Answer the following questions
Introduction: The Republic, by Plato
Here you will read the real thing, the thoughts of men who wrote over two thousand four
hundred years ago. They wrote in Greek, not English, so these are translations. Moreover, these
men did not write in casual or conversational Greek. Instead, they used a formal style of Greek
which is now called Classical Greek. Modern translations are very expensive.
Your first question is probably: “What can I possibly learn about Business f rom ancient Greek
philosophers?”
“A lot!” is the simple answer.
Our word philosophy is really two Greek words combined: philo - meaning “love of something”
and sophy - meaning “wisdom”. To the Greeks who lived in ancient times the word wisdom
includes al l the things that we consider important today: happiness, security, health, peace -of -
mind, but also knowledge, power, riches, ambition, and wealth.
Of course, questions about knowledge opened the Greek mind to all our modern questions about
biology, physi cs, chemistry, astronomy. They also inquired into things such as Cosmos -
meaning “order” and Chaos - meaning “uncertainty” or “disorder”, and this led them to things
like gods and destiny. They saw order in nature but also disorder. The stars seemed order ly. The
planets were disorderly, so they named them Planets - meaning “wanderers”. The Greek word
for star was astra, astre or astro, as in our word “astronomy”. If something that was normally
orderly went suddenly chaotic, they called it “contrary to the stars” or as they would say a dis -
aster or cat -astro -phe. Much philosophy concerned ways and means of avoiding disaster and
catastrophe which meant developing a thorough understanding of how nature works and man’s
influence in nature. They developed the concept that the earliest humans were simply animals
that gradually became smarter than the rest. The smart humans formed societies that worked
together to increase the odds of surviving a hostile world.
Later, according to Greek philosophy, an even smart er group of men decided to build the first
cities. A city was not a town, not a village. A city was a place built around a market place, a
special place dedicated to trade, or business. Business was invented to allow men to specialize, to
make better produ cts and exchange them for value in the market place. Without a market, and
without business no one could possibly specialize. Eventually, some people could even become
so specialized that all they did was think better thoughts - the philosophers. This is h ow the
ancient Greek Philosophers imagined and explained their own beginnings, and even today in the
twenty -first century this explanation still sits well with the historians because it matches the
information they glean from archaeology.
Markets and busi ness and specialization are all fine and good, but what if some clever person
decides to cheat his fellow man? What if they have the last loaf of bread in a starving city, should
they be allowed to raise the price as high as they want even though old peopl e and children may
starve? These philosophical questions began the study of ethics and morals. How should a city
decide what is ethical or moral? Before philosophy, these questions were always answered by the
gods. The people of ancient times were quite re ligious, but as philosophy grew and spread through education the Classical view of gods began to change. They began to see the gods as
distant, abstract, and even uninvolved. There is no evidence that Plato, Aristotle or Epicurus
were atheists. Indeed one of Epicurus chief moral philosophies was - piety , a deep and abiding
respect for the gods of all people. However, philosophy seemed to set the mind free to explore
things not previously questioned. The philosophical mind was an aristocratic mind, born of
wealth and security. It cost allot of money to become a philosopher in ancient Athens. It was
perfectly natural for them to consider ways of expanding their wealth, for their nations, and
cities, but also for themselves. They even began to consider question s about when war is a proper
tool for satisfying the ambition of a nation. Beneath these discussions lay the issues of wealth,
and trade. You will see that moral issues cannot be separated from economic ones. The
boundaries of right and wrong are edge to edge with those of greed and profit seeking. Whole
nations can be corrupted by greed. So can individuals. This is where moral philosophy was born.
Plato was a student of the earlier Socrates. We do not know much about Socrates because he
believed philo sophy should not be written down. Plato (thank goodness) did not feel that
way. Plato was born in 428 BCE and died in 347, so he lived to be an old man of 81. He
founded a school for his favorite, wealthy students, mostly the sons of nobles, calling it t he
Academy. This school survived for almost 800 years until it was brutally shut down by
(Christian Emperor) Theodosius the Great. Plato pioneered moral philosophy , and later became
the teacher of Aristotle. Plato accumulated many books from across the Me diterranean. Plato’s
library was destroyed when the Academy was set afire.
Plato was born in 428 BCE and died in 347, so he lived to be an old man of 81. He founded a
school for his favorite, wealthy students, mostly the sons of nobles, calling it the Aca demy. This
school survived for almost 800 years until it was brutally shut down by (Christian Emperor)
Theodosius the Great. Plato pioneered moral philosophy , and later became the teacher of
Aristotle. Plato accumulated many books from across the Mediterra nean.
Plato’s library was destroyed when the Academy was set afire. This translations is by the famous
Oxford University scholar Benjamin Jowett: Born 1817, Died: 1893. Plato wrote many books of
his own, many have survived, but hardly all. This text comes from a book he wrote about the
constitutions of many nations. He traveled extensively in his youth and collected copies of the
constitutions of nations and city -states he visited. Others he collected through writing letters to
foreign governments and aski ng them to send him copies of their sacred laws.
Later, in his own book Plato analyzes all the various ways to govern a society. This text is from
the book about Republics, that form of government ruled by elected representatives who serve
for a time and then step down. There are two extracts here from the Republic. The first is a
pretended discussion between several men reclining on couches as they drink wine and talk
together. This style of writing made Plato famous. The setting is called a symposium, o r male -
only drinking party. They always lay two men to a couch, rarely a man and woman on a couch:
for symposia are different from romantic gatherings. Setting the discussion in this situation
allows more than one voice to be presented. We are not meant to think the discussion really
happened. Instead, we are to learn from the imagined discussion. In the first text, the men begin
by telling the Fable of the Ring of Gyges . Students who know the Lord of the Rings by
J.R.R.Tolkien will immediately recognize th e story of a ring that can turn a man invisible. Fictitious stories designed to convey a moral lesson are called fables. This is a classic. A
shepherd discovers a ring, it is magic, he can make himself invisible, will he use it for good or
evil? What is t he moral here? All humans seek to be seen as moral people, that is their public
image. No one wishes to be thought of as evil or corrupt or untrustworthy. How can we tell who
to really trust? If we do not solve this problem we will never, ever be able to put someone in a
position of power, such as king or ruler, or magistrate. We must learn who can be trusted.
After reading the fable of Gyges we realize that no one can be trusted. Why can no one be
trusted? The closer one comes to success, the greater th e temptation becomes to abuse it. No one
knows their own character until they have actually been tested, and in discovering a ring that will
make them invisible when placed on their finger.
The second reading by Plato is in the same book, The Republic, but later in the book. In this
section Plato’s drinking buddies talk over many things, the conversation wanders a bit. Some
guests whisper to each other. At other times they all take turns speaking to the whole group.
Eventually, the mood changes and they tal k about morals again. What makes a good person? Is it
fear of death? Is it fear of gods? Someone tells the Myth of Er, which is one of the most
influential moral tales ever written. You must remember as you read it that this was written four
hundred years before Jesus was born, and five hundred years before the New Testament was
written. Yet it tells a story quite familiar to people who have read the New Testament and the
teachings of Jesus. Remember also that the Greeks conquered the Holy Land, and Greek was the
street language there for centuries. We know from the New Testament itself that the educated
people in Jerusalem spoke Greek, and enjoyed Greek culture, and most of them had Greek
educations. Indeed there were Greek philosophy schools all over the Middle East. James, the
brother of Jesus, attended an Epicurean University in the town of Gadara, according to some of
the very earliest Christian writings. So it is not unlikely that many ideas about death, the
judgement of the dead, the resurrection of t he dead spread from Greece to the Holy Land.
These ideas created a moral pressure on people with ambition. A person could succeed in this
life by being greedy and avaricious. One could become enormously wealthy, but was it right?
Perhaps with a judgement after death, one should pause and consider. Can a rich man enter the
kingdom of heaven? The Myth of Er is profound. It affects our view of priorities in life.
Things to ponder: While completing this reading, you should think about the following
questions. Similar or related questions may be included in the module assignment, discussion,
and quiz.
Which is more precious, a life of wealth or having a moral reputation?
How can one person measure his own moral strength?
If al l humans are morally weak, how can we know who to trust in positions of power?
When is one people justified in taking other people’s wealth?
How does judgment day influence our ambition in life?
If we must be moral, how can we be ambitious?
If we must be m oral, how can we maximize profits?
Vocabulary: The Republic, by Plato
In order to improve your comprehension of this reading, study the following words and their
definitions. You will be responsible for knowing these words.
Vocabulary
Word Definition
Propitiated Meaning satisfied --gods must be propitiated or they will punish man.
Purveyor Someone who supplies what is needed, especially food.
Supply To provide (something), to make (something) available for use.
Demand The desire to purchase goods and services.
Husband -
man One who raises crops and tends animals; a farmer.
Merchant
One who travels to a far market city, purchases goods and transports them back to
their home market or to another market city, and sells the goods, for a profit:, i.e.,
an importer and exporter.
Salesman A middleman who bought and sold goods for a price (profit), without necessarily
adding any value to the product.
Gyges According to ancient Greek le gend, the man who invented money, also the King of
Lydia which was a land in what is now modern Turkey.
Ring of
Gyges
Magic ring which made the wearer invisible. A fabled symbol of the danger of
privacy and its power to corrupt human justice.
Justice The ideal of fairness, impartiality, etc., especially with regard to the punishment of
wrongdoing. A virtue belonging to a person or a state.
State An organization arising out of the needs of mankind, larger than a tribe. A society
large enou gh to form a state in the sense of a government.
Er --The
Myth of
Plato’s account of life after death, judgement of the dead, resurrection of the dead,
all written 300 years before Jesus, and 400 years before the Christian New
Testament. The story incl udes an account of the cosmos and the afterlife that
greatly influenced religious, philosophical, and scientific thought for many
centuries.
Republic One of many forms of government of a state. Republics elect representatives who
create and administer law.
Ward A child in the care of an adult who is not the child’s parent.
Reading: The Republic, by Plato
The Republic - BOOK II [ . . . ]
NOTE: a discussion ensues between philosophers sitting around a table, drinking wine.
So [Glaucon] said to me: Socrates, they say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer
injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and
suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the
other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise
laws and mutual covenants; a nd that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just.
This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice ;— it is a mean or compromise, between the
best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is t o suffer
injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is
tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men to
do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be ca lled a man would ever submit to such an
agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account,
Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.
Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they ha ve not the power to
be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and
the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we
shall discover in the very act the jus t and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road,
following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the
path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely
given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges the
ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service
of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an openin g in the earth at
the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening,
where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he
stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as ap peared to him, more than human, and
having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now
the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about
the flocks to the king; int o their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was
sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he
became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were n o
longer present.
He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and
reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result -when he turned
the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived
to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he
seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the
kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings , and the just put on one of them
and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand
fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take
wha t he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or
release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would b oth come at last to the same
point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because
he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one
thinks that he can safely be un just, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that
injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been
supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of
becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be
thought by the lookers -on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one
another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer
injustice. Enough of this.
Now, if we are to form a real judgement of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them;
there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be
entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them,
and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be
like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pi lot or physician, who knows intuitively
his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover
himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to
be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is: to
be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must
assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while
doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a
false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of
his deeds come to light, and who can force h is way where force is required his courage and
strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his
nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be
no seeming, for if h e seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not
know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards; therefore,
let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imag ined in a state
of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst;
then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear
of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and
seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the
other of injustice, let judgement be given which of them is the happier of the two.
Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first
one and then the other, as if they were two statues.
I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing
out the sort of life which awaits eit her of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may
think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which
follow are not mine. — Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice: They will
tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound — will have his
eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will
understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the wo rds of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live
with a view to appearances — he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only: —
His mind has a soil deep and fertile,
Out of which spring his prudent counsels.
In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he
will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always
to his own advan tage, because he has no misgivings about injustice and at every contest, whether
in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich,
and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; mo reover, he can offer
sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honour the gods
or any man whom he wants to honour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely
to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in
making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.
I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brother, interposed:
Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?
Why, what else is there? I answered.
The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.
Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother' — if he fails in any part do you
assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the
dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.
Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another side to Glaucon's
argume nt about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order
to bring out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and
their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of
character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those
offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing
to the unjust from the reputation of j ustice. More, however, is made of appearances by this class
of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of
a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with
the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that the gods make the
oaks of the just —
To hear acorns at their summit, and bees I the middle;
And the sheep the bowed down bowed the with the their fleeces.
and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar
strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is — As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god,
Maintains justice to whom the black earth brings forth
Wheat and barley, whose trees are b owed with fruit,
And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish.
Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just; they take
them down into the world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast,
everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of
drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity,
as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the t hird and fourth generation. This is the
style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in
a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living they bring
them to infamy, a nd inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion
of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their
manner of praising the one and censuring the other.
Once more, Socrates, I will as k you to consider another way of speaking about justice and
injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of
mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome;
and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law
and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and
they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both in public and private
when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who
may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most
extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods
apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And
mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed
to them by th e gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices
or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust,
at a small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they s ay, to execute their
will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with
the words of Hesiod; —
Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her dwelling -place is
near. But before virtue th e gods have set toil,
and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by
men; for he also says:
The gods, too, may he turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by
sacrifices and soot hing entreaties, and by libations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned
and transgressed. And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the
Moon and the Muses — that is what they say — according to which they perfo rm their ritual, and
persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be
made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the
living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell,
but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us.
He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the way in
which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates, —
those of them, I mean, who are quick -witted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower,
and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they
should be and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the
youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar —
Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may he a fortress to
me all my days?
For what men say is that, i f I am really just and am not also thought just profit there is none, but
the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the
reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove ,
appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I
will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my
house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archil ochus, greatest of sages,
recommends. But I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often
difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if
we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment
we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric
who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by
force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods
cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose
them to have no care of human things — why in either case should we mind about co ncealment?
And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition
and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be
influenced and turned by ' sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings .' Let us be
consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had better be
unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the
vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the
gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated ,
and we shall not be punished. ' But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity wil l
suffer for our unjust deeds .' Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and
atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children
of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a lik e testimony.
On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when,
if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both
with gods and men, in life and after death, a s the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank
or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice
praised? And even if there should be someone who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and
who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to
forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless,
peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred
of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth — but no other man. He only blames
injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weak ness, has not the power of being unjust.
And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as
far as he can be.
The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my
brothe r and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of
justice — beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and
ending with the men of our own time — no one has ever blamed injustice or p raised justice except
with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever
adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in
the soul, and invisible to any human or divin e eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul
which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this
been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we
should not h ave been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but every one would
have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the
greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the la nguage
which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and
injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement
manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear f rom you the opposite side; and
I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect
they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to
him. And please, as Glaucon reque sted of you, to exclude reputations; for unless you take away
from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise
justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice
dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and
the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious
to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which
are desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes — like sight or
hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional
good — I would ask you in y our praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential
good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice
and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the ot her; that
is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have
spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your
own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is
better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes
the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these words I was
quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the
Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished
yourselv es at the battle of Megara: —
'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero.'
The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you
have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments.
And I do believe that you are not convinced — this I infer from your general character, for had I
judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my
confidence in you, the greater is my di fficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait
between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought
home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to
Thrasymachus, proving, a s I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I
cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an
impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in he r defence.
And therefore I had best give such help as I can.
Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the
investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injust ice,
and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the enquiry
would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are
no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a meth od which I may illustrate thus; suppose that
a short -sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance; and it
occurred to someone else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in
which the letters were l arger — if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and
then proceed to the lesser — this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.
Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry?
I will tell yo u, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes
spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State .
True, he replied.
And is not a State larger than an individual?
It is.
Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I
propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in
the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing
them.
That, he said, is an excellent proposal. And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the
State in process of creation also.
I dare say.
When the State is comple ted there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more
easily discovered.
Yes, far more easily.
But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a
very serious task. Reflect therefore.
I have re flected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.
A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self -sufficing, but all
of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?
There can I be no o ther.
Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper
for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered
together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State .
True, he said.
And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the
exchange will be for their good.
Very true.
Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is
the mother of our invention.
Of course, he replied.
Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.
Certainly.
The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.
True. And now let us see how o ur city will be able to supply this great demand : We may suppose that
one man is a husband -man , another a builder, someone else a weaver — shall we add to them a
shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants ?
Quite right.
The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.
Clearly.
And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into a common stock? — the
individual husband -man, for example, producing for four, and labouring four times as long and
as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or
will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but
provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the rem aining three -
fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no
partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?
Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing every thing.
Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say this, I am myself
reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to
different occupations.
Very true.
And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has
only one?
When he has only one.
Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?
No doubt.
For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must
follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object.
He must.
And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better
quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and
leaves other things.
Undoubtedly.. Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough
or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will
the builder make his tools — and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and
shoemaker.
True.
Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is
alrea dy beginning to grow?
True.
Yet even if we add neat -herds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen
may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and
curriers and weavers fleeces and hides, — sti ll our State will not be very large.
That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these.
Then, again, there is the situation of the city — to find a place where nothing need be imported is
well -nigh impossible.
Impossible.
Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another
city?
There must.
But if the trader goes empty -handed, having nothing which they require who would supply his
need, he will come back empty -handed.
That is certain.
And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both
in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.
Very true.
Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?
They will.
No t to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants ?
Yes. Then we shall want merchants?
We shall.
And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in
considerable numbers?
Yes, in considerable numbers.
Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions?
To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we
formed them into a society and constituted a State.
Clearly the y will buy and sell.
Then they will need a market -place, and a money -token for purposes of exchange.
Certainly.
Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes
at a time when there is no one to exchange with him ,— is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the
market -place ?
Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen . In
well -ordered States they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and
therefor e of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money
in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to
buy.
This want, then, creates a class of retail -traders in our State. I s not 'retailer' the term which is
applied to those who sit in the marketplace engaged in buying and selling, while those who
wander from one city to another are called merchants?
Yes, he said.
And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of
companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour, which accordingly they sell,
and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of
their labour .
True.
Then hirelings will help to make up our population?
Yes. And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?
I think so.
Where, then, is justice , and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?
Probably in the dealings of these citizens wit h one another. cannot imagine that they are more
likely to be found anywhere else.
I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better think the matter out, and not
shrink from the enquiry.
Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established
them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for
themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and
barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley -meal and flour of
wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a
mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or
myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made,
wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with
one another. And they will take care that their families do not e xceed their means; having an eye
to poverty or war.
But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.
True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish -salt, and olives, and cheese, and
they will boil roots a nd herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them
figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle -berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in
moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old
age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.
Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the
beasts?
But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.
Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be
comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and
sweets in the modern style.
Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me co nsider is, not only how a
State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a
State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true
and healthy constitution of the Sta te is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to
see a State at fever heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with
the simpler way of way They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dai nties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but
in every variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as
houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the e mbroiderer will have to be set in
motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.
True, he said.
Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will
the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural
want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with
forms and colours; another will be the votaries of music — poets and their attendant train of
rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including
women's dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses
wet and dry, tire -women and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too,
who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are
needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if
people eat them.
Certainly .
And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?
Much greater.
And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and
not enough?
Quite true.
Then a slice of our neighbours' land w ill be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will
want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up
to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?
That, Socrates, will be inevitable.
And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?
Most certainly, he replied.
The Republic - BOOK X - including The Myth of Er Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man
is to be good or bad. And what will anyone be profited if under the influence of honour or money
or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?
Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have
been.
And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.
What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.
Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten i s
surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?1
Say rather 'nothing,' he replied.
And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?
Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?
Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?
He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to
maintain this?
Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too — there is no difficulty in proving it.
I see a great difficult y; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so
light.
Listen then.
I am attending.
There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?
Yes, he replied.
Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and
the saving and improving element the good?
Yes.
And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes
and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn , and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron:
in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease? Yes, he said.
And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves
and dies?
True.
Th e vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and if this does not destroy
them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that
which is neither good nor evil.
Certainly not.
If, then, we f ind any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or
destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?
That may be assumed.
Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?
Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness,
intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.
But does any of these dissolve or destroy her? — and here do not let us fall into the error of
supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own
injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a
disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were
just now speaking come to an nihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and
inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?
Yes.
Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste
and consume her? Do they by atta ching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death,
and so separate her from the body?
Certainly not.
And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through
affection of external evil which could not be d estroyed from within by a corruption of its own?
It is, he replied.
Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or
any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body;
although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but
that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and
which does not engender any natural infection — this we shall absolutely deny?
Very true.
And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not
suppose that the soul, which is one thin g, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which
belongs to another?
Yes, he said, there is reason in that.
Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that
fever, or any other disease, or the knife pu t to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body
into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy
or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or
anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to
be affirmed by any man.
And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in
consequence of death.
But if some one who would ra ther not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and
says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I
suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that th ose who
take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills
them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive
death at the hands of others as the penalty of the ir deeds?
Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he
will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice
which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive — aye, and well awake
too; so far removed is her dwelling -place from being a house of death.
True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly
will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything
else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.
Yes, that can hardly be.
But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist for
ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?
Certainly. That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same,
for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the
increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus
end in immortality.
Very true.
But this we cannot believe — reason will not allow us — any more than we can believe the soul, in
her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.
What do you mean? he said.
The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and
cannot be compounded of many elements?
Certainly not.
Her 2 immortality is demonstr ated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but
to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and
other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and th en
her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described
will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she
appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen h er only in a condition which
may be compared to that of the sea -god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned
because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts
of ways, and incrustations have grown ove r them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is
more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a
similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.
Where then?
At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in
virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would
become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the
ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and
rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown
by the good things of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know
whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the
forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.
True, he replied.
And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have not introduced the
rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod;
but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the s oul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of
Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.3
Very true.
And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are
the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in
life and after death.
Certainly not, he said.
Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?
What did I borrow?
The assumption that th e just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of
opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men,
still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice
might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?
I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.
Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is
held by gods and men and which we acknowledge t o be her due should now be restored to her by
us; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let
what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which
is hers also, an d which she gives to her own.
The demand, he said, is just.
In the first place, I said — and this is the first thing which you will have to give back — the nature
both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.
Granted.
And if they are both known to th em, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods,
as we admitted from the beginning?
True.
And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best,
excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of f ormer sins?
Certainly. Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any
other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and
death: for the gods have a care of any o ne whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as
far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?
Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.
And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?
Certainly.
Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?
That is my conviction.
And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the
clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from t he starting -place to the goal but not
back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking
away with their ears dragging on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes
to the finish and recei ves the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who
endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off
the prize which men have to bestow.
True.
And now you must allow me to repeat of th e just the blessings which you were attributing to the
fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older,
they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in
marria ge to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other
hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are
found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and wh en they come to be old and
miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things
unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out,
as you were saying. And you may su ppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of
horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?
Certainly, he said, what you say is true.
These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and
men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides.
Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.
And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison w ith those
other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the
argument owes to them.
Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.
Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous,
yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in
battle, and ten days afte rwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of
corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And
on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them w hat he
had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a
great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the
earth; they were near together, and over against them w ere two other openings in the heaven
above.
In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had
given judgement on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the
heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend
by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on
their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry
the re port of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and
seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of
heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the tw o other openings other
souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of
heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long
journey, and they went forth with gladness into the me adow, where they encamped as at a
festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from
earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about
the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from
below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and
seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those
from above were descr ibing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story,
Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this: — He said that for every wrong which
they had done to anyone they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years — such being reck oned
to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If,
for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved
cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behavi our, for each and all of their offences they
received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness
were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying
almost as soon as they w ere born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers,
there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was
present when one of the spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeu s
lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia,
and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many
other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not hither and will
never come. And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to
reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeare d and several others, most of whom were tyrants;
and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals: they
were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of
admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or someone who had not
been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing
by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head
and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along
the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers -by what were
their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cas t into hell.'
And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror
which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was
silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and
retributions, and there were blessings as great.
Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were
obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he sai d that they came to a place
where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the
whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer;
another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the
ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds
together the circle of the universe, like the under -girders of a trireme. From these ends is
extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this
spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials.
Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; an d the description of it implied that there
is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one,
and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one
another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form
one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of
the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven in ner whorls are
narrower, in the following proportions — the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the
sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and
eighth comes the second. The largest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh (or sun) is
brightest; the eighth (or moon) coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth
(Saturn and Mercury) are in colour like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third
(Venus) has the whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness
second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction,
the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in
swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to
move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the
second fifth. The spindle t urns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle
is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one
harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, e ach sitting
upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and
have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens — Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of
the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the
outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the
inner ones, and Laches is laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.
When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there
came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lache sis lots and
samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of
Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your
genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose y our genius; and let him who draws the
first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free,
and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is
with the chooser — God i s justified.' When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots
indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er
himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had
obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there
were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of
every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannie s among them, some lasting
out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile
and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and
beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the
qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities.
And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the
soul, when ch oosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other
quality, and the all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and
disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon , is the supreme
peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave
every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be
able to learn and may find someone who will make him able to learn and discern between good
and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should
consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively
upon virtue; he shoul d know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth
in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of
private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and o f all the
natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then
look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to
determine which is the better and which is the wor se; and so he will choose, giving the name of
evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his
soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice
both in life an d after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith
in truth and right, that there too he may be dazzled by the desire of wealth or the other
allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irreme diable wrongs
to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the
extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come.
For this is the way of happiness. And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said
at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is
appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses firs t be careless, and
let not the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and
in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality,
he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that
he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and
saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the
proclamati on of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he
accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who
came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well -ordered State, bu t his virtue was a
matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly
overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been
schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came f rom earth having themselves suffered and
seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and
also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an
evil for a good. For i f a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the
first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might,
as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and r eturn to this,
instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said,
was the spectacle — sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases
based on their experience of a previous life. There h e saw the soul which had once been Orpheus
choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman
because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a
nightingale; birds, on t he other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men.
The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax
the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in
the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because,
like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of
Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable t o resist the temptation: and after
her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman
cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was
putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a
choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had
disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a
private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and
had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the
same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delig hted to have it. And not only did
men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who
changed into one another and into corresponding human natures — the good into the gentle and
the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.
All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis,
who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives
and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when
they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them
irreversible, wh ence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and
when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness,
which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they
encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all
obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than
was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after t hey had gone to rest, about
the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were
driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered
from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could
not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.
And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are
obedient to the w ord spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our
soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and
follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure
every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods,
both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts,
we receive our reward. And it shall be well wi th us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a
thousand years which we have been describing.
[ . . . ]
Notes and Bibliography
1. In antiquity people believed man was allowed to live for 70 years. - Engh
2. Gender is a grammatical component of many languages other than English. It is
fascinating to think that the Greeks considered the soul as feminine, grammatically, even
for a man. In Classical Greek the soul is female. - Engh
3. Hades , a god of the underworld, one who judges the dead. - Engh
Your assignment.
PART A: Ten Vocabulary words. As you read the text above select 10 vocabulary words
(minimum). You select the words new to you, or words used in a way new to you. List each word and
then a definition that fits the usage of the word. Look up the definition in an academic dictionary (such as
Oxford or Miriam Webster's New Collegiate , but not Google.) Then write the definition IN YOUR OWN
WORDS. Select as many vocabulary words as needed to fill up the requirement of 10.
PART B: Answer the following questions. Do NOT retype the question.
1. Who was Plato, when and where did he live?
2. What influence has Plato had on the intellectual traditions of the West?
3. Explain the sto ry of the ring of Gyges, in Book II.
4. What happens to a person's character when given the opportunity to work in secret?
5. According to Plato what are necessities? [Describe and list them.]
6. What is division of labor? Why does Plato think it is so important ? 7. Explain the role of the merchant in society.
8. Explain the function of money in society.
9. What type of society is fevered and swollen, and why?
10. Describe what happens when a state (society) develops a taste for luxury, but then grows and grows until its
ow n land is not enough.
11. In Book X, the discussion changes to questions of right and wrong. Explain "The Vision of Er." Who is
Er? What happens to him?
12. Explain how readers should interpret the Vision of Er. (See question 16 below.)
13. How do you think sto ries like Er's influenced Christianity which came along 300 years later?
14. Can you see why early Christians really liked the teachings of Plato? Explain your feelings on this. Be
specific.
15. From a Business point of view, can you see why the vision of Er an d religions such as Christianity might
conflict with the ideas that greed is good, that society should seek to be prosperous, that want more from
life is better than a life of sacrifice? Explain your feelings on this. Do not use fuzzy logic or hazy
defin itions. Be specific.
16. Dialogue is a writing style often used by philosophers in Antiquity. It is very important for students to
understand that persons in dialogues are not necessarily real. The philosophic truth is not that this or that
person lived. Personalities are manufactured to convey truth, they are not the truth themselves. Places too
are not necessarily real. Atlantis appears in several dialogues of Plato, but there is no evidence that he or
any other ancient philosopher ever thought of Atl antis as a real place. It was a utopian ideal, meant to
provide a topic for comparison to the real world, it was not real itself. With this in mind, discuss in your
own words which parts of this dialogue are meant to be literal, and which are purely fig urative.
17. Explain what value there is (if any) in having students read figurative literature.
18. What happens to human thinking about the purpose of life if there is no such thing as a soul, and an after
life?
19. Does the purpose of life have any bearing on hu man attitudes about Business? How?
20. Can you see how ideas about business might be influenced by an all -seeing god? How?
21. Can you see how ideas about business might be influenced by fear of an afterlife? Remember, the afterlife
(assuming there is one) is n ot necessarily a good place, in some superstitions it is a terrible place, a
hell. How would this impact greed for profits, avarice, and even things like ambition?
22. If afterlives and all -seeing gods are purely figurative (see question 16) what then happens to ambition,
greed for profits and avarice?