Outline and Annotated Bibliography Part 1 of 2
Chapter 7
Thomas Hobbes and Modern Civil Society
I. Historical Context
Thomas Hobbes (1588 –1679) designed a new relationship between citizens and their state in the face of
the intense conflicts that permeated his society. Before explaining the particular dimensions of these
conflicts and of the new citizen/state relationship , it is well worth discussing why Hobbes can be
properly called a major architect of modern liberalism.
:obbes’s political thinking emanates from the demands of some people for the opportunity to chart a
course in life previously denied expression. Tradit ional medieval order was predicated upon a way of life
that gave prominence to certain classes, including the nobility, the landed, church officials, and of
course the king. Those left without power were people who worked the land as peasants and serfs, as
well as people drafted into the king’s and noblemen -led army. Also left without power was a new
bourgeoisie or middle class of tradesmen, merchants, and small farmers who owned their own land. The
middle class made demands on the political system for incl usion. In effect, this new middle class sought
opportunities for a space in which a person could pursue activities, previously denied in the old order.
In practical political terms, the provision of rights provided opportunities for the new middle class t o
express as well as to pursue its own interests. What did these rights guarantee? Rights in Hobbes
provided people with the chance to make decisions about what they wanted to do with their own lives,
within certain limits that the culture of the times est ablished. This means that people would be
permitted more leeway than in the past, but not so much leeway that they would violate all the norms
of the society. Thus, whereas individuals should be given the freedom to become merchants if that is
what they wa nt to be, they could not expect to be admitted to the nobility if that is what they hoped
for.
The political system fashioned from this vision is the basis for liberalism. Liberalism makes possible
individual freedom by enabling people to have rights, whi ch provide both opportunities and protections,
but at the same time liberalism requires individuals to observe those obligations linked with the new
opportunities and protections. There are several important implications of this view. In the first place,
the history of liberalism will always be associated in public memory with the need for critiquing in the
name of freedom existing traditional ways of life, as was the case in :obbes’s time, while accepting the
need for certain culturally established limits on that freedom. And this questioning will always create
conflict in society, which will often be resolved in the name of freedom, and less so in the name of
retaining restrictions on freedom for the sake of protecting tradition.
For conservatives, as we see in the chapter on that subject, liberalism is criticized for always seeking to
make people justify tradition in the name of freedom. And doing so for conservatives can lead to the
betrayal of important values —such as religious or longstanding cultural ones —needed to maintain social
order and community. For liberals, however, freedom is not corrosive of society because for them
freedom is always associated with necessary and reasonable constraints needed to secure freedom.
Hobbes discusses the constraint s of natural law, Spinoza emphasizes the limits on authority by the
majority in a democratic society, and John Locke describes what we refer to as the constrained majority.
Each writer understands these constraints as necessary for securing freedom. As we shall see, John
Stuart Mill argues that people should be free to do what they wish so long as they do not harm others.
Immanuel Kant maintains the presence of coercive laws that are formed in keeping with universal moral
standards that secure individual fr eedom. G. W. F. Hegel gives the state the job of enforcing the law for
the sake of freedom. John Rawls discusses the place of an overlapping consensus as the basis for
necessary constraints on freedom. In short, what liberals suggest is that if tradition d enies the freedom
that takes place within reasonable constraints, then tradition should be reformed, as for example was
the case with traditions of segregation that denied freedom to African Americans.
Thus, the view of liberalism provided here explains w hy liberalism is both a history of the expansion of
the number of rights made available to protect people’s freedom as well as a history of the need to
extend the coverage of rights to those heretofore not protected by them. In Hobbes, there is to be a
bas ic right to personal freedom, and this right is to permit one to choose one’s own occupation and core
beliefs. To these ends, the right to own property will be a central concern. Later, as we move beyond
Hobbes, we see that the number of rights is expanded to include political rights, such as freedom of
conscience, speech, association, thought, and so on. Further, those covered under those rights are
expanded to include more and more groups not previously accorded rights. Indeed, the history of our
own soci ety follows the pattern of liberalism. We have seen the list of rights grow to include, in addition
to basic rights in the first ten amendments of the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court –
endorsed right to privacy, the evolving presumption of a right to health care and to an education. And
we have seen the scope of rights expand to include previously excluded groups, such as women, African
Americans, Native Americans, gays, and so on.
Another important implication of liberalism is the liberty i nterest that is central to the liberal project,
which no doubt Hobbes bequeathed. By this, we mean that in demanding a space for persons to pursue
conduct or to hold beliefs previously denied to them, individuals are said to have a prime interest in
libert y. This means that other values —such as autonomy, privacy, equality, and community —are
important insofar as they aid that interest. Let us briefly discuss each in turn.
Autonomy suggests that individuals should have the freedom to make major decisions abo ut their lives,
including such matters as choice of career, religion, or friendships. Without liberty there can be no
autonomy of choice with respect to major issues such as these. Privacy refers to a sphere outside the reach of others or the state, a sphe re in which individuals can live as they choose. Privacy in the context
used here suggests that the state or others must allow individuals to think their own thoughts, have
their own feelings, and partake in relationships of their own choice —without interf erence. Equality is a
value of high importance in this setting, too. Equality is seen as providing all citizens with like rights and,
in consequence thereof, with equal liberty.
Finally, what liberalism emphasizes is that freedom for the individual is mor e important than
community. This does not mean that community is incompatible with liberalism. It means only that the
common good of community must be defined so as not to smother liberty. Indeed, communities are
acceptable to the extent they practice norm s conducive to a broader liberty.
In taking this view, Hobbes, as one of the founders of liberalism, is advocating on the whole the interests
of a new class, the bourgeoisie, or what is the new middle class. This class has been both celebrated and
scorned . Those who celebrate it are writers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, each of whom sees it as
the phalanx of freedom. Those who attack the bourgeoisie see the new middle class as mostly
interested in material self -gratification and greed, rejecting in the process respect for all that is sacred.
The bourgeoisie is viewed in Jean -Jacques Rousseau as the source of the undermining of community. In
Karl Marx it is the basis for a cruel form of capitalism, and in Friedrich Nietzsche it is the foundation of
herd -like, conformist thinking.
All in all, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Kant as leading forerunners of liberalism represent the quest of
the Enlightenment to further the interests of a society based on the teachings of reason. Reason is the
means by which indiv iduals can best determine the basis for a good life. And in taking this position,
reason emphasizes the importance of liberty as it defends the latter against all that may stand in its way,
including well -worn traditions.
In this chapter, we wish to empha size the liberty interest dimension and ask how well Hobbes makes
this interest compatible with civil society in the separate sphere sense of the term. To that end, we
describe now the historical context of liberalism in Hobbes.
On the one hand, there are those who believe that the monarch should remain the pivotal political
force, not subject to challenge. But on the other hand, there are those arguing for greater autonomy
and independence from the king’s power. The English civil wars of :obbes’s lifetime are in part fought
over the issue of who should have greater authority, the king or the parliament. Hobbes definitely
supports the idea of an absolute monarchy.1 =n doing so, however, he predicates the king’s power upon
the idea of a social contract that the people in society consent to. A chief condition of this contract is
that the government exists to protect the freedom of individuals. This freedom is used ultimately by the
evolving merchant or new commercial class seeking independence to pursue its ow n interests in a
society where a medieval structure historically dominated.
=n :obbes’s new social contract, then, people would consent to a powerful monarch ruling them, in
exchange for the personal freedom that the monarch would guarantee and protect. This new social
contract symbolizes that the medieval order in society is no l onger the basis for establishing social
obligations. Instead, obligations grow out of the desire for individual freedom. Central to this objective is
the need to maintain a respect for civic virtue. What role does civic virtue play in the setting that Hobb es
describes in his writings? When people have the freedom to determine the way of life that is best for
them, they are bound to face conflicts and disagreements. Still, different people holding conflicting
interests can live in peace if there are common g round rules or civic virtues all can accept and abide by
during the course of promoting their interests. :obbes’s effort to provide rules that secure rights and
freedom is the basis for the liberal view of civil society that we discuss throughout this part of the book.
==. :obbes’s Method
The method Hobbes uses to find those rules that provide a common basis for politics among disparate
groups derives from his fascination with geometry. Geometry was the “only Science that it hath pleased
God hitherto to be stow on mankind.”2 =n geometry one starts with simple, but self -evident
propositions, definitions, and axioms and uses deduction to build complex systems from these simpler
starting points. This approach is used to explain relationships in the physical wor ld, and Hobbes thinks
that the political world can be studied in the same manner. The only hindrance to doing so is in
determining the correct or valid, simple, but self -evident propositions that are the basis for explaining
the general characteristics of human conduct. Once one finds these, one can use them as the starting
points for analysis and for building a logical system for the political world similar in nature to the one
that geometry constructs for the physical world.
Hobbes approaches this object ive by making use of the method Galileo employs, the resolutive -
compositive approach, and applying it to the political world.3 Galileo uses this approach to understand
complex motions. He does so by first, in the resolutive part, hypothesizing there to be simple forces.
These simple forces cannot be directly observed, but their existence is merely a creation of the
imagination. He postulates these simple forces as a necessary ground for the more complex motions he
wants to explain. When these simple forces, with the use of logical reasoning, are combined into a
composite, he is able to demonstrate why the complex motions he studies take place.
To take this method into the study of humankind, we can start with the whole arena of human conduct
as we know it a nd ask: What are the basic elements from which the whole is built? Hobbes starts his
discussion of politics by first saying that the whole, or society when viewed as a composite, is
characterized by a state of war. He then asks what the basic elements of t his system are and how they
are interrelated to create a world characterized by war. Moreover, with the understanding he gains
about how the whole is constituted, he can ask how the whole system of interrelations in society might
be reconstituted in a new way to avoid war and to make peace possible.
So :obbes’s questions are clear. What forces in the human world contribute to war, and how might they
be rearranged to achieve a peaceful world? Now, no one can know the mind of humankind for certain,
but we ca n imagine or hypothesize what the forces are that motivate humankind, given what we know
of human conduct already. Thus, if reality in general is such that individuals are prone to engage in war
with others, we have a basis for explaining our general situa tion in terms of what can be hypothesized as
self -evident and basic truths that explain these circumstances. Further, once we know why human
relationships lead to a general condition of war, it should be possible to define those common rules and
norms that all should uphold in order to make possible a society committed to peace.
In our discussion of the state of nature in the next section, we describe the basic forces that suggest the
potential for war and under what conditions it is possible to achieve pe ace. Before turning to this
endeavor it is important to note the practical, political implications of :obbes’s method. =n discussing
society, Hobbes had to confront some very difficult conflicts. We have already referred to the one
pertaining to the role o f the king in relation to parliament. But as we elaborate upon more fully in
Section V=, there are grave differences in :obbes’s society pertaining to the role of religious institutions
in their relationship to both society and the state. It would appear, given the nature and the depth of
the differences permeating :obbes’s society, that there is no common basis upon which to establish the
state’s role in society.
Seen from the perspective of the particular parties in any of these conflicts, this conclusio n would be
understandable and inevitable. Hobbes, of course, cannot accept this outcome. He believes that it is
possible to find a basis for avoiding war in his society. And to do so it would be necessary to discover a
common viewpoint that stands above th e partisanship found in his society and that can be used to
establish the common rules all could accept for securing peace. To this end, Hobbes suggests that the
reasons for conflict are quite simple in nature. As a consequence, because the real basis for conflict is
uncomplicated, the differences that separate people are not that large at all, and peaceful solutions to
resolve people’s differences are likely to be easier to identify. =n effect, when people understand that
the basis for their conflicts is n o longer actually located in particular religious or philosophical
differences, but in simpler explanations about human nature, then it is more likely that individuals will
be able to find a common set of rules for organizing political and social life in a way all can accept.
As people comprehend the real roots of conflict, they can attain a basis for overcoming once and for all
the conflict everyone loathes. In place of a society filled with war and strife, there can emerge a new
civil society that is com mitted to protect, in the name of the rule of law, the individual freedom of each
person. Here, a new doctrine of civic virtue emerges, one that is seen as the basis for supporting notions
of individual private freedom, or the freedom to make choices about the way of life that seems best for
one’s self. =n the new civic virtue, the rules that all must accept are rules that are used to avoid
destructive forms of conflict during the course of protecting each person’s private freedom. =n this case,
civic virtu e is no longer defined in terms of a need to support a particular conception of the common good, a conception that defines for each person his or her fixed and permanent place in society, as in
Plato’s republic, Aristotle’s polis, or Aquinas’s form of medi eval society. Instead, civic virtue permits
each person to have the freedom to determine which way of life is best for him or herself and, in
demanding that all should have this freedom, civic virtue becomes a doctrine that embraces a moral
order based upo n providing each individual the same basic rights.
Still, the main problem with :obbes’s argument is that his concept of civil society embraces a very
powerful state that threatens the freedom that his view of civil society defends. Explaining the reasons
for this situation is one of the main objectives of this chapter.
III. Hobbes and the State of Nature
What, then, is the enduring source of conflict? To explain the reasons for human conflict, Hobbes
describes his view of the state of nature. :obbes’s vi ew of the state of nature represents what he thinks
human interactions were like before there was organized society, before there was government, and
before there were any formal laws. :obbes’s views are his own imagined description of human life, and
his picture of this condition demonstrates why conflict was inevitable. Moreover, given the view he
provides, it is also possible to understand why it is likely that individuals will find an acceptable
resolution.
In the state of nature, Hobbes argues that pe ople are continually motivated to realize the objects of
their desires. People not only want to achieve their present desires, but they have a strong need to be in
a position that allows them to achieve whatever future desires they may have as well.4 It is only when
people are successful in these regards that they can attain a “contented life.” People differ only in the
sense that they may have different passions, but because all want to realize them, all people share a
common hope of achieving contentment in their lives.5 To obtain one’s desires, however, one must
have sufficient “power,” or the necessary means, to acquire whatever one may need to satisfy a
particular passion. Thus, given the constancy of the urge to realize one’s desires the search for pow er is
a continual enterprise that “ceaseth onely in Death.”6
Why, one might ask, is the search for power continual? After all, once one has acquired sufficient power
to attain one’s objectives, why would one want to seek more power? =n the state of nature , people find
themselves in a situation in which they never can truly relax and enjoy whatever they are able to acquire
with the power they have. People are always looking over their shoulders, wondering when and if the
person next to them will cause them harm. To avert this possibility, people always feel the need to find
ways to acquire more and more power. As they do, their purpose in acquiring power changes
somewhat. They still need power to acquire the goods that enable them to enjoy life, of course. B ut in
addition, they discover that it is necessary to secure power for its own sake, so that they can free
themselves from the constant fear that others will cause them harm. Man, :obbes says, “cannot assure
the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.”7
Moreover, the fear that others will take from us what we currently possess creates a condition of
mutual violence on the part of each person toward the other. If each person thinks that everything one
has may be taken from him or her by another, each person can never trust the other person, and each
person thinks that the other person is always scheming to do harm. Naturally, this condition of mutual
distrust leads to the development of some very destructive tend encies among people. :ere, “the way of
one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant or repell the other.”8 =n the
state of nature, competition among people leads to the need to gain at the expense of others, to
employ violen ce against others, and thus people seek “to make themselves Master of other men’s
persons, wives, children and cattell.”9 =t is not surprising that life in the state of nature is “solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”10
:obbes’s account of the stat e of nature seems to describe the ramifications for civil society of the
market mentality in its most destructive form. Here, people compete for the financial resources that
enable them to obtain the power, or the material means, to acquire the things that give them happiness
and contentment in life. Thus, Hobbes had the influence of the market context in mind when he argues
that our power as individuals is associated with our “worth,” that is, the “price” that others would pay
for our services. We can acqu ire more power, or the means to achieve our ends, if we can enhance our
worth, or the price we can charge others who want to make use of our services. Our worth, however,
always depends upon the judgments and needs of others.11 If others find that what we offer no longer
has any value, then we would lose our ability to acquire what brings us contentment and happiness.
Hobbesian persons, not unlike many today, live in constant dread and fear that, in the eyes of the
market, they will have nothing of value to contribute to the society.
Given this composite picture of humankind in the state of nature, it is understandable why society
becomes a dog -eat -dog world, where each is engaged in trying to dominate and subjugate the other
before the other dominates and subjugates him or her. If thi s picture is accurate, then it would appear
impossible for humankind to avoid war and to establish a civil society. But Hobbes suggests otherwise.
For if one looks closely at the nature of human relationships one can understand how the basis for
conflict a mong persons, the constant need to obtain more and more power, can be turned into a
direction favorable to peace, instead of war. How is this possible?
Hobbes said that, in the main, despite the fact that most people think they are superior to others and
are thus characterized by a “vain conceit,”12 the fact of the matter is that most of us are equal in ability
and capacity. “Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there
bee found one man sometimes manifestly stro nger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when
all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable.”13 :ow does
this fact explain the basis for transcending destructive behavior and creating the basis for a new so cial
contract, where cooperation replaces war? In the rest of this section, we address this question.
Our equality of ability suggests an equality of hope that we will be able to attain the ends that bring
about contentment.14 And when, as a result of thi s equality of ability and now hope, two people seek
the same thing, they naturally become enemies, because it is impossible for both of them to have that
thing. :obbes says, “From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of Ends. And
therefore if any two men desire the thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become
enemies; and in the way to their End … endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.”15
Here, in a world where people are equal in ability and where th ere are not enough of the things we all
desire to go around to everyone, it is highly likely that each of us will seek to control and dominate
others. The reason for this state of affairs is that we realize the thin line between success and failure.
What d ifferentiates me, the successful person, from you the unsuccessful person may just be luck. I got
to the cherished job opportunity we both sought before you did, and so I got the job. If you had arrived
before me, you would have had the job, not me. The pr oblem here is that there is only one job and two
people competing for it. And, because each of us is equal in ability, the prospective employer does not
have to wait for the more talented person to show up, but instead, he or she will take the first person in
line. Knowing this to be the factual context of life makes those who lose out very jealous and hateful to
those who succeed. The loser feels that the winner wins only because of luck, not because of ability. And
because each of us thinks of ourselves, with all our “vain conceits,” as better than the other, we think
that we should have gotten the job, instead of the other who is “less deserving.” So we are very bitter,
and our bitterness propels us to treat others with contempt and violence.
Furthermore , the successful person is really no better off, either. He knows that others are jealous and
harbor violent feelings toward him, and so he worries that everything he has gained will be taken from
him at some point in the future. He may have won the job, b ut, if he ever lets his guard down, even for a
minute, he will find himself on the street. He can never rest easy at night because he is always insecure
about losing everything to another. Moreover, in this setting, there are no standards of justice that
could be appealed to as the basis for assuaging one’s fear.16
In this situation, then, people are driven by a need to gain permanent advantage over each other, and
we are prone, as well, to use violence to make ourselves the masters of others. But Hobbes a rgues that
we are not destined to live like this, and again the primary reason seems to be the essential equality of
our basic capacities. We are all commonly in possession of central passions —the fear of death, and a
desire to live comfortably. “The Passi ons that encline men to Peace, are Fear of Death [and the] Desire
of such things as are necessary to commodious living.”17 These passions become center stage for us
when we realize that the constant quest for power by each of us threatens to destroy all ho pe for social
peace, for comforts, and for release from the fear of death.
At this point, people discover that the ongoing warfare they are engaged in with each other is harmful,
on the whole, to creating the conditions that make prosperity possible. Wher e war is ever -present,
there is little industrial development, there is no art or advances in knowledge, there is no trade among nations, and so on.18 Again, then, as part of the common equality in ability of humankind, it would
appear that a cause of peac e is the realization that individuals generally share a common set of
expectations for life. Were people’s expectations to be wildly different, there would be no basis upon
which to establish a peaceful social and political order, but for Hobbes this is no t the case because
people want what secures their prosperity and ensures their happiness.
Thus, our common fear of death, as well as a shared commitment to have what makes possible a
prosperous life, moves us to seek a new basis for society, and our reaso n aids in this endeavor by
defining the “Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.” The Articles of Peace
that all can accept and make the basis of the new civil society are referred to as the laws of nature.19
=V. :obbes’s Civil Society : The Laws of Nature and Civic Virtue
What is the nature of the new social contract or civil society, embodying the “Articles of Peace” that
:obbes’s citizens accept? The answer to this question revolves around what people understand to be
the common elem ent that each would accept as the basis for society. The key element is liberty or the
right, ordained by nature or reason, of each person to use his or her “power,” to prepare “for the
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and c onsequently, of doing any thing,
which in his own Hudgment, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”20 :ere,
each person is to have the personal freedom to chart his or her own course in life, in accordance with
what his or her goa ls and desires are.
Furthermore, this kind of liberty for Hobbes is made possible only when we observe certain limits and
constraints on conduct. By observing these limits on our liberty, we move from the state of nature to the
state of civil society. The limits on conduct suggest for us the need to follow rules that facilitate the
individually defined objectives that individuals may choose. In the state of nature, of course, liberty was
defined as the right to all things, and people would never accept the kinds of limits prescribed for civil
society. But the right -to-all -things doctrine of the state of nature, that is, freedom without limits,
signifies only continual war.21
This condition cannot continue if human beings are to create a society committed t o peace, a goal made
necessary by the constant fear as well as the continual threat of death. In consequence, individuals are
led to embrace certain laws of nature, or what can be called civic virtues, and to make them the basis for
establishing the rules of conduct for all citizens in the society. The first and most fundamental law of
nature is that all persons ought to seek peace. At the same time, it is also a law of nature that individuals
may use any means, including violence, to defend themselves from harm.22 In following a peaceful
course of conduct, however, people do not have to resort to force. As a result, they move from the state
of nature, where the only constant is the tendency to harm others, to a civil society.23 In a civil society,
the new c onstant is the second law of nature that says that no one should seek any more freedom for
him or herself than he or she would accord to others. This law of nature is summed up in the Bible as the golden rule or the following idea: “Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to
them.”24
Here, Hobbes has in mind a cooperative framework for society, the essence of which is acceptance by
each person of the need to mutually accommodate one another’s liberty for the sake of securing each
pe rson’s freedom. :obbes says that only “in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to
himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby”25 will individuals ever accept the constraints
associated with recognizing the liberty of others. No p erson will abide by a need to respect the liberty of
others unless in doing so one’s own rights and basic security are assured. To get people to respect one
another’s liberty, then, conditions must be created that enable people to feel that when they do so ,
their basic interests, including the need for self -preservation and contentment, are in no sense placed in
danger.26 When these conditions can be met, then each individual is in a position to respect the liberty
of others. :obbes’s new social contract, a nd the view of civil society that flows from it, suggests the
notion of mutual respect, or the idea that each person will act to promote the liberty of others when all
people attempt to make a place for all other people’s interests.
In the cooperative set ting that :obbes’s social contract makes available, avenues are created that
permit individuals to be engaged in relationships of mutual exchange. Here, people make contracts with
other people whenever they exchange one thing for another, such as when they buy or sell with
money.27 A covenant is another form of contract. In a covenant, two people make an agreement, the
provisions of which will be carried out in the future.28 The idea of the covenant, however, brings up a
serious problem that a civil society must address. What is to prevent one party to an agreement, say X,
from getting what X contracted for, and then not performing, at some future date, as the contract
requires with respect to the other party, Y? This question suggests that the urge to subdu e others is
never quite removed from individuals even in the context of a society governed by natural law. This
problem can be averted only if there is a common power that can enforce the covenants and punish
those who do not comply with them. Hobbes says:
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another; in the
condition of meer Nature (which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any
reasonable suspition, it is Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and
force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance
that the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition,
avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the fear of some coercive power.29
Based on this position, then, another very important law of nature is justice. Justice is the idea that
“men [must] performe their Covenants made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty
words, and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.”30 A just
society is one in which individuals uphold their agreements with others; when people do not, then there
is no basis for anyone to obtain from others the cooperation they need in order to achieve their pers onal goals and objectives. Moreover, justice is possible only when there is a common power, that is,
a commonwealth, or what can be called a state, with coercive power to compel people to uphold their
agreements.31 In the absence of a state that can enforc e agreements, society returns to the state of
nature, or a condition of continual warfare.
Further, :obbes’s discussion of natural law suggests that, in addition to a common power that each
person is to respect, there are other forms of civic virtue (or a dditional laws of nature) that are useful in
protecting the freedom of each person. For instance, people must display gratitude when others give
them something, without expecting anything in return.32 Hobbes hopes to create a civic culture in
which people no longer perceive each other as potential enemies. Gratitude helps to achieve this end
because it requires people to see the bearers of gifts as acting from a sense of goodwill.33 If we always
refuse to attribute goodwill to those people who bestow gifts upon us, there is no basis for initiating
trust or benevolence among people. In this regard, we should manifest toward others the virtue of
“compleasance” or the idea that an individual should “strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest.”34
This virtue wil l enable people to understand and to accept the vast diversity of interests and needs that
make up society. Moreover, individuals must learn to pardon others for past offenses and to overcome
the temptation to extract revenge for past wrongs. Otherwise, th ere would be no peace.35 Further,
people can secure peace in society only when everyone agrees to treat everyone else as equals. A
violation of this principle is the vice of pride.36 To secure the conditions of equality, individuals must
avoid “arrogance” or the tendency to attribute rights to themselves that are not accorded to all
others.37 =nstead, all must recognize the basic rights that belong to everyone, like the “right to governe
their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place t o place; and all things else without
which a man cannot live, or not live well.”38
These laws suggest that people must learn to deal fairly with each other. When people are not treated
fairly, they resort to violence to resolve disputes. But when people a re treated fairly, disputes are
resolved through peaceful means such as by impartial judges and arbitrators. In observing this
commitment, individuals maintain respect for the natural law or civic virtue called “equity.”39 To
achieve equity, which includes fairness in the distribution of basic goods such as property, additional
natural laws or civic virtues are needed, and these pertain to the way that property is divided and
disputes among citizens are settled.
Regarding property, Hobbes argues that there are natural laws pertaining to the distinction between
private and public property. With respect to public property, goods that cannot be divided must be
shared in common, and no one can be denied access to them. Hobbes has in mind basic goods needed
for survival such as the air we breathe, the water we drink, and so on. But for things that can be neither
divided nor enjoyed in common, it is necessary to find a fair procedure for distribution. In this case,
Hobbes has in mind private property. He suggests that the latter be distributed by lot so that each
person, presumably, believes that there is a fair chance of acquiring his or her share. The principle of
distribution by lot is nothing more than the notion that goods that cannot be enjoyed by all in comm on
be distributed on the basis of according entitlement of something to the person who possesses it first.40
Further, in situations in which individuals have differences of opinion and fall into controversy about
whether certain actions are permitted unde r the law, it is a law of nature that a citizen must accept that
he or she cannot properly be an arbitrator in cases involving him or herself. And thus each must put his
or her faith in a neutral third party, certainly the state, which can act fairly and j ustly toward each
individual.41
=f the laws of nature were naturally a part of each citizen’s outlook, then each citizen would respect the
rights of others by his or her own volition. But the fact is that people will not embrace even these virtues
unless there is the “terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed.” For :obbes believes that the
laws of nature are “contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the
like.”42 :obbes hopes to neutralize these powerful passions and to create a society based on the fair
rules of the laws of nature by establishing a powerful state whose sole function was to use its power to
promote these laws. As :obbes says, “Covenants without the sword, are but words,”43 and so the state
in a civil society must have a sword. Nonetheless, as we demonstrate in the next section, the power of
the state is allowed to grow to the point at which it is quite likely that it ends up threatening the
freedom a civil society seeks to preserve.
V. The Role and Structure of the State
How is what Hobbes calls the commonwealth or the Leviathan, which is the predominant governing
authority with the power to provide for the peace and defense in a civil society, created?44 Hobbes says
the commonwealth or wha t also could be referred to as the state is created when all the members of
the community agree to place authority for governing the community in either one man or one
assembly of men. In doing so, all agree to submit themselves to the will of a single aut hority. The act of
consent that makes possible a state with great powers to secure peace and to protect the society from
external enemies signifies for :obbes a basis for societal unity, predicated upon each person’s entering
into an agreement with all oth ers to permit only one governmental authority in society. In doing so,
Hobbes indicates that it is as though each individual has said to all others:
“= Authorise and give my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this
condition, that thou give thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.”45 The state or
commonwealth, also called the sovereign, is vested with sovereign power over the citizens who are
called the subjects. We use the words state and sov ereign interchangeably.46
Does this act of consent give the state or the sovereign unlimited authority over citizens? Hobbes
certainly claims not. =ndeed, :obbes seems to suggest that the state’s objectives are defined in a
manner to limit the state’s aut hority. What are the state’s objectives? Given :obbes’s views of natural
law, the state would have to follow a path that promotes justice and equity, and in doing so the state
would make as its priority the protection of citizens’ rights. Thus, the act of consent to create a sovereign authority, if it means anything, clearly would mean that the citizens in consenting to the
state’s authority do so only on the condition that the state protects their rights.47 To this end, the state,
as it arbitrated conflict s between citizens, or as it sought to maintain and uphold agreements between
citizens, would have to stand above politics and attempt to render fair and impartial, publicly binding
decisions. In all cases, the state would have to uphold the law with equal force for all. To achieve these
objectives, the state could not allow its actions to be extensions of one private interest over another, for
then public power would be used to promote specific private interests, and, in this case, the rights of all
could not be protected.
But the actual state :obbes describes appears to compromise the state’s main objective of protecting
basic rights. For Hobbes, the state is defined as an authority with sovereign power over citizens, and that
authority is vested in eithe r a single monarch or an assembly of citizen representatives. Here, once
citizens give their consent to be subject to a monarch (or to an assembly), citizens cannot, without the
permission of the monarch (or the assembly), return the power to themselves fo r the purpose of
transferring it to another.48 Nor is there a right to revolution. :obbes says that “protestation against
any of their Decrees [of the state], he does contrary to his Covenant, and therefore unjustly.”49 =n this
regard, a citizen who the so vereign kills for trying to depose the sovereign is really the “author of his
own punishment.”50 For after all, in agreeing to be governed by the sovereign, each person agrees to
abide by his authority.
But how far are we obligated to the sovereign by our agreement to be governed by him? For Hobbes,
we are given extreme obligations that limit our conduct quite severely. Indeed, subjects cannot even
accuse the sovereign of wrongdoing. For once the state has been created, the state acts with the full
authori ty of those who have authorized it, that is, the people. And if the state, now that all the members
of society have authorized it, does wrong, the people need blame only themselves, not the state.51
Further, the sovereign has a right to determine which doc trines and opinions citizens will be permitted
to hold, and no doctrine that is a threat to the general peace of the society can be allowed.52
This account suggests that the state’s powers are likely to be so great that the state could act with
unlimited authority and in doing so threaten the rights of citizens. Further, there are no institutional
constraints that would prevent the state from taking this path. For instance, Hobbes argues that all law
making, all judicial powers, and all executive powers pe rtaining to making war and peace are to reside in
a single sovereign authority.53 These powers, as we have seen, may be located in a single person such
as a monarch, or in an assembly of citizens.54 In either case, Hobbes argues for a unitary form of
gover nment, in which the governing power is either an assembly or a monarch, but not both. This view
suggests that it would be wrong for the two governing types to share power, and based on this view it is
unlikely that Hobbes would have supported a separation of powers concept of government that is
typical in our times. The only result of separated government is divided government, and what divided
government eventuates is a return to the state of war.
For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man t o have his person represented by two Actors,
that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is
indivisible; and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the end for which
all Sover aignty is instituted.55
In all cases, the government is considered a representative of the people. When the representative is
one man, the government is a monarchy; when it is an assembly of all, then the government is a
democracy; and when the assembly i s only a part of the people, then the government is called an
aristocracy.56 Hobbes favors monarchy for several reasons. First, he argues that the monarch is more
likely to understand, to articulate, and to work to realize the public interest. The monarch has no
interest in harming the citizens because his authority rests with their success and prosperity.57 Second,
the monarch has only to listen to those who are experts and who as a result are most likely to make
significant contributions in solving public problems. The assembly, on the other hand, is filled with those
whose main concern is their own wealth rather than actions based on knowledge of the public
interest.58 These comparisons suggest that the monarch, unlike the assembly, does not have to try t o
please this group or that group; all he has to do is to make the best decision possible, using the best
information available. As a result, the monarch can maintain consistency of policy directions over
time.59
The assembly, on the other hand, must try to please many different interests, each of whom has a
different conception of the public good. And because it cannot always succeed in doing so, the assembly
opens itself and society up to the prospect of civil wa r.60 Hobbes dismisses the main problem he
identifies with monarchy, namely, that at times flatterers may inveigle their way into the king’s counsel.
But for Hobbes this is a mere inconvenience that is experienced in all governments,61 and, when this
proble m is weighed against the advantages of the monarchy, it is clear to Hobbes that the monarchy
remains the best form of government.
To those who fear the state’s power, :obbes argues that the sovereign cannot command a person to kill
or maim him or herself. Further, if the sovereign interrogates a person, the latter is under no obligation
to incriminate him or herself.62 Still, one might today ask, once the state has been allowed as much
power as Hobbes grants it, what real basis exists to protect citizens f rom the state’s own abuse of its
power? But this is not a question that Hobbes is interested in addressing. But we, of course, are. It
would seem in this regard that a benefit of the separation of powers concept is that it suggests various
points of access for citizens. The latter may use their access to help define the political agenda or to help
influence government decisions about particular issues on that agenda. Hobbes, in denying a place to
the separation of powers approach, took a step in the directi on of creating a state that would deny
citizens a chance to challenge its policies. How ironical a position for citizens to be in, given that the
state itself emanates from their consent!
Important implications for the concept of a civil society arise fro m :obbes’s view of the state’s role. As
we have seen, his civil society protects freedom by maintaining regard for civic virtues such as justice,
gratitude, and the provision of rights for all. The state will have a central role in promoting these virtues.
The state’s necessary role arises from the fact that :obbes does not trust people to uphold a
commitment to civic virtue on their own, and he believes that individuals would do so only when the
state compelled people to uphold common civic standards throu gh fear.
But, given this view, could there be a separate sphere of voluntary groups that exists to provide a buffer
against the prospect of governmental encroachment upon individuals? There is no question that values
such as gratitude, justice, and respec t for rights could make possible a separate sphere. Why is this the
case? These values would contribute to a society in which individuals manifested toward others mutual
respect, or the commitment to find ways to make room for each other, no matter how dif ferent each
person might be. And one such important way to attain this objective would be to make possible a
separate sphere that protected individual freedom against government encroachment. Still, even if for
Hobbes a separate sphere is feasible, it woul d exist in tension with a state whose powers could become
so vast that individuals would not be able to challenge its decisions. Certainly, this tension would not
necessarily deny the possibility of a separate sphere, but it would make such a sphere diffic ult to
achieve. :obbes’s treatment of religion demonstrates this problem of his view of civil society very well.
VI. The Christian Commonwealth
The establishment of an English Christian church, in the aftermath of the secession from Rome,
mandated that th e king should be the head of the church. The church and state should not be two
distinct realms, but they should form one common union.63 Those who supported this view believed
that religious life should be promoted, not as Aquinas had argued by an all -emb racing Catholic Church,
but by a national government in charge of a national church. In this case, the king and, where the king
permitted parliamentary participation in these matters, the parliament would be in a position to
determine religious doctrines a nd beliefs.64
Some groups met this perspective with opposition, of course. The Anglican or English Christian church
faced demands from religious groups —Catholics, Calvinists (also called Presbyterians), and
Independents —each of whom wanted autonomy from s tate interference for their own churches. The
Catholics advocated spiritual autonomy from the state so that they could acknowledge papal jurisdiction
in religious matters.65 The Calvinists did not accept a secular head of their church, either. The Calvinis ts
advocated a separation between the church and the state, but not in the present -day sense that makes
the state a secular institution that must avoid promoting a particular religion. Instead, the Calvinists
believed that they should be free from state in terference to determine the doctrines for a moral and
religious life, and they expected the state to make these doctrines mandatory.66 The Independents
argued for noninterference in religious affairs by the state and by the national church so that they cou ld
establish their own religious communities. As George Sabine says, the Independents wanted to ordain
their own clergy and establish themselves as a “voluntary association of like -minded believers,” and they did not want the civil authority to promote, as the Presbyterians had wanted, religious doctrines to
people of a different religious persuasion. The Independents adopted a doctrine of religious toleration
that would have to apply both to themselves and to others who did not believe as they did, althoug h in
practice the Independents were more likely to support toleration for themselves than for others.67
Hobbes argues that there should be one national church and that the civil sovereign, which as indicated
above can mean either the king or an assembly, should have authority over the religious life of society.
Indeed, the church should be subordinate to the power and the authority of the civil sovereign. The
latter can make laws that pertain to both the realm of government and the realm of religion. Thus, the
civil sovereign can determine the kind of church organization and arrangement that will be put in charge
of the religious life of society, and whatever organization is chosen for leading the religious life of society
must realize that the civil sovere ign has supreme authority over its affairs. For instance, the civil
sovereign may commit the state to Catholicism, but, if it does so, the pope must still be subordinate to
the civil sovereign. Or, when the civil sovereign establishes a central church unde r a “supreme pastor or
assembly of pastors,” the civil sovereign maintains overall control of the church. The civil sovereign
maintains control by designating interpreters of the scripture, defining the offices and powers of church
officials, and determini ng how people will be taxed to support the church.68 The civil sovereign may
even define religious doctrine, with the intent especially of providing doctrines that help secure peace in
society. And further, the civil sovereign may appoint the pastors.69
Justification for this view derives from the “Laws of God.” For :obbes, the latter are nothing more than
the laws of nature. And one of the key laws of nature that the “Laws of God” sanction is that individuals
must not violate a “commandment to obey the ci vil sovereign” that citizens through their own consent
have created. This suggests that the “Laws of God” have permitted the civil sovereign to be the primary
authority not only for civil law but for religious doctrines and for the management of the church . And
thus, by the “Laws of God,” citizens are to obey the precepts of the Bible in those places where the civil
sovereign mandates such conduct.70
Given this view, it is clear that only the civil sovereign can define the basis for excommunication and for
salvation. What doctrines does :obbes’s civil sovereign establish in these regards? First, :obbes refuses
to accept that a believing Christian who obeys the laws of his or her commonwealth can in any way be
harmed by being made subject to excommunication. To paraphrase Hobbes, the person who believes in
Christ is free from all the dangers threatened to persons by excommunication.71 This suggests that the
civil authority has the right to minimize any church’s effort to excommunicate a person who is a
Christ ian believer. And to receive salvation, all one need do is to maintain two very important civic
virtues: namely, faith in Christ and the need to uphold the civil law during one’s daily conduct in society.
Upholding the civil law would have been basis enoug h for salvation were it not for the fact of original sin
and of the likelihood that, owing to a lack of perfection, we will at times transgress the law. Given
human frailty and given the hope for eternal salvation, we do best for ourselves, then, when we s eek
“remission” for our sins, and this we can attain when we maintain faith in Christ.72
Hobbes, in arguing for the supremacy of the civil state over religious matters, does not deny the
importance of religious life but suggests that, in his newly constru cted civil society, religion must be
made subject to civil control. In this setting, all Christian believers were to share a common commitment
to maintaining the civil law and the natural law principles of a civil society, principles that secure respect
for individual freedom. When placed in its proper relationship to the state, the religious life can help
sustain the new civil society and the individual freedom it promises.
But at the same time, because :obbes’s civil authority will determine the content of religious life, his
state would always live in tension with any religious organizations seeking independence from state
control. Owing to this kind of state/society relationship, creating a separate sphere for groups to exist
independently of the state so that they could act from their own self -determined doctrines would be
discouraged at some points and perhaps disallowed at other points. And thus, Hobbes would not be a
strong supporter of a civil society that contained a separate sphere of groups that would act as buffers
and restraints on the state’s power.
VII. Response and Rejoinder
=n suggesting that a separate sphere would have difficulty being constituted in :obbes’s civil society, it
should be understood that Hobbes is not diminishing the import ance of individual freedom. Indeed,
Hobbes certainly contends that one of the objectives of his thought is to protect individual freedom with
the kind of state he advocates. Hobbes claims that his system provides individuals all the private
freedom they wa nt and need. Here, individuals are given the ability to make their own choices about the
life they want to lead. The laws are designed to remove impediments to freedom and not, themselves,
to be impediments to freedom. It is for this reason, for instance, that individuals can act as they want
when the laws are silent.73 And because the laws are designed to maximize personal freedom, the laws
do not dictate to people how they should live their lives in many areas of life. This approach is absolutely
necessar y if diverse people with different values are able to pursue those values in peace.
But problems with :obbes’s view remain. Some might claim that a terrible trade -off is taking place in
which individuals gain freedom only if they permit a state with absol ute power. Hobbes might respond
by saying that, after all, government, in particular his form of government, is based upon the consent of
the governed to be ruled by a particular regime. In this case, the state operates within some important
limits, since the state can do only that which the citizens prescribe for it to do. Now, it is true that
Hobbes does have a doctrine of citizen consent to government. But once the act of consent to be ruled
by a government whose main objective is to protect private free dom and rights has occurred, it appears
that people are forced to forfeit a right to challenge state policies that the citizens do not agree with. In
this case, how are citizens going to protect those rights that the state is empowered to secure but which
it may decide not to safeguard in the name of shoring up its own authority?
The question, then, is whether Hobbes can maintain security for the freedom he promised when the
state is as powerful as :obbes made it. :obbes’s answer might be that all he is attempting to do is to
provide a fair and objective state that can enforce the law for all and prevent the reemergence of a state
of war. If he is successful, equality of rights and liberty would be provided to all. Hobbes would claim
that the modern state, as it is presently constituted, is often perceived as failing to be a fair an d
impartial force in society, working to protect the rights of each individual. Hobbes might argue, then,
that very often the modern government, built upon the separation of powers model and the provision
of access to all interests, falls into paralysis, u nable to achieve even basic objectives for its citizens. In
the modern state, government invites many private interests, each with its own view of the good, to
enter government and to lobby for their own objectives. With so many different interests pushing for
their own respective ends, the state is unable to achieve general, broad policies that are in the interest
of all. Of central concern in this regard is that the state is unable to realize even those policies that
protect the individual, private freedo m of each person.
What would fuel this tendency for Hobbes is an attitude on the part of ordinary citizens to think that he
or she can be the sole determiner of what is right and just.
From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themsel ves, and dispute the commands of
the Commonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgments they shall
think fit.74
Hobbes argues that, whereas this doctrine might be acceptable in the state of nature, it is not
acceptable in a civil society. Indeed, Hobbes considers this view to be a poisonous doctrine that weakens
civil society.75 How is the commonwealth weakened by this kind of activity? In the first place, the only
measure of right and wrong should be the laws sanctioned b y the commonwealth. But where people
think they can determine good from bad themselves, they are encouraged to debate with each other
the decisions of the state and to decide whether they want to obey them. Hobbes would no doubt
contend that when people en ter debates of this sort, they seek to promote their own interests with the
intention of getting the state to support them. But in this case, the state would no longer be the fair,
neutral arbitrator among interests that Hobbes hoped for. When the sovereig n is a strong, independent,
and powerful voice for equity and fairness, however, private interests cannot capture public power and
use it for their own designs.
But is Hobbes right? Would individuals be so willing to allow an unlimited form of power to th e state in
order to have the personal freedom and the protections from the intrusions from others that Hobbes
offers? Remember that even Machiavelli’s realism was tempered by a republican, mixed form of
government that protected liberty by avoiding the con centration of power into the hands of a few. We
first turn now to Spinoza and then to Hohn Locke, who each challenges :obbes’s claims about civil
society and the role of the state in significant ways.
Chapter 9
John Locke, Civil Society, and the Constrained Majority
I. Introduction
Hohn Locke’s (1632 –1704) The Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690, can be construed, as
Thomas Peardon claims, as an argument against Thomas :obbes’s call for an absolute monarchy based
upon citizen consent. Locke supported the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, which symbolized that the
Kin g of England should exercise his powers in keeping with the dictates of the parliament. Indeed,
Locke’s own political thought accepted the view that follows from the experience of this revolution;
namely, that the parliament is the main source of authority in government. However, as we will
demonstrate, Locke did provide a role for an executive branch, but in a setting in which the power of
both the legislative and the executive branches is limited by virtue of the precise functions each is
given.1 Locke th us rejected :obbes’s view that would place absolute power in either the legislative or
executive branches of government. Furthermore, Locke’s concept of government in a civil society was
undergirded by the view, as Richard Ashcraft argues, that productive labor, the development of land,
and commercial activities all benefited society. In taking this position, Locke favored the new
bourgeoisie or middle class. This class consisted of small farmers, who owned their own land,
merchants, tradesmen, and artisans . Locke saw this group as the most productive members of society,
and thought that their interests should supersede the interests of the traditional, and for Locke,
unproductive landed aristocracy.2
Before proceeding, it is well to point out that Locke no less than Hobbes held the view that in a civil
society individuals have rights contingent upon acceptance of necessary constraints or what we have
referred to as civic virtues. How did Locke approach the definition of such constraints? For Locke, as
Charl es Taylor says, we are to follow “the law laid down by God, which he [Locke] also calls at times the
Natural Law.”3 Moreover, this law, which suggests a rational order to our existence and which therefore
can be known by rational individuals, represents Go d’s intention to secure to each of us certain basic,
natural rights. With these rights, we are able, as individuals, to determine our own intentions and
courses of conduct. But it must always be clear that the presence of basic rights, supported by natural
law, places limits on what we can choose and how we can act.4 Indeed, in discussing the state of nature,
as we do in Section II, Locke outlines the constraints on freedom, or those rules that individuals must
observe during the course of pursuing their ow n self -defined interests. These constraints secure the
rights of all citizens. In upholding these constraints, individuals can be said to be maintaining regard for
the civic virtues that protect the rights and the basic liberty of each person.
In the rema inder of this chapter, we intend to discuss Locke’s view of civil society by pointing out the
basic natural law constraints that help to govern and to shape it. Locke’s central concern is to contest Hobbes by arguing that the state in a civil society must have limited powers so that it does not threaten
the very basic rights the state is supposed to protect for each society member. In seeking a state with
limited powers, Locke sought to locate the state’s power in what can be called a constrained majority.
Locke’s conception of the social contract, or basic agreement upon which to predicate the authority of
government, highlights the rule of the majority. But the majority’s will must always be grounded in the
natural law principles, or notions of civic virtu e, that require that the majority never acts to undermine
the natural rights provided to all citizens.
II. The Concept of Political Authority
Political authority is unlike any other kind of authority. For Locke, political authority is not the same as
the authority that husbands hold in the family, the master holds over the servant, or the lord holds over
the slave.5 The scope of political power is far wider and its coercive abilities to ensure compliance far
more extensive. Political authority enables the state to make laws that bind the whole of society.
Governments even can punish those who violate the law with death. And most important, govern ments
may use their power only for the public good.6 Thus, political power is the “right of making laws with
penalties of death and, consequently, all less penalties for regulating and preserving of property, and of
employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws and in the defense of the
commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.”7
The use of power to promote the public good is the most distinguishing feature of political authority.
But what is the public g ood? Or in others terms, what is the just basis for political authority?
Before answering this question, we need to describe the definition of the public good that Locke rejects.
For Locke, the public good has not one thing to do with maintaining monarchi cal absolutism. Advocates
of absolute monarchy argue that the monarch does in fact promote the public good. On behalf of this
claim, proponents of monarchy point out that monarchies provide a legal system as well as
opportunities to appeal to judges to dec ide cases of controversy. Locke grants that these uses of
authority are good. But Locke argues that it is never in the interest of the public for a government to
claim absolute power to achieve even good purposes such as these. Indeed, sensible people woul d
never support permitting a ruler to have unlimited amounts of power, while everyone else is made
subject to the rule of law. Locke says that the supporters of monarchy “think that men are so foolish
that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content,
nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.”8 Rulers must be made subject to limits, too. And this
means that there must be good reasons to justify their authority. But what are these good reasons? That
answe r is provided in Locke’s conception of the state of nature. =n discussing Locke’s state of nature, we
will discuss his view of the common good that is the basis for defining the legitimate grounds of political
authority.
A. The State of Nature I: Justifica tion for Political Authority
The rational grounds for political authority are located in the original intentions and understandings of
people in the state of nature. The latter is a hypothetical situation that describes for Locke the natural
condition of humankind prior to the entrance of individuals into formal society. Locke thinks that people
in the state of nature are in large part rational individuals who are able to determine the reasonable
constraints that should govern each person’s conduct. Locke thus describes in his discussion of the state
of nature a perspective that can help us understand the true purpose and basis for political authority.
For Locke, the state of nature is a state of “perfect freedom” in which individuals are entitled “to orde r
their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the
laws of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.”9 =n this context,
people treat each other as equals because “power a nd jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than other.”10 Further, Locke’s state of nature is not a “state of license”11 as in :obbes’s version of the
state of nature as a state of war, and so Locke’s state of nature is not governed by :obbes’s view of
people seeking to dominate and to control the lives of others. Instead, the state of nature is a place in
which each knows that one is not permitted to “destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his
possession.”12
On this view, then, the state of nature is a place where people treat each other in a civil way, in keeping
with norms all regarded as reasonable. Locke says:
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obligates every one; and reason, which is
that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one
omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker —all the servants of one sovereig n master, sent into the world by
his order, and about his business —they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last
during, his, not one another’s pleasure; and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one
community of nature, ther e cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize
us to destroy another, as if we were made for one another’s uses as the inferior ranks of creatures are
for ours. Everyone, as he is bound to preserve himself and not quit his station wilfully, so by the like
reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve
the rest of mankind, and may not … take way or impair the life, or what tends to be the preservation of
life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.13
It is well to concentrate for a brief time on this important paragraph. Several critical dimensions are
revealed concerning the justification for political authority. First, Locke argued that from the rational
perspective of men in the state of nature, there is a clear understanding of a law of nature, taught by
reason and sanctioned by God, which all are obligated to uphold. And the principal teaching of the law
of nature is that no one is to harm another. In particular, we a re to act positively to protect and to
preserve the lives of others by maintaining, when one’s own preservation is not at issue, the “life, the
liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.” This idea suggests that it is reasonable to assume that individuals have natural rights, or rights provided to all individuals by virtue of being human beings, and
no one may take them from another.
Support for this position ultimately derives from the fact that God, the “Maker” of all people, sanctions
natural rights. F or Locke, God created individuals as equals and furnished all people with “like faculties.”
By “faculties,” we take Locke to mean the capacities for reason, understanding, and freedom. :ad God
intended that some should have more rights than others, he woul d have created individuals with “unlike
faculties” and made them unequal to each other. But this was not God’s intention.
It is now possible to answer the question asked at the conclusion of the last section: What are the
proper or rational grounds of pol itical authority? The main lesson of the state of nature is that no one is
to be under the arbitrary will of another, for, otherwise, individuals would lose their freedom and their
rights. Political authority is legitimate when it encompasses this lesson, and it does so when individuals
are under a form of authority that they have consented to establish. And the only government that
citizens will consent to is one whose laws are made by a legislative power that protects people’s
freedom and rights or a regi me that allows “a liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule
prescribes not.”14 :ere, no person is to “be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will
of another man.” A political regime that embodies these values permits i ndividuals to live as if they were
in the state of nature, governed by “no other restraint but the law of nature.”15
B. State of Nature II: Constraints for Freedom
Regarding Locke’s view of political authority, it is important to understand the various co nstraints that
individuals must accept if they are to maintain the basic rights that secure the freedom of each person.
Locke, in arguing for individual liberty, realizes that essential to securing liberty in his natural law
framework is the need for citiz ens to accept the presence in their lives of certain moral restraints or
what we have otherwise referred to as civic virtues. Thus, further discussion of the state of nature is
needed in order to help outline these constraints. Moreover, in doing so, we de monstrate at the
conclusion of this section the problems that Locke’s conception of life in the state of nature faces, when
it appears he embraces, as part of the state of nature, certain assumptions of market life.
To discuss this subject, it must first be clear that possessing freedom is contingent upon being able to
own property. Thus, any discussion of the constraints on freedom arises from Locke’s conception of
property in the state of nature and the constraints that are associated with owning propert y. So it is first
necessary to explain the basic dimensions of Locke’s concept of property, and then move from there to
a discussion of the constraints he associates with both holding property and having freedom.
Locke argues that God, and here he quotes King David in Psalm 115, “has given the earth to the children
of men.”16 But if God has given the earth to men in common, how is private property ever justified? Locke’s answer is that “though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man
has a property in his own person; this nobody has a right to but himself. The labor of his body and the
work of his hands, we may say are properly his.”17 :ere, what individuals are able to acquire through
their own work is theirs, subject to the limitation that enough is left for others as well, or as Locke says:
“Where there is enough and as good left in common for others.”18
There seems to follow from the preceding argument two major justifications for property rights. The
first is fairness. Fairness suggests that people have a right to what they produce through their own labor.
People who do not work, and who expect to receiv e the benefit of others’ work, are violating the
freedom of others. Thus, Locke argues that God gave the world to those who are “industrious and
rational,” or individuals who through labor and work contribute something of use to the society.19
Second, Loc ke, in saying that each of us has property in our own person and that nobody has a right to
this property but oneself, attaches to the idea of private property a right to make choices about the
direction and purposes of one’s life. Locke’s conception of pr ivate property suggests that the property in
the person, one’s personality, one’s choices and decisions about the course one determines for life, are
not subject to the arbitrary power of others. “This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so
necessary to, and closely joined with, a man’s preservation that he cannot part with it but by what
forfeits his preservation and life together.”20 Certainly there will be some who cannot or will not act in
ways respectful of the rights of others, and these individ uals use “force without right,” and in doing so
fail to observe the natural right to life, liberty, and property of all people. Such individuals enter into a
Hobbesian state of war with others. But unlike Hobbes, Locke refuses to characterize the state of nature
as a state of war, since the state of nature is a condition in which people act “according to reason” and
thus the constraints that protect the freedom of each person are respected.21 Thus, those who violate
the freedom of others in the state of nat ure represent aberrations from the general tendency to act in
ways that are respectful of others’ freedom.
What prevents private property from becoming a source of social instability and discord? For, clearly,
some will, as a result of their efforts, end up with more property than others. When this occurs, will not
private property itself be seen as a threat to freedom? Locke argues that there are common, rational
constraints that legitimize differences in wealth across the society. First of all, Locke say s that even
though God gave the world to all people to enjoy and to achieve satisfaction and pleasure with, God did
not want individuals to take any portion of the earth that people could not “make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils.”22 :ere, whereas we have every right to utilize the external world in
ways that bring us happiness, we do not have a right to take more than we can make good use of. For in
that case, much of what we accumulate would spoil, and then we would render large portions of the
world of no use to anyone. Locke makes reference to the following example. If in enclosing land and
calling it our own we can use the grass on that land to feed the cattle we own, we can keep the land.
But, if the grass on the land rots, then we hav e violated a basic natural law constraint of the state of
nature and that land can become “the possession of any other.”23
But even in taking only enough so that one does not cause precious materials or resources to spoil,
certain individuals may still be come wealthier than others. Locke’s response to this likelihood is to justify
the types of wealth accumulation that are highly beneficial to society. This means that there are certain
categories of individuals who in accumulating wealth are not causing imp ortant resources to spoil, but in
fact they are adding to the stock of resources that others enjoy. What aids this prospect is commercial
trade and finance, which permit owners of land and materials to organize the laboring efforts of people
to create prod ucts that others need, and through this effort to expand the material wealth of society.
Money symbolizes this activity.
Locke says that with the invention of money, it is possible for individuals to exchange perishable goods
for durable and nonperishable metals, such as gold. And if an individual were able to exchange
consumable items such as nuts or wool —as Locke specifically lists —for durable goods that do not spoil,
such as diamonds, then there is no limit to the amount of wealth that one could in fact accumulate.24
:ere, a person can exchange his or her wool for diamonds, and “he might heap as much of these
durable things as he pleased.”25 The possession of durable goods such as diamonds or gold symbolizes
activity that is useful to the entire society. Locke has in mind the development of productive labor that
increases the total wealth of society. It is for this reason then that, for Locke, individuals accept, by a
form of “tacit and voluntary consent,” the fact of the “disproportionate and unequal pos session of the
earth.”26 This view suggests that in the state of nature people who succeed will have more wealth than
others, and this fact provides an incentive for people to work hard to provide the goods that all need.27
Based on these constraints, it would seem that from the standpoint of natural law in the state of nature,
individuals are given freedom on the condition that they do not use it in ways that harm the freedom of
others. On this view, then, Locke can be interpreted as making the claim that the standard of a civil
society is fairness. :owever, other writers, in particular C. B. Macpherson, have argued that Locke’s
treatment of property in the state of nature places his commitment to fairness in doubt.28 As part of
the evidence in support of this claim, Macpherson points to the place in The Second Treatise of
Government where Locke contradicts his own principle that the fruits of each person’s labor belong to
the person performing that labor. Locke indicates that an owner of property who emplo ys servants or
workers has a right to the wealth that these servants or workers produced. “Thus the grass my horse has
bit, the turfs my servant has cut … become my property without the assignment of consent to anybody.
The labor that was mine, removing th em, out of that common state they were in, has fixed my property
in them.”29
For Macpherson this statement indicates that Locke had incorporated into his view of property in the
state of nature a market setting in which a few would end up controlling both land and labor for the
purpose of obtaining ever -larger amounts of land and labor. The land and labor so acquired would be
used in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the economy to produce goods that could be
sold for a profit by the owner class. As a result, for Macpherson, Locke accepted as natural and rational the idea that owners could control as well as own the labor of others. The effect of accepting this view is
that, over time, large numbers of workers would end up transferring auth ority over their lives to those
who claimed a right to own their labor. In this situation, the owners could pay the workers only the
necessary amount to maintain the workers’ self -sufficiency, and the rest of what the workers produced
could be transferred to the owner for his, the owner’s, own use. Not only would this situation create
great social divisions in society between the workers and owners, but it would also lead to a politics of
class rule in which the owner class dominated the workers, denying th em their liberty.30
C. The Nature of Civil Society and Constrained Majority Rule
Putting aside for the moment Macpherson’s arguments, if we take the standards of Locke’s view of the
state of nature as he enumerates them and make them the basis for a civil society, as Locke does, then a
civil society would be a setting in which individuals have rights, conditioned upon the need to uphold the
various constraints Locke outlines. Given this view of civil society, then, the purpose of government in a
civil soci ety is clear. Locke argues that people unite into a commonwealth and form a government to
protect their property, which signifies citizens’ basic rights and freedom.31 Moreover, to support this
objective, the state or government in a civil society, as we d emonstrate in the next section, is one with
limited powers.
This view of the role and powers of government suggests that Locke believes that the level of conflict in
society would not be severe. Were it the case that the disputes were extreme, then, the s tate would
have to become as powerful and as absolute as Hobbes suggested the state must be in order to protect
the rights of all citizens and not just the most powerful ones. In point of fact, as we indicate at the
conclusion of this section, it is likely that the conflicts will be intense and deep in Locke’s state of nature.
Locke actually accepts this fact himself when he describes in a “second” view of the state of nature a
picture at variance with the view just discussed. Unlike the “first” view that i ndicates, owing to the
rational character of people, a commitment to fairness, the “second” view suggests something more like
a Hobbesian state of war. Perhaps, the reason for this deviation from the first view is that Locke himself
accepts, without saying so, some of the implications of market life that Macpherson ascribes to Locke.
Before moving to a discussion of this point, however, let’s first describe Locke’s conception of the state
in a civil society as well as his understanding of the state’s origin s in consent.
Again, the purpose of a state in a civil society is clear: “The great and chief end … of men’s uniting into
commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property.”32
The state protects everyone’s propert y by providing a system of “settled” and “known law” that
becomes the basis for resolving “all controversies between [people].” Further, the state must act as an
“indifferent judge” in deciding controversies. Finally, the state has the power to back up its decisions
and to ensure their “due execution.”33
How does the state in a civil society arise? Or in other terms what is the nature of the social contract or
agreement people strike with each other and make the basis for the state’s authority? Locke argue s the
state arises from the unanimous consent of the people for the majority to rule. In this regard, then,
Locke says that the political society, or the government of a civil society, is created “when any number
of men have, by the consent of every indivi dual, made a community, they have thereby made that
community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of
the majority.”34
Further, there is a major proviso that needs to made clear here, and this proviso indi cates that the rule
of the majority is really the rule of a constrained majority, or a majority that must respect the rights of
all. Although people, in entering civil society, leave behind the state of nature, and thus give up
complete and full autonomy o ver themselves, they do not authorize the state that they constitute in a
civil society to violate or to threaten their liberty. Locke says that “the power of the society, or legislative
constituted by them [the people], can never be supposed to extend far ther than the common good, but
is obliged to secure every one’s property.”35 Consequently, the majority and those who speak for it, in
this case either the executive or legislative arms of government, cannot violate the terms of the original
agreement peop le make when they enter civil society, namely, the requirement to protect “the peace,
safety, and public good of the people.”36
Any majority opinion formed in response to a public issue must make policies that are respectful of the
need to treat citizens as equals, that is, as individuals entitled to the basic protections that secure their
liberty. Thus, for instance, in discussing taxation, Locke made clear that the legislative branch of society
cannot tax people without their consent, that is, without th e consent of the majority, who give consent
either “by themselves or [through] their representatives chosen by them.”37 But the majority must be
constrained by always recognizing the commitment to protect the rights of all. To take a contemporary
example, the losing side in a Senate debate might not prevail on an issue pertaining to taxation. But just
the fact that it loses on the issue does not mean that it must lose all its basic rights as well, including
rights guaranteeing participation in government, d ue process of law, and so on. The state complies with
this objective by maintaining a commitment to the rule of law, which means that the state governs by
“laws, promulgated and known to people, and not by extemporary decrees.”38
In the next several parag raphs, we discuss the implications of this view for practical politics and for
citizenship obligations. With respect to the former, Locke suggests as we argued that, in having
property, people have sufficient autonomy to pursue their interests. But it must be presumed that at
times, owing to the fact that society will be composed of people with different interests, it is likely that
people will have disagreements as to what the law means and how it should be applied in their own
cases. The state in a civil society, in operating by known laws, assumes the role of an “indifferent judge”
and thus acts as an umpire. As an umpire, the state does not dictate to any individuals what way of life is
best for them, as would be the case in classical or medieval thought , where the good for each person
was defined by virtue of the role a person is given. =nstead, Locke’s state, in its indifferent judge role, would resolve differences with an intention to protect the basic rights of each person to define his or
her own way of life.
Regarding citizen obligations, it is Locke’s view that citizens living in a state that protected their liberties
are expected to uphold the laws of that state. Citizens give their tacit consent to this arrangement.
Locke says:
Every man that has any possessions or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government
does thereby give his tacit consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that
government, during such enjoyment, as anyone under it; wheth er this his possession be of land to him
and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week, or whether it be barely traveling freely the highway;
and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of anyone with the territories of that government.39
In developing the notion of tacit consent, Locke hopes to overcome a problem central to all consent
theory such as the one Locke provides. Where there is no way to demonstrate explicit consent by the
people to a regime, how can one maintain that the people have consented to the regime? Locke’s
answer to this problem is quite simple. The notion of tacit consent suggests the conditions under which
rational people would consent, were they given a chance to give their explicit consent to the regime.40
What are t he conditions that must be obtained for citizens to give their consent? Rational individuals
would say that they would consent to any regime that provided them with essential benefits. Thus,
Locke, in saying that we are obligated to the state’s authority s imply for using a highway, is really using
the highway for a metaphor. And the metaphor suggests that when we live in a society that provides us
with essential goods such as protection of our basic liberty, then, we are clearly obligated to obey the
laws o f that state.
Finally, Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent indicates, as well, that citizens are aware of a responsibility on
their part to uphold, faithfully, the rights of others who, like themselves, own property. Without this
sense of obligation to supp ort constraints on freedom, the state would have to become as powerful as
:obbes’s state, entering society in ways that threaten the commitment to protect the rights of all
citizens. But, given the rights -respecting mentality of citizens, the state can hav e a more limited role in
Locke’s society than it would have in :obbes’s society. :ere, the idea of civic virtue would have a
powerful place in Locke’s civil society. For there to be freedom and rights, individuals must identify as
the common good the need to defend both rights and the constraints needed to preserve them, even
when doing so at times requires one to accept limits on the extent to which one is able to pursue one’s
interests. Locke’s concept of a constrained majority would seem to assume that t his understanding is a
necessary part of people’s outlook.
Given this view of a constrained majority, then, a civil society would not experience great conflict and
the state could avoid the absolutist state of Hobbes. But this view presumes that the basic peace Locke describes in the state of nature would find its way into civil society. And there is some question as to
whether this view is realistic, given Locke’s “second” view of the state of nature. Thus, there is another
more Hobbesian view of the stat e of nature to appear in Locke. The “second” view casts doubt on the
prospects of a constrained majority perspective, along with the hope of limited government, and, in
place of both, the second view suggests a Hobbesian form of absolute government.
Locke ’s “second” description of the state of nature seems to suggest that the differences between
people are not as low level and as harmless as Locke might otherwise suggest. To support this point, we
quote from the second part of The Second Treatise. It would seem that when Locke wrote the following
words, he was not aware of what he had written in the first part where he said the state of nature is a
place of “perfect freedom” and mutual respect for rights. But in contrast, in the second part of The
Second Tr eatise, Locke said in reference to why individuals leave the state of nature: “The enjoyment of
it [freedom] is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as
much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the
enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure.”41 Locke also said that
there are many “privileges” found in the state of nature, but there are many “inconveniences,” too, and
these inconveniences stem from the “uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others.”42 These words indicate a :obbesian state of nature as the backdrop of
society. If this is so, the potential for intense conflict in soc iety would be strong, and to protect the rights
of all people, even Locke would need a Hobbesian absolutist state.
:ow can we account for this “second,” more :obbesian view of the state of nature? There is no doubt
that Macpherson would explain this secon d view by pointing out that it emerges from Locke’s
acceptance of market life, which permits a few to dominate and to control both the land in society and
the labor of others for their, the owner’s, own economic advantage. Further, if the second view of th e
state of nature, as defined in Macpherson’s terms, were the basis for developing both society and
government, what kind of experience would typify social life? Society would be characterized by class
conflict, between those who own most of the wealth and those who do not. In this case, the majority
rule process would really only be a majority of a small minority of people. Here, the likelihood of social
discord and instability would be ever present, because those outside the policy process, the
nonpropert ied, would demand the same rights accorded to others. Still, Locke’s notion of the state of
nature, as we saw in his first account of this concept, says that no one is to take away the “life, liberty,
health, limb, or goods of another.” This suggests that Locke is committed to extending liberty to more
than just property owners. But his view of a constrained majority would have little relevance to this
project were it merely oriented to protecting the property of a few against the great majority of the
nonp ropertied people.
What would Locke’s response be to this problem? We can only provide several conjectures. One
response might be a demand for the government to suppress the nonpropertied. But in this case, the
state would have to assume unlimited powers f or itself, a consequence that Locke rejects. On the other
hand, it is possible that Locke envisions that more and more people, as a result of advances in the economy, would acquire property so that eventually the majority would include all of the citizens in the
society. Here, where all people own property, any decision by the majority must be designed to protect
the rights of all citizens. In that case, the potential for intense conflict would be minimized, making
possible both a constrained majority, whic h sought to extend to all basic liberties, as well as the need for
and the possibility of the limited form of government Locke advocates. Were this view to prevail, the
main question then would pertain to how to maintain a government with limited powers, a government
that did not become so powerful that it threatened the rights it is supposed to protect. In the next
several sections, we discuss the approaches to this problem that Locke recommends.
===. Locke’s Limited Government
In this section, we discuss the concept of limited government that Locke proposes. Locke rejects
:obbes’s refusal to entertain a government based upon a separation of powers. Locke does so in large
part because he believes that a government based upon the concept of separated powers can institute
limitations on the authority and actions of government so that, in the long run, the people’s liberty is
protected.
There are three functions in Locke’s government: the legislative, the executive, and the federative.
Federative functions ha ve to do with making foreign policy and using the power of war and peace to this
end. Federative powers are ensconced in the executive branch, so in effect the power to enforce the law
with respect to domestic matters and the power to make foreign policy a re placed in the same office.43
At the heart of his view of government is the legislative branch, which for Locke is “the supreme power
of the commonwealth.”44 :e says, in this regard, that the “first and fundamental natural law which is to
govern even th e legislative itself is the preservation of the society and, as far as will consist with the
public good, and every person in it.”45 The legislature, which makes the laws, is the supreme authority,
but, even so, it must not abuse its authority. The legisla ture cannot act in an arbitrary fashion “over the
lives and fortunes of the people,” nor can it do anything other than “decide the rights of the subject
[citizens] by promulgated, standing laws, and known authorized judges.”46
To prevent legislative misus e of power, several remedies are provided. First, since the legislators hold
authority only on the basis of the continuing trust of the citizens who elect them, the people have the
right “to remove or alter” the legislature if it violates the trust the cit izens place in it.47 A second way to
prevent legislative misuse of power is to establish a “separate” executive branch that is to carry out the
laws the legislature passes.48 If the legislature were to have executive functions as well as legislative or
law -making ones, then it might be the case that legislators would be more likely to make laws that serve
their own interests and less likely to make laws that serve the needs of the whole society.49
Now, it should be clear that, in discussing the executive, Locke indicated that the legislative and
executive are separated only when it comes to enforcing laws that the legislative branch makes. But on
other occasions, when matters of law enforcement are not at issue, Locke argues that the executive is a
part of the legislative branch. Thus, Locke says that the executive should be viewed as having “a share in
the legislative.” This arrangement permits the legislature to make the executive subordinate to its, the
legislature’s, power because the latter can change t he executive at its, the legislature’s, “pleasure.”50
The executive, however, has special responsibilities that the legislature does not have. In particular, the
executive must, as the constitution requires, call the legislature into session to deliberate about the laws
and make sure, again in keeping with the constitution, that regular elections are held for the legislature.
At other times, it is left to the executive’s “prudence” to call for new elections and establish a new
legislature when it appears t hat old laws no longer are relevant to meeting current challenges that
threaten the public interest.51 Regarding the issue of elections, Locke says that, over time, population
shifts may occur, and thus some districts may need more representatives and othe rs less. The executive
must examine matters of this sort and distribute representatives proportionately. “For it being the
interest as well as intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative, whoever brings it
nearest to that is an undoubte d friend to and establisher of the government and cannot miss the
consent and approbation of the community.”52
Still, Locke is well aware that the executive may abuse its power, and this problem grows out of the
practical necessities of governing. Often, when political problems confront a nation, either the
legislature is not in power, or it is too slow to act. In these situations, the executive assumes the power
of “prerogative” and makes decisions on behalf of the public interest.53 :obbes of course also sees this
power as inevitable. The difference between Hobbes and Locke on this issue is that the latter does no t
see this power as placed, without limits, into the hands of the executive (or king as in Hobbes), and,
further, Locke believes that the executive should be held accountable for misusing it. Hobbes places no
such limits on the monarch. But Locke presumes that people, acting through their legislators, would
allow the executive the use of its prerogative so long as good judgments are made, and, when poor
judgments result, the public will seek to limit the executive use of its power of prerogative.54
Now, th e hope of this view of separated government is that each branch will balance the other, so that
in the long run government will continue to make and to enforce fair laws that protect the liberty of the
citizens. However, as in our times, we have come to re alize that a practical consequence of a separation
of powers view of government is intense competition between the branches. Moreover, when this
happens, one branch or the other of government may grow in power to such an extent that the
government as a who le threatens, rather than protects, the rights of its citizens. What is the remedy in
this case? Locke says that all people can do is to “appeal to heaven; for the rulers, in such attempts,
exercising a power the people never put into their hands [and] do that which they have not a right to
do.”55
A. The Right of Revolution
The right to revolt against the central government arises from the fact that in cases in which there is
abuse of power and no remedy from within constituted authority, citizens always r eserve for themselves
the option of deciding to revolt against the rulers. Indeed, this option can never be given up by citizens,
since it is not within a citizen’s “power” to “submit himself to another as to give him a liberty to destroy
him, God and natu re never allowing a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation.”56
God ordains, on this view, that each of us has a duty to ensure that our freedom is not taken from us. In
the face of errant executive or legislative power, then, Locke re affirms not just a natural right to liberty,
but both a right to revolution as well as a duty, mandated by God, to recreate the conditions of liberty.
The right to revolt for Locke would not be a recipe to encourage continual disorder and social instabili ty.
The reason for this view is that Locke sees this right as principally exercised by the majority, and thus,
for a revolution to take place, there would have to be a wholesale denial of people’s basic rights. Locke
says when the majority is “persuaded in their consciences that their laws, and with them their estates,
liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps religion, too, how they will be hindered from resisting
illegal forces used against them = cannot tell.”57
The power of the majority in this c ase seems to be manifested more in the threat of revolution than in
the act of revolution itself. What would most keep public officials from engaging in corrupt activities
would be the fear that if they did, and if as a result the majority felt that their liberty was threatened,
there would be a revolution that would sweep all public officials from power. Not wanting this situation
to arise, public officials must maintain among themselves a modicum of honesty in their dealings with
themselves and with the c itizens.
B. Toleration and Civil Society
Locke’s view of civil society, as we have seen, provides a concept of limited government to protect the
general societal principle that the rights of each person should be protected. This principle was built into
his conception of the constrained majority, as well. But there is another approach to rights protection in
Locke. His view of civil society includes a space, outside the formal structure of government, where
individuals would be protected from infringements of their rights either from others or from the
government. An important element that helps to create this dimension of civil society is the civic virtue
of toleration.
In discussing the civic virtue of religious toleration, Locke understands that people hold their religious
beliefs with extreme conviction, and, when they do, others who do not believe as they do are inevitably
perceived as less deserving of respect. How in the face of this problem will it be possible for individuals
to extend rights protec tion to all, including those whose religion is different from their own?
Locke’s solution is found in his Letter on Toleration. Locke argues that the state is to preserve “civil
interests,” such as “life, liberty, health … and the possession of outward th ings, such as money, lands,
houses, furniture, and the like.”58 The state’s powers extend only to matters such as these, but they do
not extend to matters pertaining to religious belief. Thus, the state cannot use its powers to advocate
certain religious b eliefs. =ndeed, the power of the state cannot be used to promote the “salvation of
souls.”59
In this view, a church is a private association that can determine its own doctrines without interference
from the state. Individuals who join these associations agree to accept the doctrines that these
associations teach. Moreover, whereas these associations may declare their belief of what constitutes
proper religious doctrines, they cannot in the name of religion invade and thereby threaten or take
away the “rig hts and worldly goods” of others.60 Locke also says that moral attitudes contrary to certain
religious doctrines such as idolatry, covetousness, idleness, and uncharitableness cannot be punished by
the state. This is the case so long as these modes of cond uct are not harmful to the rights of another or
so long as such forms of conduct do not threaten the “public peace.”61
Locke’s doctrine of toleration suggests a live -and -let -live attitude. Locke says that people, who in their
practice of religion cause no harm to others, should be tolerated. “This caution and temper they ought
certainly to use toward those who mind only their own business, and are solicitous for nothing but
(whatever men think of them) they may worship God in that manner which they are per suaded is
acceptable to :im, and in which they have the strongest hopes of eternal salvation.”62 All individuals
are free to believe as they wish, just so long as they do not deny the basic civil rights to others.
What are the implications of the live -and -let -live mentality for extending rights protection to all citizens?
Possibly, members of the same church may want to maintain respect for the rights of other church
members. Possibly, members of a church may maintain respect for the rights of nonmembers. But their
doing so may not be because they believe in the priority of rights when it comes to matters of religious
truth but because they want to avoid the social instability that might arise were various people to try to
impose their respective religious views onto others.
The consequence of the attitude of toleration, which exists as a civic virtue of the highest importance, is
to secure indirectly the rights of others, including strangers who believe differently from us. Here,
people support the rights of others for a reason other than a clear commitment to make the protection
of rights the main priority. People may still harbor the view that the others whom they tolerate really do
not deserve the same rights accorded their co -religionists. The live -and -let -live attitude helps to prevent
one from acting on these views for the sake of peace and stability. Still, a deep, underlying sense of
difference may remain with each side thinking the other side lacks a grasp of the truth and because of
this fact ultim ately poses a long -term threat to each person’s religious choice.
A dimension of this attitude is manifested in Locke’s views toward Catholics, atheists, and agnostics.
Locke says that no “opinions” that are contrary “to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated
by the magistrate.”63 On this view, Locke barely tolerates Catholics, claiming that there is no
requirement to tolerate those (presumably Catholics) who say that “kings excommunicated forfeit their
crowns and kingdoms.”64 Could Locke, then, extend rights to Catholics who believed in papal
infallibility? Maybe he could, so long as he is assured that the Catholics in question are not subversive of
civil society. But it is not clear that he would. For atheists, a more categorical denial of rights is provided.
Locke says, “Lastly those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, convents,
and oaths, which are bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.”65 Finally, it is not
clear that even an agnostic wo uld find a full plate of rights in Locke’s civil society. Locke says that all men
are to believe in God and, in consequence, all should “enter into some religious society.”66
Locke’s doctrine of toleration, then, suggests that people who in all respects uphold the civil laws may
still fall outside their protection and thus be denied the same rights guaranteed to all. Because a live -
and -let -live view allows people to live side b y side without interacting with each other for the purpose of
creating common bonds of understanding, bonds that help them to appreciate others’ beliefs,
individuals may live side by side, but with a growing sense of distrust and suspicion. As a result, re al
barriers to communication would exist between people, and these barriers might lead individuals to
form majorities that work to deny basic rights to others for no other reason than that others have
different religious beliefs.
However, the civic virtue of toleration suggests a space in society where individuals can meet together
and form associations and enter into relations of their choice. In these spaces, freedom of conscience
would be afforded protection. But the problems we have just enumerated wit h respect to Locke’s view
of toleration suggest that this space in a civil society, what we refer to in Chapter 1 as the separate
sphere of voluntary associations, might have difficulty enduring where the civic virtue of toleration is not
buttressed by the civic virtue of mutual respect. The latter symbolizes a willingness on the part of
individuals to manifest goodwill to others, even to those with whom they do not agree, so that persons
at least learn to understand views different from their own. As a res ult of this way of understanding,
people create conditions that afford others a place in society where they can be protected as they go
about their lives, pursuing particular religious or moral views that in no sense threaten the rights of
others. But when mutual respect does not exist in a strong sense, then individuals who do not threaten
others’ rights may still be denied a secure place in society to practice their own views. This problem can
be overcome, and the separate sphere of voluntary groups in ci vil society secured, only when mutual
respect is made a preeminent part of the practice of the civic virtue of toleration.
Mutual respect would have particular importance for Locke, whereas, we have seen, class conflict
arising from market relations could be an obstacle to securing the rights of all. Still, the existence of the
civic virtue of toleration, when coupled with the commitment to constrained majority rule and limited
government, goes a long way to maintain both the possibility of mutual respect and a separate sphere. Thus, the prospect of mutual respect is not to be ruled out for Locke. Indeed, it would seem that owing
to this fact the potential for avoiding destructive class conflict might well be conceivable.
IV. Response and Rejoinder
Hobbes might argue that Locke’s second view of the state of nature really is close to :obbes’s own view,
the doctrine of toleration notwithstanding. Thus, for Hobbes, Locke would need the same kind of state
Hobbes advocated, in order to secure the freedom that hi s philosophy promises. Locke might respond,
however, that the doctrine of toleration is a civic virtue that would minimize conflict over religion, thus
making the need for a Hobbesian form of government unnecessary. Moreover, perhaps over time, the
intensi ty of feeling for religion would diminish. =n Locke’s society what would take center stage would be
the pursuit of material goals, such as wealth and property, and in this context religious issues might lose
their fervor. Indeed, as Benedict Spinoza had ho ped perhaps religious issues would be less important
and less divisive as freedom became more and more associated with material acquisition in a
commercially based society.
Also, even if interest in material matters did not diminish the strength of religi ous concerns, practicing
the doctrine of toleration might make people more prone to establish, as the basis for interacting with
others, a sincere commitment to understanding the viewpoints and arguments of those who differ from
theirs. Were this situation to arise, then, individuals would be able to engage each other in discussions
that reached for and even achieved at times a common ground. For instance, the religious
fundamentalist in discussing public issues might realize that it is best not to broach i n such a discussion
elements of fundamentalist religious views that tend to threaten and to turn away those who reject
fundamentalist religious doctrines. Spinoza would have taken the same position, arguing that in a
society where the majority advances fre edom of thought and speech, people will come to appreciate
differences and to learn to make room for them. People in a tolerant society thus might learn how to
maintain many differences, but still live together without conflict.
Of course, Hobbes might ha ve the same hope that fundamentalists and nonfundamen -talists would
become more conciliatory to each other over time, but he probably would not believe that this outcome
was realistic. Given this fact, the only way to protect the rights of all citizens is with the state Hobbes
would contemplate. In this case, Hobbes would argue that the doctrine of toleration would not be
sufficient to protect citizens’ rights. This is the case because in a situation in which people are strongly
committed to a particular vi ew, the only way they will be stopped from interfering with others is when
the state uses its considerable power to compel compliance with the laws. Locke, on the other hand,
would, as would Spinoza, maintain that :obbes’s approach would end up threatening people’s basic
rights. Hobbes would no doubt argue in response that threatening rights is not the same thing as
denying them. Hobbes would further add that in order to protect rights, it may well be necessary to
create an atmosphere of fear so that those likely to attack the rights of others would be less prone to do
so.
In contrast, Locke would argue that his view of the state that limits the powers of the various branches,
in this case, the legislative and the executive branches, is more inclined to ach ieve a political setting that
can protect the rights of individuals. :obbes’s unified state works to hand it so much power that the
state itself will likely become an enemy of rights. Locke, on the other hand, would recognize that to
offset this problem, i t is necessary to secure conditions within the society and the state that limit the
powers of the various branches of government, lest the government become the main enemy of the
rights it is supposed to protect. Hobbes would have responded that it is impo ssible to achieve the goals
of a fair and just state when the state is constantly made the target for various political opportunists
who attempt to take it over and use the state’s power for their own purposes. And that is just what
Locke’s form of state i nvites when he allows the power of the state to be subdivided into different
branches of authority.
Finally, others might claim that Locke’s main problem in maintaining a civil society that can secure the
rights of citizens has to do with the difficulties of securing a constrained majority. Those who make this
argument might claim that Locke failed to address adequately the impact of market realities in his view
of the state of nature. This lapse places in jeopardy a majority rule conception, which at the same time is
committed to not infringe the rights of any citizen. =n particular, it could be argued that Locke’s citizens
become so concerned, as they pursue their rights, with their own private interests, that they reject any
concern for a larger, more em bracing common good. Jean -Jacques Rousseau will discuss these problems
in the next chapter.
DeLue, S. M. (2008). Political Thinking, Political Theory, and Civil Society, 3rd Edition .
[Bookshelf Ambassadored]. Retrieved from
https://ambassadored.vitalsource .com/#/books/9781317345527/
