hich rep resent s a God, and there are ot hers representi ng corpo real a nd ina nimate th ings , others angel s, ot hers ani mals, and others again w hic h rep resent to m e me n s im ilar to m yself. As regar ds th e ideas w hich rep resent to me ot her me n or a ni mals, or angel s, I can ho wev er eas ily concei ve tha t they m igh t be for med by an adm ix tu re of th e ot her ideas w hic h I have of m ys elf, o f corpo real 1- 15 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y th ings, a nd of God, even altho ugh t here were apa rt fro m me neither me n nor ani mals, nor angels, in all the world. An d in rega rd to th e ideas of corp oreal obj ects, I do n ot rec ogni ze in th em anyth ing so great or so ex cellen t tha t they m igh t no t h ave poss ibly proce eded fro m m ys elf; for if I con sider th em mo re closely, and e xa mi ne the m indi vidually, a s I yester day ex ami ned th e idea o f wa x, I f in d tha t there is very li ttle in th em w hic h I perc eive clearly a nd dis tinctly. Magn itude or ex ten sion in len gth , breadth, or depth, I do so per ceive; also fig ure w hic h resu lts fro m a term ination of thi s e xt en sio n, th e s it ua tion w hich bodies of di fferent fi gure preserve in relation to one anot her, and m ove men t or change of si tua tion; to w hic h we m ay al so add s ub sta nce, duration and nu mber. As to ot her th ings s uc h as li gh t, colours, s ou nds, sce nts, ta stes, heat, cold and th e ot her tacti le q ualit ies, th ey are th oug ht by me w ith so m uc h obscurity a nd conf usion tha t I do no t eve n kn ow if they are tr ue or fa lse, i.e. w he ther the ideas w hich I form of the se qual ities are actual ly th e ideas of real obj ects or n ot [or w he ther they o nly rep resent chi meras w hic h cannot e xi st in fact]. For alt houg h I ha ve befor e rem arked th at it is only in judgm ents that fa lsity, pro perl y speak ing, or form al fal sity, can be me t w ith, a certain ma terial fal sity m ay n evert heless be fou nd in ideas, i.e. w hen the se ideas rep resent w ha t is n ot hing as th oug h it w ere so methi ng. For ex am ple, th e ideas w hic h I ha ve of cold and heat are so far from clear and distinc t th at by their m ea ns I can not te ll w het her cold is m ere ly a privat ion of heat, or heat a privat ion o f cold, or w he ther both are real qual ities, or are n ot su ch. An d ina smu ch as [si nce ideas resem ble ima ges ] there canno t be a ny ideas w hich do no t appea r to repr esent s om e th ings, if it is corr ect to say th at cold is m erely a privatio n of h eat, th e idea w hic h rep resents it to m e as so me thing real and posi tive w ill no t be i mp rope rly term ed fal se, a nd th e sa me hold s good of other sim ilar ideas.

To the se it is certainly no t neces sary th at I s ho uld at tribute a ny au thor ot her th an m ys elf. For if they are fal se, i.e. if they rep resent th ings w hic h do not ex ist, the lig ht of n at ure s ho ws me th at they iss ue from nought, tha t is to s ay, th at they are o nly in me so far as so methi ng is lack ing to the perfection of my n at ure. But if th ey are true, ne vertheles s because th ey e xh ibit s o li ttle reality to m e tha t I cannot eve n clearly di sting uish the thi ng repr esented fro m no n-being, I do no t see any reason why th ey sh ould not be produced by my self. A s to the clear a nd dis tinct idea w hic h I ha ve of corpo real thi ng s, so me of th em see m as tho ugh I m igh t have derived th em fro m th e idea w hic h I posses s of my self, as th ose w hic h I ha ve o f s ub sta nce, duration, nu mber, a nd su ch li ke. For [eve n] w hen I thi nk tha t a st one is a su bstance, or at least a thi ng capable of existin g of it self, and that I a m a su bstance also, alt houg h I concei ve tha t I am a th ing tha t th inks and n ot one t hat is ex tended, and t hat the sto ne o n th e other ha nd i s an e xt ended th ing w hic h does no t thi nk , a nd th at th us there is a n otable dif ference betw een the tw o conception s—they see m, ne vertheles s, to agree in thi s, th at bot h rep resent s ub sta nces. In the s a me wa y, w hen I per ceive tha t I no w ex ist and f urt her rec ollect tha t I ha ve in for mer ti m es e xi sted, a nd w he n I re me mber tha t I ha ve vario us tho ugh ts of w hich I can rec ogni ze th e nu mber, I acquire ideas of d uration and n umb er w hich I can after wards tran sfer to a ny obj ect that I please. But as to al l the ot her qual ities o f w hich the ideas o f corpo real th ings are com posed, to w it, ex tens ion, fi gure, sit uat ion and mo tion , it is true th at th ey are no t form ally in me , si nce I am o nly a thi ng tha t thi nk s; b ut because t hey are me rely certain modes of sub sta nce [and so to speak the ves tm ents u nder w hic h corp oreal s ub sta nce appea rs to us ] and because I m ys elf a m also a su bstance, it w oul d seem that they m ight be con tained in m e em inen tly. Hence th ere re mai ns o nly the idea of God, concerning w hich we m ust con sider w het her it is so me thing w hic h canno t ha ve proc eeded from me m ys elf. By th e na me God I un dersta nd a s ub sta nce th at is in fini te [e ternal, im muta ble ], in dependent, all -kn owi ng, al l-po werful, and by w hic h I my self and e ver ythi ng el se, if anyth ing else does ex ist, ha ve been cre ated. Now all th ese c hara cteristics are s uc h tha t the m ore dil igent ly I attend to the m, th e les s do th ey appea r capa ble of pro ceeding fro m m e alone; h ence, from what ha s been alread y s aid, we m ust conclude tha t God necessarily exists. For al tho ugh the idea of su bstance is w ith in me ow ing to the fact th at I am sub sta nce, ne verthele ss I sho uld n ot h ave the idea of an in fini te su bstance— since I am fi ni te— if it had not proc eeded fro m so me substance which wa s v eritably i nf inite. Nor s ho uld I im ag ine th at I do n ot per ceive the in fini te by a true idea, but o nly by t he negatio n of the f in ite, jus t as I perc eive repose and darknes s by th e negatio n o f m ove men t and of lig ht; for, on the contrar y, I see tha t there is ma nif es tly mo re reality in in fini te s ub sta nce tha n in fi ni te, and therefore that in so me w ay I h ave in me the n otio n of the in fini te earlier then the f in ite —to w it, the n ot ion o f God before that of my self. For h ow wo uld it be pos sible tha t I sh ou ld k no w tha t I doubt and desire, tha t is to s ay, th at so methi ng is lac king to m e, and tha t I am no t q ui te perfect, u nl es s I h ad w ith in me so me idea of a Being m ore perfect th an my self, in com pariso n w ith w hich I s ho uld recognize th e 1- 16 16 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y deficiencie s of m y nat ure? A nd we cannot s ay th at thi s idea o f God is perhaps m aterially fal se and that conseque ntly I can derive it fro m no ugh t [ i.e. tha t poss ibly it ex ists in me because I a m imp erfect], as I ha ve ju st sa id i s th e case w ith ideas o f h eat, cold a nd ot her su ch thi ng s; for, on th e con trary, as th is idea is very clear and di stinc t a nd con tain s w ithin it m ore obje ctive reality t ha n any other, there can be none which is of it self mo re true, nor any in w hic h there can be le ss su spicion o f fal sehood. The idea, I say, of th is Being w ho is absol utely perfect and in fini te, is e nt irel y true; for alt houg h, perhaps, w e can ima gine th at su ch a Being does n ot ex ist, w e canno t n evert heless im ag ine t hat H is idea rep resent s n ot hing real to m e, as I ha ve said of the idea of cold. This idea is also very clear and dis tinct; s in ce all that I concei ve clearly and dis tinctly of the real and th e true, and o f w ha t con veys so me perfection, is in it s ent irety contai ned in th is idea. A nd th is does n ot cease to be tr ue alt houg h I do no t com prehend the inf inite, or thoug h in God there is an in fini tude of th ings w hich I can not com prehend, nor pos sibly eve n reach in a ny w ay by tho ught; for it is of th e na ture of the inf inite that my nat ure, w hic h is fi ni te a nd li m ited, sh ou ld no t co mprehend it; and it is su ffic ient tha t I sh ou ld un derstand thi s, and th at I s ho uld judge tha t all th ings w hic h I clearl y per ceive and in w hic h I kn ow that there is so me perfe ction, and poss ibly lik ew ise an in fini tude of prop erties of w hich I a m ignorant, are in God form ally or em inen tly, so that t he idea w hic h I ha ve of Him ma y become th e mo st true, m os t clear, a nd mo st dis tinct of all th e ideas that are in m y m in d. But pos sibly I a m somethi ng m ore th an I su ppose my self to be, and perhaps all th ose perfections w hic h I attribu te to God are in s om e w ay potent ially in me , al tho ugh they do no t yet di sclose the mse lves, or is su e in action. As a ma tter of fact I a m alread y se ns ible tha t my kn owl edge in creases [and perfects i tse lf] l it tle by l it tle, a nd I s ee no thing w hich can prevent it fro m increasing mo re and mo re int o inf initude ; n or do I see, after it ha s th us been increased [or perfe cted], anyth ing to prevent my being able to acquire by i ts me ans al l th e ot her perfections of the Div ine na ture; nor f in ally w hy the po wer I ha ve of acquiri ng these perfection s, if it really e xi sts in me , sha ll no t suf fice to produce the ideas of the m. At th e sa me ti m e I recognize tha t th is cannot be. For, in the fir st place, alt houg h it w ere true that ever y day my kno wledge acquired n ew degr ees of perfection, a nd th at there w ere in m y na ture ma ny th ings potent ially w hich are not yet th ere actual ly, ne vertheles s the se ex celle nces do n ot pertain to [or m ake the s m allest appro ach to] the idea w hic h I ha ve o f God in w hom there is no thing m ere ly poten tial [bu t in w ho m all is present reall y and actually]; for it is an in fallible toke n of imp erfection in my k no wledge tha t it increases lit tle by li ttle. and furt her, al tho ugh my kno wledge gro ws m ore and mo re, ne vertheles s I do no t for th at reason belie ve that it can ever be actual ly in fini te, si nce it can ne ver reach a poi nt so hi gh tha t it w ill be u nab le to attai n to any greater increase. But I u nders tand God to be act ually in fini te, so th at He can add not hing to Hi s s upre me perfection. A nd fi na lly I perc eive t ha t t he obj ective being of an idea canno t be produced by a being that ex ists poten tially on ly, w hic h prop erly speaki ng is no thing, bu t only by a being w hic h is form al or act ual. T o speak the tr uth, I see not hing in all th at I have jus t said w hic h by th e lig ht of n at ure is not ma nif es t to anyone w ho desires to th ink atte ntively on the su bject; bu t w hen I sl ig ht ly relax m y at ten tion, my m ind , fi ndi ng it s vi sion s om ew ha t obscured a nd so to speak bli nded by th e ima ges of se ns ible obj ects, I do no t easi ly recollect th e reason w hy th e idea tha t I posses s of a being mo re perfect the n I , m ust neces sarily ha ve been placed in me by a being w hic h i s really m ore perfect; and th is is w hy I w is h here to go o n to inq uire whether I, w ho ha ve th is idea, can ex ist i f n o suc h being ex ists. An d I as k, from w ho m do I th en derive m y ex istence? Perhaps from m ys elf or fro m my parents, or from so me ot her source le ss perfect th an God; for we can ima gine n ot hing mo re perfe ct than God, or e ven as perfect a s He is . But [w ere I in dependent o f e ver y other a nd] w ere I m ys elf th e au thor of m y being, I sh ou ld doubt n ot hing a nd I s ho uld desire no thing, and fina lly no perfection w ou ld be lack ing to me ; for I s ho uld h ave bestow ed on m ys elf ever y perfection of w hich I pos sessed a ny idea and sh ou ld th us be God. An d it m ust not be ima gined th at tho se th ings th at are lac kin g to m e are perhaps m ore di fficu lt of attai nme nt th an tho se w hic h I alrea dy pos sess ; for, on the contrar y, it is qu ite ev ident tha t it wa s a ma tter of m uch greate r di fficu lty to bring to pas s th at I, th at is to say, a th ing or a su bstance tha t thi nk s, sh ou ld e merge ou t of n ot hing, th an it wo uld be to at tain to th e kn owl edge of ma ny th ings of w hich I am ignorant, and w hic h are on ly the accidents of thi s thi nk ing su bstance. But it is clear tha t if I had of my self posses sed thi s greate r perfection of w hich I h ave ju st spoke n [t hat is to s ay, if I had been th e au thor of m y ow n ex iste nce], I sh ou ld not at leas t ha ve denied my self th e thi ng s w hic h are the mo re easy to acquire [to w it, ma ny branches of kn owl edge of w hich my n ature is des titute ]; n or s ho uld I h ave deprived my self of a ny of the thi ng s contained in th e idea w hich I f orm of God, because th ere are no ne of the m w hic h s eem to m e specially dif ficult to 1- 17 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y acquire:

and if there w ere any tha t we re m ore dif ficult to acquire, they wo uld certainly appea r to m e to be s uc h (supposi ng I my self we re th e origin o f th e ot her thi ng s w hich I pos sess) s in ce I s ho uld di scover in th em that my powers we re limited. But tho ugh I ass ume tha t perhaps I h ave al ways e xi sted ju st as I am at present, n eit her can I escape the force of th is reasoning, and ima gine th at t he concl usion to be draw n from t hi s is, tha t I need no t seek for any au thor of m y ex iste nce. For all the course o f my li fe ma y be div ided in to an in fini te n umb er of parts, no ne o f w hich is in any w ay dependent on th e other; and thu s from the fact that I w as in ex iste nce a s hort ti m e ago it does no t fo llow that I m ust be in ex iste nce no w, un less so me cause at th is ins tan t, so to speak, produces m e ane w, that is to say, conserves m e. I t is as a m atter of fact perfectly clear a nd e vident to all th ose w ho con sider w ith at ten tion the nature of t ime , t hat, in orde r to be conserved in each mo ment in w hic h it end ures, a s ub sta nce ha s need of th e s am e po wer and action as wo uld be n ecessary to pro duce and cre ate it a new , s uppos ing it did no t yet e xi st, so th at th e ligh t of na ture s ho ws us clearl y th at th e di stinc tion bet wee n creation a nd conservat ion is solely a distinction of the reason. A ll tha t I th us require here is tha t I sh ou ld in terrog ate m ys elf, if I w ish to kn ow whe ther I posse ss a po wer w hic h is capable of bring ing it to pass th at I w ho no w a m s ha ll st ill be in the fut ure; for s in ce I a m no thing b ut a thi nk ing thi ng, or at least si nce th us far it is on ly th is portion of m ys elf w hich is precisely in ques tion at present, if su ch a pow er did reside in me , I s ho uld certain ly be con sciou s o f it. But I a m conscio us of n oth ing of the ki nd, a nd by th is I kn ow clearl y th at I depend o n so me being dif ferent from m yself. Possibly, ho wev er, th is being on w hic h I depend is n ot th at w hic h I call God, a nd I a m create d eit her by m y parents or by s om e ot her cause les s perfect tha n God. Thi s cannot be, because, as I h ave jus t said, it is perfectl y e vident th at there m ust be at least as m uch reality in the cause as in th e ef fect; and thu s s in ce I a m a thi nk ing th ing, a nd pos sess an idea of God w ithi n me , w ha tever in the end be t he cau se ass igned to my ex iste nce, it m ust be al low ed that it is like wise a th inking thi ng and th at it pos sesse s in it self the idea of all the perfections w hic h I attribu te to God.

We m ay again inq uire w he ther th is cau se derives its origin from it sel f or fro m so me ot her th ing. For if from it self, it fol low s by the reasons before brought forw ard, tha t th is cau se m ust itse lf be God; for si nce i t pos sesse s th e vi rtue of se lf-ex iste nce, it m ust al so w ithou t doubt ha ve the pow er o f act ually posse ssing all t he perfections of w hic h it h as th e idea, that is, all tho se w hic h I conceive as ex isting in God. But if it derives its ex iste nce fro m so me ot her cau se th an it sel f, we s ha ll again ask , for th e sa me reason, w het her thi s second cause e xi sts by itsel f or thro ugh a nother, un til from o ne s tep to anot her, we fi nal ly ar rive at a n ul tim ate cause, which w ill be God. A nd it is perfectly ma nif es t tha t in th is there can be no reg ression in to inf inity, s in ce w hat is in ques tion is n ot so m uc h the cause w hich form erly create d me , as t hat w hich conserve s m e at th e present time . Nor can we suppose tha t se veral cau ses ma y ha ve concurred in m y pro ductio n, a nd th at from one I ha ve received th e idea o f o ne of the perfections w hic h I attribu te to God, and from another the idea of so me other, so that al l the se perfections indeed ex ist so mew he re in th e un iverse, bu t no t as com plete in one un ity w hic h is God. On th e contrary , the un ity, the simp lici ty or the ins epar ability o f all th ings w hic h are in god is one o f th e principal perfections w hic h I conceive to be in Him. An d certain ly the idea of th is un ity of al l D iv ine perfections canno t h ave been placed in me by any cause from w hic h I ha ve n ot li ke wi se received the ideas o f all the other perfections; for th is cau se could no t m ak e me able to com prehend the m as joined together in a n in separa ble u ni ty w ith ou t ha ving at th e sa me time caused me in s o me me asure to k no w w ha t th ey are [and in some wa y to rec ognize each o ne of th em]. Fina lly, so far as my parents [fro m w hom it appe ars I ha ve s prung ] are concerned, al tho ugh all tha t I ha ve ever been able to belie ve of the m we re true, tha t does not m ak e it fo llow that it is they w ho con serve m e, nor are th ey eve n th e au thors of m y being i n any s en se, in so far as I am a thi nk ing bei ng; si nce w hat they did w as me rely to imp lant certain dispos itions in that ma tter in w hich the sel f— i.e. the m in d, w hic h alone I at present ident ify w ith my self—i s by m e deem ed to ex ist. A nd th us th ere can be no di fficu lty in th eir rega rd, b ut w e m ust of neces sity conclude fro m the fact alone that I e xi st, or tha t the idea of a Being su prem ely perfect—that is of God—is in m e, th at th e pro of of God’ s ex iste nce is grounded on the highest ev idence. It o nly rem ains to m e to ex ami ne in to th e m ann er in w hic h I ha ve acquired thi s idea fro m God; for I ha ve not received it throug h the sen ses, a nd it is n ever presented to m e un expectedly, a s is u su al w ith th e ideas of se ns ible thi ng s w he n the se thi ng s present the mse lves, or seem to present the mse lves, to the e xt ernal org ans of m y s en ses ; n or is it li ke wi se a f ict ion o f my m ind , for it is n ot in my po wer to take fro m or to add a nythi ng to it ; a nd con sequen tly the only alternati ve is tha t it is in nate in me , jus t as the idea of myself i s i nn ate in me. A nd one certainly oug ht n ot to fi nd it strange that God, in creating 1- 18 18 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y me , placed th is idea w ithin m e to be like the ma rk of th e wo rkman i mp rinted on h is w or k; a nd it is like wise not esse ntial th at the ma rk sh all be s om ethi ng dif ferent fro m t he wo rk it self. For from the sole fact th at God cre ated m e it is mo st proba ble tha t in so me wa y h e has placed hi s ima ge and s im ilitude upon me, and t hat I perceive t hi s si m ilitud e (in w hic h the idea of God is contai ned) by me ans of th e sa me facul ty by w hic h I per ceive my self—t hat is to say, w hen I reflect on m ys elf I no t on ly kn ow th at I am so methi ng [i m perfect], inco mplete a nd dependent on anot her, w hic h ince ssantly aspires after so methi ng w hich is better and gre ater than my self, bu t I also kn ow th at He o n w ho m I depend posses ses in Hi mse lf all the gre at t hi ng s to wards which I aspire [a nd t he ideas o f w hich I fin d w ithin my self], a nd th at no t inde finitely or potent ially alo ne, b ut really, actual ly and inf initely; and that th us He is God.

A nd th e w hol e stre ngth of the argu ment w hic h I ha ve h ere ma de us e of to prove the ex iste nce of God cons ists in thi s, that I recognize th at it is n ot poss ible th at my n ature sh ou ld be w hat it is , a nd indeed th at I sh ou ld ha ve in my self the idea of a God, if God did not veritably ex ist— a God, I s ay, w hos e idea is in me , i.e. w ho pos sesse s all th ose su prem e perfections of w hich our m in d ma y indeed h ave so me idea b ut w ithou t un derstandi ng the m all, who is liable to no erro rs or defect [a nd w ho ha s n one of all tho se ma rks w hic h denote i m perfection ]. Fro m this it is m an ifes t tha t He canno t be a deceiver, si nce th e ligh t of na ture teaches u s th at fra ud and deception necessarily proce ed from so me defect.

But before I ex ami ne thi s ma tter w ith m ore care, and pass on to th e cons ideration of other tru ths w hic h ma y be derived fro m it , it see ms to me righ t to pau se for a w hil e in orde r to con tem plate God H im sel f, to ponder at leisure His m arve llou s at tributes, to consider, and admire, and ado re, the beauty of th is lig ht so resplenden t, at leas t a s far as th e stre ngth o f m y m ind , w hich is in so me me asure dazz led by th e sig ht, w ill al low m e to do so. For ju st as fa ith teaches us th at th e s upre me fel icity of th e other life cons ists o nly in this conte mplation of th e Divine Majesty, so we cont inue to learn by experience that a si m ilar me ditat ion, tho ugh inco mparabl y le ss perfect, cause s u s to e njo y the greatest satisfactio n of w hich w e are capable in t his l ife. M ed it at ion IV . O f t h e T ru e an d t h e F als e . I ha ve been we ll accus tomed these pas t days to detach m y m ind from my sen ses, and I ha ve accuratel y observed that there are very fe w th ings th at o ne kn ows w ith certain ty respecting corp oreal obje cts, th at th ere are ma ny m ore which are k no wn to u s respe cting t he hu man m ind , and yet m ore s ti ll regar ding God H ims elf; so tha t I sh all n ow w ith ou t any dif ficulty abstract my th oug hts from the con sideration o f [ sen sible or] i ma ginable obje cts, and carr y t he m to th ose w hic h, bei ng w ithdra wn from all contact w ith m atter, are p urel y in tel ligible. A nd certainly th e idea w hic h I posses s of th e h uma n m ind ina sm uc h a s it is a thi nk ing th ing, and n ot e xt ended in le ngt h, w idt h and depth, n or participating in anyth ing pertaini ng to bod y, is in com parabl y mo re di stinc t tha n is the idea of any corp oreal thing. A nd w hen I con sider that I doubt, t ha t i s to say, tha t I am an in com plete and dependent bei ng, th e idea of a being th at is com plete and independent, th at is of God, present s it sel f to m y m ind w ith so m uc h dis tinct nes s and clearnes s—and from the fact alo ne th at thi s idea is fou nd in me , or that I w ho pos sess th is idea ex ist, I conclude so certainly that God e xi sts, and th at m y e xi ste nce depends en tirely on Him i n every moment of my l ife —t hat I do n ot th ink t hat the hu man m in d is capable of k no win g anyt hing w ith m ore e vidence and certitude.

An d it see ms to m e tha t I no w ha ve before me a road w hich w ill lead u s fro m the conte mplation of th e tr ue God (i n w ho m all th e treasures of scie nce and w is do m are contained) to th e kn owl edge of th e other objects of th e uni ver se. For, fir st of al l, I recognize it to be imp ossib le th at He s ho uld ever deceive me ; for in al l fraud a nd deception so me im perfectio n is to be fou nd, and altho ugh i t m ay appea r t hat the pow er of deception is a ma rk of su btilty or pow er, yet th e desire to deceive w itho ut doubt tes tifies to ma lice or f eebleness, and acco rdingly can not be found i n God. In the ne xt place I e xperienced in my self a certain capa city for judging w hic h I ha ve doubtles s rec eived from God, li ke all th e ot her th ings tha t I posses s; and as He cou ld no t desire to deceive m e, it is clear that He has n ot gi ven m e a f acul ty tha t w ill lead me to er r if I us e it arigh t. A nd no doubt respecting thi s ma tter could rem ain, if it we re no t th at the con sequence wo uld see m to fol low that I can th us n ever be deceived; for if I h old al l tha t I posses s from God, a nd if He h as n ot placed in me the capacity for erro r, i t see ms as tho ugh I could never fall in to err or. An d it is tr ue tha t w hen I th ink on ly of God [and direct my m ind w ho lly to Hi m], 1 7 I discover [in my self] n o cause of er ror , or fal sity; yet directly a fter wards, w he n recur ring to m ys elf, e xperience 17 Not in the French version. 1- 19 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y sh ows me tha t I am nevertheles s s ubject to an inf initude of erro rs, as to w hic h, w hen we com e to inv estigate the m mo re clo sely, I n ot ice tha t not on ly is there a real a nd posit ive idea of God or of a Being o f su prem e perfection present to my m ind , bu t al so, so to speak, a certain negati ve idea of no thing, th at is , of tha t w hic h is inf initely rem oved from a ny ki nd of perfection; and th at I am in a se nse so methi ng int erm ediate betw een God and n oug ht, i.e. place d in su ch a ma nner bet wee n th e su prem e Being and no n-being, that there is in tru th not hing in m e tha t can lead to err or in so far a s a so vereign Being h as form ed m e; bu t t hat, as I in so me degr ee participate li ke wi se in no ugh t or in non -bei ng, i.e. in so far as I am n ot m ys elf the s upre me B eing, and a s I fi nd m ys elf su bject to a n in fini tude of im perfectio ns, I o ugh t no t to be asto nished if I sh ou ld fal l int o erro r. Thu s do I reco gnize that erro r, in so far as it is su ch, is no t a real thi ng depending on God, bu t si m ply a defect; and th erefor e, in order to fall in to it, t hat I h ave no n eed to pos sess a special facu lty gi ven m e by God f or th is very p urpose, b ut th at I fa ll in to err or from the fact tha t the po wer gi ven me by God for the purpose of dis tingu ishi ng tr uth from error is not i nfinite. Nevert heless th is does no t qu ite sa tisfy me ; f or erro r is n ot a p ure negatio n [ i.e. is not th e di mp le defect or w an t of so me perfection w hic h oug ht no t to be m in e] , but it is a lack of so me k no wledge w hic h it seem s tha t I ough t to posses s. A nd on cons idering the na ture of God it does n ot app ear to me poss ible tha t He sh ou ld ha ve gi ven me a fac ulty w hic h is n ot perfect of it s ki nd, th at is , w hic h is w an ting in so me perfection due to it. For if i t is true th at the m ore s killfu l t he artiza n, the mo re perfect is the wo rk of hi s ha nds, w hat can ha ve been produce d by th is su prem e Creator o f al l th ings that is no t in all it s parts perfect? An d certainly there is no doubt tha t God could have create d me s o tha t I could never have been su bje ct to err or; it is also certain tha t He ever w ills w hat is best ; is it the n better tha t I sh ou ld be s ubject to err tha n th at I should not ? In cons idering thi s mo re at tent ively, it occurs to m e in th e fir st place th at I s ho uld n ot be asto nished i f m y inte llige nce i s not cap able of com prehendi ng w hy God acts as He does; and tha t there is th us n o reason to doubt of Hi s e xi ste nce from the fact tha t I ma y perhaps fi nd ma ny ot her th ings besides thi s a s to w hich I a m able to un derstand ne ither for w ha t reason n or ho w God has produced th em. For, in th e fir st place, k no wing that my nat ure is ex trem ely feeble and limi ted, a nd th at th e n at ure of God is on th e con trary im men se , inco mpre hensible, and inf inite, I h ave n o f urt her di fficu lty in reco gnising that there is an in fini tude of m atter in Hi s po wer, th e cau ses of w hic h tran scend my kn owl edge; and thi s reason su ffice s to con vince m e th at th e species o f cause ter med fi nal, f in ds no u se ful em ploy ment in p hysical [or n atural ] th ings ; for it does no t appea r to m e tha t I can w ith ou t te mer ity s eek to in ve stigate the [i nscr utable] ends of God. It furt her occurs to me th at w e sh ou ld no t cons ider one s in gle cre ature separatel y, w hen we inq uire a s to w het her th e wo rks of God are perfect, but sh ou ld rega rd al l h is creations together. For the sa me th ing w hic h m ight pos sibly seem very im perfect w ith so me se mb lance of reason if regar ded by itse lf, is fou nd to be v er y perfect if rega rded as part of the w ho le un iverse; a nd alt houg h, s ince I resolved to doubt all th ings, I a s yet h ave o nly k no wn certainly my ow n exi stence and tha t of God, nevert heless si nce I have recognized th e in fini te pow er of God, I canno t deny that He ma y h ave produce d ma ny ot her th ings, or at least th at He h as the pow er o f producing th em, so tha t I ma y obtai n a place as a part of a great universe. W hereupon, reg arding m ys elf m ore clo sely, and con sidering w ha t are my erro rs (for th ey alone te stify to th ere being any im perfectio n in me ), I an swer that they depend o n a com binat ion of two cau ses, to w it, on th e facu lty of kn owl edge that rest s in me , and on t he pow er of c hoice or of free w ill —t hat is to say, o f th e u ndersta nding and at t he sa me tim e of the w ill. For by the u nders tanding alone I [n either assert n or deny anyth ing, b ut ] appr ehend 1 8 the ideas of th ings as to w hic h I can for m a judgm ent. But no err or is pro perl y speaki ng fo un d in it, provided the wo rd erro r is ta ken in its pro per sig ni ficatio n; a nd tho ugh there is poss ibly an in fini tude of thi ng s in th e wo rld of w hich I ha ve n o idea in my u nders tanding, we cannot for all th at say th at it is dep rived of these ideas [a s we m ight say of so methi ng w hich is required by it s na ture], bu t s imp ly it does n ot posse ss th ese; because in tr ut h th ere is n o reason to prove tha t God s ho uld h ave give n m e a greater facu lty of kn owl edge th an He has g ive n me ; and ho we ver sk illf ul a w or kma n I repr esent Hi m to be, I sh ou ld n ot for al l tha t con sider th at He w as bound to have placed i n each of His wo rks all the perfe ctions w hich He may have been able to place in so me. I li ke wise canno t com plain th at God ha s not give n me a free c hoice or a w ill w hich is su ffic ien t, a mp le and perfect, si nce as a ma tter of fact I am conscio us of a w ill so ex tended as to be su bject to n o limi ts. A nd w ha t seem s to m e very rem arkable in th is rega rd is th at of all the quali ties w hic h I posses s there is no o ne so perfect and so com prehen sive th at I do n ot very clearl y reco gnize tha t i t m ight be yet greater and mo re perfect. For, to take an e xa mple, if I 18 percipio. 1- 20 20 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y cons ider the facu lty o f com prehen sion w hich I posse ss, I f ind th at it is of v ery s m all e xte nt and e xtre mely li m ited, and at the sa me time I f ind th e idea o f a nother facul ty m uc h mo re am ple a nd eve n in fini te, and seein g th at I can f orm the idea of it, I recognize fro m thi s very fact tha t it pertain s to the na ture o f God. If in th e s am e w ay I e xa mine the me mory, t he im ag ina tion, or so me ot her facu lty, I do n ot fin d any whic h is no t s m all and circu mscribed, w hile in God it is i m mens e [or inf inite]. I t i s free-w ill alo ne or liberty of choice w hic h I fi nd to be so great in me th at I can concei ve no ot her idea to be mo re great; it is in deed th e case th at it is for the m os t part th is w ill that cau ses me to k no w that in so me ma nner I bear th e ima ge and sim ilitude of God. For alt houg h the power of w ill i s inco mparably greate r in God th an in me, bot h by reason of the kn owl edge and th e po wer w hic h, conjoined w ith it, render it stronger and mo re e ff icacious, a nd by reason of it s obje ct, in as muc h as in God it ex tends to a great ma ny thi ng s; it ne verthele ss does n ot seem to me greate r if I cons ider it for ma lly and precisely in itsel f: for th e facu lty of w ill con sists alone in o ur ha ving th e pow er of choos ing to do a thi ng or choosi ng no t to do it (that is, to aff irm or deny, to pursue or to sh un it), or rather it con sists alone in the fact th at in orde r to af fir m or deny, purs ue or s hu n th ose th ings placed befor e us by the un dersta nding, we act so that w e are u nco nscious tha t a ny out side force cons trains us in doing so. For in orde r tha t I sh ou ld be free it is not n ecessar y th at I sh ou ld be ind ifferent a s to the choice of o ne or th e ot her of two contraries; b ut contrari wise th e mo re I lean to the o ne—w het her I rec ogni ze clearl y th at th e reason s o f the good a nd tr ue are to be f ou nd in it, or w he ther God so disposes m y in wa rd tho ugh t—the mo re freely do I choose and e mbrace it. An d un doubtedly both div ine grac e and na tural k no wledge, far from di mi nis hi ng my liberty , rather in crease it and s trengt hen it. Hence th is indi fference w hich I f eel, w he n I a m not s wayed to o ne s ide rather tha n to the other by lack o f reason, is th e lo we st grade o f liberty, and rather evi nces a lac k or n egation in kn owl edge tha n a perfection o f w ill : f or if I al ways recognized clearl y w ha t wa s tr ue a nd good, I s ho uld ne ver ha ve trouble in deliberating as to w hat judgm ent or choice I s ho uld make, and then I s ho uld be en tirely free withou t e ver being ind ifferent. From all th is I reco gnize that the pow er of w ill w hic h I have rec eived fro m God is no t o f i tse lf the source of my erro rs—for i t is very am ple a nd very perfe ct of its k in d—a ny mo re tha n is the po wer of un derstandi ng; for si nce I un derstand no thing bu t by th e po wer w hic h God h as give n m e for u nders tanding, th ere is n o doubt that all tha t I un derstand, I un derstand as I o ugh t, and it is not poss ible tha t I err in th is. W hence the n co me my erro rs? They com e fro m the sole fact tha t si nce the w ill is m uch w id er in it s range and com pass th an the un derstandi ng, I do no t restrai n it w ith in the sa me bound s, b ut ex tend it also to th ings w hic h I do n ot u ndersta nd: a nd as the w ill is of itsel f in dif ferent to these, it easily falls in to erro r and sin , and chooses the ev il for the good, or the false for the true. For e xa mple, w he n I la tely ex am ined w het her anyt hing e xi sted in th e w or ld, a nd fo un d tha t fro m the very fact tha t I cons idered thi s ques tion it fo llow ed v ery clearl y th at I m ys elf ex isted, I could no t prevent m ys elf fro m belie ving that a th ing I so clearly conceived w as true:

no t tha t I fou nd my self co mpe lled to do so by so me e xt ernal cause, but simp ly because from great clearness in my m in d there fol low ed a great inclinat ion of my will ; and I believed thi s w ith so m uch th e greate r freedom or s ponta neity a s I posses sed the le ss in difference to wards it. Now, on the contrary , I n ot only know t ha t I ex ist, ina sm uc h as I am a t hi nk ing th ing, bu t a certain repr esentatio n of cor poreal na ture is al so presented to m y m in d; and it co me s to pass tha t I doubt w he ther th is th inking na ture w hich is in me , or rather by w hic h I am w hat I am , dif fers from thi s cor poreal na ture, or w he ther both are not si m ply the sa me thi ng ; a nd I h ere su ppose tha t I do n ot yet kn ow any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief rat her th an th e other. Fro m th is it fol low s tha t I am e ntirely indi fferent as to w hich of the tw o I aff irm or deny, or e ven w he ther I abstain from form ing a ny judg ment in th e ma tter. A nd th is ind ifference does n ot only ex tend to m atters as to w hic h th e un derstandi ng h as no k no wledge, bu t al so in general to all tho se w hic h are no t app rehended w ith perfect clearness at the mo men t w he n th e w ill is deliber ating upo n the m: for, ho wev er prob able are the conjectures w hic h rende r me disposed to form a judgm ent respecting anyth ing, th e si m ple k no wledge th at I ha ve tha t tho se are conjectures alone and n ot certain and in dubi table reason s, su ffices to occasion m e to judge t he con trary. Of th is I ha ve had great e xperience of late when I set aside as fa lse al l that I h ad form erly h eld to be absolu tely tr ue, f or th e sole reason that I re mar ked that it m ight in som e me asure be doubted.

But if I abs tain fro m gi vi ng my judgm ent o n any th ing w he n I do no t perc eive it w ith s uf ficie nt clearness and disti nct nes s, it i s plai n tha t I act right ly a nd a m not deceived. But if I deter mine to deny or a ff irm , I no lon ger m ake us e a s I sh ou ld of m y free w ill, and if I a ff irm w hat is no t true, it is eviden t that I deceive my self; eve n thou gh I judge acco rding to tru th, this co mes about only by chance, and I do not escape 1- 21 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y th e blam e of m is u si ng m y freedom ; for the lig ht of n ature teaches us th at the k no wledge of th e un derstandi ng sho uld al ways prece de the determ inatio n of the w ill. An d it is in the m isuse of th e free w ill that th e privatio n w hich con stitute s th e characteristic na ture of erro r is m et w ith. Privat ion, I say, is fou nd in th e act, in so far as it pro ceeds from me , b ut it is n ot fo und in the facu lty w hic h I ha ve rec eived from God, nor even in the act in so far as it depends on Him. For I h ave certainly no cau se to com plain that God h as no t give n me an in tel ligence w hic h is m ore pow erful, or a n at ural lig ht w hic h is stro nger tha n tha t w hich I ha ve received fro m Him, s in ce it is prop er to th e fi ni te u nders tandin g no t to co mprehe nd a m ulti tude of thi ng s, and it is pro per to a cre ated u nders tandin g to be f in ite ; on th e con trary, I ha ve every reason to render tha nk s to God w ho ow es me n ot hing and w ho ha s gi ven me all th e perfections I posse ss, a nd I s ho uld be far from charging Hi m w ith inju stice, and w ith h av ing deprived me o f, or wr ongfully w ithheld from me , the se perfections w hich He h as n ot bestow ed upon me. I ha ve fu rther n o reason to co mp lain th at He h as g ive n m e a w ill mo re a mp le th an my un derstandi ng, for si nce the w ill con sists on ly of one si ng le elem ent, a nd is so to speak in div isible, it appe ars th at it s na ture is such that nothing can be abstracted from i t [w ith ou t destroying it ]; a nd certainly th e mo re co mprehe nsive it is fou nd to be, the mo re reason I h ave to render gratitude to the gi ver. A nd, fi na lly, I m ust also no t com plain tha t God concurs w ith me in form ing the acts of the w ill, th at is th e judg ment in w hic h I go as tra y, because the se acts are e ntirely tr ue and good, ina sm uc h as they depend on God; a nd in a certain se nse m ore perfection accrues to m y n at ure from the fact that I can for m th em, th an if I cou ld no t do so. A s to the privatio n in w hic h alone the forma l reason o f err or or si n con sists, it ha s no need o f a ny concurrence fro m God, si nce it is no t a th ing [or a n ex iste nce], a nd si nce it is not related to God as to a cau se, bu t sh ould be term ed m erely a negatio n [accor ding to the s ig ni ficance gi ven to th ese wo rds in the Sc hools ]. For in fact it is no t an imp erfection in God th at He ha s gi ven me th e libert y to g ive or w ithho ld m y as sen t from certain th ings as to w hic h He ha s n ot placed a clear and di sti nct kn owl edge in my u nders tanding; b ut it is w ith ou t doubt a n imp erfection in m e n ot to ma ke a good us e of my freedom, a nd to give m y judg ment rea dily on ma tters w hich I o nly un derstand obscurely. I ne vertheles s perceive that God could easily ha ve cre ated m e so th at I n ever s ho uld err , alt houg h I st ill rem ained free, and endow ed w ith a li m ited kn owl edge, vi z. by giv ing to m y un derstandi ng a clear a nd di stinct i nte lligence of all th ings as to w hic h I sh ould ever h ave to deliber ate; or si m ply by His engravi ng deepl y in m y m em ory th e resolu tion ne ver to form a judgm ent on anyth ing w ithou t ha ving a clear and di stinc t un derstandi ng o f it, so that I cou ld ne ver forget it . A nd it is easy for m e to u ndersta nd tha t, in s o far as I cons ider my self alone, and as if th ere we re o nly m ys elf in th e wo rld, I sh ou ld have been m uc h mo re perfect tha n I am , if God h ad cre ated me so tha t I could n ever err . Ne vertheles s I canno t deny that in so me sen se it is a gre ater perfection in the w hol e un iverse tha t certain parts s ho uld no t be e xe mpt from erro r as others are than tha t all parts sh ou ld be e xact ly si m ilar. A nd I ha ve n o right to com plain if God, ha ving placed me in th e w or ld, h as n ot called upo n m e to play a part th at ex cels al l ot hers in distinc tion and perfection. A nd fu rther I ha ve reason to be glad o n the grou nd tha t if He h as no t gi ven me th e pow er of never going astray by the firs t m ea ns poi nted ou t above, w hich depends o n a clear and ev ident k no wledge o f all the th ings rega rding w hic h I can deliberate , He ha s at least lef t w ith in m y pow er t he other m ea ns , w hic h is fir mly to adhere to the resol ution never to give judgm ent on ma tters w ho se tru th i s no t clearl y k no wn to m e; for alt houg h I no tice a certain we akness in m y n ature in tha t I canno t cont inual ly concentrate my m in d on o ne si ng le tho ught, I can yet, by atte ntive and freque ntly repe ated me ditatio n, imp ress it so forcibl y o n my me mory that I s ha ll ne ver fa il to rec ollect it w he never I have n eed of it, a nd th us acquire the habi t of never going astray . A nd in as much as it is in th is that the greatest a nd principal perfection of m an cons ists, it seem s to me th at I ha ve not gai ned li ttle by thi s day's Meditat ion, si nce I have di scovere d th e s ource of fal sity and erro r. An d certainly there can be n o other so urce th an th at w hich I ha ve ex plai ned; for as o ften as I so restrai n my w ill w ithi n the limi ts of my kn owl edge tha t it for ms n o judgm ent ex cept o n ma tters w hic h are clearl y and di stinc tly rep resented to it by the u ndersta nding, I can ne ver be deceived; for every clear a nd dis tinc t conception 1 9 is w itho ut doubt so me thing, and hence canno t derive it s origin from w ha t is nou ght, b ut m ust of neces sity h ave God as it s au thor—God, I say, w ho bei ng su prem ely perfect, can not be th e cau se of any err or; and con sequen tly we m ust conclude th at s uc h a conception [or s uc h a judg ment] is true. Nor ha ve I on ly learned to -day w hat I sh ou ld avoid in order tha t I ma y no t err, b ut al so ho w I sh ou ld act in orde r to arrive at a k no wledge of th e tru th; for w itho ut doubt I s ha ll arrive at thi s end if I devote my atte ntio n suf ficien tly to those thi ng s w hich I perfectly understand; and if 19 perceptio. 1- 22 22 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y I separate fro m th ese th at w hic h I on ly u nders tand con fusedly and w ith obscurity.

To the se I sh all h enceforth di ligently give h eed. M ed it at ion V. O f t h e e ss e n ce of material t h in gs , an d, agai n, of God, t h at H e e xi sts . Ma ny ot her m atter s respecting the at tributes of God and my ow n na ture or m ind rem ain for con sideration; bu t I sh all pos sibly on a nother occasion res ume the inv estigatio n of the se. Now (after first no ting w hat m ust be done or avoided, in ord er to arrive at a k no wledge of the tr ut h) my pri ncipal tas k i s to endeavour to e merge from t he state of doubt i nto w hic h I ha ve th ese la st days fal len, and to see w he ther no thing certain can be known rega rding material th ings. But before e xa mi nin g w he ther a ny su ch obje cts as I concei ve e xi st ou tside of me , I m ust con sider th e ideas of th em in so far a s they are in my thoug ht, a nd see w hic h o f the m are dis tinct and w hic h con fused. In the fir st place, I am able distinctly to ima gine that qua ntity w hich ph ilosophers com mon ly call cont inuou s, or th e e xt en sio n in leng th, bre adth, or depth, that is i n th is qua ntity, or rat her in t he ob ject to which it is at tributed. Furt her, I can n umb er in it ma ny dif ferent parts, and attribu te to each of its parts ma ny sort s of s iz e, fi gure, s it ua tion and local mo vemen t, a nd, f in ally, I can ass ign to each of the se mo veme nts all degr ees of duratio n. An d no t only do I k no w th ese th ings w ith dis tinct nes s w he n I cons ider the m in general, bu t, lik ew ise [ho wev er li ttle I apply m y atte ntio n to the matter ], I di scover a n inf initude of particulars respecting nu mber s, fig ures, m ove men ts, a nd other su ch thi ng s, w ho se tr ut h is so ma nif es t, and so we ll accor ds w ith my na ture, that w hen I begin to discover them, it see ms to me th at I learn nothing ne w, or recollect w hat I for merly k ne w—t hat is to say, tha t I for the fir st ti m e per ceive th ings w hic h we re already present to my m in d, alt houg h I h ad no t as yet applied m y m ind to the m. An d w ha t I h ere fin d to be m os t im portan t is tha t I discover in my self an inf initude of ideas of certain things w hic h can not be estee med as pure negations, al though t hey ma y possibly have no ex iste nce outs ide of m y th oug ht, and w hic h are n ot fra med by me , alt houg h it is w ithin my po wer either to thi nk or no t to thi nk th em, b ut which posses s na tures w hic h are true a nd i m muta ble. For ex amp le, w he n I i ma gine a triang le, alt houg h th ere m ay n ow here in the wo rld be su ch a fi gure o ut side m y th oug ht, or ever h ave been, there is ne vertheles s in th is f igure a certain determ inate n at ure, form , or es sence, w hic h is im muta ble and eternal, w hic h I ha ve n ot in ve nted, and w hich in n o w is e depends o n my m ind , as appe ars from the fact th at diverse pro perties of th at triang le can be dem onstrated, v iz . tha t it s three angles are equal to tw o righ t ang les, th at th e greatest side is s ub tended by the greatest ang le, and the like, w hic h no w, w he ther I w is h it or do n ot w is h it , I rec ognize very clearly as pertaini ng to it, altho ugh I ne ver tho ugh t of the ma tter at al l w he n I i ma gined a triangle for the firs t ti m e, and w hich therefore canno t be said to have been in vented by me . Nor does the obje ction ho ld good tha t pos sibly th is idea of a triang le h as rea ched m y m ind throug h the m ed ium of m y se nse s, s ince I ha ve s om etime s seen bodies tr iangu lar in sh ape; because I can f orm in my m ind an inf initude of other f ig ures regar ding w hic h w e can not ha ve th e lea st conception of the ir ever h av ing been ob jects of se nse, and I can nevert heless dem onstrate v arious prope rties pertain ing to th eir na ture as w ell as to that of the tria ngle, and th ese m ust certainly al l be true si nce I conceive the m clearl y. Hence they are s om ethi ng , a nd n ot pure n egation ; for it is perfectly clear th at al l that is true is so me thing, and I ha ve alread y f ul ly dem onstrated that all th at I k no w clearly i s true. An d e ven alt houg h I had no t de mo nstrated th is, the n ature of my m ind is su ch that I cou ld n ot prevent my self fro m ho lding the m to be true so long as I conceive the m clearl y; a nd I recollect that eve n w he n I w as st ill stro ngly attached to th e obje cts of sen se, I coun ted as th e mo st certain th ose tr ut hs w hic h I conceived clearl y as reg ards fi gures, nu mber s, and the ot her ma tters w hich pertain to arith metic and geom etry, and, in general, to pure and abstract m athema tics. But n ow, if jus t because I can draw the idea of so methi ng fro m my th oug ht, it fol low s tha t all w hic h I kn ow clearl y and di stinct ly as pertainin g to thi s obj ect does really belong to it, ma y I not derive fro m th is an argum ent dem onstrati ng th e exi stence of God? It i s certain th at I no le ss fi nd the idea of God, that is to say, the idea of a s upre mely perfect Being, in me , th an th at o f any fig ure or nu mber w ha tever it is ; and I do n ot k no w a ny les s clearly and di sti nct ly th at a n [act ual a nd] eternal ex iste nce pertains to th is nature th an I kn ow tha t all tha t w hich I am able to de mo nstrate of so me f igure or n umb er tru ly pertains to the na ture of thi s figure or n umb er, and therefore, alt houg h all that I concluded in the pre ceding Meditat ions w ere fo un d to be fa lse, the ex iste nce o f God w oul d pass w ith me as at least as certain as I h ave ever h eld the tr ut hs of m athema tics (w hich concern on ly n umb ers and fi gures) to be. 1- 23 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y This in deed is no t at f irs t m an ifes t, si nce it wo uld see m to present so me appe arance of being a sophism. For being accus tomed in all other th ings to m ak e a dis tinctio n bet wee n e xi stence and e sse nce, I easily persuade my self th at the e xi stence can be separate d fro m the esse nce of God, and tha t we can thu s concei ve God as not actual ly ex isting. But, ne vertheles s, w he n I thi nk of it w ith mo re at ten tion, I clearly see tha t ex iste nce can no mo re be separate d from the es sence of God than can it s ha ving it s three angle s equal to two rig ht angle s be s epar ated fro m th e e sse nce of a [rectil inear] tria ngle, or th e idea of a mo unta in from t he idea of a v alley; a nd so th ere is n ot any le ss repugna nce to o ur conceiv ing a God (that is , a Being supre mely perfect) to w ho m ex iste nce is lack ing (t hat is to say, to w ho m a certain perfection is lack ing), than to concei ve of a mo unt ain w hich ha s no va lley. But al tho ugh I cannot really concei ve of a God w ithou t ex iste nce any mo re th an a mo unt ain w itho ut a v alley, st ill from the fact th at I conceive of a m ount ain w ith a va lley, it does n ot fol low th at there is su ch a mo unt ain in the wo rld; si m ilarly alt houg h I concei ve of God as posses sing e xi stence, it wo uld see m tha t it does no t fol low that there is a God w hich exists; for my thou ght does no t im po se a ny necess ity upo n th ings, a nd jus t as I ma y ima gine a w ing ed h orse, alt houg h no h orse w ith w in gs exi sts, so I could perhaps attribu te ex iste nce to God, alt houg h no God existed. But a soph ism is concealed in this objection; for from the f act t ha t I canno t conceive a m ou nta in w itho ut a v alley, it does no t fo llow that th ere is a ny mo unt ain or a ny va lley in ex istence, bu t o nly that th e mo unt ain a nd the va lley, w het her th ey ex ist or do no t ex ist, canno t in any w ay be separated one from the ot her. W hile fro m the fact that I canno t conceive God w ithou t ex iste nce, it follo ws that ex iste nce is in separa ble fro m Hi m, a nd he nce tha t He really ex ists; not th at m y th oug ht can bring thi s to pass, or imp ose a ny neces sity on th ings, but, on th e contrar y, because the neces sity w hich lie s in th e thi ng itse lf, i.e. th e n ecess ity of th e e xi stence of God determ ines me to thi nk in thi s wa y. For it is not w ithin m y pow er to thi nk of God w ithou t ex iste nce (that is of a s upre mely perfect Being devoid of a s upre me perfection) th oug h it i s i n m y po wer to i magine a horse either w ith w in gs or with ou t w ing s. An d we m ust no t h ere ob ject tha t it is in tru th n ecessary for m e to assert that God e xi sts af ter ha ving presupposed that He posses ses e ver y sort of perfe ction, si nce ex istence is one o f the se, bu t tha t as a ma tter of fact my original supposi tion w as no t n ecessary , jus t as it is no t neces sary to con sider tha t all quadrilateral fig ures can be ins cribed in th e circle; for su pposi ng I th oug ht t hi s, I s ho uld be cons trained to adm it th at th e rhom bus m igh t be in scribed in th e circle sin ce it is a quadrilateral f ig ure, w hic h, h ow ever, is ma nif es tly f alse. [We m ust not, I s ay, ma ke a ny s uc h al legations because] alt houg h it is no t neces sary th at I sh ou ld at a ny time e ntertain the not ion o f God, n evert heless w he never it h appens tha t I th ink of a f irs t a nd a sovereign Being, and, so to speak, derive the idea of H im from the s torehouse of my m in d, it is neces sary that I s ho uld at tribute to Hi m every s ort of perfection, alt houg h I do no t get so far as to e nu merate the m al l, or to apply my m ind to each one in particular. A nd th is neces sity s uf fices to ma ke me conclude (after h av ing recognized that e xi stence is a perfe ction) tha t th is fir st and sovereign Being really ex ists; ju st as th oug h it is n ot neces sary for me ever to im ag ine a ny tria ngle, yet, w he never I w ish to cons ider a rectilinear fi gure co mpo sed on ly o f three ang les, it is absolu tely es sen tial tha t I sh ou ld attribu te to it all tho se prop erties w hic h serve to bring about th e concl usion tha t its three a ngles are n ot greate r th an two rig ht angles, even altho ugh I ma y no t then be cons idering th is poi nt in particular. But w he n I con sider w hich f ig ures are capable of being in scribed in th e circle, it is in n o w ise n ecessary th at I sh ou ld th ink tha t all quadrilateral f ig ures are of th is nu mber ; on th e con trary, I canno t even pretend th at th is is th e case, s o lo ng as I do no t desire to acce pt a nythi ng w hich I can not concei ve clearl y and dis tinctly. An d in con sequence there is a great dif ference bet wee n th e fal se s uppos itions s uc h as th is, and the true ideas born w ithin me , the fir st and principal o f w hich is th at of God. For really I discern in m any wa ys tha t thi s idea is n ot so me thing fact itiou s, and depending so lely on my thoug ht, b ut th at it is t he i ma ge o f a true and i m muta ble na ture; fir st of all, because I can not conceive anyth ing bu t God hi msel f to w ho se esse nce ex iste nce [ necessarily] pertain s; in th e second place because it is no t pos sible for me to concei ve two or mo re Gods in th is sa me posit ion; and, granted tha t th ere is o ne su ch God w ho n ow e xi sts, I see clearl y that it is neces sary that He s ho uld have ex isted from al l eterni ty, and tha t He m ust ex ist eternally; and fi na lly, bec ause I kn ow a n in fini tude of ot her prope rties in God, no ne of w hich I can eit her di mi nish or cha nge. For the rest, w hat ev er proof or argum ent I a vail my self o f, we m ust al ways return to the poin t th at it is on ly th ose thi ng s w hich we conceive clearl y and di stinc tly th at ha ve the pow er o f persuadi ng m e e ntirely. An d al tho ugh a mo ngst the ma tters w hic h I conceive of in th is wa y, so me in deed are ma nifestly obv ious to al l, w hile others on ly m ani fest th em sel ves to those w ho cons ider the m closely a nd ex ami ne the m 1- 24 24 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y atte ntively; s ti ll, af ter they h ave once been discovered, th e latter are not estee med as any le ss certain th an the form er. For ex amp le, in the case of e ver y righ t-angled tr iangle, alt houg h it does n ot s o ma nif es tly appe ar th at the s quare of th e base is equal to the squares of the two other s ides as th at th is base is opposite to th e greatest angle; st ill, w he n thi s h as once been app rehended, we are ju st as certain of it s tru th a s o f the tru th of th e ot her. An d as rega rds God, if m y m ind we re n ot pre- occupied w ith pre judices, and if m y tho ugh t did n ot fi nd it sel f on all h and s diverted by the con tinua l press ure of sen sible thi ng s, there w oul d be no thing w hic h I could kn ow mo re im medi ately a nd mo re easily th an Hi m. For is there anyt hing m ore m an ifes t tha n th at th ere is a God, tha t is to say, a Su prem e Being, to whos e es sence alone exi stence pertain s? 2 0 A nd alt houg h for a fir m grasp of thi s tru th I h ave need o f a stre nuo us application of m in d, at present I no t o nly feel my self to be a s ass ured of it as o f all tha t I ho ld a s mo st certain, b ut I also re mar k th at th e certain ty o f al l other t hi ng s depends on i t so absolu tely, tha t w itho ut th is kn owl edge it is imp ossible ever to know anyt hing perfectly. For al tho ugh I a m of s uc h a n ature that as lo ng as 21 I u ndersta nd anyth ing very clearl y and distinc tly, I am nat urally imp elled to belie ve it to be true, yet because I am also o f su ch a na ture th at I canno t ha ve m y m ind cons tantly fi xed on th e s am e obje ct in orde r to perceive it clearly, and as I of ten rec ollect h av ing for med a pas t judgm ent w ithou t at the sa me time prope rly recollecting the reasons th at led m e to ma ke it, it ma y happen m ea nw hil e that ot her reasons present the mse lves to me , w hic h w ou ld easi ly cau se me to c hange my opi nion, if I we re ig norant of th e f acts of th e ex istence of God, and thu s I sh ou ld have n o tr ue a nd certain kn owl edge, but only vag ue and vaci llating opi nions. Thus, for ex amp le, w hen I cons ider the na ture o f a [rectili near] tria ngle, I w ho ha ve s om e lit tle kn owl edge of the principles of geom etry rec ognize qu ite clearl y that the three angle s are equal to tw o rig ht a ngles, a nd it is no t pos sible for me not to belie ve th is so lon g a s I appl y my m ind to it s dem onstrat ion; b ut so soon as I abs tain fro m atte nding to th e pro of, alt houg h I st ill recollect h av ing clearl y co mprehe nded it, it ma y easi ly occur that I co me to doubt its tr ut h, if I am ig norant o f th ere being a God.

For I can persuade myself of ha ving been so cons titu ted by n at ure th at I can easi ly deceive my self even in those m atter s w hich I belie ve my self to appr ehend w ith the greatest ev idence and certainty, e specially 20 “ In the idea of wh om alone nec essary or et ernal existence is comprised.” French version. 21 “From the mom ent that.” French version. w he n I recollect that I h ave frequent ly judged ma tters to be tr ue and certain w hic h ot her reasons ha ve after wards im pe lled me to judge to be altogether false. But a fter I ha ve rec ognized tha t there is a God—because at th e sa me time I ha ve al so rec ognized th at al l thi ng s depend u pon H im, a nd th at He is no t a deceiver, a nd from th at ha ve inf erre d tha t w ha t I per ceive clearly and dis tinctly can not fai l to be tr ue—alt hough I n o longer pay at tent ion to th e reason s f or w hic h I ha ve judged th is to be true, provided th at I recollect hav ing clearl y a nd di stinct ly per ceived it no contrary reason can be brought for ward w hich cou ld ever cau se m e to doubt o f its tru th; and thu s I ha ve a true and certain k no wledge of it. An d thi s sa me k no wledge ex tend s li ke wi se to all other thi ng s w hic h I rec ollect h av ing for mer ly de mo nstrated, su ch as the tru ths of geom etry and the like ; for w ha t can be alleged agains t the m to cau se m e to place th em in doubt? Wi ll it be said tha t my na ture is su ch as to cau se m e to be frequen tly deceived? But I alrea dy kn ow th at I can not be deceived in the judg ment w hos e grounds I k no w clearly . W ill it be said that I form erly h eld m an y thi ng s to be tr ue and certain w hich I ha ve after wards recognized to be false ? But I h ad n ot had any clear a nd dis tinct k no wledge of the se th ings , and n ot as yet k no win g th e ru le w he reby I as sure m ys elf of the tru th, I h ad been im pe lled to gi ve my asse nt fro m reasons w hic h I ha ve si nce recognized to be less stro ng tha n I h ad at the time im ag ined the m to be. Wha t fu rther obje ction can the n be raised? That pos sibly I am dream ing (an obje ction I m ys elf ma de a li ttle w hile ago ), or tha t al l the thou ghts w hich I n ow ha ve are no mo re true tha n the phanta sies of my dre ams ? But even tho ugh I slept the case wo uld be the sa me, for all tha t is clearly present to m y m ind is absolu tely true. A nd so I v er y clearly rec ognize that th e certainty a nd tru th of al l kn owl edge depends alone on the kn owl edge of the true God, in so m uch th at, before I k ne w H im, I could n ot h ave a perfect k no wledge o f any other th ing. A nd now tha t I kn ow Him I h ave the me ans of acquiri ng a perfect k no wledge of an in fini tude of th ings, no t only of those w hic h relate to God H ims elf a nd other in tel lectual ma tters, bu t al so o f tho se w hic h pertain to corp oreal nat ure in so far a s it is th e obje ct of p ure ma thema tics [ w hic h have n o concern w ith w het her i t exists or no t]. M ed it at ion VI. O f t h e E xiste n ce of M aterial T hin gs , an d of th e r eal di stin ctio n be tw een th e S ou l an d B ody of M an. 1- 25 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y Not hing fur ther no w rem ains bu t to inq uire w he ther ma terial th ings ex ist. An d certain ly I at least kn ow that t hese ma y exist i n s o far as th ey are cons idered as the obje cts of pure m athema tics, s in ce in thi s aspect I per ceive the m clearly and dis tinctly. For there is no doubt th at God posses ses th e pow er to pro duce everything that I am capable of per ceivi ng with di stinc tness, and I h ave never deem ed tha t anyt hing was i mp ossible for H im , u nl es s I fo und a con tradiction in at tem pting to conceive it clearly . Furt her, the fac ulty of im ag ina tion w hich I pos sess, and of w hic h, ex perience tel ls me , I m ake u se w hen I apply my self to th e con sideration of ma terial thi ng s, is capable of persuadi ng m e of th eir e xi stence; for w hen I atte ntively cons ider w hat im ag ina tion is, I fi nd th at it is n ot hing bu t a certain application of the facu lty of kn owl edge to th e body w hich is im med iately present to it, a nd w hic h th erefor e ex ists. An d to render th is qu ite clear , I rem ark in th e fir st place the dif ference tha t e xi sts betw een the ima ginat ion and pure in tellection [or conception 22 ].

For e xa mple, w hen I ima gine a tria ngle, I do no t conceive it o nly as a fig ure com prehended by th ree line s, bu t I also app rehend 2 3 these three lin es as present by the po wer a nd in ward v is ion of m y m ind , 2 4 and thi s is w hat I call ima gini ng. But if I desire to th ink of a chil iagon, I certain ly concei ve truly that it is a fi gure compo sed of a th ou sand sides, just as easi ly as I conceive of a triang le t ha t it i s a fig ure of three s ides on ly; bu t I canno t in a ny wa y im ag ine the th ou sand side s of a c hil iagon [a s I do th e three s ides of a tria ngle], nor do I, so to speak, reg ard th em as present [wi th th e eyes of my m in d] . A nd alt houg h in acco rdance w ith the h abit I h ave form ed of al ways em ployi ng the aid of m y im ag ina tion w hen I th ink of corp oreal th ings, it ma y h appen tha t in im ag ining a ch iliagon I con fusedly repr esent to my self so me figure, yet it is very e vident that thi s figure is n ot a ch iliagon, si nce it in n o w ay di ffers from tha t w hic h I rep resent to my self w he n I thi nk of a m yriagon or any ot her ma ny-si ded f igure; n or does it serve m y purpose in discovering the pro perties whic h go to f orm th e di stinc tion bet wee n a c hi liagon and ot her polyg ons. But if the ques tion tur ns u pon a pen tagon, it is qu ite true tha t I can conceive its fi gure as w ell as th at of a chi liagon w itho ut the help of my im ag ina tion; bu t I can also im ag ine i t by applying the atte ntion of my mind to each of it s fi ve s ides, and at the sa me ti m e to the space w hic h they enclo se. 22 “Co nceptio n,” French version. “intellectionem,” Latin version. 23 intue or. 24 aci e mentis. An d th us I clearly rec ognize that I h ave need o f a particular e ffort of m ind in ord er to ef fect the act of imag ina tion, su ch as I do not require in ord er to un dersta nd, and th is particular effort of m ind clearl y m ani fests th e di fference whic h ex ists betw een i ma ginat ion and pure intellection. 25 I rem ark besides tha t thi s pow er o f ima ginat ion w hich is in one, in as muc h as it di ffers from the po wer of un derstandi ng, is in n o w is e a neces sary ele me nt in my nature, or i n [ m y esse nce, th at is to s ay, i n] the esse nce of my min d; for alt houg h I did not pos sess i t I sh ou ld doubtles s ever re ma in the sa me as I no w am , from w hich it appe ars th at w e m ight conclude tha t it depends o n so me thing w hic h dif fers fro m me . A nd I easily conceive th at if so me body exi sts w ith w hich my m in d is conjoined and un ited in such a wa y th at it can apply itse lf to cons ider it w he n it pleases, it ma y be th at by thi s m ea ns it can im ag ine corp oreal obj ects; so tha t th is mo de of th inking differs fro m pure i nte llectio n o nly in as muc h as m ind in it s inte llect ual activ ity in s om e ma nner tur ns on it sel f, and con siders so me of the ideas w hic h it pos sesse s in itse lf; w hile in im ag ining it turn s to wards the body , and there beholds in it so me thing con form able to the idea w hic h it h as either conceived of it sel f or perceived by th e s en ses. I easily u ndersta nd, I say, th at th e i ma ginat ion cou ld be thu s cons titu ted if it is tr ue tha t body e xi sts; a nd because I can disco ver n o other con venient m od e o f e xp lain ing it, I conjecture w ith prob ability th at bod y does ex ist; but thi s is on ly w ith pro bability, and al tho ugh I e xa mine all th ings w ith care , I ne verthele ss do n ot fin d t hat from th is di stinc t idea o f corp oreal na ture, w hic h I ha ve in m y ima ginat ion, I can derive any argum ent from w hich there w ill neces sarily be deduced t he ex iste nce of body . But I am in the habi t of ima gini ng ma ny ot her th ings besides thi s cor por eal n at ure w hic h is the obj ect of pure ma the matics, to w it, th e colours, so und s, sce nts, pain, a nd ot her su ch th ings, altho ugh le ss dis tinctly. An d ina sm uc h as I perc eive these thi ng s m uch better through th e s en ses, by the me dium of w hic h, a nd by the m em ory, they seem to ha ve reached m y ima ginatio n, I believe tha t, in orde r to e xa mine the m mo re con venient ly, it is rig ht tha t I sh ou ld at the sa me ti m e in ve stigate th e na ture of se nse per ception, a nd th at I sh ou ld see if fro m th e ideas w hic h I app rehend by th is mo de of tho ugh t, w hic h I call feeli ng, I canno t derive so me certain proof of the exi stence of cor poreal obje cts. A nd fir st of al l I sh all rec all to m y me mory tho se ma tters w hic h I hi therto he ld to be true, as ha ving per ceived th em thro ugh the sen ses, and the fo un dation s on w hic h my belief ha s rested; in the ne xt place I 25 intellectio nem. 1- 26 26 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y sh all ex ami ne the reason s w hic h have sin ce obliged me to place the m i n doubt; in th e las t place I s ha ll cons ider w hich of th em I m ust n ow believe.

First of all, th en, I perceived tha t I had a head, ha nds, feet, and all other me mbers of w hich th is body—w hich I con sidered a s a part, or poss ibly e ven as th e w ho le, of my self—i s com posed. Furt her I wa s sen sible tha t thi s bod y wa s placed a mi dst ma ny others, fro m w hic h it wa s capa ble of bei ng af fected in m any di fferent wa ys, bene ficial a nd hu rtfu l, and I rem arked th at a certain feeli ng of pleasure acco mpanied th ose that we re beneficial, and pain tho se w hic h w ere h arm ful . An d in addition to th is pleas ure a nd pai n, I also e xperienced h un ger, thir st, a nd other s im ilar appetites, as also certain corpo real in clinat ions tow ards jo y, sadnes s, a nger, a nd other si m ilar pas sions. An d o ut side my self, in addition to ex tens ion, figure, a nd mo tion s of bodies, I rem arked in th em hardnes s, h eat, a nd al l ot her tacti le q ualit ies, and, furt her, lig ht a nd colour, a nd scen ts a nd sou nds, th e variety o f w hic h gave m e the me ans of di sting uish ing the s ky, th e earth, th e sea, and generally all the other bodies, one from the other. A nd certainly, con sidering th e ideas of all th ese quali ties w hich presented th ems elve s to m y m ind , a nd w hich alone I per ceived pro perl y or im media tely, it wa s n ot w ith ou t reason th at I believed m ys elf to per ceive obj ects q ui te dif ferent from my th oug ht, to w it, bodies from w hich tho se ideas pro ceeded; for I fo un d by ex perience th at the se ideas presented the mse lves to me w itho ut m y conse nt being requis ite, so tha t I could n ot perc eive any ob ject, ho wev er desirous I m igh t be, un less it we re present to the organs of sen se; a nd it wa s no t in my pow er n ot to per ceive it , w hen it w as present.

A nd because th e ideas w hic h I received thro ugh th e se nse s we re m uch mo re live ly, mo re clear, and e ven, in the ir ow n wa y, mo re dis tinct tha n a ny of tho se w hic h I could of m ys elf fra me in me ditat ion, or than th ose I fo und impre ssed on m y m em ory, it appe ared as thou gh th ey cou ld n ot ha ve proce eded fro m m y m in d, so that they m ust neces sarily h ave been produce d in me by so me other th ings. An d ha ving no kn owl edge o f tho se obje cts ex cepting th e kn owl edge w hic h th e ideas th ems elve s gave m e, n ot hing w as m ore lik ely to occur to m y m ind th an that the obj ects w ere si m ilar to th e ideas w hic h we re caused. An d because I l ike wise rem embered t hat I h ad form erly m ade us e of my sen ses rather tha n m y reason, and reco gnized that th e ideas w hic h I form ed of my self w ere no t so dis tinc t as tho se w hich I perceived thro ugh the sen ses, and th at they we re mo st freque ntly even com posed of portions of th ese las t, I persuade d my self easi ly tha t I had no idea in my m ind w hic h had not for mer ly co me to m e th rough the se nse s. Nor wa s it w ithou t s om e reason th at I believed tha t thi s body (w hic h by a certain s pecial righ t I call my ow n) belonged to m e m ore prop erly a nd mo re s trictly tha n a ny ot her; for in fact I cou ld never be separ ated from it as fro m other bodies; I ex perienced in it and o n account of it al l m y appetites and affection s, and fin ally I wa s to uched by t he feel ing of pain and the tit illation of pleas ure in it s parts, and no t in the parts o f ot her bodies w hich we re separated fro m it. But w hen I in qu ired, w hy, from so me , I kn ow n ot w ha t, painf ul sen sation, there fo llo ws sadnes s of m ind , and fro m the pleasurable sen sation th ere arises jo y, or w hy th is my sterious pinc hing o f th e st om ach w hich I call hu nger cau ses m e to desire to eat, and dr yness of th roat cause s a desire to drink , a nd so o n, I could gi ve no reason ex cepting tha t na ture taug ht me so ; for there is certainly n o af fini ty (t hat I at leas t can u ndersta nd) bet wee n the cravi ng of th e sto ma ch a nd th e desire to eat, any mo re tha n betw een th e per ception of w hat ever cau ses pai n and the tho ugh t of sadnes s w hich arises fro m th is perc eption. A nd in the same way it appea red to me th at I h ad learned fro m n at ure al l th e ot her judg ments w hic h I form ed rega rding th e ob jects of my se nse s, si nce I rem arked th at th ese judgm ents we re form ed in me before I had the le isure to we igh a nd cons ider any reason s w hich m igh t oblige me to ma ke th em . But a fterw ards m any ex periences lit tle by lit tle destro yed all th e fai th w hic h I had rested in m y se nse s; f or I from time to ti m e observed th at th ose tow ers w hich fro m afar appe ared to m e to be round, mo re closely observed s eem ed sq uare, and that colossal s tat ues raised on th e su mm it of the se to wers, appe ared a s q ui te ti ny s tat ues w hen vie wed from the botto m; and so in a n in fini tude of ot her cases I fou nd erro r in judgm ents fo un ded o n th e ex ter nal se nse s. A nd no t on ly in tho se fou nded o n the ex ter nal sen ses, bu t e ven in th ose fou nded o n the in ternal a s we ll; for is there anyth ing mo re in tim ate or mo re in ternal th an pain? A nd yet I ha ve learned fro m so me persons w ho se arm s or legs ha ve been cu t off, th at th ey so me tim es see med to feel pain in the part w hic h h ad been am putated, w hich ma de me th ink th at I could no t be q uite certain tha t it w as a certain me mber w hich pained m e, even alt houg h I fe lt pai n in it. An d to th ose grou nds of doubt I have lately adde d tw o others, w hich are v ery general; the fir st is tha t I ne ver h ave believed my self to feel a nythi ng in wa kin g mo men ts w hic h I canno t also so me tim es belie ve my self to feel w hen I sleep, a nd as I do n ot th ink that th ese thi ng s w hich I see m to feel in sl eep, proc eed fro m obj ects o uts ide of me , I do no t s ee any reason w hy I sh ou ld h ave th is belief rega rding obj ects w hich I s eem to perc eive w hil e aw ake. The other w as th at being st ill ignoran t, or rather su pposi ng my self to be 1- 27 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y ignoran t, of the au thor of m y bei ng, I s aw no thing to prevent me from ha ving been so con stitu ted by nat ure th at I m igh t be deceived e ven in ma tters w hich seem ed to me to be mo st certain. A nd as to the grou nds on w hich I w as form erly persuaded of the tr ut h o f se ns ible obj ects, I had not m uch trouble in replying to th em . For si nce na ture see med to cause me to lea n tow ards ma ny th ings fro m whic h reason repelled m e, I did not believe that I s ho uld tr us t m uch to the teachin gs o f na ture. An d alt houg h th e ideas w hic h I receive by the sen ses do n ot depend on my w ill, I did not thi nk that o ne sh ou ld for th at reason concl ude that they pro ceeded fro m th ings dif ferent from m ys elf, si nce pos sibly som e facu lty m igh t be di scovere d in me —t hough hi therto u nk nown to me — w hic h pro duced the m. But n ow tha t I begin to k no w m ys elf better, a nd to disco ver mo re clearl y the a uthor of my being, I do no t in tr ut h th ink th at I s ho uld rash ly adm it all the m atter s w hich the s en ses seem to teach us , b ut, on th e ot her hand, I do not t hink that I s ho uld doubt th em all un iversal ly. A nd fir st of al l, because I k no w th at al l thi ng s w hich I apprehend clearl y and di stinc tly can be cre ated by God as I app rehend the m, it su ffice s th at I a m able to appr ehend one thi ng apart from anot her clearl y and distinc tly i n ord er to be certain that t he o ne is dif ferent fro m th e ot her, si nce they m ay be ma de to ex ist in s epar ation at least by the om nipo tence of God; a nd it does no t sig nify by w hat po wer th is separation is ma de in orde r to co mpel m e to judge the m to be di fferent : and, th erefor e, jus t because I kn ow certainly that I e xi st, a nd tha t me anwhile I do n ot re mar k th at a ny ot her thi ng necessarily pertains to my na ture or es sence, e xcepti ng tha t I am a th inking th ing, I righ tly conclude tha t my esse nce cons ists s olely in th e f act tha t I am a th inking th ing [or a s ub sta nce w ho se w ho le es sence or n ature is to thi nk ]. A nd alt houg h poss ibly (or rather certainly, a s I sh all say in a mo ment ) I posses s a body w ith whic h I am very in tim ately conjoined, yet because, on th e one s ide, I h ave a clear and dis tinc t idea of my self in as much as I am only a th inking and u ne xten ded thing, and a s, o n t he other, I posses s a di stinct idea of body , ina sm uc h as it is on ly an ex tended and un thinkin g thi ng, it is certain t hat thi s I [ th at is to s ay, m y sou l by w hic h I a m w ha t I am ], is en tirely and absolu tely di stinct from m y bod y, and can ex ist w itho ut it. I fu rther find in m ys elf fac ulties e mp loying m od es o f th inking peculiar to th em sel ves, to w it, the f acul ties of im ag ina tion and feel ing, w ithou t w hic h I can easi ly conceive m ys elf clearly and dis tinctly as a com plete being; w hile , o n the ot her ha nd, they canno t be s o concei ved apa rt from me , that is w ith ou t an in tel ligen t su bstance in w hich they reside, for [i n th e no tio n we h ave of th ese fac ulties, or, to us e th e lang uage of th e School s] in their form al concept, so me k in d of in tel lection is com prised, from w hic h I in fer that they are dis tinc t fro m me as it s mo des are from a th ing. I observe also in me so me other facu lties s uc h as tha t of change of posit ion, the as su mption o f dif ferent fi gures and su ch like, w hic h canno t be concei ved, any mo re tha n can th e prece ding, apart from so me su bstance to w hic h they are attached, and con sequent ly can not e xi st w itho ut it; bu t it is v ery clear tha t th ese facu lties, if i t be true that th ey ex ist, m ust be attached to some corpo real or ex tended s ub sta nce, and n ot to an in tellige nt su bstance, si nce in th e clear and dis tinct conception of the se there is so me s ort of e xt en sio n fou nd to be present, b ut n o inte llectio n at al l. Ther e is certainly f urt her in me a certain passi ve facu lty of per ception, th at is , of rec eivi ng and rec ogni sing the ideas of sen sible th ings , b ut th is wo uld be us eles s to m e [and I cou ld in no wa y avai l m ys elf of it], if there w ere n ot either in me or in so me other thi ng a nother acti ve facul ty cap able o f form ing a nd pro duci ng the se ideas. But thi s active facu lty can not e xi st in m e [i nas much as I a m a t hi ng tha t t hi nk s] s eeing that it does not presuppose th oug ht, and also th at th ose ideas are ofte n produced in me w ithou t m y contribu ting in any w ay to th e sa me, a nd ofte n eve n again st m y w ill ; it is th us neces sarily the case that the facu lty resides in so me su bstance dif ferent fro m m e in w hich al l the reality w hich is obj ectively in th e ideas tha t are pro duced by th is facu lty is form ally or em inen tly contai ned, as I re mar ked before. An d th is s ub sta nce is either a bod y, th at is, a corpo real n at ure in w hic h there is con tained for ma lly [and really] al l tha t w hic h is obje ctively [a nd by rep resentatio n] in th ose ideas, or it is God Hi mse lf, or so me other creature mo re noble than bod y in w hich tha t sa me is contai ned em inen tly. But, si nce God is no deceiver, it is very ma nif es t tha t He does no t com municate to me th ese ideas im media tely and by H im sel f, n or yet by the in terven tion of s o me cre ature in w hic h their reality is not form ally, b ut o nly e mi nen tly, contai ned. For s in ce He h as gi ven m e n o f acul ty to recognize tha t th is is the case, but, on the ot her h and, a v ery great inc linatio n to belie ve [t hat they are sen t to me or] tha t they are con veye d to m e by cor poreal obj ects, I do n ot see h ow He cou ld be defended from th e accu sation of deceit if the se ideas we re pro duced by cause s ot her th an corpo real obj ects. Hence w e m ust allo w that corp oreal th ings e xi st. How ever, th ey are perhaps no t e xact ly w ha t we perceive by the sen ses, s in ce th is com prehen sion by th e se nse s is in ma ny in stances very obscure a nd conf used; but we must at least adm it tha t all th ings w hic h I conceive in th em clearl y and di stinc tly, tha t is to say, all thi ng s w hic h, s peakin g 1- 28 28 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y generally, are co mprehe nded in the obj ect of pure ma the matics, are tru ly to be recognized as external ob jects. As to other things, howev er, whic h are eit her particular on ly, a s, for ex amp le, that the sun is of su ch and suc h a figure, etc., or w hic h are les s clearl y and di stinc tly conceived, su ch as lig ht, so und, pain a nd th e li ke, it i s certain th at althoug h they are very d ubiou s and uncertai n, yet on the sole ground tha t God is n ot a deceiver, and tha t con sequen tly He h as no t perm itted any fa lsity to ex ist in m y opi nion w hic h He ha s n ot li ke wi se give n me th e facul ty of cor recting, I ma y ass uredly h ope to conclude that I h ave w ithi n me the m ea ns of arrivi ng at the tr ut h e ven here.

An d f irs t of all there is no doubt th at in all thi ng s w hic h na ture teaches m e there is so me tr ut h contained; for by n at ure, con sidere d in general, I no w u nders tand n o other thi ng than either God Hi ms elf or else th e order and disposi tion w hich God h as es tablis hed in create d th ings ; and by my n ature in particular I un derstand no other th ing tha n th e co mp lexus of all th e thi ng s w hic h God has give n me. But there is no thing w hich th is na ture teache s m e m ore ex press ly [n or m ore sen sibly] tha n that I h ave a body w hich is adversely af fected w he n I f eel pai n, w hich h as need o f f ood or dri nk when I ex perience the feeli ngs o f h un ger a nd thir st, and so on; n or can I doubt there bei ng so me tru th i n al l th is. Nat ure al so teaches m e by the se sen sation s of pai n, hu nger, thir st, etc., t hat I a m no t on ly lodged in m y body as a pilot i n a ve ssel, but tha t I a m very closely u ni ted to it, a nd so to speak so in term ingled w ith it th at I see m to com pose w ith it one w ho le. For if tha t w ere n ot th e case, w he n my body is hu rt, I, w ho am m ere ly a th inking thi ng, sh ou ld not feel pai n, for I s ho uld perceive thi s wo und by the u nders tandin g on ly, jus t as the sa ilor perc eives by s ig ht w hen so me thing is dam aged in hi s ve ssel ; and w hen m y bod y ha s n eed of drink or f ood, I sh ou ld clearl y un derstand th e f act w itho ut being wa rned of it by con fused feel ings of hu nger a nd th irs t. For all th ese se nsa tion s o f hu nger, thir st, pai n, etc. are in tr ut h no ne ot her th an certain conf used mo des of tho ugh t w hic h are produce d by the un ion and appa rent inter mingling o f m in d a nd bod y. Moreover, n at ure teaches me that ma ny other bodies e xi st around m ine , of w hic h s om e are to be avoided, a nd ot hers s oug ht af ter. A nd certainly fro m the fact that I a m sen sible of di fferent s orts of colours, sou nds, scen ts, tas tes, heat, h ardness, etc., I very easily conclude th at th ere are in the bodies fro m w hich all the se diverse se nse -per ceptions pro ceed certain v ariation s w hich a ns wer to the m, alt houg h pos sibly th ese are no t reall y at all si m ilar to the m. A nd also from the fact th at am ongst th ese dif ferent s en se-perc eptions so me are very agree able to me and ot hers disagree able, it is q ui te certain tha t my bod y (or rather my self in m y en tirety, ina sm uc h as I a m f orm ed of body a nd sou l) ma y rec eive di fferent im pres sions agre eable a nd di sagree able from the other bodies whic h su rround it. But there are m any other th ings w hich na ture s eem s to ha ve ta ugh t me , b ut w hic h at the sa me time I ha ve never reall y rec eived fro m her, bu t w hic h have been brough t about i n my m in d by a certain habi t w hic h I h ave of for ming inco nsider ate judg ments on thi ng s; and thu s it m ay easily h appen th at th ese judgm ents contai n so me err or. T ake, for ex amp le, th e opin ion w hich I h old that all space in w hich there is no thing tha t af fects [or m ak es an im pres sion on ] my senses is vo id; that in a body w hic h is w ar m th ere is s om ethi ng ent irely si m ilar to th e idea of heat w hic h is in me ; th at in a w hite or green body th ere is the sa me w hit en ess or gre enness tha t I perc eive; that in a bit ter or s w ee t body th ere is the sa me tas te, and so on in other in sta nces; that the stars, th e to wer s, and al l other dis tan t bodies are of the sa me fi gure and si ze a s th ey appea r from far off to o ur ey es, etc. But in orde r tha t in thi s there sh ou ld be n ot hing w hic h I do no t concei ve di stinct ly, I sh ou ld defi ne ex actly w hat I really u nders tand w he n I s ay th at I a m ta ug ht so me what by nat ure. For here I ta ke na ture in a m ore lim ited si gn ification tha n w he n I ter m it the su m of al l th e thi ng s gi ven me by God, s in ce in thi s su m ma ny th ings are com prehended w hich only pertain to m in d (and to th ese I do n ot refer in speaki ng of na ture) s uc h as the no tion w hic h I ha ve o f the fact th at w ha t ha s once been done canno t ever be un done and an in fini tude o f s uc h th ings w hic h I kn ow by the li gh t of nat ure [ wi tho ut the h elp of the bod y]; and seei ng th at it com prehends m any other ma tters besides w hic h o nly pertain to bod y, and are no lo nger here con tained u nder the na me o f na ture, su ch as the q uali ty of w eigh t w hic h it pos sesse s a nd the li ke, w ith w hich I al so do n ot deal; for in tal king of na ture I o nly treat of tho se th ings gi ven by God to m e as a being co mpo sed of m ind a nd body. But th e na ture here describe d tru ly teaches m e to flee fro m th ings w hic h cau se the sen sation o f pain, a nd seek after the th ings w hic h co mmunica te to me the se ntime nt of pleasure a nd so fort h; bu t I do no t s ee th at bey ond th is it teaches me th at fro m tho se diverse se nse -perc eptions w e sh ou ld ever form any conclu sion regar ding th ings outside o f us , w itho ut h av ing [careful ly and ma turely] me ntally ex ami ned the m befor ehand. For it s eem s to me that it is m in d alo ne, and not m in d a nd bod y in conjunct ion, th at is requisi te to a kn owl edge of the tr ut h in rega rd to s uc h thi ng s. Th us, al tho ugh a star ma kes n o large r an imp ress ion on m y eye tha n th e f la me of a lit tle 1- 29 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y candle there is yet in me no real or pos itive prop ensity im pe lling me to believe tha t it is no t gre ater than tha t fla me; b ut I have judged it to be so from my earliest ye ars, w itho ut any rational fo un dation. An d al tho ugh in app roaching f ire I f eel h eat, a nd in appr oaching it a li ttle too near I eve n f eel pai n, there is at the sa me time no reason in thi s w hich cou ld persuade m e that there is in the f ire so methi ng rese mbling th is heat any mo re than th ere is in it so methi ng resem bling the pain; all tha t I ha ve any reason to belie ve from this is , t ha t t here is so mething in it , w hat ev er it ma y be, w hich ex cites in me th ese se nsa tions o f heat or of pai n. S o also, althoug h there are spaces i n w hic h I fi nd not hing w hic h ex cites my sen ses, I m ust n ot from that conclude that the se s paces contai n no body; for I s ee in th is, as in ot her s im ilar th ings, th at I ha ve been in the habit of perverting the order o f na ture, bec ause the se per ception s of sen se ha ving been placed w ithi n m e by nat ure me rely for the p urpose of si gn ifyi ng to my m in d w hat thi ng s are benef icial or h ur tful to the com posite w hol e of w hic h it form s a part, and being up to tha t point su ffic ien tly clear a nd dis tinct, I yet avai l m ys elf of th em as th oug h th ey we re absol ute ru les by w hic h I m ight im media tely deter mine the esse nce o f th e bodies w hic h are ou tside m e, a s to w hich , in fact, they can teach me n oth ing but w hat is mo st obscure and conf used. But I ha ve alread y su ffic ient ly con sidere d h ow, not wi thsta ndi ng t he su prem e goodness of God, fals ity enters int o th e judgm ents I m ak e. On ly here a n ew dif ficulty is presented—one respecting t ho se t hi ng s th e purs uit or avoidance of w hic h is ta ugh t m e by nat ure, and also respecting the in ternal se nsa tions w hic h I posse ss, and in w hic h I seem to have so metime s detecte d err or [and thu s to be directly dec eived by my ow n nat ure]. To take a n e xa mple, th e agr eea ble tas te of so me food in w hic h poison ha s been inter mingled ma y ind uce me to partake o f the poison, and th us deceive m e. I t is true, at the sa me time , tha t in th is case n at ure m ay be e xc used, for it on ly in duces me to desire food in w hic h I fi nd a pleasa nt ta ste, and n ot to desire the poiso n w hich is un know n to it; and thu s I can infer n oth ing fro m thi s fact, e xcept that my n at ure is not om nis cie nt, at w hic h there is certain ly no reason to be asto nished, s in ce m an , being fi ni te in nat ure, can only h ave kn owl edge th e perfectnes s of whic h i s l imi ted. But w e not un freque ntly deceive o urselve s eve n in tho se th ings to w hic h w e are directly imp elled by n ature, as h appens w ith tho se w ho w he n they are sic k des ire to drin k or eat th ings hu rtfu l to the m. It w ill perhaps be said here th at th e cause of the ir dece ptivenes s is tha t the ir na ture is cor rupt, bu t th at does n ot re mo ve th e di fficul ty, because a sic k ma n is n one the less tru ly God’ s creature than he w ho i s in heal th; and it is therefore a s repugna nt to God’s goodness for the one to have a deceitfu l nat ure as it is for th e ot her. An d as a clock co mpo sed of w he els a nd coun ter-we ight s no les s e xactly observes th e la ws of na ture w he n it is badl y ma de, a nd does n ot sh ow the ti m e prope rly, tha n w he n it en tirely satisfie s th e w is he s of its ma ker, and as, if I con sider t he body of a man as being a sort of ma chine so bu ilt up and compo sed of nerve s, m usc les, v ei ns, blood and sk in, th at th oug h th ere w ere n o m in d in it at all, it woul d no t cease to have the s am e m otions as at present, e xceptio n being m ade of tho se mo vemen ts w hich are d ue to th e direction of the w ill, and in conseque nce depend u pon th e m ind [as opposed to th ose w hic h ope rate by the di sposit ion of it s organs], I easi ly rec ognize th at it wo uld be a s na tural to thi s bod y, su pposi ng it to be, for ex am ple, dro psical, to su ffer the parchedness of the t hroat w hich usua lly s ig ni fie s to the m in d the feeli ng of th irs t, and to be disposed by th is parched feeli ng to mo ve the n erves a nd other parts in the w ay requisi te for drink ing, a nd thu s to a ugm ent it s ma lady a nd do har m to it sel f, a s it is na tural to it, w hen it h as no indi sposi tion, to be im pe lled to drin k for its good by a si m ilar cause. An d alt houg h, cons idering the us e to w hich th e clock h as been des tined by its ma ker, I m ay say that it deflects from th e orde r of its nature w he n it does not ind icate the h our s cor rectl y; and as, in the sa me w ay, cons idering the ma chine of th e h uma n bod y as ha ving been for med by God in ord er to ha ve in itse lf all the m ove men ts us ua lly ma nifested there, I h ave reason for thi nk ing tha t it does no t fol low the orde r of nat ure w hen, if the throat is dry, dri nking does h arm to the con servation of h ealth , ne vertheles s I recognize at the sa me ti m e th at th is las t mo de of ex plain ing nat ure is very di fferent fro m th e other. For th is i s but a purely verbal c haracte risation dep ending ent irely on my th oug ht, w hic h com pares a s ick man and a badly con structed clock w ith th e idea w hich I h ave o f a heal thy ma n and a w ell m ade clock, and it is he nce ex trin sic to the thi ng s to w hic h it is applied; bu t accor ding to the other int erp retation of the ter m na ture I u nders tand s om ethi ng w hic h is tru ly fou nd in things a nd which is th erefor e not w itho ut so me tru th. But certain ly alt houg h in rega rd to th e dropsical body it is only so to speak to apply a n e xtr insic ter m w hen w e say that it s n at ure is cor rupted, ina smu ch as apart from the need to drin k, th e throat is par ched; yet in rega rd to th e com posite w hol e, tha t is to say, to the m in d or sou l un ited to th is bod y, it is no t a purely v erbal pre dicate, bu t a real err or of nature, for it to have th irst w hen drink ing wo uld be h ur tful to it. An d th us it st ill re ma ins to inq uire ho w th e goodness of God does n ot prevent th e nat ure of ma n s o regar ded from being fal lacious. In ord er to begin thi s ex ami natio n, the n, I here s ay, in the firs t 1- 30 30 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y place, t hat t here is a great dif ference bet wee n m ind and bod y, i nas much as bod y is by nat ure al way s di visib le, and the m in d is en tirely in div isible. For, as a m atter of fact, when I cons ider th e m ind , t hat is to say, m ys elf in as much as I a m only a th inking thi ng, I can not di sting uish in m ys elf a ny parts, but app rehend my self to be clearly one and e ntire; and alt houg h the w ho le m ind see ms to be u ni ted to the w hol e bod y, yet if a foot, or an arm, or so me other part, is separated fro m my body , I am aw are that n oth ing has been take n aw ay fro m my m in d. An d the facu lties of w illing , feeli ng, conceivi ng, etc. canno t be prope rly speaki ng sa id to be it s parts, for it is o ne and th e sa me m in d w hic h em ploys it sel f in w illing and in feeli ng and un derstandi ng. But it is qu ite ot herw ise w ith cor por eal or e xt ended obj ects, for there is no t one of th ese ima ginable by m e w hich my m in d can not easily di vide int o parts, a nd whic h con sequent ly I do n ot recognize as being divisible; th is wo uld be s uf ficie nt to teach me tha t the m ind or sou l of ma n is e nt irel y dif ferent fro m the body, if I h ad not alrea dy learned it from other sources.

I fu rther not ice th at th e m in d does not receive th e i mpre ssions from all parts o f the bod y im med iately, bu t only fro m th e brain, or perhaps eve n fro m o ne of it s s m allest parts, to w it, from tha t in w hic h the com mon se nse 2 6 is s aid to reside, w hic h, w he never it is disposed in the sa me particular wa y, con veys the sa me th ing to the m in d, alt houg h me anwhile the ot her portions of th e bod y m ay be dif ferently di sposed, as is tes tified by inn um erable ex perim ents w hic h it is un nece ssary here to rec ount. I no tice, also, tha t the n ature of bod y is su ch tha t none of its parts can be mo ved by anot her part a lit tle w ay off w hic h can not al so be mo ved in the sa me w ay by each one of the parts w hic h are betw een the t wo , alt houg h th is mo re rem ote part does n ot act at al l. As , for ex amp le, in the cord ABC D [ w hi ch is in ten sion] i f we pu ll th e la st part D, th e fir st part A w ill n ot be mo ved in any w ay dif ferently fro m w ha t wo uld be the case if one of th e int erven ing parts B or C we re p ul led, and the la st part D we re to re ma in u nmo ved. A nd in the sa me w ay, w he n I f eel pain in m y foot, m y kn owl edge of p hysics teaches me th at th is se nsa tion is co mmunica ted by m ea ns of ner ves di spersed throug h th e f oot, w hich , being ex tended li ke cor ds fro m there to the brain, w hen th ey are contracted in the foot, at th e sa me time contract the in mo st portions o f th e brain w hich is th eir ex trem ity and place o f origin, a nd th en e xc ite a certain m ove men t w hic h nat ure ha s establi shed in ord er to 26 sensus com munis. cause th e m in d to be af fected by a s en satio n of pain rep resented as ex isting in the foot. But because these n erves m ust pass thro ugh the tib ia, th e thi gh, the loi ns, the back a nd th e neck, in orde r to reach from th e leg to th e brain, it m ay h appen th at alt houg h th eir e xt rem itie s w hic h are in t he foot are not affected, but only certain ones of t heir intervening parts [ w hi ch pas s by th e loi ns or the neck ], th is actio n w ill ex cite the sa me mo veme nt in the brain tha t m igh t ha ve been ex cited th ere by a hu rt received in th e foot, in conseque nce of w hic h the m in d w ill neces sarily feel in the foot th e s am e pai n as if it had rec eived a hu rt. An d the sa me ho lds good of all the other perceptions of our se nse s. I no tice fi na lly th at si nce each of the mo veme nts w hic h are in th e portion o f the brain by w hic h th e m in d is im medi ately affected bring s about one particu lar s en satio n only, we canno t u nder the circu mstances i ma gine anyt hing mo re like ly than that th is m ov eme nt, am ongst al l th e sen sation s w hic h it is capa ble of impre ssing on it, causes m in d to be affected by tha t one w hich is best f it ted and m os t ge nerall y u se ful f or th e conservat ion o f th e hu man bod y w he n it is in healt h. But ex perience m ak es u s a ware th at al l the feel ings w ith w hic h na ture in sp ires u s are s uc h as I h ave ju st spoke n of ; and there is therefore no thing in the m w hic h does not give tes timo ny to the pow er a nd goodness of th e God [ w ho h as produce d th em 2 7 ].

Thus, for e xa mple, w he n the nerve s w hic h are in the feet are v iole ntly or m ore tha n u su ally mo ved, th eir mo veme nt, pas sing throug h the m ed ulla of th e spi ne 28 to th e in mo st parts of th e brain, give s a s ign to the m ind w hic h ma kes it feel so me what , to w it, pai n, a s tho ugh in the foot, by w hich th e m ind is ex cited to do its ut mos t to re mo ve the cau se of the ev il as dangerous and hu rtful to the foot. I t is true th at God could ha ve con stituted the na ture of m an in su ch a wa y tha t this sa me mo vemen t in the brain wou ld ha ve conveyed so me thing q ui te dif ferent to the m in d; for e xa mp le, it m ight h ave produce d conscio usnes s of it self ei ther in s o f ar as it is in th e brain, or as it is in th e foot, or as it is in so me other place betw een th e f oot a nd the brain, or it m ight f in ally h ave pro duced con sciou sness of anythi ng else w hatsoever; but none of all th is w ou ld h ave contributed so we ll to the conservat ion of th e body . Si milarly, w he n w e desire to drink , a certain dr yness of the throat is produce d w hich mo ves it s nerve s, and by th eir me ans the inter nal portions of the brain; and th is mo veme nt cau ses in th e m in d the se nsa tion of thir st, because in th is case th ere is n ot hing mo re us eful to us than to beco me aw are th at we 27 Latin version only . 28 spini dorsae medullam. 1- 31 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y ha ve need to drin k for the con servatio n of o ur h ealt h; and the sa me ho lds good in other in stances. From th is it is qu ite clear th at, no twithst an din g the su prem e goodness of God, the n ature of ma n, ina sm uc h as it is com posed of m ind and bod y, canno t be other wise than so me tim es a source of dece ption. For if there is a ny cau se w hich exc ites, no t in the foot bu t in so me part of the n erves w hich are e xt ended betw een the foot and th e brain, or eve n in the brain it sel f, th e sa me m ove men t w hich us ua lly is pro duced w he n th e foot is detrim ental ly af fected, pain w ill be ex perienced as thou gh it we re in the foot, and the sen se w ill th us na turally be deceived; for s in ce the sa me mo veme nt in the brain is capa ble of caus ing bu t one s en satio n in the m in d, and th is sen sation is m uc h m ore frequen tly ex cited by a cause w hic h h ur ts the foot th an by anot her e xi stin g in so me ot her q uarter, it is reasonable th at it s ho uld convey to th e m ind pai n in the foot rather tha n in any other part of the bod y. An d al tho ugh the parchedness of the throat does n ot al way s pro ceed, a s it us ua lly does, fro m the fact th at drink ing is n ecessary for th e h ealt h of th e body , bu t s om etime s com es fro m q uite a di fferent cause, as is the case w ith dropsical patient s, it is yet m uc h better th at it sh ou ld m is lead on th is occasion tha n if , on th e ot her ha nd, it we re al ways to deceive us w hen the body is in good heal th; and so on in si m ilar cases. A nd certainly thi s cons ideration is of great service to m e, n ot o nly in enabli ng me to recognize al l the erro rs to w hic h my nature i s su bject, bu t al so in e nabling m e to avoid the m or to corr ect the m mo re eas ily. for kn owi ng tha t all my s en ses mo re frequen tly i nd icate to me tru th th an fal sehood respecting the thi ng s w hic h concern th at w hic h is bene ficial to the body , and bei ng able al m os t al ways to avai l my self of m any o f th em in ord er to ex ami ne one particular th ing, and, besides th at, being able to ma ke use of m y me mory in orde r to con nect th e present w ith the past, and o f m y un derstandi ng w hic h already h as di scovere d all th e cause s of m y erro rs, I oug ht no lo nger to f ear th at f al sity ma y be fou nd in m atter s every da y presented to me by m y se nse s. A nd I oug ht to set aside al l the doubt s of the se pas t days as hyper bolical and ridiculo us, particularly that v er y com mon un certain ty respe cting s leep, w hic h I could not di sting uish from the wa kin g sta te; f or at present I fi nd a v er y no table di fference bet wee n the t wo , inas much as our me mory can ne ver connect our dre ams one w ith the other, or w ith the w hol e course o f o ur li ves, as it u ni tes e vent s w hich happen to u s w hil e we are aw ake. A nd , as a m atter of fact, if s om eone, w hile I wa s a wa ke, qu ite s udden ly appe ared to me and disappea red as fas t as do the im age s w hich I s ee in sleep, so that I cou ld not kn ow from w he nce the for m came nor w hith er it went , it wo uld not be w ith ou t reason th at I s ho uld deem it a spectre or a phan tom for med by my brain [a nd s imi lar to th ose w hich I for m in sleep], rather tha n a real ma n. But w hen I per ceive th ings as to w hic h I kn ow dis tinctly both the place fro m w hic h they proc eed, a nd tha t in w hic h they are, a nd the ti m e at w hich th ey app eared to me ; and w he n, w ithou t a ny in terruption, I can connect th e per ception s w hic h I have of th em w ith the w ho le course of m y life, I am perfectly a ss ured th at the se per ceptions occur whil e I a m wa kin g and n ot duri ng sleep. An d I o ugh t in no w ise to doubt the tru th of su ch m atter s, if, after h av ing called u p all my se nse s, my me mory, and my un derstandi ng, to e xa mine the m, no thing is brought to ev idence by a ny o ne of the m w hich is repugnan t to w ha t is s et forth by th e ot hers. For because God is in no w ise a deceiver, it fol low s tha t I am no t deceived in th is. But bec ause the ex ige ncies of action of ten oblige us to ma ke u p our m ind s befor e ha ving lei sure to e xa mine m atter s careful ly, w e m ust con fess tha t the li fe of ma n is v er y frequen tly su bject to erro r in respect to in div idua l obje cts, and we m ust i n t he end ackno wledge the in firm ity of our nature. 29 29 Unaltered copies of this computer text fil e may be fre ely distrib uted for personal and cla ssroom use . Al ter atio ns to this file are permitted only for purposes of computer print outs, althou gh alter ed computer text file s may not circulate. 1- 32 32 R EN E D ESC A RTES M ED IT A TIO NS O N F IR ST P H IL O SO PH Y 33